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IPv6 over Low Power WPAN (6lowpan)                               S. Park
Internet-Draft                                       Samsung Electronics
Intended status: Informational                                    K. Kim
Expires: September 16, 2011                              Ajou University
                                                         W. Haddad (Ed.)
                                                          S. Chakrabarti
                                                                Ericsson
                                                             J. Laganier
                                                                 Juniper
                                                          March 15, 2011


               IPv6 over Low Power WPAN Security Analysis
               draft-daniel-6lowpan-security-analysis-05

Abstract

   This document discusses possible threats and security options for
   IPv6-over-IEEE802.15.4 networks.  Its goal is to raise awareness
   about security issues in IPv6 lowPan networks.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 16, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Security Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  Assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9.  6Lowpan Security Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     9.1.  IEEE 802.15.4 Security analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     9.2.  IP Security analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   10. Key Management in 6Lowpan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     10.1. Existing Key Management Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     10.2. Issues With Key Management in 6Lowpan  . . . . . . . . . . 18
   11. Security Consideration in Bootstrapping a 6lowpan Node . . . . 19
   12. Possible Scenarios Using Different Levels of Security  . . . . 20
   13. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   14. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   16. No I-D References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26



















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1.  Introduction

   IEEE 802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4] specification defines Physical and MAC
   layers targeted for the Low Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-
   WPAN) using short distance applications with low power and low cost
   communication networks, particularly for the short range applications
   such as Wireless Sensors Network (WSN).  In an IEEE 802.15.4
   compliant WPAN, a central controller device, i.e., the PAN
   coordinator, builds a WPAN with other devices within a small physical
   space known as the personal operating system.  IEEE 802.15.4 is
   designed to support a variety of applications in personal area
   networks; many of these applications are security sensitive.  The
   principal goal of the 6lowpan working group is to design IPv6
   transmission over IEEE 802.15.4.

   In fact, some of the IEEE 802.15.4 optional features actually reduce
   security and implementation would be limited for their extensions.
   The applications range from defense systems to building monitoring,
   fire-safety, patient monitoring, etc.  If the network is not secured,
   an intruder can inject incorrect messages to trigger false
   situations.

   IEEE 802.15.4 working group is trying to improving the link-layer
   security specification.  However, this document will focus on
   discussing different security threats from the 6lowpan perspective
   and discuss different options for applying existing security methods
   to overcome/alleviate these threats.  The main goal is to provide a
   trust model using both link-layer and IP layer security packages
   whenever possible.

   Designing a new security protocol for 6lowpan network is out of scope
   of this document.  However, the document states desired security
   requirements, which can be fed into the appropriate IETF security
   working group in order to design appropriate security protocols.

















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2.  Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].














































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3.  Terminology

   This document uses terminology specific to IPv6 and DHCPv6 as defined
   in the "Terminology" section of the DHCPv6 specification [RFC3315].















































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4.  Overview

   As described in [RFC4919], unlike regular IP network, 6lowpan has
   some special characteristics such as small packet size, low
   bandwidth, large number of devices, etc. 6lowpan devices are
   generally assumed to be resource-limited with respect to computation
   power, storage, memory and especially battery life.  One common
   feature, which is worthy to remember is the disproportionately high
   cost of transmitting information as compared to performing local
   computation.  For example, a Berkeley mote spends approximately 800
   instructions as it does in sending a single bit [Madden].  It thus
   become a main design criteria for 6lowpan to reduce the number of
   bits forwarded by intermediate nodes, in order to extend the entire
   network's lifetime as recharging may not be practical in some
   deployment scenarios.

   IEEE 802.15.4 nodes can operate in either secure mode or non-secure
   mode.  Two security modes are defined in the specification in order
   to achieve different security objectives:

   - Access Control List (ACL) mode which provides limited security
   services and requires each device to maintain its own ACL.  This mode
   allows receiving frames only from nodes that are present in the
   devices's ACL, i.e., considered as trusted nodes.  Frames from non-
   registered devices are filtered.  However, cryptographic protection
   is not provided in this mode.

   - Secure mode provides all the security services according to the
   defined security suite.  It provides confidentiality of the frame
   along with the message integrity, access control, and sequential
   freshness.

   However, the specification is not clear about key management methods,
   state of ACL table in the event of power loss and support of group
   keying in which case, network shared common key may be an answer for
   the link layer security but is vulnerable to replay attacks launched
   from stolen devices.  Yet, in most common cases, network shared
   keying can be the simple answer to the link layer security as it is
   easily configurable among large number of devices.

   The security aspect, however, seems a bit tradeoff in the 6lowpan
   since security is always a costly function.  This is particularly
   true to low rate WPAN.  Obviously, adding security makes the issue
   even more challenging.  For instance, when putting IPv6 on top of
   6lowpan, it may seem possible to use IP security protocol [RFC4301]
   and turn off the security mechanism defined by IEEE 802.15.4.  But on
   the other hand, IPsec is relatively mature for services at IP or
   upper layers.  Furthermore, due to their inherent properties and/or



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   constraints mentioned earlier, 6lowpan poses unique challenges to
   which, traditional security techniques cannot be applied directly.
   For example, public key cryptography primitives are typically avoided
   (as being too expensive) as are relatively heavyweight conventional
   encryption methods.

   Consequently, it becomes questionable whether the 6lowpan devices can
   support IPsec as it is.  This document explains in the following
   sections some of the difficulties resulting from adopting IPSec.
   However, Layer 2 security must be used for all associated operations
   such as MAC sub-layer association, beaconing, orphaning, etc.

   While IPsec is mandatory with IPv6, considering the power constraints
   and limited processing capabilities of IEEE802.15.4 capable devices,
   IPsec is computationally expensive; Internet key exchange (IKEv2)
   messaging described in [RFC5996] will not work well in 6lowpans as we
   want to minimize the amount of signaling in these networks.  Thus,
   6lowpan may need to define its own keying management method(s) that
   requires minimum overhead in packet-size and in number of signaling
   messages exchange.  IPsec will provide authentication and
   confidentiality between end-nodes and across multiple lowpan-links,
   and may be useful only when two nodes want to apply security to all
   exchanged messages.  However, in most cases, the security may be
   requested at the application layer as needed, while other messages
   can flow in the network without security overhead.

   Attacks against 6lowpands can be classified into external attacks and
   internal ones.  In an external attack, the attacker is not an
   authorized entity of the 6lowpan.  External attacks can be further
   divided into two categories: passive and active.  Passive attacks
   involve mainly eavesdropping on network's radio frequency range in an
   attempt to discover sensitive information.  Among active attacks
   against 6lowpans, denial-of service (DoS) attack at the physical
   layer can produce devastating consequences.  To this end, the
   attacker can broadcast a powerful signal within the WPAN zone, i.e.,
   jamming, and paralyzes part(s) or even the entire network.

   An attacker may also disable a 6lowpan node (e.g., by smashing it!)
   or capture one, extracts the key(s) and uses it for eavesdropping
   purposes and/or to directly intervene at some point in time, by
   injecting false but valid data in order to disturb the overall
   system, e.g., trigger an undesired chain of events.  Consequently, a
   challenging issue facing 6lowpans is to provide resiliency against
   node capture attack.

   Data collection and dissemination being their ultimate goals,
   6lowpans also highlights privacy concerns.  In fact, as devices are
   in general, getting smaller (i.e., easier to conceal) and cheaper



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   (i.e., easier to obtain), an obvious risk is that 6lowpan technology
   might be used for privacy violation purposes, e.g., employers might
   spy on their employees, neighbors might spy on each other.

   Possible threats in 6lopwan include intrusion, sink-hole and replay
   attacks.  As in traditional networks, routing mechanisms in 6lowpan
   present another window from which, an attacker might disrupt and
   significantly degrade the 6lowpan overall performance.  Attacks
   against unsecure routing aim mainly to contaminate WPAN networks with
   false routing information resulting in routing inconsistencies.  A
   malicious node can also snoop packets and then launch replay attacks
   on the 6lowpan nodes.  These attacks can cause harm especially when
   the attacker is a high-power device, such as laptop.  It can also
   easily drain 6lowpan devices batteries by sending broadcast messages,
   redirecting routes etc.

   A possible solution to address security issues in the 6lowpan
   networks might consist of implementing application level security,
   e.g., SSL, on top of link layer security.  In such case, link layer
   security protects from intrusion and the application level security
   protects from another user peeking at the data and against
   impersonation.





























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5.  Security Challenges

   We summarize the security challenges in 6lowpan networks as it
   follows (for more information about this section and the following
   ones, please check the references):

   - Minimizing resource consumption and maximizing security
   performance.

   - 6lowpan deployment enables link attacks ranging from passive
   eavesdropping to active interfering.

   - In-network processing involves intermediate nodes in end-to-end
   information transfer.

   - 6lowpan communication characteristics render traditional wired
   based security schemes unsuitable.


































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6.   Security Requirements

   Security requirements for 6lowpan can be listed as it follows:

   - Data Confidentiality: make information inaccessible to unauthorized
   users.  For example, a 6lowpan node should not leak some of its
   collected data to neighboring networks.

   - Data Authentication: since an adversary can easily inject messages,
   the receiver needs to ensure that data are originated from a trusted
   sources.

   - Data Integrity: ensures that the received data is not altered in
   transit by an adversary.

   - Data freshness: this could mean data freshness as well as key
   freshness.  Informally, data freshness implies that each data is
   recent, and it ensures that no adversary replayed old messages.

   - Availability: ensures the survivability of network services to
   (only) authorized parties when needed, despite a DoS attack(s).

   - Robustness: ensures operation continuity despite abnormalities,
   such as attacks, failed nodes, etc.

   - Resiliency: is the network ability to provide and maintain an
   acceptable level of security in case some nodes are compromised.

   - Resistance: is the network ability to prevent the adversary from
   gaining full control of the network by node replication attack in
   case some nodes are compromised.

   - Energy efficiency: a security scheme must be energy efficient so as
   to maximize network lifetime.

   - Assurance: is the ability to disseminate different information at
   different assurance levels.














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7.  Security Threats

   Most of the attacks and threats against user and data security in
   6lowpan are plausible and MAY be very destructible in effect, because
   of its wireless radio access and connectivity to the Internet.  The
   security analysis of 6lowpan starts with the appreciation of various
   threats posed at respective ISO OSI layers.  In this section, we
   classify and discuss the threats in layer-wise order.  The suggested
   threat model assumes that the attacker is fully capable at all times
   except during the deployment phase.

   6lowpan is highly susceptible to physical attacks. i.e., threats due
   to physical node destruction relocation and masking.  By physical
   attacks, one or multiple 6lowpan nodes can be knocked out
   permanently, so the losses are irreversible.  Physical attack can
   extract cryptographic secrets from the associated circuitry, modify
   programming in the nodes, and may allow the malicious node to take
   control over them.  These compromises can result into code
   modification inside the node and to change the mission-oriented role
   of full fledged networks, let alone sensors.

   In 6lowpan environment, several types of DoS attacks can be triggered
   in different layers.  At the physical Layer, the DoS attacks can be
   launched by tampering and jamming electromagnetic (EM) signals by
   swarming the limited resources of 6lowpan devices with the high
   resource devices very easily.

   Attacks on MAC layer involves collision, exhaustion and unfairness.
   Being always power hungry, 6lowpan devices try to sleep as often as
   possible in order to conserve it.  Such constraints open the door for
   an attacker to let the device execute a large number of tasks in
   order to deplete its battery.  This is called "sleep deprivation
   torture" [Stajano].  To achieve such goal, an attacker can for
   example, target different destination devices with unnecessary
   packets, possibly in other WPANs, regardless of whether the
   destination WPAN and/or device actually exist or not.  Such attack
   can also lead to depleting the PAN coordinator battery power, i.e.,
   since the downlink packets have to be explicitly requested from the
   PAN coordinator, this will keep it busy (as well as an eventual
   destination).

   An attack against network availability can consist of flooding the
   network by simply transmitting a large number of large(st) packets
   size.  In such case, the attacker may degrade the network performance
   and drastically reduce the throughput.

   In WPAN specification, the replayed message is prevented by the
   replay protection mechanism, i.e., sequential freshness.  In a



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   replay-protection attack, the malicious node sends many frames
   containing large counters to a particular receiver, which in turn
   raises the replay counter up.  Then, when a normal device sends a
   frame with a lower frame counter, it will be rejected by the receiver
   and thus, leading to DoS attack.

   As the ACK frame integrity is not protected, it also opens the door
   for a malicious node to prevent a legitimate device from receiving a
   particular frame.  This is possible by forging an ACK using the un-
   encrypted sequence number from the data frame and sending it to the
   source while creating enough interference, in order to prevent the
   legitimate receiver from receiving the frame.  In such scenario, the
   source device is led to believe that the frame has been received.

   A corrupted device can also attack the key distribution process since
   the WPAN coordinator announces the IDs of devices who are about the
   change the link key in plain-text in the beacon frame.  Therefore,
   the attacker can send request packet with the ID of the legitimate
   node.  The goal from such request is to push the coordinator to
   trigger a key exchange process while the legitimate recipient may not
   be ready.

   Attacks against network layer fall into one of the following
   categories:

   - Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information: in this attack,
   the malicious node uses spoofing, altering and/or replaying to target
   routing information exchanged between nodes in an attempt to create
   routing loops, attract/repel network traffic, extend/shorten source
   routes, generate false error messages, etc.

   - Selective forwarding: in this attack, the malicious device may
   refuse to forward certain messages (e.g., by dropping them).  In this
   case, neighboring devices may conclude that the malicious device has
   failed and thus, try to seek another route.  A more subtle form of
   this attack is when the malicious device selectively forward packets
   in which case, neighboring nodes won't be able to reach the
   conclusion that another route is needed which in turn, would
   encourage them to re-send the data packets.

   - Sinkhole attack: in a sinkhole attack, the malicious device tries
   to get all traffic from one particular area which can potentially
   result in a DoS attack.  In order to launch a sinkhole attack (aka
   blackhole attack), the attacker can listen to requests for routes
   then replies to the requesting nodes that it contains the high
   quality or shortest path to the base station.  Once the malicious
   device is able to insert itself between the communicating nodes, he/
   she is able to do anything with the packets passing through it.  In



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   fact, this attack can affect even the nodes that are spatially
   located farther from the malicious node.

   - Sybil attack: in a Sybil attack, a single node presents multiple
   identities to other nodes in the WPAN.  Sybil attacks pose a
   significant threat to geographic routing protocols and MAY be
   performed against the distributed storage, routing mechanism, data
   aggregation, voting, fair resource-allocation and misbehavior
   detection, etc.  Note that it is not easy to detect a Sybil attack in
   progress (measuring the usage of radio resources MAY lead to detect
   it, though with very little probability).

   - Wormhole attack: in a Wormhole attack, the attacker records packets
   (or bits) at one location in the network and tunnels them to another
   one.  Such attacks can be devastating to the working of the 6lowpan
   since it does not require compromising a node in the WPAN; instead,
   it could be performed at the initial phase when 6lowpan nodes start
   to discover the neighboring information.  Wormhole attacks can target
   for example, routing function or application.

   - Neighbor Discovery attacks: a modified version of the IPv6 Neighbor
   Discovery protocol (described in [RFC4861]) has been specifically
   designed for WPAN.  However, the modified version (described in
   [I-D.ietf-6lowpan-nd] inherits threats which applies in the WPAN
   deployment.  This includes unsecured router advertisement, neighbor
   discovery DoS attacks.  Threats against neighbor discovery protocol
   are described in [RFC3756].

   At the transport layer, attacks could be performed by half open and
   half closed TCP segments.  A malicious device can repeatedly forge
   messages carrying sequence numbers or control flags which will
   ultimately cause the endpoints to request retransmission of missed
   frames.


















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8.  Assumptions

   [RFC4919] describes two security concerns as follows;

   In Section 4.6 Security: Although IEEE 802.15.4 provides AES link
   layer security, a complete end-to-end security is needed.

   In Section 5 Goals: Security threats at different layers must be
   clearly understood and documented.  Bootstrapping of devices into a
   secure network could also be considered given the location, limited
   display, high density and ad hoc deployment of devices.

   This document will meet the above considerations.

   In addition, existing IP security technologies will be simplified to
   be implemented on the 6lowpan small devices. 6lowpan security
   architecture will shed off lots of fat from IP security technologies
   whenever available.

   IEEE 802.15.4 AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) will be used for
   6lowpan security architecture in conjunction with IP security
   whenever available.





























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9.  6Lowpan Security Analysis

   In this section, both IEEE 802.15.4 MAC security and IP security are
   tackled to search for a new 6lowpan trust models and available
   solution spaces if feasible.  The principal object of this analysis
   is to improve 6lowpan security level as we use IP layer security
   mechanism as possible regardless of 802.15.4 vulnerable MAC security.
   802.15.4 MAC enhancement and amendment are not scope of this document
   but IEEE 802 standard stuff.

9.1.  IEEE 802.15.4 Security analysis

   As mentioned earlier, IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer provides security
   services that are controlled by the MAC PIB (PAN Information Base).
   For security purpose, the MAC sublayer maintains an access control
   list (ACL) in its MAC PIB.  By specifying a security suite in the ACL
   for a communication peer, a device can indicate what security level
   should be used (i.e., none, access control, data encryption, frame
   integrity, etc.) for communications with that peer.

   A critical function of IEEE 802.15.4 MAC is frame security.  Frame
   security is actually a set of optional services that may be provided
   by the MAC to the upper layers (applications).  The standard strikes
   a balance between the need for these services in many applications,
   and the desire to minimize the burden of their implementation on
   those applications that do not need them.  As described in [802.15.4-
   ACM], if an application does not set any security parameters, then
   security is not enabled by default.  IEEE 802.15.4 defines four
   packet types: beacon packets, data packets, acknowledgements packets
   and control packets for the media access control layer.  It does not
   support security for acknowledgement packets.  But on the other hand,
   other packet types can optionally support integrity and
   confidentiality protection for the packet's data field.

   Due to the variety of applications targeted by IEEE 802.15.4, the
   processes of authentication and key exchange are not defined in the
   standard.  Devices without the key cannot decrypt the encrypted
   messages.

   In addition, unsecured mode is suitable for some applications in
   which implementation cost is important, and security is either not
   required or obtained in other ways.  An example of this is that all
   6lowpan devices are assigned a default key by the administrator they
   can exchange data encrypted with that key.  This may work in some
   situations, but this solution is not quite scalable.  In this case,
   802.15.4 node is very vulnerable.

   The security service enables the MAC to select the devices with which



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   it is willing to communicate.  The device may decide to communicate
   with some devices, and not others.  To minimize complexity, the
   access control service is performed on an individual device basis,
   rather than on groups or collections of devices.

   Unlike file transfer or voice communication applications common with
   other protocols, IEEE 802.15.4 applications often transmit messages
   that do not convey secret information.

9.2.  IP Security analysis

   IPsec can guarantee integrity and optionally confidentiality of IP
   (v4 or v6) packets exchanged between two peers.

   Basically, IPsec works well on non-low-power devices which are not
   subject to severe constraints on host software size, processing and
   transmission capacities.  IPsec supports AH for authenticating the IP
   header and ESP for authenticating and encrypting the payload.  The
   main issues of using IPsec are two-fold: (1) processing power and (2)
   key management.  Since these tiny 6lowpan devices do not process huge
   number of data or communicate with many different nodes, it is not
   well understood if complete implementation of SADB, policy-database
   and dynamic key-management protocol are appropriate for these small
   battery powered devices.

   Given existing constraints in 6lowpan environments, IPsec may not be
   suitable to use in such environments, especially that 6lowpan node
   may not be able to operate all IPsec algorithms on its own capability
   either FFD or RFD.

   Bandwidth is a very scarce resource in 6lowpan environments.  The
   fact that IPsec additionally requires another header (AH or ESP) in
   every packet makes its use problematic in 6lowpan environments.

   IPsec requires two communicating peers to share a secret key that is
   typically established dynamically with the Internet Key Exchange
   (IKEv2) protocol.  Thus, it has an additional packet overhead
   incurred by IKEv2 packets exchange.

   As neighbor discovery protocol will be applied to 6lowpan, Secure
   Neighbor Discovery (SeND) protocol [RFC3971] should be considered to
   provide security in conjunction with 6lowpan NDP.  SeND works well
   over existing IP networks.  However, the crypto-generated address
   (CGA) (described in [RFC3972]) used in SeND is based on RSA based and
   thus, requires larger packet-size and processing time than in the
   case where Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) keying algorithm is
   used.  Therefore, it could be reasonable to use the SeND protocol if
   it is extended to support ECC for 6lowpan networks application.



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10.  Key Management in 6Lowpan

   In order to provide security in 6lowpans, a robust encryption
   mechanism MUST be in place.  Only the non-tamperable keys can provide
   an encryption infrastructure that is thorough enough to provide a
   wide range of security services such as but not limited to
   authentication, authorization, non-repudiation and prevention from
   replay attacks.  Key management issues are discussed in the following
   section.

10.1.  Existing Key Management Methods

   The characteristics of 6lowpan communicating devices and resulting
   WPANs, such as limited resources at the node and network level, lack
   of physical protection, unattended operation, and a close interaction
   with the physical environment, all make it infeasible to implement
   some of the most popular key exchange techniques in their literal
   forms for 6lowpans.  In this section, we visit three widely known
   schemes such as trusted-server scheme, pre-distribution scheme and
   public key cryptography schemes in order to reach a pragmatic key
   management mechanism for 6lowpans.

   The trusted-server scheme relies solely on the server for key
   agreement between nodes, e.g., Kerberos.  If the server is
   compromised, the trust amongst nodes is severed.  Such scheme is not
   suitable for 6lowpan networks because there is usually no guarantee
   of seamless communication with a trusted server at anytime.

   The key agreement scheme is key pre-distribution, where key
   information is distributed among all 6lowpan nodes prior to
   deployment.  If the network deployers were to know which nodes were
   more likely to stay in the same neighborhood before deployment, keys
   MAY be decided a priori.  However, because of the randomness of the
   deployment, knowing the set of neighbors deterministically might not
   be feasible.  Furthermore, the presence of intruder nodes right from
   the network deployment and initiation time cannot be rejected
   outright as implausible.  Some schemes like network shared keying,
   pair-wise keying, and group keying, have been defined as variants of
   key distribution.  On-site key management mechanisms, while
   warranting the same level of security as key pre-distribution schemes
   have an obvious edge to cope up with network dynamics.

   This class of key management scheme depends on asymmetric
   cryptography, such as public key certificates that are irreversible
   singularly.  This irreversibility comes at a price-often staked by
   the limited computation and energy resources of 6lowpan nodes.
   However, these are the hardest cryptanalyze.  Some of the most
   popular examples include, but are not limited to Diffie-Hellman key



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   agreement, RSA or ECC [RFC2631].  Recent works on ECC implementation
   for low power devices has proven its feasibility for sensor networks.
   ECC provides security with smaller key size that is comparable to
   security provided by RSA or AES with much higher key size.

   Network topologies for 6LowPan (i.e., star and mesh) and presence of
   FFD and RFD makes cluster based dynamic key management schemes seem
   the most appropriate.  These schemes use Master Keys; Network Keys
   and Links keys which could be pre-installed for first round and can
   be distributed by key transport mechanism during later rounds.  This
   scheme provides ease in key distribution and key revocation [ZigBee].

10.2.  Issues With Key Management in 6Lowpan

   - In a 6lowpan, a malicious node MAY sit amongst other nodes at the
   deployment phase-a problem of secure key assignment at bootstrap
   time.

   - A node is compromised during the operating time of 6lowpan-A key
   revocation system MUST be employed.

   - In a sleep-mode enabled 6lowpan, keys to sleeping nodes MUST be
   deprived and reinstated after such nodes resume active state.

   - In case the keys are compromised, a mechanism to diagnose security
   violation MUST be invoked.

   - It SHOULD allow and support dynamic addition of a new node.























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11.  Security Consideration in Bootstrapping a 6lowpan Node

   This section aims to discuss how does a node configures itself
   securely with a IPv6 router in the network.  It involves assignment
   of IPv6 prefix and the default IPv6 router in the 6lowpan.  Further
   details will be collaborated with 6lowpan commissioning/bootstrapping
   works in near future according to the 6lowpan working group
   rechartering.











































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12.  Possible Scenarios Using Different Levels of Security

   This section may suggest example scenarios with example solutions in
   different cases (IPsec, SSL, other type of solutions) although this
   document does not recommend or specify any security solutions.
   Further details will be collaborated with 6lowpan architecture works
   in near future according to the 6lowpan working group re-chartering.












































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13.  Security Considerations

   This document addresses only security issues around IPv6 over Low
   Power WPAN.















































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14.  IANA Considerations

   There is no IANA considerations.
















































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15.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Myungjong Lee at CUNY, USA, Rabia Iqbal, Mustafa Hasan and
   Ali Hammad Akbar all at Ajou University for their valuable comments
   to improve the document.  Special thanks to Jung-Hyun Oh for his
   valuable help on this document.













































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16.  No I-D References

   All references shown in this section MUST be added into the
   Informative References before publishing it officially.

   [ieee802.15.4] IEEE Std., 802.15.4-2003, ISBN 0-7381-3677-5, May
   2003.

   [802.15.4-ACM] Sastry, N. and Wagner, D., Security Considerations for
   IEEE 802.15.4 Networks, ACM WiSE'04, October 2004.

   [Madden] Madden, S. R., Franklin, M. J., Hellerstein, J. M., and
   Hong, W., "TAG: a Tiny AGgregation service for ad-hoc sensor
   networks".  In Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium on Operating
   Systems Design and Implementation, 2002.

   [Stajano] Stajano, F., and Anderson, R., "The Resurrecting Duckling:
   Security Issues for Ubiquitous Computing".  In IEEE Computer Journal,
   Volume 42, Issue 5, 2002.

   [WSN] Shi, E., and Perrig, A., "Designing Secure Sensor Networks", In
   IEEE Wireless Communications, December 2004.

   [MAC802154] Misic V. B., Fung J., and Misic, J., "MAC Layer Security
   of 802.15.4-Compliant Networks".  In MASS 2005 Workshop, IEEE WSN
   Conference.

   [SEC802154] Xiao, Y., Sethi, S., Chen, H. H., and Sun B., "Security
   Services and Enhancements in the IEEE 802.15.4 Wireless Sensor
   Networks".  In IEEE GlobeCom 2005.

   [SECWSN] Chen, X., Makki, K., Yen, K., and Pissinou, N., "Sensor
   Network Security: A Survey".  In IEEE Communications Surveys &
   Tutorials, Volume 11, No. 2, 2nd Quarter 2009.

   [ZigBee] Specification Version 1.0, December 2004.















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17.  References

17.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
              and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

17.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-6lowpan-nd]
              Shelby, Z., Chakrabarti, S., and E. Nordmark, "Neighbor
              Discovery Optimization for Low-power and Lossy Networks",
              draft-ietf-6lowpan-nd-15 (work in progress),
              December 2010.

   [RFC2631]  Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
              RFC 2631, June 1999.

   [RFC3756]  Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
              Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756,
              May 2004.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
              Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC4919]  Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
              over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
              Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
              RFC 4919, August 2007.

   [RFC5996]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
              "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
              RFC 5996, September 2010.




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Authors' Addresses

   Soohong Daniel Park
   System Solution Laboratory, Samsung  Electronics
   416 Maetan-3dong, Yeongtong-gu
   Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do  442-742
   KOREA

   Phone: +82 31 200 4635
   Email: soohong.park@samsung.com


   Ki-Hyung Kim
   Ajou University
   San 5 Wonchun-dong, Yeongtong-gu
   Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do  442-749
   KOREA

   Phone: +82 31 219 2433
   Email: kkim86@ajou.ac.kr


   Wassim Michel Haddad
   Ericsson
   300 Holger Way
   San Jose, CA  95134
   US

   Phone: +1 646 256 2030
   Email: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com


   Samita Chakrabarti
   Ericsson
   300 Holger Way
   San Joe, CA
   USA

   Email: samita.chakrabarti@ericsson.com


   Julien Laganier
   Juniper
   Sunnyvale, CA
   USA

   Email: Julien.ietf@laposte.net




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