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CoRE Working Group                                            C. Bormann
Internet-Draft                                                 K. Hartke
Intended status: Informational                   Universitaet Bremen TZI
Expires: June 9, 2013                                  December 06, 2012


                    Miscellaneous additions to CoAP
                       draft-bormann-coap-misc-22

Abstract

   This short I-D makes a number of partially interrelated proposals how
   to solve certain problems in the CoRE WG's main protocol, the
   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP).  The current version has
   been resubmitted to keep information about these proposals available;
   the proposals are not all fleshed out at this point in time.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 9, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Observing Resources in CoAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  The Base-Uri Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  The Nursery (Things that still need to ripen a
                bit)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     A.1.  Envelope Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     A.2.  Payload-Length Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.3.  URI Authorities with Binary Adresses . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.4.  Length-aware number encoding (o256)  . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     A.5.  SMS encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       A.5.1.  ASCII-optimized SMS encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     A.6.  CONNECT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       A.6.1.  Requesting a Tunnel with CONNECT . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       A.6.2.  Using a CONNECT Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       A.6.3.  Closing down a CONNECT Tunnel  . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Appendix B.  The Museum (Things we did, but maybe not exactly
                this way) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     B.1.  Getting rid of artificial limitations  . . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.1.1.  Beyond 270 bytes in a single option  . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.1.2.  Beyond 15 options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       B.1.3.  Implementing the option delimiter for 15 or more
               options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       B.1.4.  Option Length encoding beyond 270 bytes  . . . . . . . 27
     B.2.  Registered Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
       B.2.1.  A Separate Suboption Number Space  . . . . . . . . . . 30
       B.2.2.  Opening Up the Option Number Space . . . . . . . . . . 31
     B.3.  Enabling Protocol Evolution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
       B.3.1.  Potential new option number allocation . . . . . . . . 36
     B.4.  Patience, Leisure, and Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
       B.4.1.  Patience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
       B.4.2.  Leisure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
       B.4.3.  Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
       B.4.4.  Option Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
   Appendix C.  The Cemetery (Things we won't do) . . . . . . . . . . 41
     C.1.  Example envelope option: solving #230  . . . . . . . . . . 41
     C.2.  Example envelope option: proxy-elective options  . . . . . 42
     C.3.  Stateful URI compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
   Appendix D.  Experimental Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     D.1.  Options indicating absolute time . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     D.2.  Representing Durations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
     D.3.  Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
     D.4.  Pseudo-Floating Point  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47



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     D.5.  A Duration Type for CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

















































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1.  Introduction

   The CoRE WG is tasked with standardizing an Application Protocol for
   Constrained Networks/Nodes, CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-coap].  This protocol
   is intended to provide RESTful [REST] services not unlike HTTP
   [RFC2616], while reducing the complexity of implementation as well as
   the size of packets exchanged in order to make these services useful
   in a highly constrained network of themselves highly constrained
   nodes.

   This objective requires restraint in a number of sometimes
   conflicting ways:

   o  reducing implementation complexity in order to minimize code size,

   o  reducing message sizes in order to minimize the number of
      fragments needed for each message (in turn to maximize the
      probability of delivery of the message), the amount of
      transmission power needed and the loading of the limited-bandwidth
      channel,

   o  reducing requirements on the environment such as stable storage,
      good sources of randomness or user interaction capabilities.

   This draft attempts to address a number of problems not yet
   adequately solved in [I-D.ietf-core-coap].  The solutions proposed to
   these problems are somewhat interrelated and are therefore presented
   in one draft.  As of the current version of the draft, the main body
   is almost empty, since few significant problems remain with CoAP or
   its satellite specifications.

   The appendix contains the "CoAP cemetery" (Appendix C, possibly later
   to move into its own draft), documenting roads that the WG decided
   not to take, in order to spare readers from reinventing them in vain.
   There is also a "CoAP museum" (Appendix B), which documents previous
   forms of proposals part of which did make it into the main documents
   in one form or another.  Finally, the "CoAP nursery" (Appendix A)
   contains half- to fully-baked proposals that might become interesting
   as the basis for future extensions.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The term "byte" is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for
   "octet".





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2.  Observing Resources in CoAP

   (Co-Author for this section: Matthias Kovatsch)

   There are two open issues related to -observe
   [I-D.ietf-core-observe]:

   o  mixing freshness and observation lifetime, and

   o  non-cacheable resources.

   To solve the first issue, we think that -observe should be clarified
   as follows:

   A server sends at least some notifications as confirmable messages.
   Each confirmable notification is an opportunity for the server to
   check if the client is still there.  If the client acknowledges the
   notification, it is assumed to be well and alive and still interested
   in the resource.  If it rejects the message with a reset message or
   if it doesn't respond, it is assumed not longer to be interested and
   is removed from the list of observers.  So an observation
   relationship can potentially go on forever, if the client
   acknowledges each confirmable notification.  If the server doesn't
   send a notification for a while and wants to check if the client is
   still there, it may send a confirmable notification with the current
   resource state to check that.

   So there is no mixing of freshness and lifetime going on.

   The other issue is a bit less trivial to solve.  The problem is that
   normal CoAP and -observe actually have very different freshness
   models:

   Normally, when a client wants to know the current state of a
   resource, it retrieves a representation, uses it and stores it in its
   cache.  Later, when it wants to know the current state again, it can
   either use the stored representation provided that it's still fresh,
   or retrieve a new representation, use it and store it in its cache.

   If a server knows when the state of the resource will change the next
   time, it can set the Max-Age of the representation to an accurate
   time span.  So the change of the resource state will coincide with
   the expiration of the freshness of the representation stored in the
   client's cache (ignoring network latency).

   But if the resource changes its state unpredictably at any time, the
   server can set the Max-Age only to an estimate.  If the state then
   actually changes before the freshness expires, the client wrongly



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   believes it has fresh information.  Conversely, if the freshness
   expires and the client wants to know the current state, the client
   wrongly believes it has to make a new request although the
   representation is actually still fresh (this is defused by ETag
   validation).

   -observe doesn't have these kinds of problems: the server does not
   have to predict when the resource will change its state the next
   time.  It just sends a notification when it does.  The new
   representation invalidates the old representation stored in the
   client's cache.  So the client always has a fresh representation that
   it can use when it wants to know the current resource state without
   ever having to make a request.  An explicit Max-Age is not needed for
   determining freshness.

   But -observe has a different set of problems:

   The first problem is that the resource may change its state more
   often than there is bandwidth available or the client can handle.
   Thus, -observe cannot make any guarantee that a client will see every
   state change.  The solution is that -observe guarantees that the
   client will eventually see the latest state change, and follows a
   best effort approach to enable the client to see as many state
   changes as possible.

   The second problem is that, when a notification doesn't arrive for a
   while, the client does not know if the resource did not change its
   state or if the server lost its state and forgot that the client is
   interested in the resource.  We propose the following solution: With
   each notification that the server sends, it makes a promise to send
   another notification, and that it will send this next notification at
   latest after a certain time span.  This time span is included with
   each notification.  So when no notification arrives for a while and
   the time span has not expired yet, the client assumes that the
   resource did not change its state.  If the time span has expired, no
   notification has arrived and the client wants to know the current
   state of the resource, it has to make a new request.

   The third problem is that, when an intermediary is observing a
   resource and wants to create a response from a representation stored
   in its cache, it needs to specify a Max-Age.  But the intermediary
   cannot predict when it will receive the next notification, because
   the next notification can arrive at any time.  Unlike the origin
   server, it also doesn't have the application-specific knowledge that
   the origin server has.  We propose the following solution: With each
   notification a server sends, it includes a value that an intermediary
   should use to calculate the Max-Age.




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   To summarize:

   o  A notification doesn't have a Max-Age; it's fresh until the next
      notification arrives.  A notification is the promise for another
      notification that will arrive at latest after Next-Notification-
      At-Latest.  This value is included with every notification.  The
      promise includes that the server attempts to transmit a
      notification to the client for the promised time span, even if the
      client does not seem to respond, e.g., due to a temporary network
      outage.

   o  A notification also contains another value, called Max-Age-Hint.
      This value is used by a cache to calculate a Max-Age for the
      representation if needed.  In a cache, the Max-Age-Hint of a
      representation is counted down like Max-Age.  When it reaches
      zero, however, the representation can be still used to satisfy
      requests, but is non-cacheable (i.e., Max-Age is 0).  The Max-Age-
      Hint must be less than or equal to Next-Notification-At-Latest.

   We see two possible ways to encode Next-Notification-At-Latest and
   Max-Age-Hint in a message:

   o  The first way is to require the values of Next-Notification-At-
      Latest and Max-Age-Hint to be the same, although they are
      conceptually unrelated.  Then, a single option in the message can
      be used to hold both values.

   o  The second way is to include two options, one for Next-
      Notification-At-Latest and one for Max-Age-Hint.  Since Next-
      Notification-At-Latest is less than or equal to Max-Age-Hint, the
      first option should indicates Max-Age-Hint, and the second option
      Next-Notification-At-Latest minus Max-Age-Hint with a default
      value of 0.


















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3.  The Base-Uri Option

   A proxy that forwards a response with embedded URIs may need to
   indicate a base URI relative to which the embedded URIs need to be
   interpreted that is different from the original request URI.  E.g.,
   when the proxy forwarded the request to a multicast address, it may
   need to indicate which specific server sent the response.  A similar
   requirement is the need to provide a request URI relative to which
   the Location-* options can be interpreted.

   The Base-Uri Option can be used in a response to provide this
   information.  It is structured like the Proxy-Uri option, but it is
   elective and safe to forward (whether it is a cache-key is
   irrelevant, as it is a response option only).

                     +--------+----------+-----------+
                     | Number | Name     | Reference |
                     +--------+----------+-----------+
                     | TBD    | Base-Uri | [RFCXXXX] |
                     +--------+----------+-----------+































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4.  Acknowledgements

   This work was partially funded by the Klaus Tschira Foundation and by
   Intel Corporation.

   Of course, much of the content of this draft is the result of
   discussions with the [I-D.ietf-core-coap] authors.

   Patience and Leisure were influenced by a mailing list discussion
   with Esko Dijk, Kepeng Li, and Salvatore Loreto - thanks!









































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5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-coap]
              Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., Bormann, C., and B. Frank,
              "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)",
              draft-ietf-core-coap-12 (work in progress), October 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-core-observe]
              Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in CoAP",
              draft-ietf-core-observe-07 (work in progress),
              October 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]
              Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
              (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-21 (work in progress),
              October 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional]
              Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
              (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests",
              draft-ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional-21 (work in progress),
              October 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p6-cache]
              Fielding, R., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
              draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-21 (work in progress),
              October 2012.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC6256]  Eddy, W. and E. Davies, "Using Self-Delimiting Numeric
              Values in Protocols", RFC 6256, May 2011.







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5.2.  Informative References

   [CoRE201]  "Clarify use of retransmission window for duplicate
              detection", CoRE ticket #201, 2012,
              <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ticket/201>.

   [CoRE214]  "Adopt vendor-defined option into core-coap", CoRE
              ticket #214, 2012,
              <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ticket/214>.

   [CoRE230]  "Multiple Location options need to be processed as a
              unit", CoRE ticket #230, 2012,
              <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ticket/230>.

   [CoRE241]  "Proxy Safe & Cache Key indication for options", CoRE
              ticket #241, 2012,
              <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ticket/241>.

   [REST]     Fielding, R., "Architectural Styles and the Design of
              Network-based Software Architectures", 2000.

   [RFC1924]  Elz, R., "A Compact Representation of IPv6 Addresses",
              RFC 1924, April 1996.

   [RFC2817]  Khare, R. and S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within
              HTTP/1.1", RFC 2817, May 2000.

   [RFC5198]  Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
              Interchange", RFC 5198, March 2008.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC6648]  Saint-Andre, P., Crocker, D., and M. Nottingham,
              "Deprecating the "X-" Prefix and Similar Constructs in
              Application Protocols", BCP 178, RFC 6648, June 2012.














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Appendix A.  The Nursery (Things that still need to ripen a bit)

A.1.  Envelope Options

   As of [I-D.ietf-core-coap], options can take one of four types, two
   of which are mostly identical:

   o  uint: A non-negative integer which is represented in network byte
      order using a variable number of bytes (see [I-D.ietf-core-coap]
      Appendix A);

   o  string: a sequence of bytes that is nominally a Net-Unicode string
      [RFC5198];

   o  opaque: a sequence of bytes.

   o  empty (not explicitly identified as a fourth type in
      [I-D.ietf-core-coap]).

   It turns out some options would benefit from some internal structure.
   Also, it may be a good idea to be able to bundle multiple options
   into one, in order to ensure consistency for a set of elective
   options that need to be processed all or nothing (i.e., the option
   becomes critical as soon as another option out of the set is
   processed, too).

   In this section, we introduce a fifth CoAP option type: Envelope
   options.

   An envelope option is a sequence of bytes that looks and is
   interpreted exactly like a CoAP sequence of options.  Instead of an
   option count or an end-of-option marker, the sequence of options is
   terminated by the end of the envelope option.

   The nested options (options inside the envelope option) may come from
   the same number space as the top-level CoAP options, or the envelope
   option may define its own number space - this choice needs to be
   defined for each envelope option.

   If the top-level number space is used, the envelope option typically
   will restrict the set of options that actually can be used in the
   envelope.  In particular, it is unlikely that an envelope option will
   allow itself inside the envelope (this would be a recursive option).

   Envelope options are a general, but simple mechanism.  Some of its
   potential uses are illustrated by two examples in the cemetery:
   Appendix C.1 and Appendix C.2.  (Each of these examples has its own
   merits and demerits, which led us to decide not to pursue either of



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   them right now, but this should be discussed separately from the
   concept of Envelope options employed in the examples.)

A.2.  Payload-Length Option

   Not all transport mappings may provide an unambiguous length of the
   CoAP message.  For UDP, it may also be desirable to pack more than
   one CoAP message into one UDP payload (aggregation); in that case,
   for all but the last message there needs to be a way to delimit the
   payload of that message.

   This can be solved using a new option, the Payload-Length option.  If
   this option is present, the value of this option is an unsigned
   integer giving the length of the payload of the message (note that
   this integer can be zero for a zero-length payload, which can in turn
   be represented by a zero-length option value).  (In the UDP
   aggregation case, what would have been in the payload of this message
   after "payload-length" bytes is then actually one or more additional
   messages.)

A.3.  URI Authorities with Binary Adresses

   One problem with the way URI authorities are represented in the URI
   syntax is that the authority part can be very bulky if it encodes an
   IPv6 address in ASCII.

   Proposal:  Provide an option "Uri-Authority-Binary" that can be an
      even number of bytes between 2 and 18 except 12 or 14.

   o  If the number of bytes is 2, the destination IP address of the
      packet transporting the CoAP message is implied.

   o  If the number of bytes is 4 or 6, the first four bytes of the
      option value are an IPv4 address in binary.

   o  If the number of bytes is 8 or 10, the first eight bytes are the
      lower 64 bits of an IPv6 address; the upper eight bytes are
      implied from the destination address of the packet transporting
      the CoAP message.

   o  If the number of bytes is 16 or 18, the first 16 bytes are an IPv6
      address.

   o  If two more bytes remain, this is a port number (as always in
      network byte order).

   The resulting authority is (conceptually translated into ASCII and)
   used in place of an Uri-Authority option, or inserted into a Proxy-



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   Uri. Examples:

   +-------------+------------------+---------+------------------------+
   | Proxy-Uri   | Uri-Authority-Bi | Uri-Pat | URI                    |
   |             | nary             | h       |                        |
   +-------------+------------------+---------+------------------------+
   | (none)      | (none)           | (none)  | "/"                    |
   |             |                  |         |                        |
   | (none)      | (none)           | 'temp'  | "/temp"                |
   |             |                  |         |                        |
   | (none)      | 2 bytes: 61616   | 'temp'  | "coap://[DA]:61616/tem |
   |             |                  |         | p"                     |
   |             |                  |         |                        |
   | (none)      | 16 bytes:        | temp    | "coap://[2000::1]/temp |
   |             | 2000::1          |         | "                      |
   |             |                  |         |                        |
   | 'http://'   | 10 bytes:        | (none)  | "http://[DA::123:45]:6 |
   |             | ::123:45 + 616   |         | 16"                    |
   |             |                  |         |                        |
   | 'http:///te | 18 bytes:        | (none)  | "http://[2000::1]:616/ |
   | mp'         | 2000::1 + 616    |         | temp"                  |
   +-------------+------------------+---------+------------------------+

A.4.  Length-aware number encoding (o256)

   The number encoding defined in Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-core-coap] has
   one significant flaw: Every number has an infinite number of
   representations, which can be derived by adding leading zero bytes.
   This runs against the principle of minimizing unnecessary choice.
   The resulting uncertainty in encoding ultimately leads to unnecessary
   interoperability failures.  (It also wastes a small fraction of the
   encoding space, i.e., it wastes bytes.)

   We could solve the first, but not the second, by outlawing leading
   zeroes, but then we have to cope with error cases caused by illegal
   values, another source of interoperability problems.

   The number encoding "o256" defined in this section avoids this flaw.
   The suggestion is not to replace CoAP's "uint" encoding wholesale
   (CoAP is already too widely implemented for such a change), but to
   consider this format for new options.

   The basic requirements for such an encoding are:

   o  numbers are encoded as a sequence of zero or more bytes

   o  each number has exactly one encoding




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   o  for a < b, encoding-size(a) <= encoding-size(b) -- i.e., with
      larger numbers, the encoding only gets larger, never smaller
      again.

   o  within each encoding size (0 bytes, 1 byte, etc.), lexicographical
      ordering of the bytes is the same as numeric ordering

   Obviously, there is only one encoding that satisfies all these
   requirements.  As illustrated by Figure 1, this is unambiguously
   derived by

   1.  enumerating all possible byte sequences, ordered by length and
       within the same length in lexicographic ordering, and,

   2.  assigning sequential cardinals.


           0x'' -> 0
           0x'00' -> 1
           0x'01' -> 2
           0x'02' -> 3
           ...
           0x'fe' -> 255
           0x'ff' -> 256
           0x'0000' -> 257
           0x'0001' -> 258
           ...
           0x'fefd' -> 65534
           0x'fefe' -> 65535
           0x'feff' -> 65536
           ...
           0x'ffff' -> 65792
           0x'000000' -> 65793
           0x'000001' -> 65794

   Figure 1: Enumerating byte sequences by length and then lexicographic
                                   order

   This results in an exceedingly simple algorithm: each byte is
   interpreted in the base-256 place-value system, but stands for a
   number between 1 and 256 instead of 0 to 255.  We therefore call this
   encoding "o256" (one-to-256). 0 is always encoded in zero bytes; 1 to
   256 is one byte, 257 (0x101) to 65792 (0x10100) is two bytes, 65793
   (0x10101) to 16843008 (0x1010100) is three bytes, etc.

   To further illustrate the algorithmic simplicity, pseudocode for
   encoding and decoding is given in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively
   (in the encoder, "prepend" stands for adding a byte at the _leading_



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   edge, the requirement for which is a result of the network byte
   order).  Note that this differs only in a single subtraction/addition
   (resp.) of one from the canonical algorithm for Appendix A uints.

       while num > 0
         num -= 1
         prepend(num & 0xFF)
         num >>= 8
       end

                    Figure 2: o256 encoder (pseudocode)


       num = 0
       each_byte do |b|
         num <<= 8
         num += b + 1
       end

                    Figure 3: o256 decoder (pseudocode)

   On a more philosophical note, it can be observed that o256 solves the
   inverse problem of Self-Delimiting Numeric Values (SDNV) [RFC6256]:
   SDNV encodes variable-length numbers together with their length
   (allowing decoding without knowing their length in advance, deriving
   delimiting information from the number encoding). o256 encodes
   variable-length numbers when there is a way to separately convey the
   length (as in CoAP options), encoding (and later deriving) a small
   part of the numeric value into/from that size information.

A.5.  SMS encoding

   For use in SMS applications, CoAP messages can be transferred using
   SMS binary mode.  However, there is operational experience showing
   that some environments cannot successfully send a binary mode SMS.

   For transferring SMS in character mode (7-bit characters), base64-
   encoding [RFC4648] is an obvious choice. 3 bytes of message (24 bits)
   turn into 4 characters, which cosume 28 bits.  The overall overhead
   is approximately 17 %; the maximum message size is 120 bytes (160 SMS
   characters).

   If a more compact encoding is desired, base85 encoding can be
   employed (however, probably not the version defined in [RFC1924] --
   instead, the version used in tools such as btoa and PDF should be
   chosen).  However, this requires division operations.  Also, the
   base85 character set includes several characters that cannot be
   transferred in a single 7-bit unit in SMS and/or are known to cause



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   operational problems.  A modified base85 character set can be defined
   to solve the latter problem. 4 bytes of message (32 bits) turn into 5
   characters, which consume 35 bits.  The overall overhead is
   approximately 9.3 %; the resulting maximum message size is 128 bytes
   (160 SMS characters).

   Base64 and base85 do not make use of the fact that much CoAP data
   will be ASCII-based.  Therefore, we define the following experimental
   SMS encoding.

A.5.1.  ASCII-optimized SMS encoding

   Not all 128 theoretically possible SMS characters are operationally
   free of problems.  We therefore define:

   Shunned code characters:  @ sign, as it maps to 0x00

      LF and CR signs (0x0A, 0x0D)

      uppercase C cedilla (0x09), as it is often mistranslated in
      gateways

      ESC (0x1B), as it is used in certain character combinations only

   Some ASCII characters cannot be transferred in the base SMS character
   set, as their code positions are taken by non-ASCII characters.
   These are simply encoded with their ASCII code positions, e.g., an
   underscore becomes a section mark (even though underscore has a
   different code position in the SMS character set).

   Equivalently translated input bytes:  $, @, [, \, ], ^, _, `, {, |,
      }, ~, DEL

   In other words, bytes 0x20 to 0x7F are encoded into the same code
   positions in the 7-bit character set.

   Out of the remaining code characters, the following SMS characters
   are available for encoding:

   Non-equivalently translated (NET) code characters:  0x01 to 0x08, (8
      characters)

      0x0B, 0x0C, (2 characters)

      0x0E to 0x1A, (13 characters)






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      0x1C to 0x1F, (4 characters)

   Of the 27 NET code characters, 18 are taken as prefix characters (see
   below), and 8 are defined as directly translated characters:

   Directly translated bytes:  Equivalently translated input bytes are
      represented as themselves

      0x00 to 0x07 are represented as 0x01 to 0x08

   This leaves 0x08 to 0x1F and 0x80 to 0xFF.  Of these, the bytes 0x80
   to 0x87 and 0xA0 to 0xFF are represented as the bytes 0x00 to 0x07
   (represented by characters 0x01 to 0x08) and 0x20 to 0x7F, with a
   prefix of 1 (see below).  The characters 0x08 to 0x1F are represented
   as the characters 0x28 to 0x3F with a prefix of 2 (see below).  The
   characters 0x88 to 0x9F are represented as the characters 0x48 to
   0x5F with a prefix of 2 (see below).  (Characters 0x01 to 0x08, 0x20
   to 0x27, 0x40 to 0x47, and 0x60 to 0x7f with a prefix of 2 are
   reserved for future extensions, which could be used for some
   backreferencing or run-length compression.)

   Bytes that do not need a prefix (directly translated bytes) are sent
   as is.  Any byte that does need a prefix (i.e., 1 or 2) is preceded
   by a prefix character, which provides a prefix for this and the
   following two bytes as follows:

                      +------+-----+---+------+-----+
                      | 0x0B | 100 |   | 0x15 | 200 |
                      +------+-----+---+------+-----+
                      | 0x0C | 101 |   | 0x16 | 201 |
                      |      |     |   |      |     |
                      | 0x0E | 102 |   | 0x17 | 202 |
                      |      |     |   |      |     |
                      | 0x0F | 110 |   | 0x18 | 210 |
                      |      |     |   |      |     |
                      | 0x10 | 111 |   | 0x19 | 211 |
                      |      |     |   |      |     |
                      | 0x11 | 112 |   | 0x1A | 212 |
                      |      |     |   |      |     |
                      | 0x12 | 120 |   | 0x1C | 220 |
                      |      |     |   |      |     |
                      | 0x13 | 121 |   | 0x1D | 221 |
                      |      |     |   |      |     |
                      | 0x14 | 122 |   | 0x1E | 222 |
                      +------+-----+---+------+-----+

   (This leaves one non-shunned character, 0x1F, for future extension.)




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   The coding overhead of this encoding for random bytes is similar to
   Base85, without the need for a division/multiplication.  For bytes
   that are mostly ASCII characters, the overhead can easily become
   negative.  (Conversely, for bytes that are more likely to be non-
   ASCII than in a random sequence of bytes, the overhead becomes
   greater.)

   So, for instance, for the CoAP message in Figure 4:

   ver     tt      code    mid
   1       ack     2.05    17033
   content_type    40
   token           sometok
   3c 2f 3e 3b 74 69 74 6c 65 3d 22 47 65 6e 65 72  |</>;title="Gener|
   61 6c 20 49 6e 66 6f 22 3b 63 74 3d 30 2c 3c 2f  |al Info";ct=0,</|
   74 69 6d 65 3e 3b 69 66 3d 22 63 6c 6f 63 6b 22  |time>;if="clock"|
   3b 72 74 3d 22 54 69 63 6b 73 22 3b 74 69 74 6c  |;rt="Ticks";titl|
   65 3d 22 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 61 6c 20 43 6c 6f 63  |e="Internal Cloc|
   6b 22 3b 63 74 3d 30 2c 3c 2f 61 73 79 6e 63 3e  |k";ct=0,</async>|
   3b 63 74 3d 30                                   |;ct=0           |

          Figure 4: CoAP response message as captured and decoded

   The 116 byte unencoded message is shown as ASCII characters in
   Figure 5 (\xDD stands for the byte with the hex digits DD):

   bEB\x89\x11(\xA7sometok</>;title="General Info";ct=0,</time>
   ;if="clock";rt="Ticks";title="Internal Clock";ct=0,</async>;ct=0

       Figure 5: CoAP response message shown as unencoded characters

   The equivalent SMS encoding is shown as equivalent-coded SMS
   characters in Figure 6 (7 bits per character, \x12 is a 220 prefix
   and \x0B is a 100 prefix, the rest is shown in equivalent encoding),
   adding two characters of prefix overhead, for a total length of 118
   7-bit characters or 104 (103.25 plus padding) bytes:

   bEB\x12I1(\x0B'sometok</>;title="General Info";ct=0,</time>
   ;if="clock";rt="Ticks";title="Internal Clock";ct=0,</async>;ct=0

      Figure 6: CoAP response message shown as SMS-encoded characters

A.6.  CONNECT

   [RFC2817] defines the HTTP CONNECT method to establish a TCP tunnel
   through a proxy so that end-to-end TLS connections can be made
   through the proxy.  Recently, a requirement for similar functionality
   has been discussed for CoAP.  This section defines a straw-man



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   CONNECT method and related methods and response codes for CoAP.

   (IANA considerations for this section TBD.)

A.6.1.  Requesting a Tunnel with CONNECT

   CONNECT is allocated as a new method code in the "CoAP Method Codes"
   registry.  When a client makes a CONNECT request to an intermediary,
   the intermediary evaluates the Uri-Host, Uri-Port, and/or the
   authority part of the Proxy-Uri Options in a way that is defined by
   the security policy of the intermediary.  If the security policy
   allows the allocation of a tunnel based on these parameters, the
   method returns an empty payload and a response code of 2.30 Tunnel
   Established.  Other possible response codes include 4.03 Forbidden.

   It may be the case that the intermediary itself can only reach the
   requested origin server through another intermediary.  In this case,
   the first intermediary SHOULD make a CONNECT request of that next
   intermediary, requesting a tunnel to the authority.  A proxy MUST NOT
   respond with any 2.xx status code unless it has either a direct or
   tunnel connection established to the authority.

   An origin server which receives a CONNECT request for itself MAY
   respond with a 2.xx status code to indicate that a tunnel is
   established to itself.

   Code 2.30 "Tunnel Established" is allocated as a new response code in
   the "CoAP Response Codes" registry.

A.6.2.  Using a CONNECT Tunnel

   Any successful (2.xx) response to a CONNECT request indicates that
   the intermediary has established a tunnel to the requested host and
   port.  The tunnel is bound to the requesting end-point and the Token
   supplied in the request (as always, the default Token is admissible).
   The tunnel can be used by the client by making a DATAGRAM request.

   DATAGRAM is allocated as a new method code in the "CoAP Method Codes"
   registry.  When a client makes a DATAGRAM request to an intermediary,
   the intermediary looks up the tunnel bound to the client end-point
   and Token supplied in the DATAGRAM request (no other Options are
   permitted).  If a tunnel is found and the intermediary's security
   policy permits, the intermediary forwards the payload of the DATAGRAM
   request as the UDP payload towards the host and port established for
   the tunnel.  No response is defined for this request (note that the
   request can be given as a CON or NON request; for CON, there will be
   an ACK on the message layer if the tunnel exists).




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   The security policy on the intermediary may restrict the allowable
   payloads based on its security policy, possibly considering host and
   port.  An inadmissible payload SHOULD cause a 4.03 Forbidden response
   with a diagnostic message as payload.

   The UDP payload of any datagram received from the tunnel and admitted
   by the security policy is forwarded to the client as the payload of a
   2.31 "Datagram Received" response.  The response does not carry any
   Option except for Token, which identifies the tunnel towards the
   client.

   Code 2.31 "Datagram Received" is allocated as a new response code in
   the "CoAP Response Codes" registry.

   An origin server that has established a tunnel to itself processes
   the CoAP payloads of related DATAGRAM requests as it would process an
   incoming UDP payload, and forwards what would be outgoing UDP
   payloads in 2.31 "Datagram Received" responses.

A.6.3.  Closing down a CONNECT Tunnel

   A 2.31 "Datagram Received" response may be replied to with a RST,
   which closes down the tunnel.  Similarly, the Token used in the
   tunnel may be reused by the client for a different purpose, which
   also closes down the tunnel.


























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Appendix B.  The Museum (Things we did, but maybe not exactly this way)

B.1.  Getting rid of artificial limitations

   _Artificial limitations_ are limitations of a protocol or system that
   are not rooted in limitations of actual capabilities, but in
   arbitrary design decisions.  Proper system design tries to avoid
   artificial limitations, as these tend to cause complexity in systems
   that need to work with these limitations.

   E.g., the original UNIX filesystem had an artificial limitation of
   the length of a path name component to 14 bytes.  This led to a
   cascade of workarounds in programs that manipulate file names: E.g.,
   systematically replacing a ".el" extension in a filename with a
   ".elc" for the compiled file might exceed the limit, so all ".el"
   files were suddenly limited to 13-byte filenames.

   Note that, today, there still is a limitation in most file system
   implementations, typically at 255.  This just happens to be high
   enough to rarely be of real-world concern; we will refer to this case
   as a "painless" artificial limitation.

   CoAP-08 had two highly recognizable artificial limitations in its
   protocol encoding

   o  The number of options in a single message is limited to 15 max.

   o  The length of an option is limited to 270 max.

   It has been argued that the latter limitation causes few problems,
   just as the 255-byte path name component limitation in filenames
   today causes few problems.  Appendix B.1.1 provided a design to
   extend this; as a precaution to future extensions of this kind, the
   current encoding for length 270 (eight ones in the extension byte)
   could be marked as reserved today.  Since, Matthias Kovatsch has
   proposed a simpler scheme that seems to gain favor in the WG, see
   Appendix B.1.4.

   The former limitation has been solved in CoAP-09.  A historical
   discussion of other approaches for going beyond 15 options is in
   Appendix B.1.2.  Appendix B.1.3 discusses implementation.

B.1.1.  Beyond 270 bytes in a single option

   The authors would argue that 270 as the maximum length of an option
   is already beyond the "painless" threshold.

   If that is not the consensus of the WG, the scheme can easily be



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   extended as in Figure 7:

                                               for 15..269:
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | Option Delta  | 1   1   1   1 |          Length - 15          |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   |   Option Value ...
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                                               for 270..65805:
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | Option Delta  | 1   1   1   1 | 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   |              Length - 270 (in network byte order)             |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   |   Option Value ...
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                 Figure 7: Ridiculously Long Option Header

   The infinite number of obvious variations on this scheme are left as
   an exercise to the reader.

   Again, as a precaution to future extensions, the current encoding for
   length 270 (eight ones in the extension byte) could be marked as
   reserved today.

B.1.2.  Beyond 15 options

   (This section keeps discussion that is no longer needed as we have
   agreed to do what is documented in Appendix B.1.3).

   The limit of 15 options is motivated by the fixed four-bit field "OC"
   that is used for indicating the number of options in the fixed-length
   CoAP header (Figure 8).

     0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Ver| T |  OC   |      Code     |          Message ID           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Options (if any) ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Payload (if any) ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 8: Four-byte fixed header in a CoAP Message




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   Note that there is another fixed four-bit field in CoAP: the option
   length (Figure 9 - note that this figure is not to the same scale as
   the previous figure):

     0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | Option Delta  |    Length     | for 0..14
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   |   Option Value ...
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                       Figure 9: Short Option Header

   Since 15 is inacceptable for a maximum option length, the all-ones
   value (15) was taken out of the set of allowable values for the short
   header, and a long header was introduced that allows the insertion of
   an extension byte (Figure 10):

                                               for 15..270:
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | Option Delta  | 1   1   1   1 |          Length - 15          |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   |   Option Value ...
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                       Figure 10: Long Option Header

   We might want to use the same technique for the CoAP header as well.
   There are two obvious places where the extension byte could be
   placed:

   1.  right after the byte carrying the OC field, so the structure is
       the same as for the option header;

   2.  right after the fixed-size CoAP header.

   Both solutions lose the fixed-size-ness of the CoAP header.

   Solution 1 has the disadvantage that the CoAP header is also changing
   in structure: The extension byte is wedged between the first and the
   second byte of the CoAP header.  This is unfortunate, as the number
   of options only comes into play when the option processing begins, so
   it is more natural to use solution 2 (Figure 11):








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     0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Ver| T |  15   |      Code     |          Message ID           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    OC - 15    |   Options ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Payload (if any) ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 11: Extended header for CoAP Messages with 15+ options

   This would allow for up to 270 options in a CoAP message, which is
   very likely way beyond the "painless" threshold.

B.1.2.1.  Implementation considerations

   For a message decoder, this extension creates relatively little pain,
   as the number of options only becomes interesting when the encoding
   turns to the options part of the message, which is then simply lead
   in by the extension byte if the four-bit field is 15.

   For a message encoder, this extension is not so rosy.  If the encoder
   is constructing the message serially, it may not know in advance
   whether the number of options will exceed 14.  None of the following
   implementation strategies is particularly savory, but all of them do
   work:

   1.  Encode the options serially under the assumption that the number
       of options will be 14 or less.  When the 15th option needs to be
       encoded, abort the option encoding, and restart it from scratch
       one byte further to the left.

   2.  Similar to 1, except that the bytes already encoded are all moved
       one byte to right, the extension byte is inserted, and the option
       encoding process is continued.

   3.  The encoder always leaves space for the extension byte (at least
       if it can't prove the number will be less thatn 14).  If the
       extension byte is not needed, an Option 0 with length 0 is
       encoded instead (i.e., one byte is wasted - this option is
       elective and will be ignored by the receiver).

   As a minimum, to enable strategy 3, the option 0 should be reserved
   at least for the case of length=0.






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B.1.2.2.  What should we do now?

   As a minimum proposal for the next version of CoAP, the value 15 for
   OC should be marked as reserved today.

B.1.2.3.  Alternatives

   One alternative that has been discussed previously is to have an
   "Options" Option, which allows the carriage of multiple options in
   the belly of a single one.  This could also be used to carry more
   than 15 options.  However:

   o  The conditional introduction of an Options option has
      implementation considerations that are likely to be more severe
      than the ones listed above;

   o  since 270 bytes may not be enough for the encoding of _all_
      options, the "Options" option would need to be repeatable.  This
      creates many different ways to encode the same message, leading to
      combinatorial explosion in test cases for ensuring
      interoperability.

B.1.2.4.  Alternative: Going to a delimiter model

   Another alternative is to spend the additional byte not as an
   extended count, but as an option terminator.

B.1.3.  Implementing the option delimiter for 15 or more options

   Implementation note:  As can be seen from the proof of concept code
      in Figure 12, the actual implementation cost for a decoder is
      around 4 lines of code (or about 8-10 machine code instructions).


         while numopt > 0
           nextbyte = ... get next byte

           if numopt == 15                  # new
             break if nextbyte == 0xF0      # new
           else                             # new
             numopt -= 1
           end                              # new

           ... decode the delta and length from nextbyte and handle them
         end

               Figure 12: Implementing the Option Terminator




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   Similarly, creating the option terminator needs about four more lines
   (not marked "old" in the C code in Figure 13).

       b0 = 0x40 + (tt << 4);              /* old */
       buffer[0] = b0 + 15;                /* guess first byte */

           ....  encode options ....       /* old */

       if (option_count >= 15 || first_fragment_already_shipped)
          buffer[pos++] = 0xF0;            /* use delimiter */
       else                                /* save a byte: */
          buffer[0] = b0 + option_count;   /* old: backpatch */

                 Figure 13: Creating the Option Terminator

B.1.4.  Option Length encoding beyond 270 bytes

   For option lengths beyond 270 bytes, we reserve the value 255 of an
   extension byte to mean "add 255, read another extension byte"
   Figure 14.  While this causes the length of the option header to grow
   linearly with the size of the option value, only 0.4 % of that size
   is used.  With a focus on short options, this encoding is justified.





























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                                                   for 15..269:
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       | Option Delta  | 1   1   1   1 |          Length - 15          |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       |   Option Value ...
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                                                   for 270..524:
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       | Option Delta  | 1   1   1   1 | 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       |         Length - 270          |   Option Value ...
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                                                   for 525..779:
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       | Option Delta  | 1   1   1   1 | 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       | 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 |        Length - 525           |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       |   Option Value ...
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                                                   for 780..1034:
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       | Option Delta  | 1   1   1   1 | 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       | 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 | 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       |         Length - 780          |   Option Value ...
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       |
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+


                    Figure 14: Options beyond 270 bytes

   Options that are longer than 1034 bytes MUST NOT be sent; an option
   that has 255 (all one bits) in the field called "Length - 780" MUST
   be rejected upon reception as an invalid option.

   In the process, the maximum length of all options that are currently
   set at 270 should now be set to a carefully chosen value.  With the
   purely encoding-based limit gone, Uri-Proxy should now be restored to
   be a non-repeatable option.




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   A first proposal for a new set of per-option length restrictions
   follows:

      +--------+---------------------+-----+------+--------+--------+
      | number | name                | min | max  | type   | repeat |
      +--------+---------------------+-----+------+--------+--------+
      | 1      | content_type        | 0   | 2    | uint   | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 2      | max_age             | 0   | 4    | uint   | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 3      | proxy_uri           | 1   | 1023 | string | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 4      | etag                | 1   | 8    | opaque | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 5      | uri_host            | 1   | 255  | string | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 6      | location_path       | 0   | 255  | string | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 7      | uri_port            | 0   | 2    | uint   | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 8      | location_query      | 0   | 255  | string | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 9      | uri_path            | 0   | 255  | string | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 10     | observe             | 0   | 2    | uint   | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 11     | token               | 1   | 8    | opaque | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 12     | accept              | 0   | 2    | uint   | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 13     | if_match            | 0   | 8    | opaque | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 14     | registered_elective | 1   | 1023 | opaque | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 15     | uri_query           | 1   | 255  | string | yes    |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 17     | block2              | 0   | 3    | uint   | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 18     | size                | 0   | 4    | uint   | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 19     | block1              | 0   | 3    | uint   | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 21     | if_none_match       | 0   | 0    | empty  | -      |
      |        |                     |     |      |        |        |
      | 25     | registered_critical | 1   | 1023 | opaque | yes    |
      +--------+---------------------+-----+------+--------+--------+

   (Option 14 with a length of 0 is a fencepost only.)



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B.2.  Registered Option

   CoAP's option encoding is highly efficient, but works best with small
   option numbers that do not require much fenceposting.  The CoAP
   Option Number Registry therefore has a relatively heavyweight
   registration requirement: "IETF Review" as described in [RFC5226].

   However, there is also considerable benefit in a much looser registry
   policy, enabling a first-come-first-served policy for a relatively
   large option number space.

   Here, we discuss two solutions that enable such a registry.  One is
   to define a separate mechanism for registered options, discussed in
   Appendix B.2.1.  Alternatively, we could make it easier to use a
   larger main option number space, discussed in Appendix B.2.2.

B.2.1.  A Separate Suboption Number Space

   This alternative defines a separate space of suboption numbers, with
   an expert review [RFC5226] (or even first-come-first-served)
   registration policy.  If expert review is selected for this registry,
   it would be with a relatively loose policy delegated to the expert.
   This draft proposes leaving the registered suboption numbers 0-127 to
   expert review with a policy that mainly focuses on the availability
   of a specification, and 128-16383 for first-come-first-served where
   essentially only a name is defined.

   The "registered" options are used in conjunction with this suboption
   number registry.  They use two normal CoAP option numbers, one for
   options with elective semantics (Registered-Elective) and one for
   options with critical semantics (Registered-Critical).  The suboption
   numbers are not separate, i.e. one registered suboption number might
   have some elective semantics and some other critical semantics (e.g.,
   for the request and the response leg of an exchange).  The option
   value starts with an SDNV [RFC6256] of the registered suboption
   number.  (Note that there is no need for an implementation to
   understand SDNVs, it can treat the prefixes as opaque.  One could
   consider the SDNVs as a suboption prefix allocation guideline for
   IANA as opposed to a number encoding.)

       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|            value...           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       \___SDNV of registered number___/

           Figure 15: Example option value for registered option

   Note that a Registered Option cannot be empty, because there would be



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   no space for the SDNV.  Also, the empty option 14 is reserved for
   fenceposting ([I-D.ietf-core-coap], section 3.2).  (Obviously, once a
   Registered-Elective Option is in use, there is never a need for a
   fence-post for option number 14.)

   The Registered-Elective and Registered-Critical Options are
   repeatable.

   +-----+----------+---------------------+---------+--------+---------+
   | No. | C/E      | Name                | Format  | Length | Default |
   +-----+----------+---------------------+---------+--------+---------+
   | 14  | Elective | Registered-Elective | (see    | 1-1023 | (none)  |
   |     |          |                     | above)  | B      |         |
   |     |          |                     |         |        |         |
   | 25  | Critical | Registered-Critical | (see    | 1-1023 | (none)  |
   |     |          |                     | above)  | B      |         |
   +-----+----------+---------------------+---------+--------+---------+

   This solves CoRE issue #214 [CoRE214].  (How many options we need
   will depend on the resolution of #241 [CoRE241].)

B.2.2.  Opening Up the Option Number Space

   The disadvantage of the registered-... options is that there is a
   significant syntactic difference between options making use of this
   space and the usual standard options.  This creates a problem not
   unlike that decried in [RFC6648].

   The alternative discussed in this section reduces the distance by
   opening up the main Option number space instead.

   There is still a significant incentive to use low-numbered Options.
   However, the proposal reduces the penalty for using a high-numbered
   Option to two or three bytes.  More importantly, using a cluster of
   related high-numbered options only carries a total penalty of two or
   three bytes.

   The main reason high-numbered options are expensive to use and thus
   the total space is relatively limited is that the option delta
   mechanism only allows increasing the current option number by up to
   14 per one-byte fencepost.  To use, e.g., Option number 1234 together
   with the usual set of low-numbered Options, one needs to insert 88
   fence-post bytes.  This is prohibitive.

   Enabling first-come-first-served probably requires easily addressing
   a 16-bit option number space, with some potential increase later in
   the lifetime of the protocol (say, 10 to 15 years from now).




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   To enable the use of large option numbers, one needs a way to advance
   the Option number in bigger steps than possible by the Option Delta.
   So we propose a new construct, the Long Jump construct, to move the
   Option number forward.

B.2.2.1.  Long Jump construct

   The following construct can occur in front of any Option:

     0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | 1   1   1   1 | 0   0   0   1 |  0xf1 (Delta = 15)
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

     0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | 1   1   1   1 | 0   0   1   0 |  0xf2
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   |        Long Jump Value        |  (Delta/8)-2
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

     0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | 1   1   1   1 | 0   0   1   1 |  0xf3
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   |     Long Jump Value, MSB      |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+  (Delta/8)-258
   |     Long Jump Value, LSB      |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                        Figure 16: Long Jump Format

   This construct is not by itself an Option.  It can occur in front of
   any Option to increase the current Option number that then goes into
   its Option number calculation.  The increase is done in multiples of
   eight.  More specifically, the actual addition to the current Option
   number is computed as follows:

      Delta = ((Long Jump Value) + N) * 8

   where N is 2 for the one-byte version and N is 258 for the two-byte
   version.

   A Long Jump MUST be followed by an actual Option, i.e., it MUST NOT
   be followed by another Long Jump or an end-of-options indicator.  A
   message violating this MUST be rejected as malformed.

   Long Jumps do NOT count as Options in the Option Count field of the



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   header (i.e., they cannot by themselves end the Option sequence).

B.2.2.2.  Discussion

   Adding a mechanism at this late stage creates concerns of backwards
   compatibility.  A message sender never needs to implement long-jumps
   unless it wants to make use of a high-numbered option.  So this
   mechanism can be added once a high-numbered option is added.  A
   message receiver, though, would more or less unconditionally have to
   implement the mechanism, leading to unconditional additional
   complexity.  There are good reasons to minimize this, as follows:

   o  The increase in multiples of eight allows looking at an option and
      finding out whether it is critical or not even if the Long Jump
      value has just been skipped (as opposed to having been processed
      fully).  (It also allows accessing up to approximately 2048
      options with a two-byte Long Jump.)  This allows a basic
      implementation that does not implement any high-numbered options
      to simply ignore long jumps and any elective options behind them,
      while still properly reacting to critical options.

   o  There is probably a good reason to disallow long-jumps that lead
      to an option number of 42 and less, enabling simple receivers to
      do the above simplification.

   o  It might seem obvious to remove the fenceposting mechanism
      altogether in favor of long jumps.  This is not advisable:
      Fenceposting already has zero implementation effort at the
      receiver, and the overhead at the sender is very limited (it is
      just a third kind of jump, at one byte per jump).  Beyond 42,
      senders can ignore the existence of fenceposts if they want
      (possibly obviating the need for more complex base-14 arithmetic).

   There is no need for a finer granularity than 8, as the Option
   construct following can also specify a Delta of 0..14.  (A
   granularity of 16 will require additional fenceposting where an
   option delta of 15 would happen to be required otherwise, which we
   have reserved.  It can be argued that 16 is still the better choice,
   as fenceposting is already in the code path.)

   The Long Jump construct takes 0xf1 and 0xf2 from the space available
   for initial bytes of Options.  (Note that we previously took 0xf0 to
   indicate end-of-options for OC=15.)

   Varying N with the length as defined above makes it unambiguous
   whether a one- or two-byte Long Jump is to be used.  Setting N=2 for
   the one-byte version makes it clear that a Delta of 8 is to be
   handled the usual way (i.e., by Option Delta itself and/or



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   fenceposting).  If the delta is not small and not 7 modulo 8, there
   is still a choice between using the smaller multiple of 8 and a
   larger Delta in the actual Option or v.v., this biases the choice
   towards a larger Long Jump and a smaller following Delta, which is
   also easier to implement as it reduces the number of choice points.

B.2.2.3.  Example

   The following sequence of bytes would encode a Uri-Path Option of
   "foo" followed by Options 1357 (value "bar") and 1360 (value "baz"):

   93 65 6f 6f       Option 9 (0 + 9, "foo")
   f1 a6             Long Jump by 1344
   43 62 61 72       Option 1357 (9 + 1344 + 4, "bar")
   33 62 61 7a       Option 1360 (1357 + 3, "baz")

              Figure 17: Example using a Long Jump construct

   where f1 a6 is the long jump forward by (0xa6+2)*8=1344 option
   numbers.  The total option count (OC) for the CoAP header is 3.  Note
   that even if f1 a6 is skipped, the 1357 (which then appears as an
   Option number 13) is clearly visible as Critical.

B.2.2.4.  IANA considerations

   With the scheme proposed above, we could have three tiers of Option
   Numbers:

                +---------------+-------------------------+
                | Option Number | Policy [RFC5226]        |
                +---------------+-------------------------+
                |        0..255 | Standards Action        |
                |               |                         |
                |     256..2047 | Designated Expert       |
                |               |                         |
                |   2048..65535 | First Come First Served |
                +---------------+-------------------------+

   For the inventor of a new option, this would provide a small
   incentive to go through the designated expert for some minimal cross-
   checking in order to be able to use the two-byte long-jump.

   This draft adds option numbers to Table 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap]:








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               +--------+---------------------+-----------+
               | Number | Name                | Reference |
               +--------+---------------------+-----------+
               | 14     | Registered-Elective | [RFCXXXX] |
               |        |                     |           |
               | 25     | Registered-Critical | [RFCXXXX] |
               +--------+---------------------+-----------+

                     Table 1: New CoAP Option Numbers

   This draft adds a suboption registry, initially empty.

         +------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
         | Number     | Name                        | Reference |
         +------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
         | 0..127     | (allocate on export review) | [RFCXXXX] |
         |            |                             |           |
         | 128..16383 | (allocate fcfs)             | [RFCXXXX] |
         +------------+-----------------------------+-----------+

                      Table 2: CoAP Suboption Numbers

B.3.  Enabling Protocol Evolution

   To enable a protocol to evolve, it is critical that new capabilities
   can be introduced without requiring changes in components that don't
   really care about the capability.  One such probem is exhibited by
   CoAP options: If a proxy does not understand an elective option in a
   request, it will not be able to forward it to the origin server,
   rendering the new option ineffectual.  Worse, if a proxy does not
   understand a critical option in a request, it will not be able to
   operate on the request, rendering the new option damaging.

   As a conclusion to the Ticket #230 discussion in the June 4th interim
   call, we decided to solve the identification of options that a proxy
   can safely forward even if not understood (previously called Proxy-
   Elective).

   The proposal is to encode this information in the option number, just
   like the way the information that an option is critical is encoded
   now.  This leads to two bits with semantics: the lowest bit continues
   to be the critical bit, and the next higher bit is now the "unsafe"
   bit (i.e., this option is not safe to forward unless understood by
   the proxy).

   Another consideration (for options that are not unsafe to forward) is
   whether the option should serve as a cache key in a request.  HTTP
   has a vary header that indicates in the response which header fields



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   were considered by the origin server to be cache keys.  In order to
   avoid this complexity, we should be able to indicate this information
   right in the option number.  However, reserving another bit is
   wasteful, in particular as there are few safe-to-forward options that
   are not cache-keys.

   Therefore, we propose the following bit allocation in an option
   number:

   xxx nnn UC

                                 Figure 18

   (where xxx is a variable length prefix, as option numbers are not
   bounded upwards).  UC is the unsafe and critical bits.  For U=0 only,
   if nnn is equal to 111 binary, the option does not serve as a cache
   key (for U=1, the proxy has to know the option to act on it, so there
   is no point in indicating whether it is a cache key).  There is no
   semantic meaning of xxx.

   Note that clients and servers are generally not interested in this
   information.  A proxy may use an equivalent of the following C code
   to derive the characteristics of an option number "onum":

   Critical = (onum & 1);
   UnSafe = (onum & 2);
   NoCache = ((onum & 0x1e) == 0x1c);

                                 Figure 19

   Discussion:  This requires a renumbering of all options.

      This renumbering may also be considered as an opportunity to make
      the numbering straight again shortly before nailing down the
      protocol

      In particular, Content-Type is now probably better considered to
      be elective.

B.3.1.  Potential new option number allocation

   We want to give one example for a revised allocation of option
   numbers.  Option numbers are given as decimal numbers, one each for
   xxx, nnn, and UC, with the UC values as follows







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      +-----------+------------+------------------------------------+
      | UC binary | UC decimal | meaning                            |
      +-----------+------------+------------------------------------+
      | 00        | 0          | (safe, elective, 111=no-cache-key) |
      |           |            |                                    |
      | 01        | 1          | (safe, critical, 111=no-cache-key) |
      |           |            |                                    |
      | 10        | 2          | (unsafe, elective)                 |
      |           |            |                                    |
      | 11        | 3          | (unsafe, critical)                 |
      +-----------+------------+------------------------------------+

   The table is:

   +-----+---------+-------+-------------------+-----------------------+
   | New | xx nnn  | Old   | Name              | Comment               |
   |     | UC      |       |                   |                       |
   +-----+---------+-------+-------------------+-----------------------+
   | 4   | 0 1 0   | 1     | Content-Type      | category change       |
   |     |         |       |                   | (elective)            |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 8   | 0 2 0   | 4     | ETag              |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 12  | 0 3 0   | 12    | Accept            |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 16  | 0 4 0   | 6     | Location-Path     |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 20  | 0 5 0   | 8     | Location-Query    |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 24  | 0 6 0   | -     | (unused)          |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 28  | 0 7 0   | 18    | Size              | needs nnn=111         |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 32  | 1 0 0   | 20/22 | Patience          |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 64  | 2 x 0   | -     | Location-reserved | (nnn = 0..3, 4        |
   |     |         |       |                   | reserved numbers)     |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 1   | 0 0 1   | 13    | If-Match          |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 5   | 0 1 1   | 21    | If-None-Match     |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 2   | 0 0 2   | 2     | Max-Age           |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 6   | 0 1 2   | 10    | Observe           |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 10  | 0 2 2   | xx    | Observe-2         |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |



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   | 14  | 0 3 2   | xx    | (unused)          | was fencepost         |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 3   | 0 0 3   | 3     | Proxy-Uri         |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 7   | 0 1 3   | 5     | Uri-Host          |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 11  | 0 2 3   | 7     | Uri-Port          |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 15  | 0 3 3   | 9     | Uri-Path          |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 19  | 0 4 3   | 15    | Uri-Query         |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 23  | 0 5 3   | 11    | Token             |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 27  | 0 6 3   | 17    | Block2            |                       |
   |     |         |       |                   |                       |
   | 31  | 0 7 3   | 19    | Block1            | yes, we can use       |
   |     |         |       |                   | nnn=111 with U=1      |
   +-----+---------+-------+-------------------+-----------------------+

B.4.  Patience, Leisure, and Pledge

   A number of options might be useful for controlling the timing of
   interactions.

   (This section also addresses core-coap ticket #177.)

B.4.1.  Patience

   A client may have a limited time period in which it can actually make
   use of the response for a request.  Using the Patience option, it can
   provide an (elective) indication how much time it is willing to wait
   for the response from the server, giving the server license to ignore
   or reject the request if it cannot fulfill it in this period.

   If the server knows early that it cannot fulfill the request in the
   time requested, it MAY indicate this with a 5.04 "Timeout" response.
   For non-safe methods (such as PUT, POST, DELETE), the server SHOULD
   indicate whether it has fulfilled the request by either responding
   with 5.04 "Timeout" (and not further processing the request) or by
   processing the request normally.

   Note that the value of the Patience option should be chosen such that
   the client will be able to make use of the result even in the
   presence of the expected network delays for the request and the
   response.  Similarly, when a proxy receives a request with a Patience
   option and cannot fulfill that request from its cache, it may want to
   adjust the value of the option before forwarding it to an upstream



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   server.

   (TBD: The various cases that arise when combining Patience with
   Observe.)

   The Patience option is elective.  Hence, a client MUST be prepared to
   receive a normal response even after the chosen Patience period (plus
   an allowance for network delays) has elapsed.

B.4.2.  Leisure

   Servers generally will compute an internal value that we will call
   Leisure, which indicates the period of time that will be used for
   responding to a request.  A Patience option, if present, can be used
   as an upper bound for the Leisure.  Leisure may be non-zero for
   congestion control reasons, in particular for responses to multicast
   requests.  For these, the server should have a group size estimate G,
   a target rate R (which both should be chosen conservatively) and an
   estimated response size S; a rough lower bound for Leisure can then
   be computed as follows:

     lb_Leisure = S * G / R

            Figure 20: Computing a lower bound for the Leisure

   E.g., for a multicast request with link-local scope on an 2.4 GHz
   IEEE 802.15.4 (6LoWPAN) network, G could be (relatively
   conservatively) set to 100, S to 100 bytes, and the target rate to 8
   kbit/s = 1 kB/s.  The resulting lower bound for the Leisure is 10
   seconds.

   To avoid response implosion, responses to multicast requests SHOULD
   be dithered within a Leisure period chosen by the server to fall
   between these two bounds.

   Currently, we don't foresee a need to signal a value for Leisure from
   client to server (beyond the signalling provided by Patience) or from
   server to client, but an appropriate Option might be added later.

B.4.3.  Pledge

   In a basic observation relationship [I-D.ietf-core-observe], the
   server makes a pledge to keep the client in the observation
   relationship for a resource at least until the max-age for the
   resource is reached.

   To save the client some effort in re-establishing observation
   relationships each time max-age is reached, the server MAY want to



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   extend its pledge beyond the end of max-age by signalling in a
   response/notification an additional time period using the Pledge
   Option, in parallel to the Observe Option.

   The Pledge Option MUST NOT be used unless the server can make a
   reasonable promise not to lose the observation relationship in this
   time frame.

   Currently, we don't foresee a need to signal a value for Pledge from
   client to server, but an appropriate behavior might be added later
   for this option when sent in a request.

B.4.4.  Option Formats

    +-----+----------+----------+-----------------+--------+---------+
    | No. | C/E      | Name     | Format          | Length | Default |
    +-----+----------+----------+-----------------+--------+---------+
    | 22  | Elective | Patience | Duration in mis | 1 B    | (none)  |
    |     |          |          |                 |        |         |
    | 24  | Elective | Pledge   | Duration in s   | 1 B    | 0       |
    +-----+----------+----------+-----------------+--------+---------+

   All timing options use the Duration data type (see Appendix D.2),
   however Patience (and Leisure, if that ever becomes an option) uses a
   timebase of mibiseconds (mis = 1/1024 s) instead of seconds.  (This
   reduces the range of the Duration from ~ 91 days to 128 minutes.)

   Implementation note:  As there are no strong accuracy requirements on
      the clocks employed, making use of any existing time base of
      milliseconds is a valid implementation approach (2.4 % off).

   None of the options may be repeated.



















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Appendix C.  The Cemetery (Things we won't do)

   This annex documents roads that the WG decided not to take, in order
   to spare readers from reinventing them in vain.

C.1.  Example envelope option: solving #230

   Ticket #230 [CoRE230] points out a design flaw of
   [I-D.ietf-core-coap]: When we split the elective Location option of
   draft -01 into multiple elective options, we made it possible that an
   implementation might process some of these and ignore others, leading
   to an incorrect interpretation of the Location expressed by the
   server.

   There are several more or less savory solutions to #230.

   Each of the elective options that together make up the Location could
   be defined in such a way that it makes a requirement on the
   processing of the related option (essentially revoking their elective
   status once the option under consideration is actually processed).
   This falls flat as soon as another option is defined that would also
   become part of the Location: existing implementations would not know
   that the new option is also part of the cluster that is re-
   interpreted as critical.  The potential future addition of Location-
   Host and Location-Port makes this a valid consideration.

   A better solution would be to define an elective Envelope Option
   called Location.  Within a Location Option, the following top-level
   options might be allowed (now or in the future):

   o  Uri-Host

   o  Uri-Port

   o  Uri-Path

   o  Uri-Query

   This would unify the code for interpreting the top-level request
   options that indicate the request URI with the code that interprets
   the Location URI.

   The four options listed are all critical, while the envelope is
   elective.  This gives exactly the desired semantics: If the envelope
   is processed at all (which is elective), the nested options are
   critical and all need to be processed.





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C.2.  Example envelope option: proxy-elective options

   Another potential application of envelope options is motivated by the
   observation that new critical options might not be implemented by all
   proxies on the CoAP path to an origin server.  So that this does not
   become an obstacle to introducing new critical options that are of
   interest only to client and origin server, the client might want to
   mark some critical options proxy-elective, i.e. elective for a proxy
   but still critical for the origin server.

   One way to do this would be an Envelope option, the Proxy-Elective
   Option.  A client might bundle a number of critical options into a
   critical Proxy-Elective Option.  A proxy that processes the message
   is obliged to process the envelope (or reject the message), where
   processing means passing on the nested options towards the origin
   server (preferably again within a Proxy-Elective option).  It can
   pass on the nested options, even ones unknown to the proxy, knowing
   that the client is happy with proxies not processing all of them.

   (The assumption here is that the Proxy-Elective option becomes part
   of the base standard, so all but the most basic proxies would know
   how to handle it.)

C.3.  Stateful URI compression

   Is the approximately 25 % average saving achievable with Huffman-
   based URI compression schemes worth the complexity?  Probably not,
   because much higher average savings can be achieved by introducing
   state.

   Henning Schulzrinne has proposed for a server to be able to supply a
   shortened URI once a resource has been requested using the full-
   length URI.  Let's call such a shortened referent a _Temporary
   Resource Identifier_, _TeRI_ for short.  This could be expressed by a
   response option as shown in Figure 21.

           0
           0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
          +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
          |    duration   |    TeRI...
          +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 21: Option for offering a TeRI in a response

   The TeRI offer option indicates that the server promises to offer
   this resources under the TeRI given for at least the time given as
   the duration.  Another TeRI offer can be made later to extend the
   duration.



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   Once a TeRI for a URI is known (and still within its lifetime), the
   client can supply a TeRI instead of a URI in its requests.  The same
   option format as an offer could be used to allow the client to
   indicate how long it believes the TeRI will still be valid (so that
   the server can decide when to update the lifetime duration).  TeRIs
   in requests could be distinguished from URIs e.g. by using a
   different option number.

   Proposal:  Add a TeRI option that can be used in CoAP requests and
      responses.

      Add a way to indicate a TeRI and its duration in a link-value.

      Do not add any form of stateless URI encoding.

   Benefits:  Much higher reduction of message size than any stateless
      URI encoding could achieve.

      As the use of TeRIs is entirely optional, minimal complexity nodes
      can get by without implementing them.

   Drawbacks:  Adds considerable state and complexity to the protocol.

      It turns out that real CoAP URIs are short enough that TeRIs are
      not needed.

      (Discuss the security implications of TeRIs.)
























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Appendix D.  Experimental Options

   This annex documents proposals that need significant additional
   discussion before they can become part of (or go back to) the main
   CoAP specification.  They are not dead, but might die if there turns
   out to be no good way to solve the problem.

D.1.  Options indicating absolute time

   HTTP has a number of headers that may indicate absolute time:

   o  "Date", defined in Section 14.18 in [RFC2616] (Section 9.3 in
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]), giving the absolute time a
      response was generated;

   o  "Last-Modified", defined in Section 14.29 in [RFC2616], (Section
      6.6 in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional], giving the absolute time
      of when the origin server believes the resource representation was
      last modified;

   o  "If-Modified-Since", defined in Section 14.25 in [RFC2616],
      "If-Unmodified-Since", defined in Section 14.28 in [RFC2616], and
      "If-Range", defined in Section 14.27 in [RFC2616] can be used to
      supply absolute time to gate a conditional request;

   o  "Expires", defined in Section 14.21 in [RFC2616] (Section 3.3 in
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p6-cache]), giving the absolute time after which
      a response is considered stale.

   o  The more obscure headers "Retry-After", defined in Section 14.37
      in [RFC2616], and "Warning", defined in section 14.46 in
      [RFC2616], also may employ absolute time.

   [I-D.ietf-core-coap] defines a single "Date" option, which however
   "indicates the creation time and date of a given resource
   representation", i.e., is closer to a "Last-Modified" HTTP header.
   HTTP's caching rules [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p6-cache] make use of both
   "Date" and "Last-Modified", combined with "Expires".  The specific
   semantics required for CoAP needs further consideration.

   In addition to the definition of the semantics, an encoding for
   absolute times needs to be specified.

   In UNIX-related systems, it is customary to indicate absolute time as
   an integer number of seconds, after midnight UTC, January 1, 1970.
   Unless negative numbers are employed, this time format cannot
   represent time values prior to January 1, 1970, which probably is not
   required for the uses ob absolute time in CoAP.



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   If a 32-bit integer is used and allowance is made for a sign-bit in a
   local implementation, the latest UTC time value that can be
   represented by the resulting 31 bit integer value is 03:14:07 on
   January 19, 2038.  If the 32-bit integer is used as an unsigned
   value, the last date is 2106-02-07, 06:28:15.

   The reach can be extended by: - moving the epoch forward, e.g. by 40
   years (= 1262304000 seconds) to 2010-01-01.  This makes it impossible
   to represent Last-Modified times in that past (such as could be
   gatewayed in from HTTP). - extending the number of bits, e.g. by one
   more byte, either always or as one of two formats, keeping the 32-bit
   variant as well.

   Also, the resolution can be extended by expressing time in
   milliseconds etc., requiring even more bits (e.g., a 48-bit unsigned
   integer of milliseconds would last well after year 9999.)

   For experiments, an experimental "Date" option is defined with the
   semantics of HTTP's "Last-Modified".  It can carry an unsigned
   integer of 32, 40, or 48 bits; 32- and 40-bit integers indicate the
   absolute time in seconds since 1970-01-01 00:00 UTC, while 48-bit
   integers indicate the absolute time in milliseconds since 1970-01-01
   00:00 UTC.

   However, that option is not really that useful until there is a
   "If-Modified-Since" option as well.

   (Also: Discuss nodes without clocks.)

D.2.  Representing Durations

   Various message types used in CoAP need the representation of
   *durations*, i.e. of the length of a timespan.  In SI units, these
   are measured in seconds.  CoAP durations represent integer numbers of
   seconds, but instead of representing these numbers as integers, a
   more compact single-byte pseudo-floating-point (pseudo-FP)
   representation is used (Figure 22).

     0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | 0...          value           |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   | 1... mantissa |    exponent   |
   +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+





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           Figure 22: Duration in (8,4) pseudo-FP representation

   If the high bit is clear, the entire n-bit value (including the high
   bit) is the decoded value.  If the high bit is set, the mantissa
   (including the high bit, with the exponent field cleared out but
   still present) is shifted left by the exponent to yield the decoded
   value.

   The (n,e)-pseudo-FP format can be decoded with a single line of code
   (plus a couple of constant definitions), as demonstrated in
   Figure 23.

   #define N 8
   #define E 4
   #define HIBIT (1 << (N - 1))
   #define EMASK ((1 << E) - 1)
   #define MMASK ((1 << N) - 1 - EMASK)

   #define DECODE_8_4(r) (r < HIBIT ? r : (r & MMASK) << (r & EMASK))


               Figure 23: Decoding an (8,4) pseudo-FP value

   Note that a pseudo-FP encoder needs to consider rounding; different
   applications of durations may favor rounding up or rounding down the
   value encoded in the message.

   The highest pseudo-FP value, represented by an all-ones byte (0xFF),
   is reserved to indicate an indefinite duration.  The next lower value
   (0xEF) is thus the highest representable value and is decoded as
   7340032 seconds, a little more than 12 weeks.

D.3.  Rationale

   Where CPU power and memory is abundant, a duration can almost always
   be adequately represented by a non-negative floating-point number
   representing that number of seconds.  Historically, many APIs have
   also used an integer representation, which limits both the resolution
   (e.g., if the integer represents the duration in seconds) and often
   the range (integer machine types have range limits that may become
   relevant).  UNIX's "time_t" (which is used for both absolute time and
   durations) originally was a signed 32-bit value of seconds, but was
   later complemented by an additional integer to add microsecond
   ("struct timeval") and then later nanosecond ("struct timespec")
   resolution.

   Three decisions need to be made for each application of the concept
   of duration:



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   o  the *resolution*.  What rounding error is acceptable?

   o  the *range*.  What is the maximum duration that needs to be
      represented?

   o  the *number of bits* that can be expended.

   Obviously, these decisions are interrelated.  Typically, a large
   range needs a large number of bits, unless resolution is traded.  For
   most applications, the actual requirement for resolution are limited
   for longer durations, but can be more acute for shorter durations.

D.4.  Pseudo-Floating Point

   Constrained systems typically avoid the use of floating-point (FP)
   values, as

   o  simple CPUs often don't have support for floating-point datatypes

   o  software floating-point libraries are expensive in code size and
      slow.

   In addition, floating-point datatypes used to be a significant
   element of market differentiation in CPU design; it has taken the
   industry a long time to agree on a standard floating point
   representation.

   These issues have led to protocols that try to constrain themselves
   to integer representation even where the ability of a floating point
   representation to trade range for resolution would be beneficial.

   The idea of introducing _pseudo-FP_ is to obtain the increased range
   provided by embedding an exponent, without necessarily getting stuck
   with hardware datatypes or inefficient software floating-point
   libraries.

   For the purposes of this draft, we define an (n,e)-pseudo-FP as a
   fixed-length value of n bits, e of which may be used for an exponent.
   Figure 22 illustrates an (8,4)-pseudo-FP value.

   If the high bit is clear, the entire n-bit value (including the high
   bit) is the decoded value.  If the high bit is set, the mantissa
   (including the high bit, but with the exponent field cleared out) is
   shifted left by the exponent to yield the decoded value.

   The (n,e)-pseudo-FP format can be decoded with a single line of code
   (plus a couple of constant definition), as demonstrated in Figure 23.




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   Only non-negative numbers can be represented by this format.  It is
   designed to provide full integer resolution for values from 0 to
   2^(n-1)-1, i.e., 0 to 127 in the (8,4) case, and a mantissa of n-e
   bits from 2^(n-1) to (2^n-2^e)*2^(2^e-1), i.e., 128 to 7864320 in the
   (8,4) case.  By choosing e carefully, resolution can be traded
   against range.

   Note that a pseudo-FP encoder needs to consider rounding; different
   applications of durations may favor rounding up or rounding down the
   value encoded in the message.  This requires a little more than a
   single line of code (which is left as an exercise to the reader, as
   the most efficient expression depends on hardware details).

D.5.  A Duration Type for CoAP

   CoAP needs durations in a number of places.  In [I-D.ietf-core-coap],
   durations occur in the option "Subscription-lifetime" as well as in
   the option "Max-age".  (Note that the option "Date" is not a
   duration, but a point in time.)  Other durations of this kind may be
   added later.

   Most durations relevant to CoAP are best expressed with a minimum
   resolution of one second.  More detailed resolutions are unlikely to
   provide much benefit.

   The range of lifetimes and caching ages are probably best kept below
   the order of magnitude of months.  An (8,4)-pseudo-FP has the maximum
   value of 7864320, which is about 91 days; this appears to be adequate
   for a subscription lifetime and probably even for a maximum cache
   age.  Figure 24 shows the values that can be expressed.  (If a larger
   range for the latter is indeed desired, an (8,5)-pseudo-FP could be
   used; this would last 15 milleniums, at the cost of having only 3
   bits of accuracy for values larger than 127 seconds.)

   Proposal:  A single duration type is used throughout CoAP, based on
      an (8,4)-pseudo-FP giving a duration in seconds.

   Benefits:  Implementations can use a single piece of code for
      managing all CoAP-related durations.

      In addition, length information never needs to be managed for
      durations that are embedded in other data structures: All
      durations are expressed by a single byte.

   It might be worthwhile to reserve one duration value, e.g. 0xFF, for
   an indefinite duration.

       Duration     Seconds     Encoded



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       -----------  ----------  -------
          00:00:00  0x00000000  0x00
          00:00:01  0x00000001  0x01
          00:00:02  0x00000002  0x02
          00:00:03  0x00000003  0x03
          00:00:04  0x00000004  0x04
          00:00:05  0x00000005  0x05
          00:00:06  0x00000006  0x06
          00:00:07  0x00000007  0x07
          00:00:08  0x00000008  0x08
          00:00:09  0x00000009  0x09
          00:00:10  0x0000000a  0x0a
          00:00:11  0x0000000b  0x0b
          00:00:12  0x0000000c  0x0c
          00:00:13  0x0000000d  0x0d
          00:00:14  0x0000000e  0x0e
          00:00:15  0x0000000f  0x0f
          00:00:16  0x00000010  0x10
          00:00:17  0x00000011  0x11
          00:00:18  0x00000012  0x12
          00:00:19  0x00000013  0x13
          00:00:20  0x00000014  0x14
          00:00:21  0x00000015  0x15
          00:00:22  0x00000016  0x16
          00:00:23  0x00000017  0x17
          00:00:24  0x00000018  0x18
          00:00:25  0x00000019  0x19
          00:00:26  0x0000001a  0x1a
          00:00:27  0x0000001b  0x1b
          00:00:28  0x0000001c  0x1c
          00:00:29  0x0000001d  0x1d
          00:00:30  0x0000001e  0x1e
          00:00:31  0x0000001f  0x1f
          00:00:32  0x00000020  0x20
          00:00:33  0x00000021  0x21
          00:00:34  0x00000022  0x22
          00:00:35  0x00000023  0x23
          00:00:36  0x00000024  0x24
          00:00:37  0x00000025  0x25
          00:00:38  0x00000026  0x26
          00:00:39  0x00000027  0x27
          00:00:40  0x00000028  0x28
          00:00:41  0x00000029  0x29
          00:00:42  0x0000002a  0x2a
          00:00:43  0x0000002b  0x2b
          00:00:44  0x0000002c  0x2c
          00:00:45  0x0000002d  0x2d
          00:00:46  0x0000002e  0x2e



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          00:00:47  0x0000002f  0x2f
          00:00:48  0x00000030  0x30
          00:00:49  0x00000031  0x31
          00:00:50  0x00000032  0x32
          00:00:51  0x00000033  0x33
          00:00:52  0x00000034  0x34
          00:00:53  0x00000035  0x35
          00:00:54  0x00000036  0x36
          00:00:55  0x00000037  0x37
          00:00:56  0x00000038  0x38
          00:00:57  0x00000039  0x39
          00:00:58  0x0000003a  0x3a
          00:00:59  0x0000003b  0x3b
          00:01:00  0x0000003c  0x3c
          00:01:01  0x0000003d  0x3d
          00:01:02  0x0000003e  0x3e
          00:01:03  0x0000003f  0x3f
          00:01:04  0x00000040  0x40
          00:01:05  0x00000041  0x41
          00:01:06  0x00000042  0x42
          00:01:07  0x00000043  0x43
          00:01:08  0x00000044  0x44
          00:01:09  0x00000045  0x45
          00:01:10  0x00000046  0x46
          00:01:11  0x00000047  0x47
          00:01:12  0x00000048  0x48
          00:01:13  0x00000049  0x49
          00:01:14  0x0000004a  0x4a
          00:01:15  0x0000004b  0x4b
          00:01:16  0x0000004c  0x4c
          00:01:17  0x0000004d  0x4d
          00:01:18  0x0000004e  0x4e
          00:01:19  0x0000004f  0x4f
          00:01:20  0x00000050  0x50
          00:01:21  0x00000051  0x51
          00:01:22  0x00000052  0x52
          00:01:23  0x00000053  0x53
          00:01:24  0x00000054  0x54
          00:01:25  0x00000055  0x55
          00:01:26  0x00000056  0x56
          00:01:27  0x00000057  0x57
          00:01:28  0x00000058  0x58
          00:01:29  0x00000059  0x59
          00:01:30  0x0000005a  0x5a
          00:01:31  0x0000005b  0x5b
          00:01:32  0x0000005c  0x5c
          00:01:33  0x0000005d  0x5d
          00:01:34  0x0000005e  0x5e



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          00:01:35  0x0000005f  0x5f
          00:01:36  0x00000060  0x60
          00:01:37  0x00000061  0x61
          00:01:38  0x00000062  0x62
          00:01:39  0x00000063  0x63
          00:01:40  0x00000064  0x64
          00:01:41  0x00000065  0x65
          00:01:42  0x00000066  0x66
          00:01:43  0x00000067  0x67
          00:01:44  0x00000068  0x68
          00:01:45  0x00000069  0x69
          00:01:46  0x0000006a  0x6a
          00:01:47  0x0000006b  0x6b
          00:01:48  0x0000006c  0x6c
          00:01:49  0x0000006d  0x6d
          00:01:50  0x0000006e  0x6e
          00:01:51  0x0000006f  0x6f
          00:01:52  0x00000070  0x70
          00:01:53  0x00000071  0x71
          00:01:54  0x00000072  0x72
          00:01:55  0x00000073  0x73
          00:01:56  0x00000074  0x74
          00:01:57  0x00000075  0x75
          00:01:58  0x00000076  0x76
          00:01:59  0x00000077  0x77
          00:02:00  0x00000078  0x78
          00:02:01  0x00000079  0x79
          00:02:02  0x0000007a  0x7a
          00:02:03  0x0000007b  0x7b
          00:02:04  0x0000007c  0x7c
          00:02:05  0x0000007d  0x7d
          00:02:06  0x0000007e  0x7e
          00:02:07  0x0000007f  0x7f
          00:02:08  0x00000080  0x80
          00:02:24  0x00000090  0x90
          00:02:40  0x000000a0  0xa0
          00:02:56  0x000000b0  0xb0
          00:03:12  0x000000c0  0xc0
          00:03:28  0x000000d0  0xd0
          00:03:44  0x000000e0  0xe0
          00:04:00  0x000000f0  0xf0
          00:04:16  0x00000100  0x81
          00:04:48  0x00000120  0x91
          00:05:20  0x00000140  0xa1
          00:05:52  0x00000160  0xb1
          00:06:24  0x00000180  0xc1
          00:06:56  0x000001a0  0xd1
          00:07:28  0x000001c0  0xe1



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          00:08:00  0x000001e0  0xf1
          00:08:32  0x00000200  0x82
          00:09:36  0x00000240  0x92
          00:10:40  0x00000280  0xa2
          00:11:44  0x000002c0  0xb2
          00:12:48  0x00000300  0xc2
          00:13:52  0x00000340  0xd2
          00:14:56  0x00000380  0xe2
          00:16:00  0x000003c0  0xf2
          00:17:04  0x00000400  0x83
          00:19:12  0x00000480  0x93
          00:21:20  0x00000500  0xa3
          00:23:28  0x00000580  0xb3
          00:25:36  0x00000600  0xc3
          00:27:44  0x00000680  0xd3
          00:29:52  0x00000700  0xe3
          00:32:00  0x00000780  0xf3
          00:34:08  0x00000800  0x84
          00:38:24  0x00000900  0x94
          00:42:40  0x00000a00  0xa4
          00:46:56  0x00000b00  0xb4
          00:51:12  0x00000c00  0xc4
          00:55:28  0x00000d00  0xd4
          00:59:44  0x00000e00  0xe4
          01:04:00  0x00000f00  0xf4
          01:08:16  0x00001000  0x85
          01:16:48  0x00001200  0x95
          01:25:20  0x00001400  0xa5
          01:33:52  0x00001600  0xb5
          01:42:24  0x00001800  0xc5
          01:50:56  0x00001a00  0xd5
          01:59:28  0x00001c00  0xe5
          02:08:00  0x00001e00  0xf5
          02:16:32  0x00002000  0x86
          02:33:36  0x00002400  0x96
          02:50:40  0x00002800  0xa6
          03:07:44  0x00002c00  0xb6
          03:24:48  0x00003000  0xc6
          03:41:52  0x00003400  0xd6
          03:58:56  0x00003800  0xe6
          04:16:00  0x00003c00  0xf6
          04:33:04  0x00004000  0x87
          05:07:12  0x00004800  0x97
          05:41:20  0x00005000  0xa7
          06:15:28  0x00005800  0xb7
          06:49:36  0x00006000  0xc7
          07:23:44  0x00006800  0xd7
          07:57:52  0x00007000  0xe7



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          08:32:00  0x00007800  0xf7
          09:06:08  0x00008000  0x88
          10:14:24  0x00009000  0x98
          11:22:40  0x0000a000  0xa8
          12:30:56  0x0000b000  0xb8
          13:39:12  0x0000c000  0xc8
          14:47:28  0x0000d000  0xd8
          15:55:44  0x0000e000  0xe8
          17:04:00  0x0000f000  0xf8
          18:12:16  0x00010000  0x89
          20:28:48  0x00012000  0x99
          22:45:20  0x00014000  0xa9
       1d 01:01:52  0x00016000  0xb9
       1d 03:18:24  0x00018000  0xc9
       1d 05:34:56  0x0001a000  0xd9
       1d 07:51:28  0x0001c000  0xe9
       1d 10:08:00  0x0001e000  0xf9
       1d 12:24:32  0x00020000  0x8a
       1d 16:57:36  0x00024000  0x9a
       1d 21:30:40  0x00028000  0xaa
       2d 02:03:44  0x0002c000  0xba
       2d 06:36:48  0x00030000  0xca
       2d 11:09:52  0x00034000  0xda
       2d 15:42:56  0x00038000  0xea
       2d 20:16:00  0x0003c000  0xfa
       3d 00:49:04  0x00040000  0x8b
       3d 09:55:12  0x00048000  0x9b
       3d 19:01:20  0x00050000  0xab
       4d 04:07:28  0x00058000  0xbb
       4d 13:13:36  0x00060000  0xcb
       4d 22:19:44  0x00068000  0xdb
       5d 07:25:52  0x00070000  0xeb
       5d 16:32:00  0x00078000  0xfb
       6d 01:38:08  0x00080000  0x8c
       6d 19:50:24  0x00090000  0x9c
       7d 14:02:40  0x000a0000  0xac
       8d 08:14:56  0x000b0000  0xbc
       9d 02:27:12  0x000c0000  0xcc
       9d 20:39:28  0x000d0000  0xdc
      10d 14:51:44  0x000e0000  0xec
      11d 09:04:00  0x000f0000  0xfc
      12d 03:16:16  0x00100000  0x8d
      13d 15:40:48  0x00120000  0x9d
      15d 04:05:20  0x00140000  0xad
      16d 16:29:52  0x00160000  0xbd
      18d 04:54:24  0x00180000  0xcd
      19d 17:18:56  0x001a0000  0xdd
      21d 05:43:28  0x001c0000  0xed



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      22d 18:08:00  0x001e0000  0xfd
      24d 06:32:32  0x00200000  0x8e
      27d 07:21:36  0x00240000  0x9e
      30d 08:10:40  0x00280000  0xae
      33d 08:59:44  0x002c0000  0xbe
      36d 09:48:48  0x00300000  0xce
      39d 10:37:52  0x00340000  0xde
      42d 11:26:56  0x00380000  0xee
      45d 12:16:00  0x003c0000  0xfe
      48d 13:05:04  0x00400000  0x8f
      54d 14:43:12  0x00480000  0x9f
      60d 16:21:20  0x00500000  0xaf
      66d 17:59:28  0x00580000  0xbf
      72d 19:37:36  0x00600000  0xcf
      78d 21:15:44  0x00680000  0xdf
      84d 22:53:52  0x00700000  0xef
      91d 00:32:00  0x00780000  0xff (reserved)

                                 Figure 24
































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Authors' Addresses

   Carsten Bormann
   Universitaet Bremen TZI
   Postfach 330440
   Bremen  D-28359
   Germany

   Phone: +49-421-218-63921
   Email: cabo@tzi.org


   Klaus Hartke
   Universitaet Bremen TZI
   Postfach 330440
   Bremen  D-28359
   Germany

   Phone: +49-421-218-63905
   Email: hartke@tzi.org































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