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Versions: 00 01 02

Network Working Group                                       M. Behringer
Internet-Draft                                               M. Pritikin
Intended status: Informational                              S. Bjarnason
Expires: August 17, 2014                                           Cisco
                                                       February 13, 2014


                    Bootstrapping Trust on a Homenet
             draft-behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap-02.txt

Abstract

   A homenet must be aware of its borders, and the realms within those.
   This document proposes an approach to bootstrap trust in such an
   environment.  The idea is to select one device as the trust anchor
   and to enrol other devices into the domain.  The result is the
   creation of a domain of trust in the homenet, with a common trust
   anchor.  This trust model can subsequently be used to determine
   boundaries, and to autonomically bootstrap network services.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 17, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Approach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Summary of the approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Autonomic devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  User interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.4.  The Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.5.  Autonomic Adjacency Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.6.  Validating a new device's identity  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.7.  Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.8.  Network boundaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Problem Statement

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-arch] states that "A homenet will most likely also
   have internal borders between internal realms, e.g. a guest realm or
   a corporate network extension realm.  It should be possible to
   automatically discover these borders."  Simple approaches, such as
   terminating a homenet on a particular interface type do not easily
   allow for devices from different administrative realms to be locally
   connected.  [I-D.ietf-homenet-arch] states further that "It is
   important that self-configuration with 'unintended' devices is
   avoided.  There should be a way for a user to administratively assert
   in a simple way whether or not a device belongs to a homenet."

   An approach is needed that allows to establish trust inside a homenet
   according to a policy set by the user of the homenet.

2.  Approach

   This approach is based on making homenet devices behave in autonomic
   mode where devices discover each others and autonomically establish
   trust boundaries.  See [I-D.behringer-autonomic-network-framework]
   for more information on autonomic networking.

   The document "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures"
   [I-D.pritikin-bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures] explains in detail
   how key infrastructures can be securely and automatically deployed.
   This document applied those concepts to a homenet.




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2.1.  Summary of the approach

   In short, the approach is:

   o  The user pairs a smart phone (or similar device) with one of the
      devices in the homenet, for example the CPE.  The smart phone acts
      as a user interface only.

   o  The selected device automatically becomes the trust anchor of the
      homenet.  Technically, it acts as a certification authority (CA)
      as well as a registration authority (RA) (see section 3.1 and 3.2
      of [I-D.pritikin-bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures]).

   o  Devices in the homenet use a protocol to exchange identities.

   o  A new device is added to the homenet by the user accepting it on
      the smart phone, and the CA issuing a domain certificate to the
      new device.

   o  The boundary of the network is determined by checking the
      certificates of devices.

2.2.  Autonomic devices

   An autonomic device can be a router, switch, PC, smartphone, or any
   other device, independent of its role in the network, which has the
   autonomic functionality mentioned below.  A homenet consists of
   autonomic devices and non-autonomic devices.  This approach requires
   at least one autonomic networking device, such as a router or switch.

2.3.  User interface

   The user interface can be provided by the devices themselves or for
   example through a smart phone interface.  It is also possible to
   access the devices indirectly through the manufactures web site.
   Options are:

   o  The user connects a PC to a physical port on network device and
      gets access to devices's user interface.

   o  Using a smartphone app which is automatically downloaded when
      scanning a QR code on the device.  This will then allow the user
      to connect to the device on an SSID which is dynamically created
      based on the device serial number.  The device will only allow
      connections from smartphones using the manufactures app.






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2.4.  The Registrar

   One autonomic device in the homenet takes on a registrar function,
   which contains a registration autority and a certificate authority.
   In a homenet, the simplest method should be chosen: The first device
   the user connects to automatically takes on these functions.
   Therefore, the function of the registrar is essentially hidden to the
   user.

   Technically, the registrar creates a trust anchor for the homenet
   domain, and subsequently acts as a certification authority, granting
   domain certificates to other devices.

2.5.  Autonomic Adjacency Discovery

   Every autonomic device discovers neighbouring autonomic nodes through
   an autonomic secure neighbour discovery protocol.  This could be
   implemented for example through IPv6 secure neighbour discovery,
   using a to-be-assigned well-known multicast address indicating "all
   autonomic nodes on this subnet".

   The identity exchanged in this protocol is either a domain
   certificate, for devices that have already joined the domain, or a
   vendor certificate (802.1AR) [IDevID] if available, or an insecure
   device identity (serial number).

   If two autonomic homenet devices use the same trust anchor they can
   verify each other's certificate thus establishing that the peer is a
   member of the same local domain.

   An autonomic device signs its neighbour discovery packets.  If it has
   a domain certificate from the domain registrar, it uses that.  If
   not, it uses either a vendor certificate (e.g., an IEEE 802.1AR
   [IDevID] credential) or a self-signed certificate.

2.6.  Validating a new device's identity

   If one autonomic homenet device is member of the homenet domain, and
   its neighbour is not, the device without domain credentials requests
   to join the first domain it is presented with.  The device must only
   join a homenet domain when it is in the factory default configuration
   (e.g. it is not currently a member of a homenet).  The domain device
   proxies the request to the registrar, including the device
   credentials of the device without domain credentials.  The registrar
   informs the user about the new device, using the user interface, for
   example the smart phone.

   The user decides to accept the device based on various criteria:



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   o  Allow any device to join within a specific time period.

   o  Allow only devices with specific serial numbers to join.  These
      can either be entered manually into the registrar or by scanning a
      QR code using the manufactures autonomic app on a smartphone.

   o  Allow only devices to join on a specific proxy device, or
      interface on that proxy.

   o  If the device has a vendor certificate (e.g., an IEEE 802.1AR
      [IDevID] credential), the device can be validated using a Cloud
      service from the vendor.

   If a device is accepted into the domain, it is then invited to
   request a domain certificate through a certificate enrolment process.

   A device MAY require an invitation to be signed by the manufacturer,
   stating that it has been claimed by the user before it decides to
   join the domain.

   The result is a common trust anchor and device certificates for all
   autonomic devices in a domain.  These certificates can subsequently
   be used to determine the boundaries of the homenet, to authenticate
   other domain nodes, and to autonomically enable services on the
   homenet.

   Section 4 of [I-D.pritikin-bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures] explains
   the functional overview of the solution, including all the functional
   elements and additional options, for example how to securely claim a
   device.  The homenet case can be significantly more restrictive, for
   example work with serial numbers only, or using physical methods,
   such as pressing a button to pair a device, or typing a key displayed
   on an LED display into the registrar.

2.7.  Services

   As the devices have a common trust anchor, device identity can be
   securely established, making it possible to automatically deploy
   services across the domain in a secure manner.

   Examples of services are device management, routing authentication,
   and service discovery.

2.8.  Network boundaries

   When a device has joined the domain, it can validate the domain
   membership of other devices.  This makes it possible to create trust
   boundaries where domain members have higher level of trusted than



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   external devices.  Using the autonomic User Interface, specific
   devices can be grouped into to sub domains and specific trust levels
   can be implemented between those.

3.  Security Considerations

   The approach as outlined in this document is open to a number of
   attacks at bootstrap time.  For example, a malicious device could
   pretend to be an expected device and assume its role.

   There are counter-measures against these attacks, with various
   security levels, and corresponding various ease of use.  The options
   are (in order of increased security):

   o  Only allow new devices to join in a specific time period.

   o  Only allow specific devices to join by matching their serial
      numbers.

   o  Validating the vendor certificate on new devices using the vendors
      Cloud portal.

   In order to support a variety of use cases, devices can be claimed by
   a registrar without proving possession of the device in question.
   This would result in a nonceless, and thus always valid, claim.
   Future registrars are recommended to take the audit history of a
   device into account when deciding to join the device into their
   network.

4.  Informative References

   [I-D.behringer-autonomic-network-framework]
              Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., and A. Clemm,
              "A Framework for Autonomic Networking", draft-behringer-
              autonomic-network-framework-01 (work in progress), October
              2013.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-arch]
              Chown, T., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J. Weil,
              "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles", draft-
              ietf-homenet-arch-11 (work in progress), October 2013.

   [I-D.pritikin-bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures]
              Pritikin, M., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason,
              "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures", draft-pritikin-
              bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures-00 (work in progress),
              January 2014.




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   [IDevID]   IEEE Standard, , "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

Authors' Addresses

   Michael H. Behringer
   Cisco

   Email: mbehring@cisco.com


   Max Pritikin
   Cisco

   Email: pritikin@cisco.com


   Steinthor Bjarnason
   Cisco

   Email: sbjarnas@cisco.com





























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