[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 5849

Network Working Group                               E. Hammer-Lahav, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                    Yahoo!
Intended status: Standards Track                                 B. Cook
Expires: September 11, 2009                               March 10, 2009


                        The OAuth Core Protocol
                         draft-hammer-oauth-01

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   This document specifies the OAuth core protocol.  OAuth provides a
   method for clients to access server resources on behalf of another
   party (such a different client or an end user).  It also provides a



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   redirection-based user agent process for end users to authorize
   access to clients by substituting their credentials (typically, a
   username and password pair) with a different set of delegation-
   specific credentials.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Authenticated Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Protocol Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Nonce and Timestamp  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.3.1.  Signature Base String  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.3.2.  HMAC-SHA1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.3.3.  RSA-SHA1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.3.4.  PLAINTEXT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.4.  Parameter Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.4.1.  Authorization Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.4.2.  Form-Encoded Body  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       3.4.3.  Request URI Query  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     3.5.  Server Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     3.6.  Percent Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   4.  Redirection-Based Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     4.1.  Temporary Credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.2.  Resource Owner Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     4.3.  Token Credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.1.  Credentials Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.2.  RSA-SHA1 Signature Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.3.  PLAINTEXT Signature Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.4.  Confidentiality of Requests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     6.5.  Spoofing by Counterfeit Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     6.6.  Proxying and Caching of Authenticated Content  . . . . . . 23
     6.7.  Plaintext Storage of Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     6.8.  Secrecy of the Client Credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     6.9.  Phishing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     6.10. Scoping of Access Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     6.11. Entropy of Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     6.12. Denial of Service / Resource Exhaustion Attacks  . . . . . 25
     6.13. Cryptographic Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     6.14. Signature Base String Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   Appendix A.     Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   Appendix A.1.   Obtaining Temporary Credentials  . . . . . . . . . 27
   Appendix A.2.   Requesting Resource Owner Authorization  . . . . . 27



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   Appendix A.3.   Obtaining Token Credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Appendix A.4.   Accessing protected resources  . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Appendix A.4.1. Generating Signature Base String . . . . . . . . . 28
   Appendix A.4.2. Calculating Signature Value  . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   Appendix A.4.3. Requesting protected resource  . . . . . . . . . . 30
   Appendix B.     Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   Appendix C.     Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32








































Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


1.  Introduction

   The OAuth protocol provides a method for servers to allow third-party
   access to protected resources, without forcing their end users to
   share their credentials.  This pattern is common among services that
   allow third-party developers to extend the service functionality, by
   building applications using an open API.

   For example, a web user (resource owner) can grant a printing service
   (client) access to its private photos stored at a photo sharing
   service (server), without sharing its credentials with the printing
   service.  Instead, the user authenticates directly with the photo
   sharing service and issue the printing service delegation-specific
   credentials.

   OAuth introduces a third role to the traditional client-server
   authentication model: the resource owner.  In the OAuth model, the
   client requests access to resources hosted by the server but not
   controlled by the client, but by the resource owner.  In addition,
   OAuth allows the server to verify not only the resource owner's
   credentials, but also those of the client making the request.

   In order for the client to access resources, it first has to obtain
   permission from the resource owner.  This permission is expressed in
   the form of a token and matching shared-secret.  The purpose of the
   token is to substitute the need for the resource owner to share its
   server credentials (usually a username and password pair) with the
   client.  Unlike server credentials, tokens can be issued with a
   restricted scope and limited lifetime.

   This specification consists of two parts.  The first part defines a
   method for making authenticated HTTP requests using two sets of
   credentials, one identifying the client making the request, and a
   second identifying the resource owner on whose behalf the request is
   being made.

   The second part defines a redirection-based user agent process for
   end users to authorize client access to their resources, by
   authenticating directly with the server and provisioning tokens to
   the client for use with the authentication method.

   [[ This draft is mostly an editorial revision of the [OAuth Core 1.0]
   community specification.  It is intended as starting point for future
   standardization efforts within the IETF.  See Appendix C for list of
   changes.  Please discuss this draft on the oauth@ietf.org [1] mailing
   list. ]]





Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


1.1.  Terminology

   client
         An HTTP client (per [RFC2616]) capable of making OAuth-
         authenticated requests (Section 3).

   server
         An HTTP server (per [RFC2616]) capable of accepting OAuth-
         authenticated requests (Section 3).

   protected resource
         An access-restricted resource (per [RFC2616]) which can be
         obtained from the server using an OAuth-authenticated request
         (Section 3).

   resource owner
         An entity capable of accessing and controlling protected
         resources by using credentials to authenticate with the server.

   token
         An unique identifier issued by the server and used by the
         client to associate authenticated requests with the resource
         owner whose authorization is requested or has been obtained by
         the client.  Tokens have a matching shared-secret that is used
         by the client to establish its ownership of the token, and its
         authority to represent the resource owner.


2.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  Authenticated Requests

   The HTTP authentication methods defined by [RFC2617], enable clients
   to make authenticated HTTP requests.  Clients using these methods
   gain access to protected resource by using their server credentials
   (typically a username and password pair), which allows the server to
   verify their authenticity.  Using these methods for delegation
   requires the client to pretend it was the resource owner.

   OAuth provides a method designed to include two sets of credentials
   with each request, one to identify the client, and another to
   identify the resource owner.  Before a client can make authenticated
   requests on behalf of the resource owner, it must obtain a token



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   authorized by the resource owner.  Section 4 provides one such method
   in which the client can obtain a token authorized by the resource
   owner.

   The client credentials take the form of a unique identifier, and an
   associated share-secret or RSA key pair.  Prior to making
   authenticated requests, the client establishes a set of credentials
   with the server.  The process and requirements for provisioning these
   are outside the scope of this specification.  Implementers are urged
   to consider the security ramification of using client credentials,
   some of which are described in Section 6.8.

   Making authenticated requests requires prior knowledge of the
   server's configuration.  OAuth provides multiple methods for
   including protocol parameters in requests (Section 3.4), as well as
   multiple methods for the client to prove its rightful ownership of
   the credentials used (Section 3.3).  The way in which clients
   discovery the required configuration is outside the scope of this
   specification.

3.1.  Protocol Parameters

   An OAuth-authenticated request includes several protocol parameters.
   Each parameter name begins with the "oauth_" prefix, and the
   parameter names and values are case sensitive.  Protocol parameters
   MUST NOT appear more than once per request.  The parameters are:

   oauth_consumer_key
         The identifier portion of the client credentials (equivalent to
         a username).  The parameter name reflects a deprecated term
         (Consumer Key) used in previous revisions of the specification,
         and has been retained to maintain backward compatibility.

   oauth_token
         The token value used to associate the request with the resource
         owner.  If the request is not associated with a resource owner
         (no token), clients MAY omit the parameter.

   oauth_signature_method
         The name of the signature method used by the client to sign the
         request, as defined in Section 3.3.

   oauth_signature
         The signature value as defined in Section 3.3.







Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 6]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   oauth_timestamp
         The timestamp value as defined in Section 3.2.

   oauth_nonce
         The nonce value as defined in Section 3.2.

   oauth_version
         The protocol version.  If omitted, the protocol version
         defaults to "1.0".

   Server-specific request parameters MUST NOT begin with the "oauth_"
   prefix.

3.2.  Nonce and Timestamp

   Unless otherwise specified by the server, the timestamp is expressed
   in the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00 GMT.  The
   timestamp value MUST be a positive integer and MUST be equal or
   greater than the timestamp used in previous requests with the same
   client credentials and token credentials combination.

   A nonce is a random string, uniquely generated to allows the server
   to verify that a request has never been made before and helps prevent
   replay attacks when requests are made over a non-secure channel.  The
   nonce value MUST be unique across all requests with the same
   timestamp, client credentials, and token combinations.

   To avoid the need to retain an infinite number of nonce values for
   future checks, servers MAY choose to restrict the time period after
   which a request with an old timestamp is rejected.  Server applying
   such restriction SHOULD provide a way for the client to sync its
   clock with the server's clock.

3.3.  Signature

   OAuth-authenticated requests can have two sets of credentials
   included via the "oauth_consumer_key" parameter and the "oauth_token"
   parameter.  In order for the server to verify the authenticity of the
   request and prevent unauthorized access, the client needs to prove it
   is the rightful owner of the credentials.  This is accomplished using
   the shared-secret (or RSA key) part of each set of credentials.

   OAuth provides three methods for the client to prove its rightful
   ownership of the credentials: "HMAC-SHA1", "RSA-SHA1", and
   "PLAINTEXT".  These methods are generally referred to as signature
   methods, even though "PLAINTEXT" does not involve a signature.  In
   addition, "RSA-SHA1" utilizes an RSA key instead of the shared-
   secrets associated with the client credentials.



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 7]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   OAuth does not mandate a particular signature method, as each
   implementation can have its own unique requirements.  Servers are
   free to implement and document their own custom methods.
   Recommending any particular method is beyond the scope of this
   specification.

   The client declares which signature method is used via the
   "oauth_signature_method" parameter.  It then generates a signature
   (or a sting of an equivalent value), and includes it in the
   "oauth_signature" parameter.  The server verifies the signature as
   specified for each method.

   The signature process does not change the request or its parameter,
   with the exception of the "oauth_signature" parameter.

3.3.1.  Signature Base String

   The signature base string is a consistent, reproducible concatenation
   of several request elements into a single string.  The string is used
   as an input to the "HMAC-SHA1" and "RSA-SHA1" signature methods, or
   potential future extension.

   The signature base string does not cover the entire HTTP request.
   Most notably, it does not include the entity-body in most requests,
   nor does it include most HTTP entity-headers.  The importance of the
   signature base string scope is that the authenticity of the excluded
   components cannot be verified using the signature.

3.3.1.1.  Collect Request Parameters

   The signature base string includes a specific set of request
   parameters.  In order for the parameter to be included in the
   signature base string, they MUST be used in their unencoded form.

   For example, the URI:

     http://example.com/request?b5=%3D%253D&a3=a&c%40=&a2=r%20b&c2&a3=2q

   contains the following raw-form parameters:












Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 8]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


                             +------+-------+
                             | Name | Value |
                             +------+-------+
                             |  b5  |  =%3D |
                             |  a3  |   a   |
                             |  c@  |       |
                             |  a2  |  r b  |
                             |  c2  |       |
                             |  a3  |   2q  |
                             +------+-------+

   Note that the value of "b5" is "=%3D" and not "==".  Both "c@" and
   "c2" have empty values.

   The request parameters, which include both protocol parameters and
   request-specific parameters, are extracted and restored to their
   original unencoded form, from the following sources:

   o  The OAuth HTTP Authorization header (Section 3.4.1).  The "realm"
      parameter MUST be excluded if present.

   o  The HTTP request entity-body, but only if:

      *  The entity-body is single-part.

      *  The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
         "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
         [W3C.REC-html40-19980424].

      *  The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type"
         header set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".

   o  The query component of the HTTP request URI as defined by
      [RFC3986] section 3.

   The "oauth_signature" parameter MUST be excluded if present.

   In many cases, clients have direct access to the parameters in their
   original, unencoded form.  In such cases, clients SHOULD use the
   unencoded values instead of extracting them.  This option is not
   available for servers when validating incoming requests.  Even though
   the parameters are encoded again in the process, they are decoded
   because each of the three sources uses a different encoding
   algorithm.

   The output of this step is a list of unencoded parameter name / value
   pairs.




Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009               [Page 9]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


3.3.1.2.  Normalize Request Parameters

   The parameter collected in Section 3.3.1.1 are normalized into a
   single string as follows:

   1.  First, the name and value of each parameter are encoded
       (Section 3.6).

   2.  The parameters are sorted by name, using lexicographical byte
       value ordering.  If two or more parameters share the same name,
       they are sorted by their value.

   3.  The name of each parameter is concatenated to its corresponding
       value using an "=" character (ASCII code 61) as separator, even
       if the value is empty.

   4.  The sorted name / value pairs are concatenated together into a
       single string by using an "&" character (ASCII code 38) as
       separator.

   For example, the list of parameters from the previous section would
   be normalized as follows:

                                 Encoded:

                            +------+----------+
                            | Name |   Value  |
                            +------+----------+
                            |  b5  | %3D%253D |
                            |  a3  |     a    |
                            | c%40 |          |
                            |  a2  |   r%20b  |
                            |  c2  |          |
                            |  a3  |    2q    |
                            +------+----------+
















Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 10]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


                                  Sorted:

                            +------+----------+
                            | Name |   Value  |
                            +------+----------+
                            |  a2  |   r%20b  |
                            |  a3  |    2q    |
                            |  a3  |     a    |
                            |  b5  | %3D%253D |
                            |  c2  |          |
                            | c%40 |          |
                            +------+----------+

                            Concatenated Pairs:

                              +-------------+
                              |  Name=Value |
                              +-------------+
                              |   a2=r%20b  |
                              |    a3=2q    |
                              |     a3=a    |
                              | b5=%3D%253D |
                              |     c2=     |
                              |    c%40=    |
                              +-------------+

   And concatenated together into a single string:

     a2=r%20b&a3=2q&a3=a&b5=%3D%253D&c2=&c%40=

3.3.1.3.  Construct Base String URI

   The signature base string incorporates the scheme, authority, and
   path of the request URI as defined by [RFC3986] section 3.  The
   request URI query component is included through the normalized
   parameters string (Section 3.3.1.2), and the fragment component is
   excluded.

   This is done by constructing a base string URI representing the
   request without the query or fragment components.  The base string
   URI is constructed as follows:

   1.  The scheme and host MUST be in lowercase.

   2.  The host and port values MUST match the content of the HTTP
       request "Host" header, if present.  If the "Host" header is not
       present, the client MUST use the hostname and port used to make
       the request.  Servers SHOULD remove potential ambiguity in such



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 11]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


       cases by specifying the expected host value.

   3.  The port MUST be included if it is not the default port for the
       scheme, and MUST be excluded if it is the default.  Specifically,
       the port MUST be excluded when an "http" request uses port 80 or
       when an "https" request uses port 443.  All other non-default
       port numbers MUST be included.

   For example:

   +----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   | The request URI                  | Is included in base string as |
   +----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   | HTTP://EXAMPLE.com:80/r/x?id=123 | http://example.com/r/x        |
   | https://example.net:8080?q=1#top | https://example.net:8080      |
   +----------------------------------+-------------------------------+

3.3.1.4.  Concatenate Base String Elements

   Finally, the signature base string is put together by concatenating
   its elements together.  The elements MUST be concatenated in the
   following order:

   1.  The HTTP request method in uppercase.  For example: "HEAD",
       "GET", "POST", etc.  If the request uses a custom HTTP method, it
       MUST be encoded (Section 3.6).

   2.  An "&" character (ASCII code 38).

   3.  The base string URI from Section 3.3.1.3, after being encoded
       (Section 3.6).

   4.  An "&" character (ASCII code 38).

   5.  The normalized request parameters string from Section 3.3.1.2,
       after being encoded (Section 3.6).

3.3.2.  HMAC-SHA1

   The "HMAC-SHA1" signature method uses the HMAC-SHA1 signature
   algorithm as defined in [RFC2104]:

     digest = HMAC-SHA1 (key, text)

   The HMAC-SHA1 function variables are used in following way:






Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 12]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   text
         is set to the value of the signature base string from
         Section 3.3.1.4.

   key
         is set to the concatenated values of:

         1.    The client shared-secret, after being encoded
               (Section 3.6).

         2.    An "&" character (ASCII code 38), which MUST be included
               even when either secret is empty.

         3.    The token shared-secret, after being encoded
               (Section 3.6).

   digest
         is used to set the value of the "oauth_signature" protocol
         parameter, after the result octet string is base64-encoded per
         [RFC2045] section 6.8.

3.3.3.  RSA-SHA1

   The "RSA-SHA1" signature method uses the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature
   algorithm as defined in [RFC3447] section 8.2 (also known as PKCS#1),
   using SHA-1 as the hash function for EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5.  To use this
   method, the client MUST have established client credentials with the
   server which included its RSA public key (in a manner which is beyond
   the scope of this specification).

   The signature base string is signed using the client's RSA private
   key per [RFC3447] section 8.2.1:

     S = RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN (K, M)

   Where:

   K
         is set to the client's RSA private key,

   M
         is set to the value of the signature base string from
         Section 3.3.1.4, and

   S
         is the result signature used to set the value of the
         "oauth_signature" protocol parameter, after the result octet
         string is base64-encoded per [RFC2045] section 6.8.



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 13]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   The server verifies the signature per [RFC3447] section 8.2.2:

     RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)

   Where:

   (n, e)
         is set to the client's RSA public key,

   M
         is set to the value of the signature base string from
         Section 3.3.1.4, and

   S
         is set to the octet string value of the "oauth_signature"
         protocol parameter received from the client.

3.3.4.  PLAINTEXT

   The "PLAINTEXT" method does not employ a signature algorithm and does
   not provide any security as it transmits secrets in the clear.  It
   SHOULD only be used with a transport-layer mechanisms such as TLS or
   SSL.  It does not use the signature base string.

   The "oauth_signature" protocol parameter is set to the concatenated
   value of:

   1.  The client shared-secret, after being encoded (Section 3.6).

   2.  An "&" character (ASCII code 38), which MUST be included even
       when either secret is empty.

   3.  The token shared-secret, after being encoded (Section 3.6).

3.4.  Parameter Transmission

   When making an OAuth-authenticated request, protocol parameters SHALL
   be included in the request using one and only one of the following
   locations, listed in order of decreasing preference:

   1.  The HTTP "Authorization" header as described in Section 3.4.1.

   2.  The HTTP request entity-body as described in Section 3.4.2.

   3.  The HTTP request URI query as described in Section 3.4.3.

   In addition to these three methods, future extensions may provide
   other methods for including protocol parameters in the request.



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 14]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


3.4.1.  Authorization Header

   Protocol parameters can be transmitted using the HTTP "Authorization"
   header as defined by [RFC2617] with the auth-scheme name set to
   "OAuth" (case-insensitive).

   For example:

     Authorization: OAuth realm="http://server.example.com/",
        oauth_consumer_key="0685bd9184jfhq22",
        oauth_token="ad180jjd733klru7",
        oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
        oauth_signature="wOJIO9A2W5mFwDgiDvZbTSMK%2FPY%3D",
        oauth_timestamp="137131200",
        oauth_nonce="4572616e48616d6d65724c61686176",
        oauth_version="1.0"

   Protocol parameters SHALL be included in the "Authorization" header
   as follows:

   1.  Parameter names and values are encoded per Parameter Encoding
       (Section 3.6).

   2.  Each parameter's name is immediately followed by an "=" character
       (ASCII code 61), a """ character (ASCII code 34), the parameter
       value (MAY be empty), and another """ character (ASCII code 34).

   3.  Parameters are separated by a "," character (ASCII code 44) and
       OPTIONAL linear whitespace per [RFC2617].

   4.  The OPTIONAL "realm" parameter MAY be added and interpreted per
       [RFC2617], section 1.2.

   Servers MAY indicate their support for the "OAuth" auth-scheme by
   returning the HTTP "WWW-Authenticate" response header upon client
   requests for protected resources.  As per [RFC2617] such a response
   MAY include additional HTTP "WWW-Authenticate" headers:

   For example:

     WWW-Authenticate: OAuth realm="http://server.example.com/"

   The realm parameter defines a protection realm per [RFC2617], section
   1.2.







Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 15]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


3.4.2.  Form-Encoded Body

   Protocol parameters can be transmitted in the HTTP request entity-
   body, but only if the following REQUIRED conditions are met:

   o  The entity-body is single-part.

   o  The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
      "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
      [W3C.REC-html40-19980424].

   o  The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" header
      set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".

   For example (line breaks are for display purposes only):

     oauth_consumer_key=0685bd9184jfhq22&oauth_token=ad180jjd733klr
     u7&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1&oauth_signature=wOJIO9A2W5
     mFwDgiDvZbTSMK%2FPY%3D&oauth_timestamp=137131200&oauth_nonce=4
     572616e48616d6d65724c61686176&oauth_version=1.0

   The entity-body MAY include other request-specific parameters, in
   which case, the protocol parameters SHOULD be appended following the
   request-specific parameters, properly separated by an "&" character
   (ASCII code 38).

3.4.3.  Request URI Query

   Protocol parameters can be transmitted by being added to the HTTP
   request URI as a query parameter as defined by [RFC3986] section 3.

   For example (line breaks are for display purposes only):

     GET /example/path?oauth_consumer_key=0685bd9184jfhq22&
     oauth_token=ad180jjd733klru7&oauth_signature_method=HM
     AC-SHA1&oauth_signature=wOJIO9A2W5mFwDgiDvZbTSMK%2FPY%
     3D&oauth_timestamp=137131200&oauth_nonce=4572616e48616
     d6d65724c61686176&oauth_version=1.0 HTTP/1.1

   The request URI MAY include other request-specific query parameters,
   in which case, the protocol parameters SHOULD be appended following
   the request-specific parameters, properly separated by an "&"
   character (ASCII code 38).

3.5.  Server Response

   Servers receiving an authenticated request MUST:




Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 16]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   o  Recalculate the request signature independently and compare it to
      the value received from the client.

   o  Ensure that the nonce / timestamp / token combination has not been
      used before, and MAY reject requests with stale timestamps.

   o  If a token is present, verify the scope and status of the client
      authorization by using the token, and MAY choose to restrict token
      usage to the client to which it was issued.

   o  Ensure that the protocol version used is "1.0".

   If the request fails verification, the server SHOULD respond with the
   appropriate HTTP response status code.  The server MAY include
   further details about why the request was rejected in the response
   body.  The following status codes SHOULD be used:

   o  400 (Bad Request)

      *  Unsupported parameters

      *  Unsupported signature method

      *  Missing parameters

      *  Duplicated protocol parameters

   o  401 (Unauthorized)

      *  Invalid client credentials

      *  Invalid or expired token

      *  Invalid signature

      *  Invalid or used nonce

3.6.  Percent Encoding

   OAuth uses the following percent-encoding rules:

   1.  Text values are first encoded as UTF-8 octets per [RFC3629] if
       they are not already.  This does not include binary values which
       are not intended for human consumption.

   2.  The values are then escaped using the [RFC3986] percent-encoding
       (%XX) mechanism as follows:




Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 17]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


       *  Characters in the unreserved character set as defined by
          [RFC3986] section 2.3 (ALPHA, DIGIT, "-", ".", "_", "~") MUST
          NOT be encoded.

       *  All other characters MUST be encoded.

       *  The two hexadecimal characters use to represent encoded
          characters MUST be upper case.


4.  Redirection-Based Authorization

   OAuth uses a set of token credentials to represent the authorization
   granted to the client by the resource owner.  Typically, token
   credentials are issued by the server at the resource owner's request,
   after authenticating the resource owner's identity using its server
   credentials (usually a username and password pair).

   There are many ways in which a resource owner can facilitate the
   provisioning of token credentials.  This section defines one such
   way, using HTTP redirections and the resource owner's user agent.
   This redirection-based authorization method includes three steps:

   1.  The client obtains a set of temporary credentials from the
       server.

   2.  The resource owner authorizes the server to issue token
       credentials to the client using the temporary credentials.

   3.  The client uses the temporary credentials to request a set of
       token credentials from the server, which will enable it to access
       the resource owner's protected resources.  The temporary
       credentials discarded.

   The temporary credentials MUST be revoked after being used once to
   obtain the token credentials.  It is RECOMMENDED that the temporary
   credentials have a limited lifetime.  Servers SHOULD enable resource
   owners to revoke token credentials after they have been issued to
   clients.

   In order for the client to perform these steps, the server needs to
   advertise the URIs of these three endpoints, as well as the HTTP
   method (GET, POST, etc.) used to make each requests.  To assist in
   communicating these endpoint, each is given a name:







Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 18]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   Temporary Credential Request
         The endpoint used by the client to obtain temporary credentials
         as described in Section 4.1.

   Resource Owner Authorization
         The endpoint to which the resource owner is redirected to grant
         authorization as described in Section 4.2.

   Token Request
         The endpoint used by the client to request a set of token
         credentials using the temporary credentials as described in
         Section 4.3.

   The three URIs MAY include a query component as defined by [RFC3986]
   section 3, but if present, the query MUST NOT contain any parameters
   beginning with the "oauth_" prefix.

   The method in which the server advertises its three endpoint is
   beyond the scope of this specification.

4.1.  Temporary Credentials

   The client obtains a set of temporary credentials from the server by
   making an authenticated request (Section 3) to the Temporary
   Credential Request endpoint URI.  The client MUST use the HTTP method
   advertised by the server.  The HTTP POST method is RECOMMENDED.

   When making the request, the client authenticates using only the
   client credentials.  The client MUST omit the "oauth_token" protocol
   parameter from the request and use an empty string as the token
   secret value.

   The server MUST verify (Section 3.5) the request and if valid,
   respond back to the client with a set of temporary credentials.  The
   temporary credentials are included in the HTTP response body using
   the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content type as defined by
   [W3C.REC-html40-19980424].

   The response contains the following parameters:

   oauth_token
         The temporary credentials identifier.

   oauth_token_secret
         The temporary credentials shared-secret.

   Note that even though the parameter names include the term 'token',
   these credentials are not token credentials, but are used in the next



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 19]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   two steps in a similar manner to token credentials.

   For example:

     oauth_token=ab3cd9j4ks73hf7g&oauth_token_secret=xyz4992k83j47x0b

4.2.  Resource Owner Authorization

   Before the client requests a set of token credentials from the
   server, it MUST send the user to the server to authorize the request.
   The client constructs a request URI by adding the following
   parameters to the Resource Owner Authorization endpoint URI:

   oauth_token
         REQUIRED.  The temporary credentials identifier obtained in
         Section 4.1 in the "oauth_token" parameter.  Servers MAY
         declare this parameter as OPTIONAL, in which case they MUST
         provide a way for the resource owner to indicate the identifier
         through other means.

   oauth_callback
         OPTIONAL.  The client MAY specify an absolute URI for the
         server to redirect the resource owner back to the client when
         authorization has been obtained or denied.

   Servers MAY specify additional parameters.

   In this example (line breaks are for display purposes only):

     https://server.example.com/authorize?
     oauth_token=ab3cd9j4ks73hf7g&
     oauth_callback=http%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.net%2Fcb%3Fstate%3D1

   the temporary credentials identifier is "ab3cd9j4ks73hf7g" and the
   callback URI is "http://client.example.net/cb?state=1".

   The client redirects the resource owner to the constructed URI using
   an HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via
   the resource owner's user agent.  The request MUST use the HTTP GET
   method.

   The way in which the server handles the authorization request is
   beyond the scope of this specification.  However, the server MUST
   first verify the identity of the resource owner.

   When asking the resource owner to authorize the requested access, the
   server SHOULD present to the resource owner information about the
   client requesting access based on the association of the temporary



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 20]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   credentials with the client identity.  When displaying any such
   information, the server SHOULD indicate if the information has been
   verified.

   After receiving an authorization decision from the resource owner,
   the server redirects the resource owner to the callback URI if one
   was provided in the "oauth_callback" parameter.  The server
   constructs the request URI by adding the following parameter to the
   callback URI query component:

   oauth_token
         The temporary credentials identifier the resource owner
         authorized or denied access to.

   If the callback URI already includes a query component, the server
   MUST append the "oauth_token" parameter to the end of the existing
   query.

   For example (line breaks are for display purposes only):

     http://client.example.net/cb?state=1&oauth_token=ab3cd9j4ks73hf7g

4.3.  Token Credentials

   The client obtains a set of token credentials from the server by
   making an authenticated request (Section 3) to the Token Request
   endpoint URI.  The client MUST use the HTTP method advertised by the
   server.  The HTTP POST method is RECOMMENDED.

   When making the request, the client authenticates using the client
   credentials as well as the temporary credentials.  The temporary
   credentials are used as a substitution for token credentials in the
   authenticated request.

   The server MUST verify (Section 3.5) the validity of the request,
   ensure that the resource owner has authorized the provisioning of
   token credentials to the client, and that the temporary credentials
   have not expired or used before.  If the request is valid and
   authorized, the token credentials are included in the HTTP response
   body using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content type as
   defined by [W3C.REC-html40-19980424].

   The response contains the following parameters:

   oauth_token
         The token identifier.





Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 21]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   oauth_token_secret
         The token shared-secret.

   For example:

     oauth_token=j49ddk933skd9dks&oauth_token_secret=ll399dj47dskfjdk

   The token credentials issued by the server MUST reflect the exact
   scope, duration, and other attributes approved by the resource owner.

   Once the client receives the token credentials, it can proceed to
   access protected resources on behalf of the resource owner by making
   authenticated request (Section 3) using the client credentials and
   the token credentials received.


5.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.


6.  Security Considerations

   As stated in [RFC2617], the greatest sources of risks are usually
   found not in the core protocol itself but in policies and procedures
   surrounding its use.  Implementers are strongly encouraged to assess
   how this protocol addresses their security requirements.

6.1.  Credentials Transmission

   The OAuth specification does not describe any mechanism for
   protecting tokens and shared-secrets from eavesdroppers when they are
   transmitted from the server to the client during the authorization
   phase.  Servers should ensure that these transmissions are protected
   using transport-layer mechanisms such as TLS or SSL.

6.2.  RSA-SHA1 Signature Method

   When used with "RSA-SHA1" signatures, the OAuth protocol does not use
   the token shared-secret, or any provisioned client shared-secret.
   This means the protocol relies completely on the secrecy of the
   private key used by the client to sign requests.

6.3.  PLAINTEXT Signature Method

   When used with the "PLAINTEXT" method, the protocol makes no attempts
   to protect credentials from eavesdroppers or man-in-the-middle
   attacks.  The "PLAINTEXT" method is only intended to be used in



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 22]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   conjunction with a transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS or
   SSL which does provide such protection.

6.4.  Confidentiality of Requests

   While OAuth provides a mechanism for verifying the integrity of
   requests, it provides no guarantee of request confidentiality.
   Unless further precautions are taken, eavesdroppers will have full
   access to request content.  Servers should carefully consider the
   kinds of data likely to be sent as part of such requests, and should
   employ transport-layer security mechanisms to protect sensitive
   resources.

6.5.  Spoofing by Counterfeit Servers

   OAuth makes no attempt to verify the authenticity of the server.  A
   hostile party could take advantage of this by intercepting the
   client's requests and returning misleading or otherwise incorrect
   responses.  Service providers should consider such attacks when
   developing services based on OAuth, and should require transport-
   layer security for any requests where the authenticity of the server
   or of request responses is an issue.

6.6.  Proxying and Caching of Authenticated Content

   The HTTP Authorization scheme (Section 3.4.1) is optional.  However,
   [RFC2616] relies on the "Authorization" and "WWW-Authenticate"
   headers to distinguish authenticated content so that it can be
   protected.  Proxies and caches, in particular, may fail to adequately
   protect requests not using these headers.

   For example, private authenticated content may be stored in (and thus
   retrievable from) publicly-accessible caches.  Servers not using the
   HTTP Authorization header (Section 3.4.1) should take care to use
   other mechanisms, such as the "Cache-Control" header, to ensure that
   authenticated content is protected.

6.7.  Plaintext Storage of Credentials

   The client shared-secret and token shared-secret function the same
   way passwords do in traditional authentication systems.  In order to
   compute the signatures used in methods other than "RSA-SHA1", the
   server must have access to these secrets in plaintext form.  This is
   in contrast, for example, to modern operating systems, which store
   only a one-way hash of user credentials.

   If an attacker were to gain access to these secrets - or worse, to
   the server's database of all such secrets - he or she would be able



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 23]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   to perform any action on behalf of any resource owner.  Accordingly,
   it is critical that servers protect these secrets from unauthorized
   access.

6.8.  Secrecy of the Client Credentials

   In many cases, the client application will be under the control of
   potentially untrusted parties.  For example, if the client is a
   freely available desktop application, an attacker may be able to
   download a copy for analysis.  In such cases, attackers will be able
   to recover the client credentials.

   Accordingly, servers should not use the client credentials alone to
   verify the identity of the client.  Where possible, other factors
   such as IP address should be used as well.

6.9.  Phishing Attacks

   Wide deployment of OAuth and similar protocols may cause resource
   owners to become inured to the practice of being redirected to
   websites where they are asked to enter their passwords.  If resource
   owners are not careful to verify the authenticity of these websites
   before entering their credentials, it will be possible for attackers
   to exploit this practice to steal resource owners' passwords.

   Servers should attempt to educate resource owners about the risks
   phishing attacks pose, and should provide mechanisms that make it
   easy for resource owners to confirm the authenticity of their sites.

6.10.  Scoping of Access Requests

   By itself, OAuth does not provide any method for scoping the access
   rights granted to a client.  However, most applications do require
   greater granularity of access rights.  For example, servers may wish
   to make it possible to grant access to some protected resources but
   not others, or to grant only limited access (such as read-only
   access) to those protected resources.

   When implementing OAuth, servers should consider the types of access
   resource owners may wish to grant clients, and should provide
   mechanisms to do so.  Servers should also take care to ensure that
   resource owners understand the access they are granting, as well as
   any risks that may be involved.

6.11.  Entropy of Secrets

   Unless a transport-layer security protocol is used, eavesdroppers
   will have full access to OAuth requests and signatures, and will thus



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 24]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   be able to mount offline brute-force attacks to recover the
   credentials used.  Servers should be careful to assign shared-secrets
   which are long enough, and random enough, to resist such attacks for
   at least the length of time that the shared-secrets are valid.

   For example, if shared-secrets are valid for two weeks, servers
   should ensure that it is not possible to mount a brute force attack
   that recovers the shared-secret in less than two weeks.  Of course,
   servers are urged to err on the side of caution, and use the longest
   secrets reasonable.

   It is equally important that the pseudo-random number generator
   (PRNG) used to generate these secrets be of sufficiently high
   quality.  Many PRNG implementations generate number sequences that
   may appear to be random, but which nevertheless exhibit patterns or
   other weaknesses which make cryptanalysis or brute force attacks
   easier.  Implementers should be careful to use cryptographically
   secure PRNGs to avoid these problems.

6.12.  Denial of Service / Resource Exhaustion Attacks

   The OAuth protocol has a number of features which may make resource
   exhaustion attacks against servers possible.  For example, if a
   server includes a nontrivial amount of entropy in token shared-
   secrets as recommended above, then an attacker may be able to exhaust
   the server's entropy pool very quickly by repeatedly obtaining
   temporary credentials from the server.

   Similarly, OAuth requires servers to track used nonces.  If an
   attacker is able to use many nonces quickly, the resources required
   to track them may exhaust available capacity.  And again, OAuth can
   require servers to perform potentially expensive computations in
   order to verify the signature on incoming requests.  An attacker may
   exploit this to perform a denial of service attack by sending a large
   number of invalid requests to the server.

   Resource Exhaustion attacks are by no means specific to OAuth.
   However, OAuth implementers should be careful to consider the
   additional avenues of attack that OAuth exposes, and design their
   implementations accordingly.  For example, entropy starvation
   typically results in either a complete denial of service while the
   system waits for new entropy or else in weak (easily guessable)
   secrets.  When implementing OAuth, servers should consider which of
   these presents a more serious risk for their application and design
   accordingly.






Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 25]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


6.13.  Cryptographic Attacks

   SHA-1, the hash algorithm used in "HMAC-SHA1" signatures, has been
   shown [SHA1-CHARACTERISTICS] to have a number of cryptographic
   weaknesses that significantly reduce its resistance to collision
   attacks.  Practically speaking, these weaknesses are difficult to
   exploit, and by themselves do not pose a significant risk to users of
   OAuth.  They may, however, make more efficient attacks possible, and
   NIST has announced [SHA-COMMENTS] that it will phase out use of SHA-1
   by 2010.  Servers should take this into account when considering
   whether SHA-1 provides an adequate level of security for their
   applications.

6.14.  Signature Base String Limitations

   The signature base string has been designed to support the signature
   methods defined in this specification.  When designing additional
   signature methods, the signature base string should be evaluated to
   ensure compatibility with the algorithms used.

   Since the signature base string does not cover the entire HTTP
   request, such as most request entity-body, most entity-headers, and
   the order in which parameters are sent, servers should employ
   additional mechanisms to protect such elements.


Appendix A.  Examples

   In this example, photos.example.net is a photo sharing website
   (server), and printer.example.com is a photo printing service
   (client).  Jane (resource owner) would like printer.example.com to
   print a private photo stored at photos.example.net.

   When Jane signs-into photos.example.net using her username and
   password, she can access the photo by requesting the URI
   "http://photos.example.net/photo?file=vacation.jpg" (which also
   supports the optional "size" parameter).  Jane does not want to share
   her username and password with printer.example.com, but would like it
   to access the photo and print it.

   The server documentation advertises support for the "HMAC-SHA1" and
   "PLAINTEXT" methods, with "PLAINTEXT" restricted to secure (HTTPS)
   requests.  It also advertises the following endpoint URIs:

   Temporary Credential Request
         https://photos.example.net/initiate, using HTTP POST





Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 26]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   Resource Owner Authorization URI:
         http://photos.example.net/authorize, using HTTP GET

   Token Request URI:
         https://photos.example.net/token, using HTTP POST

   The printer.example.com has already established client credentials
   with photos.example.net:

   Client Identifier
         "dpf43f3p2l4k3l03"

   Client Shared-Secret:
         "kd94hf93k423kf44"

   When printer.example.com attempts to print the request photo, it
   receives an HTTP response with a 401 (Unauthorized) status code, and
   a challenge to use OAuth:

     WWW-Authenticate: OAuth realm="http://photos.example.net/"

Appendix A.1.  Obtaining Temporary Credentials

   The client sends the following HTTPS POST request to the server:

     POST /initiate HTTP/1.1
     Host: photos.example.net
     Authorization: OAuth realm="http://photos.example.com/",
        oauth_consumer_key="dpf43f3p2l4k3l03",
        oauth_signature_method="PLAINTEXT",
        oauth_signature="kd94hf93k423kf44%26",
        oauth_timestamp="1191242090",
        oauth_nonce="hsu94j3884jdopsl",
        oauth_version="1.0"

   The server validates the request and replies with a set of temporary
   credentials in the body of the HTTP response:

     oauth_token=hh5s93j4hdidpola&oauth_token_secret=hdhd0244k9j7ao03

Appendix A.2.  Requesting Resource Owner Authorization

   The client redirects Jane's browser to the server's Resource Owner
   Authorization endpoint URI to obtain Jane's approval for accessing
   her private photos.

   http://photos.example.net/authorize?oauth_token=hh5s93j4hdidpola&
   oauth_callback=http%3A%2F%2Fprinter.example.com%2Frequest_token_ready



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 27]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   The server asks Jane to sign-in using her username and password and
   if successful, asks her if she approves granting printer.example.com
   access to her private photos.  Jane approves the request and is
   redirects her back to the client's callback URI:

     http://printer.example.com/request_token_ready?
     oauth_token=hh5s93j4hdidpola

Appendix A.3.  Obtaining Token Credentials

   After being informed by the callback request that Jane approved
   authorized access, printer.example.com requests a set of token
   credentials using its temporary credentials:

     POST /token HTTP/1.1
     Host: photos.example.net
     Authorization: OAuth realm="http://photos.example.com/",
        oauth_consumer_key="dpf43f3p2l4k3l03",
        oauth_token="hh5s93j4hdidpola",
        oauth_signature_method="PLAINTEXT",
        oauth_signature="kd94hf93k423kf44%26hdhd0244k9j7ao03",
        oauth_timestamp="1191242092",
        oauth_nonce="dji430splmx33448",
        oauth_version="1.0"

   The server validates the request and replies with a set of token
   credentials in the body of the HTTP response:

     oauth_token=nnch734d00sl2jdk&oauth_token_secret=pfkkdhi9sl3r4s00

Appendix A.4.  Accessing protected resources

   The printer is now ready to request the private photo.  Since the
   photo URI does not use HTTPS, the "HMAC-SHA1" method is required.

Appendix A.4.1.  Generating Signature Base String

   To generate the signature, it first needs to generate the signature
   base string.  The request contains the following parameters
   ("oauth_signature" excluded) which need to be ordered and
   concatenated into a normalized string:

   oauth_consumer_key
         "dpf43f3p2l4k3l03"







Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 28]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   oauth_token
         "nnch734d00sl2jdk"

   oauth_signature_method
         "HMAC-SHA1"

   oauth_timestamp
         "1191242096"

   oauth_nonce
         "kllo9940pd9333jh"

   oauth_version
         "1.0"

   file
         "vacation.jpg"

   size
         "original"

   The following inputs are used to generate the signature base string:

   1.  The HTTP request method: "GET"

   2.  The request URI: "http://photos.example.net/photos"

   3.  The encoded normalized request parameters string: "file=vacation.
       jpg&oauth_consumer_key=dpf43f3p2l4k3l03&oauth_nonce=kllo9940pd933
       3jh&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1&oauth_timestamp=1191242096&o
       auth_token=nnch734d00sl2jdk&oauth_version=1.0&size=original"

   The signature base string is (line breaks are for display purposes
   only):

     GET&http%3A%2F%2Fphotos.example.net%2Fphotos&file%3Dvacation.jpg%26
     oauth_consumer_key%3Ddpf43f3p2l4k3l03%26oauth_nonce%3Dkllo9940pd933
     3jh%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D119124
     2096%26oauth_token%3Dnnch734d00sl2jdk%26oauth_version%3D1.0%26size%
     3Doriginal

Appendix A.4.2.  Calculating Signature Value

   HMAC-SHA1 produces the following "digest" value as a base64-encoded
   string (using the signature base string as "text" and
   "kd94hf93k423kf44&pfkkdhi9sl3r4s00" as "key"):

     tR3+Ty81lMeYAr/Fid0kMTYa/WM=



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 29]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


Appendix A.4.3.  Requesting protected resource

   All together, the client request for the photo is:

     GET /photos?file=vacation.jpg&size=original HTTP/1.1
     Host: photos.example.com
     Authorization: OAuth realm="http://photos.example.net/",
        oauth_consumer_key="dpf43f3p2l4k3l03",
        oauth_token="nnch734d00sl2jdk",
        oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
        oauth_signature="tR3%2BTy81lMeYAr%2FFid0kMTYa%2FWM%3D",
        oauth_timestamp="1191242096",
        oauth_nonce="kllo9940pd9333jh",
        oauth_version="1.0"

   The photos.example.net sever validates the request and responds with
   the requested photo.


Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

   This specification is directly based on the [OAuth Core 1.0]
   community specification which was the product of the OAuth community.
   OAuth was modeled after existing proprietary protocols and best
   practices that have been independently implemented by various web
   sites.  This specification was orignially authored by: Mark Atwood,
   Richard M. Conlan, Blaine Cook, Leah Culver, Kellan Elliott-McCrea,
   Larry Halff, Eran Hammer-Lahav, Ben Laurie, Chris Messina, John
   Panzer, Sam Quigley, David Recordon, Eran Sandler, Jonathan Sergent,
   Todd Sieling, Brian Slesinsky, and Andy Smith

   The authors takes all responsibility for errors and omissions.


Appendix C.  Document History

   [[ To be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC. ]]

   -01

   o  Complete rewrite of the entire specification from scratch.
      Separated the spec structure into two parts and flipped their
      order.

   o  Corrected errors in instructions to encode the signature base
      sting by some methods.  The signature value is encoded using the
      transport rules, not the spec method for encoding.




Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 30]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


   o  Replaced the entire terminology.

   -00

   o  Initial draft based on the [OAuth Core 1.0] community
      specification with the following changes.

   o  Various changes required to accommodate the strict format
      requirements of the IETF, such as moving sections around
      (Security, Contributors, Introduction, etc.), cleaning references,
      adding IETF specific text, etc.

   o  Moved the Parameter Encoding sub-section from section 5
      (Parameters) to section 9.1 (Signature Base String) to make it
      clear it only applies to the signature base string.

   o  Nonce language adjusted to indicate it is unique per token/
      timestamp/consumer combination.

   o  Added security language regarding lack of token secrets in RSA-
      SHA1.

   o  Fixed the bug in the Normalize Request Parameters section.
      Removed the 'GET' limitation from the third bullet (query
      parameters).

   o  Removed restriction of only signing application/
      x-www-form-urlencoded in POST requests, allowing the entity-body
      to be used with all HTTP request methods.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2045]  Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
              Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext



Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 31]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [W3C.REC-html40-19980424]
              Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.0
              Specification", World Wide Web Consortium
              Recommendation REC-html40-19980424, April 1998,
              <http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/REC-html40-19980424>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [OAuth Core 1.0]
              OAuth, OCW., "OAuth Core 1.0".

   [SHA-COMMENTS]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST.,
              "NIST Brief Comments on Recent Cryptanalytic Attacks on
              Secure Hashing Functions and the Continued Security
              Provided by SHA-1, August, 2004.".

   [SHA1-CHARACTERISTICS]
              De Canniere, C. and C. Rechberger, "Finding SHA-1
              Characteristics: General Results and Applications".

URIs

   [1]  <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>









Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 32]

Internet-Draft                    OAuth                       March 2009


Authors' Addresses

   Eran Hammer-Lahav (editor)
   Yahoo!

   Email: eran@hueniverse.com
   URI:   http://hueniverse.com


   Blaine Cook

   Email: romeda@gmail.com
   URI:   http://romeda.org/






































Hammer-Lahav & Cook    Expires September 11, 2009              [Page 33]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.108, available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/