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Internet Engineering Task Force                         Francis Dupont
INTERNET DRAFT                                       GET/ENST Bretagne
Expires in December 2004                          Jean-Jacques Bernard
                                                                 AFNIC
                                                             June 2004


                 Transient pseudo-NAT attacks or
           how NATs are even more evil than you believed

             <draft-dupont-transient-pseudonat-04.txt>



Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
   areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also
   distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-
   Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as
   "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.


Abstract

   When a "NAT traversal" capability is added to a class of signaling
   protocols which can control some traffic aggregation points, an
   attack based on a temporary access to the path followed by messages
   exists.

   Mobile IP [1] with NAT traversal [2] or IKE [3] with NAT
   traversal [6], including the IKEv2 [7] proposal, are potentially
   affected by this kind of attacks.

   This document claims this vulnerability is an intrinsic property
   of the NAT traversal capability, and so is another point where the
   usage of NATs is very damaging.


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1. Introduction

   A Network Address Translator (NAT [8]) is a device which rewrites
   the source address or/and destination address as well as usually
   the transport protocol ports of a communication. Many kinds of NATs
   [9] exist but in this document the term NAT will be used for any
   device which modifies at least one of the IP header addresses (a
   pseudo-NAT when this is done for an attack, i.e., we will call
   pseudo-NAT an attacker spoofing a NAT device).

   NAT traversal capability consists in a NAT resilient transport
   protocol , usually UDP, and in address "agility", i.e., addresses
   in the header of packets are taken as they are, without control,
   especially the source address (packets with a fake destination
   address are likely to not reach their intended recipient).

   A traffic aggregation point is a place where traffic from many
   sources and/or many destinations is aggregated and sent to the same
   destination. The traffic usually arrives from the same source (the
   traffic aggregation point) through a tunnel. Home agents in Mobile
   IP and security gateways in IPsec [4] are typical examples of such
   traffic aggregation points (which are not necessary for the attack
   to work but increase its impact).


2. The Transient Pseudo-NAT Attack

   An attacker acting as a NAT (i.e., a pseudo-NAT) may:
    - redirect packets to another node
    - make the intended recipient to not receive packets
      (first form of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack)
    - flood a third party with the hijacked packets
      (second form of DoS attack, perhaps the most serious)
   To perform the attack, the attacker must be on the path of packets
   during the attack.

   When there is a traffic aggregation point, the effects of the
   attack are amplified when the attack is done "at the outgoing side"
   of the aggregation point.

   When a signaling protocol manages the direction followed by the
   traffic, the attacker only has to spoof the addresses in the
   headers of some messages of the protocol in order to hijack the
   traffic during a long period (i.e., until an error is detected and
   the correct path re-established). Since the attacker has to stay on
   the path only for a short moment this attack is named the
   "transient" pseudo-NAT attack.


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3. Attack Examples

3.1 Mobile IP

   For Mobile IP the traffic aggregation point fo choice is the home
   agent and the target signaling protocol is the binding update (the
   binding acknowledgment exchange). If the NAT traversal capability
   is enabled, the care-of address of the mobile may not be protected,
   and therefore may be easily spoofed.

   If no binding acknowledgment is required, the attack can be reduced
   to the modification in transit of only one packet. Thus we
   recommend to always require acknowledgment when NAT traversal is
   enabled (as a weak form of return-routability check).

3.2 IKE

   The context of IKE is a bit different: because of an under-
   specification in IKE documents, there is no standard provision for
   address protection and most implementations fix this security flaw
   in ways which clearly interfere with NAT traversal features.

   The attack against IKE is worse because IKE is supposed to ensure
   a high level of security, unfortunately bypassed by NAT traversal
   which is the first short-term work item of the IETF ipsec working
   group charter [5]...

   The attack follows the same scheme: addresses in headers of IKE
   exchange messages are spoofed and the traffic is hijacked.

   Any improvement to the IKE protocol makes the attack easier (a
   very unpleasant property of this attack). For instance if an
   implementation supports an address change between two "phases",
   (something desirable and supported via the SPI of the phase one)
   then spoofing the two or three messages of a quick mode exchange is
   enough to perform the attack. In IKEv2 only one packet of a
   CREATE-CHILD-SA exchange is necessary to do so.

   Again there is no easy way to keep the NAT traversal capability and
   to achieve a good level of security at the same time. For instance
   the protection of the header addresses (which is very easy to provide
   in the IKE framework) cannot work with the NAT traversal capability.


4. Security Considerations

   The Mobile IP NAT traversal document has a long description
   of this attack [10,5]. We believe the ipsec working group will
   examine in details which features can help mobility or/and NAT
   traversal and what are their consequences for security.


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   The architectural implications of the NAT document [11] do not
   describe this attack but it can be considered a result of
   the violation of the end-to-end principle.


5. Acknowledgments

   Maryline Maknavicius-Laurent drew my attention on this attack at
   the IP Cellular Network 2002 conference. Phil Roberts encouraged
   me to point out this attack in the IETF mobileip WG mailing-list
   ASAP. I'd like to thank a well known NAT hater who'd like to stay
   anonymous for his help to write this document. Mohan Parthasarathy
   helped us to clarify the context of IKE.


6. Normative References

   [1] C. Perkins (ed.), "IP Mobility Support for IPv4", RFC 3344,
   August 2002.

   [2] H. Levkowetz, S. Vaarala, "Mobile IP Traversal of Network
   Address Translation (NAT) Devices", RFC 3519, April 2003.

   [3] D. Harkins, D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
   RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [4] S. Kent, R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet
   Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [5] http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html


7. Informative References

   [6] A. Huttunen & all, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets",
   draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-09.txt, May 2004.

   [7] C. Kaufman (ed.), "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
   draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-14.txt, May 2004.

   [8] P. Srisuresh, K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address
   Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,January 2001 .

   [9] P. Srisuresh, M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address Translator
   (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC 2663, August 1999.

   [10] S. Vaarala, public communication in the mobileip mailing-list,
   <E2EFC3D881823A4CA24022D163D2C4AE2391AB@server.netseal.com>,
   May 2002.

   [11] T. Hain, "Architectural Implications of NAT", RFC 2993,
   November 2000.


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8. Authors' Addresses

   Francis Dupont
   ENST Bretagne
   Campus de Rennes
   2, rue de la Chataigneraie
   CS 17607
   35576 Cesson-Sevigne Cedex
   FRANCE
   Fax: +33 2 99 12 70 30
   EMail: Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr

   Jean-Jacques Bernard
   AFNIC / NIC France
   Immeuble International
   2 rue Stephenson
   78181 Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines Cedex
   FRANCE
   Fax: +33 1 39 30 83 01
   EMail: Jean-Jacques.Bernard@nic.fr


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