[Docs] [txt|pdf]



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                     A. DeKok, Ed.
Request for Comments: 6158                                    FreeRADIUS
BCP: 158                                                        G. Weber
Category: Best Current Practice                   Individual Contributor
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               March 2011



                        RADIUS Design Guidelines

Abstract

   This document provides guidelines for the design of attributes used
   by the Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) protocol.
   It is expected that these guidelines will prove useful to authors and
   reviewers of future RADIUS attribute specifications, within the IETF
   as well as other Standards Development Organizations (SDOs).

Status of This Memo

   This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6158.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.





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   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................3
      1.1. Terminology ................................................4
      1.2. Requirements Language ......................................4
      1.3. Applicability ..............................................5
           1.3.1. Reviews .............................................5
   2. Guidelines ......................................................6
      2.1. Data Types .................................................8
      2.2. Vendor Space ...............................................9
      2.3. Service Definitions and RADIUS .............................9
      2.4. Translation of Vendor Specifications ......................10
   3. Rationale ......................................................11
      3.1. RADIUS Operational Model ..................................11
      3.2. Data Model Issues .........................................14
           3.2.1. Issues with Definitions of Types ...................15
           3.2.2. Tagging Mechanism ..................................16
           3.2.3. Complex Data Types .................................16
           3.2.4. Complex Data Type Exceptions .......................18
      3.3. Vendor Space ..............................................19
           3.3.1. Interoperability Considerations ....................20
           3.3.2. Vendor Allocations .................................20
           3.3.3. SDO Allocations ....................................20
      3.4. Polymorphic Attributes ....................................21
   4. IANA Considerations ............................................22
   5. Security Considerations ........................................22
      5.1. New Data Types and Complex Attributes .....................23
   6. References .....................................................24
      6.1. Normative References ......................................24
      6.2. Informative References ....................................24
   Appendix A.  Design Guidelines Checklist ..........................27
      A.1. Types Matching the RADIUS Data Model ......................27
         A.1.1. Transport of Basic Data Types ........................27
         A.1.2. Transport of Authentication and Security Data ........27
         A.1.3. Opaque Data Types ....................................27
         A.1.4. Pre-existing Data Types ..............................28



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      A.2. Improper Data Types .......................................28
         A.2.1. Simple Data Types ....................................28
         A.2.2. More Complex Data Types ..............................29
      A.3. Vendor-Specific Formats ...................................29
      A.4. Changes to the RADIUS Operational Model ...................30
      A.5. Allocation of Attributes ..................................31
   Appendix B.  Complex Attributes ...................................32
      B.1. CHAP-Password .............................................32
      B.2. CHAP-Challenge ............................................32
      B.3. Tunnel-Password ...........................................33
      B.4. ARAP-Password .............................................33
      B.5. ARAP-Features .............................................34
      B.6. Connect-Info ..............................................34
      B.7. Framed-IPv6-Prefix ........................................35
      B.8. Egress-VLANID .............................................36
      B.9. Egress-VLAN-Name ..........................................37
      B.10. Digest-* .................................................37
   Acknowledgments ...................................................37

1.  Introduction

   This document provides guidelines for the design of Remote
   Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) attributes within the
   IETF as well as within other Standards Development Organizations
   (SDOs).  By articulating RADIUS design guidelines, it is hoped that
   this document will encourage the development and publication of high-
   quality RADIUS attribute specifications.

   However, the advice in this document will not be helpful unless it is
   put to use.  As with "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of MIB
   Documents" [RFC4181], it is expected that authors will check their
   document against the guidelines in this document prior to publication
   or requesting review (such as an "Expert Review" described in
   [RFC3575]).  Similarly, it is expected that this document will be
   used by reviewers (such as WG participants or the Authentication,
   Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Doctors [DOCTORS]), resulting in
   an improvement in the consistency of reviews.

   In order to meet these objectives, this document needs to cover not
   only the science of attribute design but also the art.  Therefore, in
   addition to covering the most frequently encountered issues, this
   document explains some of the considerations motivating the
   guidelines.  These considerations include complexity trade-offs that
   make it difficult to provide "hard and fast" rules for attribute
   design.  This document explains those trade-offs through reviews of
   current attribute usage.





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   The rest of the document is organized as follows.  Section 1
   discusses the applicability of the guidelines and defines a
   recommended review process for RADIUS specifications.  Section 2
   defines the design guidelines in terms of what is "RECOMMENDED" and
   "NOT RECOMMENDED".  Section 3 gives a longer explanation of the
   rationale behind the guidelines given in the previous section.
   Appendix A repeats the guidelines in a "checklist" format.  Appendix
   B discusses previously defined attributes that do not follow the
   guidelines.

   Authors of new RADIUS specifications can be compliant with the design
   guidelines by working through the checklists given in Appendix A.
   Reviewers of RADIUS specifications are expected to be familiar with
   the entire document.

1.1.  Terminology

   This document uses the following terms:

   Network Access Server (NAS)
      A device that provides an access service for a user to a network.

   RADIUS server
      A RADIUS authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA)
      server is an entity that provides one or more AAA services to a
      NAS.

   Standard space
      Codes in the RADIUS Attribute Type Space that are allocated by
      IANA and that follow the format defined in Section 5 of RFC 2865
      [RFC2865].

   Vendor space
      The contents of the Vendor-Specific Attribute (VSA), as defined in
      [RFC2865], Section 5.26.  These attributes provide a unique
      attribute type space in the "String" field for each vendor
      (identified by the Vendor-Type field), which they can self-
      allocate.

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].







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1.3.  Applicability

   The advice in this document applies to RADIUS attributes used to
   encode service-provisioning, authentication, or accounting data based
   on the attribute encodings and data formats defined in RFC 2865
   [RFC2865], RFC 2866 [RFC2866], and subsequent RADIUS RFCs.

   Since this document represents a Best Current Practice, it does not
   update or deprecate existing standards.  As a result, uses of the
   terms "MUST" and "MUST NOT" are limited to requirements already
   present in existing documents.

   It is RECOMMENDED that these guidelines be followed for all new
   RADIUS specifications, whether they originate from a vendor, an SDO,
   or the IETF.  Doing so will ensure the widest possible applicability
   and interoperability of the specifications, while requiring minimal
   changes to existing systems.  In particular, it is expected that
   RADIUS specifications requesting allocation within the standard space
   will follow these guidelines and will explain why this is not
   possible if they cannot.

   However, there are situations in which vendors or SDOs can choose not
   to follow these guidelines without major consequences.  As noted in
   Section 5.26 of [RFC2865], Vendor-Specific Attributes (VSAs) are
   "available to allow vendors to support their own extended Attributes
   not suitable for general usage".  Where vendors or SDOs develop
   specifications "not suitable for general usage", limited
   interoperability and inability to use existing implementations may be
   acceptable, and, in these situations, vendors and SDOs MAY choose not
   to conform to these guidelines.

   Note that the RADEXT WG is currently (as of 2011) involved in
   developing updates to RADIUS.  Those updates will provide their own
   usage guidelines that may modify some of the guidelines defined here,
   such as defining new data types, practices, etc.

   RADIUS protocol changes, or specification of attributes (such as
   Service-Type), that can, in effect, provide new RADIUS commands
   require greater expertise and deeper review, as do changes to the
   RADIUS operational model.  As a result, such changes are outside the
   scope of this document and MUST NOT be undertaken outside the IETF.

1.3.1.  Reviews

   For specifications utilizing attributes within the standard space,
   conformance with the design guidelines in this document is expected
   unless a good case can be made for an exception.  Reviewers SHOULD
   use the design guidelines as a review checklist.



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   While not required, IETF review may also be beneficial for
   specifications utilizing the vendor space.  Experience has shown that
   attributes not originally designed for general usage can subsequently
   garner wide-spread deployment.  An example is the Vendor-Specific
   Attributes defined in [RFC2548], which have been widely implemented
   within IEEE 802.11 Access Points.

   In order to assist in the development of specifications conforming to
   these guidelines, authors can request review by sending an email to
   the AAA Doctors [DOCTORS] or equivalent mailing list.  The IETF
   Operations & Management Area Directors will then arrange for the
   review to be completed and posted to the AAA Doctors mailing list
   [DOCTORS], RADEXT WG mailing list, or other IETF mailing lists.
   Since reviews are handled by volunteers, responses are provided on a
   best-effort basis, with no service-level guarantees.  Authors are
   encouraged to seek review as early as possible, so as to avoid
   potential delays.

   As reviewers require access to the specification, vendors and SDOs
   are encouraged to make it publicly available.  Where the RADIUS
   specification is embedded within a larger document that cannot be
   made public, the RADIUS attribute and value definitions can be made
   available on a public web site or can be published as an
   Informational RFC, as with [RFC4679].

   The review process requires neither allocation of attributes within
   the standard space nor publication of an RFC.  Requiring SDOs or
   vendors to rehost VSAs into the standard space solely for the purpose
   of obtaining review would put pressure on the standard space and may
   be harmful to interoperability since it would create two ways to
   provision the same service.  Rehosting may also require changes to
   the RADIUS data model, which will affect implementations that do not
   intend to support the SDO or vendor specifications.

   Similarly, vendors are encouraged to make their specifications
   publicly available, for maximum interoperability.  However, it is not
   necessary for a vendor to request publication of a VSA specification
   as an RFC.

2.  Guidelines

   The RADIUS protocol as defined in [RFC2865] and [RFC2866] uses
   elements known as attributes in order to represent authentication,
   authorization, and accounting data.







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   Unlike Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), first defined in
   [RFC1157] and [RFC1155], RADIUS does not define a formal data
   definition language.  The data type of RADIUS attributes is not
   transported on the wire.  Rather, the data type of a RADIUS attribute
   is fixed when an attribute is defined.  Based on the RADIUS attribute
   type code, RADIUS clients and servers can determine the data type
   based on pre-configured entries within a data dictionary.

   To explain the implications of this early RADIUS design decision, we
   distinguish two kinds of data types, namely "basic" and "complex".
   Basic data types use one of the existing RADIUS data types as defined
   in Section 2.1, encapsulated in a [RFC2865] RADIUS attribute or in a
   [RFC2865] RADIUS VSA.  All other data formats are "complex types".

   RADIUS attributes can be classified into one of three broad
   categories:

      * Attributes that are of interest to a single vendor, e.g., for a
        product or product line.  Minimal cross-vendor interoperability
        is needed.

        Vendor-Specific Attributes (VSAs) are appropriate for use in
        this situation.  Code-point allocation is managed by the vendor
        with the vendor space defined by their Private Enterprise Number
        (PEN), as given in the Vendor-Id field.

      * Attributes that are of interest to an industry segment, where an
        SDO defines the attributes for that industry.  Multi-vendor
        interoperability within an industry segment is expected.

        Vendor-Specific Attributes (VSAs) MUST be used.  Code-point
        allocation is managed by the SDO with the vendor space defined
        by the SDO's PEN rather than the PEN of an individual vendor.

      * Attributes that are of broad interest to the Internet community.
        Multi-vendor interoperability is expected.

        Attributes within the standard space are appropriate for this
        purpose and are allocated via IANA as described in [RFC3575].
        Since the standard space represents a finite resource, and is
        the only attribute space available for use by IETF working
        groups, vendors, and SDOs are encouraged to utilize the vendor
        space rather than request allocation of attributes from the
        standard space.  Usage of attribute type codes reserved for
        standard attributes is considered antisocial behavior and is
        strongly discouraged.





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2.1.  Data Types

   RADIUS defines a limited set of data types, defined as "basic data
   types".  The following data qualifies as "basic data types":

      * 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order.

      * Enumerated data types, represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer
        with a list of name to value mappings (e.g., Service-Type).

      * IPv4 address in network byte order.

      * Time as a 32-bit unsigned value in network byte order and in
        seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, January 1, 1970.

      * IPv6 address in network byte order.

      * Interface-Id (8-octet string in network byte order).

      * IPv6 prefix.

      * String (i.e., binary data), totaling 253 octets or less in
        length.  This includes the opaque encapsulation of data
        structures defined outside of RADIUS.  See also Appendix A.1.3
        for additional discussion.

      * UTF-8 text [RFC3629], totaling 253 octets or less in length.

   Note that the length limitations for VSAs of type String and Text are
   less than 253 octets, due to the additional overhead of the Vendor-
   Specific encoding.

   The following data also qualifies as "basic data types":

      * Attributes grouped into a logical container using the [RFC2868]
        tagging mechanism.  This approach is NOT RECOMMENDED (see
        Section 3.2.2) but is permissible where the alternatives are
        worse.

      * Attributes requiring the transport of more than 253 octets of
        Text or String data.  This includes the opaque encapsulation of
        data structures defined outside of RADIUS, e.g., EAP-Message.

   All other data formats (including nested attributes) are defined to
   be "complex data types" and are NOT RECOMMENDED for normal use.
   Complex data types MAY be used in situations where they reduce
   complexity in non-RADIUS systems or where using the basic data types
   would be awkward (such as where grouping would be required in order



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   to link related attributes).  Since there are no "hard and fast"
   rules for where complexity is best located, each situation has to be
   decided on a case-by-case basis.  Examples of this trade-off are
   discussed in Appendix B.  Where a complex data type is selected, an
   explanation SHOULD be offered as to why this was necessary.

2.2.  Vendor Space

   The Vendor space is defined to be the contents of the Vendor-Specific
   Attribute ([RFC2865], Section 5.26) where the Vendor-Id defines the
   space for a particular vendor, and the contents of the "String" field
   define a unique attribute type space for that vendor.  As discussed
   there, it is intended for vendors and SDOs to support their own
   attributes not suitable for general use.

   While the encoding of attributes within the vendor space is under the
   control of vendors and SDOs, following the guidelines described here
   is advantageous since it enables maximum interoperability with
   minimal changes to existing systems.

   For example, RADIUS server support for new attributes using "basic
   data types" can typically be accomplished by editing a RADIUS
   dictionary, whereas "complex data types" typically require RADIUS
   server code changes, which can add complexity and delays in
   implementation.

   Vendor RADIUS Attribute specifications SHOULD self-allocate
   attributes from the vendor space rather than request an allocation
   from within the standard space.

   VSA encodings that do not follow the [RFC2865], Section 5.26 encoding
   scheme are NOT RECOMMENDED.  Although [RFC2865] does not mandate it,
   implementations commonly assume that the Vendor Id can be used as a
   key to determine the on-the-wire encoding of a VSA.  Vendors
   therefore SHOULD NOT use multiple encodings for VSAs that are
   associated with a particular Vendor Id.  A vendor wishing to use
   multiple VSA encodings SHOULD request one Vendor Id for each VSA
   encoding that they will use.

2.3.  Service Definitions and RADIUS

   RADIUS specifications define how an existing service or protocol can
   be provisioned using RADIUS, usually via the Service-Type Attribute.
   Therefore, it is expected that a RADIUS attribute specification will
   reference documents defining the protocol or service to be
   provisioned.  Within the IETF, a RADIUS attribute specification





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   SHOULD NOT be used to define the protocol or service being
   provisioned.  New services using RADIUS for provisioning SHOULD be
   defined elsewhere and referenced in the RADIUS specification.

   New attributes, or new values of existing attributes, SHOULD NOT be
   used to define new RADIUS commands.  RADIUS attributes are intended
   to:

      * authenticate users

      * authorize users (i.e., service provisioning or changes to
        provisioning)

      * account for user activity (i.e., logging of session activity)

   Requirements for allocation of new commands (i.e., the Code field in
   the packet header) and new attributes within the standard space are
   described in [RFC3575], Section 2.1.

2.4.  Translation of Vendor Specifications

   [RFC2865], Section 5.26 defines Vendor-Specific Attributes as
   follows:

      This Attribute is available to allow vendors to support their own
      extended Attributes not suitable for general usage.  It MUST NOT
      affect the operation of the RADIUS protocol.

      Servers not equipped to interpret the vendor-specific information
      sent by a client MUST ignore it (although it may be reported).
      Clients which do not receive desired vendor-specific information
      SHOULD make an attempt to operate without it, although they may do
      so (and report they are doing so) in a degraded mode.

   The limitation on changes to the RADIUS protocol effectively
   prohibits VSAs from changing fundamental aspects of RADIUS operation,
   such as modifying RADIUS packet sequences or adding new commands.
   However, the requirement for clients and servers to be able to
   operate in the absence of VSAs has proven to be less of a constraint
   since it is still possible for a RADIUS client and server to mutually
   indicate support for VSAs, after which behavior expectations can be
   reset.

   Therefore, RFC 2865 provides considerable latitude for development of
   new attributes within the vendor space, while prohibiting development
   of protocol variants.  This flexibility implies that RADIUS
   attributes can often be developed within the vendor space without
   loss (and possibly even with gain) in functionality.



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   As a result, translation of RADIUS attributes developed within the
   vendor space into the standard space may provide only modest
   benefits, while accelerating the exhaustion of the standard space.
   We do not expect that all RADIUS attribute specifications requiring
   interoperability will be developed within the IETF, and allocated
   from the standard space.  A more scalable approach is to recognize
   the flexibility of the vendor space, while working toward
   improvements in the quality and availability of RADIUS attribute
   specifications, regardless of where they are developed.

   It is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED that specifications intended solely
   for use by a vendor or SDO be translated into the standard space.

3.  Rationale

   This section outlines the rationale behind the above recommendations.

3.1.  RADIUS Operational Model

   The RADIUS operational model includes several assumptions:

      * The RADIUS protocol is stateless.

      * Provisioning of services is not possible within an Access-Reject
        or Disconnect-Request.

      * There is a distinction between authorization checks and user
        authentication.

      * The protocol provides for authentication and integrity
        protection of packets.

      * The RADIUS protocol is a Request/Response protocol.

      * The protocol defines packet length restrictions.

   While RADIUS server implementations may keep state, the RADIUS
   protocol is stateless, although information may be passed from one
   protocol transaction to another via the State Attribute.  As a
   result, documents that require stateful protocol behavior without use
   of the State Attribute are inherently incompatible with RADIUS as
   defined in [RFC2865] and MUST be redesigned.  See [RFC5080], Section
   2.1.1 for additional discussion surrounding the use of the State
   Attribute.

   As noted in [RFC5080], Section 2.6, the intent of an Access-Reject is
   to deny access to the requested service.  As a result, RADIUS does
   not allow the provisioning of services within an Access-Reject or



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   Disconnect-Request.  Documents that include provisioning of services
   within an Access-Reject or Disconnect-Request are inherently
   incompatible with RADIUS and need to be redesigned.

   [RFC5176], Section 3 notes the following:

      A Disconnect-Request MUST contain only NAS and session
      identification attributes.  If other attributes are included in a
      Disconnect-Request, implementations MUST send a Disconnect-NAK; an
      Error-Cause Attribute with value "Unsupported Attribute" MAY be
      included.

   As a result, documents that include provisioning of services within a
   Disconnect-Request are inherently incompatible with RADIUS and need
   to be redesigned.

   As noted in [RFC5080], Section 2.1.1, a RADIUS Access-Request may not
   contain user authentication attributes or a State Attribute linking
   the Access-Request to an earlier user authentication.  Such an
   Access-Request, known as an authorization check, provides no
   assurance that it corresponds to a live user.  RADIUS specifications
   defining attributes containing confidential information (such as
   Tunnel-Password) should be careful to prohibit such attributes from
   being returned in response to an authorization check.  Also,
   [RFC5080], Section 2.1.1 notes that authentication mechanisms need to
   tie a sequence of Access-Request/Access-Challenge packets together
   into one authentication session.  The State Attribute is RECOMMENDED
   for this purpose.

   While [RFC2865] did not require authentication and integrity
   protection of RADIUS Access-Request packets, subsequent
   authentication mechanism specifications, such as RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579]
   and Digest Authentication [RFC5090], have mandated authentication and
   integrity protection for certain RADIUS packets.  [RFC5080], Section
   2.1.1 makes this behavior RECOMMENDED for all Access-Request packets,
   including Access-Request packets performing authorization checks.  It
   is expected that specifications for new RADIUS authentication
   mechanisms will continue this practice.

   The RADIUS protocol as defined in [RFC2865] is a request-response
   protocol spoken between RADIUS clients and servers.  A single RADIUS
   request packet ([RFC2865], [RFC2866], or [RFC5176]) will solicit in
   response at most a single response packet, sent to the IP address and
   port of the RADIUS client that originated the request.  Changes to
   this model are likely to require major revisions to existing
   implementations, and this practice is NOT RECOMMENDED.





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   The Length field in the RADIUS packet header is defined in [RFC2865]
   Section 3.  It is noted there that the maximum length of a RADIUS
   packet is 4096 octets.  As a result, attribute designers SHOULD NOT
   assume that a RADIUS implementation can successfully process RADIUS
   packets larger than 4096 octets.

   Even when packets are less than 4096 octets, they may be larger than
   the Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU).  Any packet larger than
   the PMTU will be fragmented, making communications more brittle as
   firewalls and filtering devices often discard fragments.  Transport
   of fragmented UDP packets appears to be a poorly tested code path on
   network devices.  Some devices appear to be incapable of transporting
   fragmented UDP packets, making it difficult to deploy RADIUS in a
   network where those devices are deployed.  We RECOMMEND that RADIUS
   messages be kept as small possible.

   If a situation is envisaged where it may be necessary to carry
   authentication, authorization, or accounting data in a packet larger
   than 4096 octets, then one of the following approaches is
   RECOMMENDED:

      1.  Utilization of a sequence of packets.
          For RADIUS authentication, a sequence of Access-
          Request/Access-Challenge packets would be used.  For this to
          be feasible, attribute designers need to enable inclusion of
          attributes that can consume considerable space within Access-
          Challenge packets.  To maintain compatibility with existing
          NASes, either the use of Access-Challenge packets needs to be
          permissible (as with RADIUS/EAP, defined in [RFC3579]) or
          support for receipt of an Access-Challenge needs to be
          indicated by the NAS (as in RADIUS Location [RFC5580]).  Also,
          the specification needs to clearly describe how attribute
          splitting is to be signaled and how attributes included within
          the sequence are to be interpreted, without requiring stateful
          operation.  Unfortunately, previous specifications have not
          always exhibited the required foresight.  For example, even
          though very large filter rules are conceivable, the NAS-
          Filter-Rule Attribute defined in [RFC4849] is not permitted in
          an Access-Challenge packet, nor is a mechanism specified to
          allow a set of NAS-Filter-Rule Attributes to be split across
          an Access-Request/Access-Challenge sequence.

          In the case of RADIUS accounting, transporting large amounts
          of data would require a sequence of Accounting-Request
          packets.  This is a non-trivial change to RADIUS, since RADIUS
          accounting clients would need to be modified to split the





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          attribute stream across multiple Accounting-Requests, and
          billing servers would need to be modified to reassemble and
          interpret the attribute stream.

      2.  Utilization of names rather than values.
          Where an attribute relates to a policy that could conceivably
          be pre-provisioned on the NAS, then the name of the pre-
          provisioned policy can be transmitted in an attribute rather
          than the policy itself, which could be quite large.  An
          example of this is the Filter-Id Attribute defined in
          [RFC2865], Section 5.11, which enables a set of pre-
          provisioned filter rules to be referenced by name.

      3.  Utilization of Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery
          techniques, as specified in [RFC4821].
          As a last resort, where the above techniques cannot be made to
          work, it may be possible to apply the techniques described in
          [RFC4821] to discover the maximum supported RADIUS packet size
          on the path between a RADIUS client and a home server.  While
          such an approach can avoid the complexity of utilization of a
          sequence of packets, dynamic discovery is likely to be time
          consuming and cannot be guaranteed to work with existing
          RADIUS implementations.  As a result, this technique is not
          generally applicable.

3.2.  Data Model Issues

   While [RFC2865], Section 5 defines basic data types, later
   specifications did not follow this practice.  This problem has led
   implementations to define their own names for data types, resulting
   in non-standard names for those types.

   In addition, the number of vendors and SDOs creating new attributes
   within the vendor space has grown, and this has led to some
   divergence in approaches to RADIUS attribute design.  For example,
   vendors and SDOs have evolved the data model to support functions
   such as new data types along with attribute grouping and attribute
   fragmentation, with different groups taking different approaches.
   These approaches are often incompatible, leading to additional
   complexity in RADIUS implementations.

   In order to avoid repeating old mistakes, this section describes the
   history of the RADIUS data model and attempts to codify existing
   practices.







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3.2.1.  Issues with Definitions of Types

   [RFC2865], Section 5 explicitly defines five data types: text,
   string, address, integer, and time.  Both the names and
   interpretations of the types are given.

   Subsequent RADIUS specifications defined attributes by using type
   names not defined in [RFC2865], without defining the new names as
   done in [RFC2865].  They did not consistently indicate the format of
   the value field using the same conventions as [RFC2865].  As a
   result, the data type is ambiguous in some cases and may not be
   consistent among different implementations.

   It is out of the scope of this document to resolve all potential
   ambiguities within existing RADIUS specifications.  However, in order
   to prevent future ambiguities, it is RECOMMENDED that future RADIUS
   attribute specifications explicitly define newly created data types
   at the beginning of the document and indicate clearly the data type
   to be used for each attribute.

   For example, [RFC3162] utilizes, but does not explicitly define, a
   type that encapsulates an IPv6 address (Sections 2.1 and 2.4) and
   another type that encapsulates an IPv6 prefix (Section 2.3).  The
   IPv6 address attributes confusingly are referenced as type "Address"
   in the document.  This is a similar name as the "address" type
   defined in [RFC2865], which was defined to refer solely to IPv4
   addresses.

   While the Framed-Interface-Id Attribute defined in [RFC3162], Section
   2.2 included a value field of 8 octets, the data type was not
   explicitly indicated; therefore, there is controversy over whether
   the format of the data was intended to be an 8-octet String or
   whether a special Interface-Id type was intended.

   Given that attributes encapsulating an IPv6 address and an IPv6
   prefix are already in use, it is RECOMMENDED that RADIUS server
   implementations include support for these as basic types, in addition
   to the types defined in [RFC2865].  Where the intent is to represent
   a specific IPv6 address, an "IPv6 address" type SHOULD be used.
   Although it is possible to use an "IPv6 Prefix" type with a prefix
   length of 128 to represent an IPv6 address, this usage is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.  Implementations supporting the Framed-Interface-Id
   Attribute may select a data type of their choosing (most likely an
   8-octet String or a special "Interface Id" data type).







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   It is worth noting that since RADIUS only supports unsigned integers
   of 32 bits, attributes using signed integer data types or unsigned
   integer types of other sizes will require code changes and SHOULD be
   avoided.

   For [RFC2865] RADIUS VSAs, the length limitation of the String and
   Text types is 247 octets instead of 253 octets, due to the additional
   overhead of the Vendor-Specific Attribute.

3.2.2.  Tagging Mechanism

   [RFC2868] defines an attribute grouping mechanism based on the use of
   a one-octet tag value.  Tunnel attributes that refer to the same
   tunnel are grouped together by virtue of using the same tag value.

   This tagging mechanism has some drawbacks.  There are a limited
   number of unique tags (31).  The tags are not well suited for use
   with arbitrary binary data values because it is not always possible
   to tell if the first byte after the Length is the tag or the first
   byte of the untagged value (assuming the tag is optional).

   Other limitations of the tagging mechanism are that when integer
   values are tagged, the value portion is reduced to three bytes,
   meaning only 24-bit numbers can be represented.  The tagging
   mechanism does not offer an ability to create nested groups of
   attributes.  Some RADIUS implementations treat tagged attributes as
   having the additional data types tagged-string and tagged-integer.
   These types increase the complexity of implementing and managing
   RADIUS systems.

   For these reasons, the tagging scheme described in RFC 2868 is NOT
   RECOMMENDED for use as a generic grouping mechanism.

3.2.3.  Complex Data Types

   As described in this section, the creation of complex types can lead
   to interoperability and deployment issues, so they need to be
   introduced with care.  For example, the RADIUS attribute encoding is
   summarized in [RFC2865]:

    0                   1                   2
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
   |     Type      |    Length     |  Value ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-






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   However, some standard attributes pack multiple sub-fields into the
   "Value" field, resulting in the creation a non-standard, i.e.,
   complex, type.  Separating these sub-fields into different
   attributes, each with its own type and length, would have the
   following benefits:

      * When manual data entry is required, it is easier for an
        administrator to enter the data as well-known types rather than
        as complex structures.

      * It enables additional error checking by leveraging the parsing
        and validation routines for well-known types.

      * It simplifies implementations by eliminating special-case,
        attribute-specific parsing.

   One of the fundamental goals of the RADIUS protocol design was to
   allow RADIUS servers to be configured to support new attributes,
   without requiring server code changes.  RADIUS server implementations
   typically provide support for basic data types and define attributes
   in a data dictionary.  This architecture enables a new attribute to
   be supported by the addition of a dictionary entry, without requiring
   other RADIUS server code changes.

   Code changes can also be required in policy management systems and in
   the RADIUS server's receive path.  These changes are due to
   limitations in RADIUS server policy languages, which commonly provide
   for limited operations (such as comparisons or arithmetic operations)
   on the existing data types.  Many existing RADIUS policy languages
   typically are not capable of parsing sub-elements or providing more
   sophisticated matching functionality.

   On the RADIUS client, code changes are typically required in order to
   implement a new attribute.  The RADIUS client typically has to
   compose the attribute dynamically when sending.  When receiving, a
   RADIUS client needs to be able to parse the attribute and carry out
   the requested service.  As a result, a detailed understanding of the
   new attribute is required on clients, and data dictionaries are less
   useful on clients than on servers.

   Given these limitations, the introduction of new types can require
   code changes on the RADIUS server, which would be unnecessary if
   basic data types had been used instead.  In addition, if "ad hoc"
   types are used, attribute-specific parsing is required, which means
   more complex software to develop and maintain.  More complexity can
   lead to more error-prone implementations, interoperability problems,





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   and even security vulnerabilities.  These issues can increase costs
   to network administrators as well as reduce reliability and introduce
   deployment barriers.

3.2.4.  Complex Data Type Exceptions

   As described in Section 2.1, the introduction of complex data types
   is discouraged where viable alternatives are available.  A potential
   exception is attributes that inherently require code changes on both
   the client and server.  For example, as described in Appendix B,
   complex attributes have been used in situations involving
   authentication and security attributes, which need to be dynamically
   computed and verified.  Supporting this functionality requires code
   changes on both the RADIUS client and server, regardless of the
   attribute format.  As a result, in most cases, the use of complex
   attributes to represent these methods is acceptable and does not
   create additional interoperability or deployment issues.

   Another exception to the recommendation against complex types is for
   types that can be treated as opaque data by the RADIUS server.  For
   example, the EAP-Message Attribute, defined in [RFC3579], Section
   3.1, contains a complex data type that is an Extensible
   Authentication Protocol (EAP) packet.  Since these complex types do
   not need to be parsed by the RADIUS server, the issues arising from
   server limitations do not arise.  Similarly, since attributes of
   these complex types can be configured on the server using a data type
   of String, dictionary limitations are also not encountered.  Appendix
   A.1 includes a series of checklists that may be used to analyze a
   design for RECOMMENDED and NOT RECOMMENDED behavior in relation to
   complex types.

   If the RADIUS Server simply passes the contents of an attribute to
   some non-RADIUS portion of the network, then the data is opaque to
   RADIUS and SHOULD be defined to be of type String.  A concrete way of
   judging this requirement is whether or not the attribute definition
   in the RADIUS document contains delineated fields for sub-parts of
   the data.  If those fields need to be delineated in RADIUS, then the
   data is not opaque to RADIUS, and it SHOULD be separated into
   individual RADIUS attributes.

   An examination of existing RADIUS RFCs discloses a number of complex
   attributes that have already been defined.  Appendix B includes a
   listing of complex attributes used within [RFC2865], [RFC2868],
   [RFC2869], [RFC3162], [RFC4818], and [RFC4675].  The discussion of
   these attributes includes reasons why a complex type is acceptable or
   suggestions for how the attribute could have been defined to follow
   the RADIUS data model.




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   In other cases, the data in the complex type are described textually
   in a specification.  This is possible because the data types are not
   sent within the attributes but are a matter for endpoint
   interpretation.  An implementation can define additional data types
   and use these data types today by matching them to the attribute's
   textual definition.

3.3.  Vendor Space

   The usage model for RADIUS VSAs is described in [RFC2865], Section
   6.2:

      Note that RADIUS defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific
      extensions (Attribute 26) and the use of that should be encouraged
      instead of allocation of global attribute types, for functions
      specific only to one vendor's implementation of RADIUS, where no
      interoperability is deemed useful.

   Nevertheless, many new attributes have been defined in the vendor
   space in situations where interoperability is not only useful but is
   required.  For example, SDOs outside the IETF (such as the IEEE 802
   and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)) have been assigned
   Vendor-Ids, enabling them to define their own VSA encoding and assign
   Vendor types within their own vendor space, as defined by their
   unique Vendor-Id.

   The use of VSAs by SDOs outside the IETF has gained in popularity for
   several reasons:

   Efficiency
      As with SNMP, which defines an "Enterprise" Object Identifier
      (OID) space suitable for use by vendors as well as other SDOs, the
      definition of Vendor-Specific Attributes has become a common
      occurrence as part of standards activity outside the IETF.  For
      reasons of efficiency, it is easiest if the RADIUS attributes
      required to manage a standard are developed within the same SDO
      that develops the standard itself.  As noted in "Transferring MIB
      Work from IETF Bridge MIB WG to IEEE 802.1 WG" [RFC4663], today
      few vendors are willing to simultaneously fund individuals to
      participate within an SDO to complete a standard as well as to
      participate in the IETF in order to complete the associated RADIUS
      attributes specification.

   Attribute scarcity
      The standard space is limited to 255 unique attributes.  Of these,
      only about half remain available for allocation.  In the vendor
      space, the number of attributes available is a function of the
      encoding of the attribute (the size of the Vendor type field).



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3.3.1.  Interoperability Considerations

   Vendors and SDOs are reminded that the standard space and the
   enumerated value space for enumerated attributes are reserved for
   allocation through work published via the IETF, as noted in
   [RFC3575], Section 2.1.  In the past, some vendors and SDOs have
   assigned vendor-specific meaning to "unused" values from the standard
   space.  This process results in interoperability issues and is
   counterproductive.  Similarly, the vendor-specific enumeration
   practice discussed in [RFC2882], Section 2.2.1 is NOT RECOMMENDED.

   If it is not possible to follow the IETF process, vendors and SDOs
   SHOULD self-allocate an attribute, which MUST be in their own vendor
   space as defined by their unique Vendor-Id, as discussed in Sections
   3.3.2 and 3.3.3.

   The design and specification of VSAs for multi-vendor usage SHOULD be
   undertaken with the same level of care as standard RADIUS attributes.
   Specifically, the provisions of this document that apply to standard
   RADIUS attributes also apply to VSAs for multi-vendor usage.

3.3.2.  Vendor Allocations

   As noted in [RFC3575], Section 2.1, vendors are encouraged to utilize
   VSAs to define functions "specific only to one vendor's
   implementation of RADIUS, where no interoperability is deemed useful.
   For functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of RADIUS,
   the use of that should be encouraged instead of the allocation of
   global attribute types".

   The recommendation for vendors to allocate attributes from a vendor
   space rather than via the IETF process is a recognition that vendors
   desire to assert change control over their own RADIUS specifications.
   This change control can be obtained by requesting a PEN from the
   Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) for use as a Vendor-Id
   within a Vendor-Specific Attribute.  The vendor can then allocate
   attributes within the vendor space defined by that Vendor-Id at their
   sole discretion.  Similarly, the use of data types (complex or
   otherwise) within that vendor space is solely under the discretion of
   the vendor.

3.3.3.  SDO Allocations

   Given the expanded utilization of RADIUS, it has become apparent that
   requiring SDOs to accomplish all their RADIUS work within the IETF is
   inherently inefficient and unscalable.  It is therefore RECOMMENDED





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   that SDO RADIUS Attribute specifications allocate attributes from the
   vendor space rather than request an allocation from the RADIUS
   standard space for attributes matching any of the following criteria:

      * Attributes relying on data types not defined within RADIUS

      * Attributes intended primarily for use within an SDO

      * Attributes intended primarily for use within a group of SDOs

   Any new RADIUS attributes or values intended for interoperable use
   across a broad spectrum of the Internet community SHOULD follow the
   allocation process defined in [RFC3575].

   The recommendation for SDOs to allocate attributes from a vendor
   space rather than via the IETF process is a recognition that SDOs
   desire to assert change control over their own RADIUS specifications.
   This change control can be obtained by requesting a PEN from the
   Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) for use as a Vendor-Id
   within a Vendor-Specific Attribute.  The SDO can then allocate
   attributes within the vendor space defined by that Vendor-Id at their
   sole discretion.  Similarly, the use of data types (complex or
   otherwise) within that vendor space is solely under the discretion of
   the SDO.

3.4.  Polymorphic Attributes

   A polymorphic attribute is one whose format or meaning is dynamic.
   For example, rather than using a fixed data format, an attribute's
   format might change based on the contents of another attribute.  Or,
   the meaning of an attribute may depend on earlier packets in a
   sequence.

   RADIUS server dictionary entries are typically static, enabling the
   user to enter the contents of an attribute without support for
   changing the format based on dynamic conditions.  However, this
   limitation on static types does not prevent implementations from
   implementing policies that return different attributes based on the
   contents of received attributes; this is a common feature of existing
   RADIUS implementations.

   In general, polymorphism is NOT RECOMMENDED.  Polymorphism rarely
   enables capabilities that would not be available through use of
   multiple attributes.  Polymorphism requires code changes in the
   RADIUS server in situations where attributes with fixed formats would
   not require such changes.  Thus, polymorphism increases complexity
   while decreasing generality, without delivering any corresponding
   benefits.



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   Note that changing an attribute's format dynamically is not the same
   thing as using a fixed format and computing the attribute itself
   dynamically.  RADIUS authentication attributes, such as User-
   Password, EAP-Message, etc., while being computed dynamically, use a
   fixed format.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no action items for IANA.  However, it does provide
   guidelines for Expert Reviewers appointed as described in [RFC3575].

5.  Security Considerations

   This specification provides guidelines for the design of RADIUS
   attributes used in authentication, authorization, and accounting.
   Threats and security issues for this application are described in
   [RFC3579] and [RFC3580]; security issues encountered in roaming are
   described in [RFC2607].

   Obfuscation of RADIUS attributes on a per-attribute basis is
   necessary in some cases.  The current standard mechanism for this is
   described in [RFC2865], Section 5.2 (for obscuring User-Password
   values) and is based on the MD5 algorithm specified in [RFC1321].
   The MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms have recently become a focus of scrutiny
   and concern in security circles, and as a result, the use of these
   algorithms in new attributes is NOT RECOMMENDED.  In addition,
   previous documents referred to this method as generating "encrypted"
   data.  This terminology is no longer accepted within the
   cryptographic community.

   Where new RADIUS attributes use cryptographic algorithms, algorithm
   negotiation SHOULD be supported.  Specification of a mandatory-to-
   implement algorithm is REQUIRED, and it is RECOMMENDED that the
   mandatory-to-implement algorithm be certifiable under FIPS 140
   [FIPS].

   Where new RADIUS attributes encapsulate complex data types, or
   transport opaque data, the security considerations discussed in
   Section 5.1 SHOULD be addressed.

   Message authentication in RADIUS is provided largely via the Message-
   Authenticator attribute.  See Section 3.2 of [RFC3579] and also
   Section 2.2.2 of [RFC5080], which say that client implementations
   SHOULD include a Message-Authenticator Attribute in every Access-
   Request.






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   In general, the security of the RADIUS protocol is poor.  Robust
   deployments SHOULD support a secure communications protocol such as
   IPsec.  See Section 4 of [RFC3579] and Section 5 of [RFC3580] for a
   more in-depth explanation of these issues.

   Implementations not following the suggestions outlined in this
   document may be subject to problems such as ambiguous protocol
   decoding, packet loss leading to loss of billing information, and
   denial-of-service attacks.

5.1.  New Data Types and Complex Attributes

   The introduction of complex data types brings the potential for the
   introduction of new security vulnerabilities.  Experience shows that
   the common data types have few security vulnerabilities, or else that
   all known issues have been found and fixed.  New data types require
   new code, which may introduce new bugs and therefore new attack
   vectors.

   Some systems permit complex attributes to be defined via a method
   that is more capable than traditional RADIUS dictionaries.  These
   systems can reduce the security threat of new types significantly,
   but they do not remove it entirely.

   RADIUS servers are highly valued targets, as they control network
   access and interact with databases that store usernames and
   passwords.  An extreme outcome of a vulnerability due to a new,
   complex type would be that an attacker is capable of taking complete
   control over the RADIUS server.

   The use of attributes representing opaque data does not reduce this
   threat.  The threat merely moves from the RADIUS server to the system
   that consumes that opaque data.  The threat is particularly severe
   when the opaque data originates from the user and is not validated by
   the NAS.  In those cases, the RADIUS server is potentially exposed to
   attack by malware residing on an unauthenticated host.

   Any system consuming opaque data that originates from a RADIUS system
   SHOULD be properly isolated from that RADIUS system and SHOULD run
   with minimal privileges.  Any potential vulnerabilities in the non-
   RADIUS system will then have minimal impact on the security of the
   system as a whole.









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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2865]     Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
                 "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
                 RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC3575]     Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS (Remote
                 Authentication Dial In User Service)", RFC 3575, July
                 2003.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC1155]     Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and
                 identification of management information for TCP/IP-
                 based internets", STD 16, RFC 1155, May 1990.

   [RFC1157]     Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin,
                 "Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 1157,
                 May 1990.

   [RFC1321]     Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC
                 1321, April 1992.

   [RFC2548]     Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS
                 Attributes", RFC 2548, March 1999.

   [RFC2607]     Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
                 Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.

   [RFC2866]     Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

   [RFC2868]     Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J.,
                 Holdrege, M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for
                 Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2868, June 2000.

   [RFC2869]     Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS
                 Extensions", RFC 2869, June 2000.

   [RFC2882]     Mitton, D., "Network Access Servers Requirements:
                 Extended RADIUS Practices", RFC 2882, July 2000.

   [RFC3162]     Aboba, B., Zorn, G., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6",
                 RFC 3162, August 2001.



DeKok & Weber             Best Current Practice                [Page 24]

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   [RFC3579]     Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote
                 Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For
                 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
                 September 2003.

   [RFC3580]     Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., and J.
                 Roese, "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User
                 Service (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September
                 2003.

   [RFC3629]     Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
                 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [RFC4181]     Heard, C., Ed., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers
                 of MIB Documents", BCP 111, RFC 4181, September 2005.

   [RFC4663]     Harrington, D., "Transferring MIB Work from IETF Bridge
                 MIB WG to IEEE 802.1 WG", RFC 4663, September 2006.

   [RFC4675]     Congdon, P., Sanchez, M., and B. Aboba, "RADIUS
                 Attributes for Virtual LAN and Priority Support", RFC
                 4675, September 2006.

   [RFC4679]     Mammoliti, V., Zorn, G., Arberg, P., and R. Rennison,
                 "DSL Forum Vendor-Specific RADIUS Attributes", RFC
                 4679, September 2006.

   [RFC4818]     Salowey, J. and R. Droms, "RADIUS Delegated-IPv6-Prefix
                 Attribute", RFC 4818, April 2007.

   [RFC4821]     Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path
                 MTU Discovery", RFC 4821, March 2007.

   [RFC4849]     Congdon, P., Sanchez, M., and B. Aboba, "RADIUS Filter
                 Rule Attribute", RFC 4849, April 2007.

   [RFC5080]     Nelson, D. and A. DeKok, "Common Remote Authentication
                 Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Implementation Issues and
                 Suggested Fixes", RFC 5080, December 2007.

   [RFC5090]     Sterman, B., Sadolevsky, D., Schwartz, D., Williams,
                 D., and W. Beck, "RADIUS Extension for Digest
                 Authentication", RFC 5090, February 2008.

   [RFC5176]     Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
                 Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
                 Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
                 5176, January 2008.



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RFC 6158                RADIUS Design Guidelines              March 2011


   [DOCTORS]     AAA Doctors Mailing List, www.ietf.org/mail-
                 archive/web/aaa-doctors.

   [FIPS]        FIPS 140-3 (DRAFT), "Security Requirements for
                 Cryptographic Modules",
                 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html.

   [IEEE-802.1Q] IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area
                 Networks: Draft Standard for Virtual Bridged Local Area
                 Networks, P802.1Q-2003, January 2003.

   [RFC5580]     Tschofenig, H., Ed., Adrangi, F., Jones, M., Lior, A.,
                 and B. Aboba, "Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and
                 Diameter", RFC 5580, August 2009.

   [AAA-SIP]     Sterman, B., Sadolevsky, D., Schwartz, D., Williams,
                 D., and W. Beck, "RADIUS Extension for Digest
                 Authentication", Work in Progress, November 2004.

































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Appendix A.  Design Guidelines Checklist

   The following text provides guidelines for the design of attributes
   used by the RADIUS protocol.  Specifications that follow these
   guidelines are expected to achieve maximum interoperability with
   minimal changes to existing systems.

A.1. Types Matching the RADIUS Data Model

A.1.1. Transport of Basic Data Types

   Does the data fit within the basic data types described in Section
   2.1?  If so, it SHOULD be encapsulated in a [RFC2865] format RADIUS
   attribute or in a [RFC2865] format RADIUS VSA that uses one of the
   existing RADIUS data types.

A.1.2. Transport of Authentication and Security Data

   Does the data provide authentication and/or security capabilities for
   the RADIUS protocol as outlined below?  If so, use of a complex data
   type is acceptable under the following circumstances:

      * Complex data types that carry authentication methods that RADIUS
        servers are expected to parse and verify as part of an
        authentication process.

      * Complex data types that carry security information intended to
        increase the security of the RADIUS protocol itself.

   Any data type carrying authentication and/or security data that is
   not meant to be parsed by a RADIUS server is an "opaque data type",
   as defined in Section A.1.3.

A.1.3. Opaque Data Types

   Does the attribute encapsulate an existing data structure defined
   outside of the RADIUS specifications?  Can the attribute be treated
   as opaque data by RADIUS servers (including proxies)?  If both
   questions can be answered affirmatively, a complex structure MAY be
   used in a RADIUS specification.

   The specification of the attribute SHOULD define the encapsulating
   attribute to be of type String.  The specification SHOULD refer to an
   external document defining the structure.  The specification SHOULD
   NOT define or describe the structure, for reasons discussed in
   Section 3.2.3.





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A.1.4. Pre-Existing Data Types

   There is a trade-off in design between reusing existing formats for
   historical compatibility or choosing new formats for a "better"
   design.  This trade-off does not always require the "better" design
   to be used.  As a result, pre-existing complex data types described
   in Appendix B MAY be used.

A.2. Improper Data Types

   This section suggests alternatives to data types that do not fall
   within the "basic data type" definition.  Section A.2.1 describes
   simple data types, which should be replaced by basic data types.
   Section A.2.2 describes more complex data types, which should be
   replaced by multiple attributes using the basic data types.

A.2.1. Simple Data Types

   Does the attribute use any of the following data types?  If so, the
   data type SHOULD be replaced with the suggested alternatives, or it
   SHOULD NOT be used at all.

      * Signed integers of any size.
        SHOULD NOT be used.  SHOULD be replaced with one or more
        unsigned integer attributes.  The definition of the attribute
        can contain information that would otherwise go into the sign
        value of the integer.

      * 8-bit unsigned integers.
        SHOULD be replaced with 32-bit unsigned integer.  There is
        insufficient justification to save three bytes.

      * 16-bit unsigned integers.
        SHOULD be replaced with 32-bit unsigned integer.  There is
        insufficient justification to save two bytes.

      * Unsigned integers of size other than 32 bits.
        SHOULD be replaced by an unsigned integer of 32 bits.  There is
        insufficient justification to define a new size of integer.

      * Integers of any size in non-network byte order.
        SHOULD be replaced by unsigned integer of 32 bits in network.
        There is no reason to transport integers in any format other
        than network byte order.

      * Multi-field text strings.
        Each field SHOULD be encapsulated in a separate attribute.




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      * Polymorphic attributes.
        Multiple attributes, each with a static data type, SHOULD be
        defined instead.

      * Nested attribute-value pairs (AVPs).
        Attributes should be defined in a flat typespace.

A.2.2. More Complex Data Types

   Does the attribute:

      * define a complex data type not described in Appendix B?

      * that a RADIUS server and/or client is expected to parse,
        validate, or create the contents of via a dynamic computation
        (i.e., a type that cannot be treated as opaque data (Section
        A.1.3))?

      * involve functionality that could be implemented without code
        changes on both the client and server (i.e., a type that doesn't
        require dynamic computation and verification, such as those
        performed for authentication or security attributes)?

   If so, this data type SHOULD be replaced with simpler types, as
   discussed in Appendix A.2.1.  See also Section 2.1 for a discussion
   of why complex types are problematic.

A.3. Vendor-Specific Formats

   Does the specification contain Vendor-Specific Attributes that match
   any of the following criteria?  If so, the VSA encoding should be
   replaced with the [RFC2865], Section 5.26 encoding or should not be
   used at all.

      * Vendor types of more than 8 bits.
        SHOULD NOT be used.  Vendor types of 8 bits SHOULD be used
        instead.

      * Vendor lengths of less than 8 bits (i.e., zero bits).
        SHOULD NOT be used.  Vendor lengths of 8 bits SHOULD be used
        instead.

      * Vendor lengths of more than 8 bits.
        SHOULD NOT be used.  Vendor lengths of 8 bits SHOULD be used
        instead.






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      * Vendor-specific contents that are not in Type-Length-Value
        format.
        SHOULD NOT be used.  Vendor-Specific Attributes SHOULD be in
        Type-Length-Value format.

   In general, Vendor-Specific Attributes SHOULD follow the encoding
   suggested in Section 5.26 of [RFC2865].  Vendor extensions to non-
   standard encodings are NOT RECOMMENDED as they can negatively affect
   interoperability.

A.4. Changes to the RADIUS Operational Model

   Does the specification change the RADIUS operation model as outlined
   in the list below?  If so, then another method of achieving the
   design objectives SHOULD be used.  Potential problem areas include
   the following:

      * Defining new commands in RADIUS using attributes.
        The addition of new commands to RADIUS MUST be handled via
        allocation of a new Code and not by the use of an attribute.
        This restriction includes new commands created by overloading
        the Service-Type Attribute to define new values that modify the
        functionality of Access-Request packets.

      * Using RADIUS as a transport protocol for data unrelated to
        authentication, authorization, or accounting.
        Using RADIUS to transport authentication methods such as EAP is
        explicitly permitted, even if those methods require the
        transport of relatively large amounts of data.  Transport of
        opaque data relating to AAA is also permitted, as discussed in
        Section 3.2.3. However, if the specification does not relate to
        AAA, then RADIUS SHOULD NOT be used.

      * Assuming support for packet lengths greater than 4096 octets.
        Attribute designers cannot assume that RADIUS implementations
        can successfully handle packets larger than 4096 octets.  If a
        specification could lead to a RADIUS packet larger than 4096
        octets, then the alternatives described in Section 3.3 SHOULD be
        considered.

      * Stateless operation.
        The RADIUS protocol is stateless, and documents that require
        stateful protocol behavior without the use of the State
        Attribute need to be redesigned.







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      * Provisioning of service in an Access-Reject.
        Such provisioning is not permitted, and MUST NOT be used.  If
        limited access needs to be provided, then an Access-Accept with
        appropriate authorizations can be used instead.

      * Provisioning of service in a Disconnect-Request.
        Such provisioning is not permitted and MUST NOT be used.  If
        limited access needs to be provided, then a CoA-Request
        [RFC5176] with appropriate authorizations can be used instead.

      * Lack of user authentication or authorization restrictions.
        In an authorization check, where there is no demonstration of a
        live user, confidential data cannot be returned.  Where there is
        a link to a previous user authentication, the State Attribute
        SHOULD be present.

      * Lack of per-packet integrity and authentication.
        It is expected that documents will support per-packet integrity
        and authentication.

      * Modification of RADIUS packet sequences.
        In RADIUS, each request is encapsulated in its own packet and
        elicits a single response that is sent to the requester.  Since
        changes to this paradigm are likely to require major
        modifications to RADIUS client and server implementations, they
        SHOULD be avoided if possible.

   For further details, see Section 3.1.

A.5. Allocation of Attributes

   Does the attribute have a limited scope of applicability as outlined
   below?  If so, then the attributes SHOULD be allocated from the
   vendor space rather than requesting allocation from the standard
   space.

      * attributes intended for a vendor to support their own systems
        and not suitable for general usage

      * attributes relying on data types not defined within RADIUS

      * attributes intended primarily for use within an SDO

      * attributes intended primarily for use within a group of SDOs

   Note that the points listed above do not relax the recommendations
   discussed in this document.  Instead, they recognize that the RADIUS
   data model has limitations.  In certain situations where



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   interoperability can be strongly constrained by the SDO or vendor, an
   expanded data model MAY be used.  It is RECOMMENDED, however, that
   the RADIUS data model be used, even when it is marginally less
   efficient than alternatives.

   When attributes are used primarily within a group of SDOs, and are
   not applicable to the wider Internet community, we expect that one
   SDO will be responsible for allocation from their own private vendor
   space.

Appendix B.  Complex Attributes

   This appendix summarizes RADIUS attributes with complex data types
   that are defined in existing RFCs.

   This appendix is published for informational purposes only and
   reflects the usage of attributes with complex data types at the time
   of the publication of this document.

B.1. CHAP-Password

   [RFC2865], Section 5.3 defines the CHAP-Password Attribute, which is
   sent from the RADIUS client to the RADIUS server in an Access-
   Request.  The data type of the CHAP Identifier is not given, only the
   one-octet length:

    0                   1                   2
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
   |     Type      |    Length     |  CHAP Ident   |  String ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   Since this is an authentication attribute, code changes are required
   on the RADIUS client and server to support it, regardless of the
   attribute format.  Therefore, this complex data type is acceptable in
   this situation.

B.2. CHAP-Challenge

   [RFC2865], Section 5.40 defines the CHAP-Challenge Attribute, which
   is sent from the RADIUS client to the RADIUS server in an Access-
   Request.  While the data type of the CHAP Identifier is given, the
   text also says:

      If the CHAP challenge value is 16 octets long it MAY be placed in
      the Request Authenticator field instead of using this attribute.





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   Defining attributes to contain values taken from the RADIUS packet
   header is NOT RECOMMENDED.  Attributes should have values that are
   packed into a RADIUS AVP.

B.3. Tunnel-Password

   [RFC2868], Section 3.5 defines the Tunnel-Password Attribute, which
   is sent from the RADIUS server to the client in an Access-Accept.
   This attribute includes Tag and Salt fields, as well as a String
   field that consists of three logical sub-fields: the Data-Length
   (required and one octet), Password sub-fields (required), and the
   optional Padding sub-field.  The attribute appears as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |     Tag       |   Salt
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      Salt (cont)  |   String ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Since this is a security attribute, code changes are required on the
   RADIUS client and server to support it, regardless of the attribute
   format.  However, while use of a complex data type is acceptable in
   this situation, the design of the Tunnel-Password Attribute is
   problematic from a security perspective since it uses MD5 as a cipher
   and provides a password to a NAS, potentially without proper
   authorization.

B.4. ARAP-Password

   [RFC2869], Section 5.4 defines the ARAP-Password Attribute, which is
   sent from the RADIUS client to the server in an Access-Request.  It
   contains four 4-octet values instead of having a single Value field:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |             Value1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   |             Value2
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   |             Value3
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   |             Value4
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



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   As with the CHAP-Password Attribute, this is an authentication
   attribute that would have required code changes on the RADIUS client
   and server, regardless of format.

B.5. ARAP-Features

   [RFC2869], Section 5.5 defines the ARAP-Features Attribute, which is
   sent from the RADIUS server to the client in an Access-Accept or
   Access-Challenge.  It contains a compound string of two single octet
   values, plus three 4-octet values, which the RADIUS client
   encapsulates in a feature flags packet in the Apple Remote Access
   Protocol (ARAP):

   0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |     Value1    |    Value2     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Value3                              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Value4                              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Value5                              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Unlike the previous attributes, this attribute contains no encrypted
   component, nor is it directly involved in authentication.  The
   individual sub-fields therefore could have been encapsulated in
   separate attributes.

   While the contents of this attribute are intended to be placed in an
   ARAP packet, the fields need to be set by the RADIUS server.  Using
   standard RADIUS data types would have simplified RADIUS server
   implementations and subsequent management.  The current form of the
   attribute requires either the RADIUS server implementation or the
   RADIUS server administrator to understand the internals of the ARAP
   protocol.

B.6. Connect-Info

   [RFC2869], Section 5.11 defines the Connect-Info Attribute, which is
   used to indicate the nature of the connection.

    0                   1                   2
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |     Text...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



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   Even though the type is Text, the rest of the description indicates
   that it is a complex attribute:

      The Text field consists of UTF-8 encoded 10646 [8] characters.
      The connection speed SHOULD be included at the beginning of the
      first Connect-Info attribute in the packet.  If the transmit and
      receive connection speeds differ, they may both be included in the
      first attribute with the transmit speed first (the speed the NAS
      modem transmits at), a slash (/), the receive speed, then
      optionally other information.

      For example, "28800 V42BIS/LAPM" or "52000/31200 V90"

      More than one Connect-Info attribute may be present in an
      Accounting-Request packet to accommodate expected efforts by ITU
      to have modems report more connection information in a standard
      format that might exceed 252 octets.

   This attribute contains no encrypted component and is not directly
   involved in authentication.  The individual sub-fields could
   therefore have been encapsulated in separate attributes.

   However, since the definition refers to potential standardization
   activity within ITU, the Connect-Info Attribute can also be thought
   of as opaque data whose definition is provided elsewhere.  The
   Connect-Info Attribute could therefore qualify for an exception as
   described in Section 3.2.4.

B.7. Framed-IPv6-Prefix

   Section 2.3 of [RFC3162] defines the Framed-IPv6-Prefix Attribute,
   and Section 3 of [RFC4818] reuses this format for the Delegated-
   IPv6-Prefix Attribute; these attributes are sent from the RADIUS
   server to the client in an Access-Accept.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |  Reserved     | Prefix-Length |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                Prefix
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                Prefix
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                Prefix
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                Prefix                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



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   The sub-fields encoded in these attributes are strongly related, and
   there was no previous definition of this data structure that could be
   referenced.  Support for this attribute requires code changes on both
   the client and server, due to a new data type being defined.  In this
   case, it appears to be acceptable to encode them in one attribute.

B.8. Egress-VLANID

   [RFC4675], Section 2.1 defines the Egress-VLANID Attribute, which can
   be sent by a RADIUS client or server.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |            Value
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
           Value (cont)            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   While it appears superficially to be of type Integer, the Value field
   is actually a packed structure, as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Tag Indic.   |        Pad            |       VLANID          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The length of the VLANID field is defined by the [IEEE-802.1Q]
   specification.  The Tag Indicator field is either 0x31 or 0x32, for
   compatibility with the Egress-VLAN-Name, as discussed below.  The
   complex structure of Egress-VLANID overlaps with that of the base
   Integer data type, meaning that no code changes are required for a
   RADIUS server to support this attribute.  Code changes are required
   on the NAS, if only to implement the VLAN ID enforcement.

   Given the IEEE VLAN requirements and the limited data model of
   RADIUS, the chosen method is likely the best of the possible
   alternatives.












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B.9. Egress-VLAN-Name

   [RFC4675], Section 2.3 defines the Egress-VLAN-Name Attribute, which
   can be sent by a RADIUS client or server.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |   Tag Indic.  |   String...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The Tag Indicator is either the character '1' or '2', which in ASCII
   map to the identical values for Tag Indicator in Egress-VLANID above.
   The complex structure of this attribute is acceptable for reasons
   identical to those given for Egress-VLANID.

B.10. Digest-*

   [RFC5090] attempts to standardize the functionality provided by an
   expired Internet-Draft [AAA-SIP], which improperly uses two
   attributes from the standard space without having been assigned them
   by IANA.  This self-allocation is forbidden, as described in Section
   2.  In addition, the document uses nested attributes, which are
   discouraged in Section 2.1.  The updated document uses basic data
   types and allocates nearly 20 attributes in the process.

   However, the document has seen wide-spread implementation, but
   [RFC5090] has not.  One explanation may be that implementors
   disagreed with the trade-offs made in the updated specification.  It
   may have been better to simply document the existing format and
   request IANA allocation of two attributes.  The resulting design
   would have used nested attributes but may have gained more wide-
   spread implementation.

Acknowledgments

   We would like to acknowledge David Nelson, Bernard Aboba, Emile van
   Bergen, Barney Wolff, Glen Zorn, Avi Lior, and Hannes Tschofenig for
   contributions to this document.












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Authors' Addresses

   Alan DeKok (editor)
   The FreeRADIUS Server Project
   http://freeradius.org/

   EMail: aland@freeradius.org


   Greg Weber
   Knoxville, TN 37932
   USA

   EMail: gdweber@gmail.com





































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