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Internet Engineering Task Force                               S. Farrell
Internet-Draft                                    Trinity College Dublin
Intended status: Standards Track                             D. Kutscher
Expires: October 1, 2012                                             NEC
                                                            C. Dannewitz
                                                 University of Paderborn
                                                               B. Ohlman
                                                              A. Keranen
                                                                Ericsson
                                                         P. Hallam-Baker
                                                       Comodo Group Inc.
                                                          March 30, 2012


                       Naming things with hashes
                       draft-farrell-decade-ni-01

Abstract

   This document defines a set of ways to identify a thing using the
   output from a hash function, specifying URI, URL and binary formats
   for these names.  The various formats are designed to support, but
   not require, a strong link to the referenced object such that the
   referenced object may be authenticated to the same degree as the
   reference to it.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 1, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  ni URI Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  URL Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Binary Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Human-readable Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.1.  Checksum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Public Key Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   10. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     10.1. Assignment of Network Information (ni) URI Scheme  . . . . 10
     10.2. Assignment of Well Known URI prefix ni . . . . . . . . . . 11
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
























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1.  Introduction

   URIs [RFC3986] are used in various protocols for identifying
   resources.  In many deployments those URIs contain strings that are
   hash function outputs in order to ensure uniqueness in terms of
   mapping the URI to a specific resource, or to make URIs hard to guess
   for security reasons.  However, there is no standard way to interpret
   those strings, and so today in general only the creator of the URI
   knows how to use the hash function output.

   For example, protocols for accessing in-network storage servers (as
   defined in the IETF DECADE WG) need a way to identify the stored
   resources uniquely and in a location-independent way so that replicas
   on different servers can be accessed by the same name.  Also, such
   applications may require verifying that a resource that has been
   obtained actually corresponds to the name that was used to request
   the resource, i.e., verifying the name-content binding.

   Similarly, in the context of information-centric networking
   [ref.netinf-design] [ref.ccn] and elsewhere there is value in being
   able to compare a presented resource against the URI that was de-
   referenced in order to access that resource.  If a cryptographically-
   strong comparison function can be used then this allows for many
   forms of in-network storage, without requiring as much trust in the
   infrastructure used to present the resource.  The outputs of hash
   functions can be used in this manner, if presented in a standard way.

   Additional applications might include creating references from web
   pages delivered over HTTP/TLS; DNS resource records signed using
   DNSSEC or Data values embedded in certificates, CRLs, OCSP tokens and
   other signed data objects.

   Accordingly, the "ni" URI scheme allows for checking of the integrity
   of the URI/resource mapping, but it is OPTIONAL for implementations
   to do so when sending, receiving or processing "ni" URIs.

   The URI scheme defined here allows for the use of a query-string,
   similar to how query-strings are used in HTTP URLs.  A companion
   specification [niexts] describes specific values that can be used in
   such query strings in for various purposes.  That document also
   specifies additional optional algorithms for truncated hashes and for
   hashing of dynamic objects.

   In addition to the URI form we also define a ".well-known" URL
   equivalent as well as a binary format for use in protocols that
   require more compact forms of name and a human-speakable text form
   that could be used, e.g. for reading out (parts of) the name over a
   voice connection.



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   Not all uses of these names require use of the full hash output -
   truncated hashes can be safely used in some environments.  For this
   reason, we define a new IANA registry for hash functions to be used
   with this specification.

   [[Add a note somewhere that these are sort-of the same as magnet:
   links. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_link ]]

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   Syntax definitions in this memo are specified according to ABNF
   [RFC4648].

   [[Comments are included in double-square brackets, like this.]]


2.  ni URI Format

   In this section we provide an informal description of the ni URI
   syntax.  An ni URI consists of the following components:

   Scheme Name [Required]  The scheme name is 'ni'.

   Colon and Slashes [Required]  The literal "://"

   Authority [Optional]  The optional authority component may assist
      applications in accessing the object named by an ni URI.  Note
      that while the ni names with and without an authority differ
      syntactically, both names will almost always refer to the same
      object.

   One slash [Required]  The literal "/"

   Digest Algorithm [Required]  The name of the digest algorithm, as
      specified in the IANA registry titled "Data Structure for the
      Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms registry
      'Cryptographic Algorithms'" [RFC5698].

   Separator [Required]  The literal ";"

   Digest Value [Required]  The digest value encoded in the specified
      encoding.  The digest value MAY be truncated at a 64 byte
      boundary.






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   Query Parameter separator [Optional] '?'  The query parameter
      separator acts a separator between the digest value and the query
      parameters (if specified).

   Query Parameters [Optional]  A tag=value list of optional query
      parameters as are used with HTTP URLs.

   It is OPTIONAL for implementations to check the integrity of the URI/
   resource mapping when sending, receiving or processing "ni" URIs.

   When verifying whether two NI URIs refer to same object, an
   implementation MUST only consider the Digest Algorithm identifier and
   the Digest Value, i.e., it MUST NOT consider the authority field or
   any parameters.

   The digest value MUST be encoded using base64url [RFC4648] encoding.

   The query segment of an URI is NOT hierarchical.  Thus escape
   encoding of slash '/' characters is NOT required.  Since application
   code often attempts to enforce such encoding, decoders MUST recognize
   the use of URI escape encoding.  Section 3.4 of [RFC3986] states that
   "The characters slash ("/") and question mark ("?") may represent
   data within the query component."

   Consequently no special escaping mechanism is required for the query
   parameter portion of ni URIs.  URI escaping is however frequently
   imposed automatically by scripting environments.  Thus to ensure
   interoperability, implementations SHOULD NOT generate URIs that
   employ URI character escaping, and implementations MUST accept any
   URIs that employ URI character escaping.  [[That might need to be
   more specific.]]

   The Named Information URI has the following syntax:

         niname ="ni://" [ authority ] "/" alg ";" val [ "?" query ]
         alg = 1*CHAR
         val = 1*CHAR

                         Figure 1: ni Name syntax

   The "authority" and "query" types are as in the URI specification.
   [RFC3986]

   Implementations MUST support the sha-256 algorithm as specified in
   [RFC4055].

   Implementations MAY support other algorithms specified in the Data
   Structure for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms



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   registry 'Cryptographic Algorithms' [RFC5698].

   Note that additional algorithms are specified in the companion
   document to this one [niexts] that implementations can choose to
   support if they wish.  Those algorithms use a different IANA registry
   defined in that document.

   The "val" field MUST contain the output of applying the hash function
   ("alg") to its defined input, which defaults to the object bytes that
   are expected to be returned when the URI is de-referenced.


3.  URL Format

   We define a bidirectional mapping between the ni URI scheme and a
   subset of the the HTTP scheme that makes use of the .well-known URI
   [RFC5785] by defining an "ni" suffix (see Section 10).

   The HTTP(s) mapping MAY be used in any context where legacy clients
   without support for ni identifiers is required without loss of
   interoperability or functionality.  A legacy client interprets the ni
   identifier as an ordinary HTTP(s) URL while a ni aware client can
   determine the corresponding ni form of the URI and apply ni
   processing.

   Implementations SHOULD support this mapping, in both directions.
   [[Not sure if we really want 2119 language for the mapping, nor if we
   need to specify both directions, so this is kind of a placeholder.]]

   For an ni name of the form "ni://n-authority/alg;val?query-string"
   the corresponding HTTP URL produced by this algorithm is
   "http://h-authority/.well-known/ni/alg/val?query-string".  If the ni
   name has a specified authority then the h-authority MUST have the
   same value.  If the ni name has no authority specified (i.e. the
   n-authority string is empty), a h-authority value MAY be derived from
   the application context.  For example, if the mapping is being done
   in the context of a web page then the origin [websec-origin] for that
   web site can be used.  Of course, there are in general no guarantees
   that the object named by the ni name will be available at the
   corresponding HTTP URL.  But in the case that any data is returned,
   the retreiver can determine if it is the correct content.

   If an application is presented with a HTTP URL with "/.well-
   known/ni/" as the start of its pathname component, then the reverse
   mapping to an ni name either including or excluding the authority
   might produce an ni name that is meaningful depending on the
   application.




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   In all of the above the application MAY use the "https" URI scheme if
   security considerations warrant use of TLS.

   [[Might want to add a URL-fragment thing for other HTTP URLs too.]]


4.  Binary Format

   When a more space-efficient version of the identifier is needed, the
   identifier can be presented in binary format.  The binary format
   identifier consists of two parts: header and the hash.  The header
   defines how the identifier has been created and the hash part
   contains a (possibly truncated) result of a one-way hash over the a
   constant value, identifier header, and the public key.  The binary
   presentation of the identifier is shown in Figure 2.


        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Res| Suite ID  |                    Hash                       /
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       /                             ...                               /
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       /      ...      |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                        Figure 2: Identifier Format

   The Res field is reserved for future use and MUST be set to zero if
   only Suite IDs defined in this document are used.

   The hash algorithm and truncation length is given by the Suite ID.
   For maintaining efficient encoding for the binary presentation, only
   few hash algorithms and truncation lengths are supported.  The
   following initial Suite IDs are defined:


                ID  Hash algorithm  Truncation  Text
                1   SHA-256         120 bits    sha-256-120
                2   SHA-3           120 bits    sha-3-120
                32  Reserved

                        Figure 3: Suite Identifiers

   The Suite ID value 32 is reserved for compatibility with ORCHIDs
   [RFC4843].  The hash algorithm matching to the Suite ID MUST be used
   for generating the hash.  The hash is truncated by taking the 120



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   last (rightmost) bits of the hash, resulting in total length of 128
   bits for the whole identifier.  Future suite IDs MAY define different
   truncating rules and hence different length identifiers.


5.  Human-readable Format

   Sometimes the identifier may need to be used in a format that is easy
   for humans to read and possibly communicate, for example, over the
   phone.  For this purpose, the following encoding is RECOMMENDED.

   The hash is encoded using base32 encoding [RFC4648] and lower-case
   alphabets.

   The hash is preceded by the the hash algorithm identifier (TBD)

   After the hash, there MAY be a checksum; calculated as defined in
   Section 5.1.

   The identifier, hash, and checksum fields are delimited by colon (:)
   character.

   ABNF TBD

5.1.  Checksum

   When the identifier is communicated using a non-reliable channel, it
   should include a checksum for detecting errors in the communication.
   The human readable format checksum MUST be calculated as a crc32 over
   the parts preceding the checksum, i.e., the algorithm identifier, the
   delimiter, and the hash value.  The result of crc32 is encoded like
   the hash: with base32 encoding and lower-case alphabets.


6.  Public Key Identifiers

   When the identifier is calculated from a cryptographic public key,
   the hash is calculated over constant value (TBD) and the public key
   in a X.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure (Section 4.1 of [RFC5280]).

   [[Need to check why that constant was wanted.  Doesn't seem useful
   and would break DANE compatibility.]]


7.  Examples

   [[Note: check examples and make sure they're correct sometime.]]




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   The following digest URI specifies a reference to the text "Hello
   World !" using the SHA-2 algorithm with 256 bit output and no
   authority field:

   ni:///sha-256;B_K97zTtFuOhug27fke4_Zgc4Myz4b_lZNgsQjy6fkc

   And the same example shown with an authority would be:

   ni://example.com/sha-256;B_K97zTtFuOhug27fke4_Zgc4Myz4b_lZNgsQjy6fkc

   The following HTTP URL represents a mapping from the previous ni name
   based on the algorithm outlined above.

   http://example.com/.well-known/ni/sha-256/
   B_K97zTtFuOhug27fke4_Zgc4Myz4b_lZNgsQjy6fkc


8.  Security Considerations

   No secret information is required to generate or verify an ni URI.
   Therefore an ni URI only provides a proof of integrity for the
   referenced object and the proof of integrity provided is only as good
   as the proof of integrity for the ni URI.  In other words, the digest
   value can provide name-data integrity binding the ni name value to
   the object bytes returned when the ni name is de-referenced using
   some protocol.

   Disclosure of an ni URI value does not necessarily entail disclosure
   of the referenced object but may enable an attacker to determine the
   contents of the referenced object by reference to a search engine or
   other data repository or, for highly formatted object with little
   variation, by simply guessing the value and checking if the digest
   value matches.

   The integrity of the referenced content would be compromised if a
   weak digest were used.

   If a truncated digest is used, certain security properties MAY be
   affected.  In general a digest algorithm is designed to produce
   sufficient bits to prevent a 'birthday attack' collision occurring.
   To ensure that the difficulty of discovering two pieces of content
   that result in the same digest with a work factor O(2^x) by brute
   force requires a digest length of 2x.  Many security applications
   only require protection against a 2nd pre-image attack which only
   requires a digest length of x to achieve the same work factor.

   [[Don't reduce too much, and don't rely on a digest that has been
   truncated as being the strength of the original digest alg.]]



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9.  Acknowledgements

   This work has been supported by the EU FP7 project SAIL.  The authors
   would like to thank SAIL participants to our naming discussions,
   especially Jean-Francois Peltier, for their input.

   The authors would also like to thank Bob Moskowitz, Tero Kivinen,
   Zach Shelby, Carsten Bormann, David McGrew, Eric Rescorla, and Tobias
   Heer for their comments and input to the document.

   [[Mention folk on the WebSec list who contributed to the
   discussions]]


10.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to create a new registry for (TBD) Suite IDs.
   Initial values are given in Section 4, future assignments are to be
   made through IETF Review or IESG Approval [RFC5226].

10.1.  Assignment of Network Information (ni) URI Scheme

   The procedures for registration of a URI scheme are specified in RFC
   4395 [RFC4395].  The following is the proposed assignment template.

   URI scheme name: ni

   Status: Permanent

   URI scheme syntax.  See Section 2

   URI scheme semantics.  See Section 2

   Encoding considerations.  See Section 2

   Applications/protocols that use this URI scheme name: General
   applicability with initial use cases provided by WEBSEC and DECADE

   Interoperability considerations: TBS

   Security considerations: See Section 8

   Contact: TBD

   Author/Change controller: IETF

   References: As specified in this document




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10.2.  Assignment of Well Known URI prefix ni

   The procedures for registration of a Well Known URI entry are
   specified in RFC 5785 [RFC5785].  The following is the proposed
   assignment template.

   URI suffix: ni

   Change controller: IETF

   Specification document(s): This document

   Related information: None


11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              June 2005.

   [RFC4395]  Hansen, T., Hardie, T., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines and
              Registration Procedures for New URI Schemes", BCP 35,
              RFC 4395, February 2006.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC4843]  Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
              for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
              (ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,



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              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5698]  Kunz, T., Okunick, S., and U. Pordesch, "Data Structure
              for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms
              (DSSC)", RFC 5698, November 2009.

   [RFC5785]  Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
              Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
              April 2010.

11.2.  Informative References

   [niexts]   Hallam-Baker, P., Stradling, R., Farrell, S., Kutscher,
              C., and B. Ohlman, "The Network Information (ni) URI
              Scheme: Parameters", draft-hallambaker-decade-ni-params-00
              (work in progress), October 2011.

   [ref.ccn]  Jacobsen, K, D, F, H, and L, "Networking Named Content",
              CoNEXT 2009 , December 2009.

   [ref.netinf-design]
              Ahlgren, D'Ambrosio, Dannewitz, Marchisio, Marsh, Ohlman,
              Pentikousis, Rembarz, Strandberg, and Vercellone, "Design
              Considerations for a Network of Information", Re-Arch 2008
              Workshop , December 2008.

   [websec-origin]
              Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept",
              draft-ietf-websec-origin-06 (work in progress),
              October 2011.


Authors' Addresses

   Stephen Farrell
   Trinity College Dublin
   Dublin,   2
   Ireland

   Phone: +353-1-896-2354
   Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie








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   Dirk Kutscher
   NEC
   Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
   Heidelberg,
   Germany

   Phone:
   Email: kutscher@neclab.eu


   Christian Dannewitz
   University of Paderborn
   Paderborn
   Germany

   Email: cdannewitz@upb.de


   Borje Ohlman
   Ericsson
   Stockholm  S-16480
   Sweden

   Email: Borje.Ohlman@ericsson.com


   Ari Keranen
   Ericsson
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   Email: ari.keranen@ericsson.com


   Phillip Hallam-Baker
   Comodo Group Inc.

   Email: philliph@comodo.com













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