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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 5684

Intended Status: Informational                              P. Srisuresh
Internet Draft: draft-ford-behave-top-07.txt              Kazeon Systems
Expires: February 12, 2010                                       B. Ford
                                                                 MPI-SWS
                                                         August 12, 2009



        Unintended Consequence of two NAT deployments with
                 Overlapping Address Space


Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Drafts.

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   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.



Abstract

   This document identifies two deployment scenarios that have arisen
   from the unconventional network topologies formed using Network
   Address Translator devices (NATs). First, the simplicity of
   administering networks through the combination of NAT and DHCP has
   increasingly lead to the deployment of multi-level inter-connected
   private networks involving overlapping private IP address spaces.
   Second, the proliferation of private networks in enterprises, hotels
   and conferences, and the wide spread use of Virtual Private Networks
   (VPNs) to access enterprise intranet from remote locations has
   increasingly lead to overlapping private IP address space between
   remote and corporate networks. The document does not dismiss these



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   unconventional scenarios as invalid, but recognizes them as real and
   offers recommendations to help ensure these deployments can
   function without a meltdown.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Scope.......................................
   2.  Terminology and Conventions Used ............................
   3.  Multi-Level NAT Network Topologies ..........................
       3.1 Operational Details of the Multi-Level NAT Network ......
          3.1.1. Client/Server Communication .......................
          3.1.2. Peer-to-Peer Communication ........................
       3.2. Anomalies of the Multi-Level NAT Network ...............
          3.2.1. Plug-and-Play NAT Devices .........................
          3.2.2. Unconventional Addressing on NAT Devices ..........
          3.2.3. Multi-Level NAT Translations ......................
          3.2.4. Mistaken End Host Identity ........................
   4.  Remote Access VPN Network Topologies ........................
       4.1. Operational Details of the Remote Access VPN Network ...
       4.2. Anomalies of the Remote Access VPN Network .............
           4.2.1. Remote Router and DHCP Server Address Conflict ...
           4.2.2. Simultaneous Connectivity Conflict ...............
           4.2.3. VIP Address Conflict .............................
           4.2.4. Mistaken End Host Identity .......................
   5.  Summary of Recommendations ..................................
   6.  IANA Considerations .........................................
   7.  Security Considerations .....................................
   8.  Acknowledgements ............................................
   9.  Normative References ........................................
   10. Informational References ....................................


1. Introduction and Scope

   The Internet was originally designed to use a single, global 32-bit
   IP address space to uniquely identify hosts on the network, allowing
   applications on one host to address and initiate communications with
   applications on any other host regardless of the respective hosts'
   topological locations or administrative domains. For a variety of
   pragmatic reasons, however, the Internet has gradually drifted away
   from strict conformance to this ideal of a single flat global address
   space, and towards a hierarchy of smaller "private" address spaces
   [RFC1918] clustered around a large central "public" address space.
   The most important pragmatic causes of this unintended evolution of
   the Internet's architecture appear to be the following.

   1. Depletion of the 32-bit IPv4 address space due to the exploding



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      total number of hosts on the Internet.  Although IPv6 promises to
      solve this problem, the uptake of IPv6 has in practice been slower
      than expected.

   2. Perceived Security and Privacy: Traditional NAT devices provide a
      filtering function that permits session flows to cross the NAT in
      just one direction, from private hosts to public network hosts.
      This filtering function is widely perceived as a security benefit.
      In addition, the NAT's translation of a host's original IP
      addresses and port number in private network into an unrelated,
      external IP address and port number is perceived by some as a
      privacy benefit.

   3. Ease-of-use: NAT vendors often combine the NAT function with a
      DHCP server function in the same device, which creates a
      compelling, effectively "plug-and-play" method of setting up small
      Internet-attached personal networks that is often much easier in
      practice for unsophisticated consumers than configuring an
      IP subnet.  The many popular and inexpensive consumer NAT devices
      on the market are usually configured "out of the box" to obtain a
      single "public" IP address from an ISP or "upstream" network via
      DHCP ([DHCP]), and the NAT device in turn acts as both a DHCP
      server and default router for any "downstream" hosts (and even
      other NATs) that the user plugs into it. Consumer NATs in this way
      effectively create and manage private home networks automatically
      without requiring any knowledge of network protocols or management
      on the part of the user. Auto-configuration of private hosts makes
      NAT devices a compelling solution in this common scenario.

   [NAT-PROT] identifies various complications with application
   protocols due to NAT devices. This document acts as an adjunct to
   [NAT-PROT]. The scope of the document is restricted to the two
   scenarios identified in sections 3 and 4, as arising out of
   unconventional NAT deployment and private address space overlap.
   Even though the scenarios appear unconventional, they are not
   uncommon to find. For each scenario, the document describes the
   seeming anomalies and offers recommendations on how best to make
   the topologies work.

   Section 2 describes the terminology and conventions used in the
   document. Section 3 describes the problem of private address space
   overlap in a multi-level NAT topology, the anomalies with the
   topology, and recommendations to address the anomalies. Section 4
   describes the problem of private address space overlap with remote
   access Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection, the anomalies with
   the topology, and recommendations to address the anomalies.
   Section 5 describes the security considerations in these scenarios.




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2. Terminology and Conventions Used

   In this document, the IP addresses 192.0.2.1, 192.0.2.64,
   192.0.2.128, and 192.0.2.254 are used as example public IP addresses
   [RFC3330]. Although these addresses are all from the same /24
   network, this is a limitation of the example addresses available in
   [RFC3330]. In practice, these addresses would be on different
   networks.

   Readers are urged to refer to [NAT-TERM] for information on NAT
   taxonomy and terminology.  Unless prefixed with a NAT type or
   explicitly stated otherwise, the term NAT, used throughout this
   document, refers to Traditional NAT [NAT-TRAD].  Traditional NAT has
   two variations, namely, Basic NAT and Network Address Port Translator
   (NAPT).  Of these, NAPT is by far the most commonly deployed NAT
   device.  NAPT allows multiple private hosts to share a single public
   IP address simultaneously.


3. Multi-Level NAT Network Topologies

   Due to the pragmatic considerations discussed in the previous
   section and perhaps others, NATs are increasingly, and often
   unintentionally, used to create hierarchically interconnected
   clusters of private networks as illustrated in figure 1 below. The
   creation of multi-level hierarchies is often unintentional, since
   each level of NAT is typically deployed by a separate
   administrative entity such as an ISP, a corporation, or a home user.






















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                               Public Internet
                           (Public IP addresses)
       ----+---------------+---------------+---------------+----
           |               |               |               |
           |               |               |               |
       192.0.2.1      192.0.2.64     192.0.2.128     192.0.2.254
       +-------+        Host A          Host B      +-------------+
       | NAT-1 |        (Alice)         (Jim)       |    NAT-2    |
       | (Bob) |                                    | (CheapoISP) |
       +-------+                                    +-------------+
       10.1.1.1                                        10.1.1.1
           |                                               |
           |                                               |
       Private Network 1                      Private Network 2
     (private IP addresses)                 (private IP addresses)
       ----+--------+----      ----+-----------------------+----
           |        |              |           |           |
           |        |              |           |           |
       10.1.1.10 10.1.1.11     10.1.1.10   10.1.1.11   10.1.1.12
        Host C    Host D       +-------+    Host E     +-------+
                               | NAT-3 |    (Mary)     | NAT-4 |
                               | (Ann) |               | (Lex) |
                               +-------+               +-------+
                               10.1.1.1                10.1.1.1
                                   |                       |
                                   |                       |
               Private Network 3   |         Private Network 4
             (private IP addresses)|       (private IP addresses)
               ----+-----------+---+       ----+-----------+----
                   |           |               |           |
                   |           |               |           |
               10.1.1.10   10.1.1.11       10.1.1.10   10.1.1.11
                Host F      Host G          Host H      Host I

   Figure 1. Multi-level NAT topology with Overlapping Address Space


   In the above scenario, Bob, Alice, Jim, and CheapoISP have each
   obtained a "genuine", globally routable IP address from an upstream
   service provider.  Alice and Jim have chosen to attach only a single
   machine at each of these public IP addresses, preserving the
   originally intended architecture of the Internet and making their
   hosts, A and B, globally addressable throughout the Internet.  Bob,
   in contrast, has purchased and attached a typical consumer NAT box.
   Bob's NAT obtains its external IP address (192.0.2.1) from Bob's ISP
   via DHCP, and automatically creates a private 10.1.1.x network for
   Bob's hosts C and D, acting as the DHCP server and default router for
   this private network.  Bob probably does not even know anything about



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   IP addresses; he merely knows that plugging the NAT into the Internet
   as instructed by the ISP, and then plugging his hosts into the NAT as
   the NAT's manual indicates, seems to work and gives all of his hosts
   access to Internet.

   CheapoISP, an inexpensive service provider, has allocated only one or
   a few globally routable IP addresses, and uses NAT to share these
   public IP addresses among its many customers. Such an arrangement is
   becoming increasingly common, especially in rapidly-developing
   countries where the exploding number of Internet-attached hosts
   greatly outstrips the ability of ISPs to obtain globally unique IP
   addresses for them. CheapoISP has chosen the popular 10.1.1.x
   address for its private network, since this is one of the three
   well-known private IP address blocks allocated in [RFC1918]
   specifically for this purpose.

   Of the three incentives listed in section 1 for NAT deployment, the
   last two still apply even to customers of ISPs that use NAT,
   resulting in multi-level NAT topologies as illustrated in the right
   side of the above diagram. Even three-level NAT topologies are known
   to exist. CheapoISP's customers Ann, Mary, and Lex have each obtained
   a single IP address on CheapoISP's network (Private Network 2), via
   DHCP.  Mary attaches only a single host at this point, but
   Ann and Lex each independently purchase and deploy consumer NATs in
   the same way that Bob did above.  As it turns out, these consumer
   NATs also happen to use 10.1.1.x addresses for the private networks
   they create, since these are the configuration defaults hard-coded
   into the NATs by their vendors.  Ann and Lex probably know nothing
   about IP addresses, and in particular they are probably unaware that
   the IP address spaces of their own private networks overlap not only
   with each other but also with the private IP address space used by
   their immediately upstream network.

   Nevertheless, despite this direct overlap, all of the "multi-level
   NATed hosts" - F, G, H, and I in this case - all nominally function
   and are able to initiate connections to any public server on the
   public Internet that has a globally routable IP address. Connections
   made from these hosts to the main Internet are merely translated
   twice. Once by the consumer NAT (NAT-3 or NAT-44) into the IP
   address space of CheapoISP's Private Network 2, and then again by
   CheapoISP's  NAT-2 into the public Internet's global IP address
   space.


3.1. Operational Details of the Multi-Level NAT Network

   In the "de facto" Internet address architecture that has resulted
   from the above pragmatic and economic incentives, only the nodes on



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   the public Internet have globally unique IP addresses assigned by
   the official IP address registries. IP addresses on different
   private networks are typically managed independently - either
   manually by the administrator of the private network itself, or
   automatically by the NAT through which the private network is
   connected to its "upstream" service provider.

   By convention, nodes on private networks are usually assigned IP
   addresses in one of the private address space ranges specifically
   allocated to this purpose in RFC 1918, ensuring that private IP
   addresses are easily distinguishable and do not conflict with the
   public IP addresses officially assigned to globally routable Internet
   hosts. However, when "plug-and-play" NATs are used to create
   hierarchically interconnected clusters of private networks, a given
   private IP address can be and often is reused across many different
   private networks. In figure 1 above, for example, private networks
   1, 2, 3, and 4 all have a node with IP address 10.1.1.10.


3.1.1. Client/Server Communication

   When a host on a private network initiates a client/server-style
   communication session with a server on the public Internet, via the
   server's public IP address, the NAT intercepts the packets comprising
   that session (usually as a consequence of being the default router
   for the private network), and modifies the packets' IP and TCP/UDP
   headers so as to make the session appear externally as if it was
   initiated by the NAT itself.

   For example, if host C above initiates a connection to host A at IP
   address 192.0.2.64, NAT-1 modifies the packets comprising the
   session so as to appear on the public Internet as if the session
   originated from NAT-1.  Similarly, if host F on private network 3
   initiates a connection to host A, NAT-3 modifies the outgoing packet
   so the packet appears on private network 2 as if it had originated
   from NAT-3 at IP address 10.1.1.10.  When the modified packet
   traverses NAT-2 on private network 2, NAT-2 further modifies the
   outgoing packet so as to appear on the public Internet as if it had
   originated from NAT-2 at public IP address 192.0.2.254. The NATs in
   effect serve as proxies that give their private "downstream" client
   nodes a temporary presence on "upstream" networks to support
   individual communication sessions.

   In summary, all hosts on the private networks 1, 2, 3, and 4 in
   figure 1 above are able to establish a client/server-style
   communication sessions with servers on the public Internet.





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3.1.2. Peer-to-Peer Communication

   While this network organization functions in practice for
   client/server-style communication, when the client is behind one or
   more levels of NAT and the server is on the public Internet, the lack
   of globally routable addresses for hosts on private networks makes
   direct peer-to-peer communication between those hosts difficult.  For
   example, two private hosts F and H on the network shown above might
   "meet" and learn of each other through a well-known server on the
   public Internet, such as Host A, and desire to establish direct
   communication between G and H without requiring A to forward each
   packet.  If G and H merely learn each other's (private) IP addresses
   from a registry kept by A, their attempts to connect to each other
   will fail because G and H reside on different private networks.
   Worse, if their connection attempts are not properly authenticated,
   they may appear to succeed but end up talking to the wrong host. For
   example, G may end up talking to Host F, the host on private
   network 3 that happens to have the same private IP address as Host H.
   Host H might similarly end up unintentionally connecting to Host I.

   In summary, peer-to-peer communication between hosts on disjoint
   private networks 1, 2, 3, and 4 in figure 1 above is a challenge
   without the assistance of a well known server on the public
   Internet. However, with assistance from a node in the public
   Internet, all hosts on the private networks 1, 2, 3, and 4 in
   figure 1 above are able to establish a peer-to-peer style
   communication sessions amongst themselves as well as with hosts
   on the public Internet.


3.2. Anomalies of the Multi-Level NAT Network

   Even though conventional wisdom would suggest that the network
   described above is seriously broken, in practice it still works in
   many ways. We break up figure 1 into two sub figures to better
   illustrate the anomalies. Figure 1.1 is the left half of figure 1
   and reflects the conventional single NAT deployment that is widely
   prevalent in many last-mile locations. The deployment in figure 1.1
   is popularly viewed as a pragmatic solution to work around the
   depletion of IPv4 address space and is not considered broken.
   Figure 1.2 is the right half of figure-1 and is representative of
   the anomalies we are about to discuss.









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                     Public Internet
                   (Public IP addresses)
       ----+---------------+---------------+-----------
           |               |               |
           |               |               |
       192.0.2.1      192.0.2.64     192.0.2.128
       +-------+        Host A          Host B
       | NAT-1 |        (Alice)         (Jim)
       | (Bob) |
       +-------+
       10.1.1.1
           |
           |
       Private Network 1
     (private IP addresses)
       ----+--------+----
           |        |
           |        |
       10.1.1.10 10.1.1.11
        Host C    Host D

   Figure 1.1. Conventional Single-level NAT Network topology




























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                       Public Internet
                     (Public IP addresses)
               ---+---------------+---------------+----
                  |               |               |
                  |               |               |
              192.0.2.64     192.0.2.128     192.0.2.254
               Host A          Host B      +-------------+
               (Alice)         (Jim)       |    NAT-2    |
                                           | (CheapoISP) |
                                           +-------------+
                                              10.1.1.1
                                                  |
                                                  |
                                         Private Network 2
                                       (private IP addresses)
                ----+---------------+-------------+--+-------
                    |               |                |
                    |               |                |
                10.1.1.10       10.1.1.11        10.1.1.12
                +-------+        Host E          +-------+
                | NAT-3 |        (Mary)          | NAT-4 |
                | (Ann) |                        | (Lex) |
                +-------+                        +-------+
                10.1.1.1                         10.1.1.1
                    |                                |
                    |                                |
           Private Network 3                 Private Network 4
         (private IP addresses)            (private IP addresses)
      ----+-----------+------             ----+-----------+----
          |           |                       |           |
          |           |                       |           |
     10.1.1.10   10.1.1.11                10.1.1.10   10.1.1.11
       Host F      Host G                   Host H      Host I

   Figure 1.2. Unconventional Multi-level NAT Network topology


3.2.1. Plug-and-Play NAT Devices

   Consumer NAT devices are predominantly "plug-and-play" NAT devices,
   and assume minimal user intervention during device setup. The
   "plug-and-play" NAT devices provide DHCP service on one interface
   and NAT function on another interface. Vendors of the consumer NAT
   devices make assumptions about how their consumers configure and
   hook up their PCs to the device. When consumers do not adhere to the
   vendor assumptions, the consumers can end up with a broken network.




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   A "plug-and-play" NAT device provides DHCP service on the LAN
   attached to the private interface, and assumes that all private
   hosts at the consumer site have DHCP client enabled and are
   connected to the single LAN. Consumers need to be aware that all
   private hosts must be on a single LAN, with no router in between.

   A "Plug-and-Play" NAT device also assumes that there is no other
   NAT device or DHCP server device on the same LAN at the customer
   premises. When there are multiple "Plug-and-play" NAT devices on
   the same LAN, each NAT device will offer DHCP service on the same
   LAN, and may even be from the same private address pool. This could
   result in multiple end nodes on the same LAN ending up with identical
   IP addresses and breaking network connectivity.

   As it turns out, most consumer deployments have a single LAN where
   there they deploy a "plug-and-play" NAT device and the concerns
   raised above have not been an issue in reality.


3.2.2. Unconventional Addressing on NAT Devices

   Let us consider the unconventional addressing with NAT-3 and
   NAT-4. NAT-3 and NAT-4 are apparently multi-homed on the same
   subnet through both their interfaces. NAT-3 is on subnet 10.1.1/24
   through its external interface facing NAT-2, as well as through its
   private interface facing clients Host-F and Host-G. Likewise, NAT-4
   also has two interfaces on the same subnet 10.1.1/24.

   In a traditional network, when a node has multiple interfaces with
   IP addresses on the same subnet, it is natural to assume that all
   interfaces with addresses on the same subnet must be on a single
   connected LAN (bridged LAN or a single physical LAN). Clearly, that
   is not the case here. Even though both NAT-3 and NAT-4 have two
   interfaces on the same subnet 10.1.1/24, the NAT devices view the
   two interfaces as being on two disjoint subnets and routing realms.
   The "plug-and-play" NAT devices are really not multi-homed on the
   same subnet as in a traditional sense.

   In a traditional network, both NAT-3 and NAT-4 in figure 1.2 should
   be incapable of communicating reliably as a transport endpoint with
   other nodes on their adjacent networks (ex: private networks 2 and
   3 in the case of NAT-3 and private Networks 2 and 4 in the case of
   NAT-4). This is because applications on either of the NAT devices
   cannot know to differentiate packets from hosts on either of the
   subnets bearing the same IP address. If NAT-3 attempts to resolve
   the IP address of a neighboring host in the conventional manner by
   broadcasting an ARP request on all of its physical interfaces
   bearing the same subnet, it may get a different response on each



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   of its physical interfaces.

   Even though both NAT-3 and NAT-4 have hosts bearing the same IP
   address on the adjacent networks, the NAT devices do communicate
   effectively as end points. Many of the "plug-and-play" NAT devices
   offer a limited number of services on them. For example, many of
   the NAT devices respond to pings from hosts on either of the
   interfaces. Even though a NAT device is often not actively
   managed, many of the NAT devices are equipped to be managed from
   the private interface. This unconventional communication with
   NAT devices is achievable because many of the NAT devices conform to
   REQ-7 of [BEH-UDP] and view the two interfaces as being on two
   disjoint routing domains and distinguish between sessions initiated
   from hosts on either interface (private or public).


3.2.3. Multi-Level NAT Translations

   Use of a single NAT to connect private hosts to the public Internet
   as in figure 1.1 is a fairly common practice. Many consumer NATs are
   deployed this way. However, use of multi-level NAT translations as
   in figure 1.2 is not a common practice and is not well understood.

   Let us consider the conventional single NAT translation in
   figure 1.1. Because the public and private IP address ranges are
   numerically disjoint, nodes on private networks can make use of both
   public and private IP addresses when initiating network
   communication sessions. Nodes on a private network can use private
   IP addresses to refer to other nodes on the same private network,
   and public IP addresses to refer to nodes on the public Internet.
   For example, host C in figure 1.1 is on private network 1 and can
   directly address hosts A, B and D using their assigned IP addresses.
   This is in spite of the fact that hosts A and B are on the public
   Internet and host D alone is on the private network.

   Next, let us consider the unconventional multi-level NAT topology in
   figure 1.2. In this scenario, private hosts are able to connect to
   hosts on the public Internet. But, private hosts are not able to
   connect with all other private hosts. For example, host F in
   figure 1.2 can directly address hosts A, B, and G using their
   assigned IP addresses, but F has no way to address any of the
   other hosts in the diagram. Host F in particular cannot address
   host E by its assigned IP address, even though host E is located on
   the immediately "upstream" private network through which F is
   connected to the Internet. Host E has the same IP address as
   host G. Yet, this addressing is "legitimate" in the NAT world
   because the two hosts are on different private networks.




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   It would seem that the topology in figure 1.2 with multiple
   NAT translations is broken because private hosts are not able to
   address each other directly. However, the network is not broken.
   Nodes on any private network have no direct method of addressing
   nodes on other private networks. The private networks 1, 2, 3 and 4
   are all disjoint. Hosts on private network 1 are unable to directly
   address nodes on private networks 2, 3 or 4 and vice versa. Multiple
   NAT translations was not the cause of this.

   As described in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, client-server and
   peer-to-peer communication can and should be possible even with
   multi-level NAT topology deployment. A host on any private network
   must be able to communicate with any other host, no matter which
   private network the host is attached to or where the private network
   is located. Host F should be able to communicate with host E and
   carry out both client-server communication and peer-to-peer
   communication, and vice versa. Host F and host E form a hairpin
   session through NAT-2 to communicate with each other. Each host
   uses the public endpoint assigned by the Internet facing NAT (NAT-2)
   to address its peer.

   When the NAT devices deployed conform to the hairpin translation
   requirements in [BEH-UDP], [BEH-TCP] and [BEH-ICMP], peer nodes are
   able to connect even in this type of multi-level NAT topologies.


3.2.4. Mistaken End Host Identity

   Mistaken end host identity can result in accidental malfunction in
   some cases of multi-level NAT deployments. Consider the scenario in
   figure 1.3. Figure 1.3 depicts 2 levels of NATs between an end-user
   in private network-3 and the public Internet.

   Suppose CheapoISP assigns 10.1.1.11 to its DNS resolver, which it
   advertises through DHCP to NAT-3, the gateway for Ann's home.
   NAT-3 in turn advertises 10.1.1.11 as the DNS resolver to
   host F (10.1.1.10) and host G (10.1.1.11) on private network 3.
   However, when host F sends a DNS query to 10.1.1.11, it will be
   delivered locally to host G on private network 3 rather than
   CheapoISP's DNS resolver. This is clearly a case of mistaken
   identity due to CheapoISP advertising a server that could
   potentially overlap with its customers' IP addresses.









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                      Public Internet
                    (Public IP addresses)
              ---+---------------+---------------+----
                 |               |               |
                 |               |               |
             192.0.2.64     192.0.2.128     192.0.2.254
              Host A          Host B      +-------------+
              (Alice)         (Jim)       |    NAT-2    |
                                          | (CheapoISP) |
                                          +-------------+
                                             10.1.1.1
                                                 |
                                                 |
                                        Private Network 2
                                      (private IP addresses)
          ------------+------------------+-------+----------
                      |                  |
                  10.1.1.10              |
                  +-------+         10.1.1.11
                  | NAT-3 |          Host E
                  | (Ann) |          (DNS resolver)
                  +-------+
                   10.1.1.1
                       |    Private Network 3
                       |  (private IP addresses)
               ----+---+-----------+----------------
                   |               |
                   |               |
              10.1.1.10       10.1.1.11
                Host F          Host G


   Figure 1.3. Mistaken server identity in Multi-level NAT topology


   Recommendation-1: ISPs, using NAT devices to provide connectivity
   to customers, should assign non-overlapping addresses to servers
   advertised to customers.  One way to do this would be to assign
   global addresses to advertised servers.


4. Remote Access VPN Network Topologies

   Enterprises use remote access VPN to allow secure access to the
   employees working outside the enterprise premises. While outside
   the enterprise premises, an employee may be located in his/her
   home office, hotel, conference or a partner's office. In all cases,
   it is desirable for the employee at the remote site to have



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   unhindered access to his/her corporate network and the applications
   running on the corporate network. While doing so, the employee
   should not jeopardize the integrity and confidentiality of the
   corporate network and the applications running on the network.

   IPsec, L2TP and SSL are some of the well known secure VPN
   technologies used by the remote access vendors. Besides
   authenticating employees for granting access, remote access VPN
   servers often enforce different forms of security (e.g. IPsec, SSL)
   to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the run-time
   traffic between the VPN client and the VPN server.

   Many enterprises deploy their internal networks using RFC-1918
   private address space and use NAT devices to connect to the public
   Internet. Further, many of the applications in the corporate network
   refer to information (such as URLs) and services using private
   addresses in the corporate network. Applications such as NFS rely on
   simple source IP address based filtering to restrict access to
   corporate users. These are some reasons why the remote access VPN
   servers are configured with a block of IP addresses from the
   corporate private network to assign to remote access clients. VPN
   clients use the virtual IP (VIP) address assigned to them (by the
   corporate VPN server) to access applications inside the corporate.

   Consider the remote access VPN scenario in figure 2 below.


























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                     (Corporate Private network 10.0.0.0/8)
                     ---------------+----------------------
                                    |
                                 10.1.1.10
                          +---------+-------+
                          | Enterprise Site |
                          | Remote Access   |
                          | VPN Server      |
                          +--------+--------+
                             192.0.2.1
                                   |
                         {---------+------}
                       {                    }
                     {                        }
                   {      Public Internet       }
                   {   (Public IP addresses)    }
                     {                        }
                       {                    }
                         {---------+------}
                                   |
                             192.0.2.254
                          +--------+--------+
                          | Remote Site     |
                          | "Plug-and-Play" |
                          | NAT router      |
                          +--------+--------+
                               10.1.1.1
                                   |
      Remote Site Private Network  |
      -----+-----------+-----------+-------------+-----------
           |           |           |             |
        10.1.1.10  10.1.1.11   10.1.1.12     10.1.1.13
         Host A    Host B      +--------+    Host C
                               | VPN    |
                               | Client |
                               | on a PC|
                               +--------+

   Figure 2. Remote Access VPN with Overlapping Address Space


   In the above scenario, say an employee of the corporate is at a
   remote location and attempts to access the corporate network using
   the VPN client. The corporate network is laid out using RFC-1918
   address pool of 10.0.0.0/8 and say the VPN server is configured with
   an address block of 10.1.1.0/24 to assign virtual IP addresses to
   remote access VPN clients. Now, say the employee at the remote site
   is attached to a network on the remote site which also happens to be



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   using a  RFC-1918 address space based network and coincidentally
   overlaps the corporate network. In this scenario, it is
   conventionally problematic for the VPN client to connect to the
   server(s) and other hosts at the enterprise.

   Nevertheless, despite the direct address overlap, the remote access
   VPN connection between the VPN client at the remote site and the
   VPN server at the enterprise should remain connected and should be
   made to work. I.e., the NAT device at the remote site should not
   obstruct the VPN connection traversing it. And, the remote user
   should be able to connect to any host at the enterprise through the
   VPN from the remote desktop.

   The following subsections describe the operational details of the
   VPN, anomalies with the address overlap and recommendations on
   how best to address the situation.


4.1. Operational Details of Remote Access VPN Network

   As mentioned earlier, in the "de facto" Internet address
   architecture, only the nodes on the public Internet have globally
   unique IP addresses assigned by the official IP address registries.
   Many of the networks in the edges use private IP addresses from
   RFC 1918 and use NAT devices to connect their private networks
   to the public Internet. Many enterprises adapted the approach of
   using private IP addresses internally. Employees within the
   enterprise's Intranet private network are "trusted" and may connect
   to any of the internal hosts with minimal administrative or policy
   enforcement overhead. When an employee leaves the enterprise
   premises, remote access VPN provides the same level of intranet
   connectivity to the remote user.

   The objective of this section is to provide an overview of the
   operational details of a remote access VPN application so the reader
   has an appreciation for the problem of remote address space overlap.
   This is not a tutorial or specification of remote access VPN
   products, per se.

   When an employee at a remote site launches his/her remote access VPN
   client, the VPN server at the corporate premises demands the VPN
   client to authenticate itself. When the authentication succeeds,
   the VPN server assigns a Virtual IP (VIP) address to the client for
   connecting with the corporate Intranet. From this point onwards,
   while the VPN is active, outgoing IP packets directed to the hosts
   in the corporate Intranet are tunneled through the VPN, in that the
   the VPN server serves as the next-hop and the VPN connection as the
   next-hop link for these packets. Within the corporate Intranet, the



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   outbound IP packets appear as arriving from the VIP address. so,
   IP packets from the corporate hosts to the remote user are sent to
   the remote user's VIP address and the IP packets are tunneled
   inbound to the remote user's PC through the VPN tunnel.

   This works well so long as the subnets in the corporate network
   do not conflict with subnets at the remote site where the remote
   user's PC is located. However, when the corporate network is built
   using RFC 1918 private address space and the remote location where
   the VPN client is launched is also using an overlapping network from
   RFC 1918 address space, there can be addressing conflicts. The
   remote user's PC will have a conflict in accessing nodes on the
   corporate site and nodes at the remote site bearing the same IP
   address simultaneously. Consequently, the VPN client may be unable
   to have full access to the employee's corporate network and the
   local network at the remote site simultaneously.

   In spite of address overlap, remote access VPN clients should be
   able to successfully establish connections with Intranet hosts in
   the enterprise.


4.2. Anomalies of the Remote Access VPN network

   Even though conventional wisdom would suggest that the remote access
   VPN scenario with overlapping address space would be seriously
   broken, in practice it still works in many ways. Let us look at some
   anomalies where there might be a problem and identify solutions
   through which the remote access VPN application could be made to
   work even under the problem situations.


4.2.1. Remote Router and DHCP Server Address Conflict

   Routing and DHCP service are bootstrap services essential for a
   remote host to establish a VPN connection. Without DHCP lease, the
   remote host can not communicate over the IP network. Without a
   router to connect to the Internet, the remote host is unable to
   access past the local subnet to connect to the VPN server at the
   enterprise. It is essential that neither of these bootstrap services
   be tampered at the remote host in order for the VPN connection to
   stay operational. Typically, a "Plug-and-play" NAT device at the
   remote site provides both routing and DHCP services from the same
   IP address.

   When there is address overlap between hosts at corporate Intranet
   and hosts at the remote site, the remote VPN user is often unaware
   of the address conflict. Address overlap could potentially cause the



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   remote user to lose connectivity to the enterprise entirely or
   lose connectivity to an arbitrary block of hosts at the enterprise.

   Consider, for example, a scenario where the IP address of the DHCP
   server at the remote site matched the IP address of a host at
   the enterprise network. When the remote user's PC is ready to
   renew the lease of the locally assigned IP address, the remote
   user's VPN client would incorrectly identify the IP packet
   as being addressed to an enterprise host and tunnel the DHCP
   renewal packet over the VPN to the remote VPN server. The DHCP
   renewal requests simply do not reach the DHCP server at the
   remote site. As a result, the remote PC would eventually lose the
   lease on the IP address and the VPN connection to the enterprise
   would be broken.

   Consider another scenario where the IP address of the remote user's
   router overlapped with the IP address of a host in the enterprise
   network. If the remote user's PC were to send ping or some type of
   periodic keep-alive packets to the router (say, to test the liveness
   of the router), the packets are intercepted by the VPN client and
   simply redirected to the VPN tunnel. This type of unintended
   redirection has the twin effect of hijacking critical packets
   addressed to the router as well as the host in the enterprise
   network (bearing the same IP address as the remote router) being
   bombarded with unintended keep-alive packets. Loss of connectivity
   to the router can result in the VPN connection being broken.

   Clearly, it is not desirable to route traffic directed to the local
   router or DHCP server to be redirected to the corporate intranet.
   VPN client on remote PC should be configured such that IP packets
   whose target IP address match the following are disallowed to be
   redirected over the VPN.
   a) client's next-hop router IP address used to access the VPN
   server,
   b) DHCP server providing address lease on the remote host network
   interface.

   Recommendation-2: VPN client on remote PC should be configured such
   that IP packets whose target IP address match the following are
   disallowed to be redirected over the VPN.
   a) client's next-hop router IP address used to access the VPN
   server,
   b) DHCP server providing address lease on the remote host network
   interface.







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4.2.2. Simultaneous Connectivity Conflict

   Ideally speaking, it is not desirable for the corporate intranet to
   conflict with any of the hosts at the remote site. As a general
   practice, if simultaneous communication with end hosts at the remote
   location is important, it is advisable to disallow access to any
   corporate network resource that overlaps the client's subnet at the
   remote site. By doing this, the remote user is able to connect to
   all local hosts simultaneously while the VPN connection is active.

   Some VPN clients allow the remote PC to access the corporate network
   over VPN and all other subnets directly without routing through the
   VPN. Such a configuration is termed as "Split VPN" configuration.
   "Split VPN" configuration allows the remote user to run applications
   requiring communication with hosts at the remote site or the public
   Internet, as well as hosts at the corporate intranet, unless there
   is address overlap with the remote subnet. Applications needing
   access to the hosts at the remote site or the public Internet do not
   traverse the VPN, and hence are likely to have better performance
   when compared to traversing the VPN. This can be quite valuable
   for latency sensitive applications such as VoIP and interactive
   gaming. If there is no overriding security concern to directly
   accessing hosts at the remote site or the public Internet, the VPN
   client on remote PC should be configured in "Split VPN" mode.

   If simultaneous connectivity to hosts at remote site is not
   important, the VPN client may be configured to direct all
   communication traffic from the remote user to the VPN. Such a
   configuration is termed as "Non-Split VPN" configuration.
   "Non-Split VPN" configuration ensures that all communication from
   the remote user's PC traverses the VPN link and routed through the
   VPN server, with the exception of traffic directed to the router
   and DHCP server at the remote site. No other communication takes
   place with hosts at the remote site. Applications needing access
   to the public Internet also traverse the VPN. If the goal is to
   maximize the security and reliability of connectivity to the
   corporate network, the VPN client on remote PC should be
   configured in "Non-Split VPN" mode. "Non-Split VPN" configuration
   will minimize the likelihood of access loss to corporate hosts.

   Recommendation-3: VPN client on a remote-PC may be configured in
   "Split VPN" or 'Non-Split VPN" mode as follows, depending on the
   goal of VPN deployment.
   a) If the goal is to maximize the security and reliability of
   connectivity to the corporate network, the VPN client on remote
   PC should be configured in "Non-split VPN" mode. "Non-Split VPN"
   mode ensures that the VPN client directs all traffic from the
   remote user to the VPN server (at corporate site), with the



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   exception of traffic directed to the router and DHCP server at
   the remote site.
   b) If there is no overriding security concern to directly
   accessing hosts at the remote site or the public Internet, the
   VPN client on remote PC should be configured in "Split VPN"
   mode. "Split VPN" mode ensures that only the corporate traffic
   is directed over the VPN. All other traffic does not have the
   overhead of traversing the VPN.


4.2.3. VIP Address Conflict

   When the VIP address assigned to the VPN client at remote site is
   in direct conflict with the IP address of the existing network
   interface, the VPN client might be unable to establish the VPN
   connection.

   Consider a scenario where the VIP address assigned by the
   VPN server directly matched the IP address of the networking
   interface at the remote site. When the VPN client on the remote
   host attempts to set the VIP address on a virtual adapter (specific
   to the remote access application), the VIP address configuration
   will simply fail due to conflict with the IP address of the existing
   network interface. The configuration failure in turn can result in
   the remote access VPN tunnel not being established.

   Clearly, it is not advisable to have the VIP address overlap
   the IP address of the remote user's existing network interface. As a
   general rule, it is not advisable for the VIP address to overlap
   any IP address in the remote user's local subnet, as the VPN client
   on the remote PC might be forced to respond to ARP requests on the
   remote site and the VPN client might not process the handling of ARP
   requests gracefully.

   Some VPN vendors offer provision to detect conflict of VIP address
   with remote site address space and switch between two or more address
   pools with different subnets so the VIP address assigned is not in
   conflict with the address space at remote site. Enterprises deploying
   VPNs that support this type of vendor provisioning are advised to
   configure the VPN server with a minimum of two distinct IP address
   pools. However, this is not
   universally the case.

   Alternately, enterprises may deploy two or more VPN servers with
   different address pools. By doing so, a VPN client that detects
   conflict of VIP address with the subnet at remote site will have
   the ability able to switch to an alternate VPN server that will not
   conflict.



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   Recommendation-4: Enterprises deploying remote access VPN solution
   are advised to adapt a strategy to avoid VIP address conflict with
   the subnet at remote site. Below are two suggestions.
   a) If the VPN server being deployed has provision to configure two
   or more address pools, configure the VPN server with a minimum of
   two distinct IP address pools.
   b) Deploy two or more VPN servers with distinct IP address pools.
   By doing so, a VPN client that detects conflict of VIP address with
   the subnet at remote site will have the ability to switch to
   alternate VPN server that will not conflict.


4.2.4. Mistaken End Host Identity

   When "Split VPN" is configured on the VPN client on remote PC,
   there can be a potential security threat due to mistaken identity.
   Say, a certain service (ex: SMTP mail service) is configured on
   exactly the same IP address on both the corporate site and the
   remote site. The user could unknowingly be using the service on the
   remote site, thereby violating the integrity and confidentiality of
   the contents relating to that application. Potentially, remote
   user mail messages could be hijacked by the ISP's mail server.

   Enterprises deploying remote access VPN servers should allocate
   global IP addresses for the critical servers the remote VPN clients
   typically need to access. By doing this, even if most of the private
   corporate network uses RFC 1918 address space, this will ensure that
   the remote VPN clients can always access the critical servers
   regardless of the private address space used at the remote
   attachment point. This is akin to recommendation-1 provided in
   conjunction with multi-level NAT deployments.

   Recommendation-5: When "Split VPN" is configured on VPN client of
   a remote PC, enterprises deploying remote access VPN servers are
   advised to assign global IP addresses for the critical servers the
   remote VPN clients are likely to access.


5. Summary of Recommendations

   NAT vendors are advised to refer BEHAVE protocol documents
   ([BEH-UDP], [BEH-TCP] and [BEH-ICMP]) for a comprehensive list of
   conformance requirements for NAT devices.

   The following is a summary of recommendations to support the
   unconventional NAT topologies identified in this document. The
   recommendations are deployment specific and addressed to the



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   personnel responsible for the deployments. These personnel
   include ISP administrators and enterprise IT administrators.

   Recommendation-1: ISPs, using NAT devices to provide connectivity
   to customers, should assign non-overlapping addresses to servers
   advertised to customers.  One way to do this would be to assign
   global addresses to advertised servers.

   Recommendation-2: VPN client on remote PC should be configured such
   that IP packets whose target IP address match the following are
   disallowed to be redirected over the VPN.
   a) client's next-hop router IP address used to access the VPN
   server,
   b) DHCP server providing address lease on the remote host network
   interface.

   Recommendation-3: VPN client on a remote-PC may be configured in
   "Split VPN" or 'Non-Split VPN" mode as follows, depending on the
   goal of VPN deployment.
   a) If the goal is to maximize the security and reliability of
   connectivity to the corporate network, the VPN client on remote
   PC should be configured in "Non-split VPN" mode. "Non-Split VPN"
   mode ensures that the VPN client directs all traffic from the
   remote user to the VPN server (at corporate site), with the
   exception of traffic directed to the router and DHCP server at
   the remote site.
   b) If there is no overriding security concern to directly
   accessing hosts at the remote site or the public Internet, the
   VPN client on remote PC should be configured in "Split VPN"
   mode. "Split VPN" mode ensures that only the corporate traffic
   is directed over the VPN. All other traffic does not have the
   overhead of traversing the VPN.

   Recommendation-4: Enterprises deploying remote access VPN solution
   are advised to adapt a strategy to avoid VIP address conflict with
   the subnet at remote site. Below are two suggestions.
   a) If the VPN server being deployed has provision to configure two
   or more address pools, configure the VPN server with a minimum of
   two distinct IP address pools.
   b) Deploy two or more VPN servers with distinct IP address pools.
   By doing so, a VPN client that detects conflict of VIP address with
   the subnet at remote site will have the ability to switch to
   alternate VPN server that will not conflict.

   Recommendation-5: When "Split VPN" is configured on VPN client of
   a remote PC, enterprises deploying remote access VPN servers are
   advised to assign global IP addresses for the critical servers the
   remote VPN clients are likely to access.



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6. IANA Considerations

   This document does not warrant any IANA considerations.


7. Security Considerations

   This document does not inherently create new security issues.
   Security issues known to DHCP servers and NAT devices are
   applicable, but not within the scope of this document. Likewise,
   security issues specific to remote access VPN devices are also
   applicable to the remote access VPN topology, but not within the
   scope of this document. The security issues reviewed here only
   those relevant to the topologies described in sections 2 and 3,
   specifically as they apply to private address space overlap in
   the topologies described.

   Mistaken end host identity is a security concern present in both
   topologies discussed. Mistaken end host identity, described in
   sections 2.2.4 and 3.2.4 for each of the topologies reviewed,
   essentially points the possibility of application services being
   hijacked by the wrong application server (ex: Mail server). Security
   violation due to mistaken end host identity arises principally due
   to critical servers being assigned RFC 1918 private addresses. The
   recommendation suggested for both scenarios is to assign globally
   unique public IP addresses for the critical servers.

   It is also recommended in section 2.1.2 that applications adapt
   end-to-end authentication and not depend on source IP address for
   authentication. Doing this will thwart connection hijacking and
   denial of service attacks.


8. Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Dan Wing for reviewing the document in
   detail and making helpful suggestions in reorganizing the
   document format. The authors also wish to thank Ralph Droms for
   helping with rewording the text and recommendation-1 in section
   3.2.4 and Cullen Jennings for helping with rewording the text
   and recommendation-3 in section 4.2.2.








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9. Normative References

[BEH-ICMP]  Srisuresh, P., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and Guha, S.,
            "NAT Behavioral Requirements for ICMP Protocol",
            BCP 148, RFC 5508, January 2009.

[BEH-TCP]   Guha, S., Biswas, K., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and
            Srisuresh, P., "NAT Behavioral Requirements for TCP",
            BCP 142, RFC 5382, October 2008.

[BEH-UDP]   Audet, F. and Jennings, C., "NAT Behavioral Requirements
            for Unicast UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, January 2007.

[NAT-TERM]  P. Srisuresh and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address Translator
            (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC 2663,
            August 1999.

[NAT-TRAD]  P. Srisuresh and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address
            Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, January 2001.

[RFC1918]   Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot,G. and
            Lear, E., "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5,
            RFC 1918, February 1996.


10. Informational References

[DHCP]      Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
            March 1997.

[NAT-PROT]  Holdrege, M., and Srisuresh, P., "Protocol Complications
            with the IP Network Address Translator", RFC 3027,
            January 2001.

[RFC3330]   IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330, September
            2002.



Authors' Addresses:

   Pyda Srisuresh
   Kazeon Systems, Inc.
   1161 San Antonio Rd.
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   U.S.A.
   Phone: +1 408 836 4773
   EMail: srisuresh@yahoo.com



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   Bryan Ford
   Max Planck Institute for Software Systems
   Campus Building E1 4
   D-66123 Saarbruecken
   Germany
   Phone: +49-681-9325657
   EMail: baford@mpi-sws.org


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.































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