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   MIP6 Working Group                                       G. Giaretta
   Internet Draft                                           I. Guardini
   Expires: April 2005                                       E. Demaria
                                                                  TILab
                                                           J. Bournelle
                                                 M. Laurent-Maknavicius
                                                                GET/INT
                                                           October 2004

            MIPv6 Authorization and Configuration based on EAP
              <draft-giaretta-mip6-authorization-eap-02.txt>


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I
   certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am
   aware have been disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
   disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
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   documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
   progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

Abstract

   This draft defines an architecture, and related protocols, for
   performing dynamic Mobile IPv6 authorization and configuration
   relying on a AAA infrastructure. The necessary interaction between
   the AAA server of the home provider and the mobile node is realized
   using EAP, exploiting the capability of some EAP methods to convey
   generic information items together with authentication data. This
   approach has the advantage that the access equipment acts as a simple
   pass-through for EAP messages and therefore does not play any active
   role in the Mobile IPv6 negotiation procedure, which makes the
   solution easier to deploy and maintain.


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Table of Contents

   1.   Introduction................................................3
   2.   Terminology.................................................4
   3.   Protocol Overview...........................................5
   4.   Requirements on EAP methods................................10
   5.   Detailed description of the Protocol.......................12
      5.1  Mobile node bootstrapping...............................12
      5.2  Management of re-authentication events..................17
   6.   Home Agent considerations..................................19
      6.1  Requirements on AAAH-HA communication...................19
      6.2  Management of MIPv6 authorization state.................20
   7.   The MIPv6-Authorization container..........................22
      7.1  PEAPv2..................................................22
      7.2  EAP-FAST................................................23
      7.3  EAP-SIM.................................................23
      7.4  EAP-AKA.................................................24
      7.5  EAP-TTLS................................................24
      7.6  EAP-IKEv2...............................................25
   8.   New TLVs...................................................26
      8.1  Service-Status-TLV......................................26
      8.2  Service-Selection-TLV...................................27
      8.3  Service-Options-TLV.....................................27
      8.4  Home-Agent-Address-TLV..................................28
      8.5  Home-Address-TLV........................................28
      8.6  IKE-Authentication-Options-TLV..........................29
      8.7  IKE-Bootstrap-Information-TLV...........................30
      8.8  Negotiation-Result-TLV..................................31
      8.9  Authorization-Lifetime-TLV..............................32
   9.   Security Considerations....................................33
   10.  References.................................................34
      10.1   Normative References..................................34
      10.2   Informative References................................34
   Acknowledgments.................................................36
   Authors' Addresses..............................................36
   Intellectual Property Statement.................................37















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1. Introduction

   Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] requires that Mobile Nodes (MNs) and Home
   Agents (HAs) share a set of configuration parameters: the MN must
   know its Home Address, the Home Agent Address and the cryptographic
   material needed to protect MIPv6 signaling (e.g. shared keys or
   certificates to setup an IPsec security association). MIPv6 base
   protocol does not specify any method to automatically acquire this
   information; which means that network administrators are normally
   required to manually set configuration data on MNs and HAs.

   Manual configuration of Home Agents and Mobile Nodes also works as an
   implicit method for Mobile IPv6 authorization, because only the users
   that have been administratively enabled on a specific Home Agent are
   allowed to exploit Mobile IPv6 and its features.

   However, in a large network (e.g. the network of a mobile operator),
   which may include millions of users and many Home Agents, the
   operational and administrative burden of this procedure may easily
   become overwhelming. In addition, the extensive use of manual and
   static configurations limits the flexibility and reliability of the
   system, in that it is not possible to dynamically assign the HA when
   the user enters the network, which would help to optimize performance
   and resource utilization (e.g. assignment of the HA closest to the
   MN's point of attachment).

   This is generally referred to as the Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping
   problem. As discussed in [MIPv6PS], several bootstrapping scenarios
   can be identified depending on the relationship between the network
   operator providing IP services to the MN (Access Service Provider,
   ASP) and the service provider managing the HA (Mobility Service
   Provider, MSP). This document describes a solution to the
   bootstrapping problem that is applicable in a scenario where the ASP
   and the MSP are the same provider (Integrated ASP, IASP).

   The proposed solution performs dynamic Mobile IPv6 authorization and
   configuration together with MN authentication for network access.
   MIPv6 negotiation and bootstrapping is controlled by the AAA server
   of the home provider (IASP), that interacts with the mobile node
   relying on AAA routing and EAP, exploiting the capability of some EAP
   methods (e.g. PEAPv2 [PEAPv2], EAP-FAST [EAP-FAST]) to convey generic
   information items together with authentication data.









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2. Terminology

   General mobility terminology can be found in [RFC3753]. The following
   additional terms are used here:

   ASP     Access Service Provider

   IASP    Integrated Access Service Provider

   MSP     Mobility Service Provider

   AAA     Authentication Authorization Accounting

   AAAH    AAA server of the Home domain





































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3. Protocol Overview

   The basic idea behind the solution proposed herewith is to perform
   Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping during the authentication procedure
   undertaken by the Mobile Node to gain network access.
   In particular, this draft defines a method to:

   - explicitly authorize the use of Mobile IPv6 based on the service
     profile of the user, its position within the network, etc.

   - dynamically allocate a Home Agent to the Mobile Node;

   - dynamically configure Mobile IPv6 start-up parameters (i.e. MIPv6
     bootstrapping) on the Mobile Node. These parameters include the
     Home Address and the cryptographic material needed to set-up the
     IPsec Security Association used to protect Mobile IPv6 signaling
     (i.e. Binding Updates and Binding Acknowledgements).

   Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the solution proposed in
   this draft. The central element of the architecture is the AAA server
   of the Home Domain (i.e. AAAH), which interacts with both the MN and
   the selected HA to perform service authorization and configuration.

                                  AAA
                                 Client
                 IEEE 802.1x    +------+      RADIUS
                   or PANA      |      |    or Diameter
    +--------+ /--------------EAP Exchange-----------------\ +--------+
    | Mobile |/ <------------Authentication---------------> \|  AAAH  |
    |  Node  |\ <--MIPv6 authorization and configuration--> /| Server |
    +--------+ \-------------------------------------------/ +--------+
                                |      |                         /\
                                +------+                        /||\
                                 Router                          ||
                                 or AP                 AAAH-HA   ||
                             (pass through)            Protocol  ||
                                                                \||/
                                                                 \/
                                                             +--------+
                                                             |  Home  |
                                                             |  Agent |
                                                             +--------+

                     Figure 1 - Solution architecture

   The solution is applicable to any access network relying on EAP
   [RFC3748] for user authentication and works with all EAP methods
   supporting the exchange of general purpose information elements, in
   any form (e.g. TLVs or AVPs), between EAP peers. Exploiting this


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   capability, MN and AAAH can piggyback Mobile IPv6 negotiation
   messages within the same EAP conversation used to carry out user
   authentication.

   This kind of operation is already supported by several tunneled (e.g.
   PEAPv2 [PEAPv2]) and non tunneled (e.g. EAP-IKEv2 [EAP-IKEv2]) EAP
   methods, that also include native support for encryption,
   authentication and integrity protection of exchanged configuration
   data (e.g. HA address).

   Figure 2 shows an overview of the procedure defined to handle MIPv6
   bootstrap on the Mobile Node. For the sake of simplicity it is
   assumed that the employed AAA protocol is Diameter, but obviously
   RADIUS is suitable as well.

         EAP over
       IEEE 802.1x        EAP over Diameter             AAAH-HA
         or PANA    AAA      (or RADIUS)      AAAH      Protocol
    MN +---------+ Client +----------------+ Server +-------------+ HA

   1) <--Req. Id.---
      --Identity--->    --Diameter EAP Req.-->
       /-------------------------------------\
   2) /      Set-up of protected channel      \
      \      e.g. TLS Tunnel (optional)       /
       \-------------------------------------/
       /-------------------------------------\
   3) /            Authentication             \
      \                 Phase                 /
       \-------------------------------------/
       /-------------------------------------\ +-+ /--------------\ +-+
   4) /           Mobile IPv6 service         \| |/ HoA selection  \| |
      \    authorization and configuration    /| |\ and HA config. /| |
       \-------------------------------------/ +-+ \--------------/ +-+
                                            Home Agent             State
                                            Selection             Set-up

   5) <-----EAP-----    <-----Diameter EAP----
      Success/Failure   Answer (Success/Failure
                        and authorization AVPs)

       /----------------------------------------------------------\
   6) /           Set-up Security Association MN-HA and            \
      \     Mobile IPv6 registration (exchange of BU and BA)       /
       \----------------------------------------------------------/

          Figure 2 - Overview of Mobile IPv6 bootstrap procedure




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   The whole procedure can be divided in six steps:

   1. EAP identity exchange (i.e. exchange of EAP Request Identity and
      EAP Response Identity messages);

   2. set-up of a protected channel (e.g. TLS tunnel) for the delivery
      of subsequent EAP signaling. This is an optional step that is
      present only if the EAP method provides confidentiality support.
      It is mandatory only if the MIPv6 negotiation procedure involves
      the exchange of sensitive information;

   3. authentication phase. The actual authentication procedure and its
      security properties depend on the selected EAP method. In tunneled
      EAP methods (e.g. PEAPv2) this step may involve one or more
      complete EAP conversations occurring within a previously
      negotiated TLS session. Each EAP conversation may accomplish user
      authentication relying on any available EAP method (e.g. EAP-MD5,
      EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA);

   4. Mobile IPv6 service authorization and configuration. MN and AAAH
      exchange a sequence of signaling messages to authorize and
      configure Mobile IPv6. Those messages are encapsulated as
      requested by the employed EAP method (e.g. TLVs or AVPs) and
      delivered as part of the on-going EAP session. If the EAP method
      provides confidentiality this protocol handshake is encrypted
      using the previously negotiated ciphersuite. During this phase,
      AAAH selects a suitable Home Agent for the MN and exchanges
      authorization and configuration data with it using a AAAH-HA
      protocol, whose specification is out of the scope of the present
      document. Further analysis on the definition of such an interface
      can be found in [AAAH-HA] and [AAAMIPFWK]. At the end of this
      phase, the MN knows its own Home Address, the address of the
      correspondent Home Agent, the peer authentication method (i.e.
      certificates or pre-shared key) and the cryptographic material
      (e.g. pre-shared key) needed to set-up an IPsec security
      association with IKE [RFC2409]. The IKE pre-shared key can be
      either constructed by AAAH and then delivered to MN in a proper
      TLV (or AVP) or independently derived by MN and AAAH from the EAP
      key hierarchy;

   5. EAP session termination. Assuming the mobile node has been
      successfully authenticated, the AAAH server sends a Diameter EAP
      Answer message with Result-Code equal to SUCCESS. The AAA client
      extracts the EAP Success message from the Diameter EAP Answer and
      forwards it to the MN terminating the EAP session;

   6. set-up of IPsec Security Association and MIPv6 registration. At
      the end of the EAP communication, the MN gains network access and
      acquires a valid Care-of Address within the visited subnet (e.g.


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      via stateless autoconfiguration); then it performs an IKE exchange
      to establish the IPsec Security Association with the HA, using the
      authentication method and the cryptographic material negotiated
      during the MIPv6 service configuration phase (step 4). Finally,
      the MN performs MIPv6 registration, sending a Binding Update
      (protected with IPsec) to the HA.

   This draft also defines the procedures to handle re-authentication
   events and to manage the termination of the Mobile IPv6 session.

   In summary, the proposed architecture has the following advantages:

   - allows the MSP to maintain a centralized management (on the AAA
     server) of the user profiles and the authentication, authorization
     and accounting procedures for any type of service, including
     Mobile IPv6;

   - improves the reliability and performance of the Mobile IPv6
     protocol, in that the HA to be dynamically assigned to the MN can
     be freely chosen among those that are closest to the user's point
     of attachment, thus optimizing network usage and reducing the
     transfer delay for data traffic in bi-directional tunneling;

   - can be deployed, or extended with new features, without having to
     update the access equipment and the AAA protocols in use. Only
     minor changes in the AAA servers, the Home Agents and the mobile
     terminals are required, in that the AAA client does not play any
     active role in MIPv6 negotiation (i.e. it is a pass-through for
     EAP signaling). This reduces the deployment costs and makes the
     solution easy to use even when a Mobile Node is roaming with a
     provider different from its own;

   - allows the usage of any AAA protocol supporting the transport of
     EAP messages for the communication between the AAA client and
     server (i.e. not just Diameter, but also RADIUS). This
     significantly simplifies the deployment of MIPv6 in existing
     communication networks, where support for Diameter protocol in
     access equipment is not so extensive.

   - allows the operator to dynamically choose the authentication
     method for IKE bootstrapping and to automatically distribute the
     pre-shared key eventually needed; in this way the pre-shared key
     must not be pre-configured and can be frequently changed
     increasing resistance to attacks. In the case of an EAP method
     providing dynamic generation of keying material the pre-shared key
     can be derived from EAP hierarchy avoiding the need to explicitly
     send it to the MN [MIPv6AMSK].




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   As a whole, the solution adds a maximum of 2 RTTs (see the detailed
   protocol description in section 5) to the EAP conversation carried
   out by the mobile node to authenticate itself and gain network
   access. The number of extra RTTs can be reduced if the employed EAP
   method has the capability of transporting MIPv6 negotiation TLVs (or
   AVPs) together with authentication data. Nonetheless, it should be
   noted that the full negotiation procedure can be undertaken by the MN
   only during its initial bootstrapping, and therefore the performance
   requirements are not so strict.










































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4. Requirements on EAP methods

   In EAP methods, the EAP peer and EAP server exchange data in order to
   authenticate the EAP peer and eventually the EAP server (mutual
   authentication). This draft proposes the use of these exchanges to
   transport MIPv6 parameters, as part of an handshake that requires at
   maximum 2 RTTs. Thus, the main requirement for the applicability of
   the solution is:

   - the EAP method must provide a way to carry arbitrary parameters
     during or after the authentication phase. This implies that the
     EAP method must provide messages and mechanisms for this purpose.

   Then, for security reasons, the EAP method must provide the following
   properties:

   - mutual authentication: the EAP method must provide mutual
     authentication. The access network must authenticate users
     before granting them Mobile IPv6 service and the EAP peer should
     authenticate the access network before delivering sensitive
     data;

   - integrity: the exchanged MIPv6 parameters must be protected
     against any alteration and thus the EAP method must provide
     integrity protection;

   - replay protection: the EAP messages containing MIPv6 parameters
     must be protected against Replay Attack, so that an attacker is
     not able to get previous given data by replaying an old request;

   - confidentiality: depending on which data the AAA server provides
     to the mobile node (e.g. an IKE pre-shared key), it may be
     necessary to protect the message exchange against eavesdropping.

   The table below checks some existing EAP methods against the
   requirements listed above.















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     M-A: Mutual Authentication
     R-P: Replay Protection

                  +---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
                  |   |          |   |               | Exchange    |
                  |M-A| Integrity|R-P|Confidentiality| of arbitrary|
                  |   |          |   |               | Parameters  |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | PEAPv2     | x |    x     | x |        x      |     x       |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | EAP-FAST   | x |    x     | x |        x      |     x       |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | EAP-TTLS   | x |    x     | x |        x      |     x       |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | EAP-IKEv2  | x |    x     | x |        x      |     x       |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | EAP-SIM    | x |    x     | x |        x      |     x       |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | EAP-AKA    | x |    x     | x |        x      |     x       |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | EAP-TLS    | x |    x     | x |        x      |             |
     +------------+---+----------+---+---------------+-------------+
     | EAP-MD5    |   |          |   |               |             |
     +------------+---|----------|---|---------------|-------------|


   In summary, it is possible to note that the procedure described in
   this draft can be successfully undertaken with several tunneled
   (PEAPv2, EAP-FAST and EAP-TTLS) and non tunneled EAP methods (EAP-
   IKEv2, EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA), that all support the transport of arbitrary
   parameters.




















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5. Detailed description of the Protocol

   This section details the procedures and message exchanges that can be
   adopted by the network operator to explicitly authorize the
   activation of Mobile IPv6 support for a specific user as well as
   enable dynamic bootstrapping of MIPv6 protocol parameters (e.g. Home
   Address, Home Agent Address).

5.1 Mobile node bootstrapping

   If EAP is used for access control, when the MN enters the network it
   is immediately polled for its identity, by means of an EAP Request
   Identity message. This message is used to start the EAP
   communication. The MN replies sending its identity, in the form of a
   NAI (Network Access Identifier), within an EAP Response Identity
   message, that is received by a AAA client (e.g. the Access Point in
   the case of a Wireless LAN) and forwarded via AAA routing to the AAAH
   server using the Diameter EAP Application (or the RADIUS EAP
   extensions). Then the AAAH server selects an EAP method (e.g. based
   on the user service profile) and proposes it to the MN in subsequent
   EAP messages. In order to enable the Mobile IPv6 negotiation
   procedure defined in this document, the EAP method chosen by the AAAH
   server must be an EAP method supporting the transport of general
   purpose and variable length information elements, in the form of TLVs
   (or AVPs), together with authentication data (see section 4).

   After this initial handshake, MN and AAAH undertake the actual
   authentication phase, that may require the exchange of a variable
   number of EAP Request/Response messages. In many EAP methods, like
   PEAPv2 or EAP-IKEv2, the authentication phase is preceded by the
   establishment of an encrypted channel between MN and AAAH that
   provides protection capabilities (i.e. privacy, integrity protection,
   etc.) for all the messages exchanged during the rest of the EAP
   conversation.

   As soon as the authentication phase is completed, the procedure for
   MIPv6 bootstrapping may take place. For that purpose, the MN and the
   AAAH server exploit the on-going EAP communication to exchange a
   sequence of signaling messages transporting configuration parameters.

   All the messages used for MIPv6 bootstrapping are encoded in TLVs
   carried by a generic MIPv6-Authorization container. This choice
   simplifies a lot the deployment of the procedure with any EAP method
   satisfying the requirements listed in section 4. In fact, only the
   structure of the MIPv6-Authorization container needs to be adapted to
   the actual message format of the employed EAP method.

   For the sake of simplicity, in this section it is assumed that the
   EAP method used for network access authentication supports the


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   transport of arbitrary parameters in TLV format. In this case the
   MIPv6-Authorization container becomes a MIPv6-Authorization-TLV.
   Nonetheless, in section 7 the format of the container is defined for
   all the EAP methods identified in section 4.

   The whole bootstrapping procedure is depicted in Figure 3.

                                          AAAH
       MN +----------------------------+ Server +----------------+ HA

                      <---------------------
                       MIPv6-Authorization-TLV(
                       Service-Status,
                       [Service-Options])

        ----------------------->
        MIPv6-Authorization-TLV(
        Service-Selection, [Service-Options],
        [Home-Agent-Address], [Home-Address],
        [Interface-Identifier],
        [IKE-Authentication-Options])
                                             +-+                  +-+
                                             | |/----------------\| |
                                             | |\----------------/| |
                                             +-+                  +-+
                                          Home Agent              HA
                                          Selection              Conf.

                      <---------------------
                       MIPv6-Authorization-TLV(
                       Home-Address, Home-Agent-Address,
                       IKE-Bootstrap-Information,
                       Authorization-Lifetime)

        ----------------------->
        MIPv6-Authorization-TLV(
        Negotiation-Result)

                Figure 3 - MIPv6 bootstrapping procedure

   AAAH starts the MIPv6 negotiation phase sending to the MN a MIPv6-
   Authorization-TLV including the following TLVs:

   - Service-Status-TLV: used to communicate whether the home domain is
     willing to provide Mobile IPv6 service to the MN. This might
     depend on the user service profile or on other administrative
     rules (e.g. service accountability);




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   - Service-Options-TLV (optional): used to specify other service
     options the MN can ask for (e.g. allocation of a HA in the visited
     domain).

   MN replies to this first message confirming its intention to start
   Mobile IPv6 and, optionally, providing a set of hints on the desired
   service capabilities; this is achieved delivering a MIPv6-
   Authorization-TLV including the following TLVs:

   - Service-Selection-TLV: used by the MN to specify if it is willing
     to activate Mobile IPv6 protocol operation;

   - Service-Options-TLV (optional): used by the MN to communicate
     which service options, among those previously advertised by AAAH,
     it would like make use of;

   - Home-Agent-Address-TLV (optional): used by the MN to suggest a
     preferred Home Agent. This can be a HA with whom the MN has a pre-
     configured Security Association or a HA acquired through dynamic
     HA address discovery. The AAAH server treats this indication just
     as a hint, which means that, for administrative reasons, the MN
     may be assigned a Home Agent different from the one previously
     requested;

   - Home-Address-TLV (optional): used by the MN to suggest a preferred
     Home Address (e.g. an address pre-configured on one of its network
     interfaces); like the previous TLV, this indication is considered
     only as a hint by the AAAH server;

   - Interface-Identifier-TLV (optional): through this TLV, the MN can
     suggest a preferred Interface Identifier (selected according to
     [RFC3041] or following other criteria) to be used by the AAA
     infrastructure to build the Home Address starting from the
     selected home prefix. Also in this case, this information, if
     present, is treated as a pure hint by the AAAH server.

   - IKE-Authentication-Options-TLV (optional): through this TLV, the
     MN communicates to the AAAH server in order of preference the peer
     authentication methods it supports for IKE bootstrapping. The lack
     of this TLV means that the MN supports only the default method.

   The solution described in this document supports the following
   methods for peer authentication in IKE phase 1:

   - use of a pre-shared key (PSK) derived by the AAAH server and sent
     to the MN and the HA; in this case confidentiality must be
     provided by both the AAAH-HA protocol and the EAP session between
     the MN and the AAAH server. This is the default method.



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   - use of a pre-shared key independently derived by the MN and the
     AAAH server from the keying material exported by the employed EAP
     method. This key can be derived from an Application Master Session
     Key (AMSK) specific to Mobile IPv6, which can be constructed as
     explained in [MIPv6AMSK]. The PSK is then delivered by the AAAH
     server to the HA by means of a AAAH-HA protocol providing
     confidentiality;

   - use of digital certificates. This solution involves the employment
     of digital signatures and public key encryption as stated in
     [RFC2409]. This method requires the availability of a PKI.

   If in the Service-Selection-TLV the MN has chosen not to make use of
   Mobile IPv6, AAAH terminates the EAP communication sending an EAP
   Success message, since the authentication procedure has been
   accomplished successfully.

   Otherwise, if the MN has confirmed its willingness to start MIPv6
   service, AAAH selects a suitable Home Agent through a Home Agent
   Selection Algorithm. Possible parameters to be taken into account by
   this algorithm include: current load of available HAs (e.g. number of
   active bindings), location of the MN and, eventually, the preferences
   provided by the MN itself in the previous message exchange (i.e.
   Service-Options-TLV, Home-Agent-Address-TLV, Home-Address-TLV, IKE-
   Authentication-Options-TLV). For example, based on the knowledge of
   the MN's current point of attachment (i.e. the current AAA client),
   the AAAH server may select, among the HAs available in the home
   domain, the one that is closest to the MN in terms of IP routing
   hops. This approach is normally expected to improve performance.
   However, the detailed definition of a Home Agent Selection Algorithm
   is out of the scope of this document.

   After a suitable HA has been identified, the AAAH server selects the
   peer authentication method to be used in IKE phase 1. The peer
   authentication methods supported by the MN are known from the IKE-
   Authentication-Options-TLV received during the previous exchange. If
   possible, the AAAH server should choose the method on top of the list
   provided by the MN (i.e. the one with the highest preference).

   As soon as the peer authentication method has been identified, the
   AAAH server interacts with the HA to dynamically configure the state
   needed to enable subsequent MIPv6 protocol operations, including the
   authorization lifetime of the MIPv6 service granted to the MN and the
   necessary security parameters (e.g. pre-shared key). Possible
   protocols that can be used for this purpose include Diameter (through
   a new Diameter Application), SNMPv3 or COPS-PR. Further details about
   this communication are provided in section 6. Anyway, the detailed
   specification of the interface between AAAH and HA is out of the



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   scope of this document. Additional considerations on the nature and
   goals of such an interface can be found in [AAAH-HA] and [AAAMIPFWK].

   The security parameters that the AAAH server delivers to the HA may
   vary depending on the peer authentication method chosen for IKE
   bootstrapping:

   - if the AAAH server selects pre-shared key as peer authentication
     method it needs to send the chosen PSK (randomly generated or
     derived from the EAP key hierarchy) to the HA together with the
     associated lifetime;

   - if the AAAH server selects a peer authentication method based on
     certificates it does not need to derive keys nor to send security
     parameters to the HA.

   After the AAAH server has configured the state on the HA, it
   continues the EAP session communicating to the MN all the MIPv6
   configuration data it is waiting for. This is achieved delivering to
   the MN an EAP Request containing a MIPv6-Authorization-TLV and the
   following sub-TLVs: Home-Address-TLV (i.e. the home address), Home-
   Agent-Address-TLV (i.e. the address of the HA), IKE-Bootstrap-
   Information-TLV (i.e. the peer authentication method to be used in
   IKE phase 1 and associated cryptographic material) and Authorization-
   Lifetime-TLV (i.e. the lifetime granted to the MN for this session).

   After the MN has received all the configuration data from the AAAH
   server (i.e. HA address, Home Address and IKE bootstrap information),
   it sends back an EAP Response containing a Negotiation-Result-TLV,
   stating whether it accepts, or refuses, the proposed arrangement. If
   the MN refuses the configuration, the AAAH server should immediately
   release the resources previously allocated on the Home Agent.

   After the completion of the EAP session, MN holds all data needed to
   perform Mobile IPv6 registration: the MN knows its Home Address, the
   address of the correspondent Home Agent and all cryptographic data
   needed to establish the IPsec security association with it;
   furthermore, since it has been successfully authenticated, the MN can
   acquire an IPv6 address to be used as Care-of Address.

   The first operation carried out by the MN after the acquisition of
   the Care-of Address is the establishment of the IPsec Security
   Association with the HA, that is mandated by [RFC3775] to protect
   MIPv6 location update signaling. Set-up of the IPsec SA can be
   accomplished following the procedure detailed in [RFC3776].

   As soon as the IPsec Security Association is established, MN can send
   a Binding Update to the HA, thus starting up Mobile IPv6 service.



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5.2 Management of re-authentication events

   At the expiration of AAA session time-outs or after a change in the
   point of attachment to the network (e.g. change of Access Point), a
   re-authentication procedure is performed leading to the user identity
   to be checked again along with its right to continue exploiting
   network resources. To that purpose the AAAH server may repeat a full
   authentication or, alternatively, decide to use optimizations in
   order to make the procedure faster. Once this phase is completed the
   AAAH server also undertakes the re-negotiation of the MIPv6 service.

   Since the MIPv6 bootstrapping procedure is assumed to be completely
   stateless, when a re-authentication event occurs the AAAH server may
   not know the state of the MIPv6 service on the MN. For this reason
   the AAAH server starts the MIPv6 negotiation like in the
   bootstrapping case: it delivers a MIPv6-Authorization-TLV containing
   a Service-Status-TLV and optionally a Service-Options-TLV.

   If the MIPv6 service is not active on the MN the procedure continues
   as described in section 5.1. Otherwise, the MN replies with a MIPv6-
   Authorization-TLV containing a Service-Selection-TLV indicating that
   the MIPv6 service is already in use. Furthermore, the MN inserts the
   Home-Agent-Address-TLV, the Home-Address-TLV and the IKE-
   Authentication-Options-TLV to inform the AAAH server about its
   current state. The AAAH server can then get in touch with the HA to
   check the integrity of the state, renew the MIPv6 authorization
   lifetime and eventually refresh the security parameters.

   If the peer authentication method used by the MN in IKE phase 1 is
   pre-shared key, the AAAH server must derive a new PSK and send it to
   the HA together with the associated lifetime. In case the PSK is not
   derived from the EAP key hierarchy (i.e. it is randomly generated by
   the AAAH server), the AAAH server must communicate it also to the MN.
   Instead, in case of authentication based on certificates, the AAAH
   server does not need to derive keys nor deliver additional security
   data to the HA and the MN.

   If the state on the HA is successfully updated, the AAAH server
   terminates the EAP communication sending an EAP Success message.
   Otherwise, the AAAH server should continue the EAP communication
   renegotiating the MIPv6 service (i.e. allocation of a new HA and
   related Home Address).

   This solution can be easily deployed even within a network including
   several AAA servers, each one managing a subset of the available
   Network Access Servers (NASs). This is because the re-negotiation
   procedure does not assume to have any long term state related to
   Mobile IPv6 stored on the AAAH server. In this way, everything works
   correctly even if, due to MN's movements within the network, the AAAH


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   server that handles the re-authentication is not the same server that
   authenticated the MN for the first time and performed the MIPv6
   bootstrapping procedure.

   As explained above, the re-authentication events are normally
   triggered by the network. Nonetheless, if the EAP lower layer offers
   a way to trigger EAP re-authentications (e.g. PANA supports this
   feature), it may be possible for the MN to re-negotiate the MIPv6
   service at any time.










































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6. Home Agent considerations

   This section provides further thoughts about the AAAH-HA
   communication and lists specific features that have to be supported
   by the Home Agent to allow dynamic negotiation of Mobile IPv6
   protocol parameters.

6.1 Requirements on AAAH-HA communication

   This draft details only the message exchange between the MN and the
   AAAH server. Obviously a complete Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping solution
   requires also the definition of a mechanism for the communication
   between the AAAH server and the Home Agent. Possible protocols that
   may be used for this purpose include SNMPv3, COPS-PR or Diameter but
   a formal definition of such a protocol is out of scope of this
   document.

   A detailed analysis of the goals for a generic AAAH-HA protocol can
   be found in [AAAH-HA]; in this section some requirements, specific to
   this scenario, are highlighted.

   The selected protocol should allow the AAAH server to:

   - use a Network Access Identifier (NAI) to identify the mobile node
     in the communication with the HA;

   - send an authorization lifetime to the HA to limit Mobile IPv6
     session duration for the MN;

   - send to the HA a set of hints for the construction of the Home
     Address (e.g. a preferred Home Address or a preferred Interface
     Identifier);

   - poll the designated HA for the allocation of a Home Address to the
     MN;

   - force the HA to terminate an active Mobile IPv6 session for
     authorization policy reasons (e.g. credit exhaustion or
     reallocation of a new HA to the MN);

   - enforce explicit operational limitations and authorization
     restrictions on the HA (e.g. packet filters, QoS parameters);

   - retrieve the Mobile IPv6 state associated to a specific MN from
     the correspondent HA. This may be useful to periodically verify
     the Mobile IPv6 service status;





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   - send to the HA the security data needed to setup the IPsec SA with
     the MN. Possible security data are the authentication method and
     the cryptographic material to be used for IKE bootstrapping.

   Moreover, the protocol selected to implement the communication
   between the AAAH server and the HA should fulfill the following
   general requirements:

   - the AAAH server and the HA must be able to authenticate each other
     (mutual authentication) in order to prevent the installation of
     unauthorized state on the HA;

   - the AAA-HA interface must provide integrity protection in order to
     prevent any alteration of exchanged data (e.g. Mobile IPv6
     configuration parameters);

   - the AAA-HA interface must provide replay protection;

   - the AAA-HA interface should provide confidentiality since it may
     be used to transfer security parameters (e.g. IKE pre-shared key);

   - the AAA-HA interface should support inactive peer detection. This
     functionality can be used by the AAAH server to maintain a list of
     active HAs (e.g. useful for HA selection);


6.2 Management of MIPv6 authorization state

   The Home Agent is required to store some authorization data for each
   of the MNs it is serving. A new data structure may be used for this
   purpose and it should include at least the following fields:

   - NAI of the user;

   - Home Address assigned to the MN;

   - Cryptographic Data: this field includes the peer authentication
     method to be used in IKE and, if needed, the pre-shared key and
     its lifetime;

   - Authorization Lifetime: it is the lifetime of the Mobile IPv6
     service granted to the MN;

   At the expiration of the Authorization Lifetime the HA should check
   if there is an active entry for the MN in its Binding Cache in order
   to verify if the MN is still using Mobile IPv6. If the entry is
   available the Home Agent should negotiate with the AAAH server an
   extension of the Authorization Lifetime granted to the MN. Otherwise,
   the HA should immediately release the authorization state associated


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   to that MN and eventually notify the session termination to the AAAH
   server (e.g. by means of a Session Termination Request if the
   employed AAAH-HA protocol is Diameter).

   Moreover, the release of the resources previously allocated on the
   Home Agent can be undertaken at any time by the AAAH server.
   Typically this happens at credit exhaustion or when the MN
   disconnects from the network.

   The policies adopted by the AAAH server to release the resources
   allocated to the MN may vary depending on the user service profile.
   For instance, the AAAH server may decide to postpone the release of
   the resources on the HA in order to allow the MN to continue using
   the Mobile IPv6 service even if it has moved to an access network for
   which no roaming agreements are in place (e.g. a corporate network or
   a network providing cost-free access). In that case, the MN can
   continue to rely on the IPsec SA previously negotiated with the HA
   and the respective authorization is managed through the Mobile IPv6
   Authorization Lifetime.
































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7. The MIPv6-Authorization container

   All the messages used for MIPv6 bootstrapping are encoded in TLVs
   carried by a generic MIPv6-Authorization container. In this way, only
   the structure of the container needs to be adapted to the actual
   message format of the employed EAP method.

   The MIPv6-Authorization container can be implemented as a TLV, as an
   AVP or in some other way depending on the specific characteristics of
   the EAP method used for network access authentication (see Figure 4).

       +----------------------------------------------------------+
       |            MIPv6 bootstrapping TLVs (Sec. 8)             |
       +------+--------------+--------------+--------------+------+
              |              |              |              |
              |              |              |              |
       +------+-----+ +------+-----+ +------+-----+ +------+------+
       |   MIPv6    | |   MIPv6    | |   MIPv6    | |    MIPv6    |
       | Auth. TLV  | | Auth. TLV  | | Auth. AVP  | | Auth. IKEv2 |
       |            | |            | |            | |   Payload   |
       | (Sec. 7.1) | | (Sec. 7.3) | | (Sec. 7.5) | | (sec. 7.6)  |
       +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ +-------------+
       |   PEAPv2   | |  EAP-SIM   | |  EAP-TTLS  | |  EAP-IKEv2  |
       |  EAP-FAST  | |  EAP-AKA   | |            | |             |
       +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ +-------------+

           Figure 4 - Transport of MIPv6 bootstrapping messages

   In the following the format of the MIPv6-Authorization container is
   defined for each EAP method identified in section 4. This list is not
   exhaustive and does not prevent the use of other EAP methods
   satisfying all the requirements listed in this document.

7.1 PEAPv2

   The exchange of arbitrary information in PEAPv2 is based on EAP-TLVs.
   In this case the MIPv6-Authorization container is encoded as an EAP-
   TLV and has the structure depicted below:


       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |M|R|             Type          |            Length             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                              Value
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+





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      M

         0 - Non-mandatory TLV

      R

         Reserved, set to zero (0)

      Type

         TBD - MIPv6-Authorization

      Length

         The length of the Value field in octets

      Value

         This field carries the subsequent TLVs


7.2 EAP-FAST

   The format of the messages for EAP-FAST [EAP-FAST] is the same as
   PEAPv2.


7.3 EAP-SIM

   EAP-SIM [EAP-SIM] allows the transport of additional information in
   form of TLVs. The format of the MIPv6-Authorization container is
   depicted below:


       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |      Type     |    Length     |         Value
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Type

         TBD - MIPv6-Authorization

      Length

         Indicates the length of this attribute in multiples of four
         bytes. The maximum length of an attribute is 1024 bytes. The
         length includes the Type and Length bytes.


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      Value

         This field carries the subsequent TLVs


7.4 EAP-AKA

   The format of the messages for EAP-AKA [EAP-AKA] is the same as EAP-
   SIM.

7.5 EAP-TTLS

   EAP-TTLS messages [EAP-TTLS] allow the exchange of arbitrary data in
   the form of AVPs encapsulated in the TLS record. The MIPv6-
   Authorization container is encoded as depicted below:


       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                           AVP Code                            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |V M r r r r r r|                 AVP Length                    |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                        Vendor ID (opt)                        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                             Data
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


      AVP Code

         TBD - MIPv6-Authorization

      Flag 'V' (Vendor-Specific)

         0

      Flag 'M' (Mandatory)

         0

      Flag 'r' (reserved)

         must be set to 0






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      AVP Length

         the length of this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP
         Length, flags, Vendor-ID (if present) and Data.

      Data

         this field carries subsequent TLVs

7.6 EAP-IKEv2

   EAP-IKEv2 [EAP-IKEv2] allows the transport of generic data in the
   form of IKEv2 payloads. The MIPv6-Authorization container is encoded
   as depicted below:


       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |        Payload Length         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                        Data                                   ~
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Next Payload (1 octet)

         TBD - MIPv6-Authorization

      Critical (1 bit)

         must be set to zero

      RESERVED (7 bits)

         must be sent as zero; must be ignored on receipt.

      Payload Length (2 octets)

         Length in octets of the current payload, including the generic
         payload header

      Data

         It contains subsequent TLVs








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8. New TLVs

   Independently from the EAP method used for network access
   authentication, the MIPv6-Authorization container enables to
   transport a series of TLVs. This gives more flexibility to the whole
   solution and permits the definition of new TLVs that do not need to
   be bound to a specific EAP method.

   The following TLVs have been defined so far:

         Service-Status-TLV
         Service-Selection-TLV
         Service-Options-TLV
         Home-Agent-Address-TLV
         Home-Address-TLV
         IKE-Authentication-Options-TLV
         IKE-Bootstrap-Information-TLV
         Negotiation-Result-TLV


8.1 Service-Status-TLV

   This TLV is sent by the AAAH to inform the MN about the status of
   Mobile IPv6 service. It is defined as follows:

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |      Type=Service-Status      |             Length            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Code      |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Type

         TBD - Service-Status

      Length

         1

      Code

         0 = MIPv6 service is available
         1 = MIPv6 service is not available







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8.2 Service-Selection-TLV

   This TLV is sent by the MN to inform the AAAH whether it wants to
   activate MIPv6 service or whether the service is already active.

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |    Type=Service-Selection     |             Length            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Code      |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Type

         TBD - Service-Selection

      Length

         1

      Code

         0 = activate MIPv6 service
         1 = MIPv6 service already active
         2 = do not activate MIPv6 service


8.3 Service-Options-TLV

   This TLV is used by the AAAH server to advertise the service options
   the MN can ask for. It is also used by the MN to communicate its
   selection to the AAAH. So far only the HA in visited domain option
   has been defined. The TLV has the following format:

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |      Type=Service-Options     |             Length            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |V|        Reserved             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Type

         TBD - Service-Options

      Length

         2



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      V
         from AAAH to MN:
            0 = AAAH cannot provide a HA in the visited domain
            1 = AAAH can provide a HA in the visited domain

         from MN to AAAH:
            0 = MN does not specify any preference on HA location
            1 = MN is requesting a HA in the visited domain

      Reserved

         15 bit reserved set to 0

8.4 Home-Agent-Address-TLV

   This TLV carries the Home Agent's address and it's defined as
   follows:

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |      Type=HA-Address          |             Length            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      |                      Home Agent Address                       |
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Type

         TBD - Home-Agent-Address

      Length

         16

      Value

         Home Agent Address


8.5 Home-Address-TLV

   This TLV carries the Home Address assigned to the MN. It is defined
   as follows:






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       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |      Type=Home-Address        |            Length             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      |                        Home Address                           |
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Type

         TBD - Home-Address

      Length

         16

      Value

         Home Address


8.6 IKE-Authentication-Options-TLV

   This TLV carries data related to IKE bootstrapping. If used during
   the initial MIPv6 bootstrapping procedure, the value field contains
   the list of peer authentication methods supported by the MN.
   Otherwise, if used during re-authentication events, the value field
   contains only the peer authentication method currently in use.

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |Type=IKE-Authentication-Options|            Length             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | AuthMethod-1  | AuthMethod-2  | ...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Type

         TBD - IKE-Authentication-Options

      Length

         Length of this TLV.






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      Value

         AuthMethod - code corresponding to the authentication method
                      supported for IKE phase 1. All the methods
                      supported by the MN are inserted in order of
                      preference. The following values are defined:

         Authentication Method                     AuthMethod

         PSK  (pre-shared key generated by AAAH)   0
         AMSK (pre-shared key derived from EAP)    1
         CERT (use of certificates)                2


8.7 IKE-Bootstrap-Information-TLV

   This TLV carries data related to the set-up of an IPsec Security
   Association with the Home Agent. It contains the peer authentication
   method to be used for IKE phase 1 and, eventually, the related
   cryptographic material (e.g. pre-shared key).


       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |Type= IKE-Bootstrap-Information|            Length             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |  AuthMethod   |              key Length                       |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                            Key Lifetime                       |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                            Key Value
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


      Type

         TBD - IKE-Bootstrap-Information

      Length

         Length of this TLV.

      Value

         AuthMethod - the authentication method to be used in IKE
                      phase 1. This field can assume a value among
                      those defined in section 8.6 (i.e. PSK, AMSK
                      or CERT).



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         Key Length - the length of the key to be used as pre-shared key
                      for IKE phase 1 authentication. This field must be
                      present if AuthMethod is set to PSK and may be
                      present if AuthMethod is set to AMSK.

         Key Lifetime - the lifetime of the key in seconds. A value of
                        all ones means infinite. This field is present
                        only if the AuthMethod field is set to PSK or
                        AMSK.

         Key Value - the value of the key. This field is present only if
                     the AuthMethod field is set to PSK.


8.8 Negotiation-Result-TLV

   It is defined as follows:

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |    Type=Negotiation-Result    |             Length            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Result-Code   |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type

         TBD - Result

      Length

         1

      Value

           0 = Success
         128 = Failure













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8.9 Authorization-Lifetime-TLV

   It is defined as follows:

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |  Type= Authorization-Lifetime |             Length            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |    Authorization-Lifetime     |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type

         TBD - Authorization-Lifetime

      Length

         2

      Value

         The lifetime granted to the MN (in seconds)




























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9. Security Considerations

   The Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping procedure described in this document
   assumes the MN and the AAA server of the home domain exchange the
   necessary parameters exploiting the EAP communication established for
   network access authentication. Therefore, to secure the bootstrapping
   procedure, the employed EAP method must support mutual authentication
   as well as integrity and replay protection.

   Moreover, if the pre-shared key needed to bootstrap the IPsec SA with
   the Home Agent is not derived from the EAP key hierarchy but
   explicitly delivered to the MN by the AAAH server, the EAP method
   must also provide confidentiality. Several tunneled and non tunneled
   EAP methods, like PEAPv2 and EAP-IKEv2, fulfill all of these security
   requirements.




































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10. References

10.1 Normative References

   [RFC3775]   Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
               in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

   [RFC3776]   Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., Dupont, F., "Using IPsec to
               Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling between Mobile Nodes and
               Home Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004.

   [RFC3748]   B. Aboba, L. Blunk, J. Vollbrecht, J. Carlson, H.
               Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
               RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC2409]   Harkins, D., Carrel, D., "The Internet Key Exchange
               (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [PEAPv2]    Palekar, A. et al., "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)
               Version 2", draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-08 (work
               in progress), July 2004.

   [EAPKEYFWK] Aboba, B., Simon, D., Arkko, J., Levkowetz, H., "EAP
               Key Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-03 (work
               in progress), July 2004.

   [MIPv6AMSK] Giaretta, G., Guardini, I., Demaria, E., Bournelle,
               J., Laurent-Maknavicius, M., "Application Master Session
               Key (AMSK) for Mobile IPv6", draft-giaretta-mip6-amsk-00
               (work in progress), September 2004


10.2 Informative References

   [MIPv6PS]   Patel, A. et al. "Problem Statement for bootstrapping
               Mobile IPv6", draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrap-ps-00 (work in
               progress), July 2004.

   [RFC3753]   Manner, J., Kojo, M. "Mobility Related Terminology", RFC
               3753, June 2004.

   [RFC3041]   Narten, T., Draves, R., "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
               Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January
               2001.

   [AAAH-HA]   Giaretta, G., Guardini, I., Demaria, E., Bournelle, J.,
               Lopez, R., "Goals for AAA-HA interface", draft-giaretta-
               mip6-aaa-ha-goals-00 (work in progress), September 2004



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Internet-Draft     MIPv6 Authorization based on EAP       October 2004


   [AAAMIPFWK] Yegin, A., "AAA Mobile IPv6 Application Framework",
               draft-yegin-mip6-aaa-fwk-00 (work in progress), August
               2004

   [RFC3084]   K. Chan, D. Durham, S. Gai, S. Herzog, K. McCloghrie, F.
               Reichmeyer, J. Seligson, A. Smith, R. Yavatkar, "COPS
               Usage for Policy Provisioning,", RFC 3084, March 2001.

   [MIPv6APP]  Faccin, S., Perkins, C., Le, F., Patil, B., "Diameter
               Mobile IPv6 Application", draft-le-aaa-diameter-
               mobileipv6-03 (expired), April 2003.

   [PANA]      Forsberg, D. et al., "Protocol for Carrying
               Authentication for Network Access (PANA)", draft-ietf-
               pana-pana-04 (work in progress), May 2004.

   [RFC3410]   Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D. and B. Stewart,
               "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
               Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002.

   [EAP-TTLS]  Funk, P., Blake-Wilson, S., "EAP Tunneled TLS
               Authentication Protocol (EAP-TTLS)", draft-ietf-pppext-
               eap-ttls-05 (work in progress), July 2004.

   [EAP-IKEv2] Tschofenig, H., Kroeselberg, D., Ohba, Y., "EAP
               IKEv2 Method", draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-03, February
               2004.

   [EAP-SIM]   Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
               Protocol Method for GSM Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-
               SIM)", draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-13 (work in
               progress), April 2004.

   [EAP-AKA]   Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "EAP-AKA Authentication",
               draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-12 (work in progress), April
               2004.

   [EAP-FAST]  N.Cam-Winget, D. McGrew, J. Salowey, H.Zhou, "EAP
               Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST)",
               draft-cam-winget-eap-fast-00.txt (expired),
               February 2004










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Internet-Draft     MIPv6 Authorization based on EAP       October 2004


Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Simone Ruffino, Tom Hiller, Hannes
   Tschofening, Rafael Marin Lopez, Hiroyuki Ohnishi, Mayumi Yanagiya,
   James Kempf and Yoshihiro Ohba for their valuable comments.


Authors' Addresses

   Gerardo Giaretta
   Telecom Italia Lab
   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274
   10148 TORINO
   Italy
   Phone: +39 011 2286904
   Email: gerardo.giaretta@tilab.com

   Ivano Guardini
   Telecom Italia Lab
   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274
   10148 TORINO
   Italy
   Phone: +39 011 2285424
   Email: ivano.guardini@tilab.com

   Elena Demaria
   Telecom Italia Lab
   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274
   10148 TORINO
   Italy
   Phone: +39 011 2285403
   Email: elena.demaria@tilab.com

   Julien Bournelle
   GET/INT
   9 rue Charles Fourier
   Evry  91011
   France
   Email: julien.bournelle@int-evry.fr

   Maryline Laurent-Maknavicius
   GET/INT
   9 rue Charles Fourier
   Evry  91011
   France
   Email: maryline.maknavicius@int-evry.fr





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