[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 RFC 4340

Internet Engineering Task Force                             Eddie Kohler
INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 UCLA/ICIR
draft-ietf-dccp-spec-05.txt                                 Mark Handley
Expires: April 2004                                          Sally Floyd
                                                                    ICIR
                                                         Jitendra Padhye
                                                      Microsoft Research
                                                         27 October 2003


              Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)


Status of this Memo

    This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
    all provisions of Section 10 of [RFC 2026].  Internet-Drafts are
    working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
    areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also
    distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
    months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
    at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

    The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

    The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

Copyright Notice

    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

    This document specifies the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol
    (DCCP), which implements a congestion-controlled, unreliable flow of
    datagrams suitable for use by applications such as streaming media,
    Internet telephony, and on-line games.






Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                     [Page 1]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    TO BE DELETED BY THE RFC EDITOR UPON PUBLICATION:

    Changes since draft-ietf-dccp-spec-04.txt:

    * Rearchitected feature negotiation (Junwen Lai).

    * Added figures, and modified text, to the Overview section.
    Figures and text partly from Eric Rescorla.

    * New synchronziation mechanism: DCCP-Sync.

    * DCCP-Move: Add Mobility ID and remove Old Address and Old Port,
    because they wouldn't work through a NAT.

    * The MD5 ID Regime is now number 1.  (It is still the default.)  ID
    Regime 0 is the Null Regime.  Also switch the meaning of the ID
    Regime feature.

    * Rename Drop States to Drop Codes, and renumber them.

    * Ignored cannot contain more option data bytes than the offending
    option.

    * Rename Service Name to Service Code (Gorry Fairhurst).

    * Rename Cslen/Checksum Length to CsCov/Checksum Coverage and change
    its values by analogy with UDP-Lite.

    * Be more specific about what Slow Receiver means.

    * Allow a textual error message in DCCP-Reset.

    * Mention new PMTUD, but this mention needs work.

    * CCID 1: Specify when acks may be sent.

    * Specify Request retransmission strategy.

    * Other changes throughout.

    Changes since draft-ietf-dccp-spec-03.txt:

    * Specify how the Loss Window is arranged.

    * Ignored can contain multiple bytes of option data.

    * Refine the tables in Section 8.5.1, on Ack Vector Consistency.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                     [Page 2]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    * CC mechanisms must treat Data Dropped like ECN Marked unless
    otherwise specified.

    * An MTU is mandatory (although PMTU is not), and CCIDs can affect
    the MTU.

    * Clarifications in response to reviewer comments.

    Changes since draft-ietf-dccp-spec-02.txt:

    * Identification options include the Acknowledgement Number in their
    hash.

    * Added an additional condition to accepting a packet with an
    invalid Sequence Number: the Acknowledgement Number must be valid,
    as well as the Identification options.

    * Explicitly allow Connection Nonces to be negotiated in other ways
    than the Connection Nonce feature.

    * Bad Moves are ignored, not reset, to avoid leaking information to
    attackers.

    Changes since draft-ietf-dccp-spec-01.txt:

    * Revise definition of when packets are reported as received, due to
    ECN Nonce verification problems with the previous definition and
    options.

    * Replace Receive Buffer Drops with Data Dropped.

    * Remove Data Discarded in favor of Data Dropped with Drop State 0.

    * Remove Buffer Closed in favor of Data Dropped with Drop State 4
    [NB: now Drop Code 1].

    * Add Initial Sequence Number setting guidelines.

    * Add sections on retransmission of Requests, and a table to the
    state diagram.

    * Made the 4-bit Reserved field in the DCCP generic header available
    for use by CCIDs.

    * Refine description of CCID 1.

    * Add Middlebox Considerations.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                     [Page 3]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    * Change Identification option to allow middleboxes to change port
    numbers, DCCP options, and/or packet data without disrupting the
    connection.

    * Specify that Ignored should be sent only on packets with
    Acknowledgement Numbers.

    * Add Aggression Penalty Reset Reason.

    * Add Payload Checksum option.

    * Add Elapsed Time option (formerly specific to CCID 3).

    * Timestamp Echo option can omit Elapsed Time, or provide a two-byte
    Elapsed Time value. Elapsed Time is measured in tenths of
    milliseconds, not microseconds.

    * Clean up DCCP-Move and feature-negotiation options discussions.

    * Confirm(Connection Nonce) sends no data.

    * Ack Vector implementation supports ECN Nonce Echo.

    * Add CSlen and Partial Checksumming Design Motivation.

    * Clarify that Ack Vectors may be sent even if Use Ack Vector is
    false.
























Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                     [Page 4]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


                             Table of Contents

    1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
    2. Design Rationale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
    3. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.1. Robustness Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2. Packet Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.3. States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.4. Parts of a Connection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
    4. Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.1. Connection Initiation and Termination. . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.2. Congestion Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
          4.2.1. CCID 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
          4.2.2. CCID 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       4.3. Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       4.4. Example Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       4.5. Examples of DCCP Congestion Control. . . . . . . . . . .  19
          4.5.1. DCCP with TCP-like Congestion Control . . . . . . .  19
          4.5.2. DCCP with TFRC Congestion Control . . . . . . . . .  21
    5. Packet Formats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.1. Generic Packet Header. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.2. Sequence Number Synchronization. . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
          5.2.1. Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
          5.2.2. Appropriate Sequence Numbers. . . . . . . . . . . .  28
          5.2.3. Appropriate Acknowledgement Numbers . . . . . . . .  29
          5.2.4. Sequence-Validity By State. . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
          5.2.5. Handling Sequence-Invalid Packets . . . . . . . . .  31
          5.2.6. Examples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.3. Extended Sequence Numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
          5.3.1. Transitioning to Extended Sequence Num-
          bers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       5.4. DCCP State Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       5.5. DCCP-Request Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       5.6. DCCP-Response Packet Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       5.7. DCCP-Data, DCCP-Ack, and DCCP-DataAck Packet
       Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       5.8. DCCP-CloseReq and DCCP-Close Packet Format . . . . . . .  42
       5.9. DCCP-Reset Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       5.10. DCCP-Move Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       5.11. DCCP-Sync Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
    6. Options and Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       6.1. Padding Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       6.2. Ignored Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       6.3. Mandatory Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       6.4. Feature Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
          6.4.1. Value Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
          6.4.2. Feature Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
          6.4.3. Change L Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                     [Page 5]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


          6.4.4. Confirm L Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
          6.4.5. Change R Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
          6.4.6. Confirm R Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
          6.4.7. Unknown Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
          6.4.8. State Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
          6.4.9. Streamlined Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       6.5. Identification Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
          6.5.1. Identification Regime Feature . . . . . . . . . . .  59
          6.5.2. Connection Nonce Feature. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
          6.5.3. Identification Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
          6.5.4. Challenge Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       6.6. Init Cookie Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       6.7. Timestamp Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       6.8. Elapsed Time Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       6.9. Timestamp Echo Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       6.10. Loss Window Feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
    7. Congestion Control IDs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
       7.1. Unspecified Sender-Based Congestion
       Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       7.2. TCP-like Congestion Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
       7.3. TFRC Congestion Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       7.4. CCID-Specific Options, Features, and Reset
       Reasons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
    8. Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       8.1. Acks of Acks and Unidirectional
       Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       8.2. Ack Piggybacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       8.3. Ack Ratio Feature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       8.4. Use Ack Vector Feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
       8.5. Ack Vector Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
          8.5.1. Ack Vector Consistency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
          8.5.2. Ack Vector Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
       8.6. Slow Receiver Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
       8.7. Data Dropped Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
          8.7.1. Data Dropped and Normal Congestion
          Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
          8.7.2. Particular Drop Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
       8.8. Payload Checksum Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
    9. Explicit Congestion Notification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
       9.1. ECN Capable Feature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
       9.2. ECN Nonces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
       9.3. Other Aggression Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
    10. Multihoming and Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
       10.1. Mobility Capable Feature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
       10.2. Mobility ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
       10.3. Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
       10.4. Congestion Control State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
       10.5. Loss During Transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                     [Page 6]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    11. Maximum Packet Size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
    12. Middlebox Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
    13. Abstract API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
    14. Multiplexing Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
    15. DCCP and RTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
    16. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
       16.1. Security Considerations for Mobility. . . . . . . . . .  94
       16.2. Security Considerations for Partial Check-
       sums. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
    17. IANA Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
    18. Thanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96
    A. Appendix: Ack Vector Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . .  97
       A.1. Packet Arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
          A.1.1. New Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
          A.1.2. Old Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
       A.2. Sending Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
       A.3. Clearing State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
       A.4. Processing Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
    B. Appendix: Design Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
       B.1. CsCov and Partial Checksumming . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
    Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
    Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
    Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107




























Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                     [Page 7]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


1.  Introduction

    This document specifies the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol
    (DCCP).  DCCP provides the following features:

    o An unreliable flow of datagrams, with acknowledgements.

    o A reliable handshake for connection setup and teardown.

    o Reliable negotiation of options, including negotiation of a
      suitable congestion control mechanism.

    o Mechanisms allowing a server to avoid holding any state for
      unacknowledged connection attempts or already-finished
      connections.

    o Optional mechanisms that tell the sender, with high reliability,
      which packets reached the receiver, and whether those packets were
      ECN marked, corrupted, or dropped in the receive buffer.

    o Congestion control incorporating Explicit Congestion Notification
      (ECN) and the ECN Nonce, as per [RFC 3168] and [ECN NONCE].

    o Path MTU discovery, as per [RFC 1191].

    DCCP is intended for applications that require the flow-based
    semantics of TCP, but which do not want TCP's in-order delivery and
    reliability semantics, or which would like different congestion
    control dynamics than TCP.  Similarly, DCCP is intended for
    applications that do not require features of SCTP [RFC 2960] such as
    sequenced delivery within multiple streams.

    Applications that could make use of DCCP include those with timing
    constraints on the delivery of data such that reliable in-order
    delivery, when combined with congestion control, is likely to result
    in some information arriving at the receiver after it is no longer
    of use.  Such applications might include streaming media and
    Internet telephony.

    To date most such applications have used either TCP, with the
    problems described above, or used UDP and implemented their own
    congestion control mechanisms (or no congestion control at all).
    The purpose of DCCP is to provide a standard way to implement
    congestion control and congestion control negotiation for such
    applications.  One of the motivations for DCCP is to enable the use
    of ECN, along with conformant end-to-end congestion control, for
    applications that would otherwise be using UDP.  In addition, DCCP
    implements reliable connection setup, teardown, and feature



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                         Section 1.  [Page 8]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    negotiation.

    A DCCP connection contains acknowledgement traffic as well as data
    traffic.  Acknowledgements inform a sender whether its packets
    arrived, and whether they were ECN marked.  Acks are transmitted as
    reliably as the congestion control mechanism in use requires,
    possibly completely reliably.

2.  Design Rationale

    DCCP is intended to be used by applications that currently use UDP
    without end-to-end congestion control.  The desire is for many
    applications to have little reason not to use DCCP instead of UDP,
    once DCCP is deployed.  Thus, DCCP was designed to have as little
    overhead as possible, in terms both of the size of the packet header
    and in terms of the state and CPU overhead required at the end
    hosts.

    This desire for minimal overhead results in the design decision to
    include only the minimal necessary functionality in DCCP, leaving
    other functionality, such as FEC or semi-reliability, to be layered
    on top of DCCP as desired.  The desire for minimal overhead is also
    one of the reasons to propose DCCP instead of just proposing an
    unreliable version of SCTP for applications currently using UDP.

    Different forms of conformant congestion control are appropriate for
    different applications, and a second motivation behind the design of
    DCCP is to allow applications to choose between several forms of
    congestion control.  One choice, TCP-like Congestion Control, halves
    the congestion window in response to a packet drop or mark, as in
    TCP.  Applications using this congestion control mechanism will
    respond quickly to changes in available bandwidth, but must be able
    to tolerate the abrupt changes in congestion window typical of TCP.
    A second alternative, TCP-Friendly Rate Control (TFRC), a form of
    equation-based congestion control, minimizes abrupt changes in the
    sending rate while maintaining longer-term fairness with TCP.  TCP-
    like Congestion Control is appropriate for applications such as on-
    line games that want to make use of all the available bandwidth
    quickly, but can tolerate rapid reductions in rate without serious
    consequences.  TFRC is more appropriate for applications such as
    streaming media, where rapid rate changes cause unacceptable UI
    glitches (audible pauses or clicks in the playout stream, for
    example).  These applications would prefer to give up on rapid
    consumption of available bandwidth in favor of a steadier rate.

    DCCP also allows unreliable traffic to use ECN safely.  A UDP kernel
    API might not allow applications to set UDP packets as ECN-capable,
    since the API could not guarantee the application would properly



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                         Section 2.  [Page 9]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    detect or respond to congestion.  DCCP kernel APIs will have no such
    issues, since DCCP itself implements congestion control.

    In proposing a new transport protocol, it is necessary to justify
    the design decision not to require the use of the Congestion
    Manager, as well as the design decision to add a new transport
    protocol to the current family of UDP, TCP, and SCTP.  The
    Congestion Manager [RFC 3124] allows multiple concurrent streams
    between the same sender and receiver to share congestion control.
    However, the current Congestion Manager can only be used by
    applications that have their own end-to-end feedback about packet
    losses, and this is not the case for many of the applications
    currently using UDP.  In addition, the current Congestion Manager
    does not lend itself to the use of forms of TFRC where the state
    about past packet drops or marks is maintained at the receiver
    rather than at the sender.  While DCCP should be able to make use of
    CM where desired by the application, we do not see any benefit in
    making the deployment of DCCP contingent on the deployment of CM
    itself.

3.  Conventions and Terminology

    Each DCCP connection runs between two endpoints, which we often name
    DCCP A and DCCP B.  Data may pass over the connection in either or
    both directions.

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
    this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].

    All multi-byte numerical quantities in DCCP, such as Sequence
    Numbers and arguments to options, are transmitted in network byte
    order (most significant byte first).

    We occasionally refer to the "left" and "right" sides of a bit
    field.  "Left" means towards the most significant bit, and "right"
    means towards the least significant bit.

    Reserved bitfields in DCCP packet headers MUST be ignored by
    receivers, and MUST be set to zero by senders, unless otherwise
    specified.

3.1.  Robustness Principle

    DCCP implementations should follow TCP's "general principle of
    robustness": be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you
    accept from others.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 3.1.  [Page 10]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


3.2.  Packet Types

    DCCP has ten different packet types.

    The DCCP-Request and DCCP-Response packets are used in connection
    initiation, and the DCCP-CloseReq, DCCP-Close, and DCCP-Reset
    packets are used in connection termination, as described in Section
    4.1.

    The other five packet types are as follows:

    DCCP-Data
        Used to transmit data.  It carries no acknowledgement
        information.

    DCCP-Ack
        Used for pure acknowledgements.

    DCCP-DataAck
        Used for piggybacked data-plus-acknowledgements.

    DCCP-Move
        Supports multihoming and mobility.

    DCCP-Sync
        Used to resynchronize sequence numbers after a large burst of
        loss.

    All of these packets except for DCCP-DataAck, DCCP-Move, and DCCP-
    Sync are shown in the example diagram below.

3.3.  States

    DCCP endpoints progress through different states during the course
    of a connection.  The figure below shows the typical progress
    through these states for a client and server.















Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 3.3.  [Page 11]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


     Client State:                                   Server State:
     -------------                                   -------------
     CLOSED                                             LISTEN
     REQUEST                DCCP-Request ->
                         <- DCCP-Response               RESPOND
     OPEN                   DCCP-Ack ->
                         <- DCCP-Data                   OPEN
                            DCCP-Ack ->
                         <- DCCP-CloseReq               CLOSEREQ
     CLOSING                DCCP-Close ->
                         <- DCCP-Reset                  CLOSED
     TIME-WAIT
     CLOSED
         The client and server's typical progress through states.


    CLOSED
        Represents a nonexistent connection.

    LISTEN
        Represents a server socket in the passive listening state.
        LISTEN and CLOSED are not associated with any particular DCCP
        connection.

    REQUEST
        The client socket enters this state, from CLOSED, after sending
        a DCCP-Request packet to try to initiate a connection.

    RESPOND
        A server socket enters this state, from LISTEN, after receiving
        a DCCP-Request from a client.

    OPEN
        The central, data transfer portion of a DCCP connection.  Client
        and server enter into this state from REQUEST and RESPOND,
        respectively.  Sometimes we speak of SERVER-OPEN and CLIENT-OPEN
        states, corresponding to the server's OPEN state and the
        client's OPEN state.

    CLOSEREQ
        A server socket enters this state, from SERVER-OPEN, to signal
        that the connection is over, but the client must hold Time-Wait
        state.

    CLOSING
        Either server or client can enter this state to close the
        connection.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 3.3.  [Page 12]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    TIME-WAIT
        A socket remains in this state for 2MSL after the connection has
        been torn down, to prevent mistakes due to the delivery of old
        packets.

3.4.  Parts of a Connection

    The DCCP connection between DCCP A and DCCP B consists of four sets
    of packets, as follows:

    (1) Data packets from DCCP A to DCCP B.

    (2) Acknowledgements from DCCP B to DCCP A.

    (3) Data packets from DCCP B to DCCP A.

    (4) Acknowledgements from DCCP A to DCCP B.

    These four subflows are grouped into two half-connections,
    illustrated as follows:

     +--------+      A-to-B half-connection:                    +--------+
     |        |    + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +    |        |
     |        |    |                  (1)                  |    |        |
     |        |          data packets -->                       |        |
     |        |    |                  (2)                  |    |        |
     |        |                       <-- acknowledgements      |        |
     |        |    + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +    |        |
     | DCCP A |                                                 | DCCP B |
     |        |      B-to-A half-connection:                    |        |
     |        |    + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +    |        |
     |        |    |                  (3)                  |    |        |
     |        |                       <-- data packets          |        |
     |        |    |                  (4)                  |    |        |
     |        |      acknowledgements -->                       |        |
     +--------+    + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +    +--------+



    We use the following terms to refer to subsets and endpoints of a
    DCCP connection.

    Subflows
        A subflow consists of either data or acknowledgement packets,
        sent in one direction.  Each of the four sets of packets above
        is a subflow.  (Subflows may overlap to some extent, since
        acknowledgements may be piggybacked on data packets.)




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 3.4.  [Page 13]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Sequences
        A sequence consists of all packets sent in one direction,
        regardless of whether they are data or acknowledgements.  The
        sets 1+4 and 2+3, above, are sequences.  Each packet on a
        sequence has a different sequence number.

    Half-connections
        A half-connection consists of the data packets sent in one
        direction, plus the corresponding acknowledgements.  The sets
        1+2 and 3+4, above, are half-connections.  Half-connections are
        named after the direction of data flow, so the A-to-B half-
        connection contains the data packets from A to B and the
        acknowledgements from B to A.

    HC-Sender and HC-Receiver
        In the context of a single half-connection, the HC-Sender is the
        endpoint sending data, while the HC-Receiver is the endpoint
        sending acknowledgements.  For example, in the A-to-B half-
        connection, DCCP A is the HC-Sender and DCCP B is the HC-
        Receiver.

4.  Overview

4.1.  Connection Initiation and Termination

    Every DCCP connection is actively initiated by one DCCP, which
    connects to a DCCP socket in the passive listening state.  We refer
    to the active endpoint as "the client" and the passive endpoint as
    "the server".

       Client                                      Server
       ------                                      ------
       DCCP-Request            ->
       [Ports, service, features]
                               <-           DCCP-Response
                                       [Features, cookie]
       DCCP-Ack                ->
       [Features, cookie]

                      DCCP connection initiation.


    In the DCCP-Request message, the client tells the server the ports
    it wants to communicate on and possibly the Service Code of the
    service it wants to talk to.  The DCCP-Request message also starts
    feature negotiation, which, for pedagogical reasons, we will present
    separately in the next section.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 4.1.  [Page 14]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    In the DCCP-Response message, the server tells the client that it is
    willing to accept the connection and continues feature negotiation.
    In order to prevent SYN-flood style DOS attacks, DCCP incorporates a
    cookie exchange: The server can provide the client with a cookie
    that contains all the negotiation state.  This cookie must be echoed
    by the client in the DCCP-Ack, thus removing the need for the server
    to keep state.

    In the DCCP-Ack message, the client acknowledges the DCCP-Response
    and returns the cookie to permit the server to complete its side of
    the connection.  This message may also include feature negotiation
    messages.

    DCCP does not support TCP-style simultaneous open.  In particular, a
    host MUST NOT respond to a DCCP-Request packet with a DCCP-Response
    packet unless the destination port specified in the DCCP-Request
    corresponds to a local socket opened for listening.  This preserves
    the invariant that every connection has one client and one server.

    The server sends a DCCP-CloseReq packet to the client to ask it to
    close the connection with a DCCP-Close.  The server sends DCCP-
    CloseReq, rather than DCCP-Close, when it wants the client to hold
    Time-Wait state for the connection.  Only the server may generate a
    DCCP-CloseReq packet.  This means that the client cannot force the
    server to maintain connection state after the connection is closed.

    An endpoint sends a DCCP-Close packet to request that the other
    endpoint tear down the connection via DCCP-Reset.  Every explicitly-
    terminated connection ends with a DCCP-Reset packet.  The receiver
    of DCCP-Reset holds Time-Wait state for the connection.  DCCP-Reset
    is sent in response to DCCP-Close during normal connection
    termination, or due to some inappropriate protocol event.

       Client                                      Server
       ------                                      ------
                               <-           DCCP-CloseReq
       DCCP-Close              ->
                               <-              DCCP-Reset

                      DCCP connection termination.


    DCCP shuts down both half-connections as a unit; it has no states
    analogous to TCP's FINWAIT and CLOSEWAIT states, where one TCP
    "half-connection" is closed and the other remains open.  However,
    DCCP implementations SHOULD allow applications to declare that they
    are no longer interested in receiving data.  This would allow DCCP
    implementations to streamline state for certain half-connections.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 4.1.  [Page 15]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    See Section 8.7, on the Data Dropped option---and particularly its
    Drop Code 1---for more information.

4.2.  Congestion Control

    Each half-connection is managed by a congestion control mechanism
    named by a single-byte congestion control identifier, or CCID.  The
    CCID for a half-connection describes how the HC-Sender limits data
    packet rates; how it maintains necessary parameters, such as
    congestion windows; how the HC-Receiver sends congestion feedback
    via acknowledgements; and how it manages the acknowledgement rate.
    The endpoints negotiate their CCIDs at connection setup; the CCIDs
    for the two half-connections need not be the same.

    Section 7 introduces the currently allocated CCIDs, which are
    defined in separate profile documents.

4.2.1.  CCID 2

    CCID 2's congestion control is extremely similar to that of TCP.
    The sender maintains a congestion window and sends packets until
    that window is full.  Packets are acknowledged by the receiver.
    Dropped packets and ECN [RFC 3168] are used to indicate congestion.
    The response to congestion is to halve the congestion window.  One
    subtle diference between DCCP and TCP is that the acknowledgements
    in DCCP contain the sequence numbers of all received packets within
    a given window, not just the highest sequence number as in TCP's
    cumulative ackowledgement.

4.2.2.  CCID 3

    CCID 3 is an equation-based form of congestion control which is
    intended to provide a smoother response to congestion than CCID 2.
    The sender maintains a "transmit rate".  The receiver sends
    acknowledgement packets which also contain information about the
    receiver's estimate of packet loss.  The sender uses this
    information to update its transmit rate.  Although CCID 3 behaves
    somewhat differently from TCP in its short term congestion response,
    it is designed to operate fairly with TCP over the long term.

4.3.  Features

    In DCCP, feature negotiation is performed by attaching options to
    other DCCP packets. Thus feature negotiation can be piggybacked on
    any other DCCP message. This allows feature negotiation during
    connection initiation as well as feature renegotiation during data
    flow.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 4.3.  [Page 16]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    DCCP features are one-sided.  Thus, it's possible to have a
    different congestion control regime for data sent from client to
    server than from server to client.  The endpoint in charge of a
    particular feature is called its feature location; the other
    endpoint is called the feature remote.  Feature negotiation is done
    with the Change L, Confirm L, Change R, and Confirm R options, with
    the "L" options sent by the feature location, and "R" options sent
    by the feature remote.

    A Change R message says to the peer "change this option setting on
    your side".  The peer responds with a Confirm L, meaning "I've
    changed it".  Some sample exchanges follow:

       Client                                      Server
       ------                                      ------
       Change R(CCID, 2)       ->
                               <-        Confirm L(CCID, 2)
                  * agreement that (CCID,Server) = 2 *

    In this exchange, the peers agree to set the server's CCID to 2.

       Client                                      Server
       ------                                      ------
       Change R(CCID, 3 4)      ->
                                <-  Confirm L(CCID, 4, 4 2)
                  * agreement that (CCID,Server) = 4 *

    In this exchange, the client requests CCID value 3 or 4 for the
    server's CCID, with 3 preferred. Note that the client can offer
    multiple values. The server chooses 4, giving its preference list of
    "4 2".

    If a party wants to change one of his own options, he issues a
    "Change L", as shown below.

       Client                                      Server
       ------                                      ------
                                <-      Change L(CCID, 3 2)
       Confirm R(CCID, 3, 3 2)  ->
                  * agreement that (CCID, Server) = 3 *


    In this example, the server requests CCID value 3 or 2 for the
    server's CCID, with 3 preferred, and the client agrees.

    Retransmissions make feature negotiation reliable. Section 6.4
    describes these options further.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 4.3.  [Page 17]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


4.4.  Example Connection

    The progress of a typical DCCP connection is as follows.  (This
    description is informative, not normative.)

       Client                                      Server
       ------                                      ------
       (1) DCCP-Request        ->
                               <-       (2) DCCP-Response
       (3) DCCP-Ack            ->
       (5) DCCP-Data           ->
                               <-            (5) DCCP-Ack
                               <-           (5) DCCP-Data
       (5) DCCP-Ack            ->
                               <-       (6) DCCP-CloseReq
       (7) DCCP-Close          ->
                               <-          (8) DCCP-Reset

                    Typical DCCP Connection.


    (1) The client sends the server a DCCP-Request packet specifying the
        client and server ports, the service being requested, and any
        features being negotiated, including the CCID that the client
        would like the server to use.  The client may optionally
        piggyback some data on the DCCP-Request packet---an application-
        level request, say---which the server may ignore.

    (2) The server sends the client a DCCP-Response packet indicating
        that it is willing to communicate with the client.  The response
        indicates any features and options that the server agrees to,
        begins or continues other feature negotiations if desired, and
        optionally includes an Init Cookie that wraps up all this
        information and which must be returned by the client for the
        connection to complete.

    (3) The client sends the server a DCCP-Ack packet that acknowledges
        the DCCP-Response packet.  This acknowledges the server's
        initial sequence number and returns the Init Cookie if there was
        one in the DCCP-Response.  It may also continue feature
        negotiation.

    (4) Next comes zero or more DCCP-Ack exchanges as required to
        finalize feature negotiation.  The client may piggyback an
        application-level request on its final ack, producing a DCCP-
        DataAck packet.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 4.4.  [Page 18]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    (5) The server and client then exchange DCCP-Data packets, DCCP-Ack
        packets acknowledging that data, and, optionally, DCCP-DataAck
        packets containing piggybacked data and acknowledgements.  If
        the client has no data to send, then the server will send DCCP-
        Data and DCCP-DataAck packets, while the client will send DCCP-
        Acks exclusively.

    (6) The server sends a DCCP-CloseReq packet requesting a close.

    (7) The client sends a DCCP-Close packet acknowledging the close.

    (8) The server sends a DCCP-Reset packet whose Reason field is set
        to "Closed", and clears its connection state.  In DCCP, unlike
        TCP, Resets are part of normal connection termination; see
        Section 5.9.

    (9) The client receives the DCCP-Reset packet and holds state for a
        reasonable interval of time to allow any remaining packets to
        clear the network.

    An alternative connection closedown sequence is initiated by the
    client:

    (6) The client sends a DCCP-Close packet closing the connection.

    (7) The server sends a DCCP-Reset packet with Reason field set to
        "Closed" and clears its connection state.

    (8) The client receives the DCCP-Reset packet and holds state for a
        reasonable interval of time to allow any remaining packets to
        clear the network.

    This arrangement of setup and teardown handshakes permits the server
    to decline to hold any state until the handshake with the client has
    completed, and ensures that the client must hold the Time-Wait state
    at connection closedown.

4.5.  Examples of DCCP Congestion Control

    Before giving the detailed specifications of DCCP, we present two
    more detailed examples showing DCCP congestion control in operation.
    Again, these examples are informative, not normative.

4.5.1.  DCCP with TCP-like Congestion Control

    The first example is of a connection where both half-connections use
    TCP-like Congestion Control, specified by CCID 2 [CCID 2 PROFILE].
    In this example, the client sends an application-level request to



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 4.5.1.  [Page 19]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    the server, and the server responds with a stream of data packets.
    This example is of a connection using ECN.

    (1) The client sends the DCCP-Request, which includes a Change R
        option asking the server to use CCID 2 for the server's data
        packets, and a Change L option informing the server that the
        client would like to use CCID 2 for the its data packets.

    (2) The server sends a DCCP-Response, including a Confirm L option
        indicating that the server agrees to use CCID 2 for its data
        packets, and a Confirm R option indicating that the server
        agrees to the client's suggestion of CCID 2 for the client's
        data packets.

    (3) The client responds with a DCCP-DataAck acknowledging the
        server's initial sequence number, and including an application-
        level request for data.  We will not discuss the client-to-
        server half-connection further in this example.

    (4) The server sends DCCP-Data packets, where the number of packets
        sent is governed by a congestion window, as in TCP.  The details
        of the congestion window are defined in the profile for CCID 2,
        which is a separate document [CCID 2 PROFILE]. The server also
        sends Change R(Ack Ratio) feature options specifying the number
        of server data packets to be covered by an Ack packet from the
        client.

        Each DCCP-Data packet is sent as ECN-Capable, with either the
        ECT(0) or the ECT(1) codepoint set, as described in [ECN NONCE].


    (5) The client sends a DCCP-Ack packet acknowledging the data
        packets for every Ack Ratio data packets transmitted by the
        server.  Each DCCP-Ack packet uses a sequence number and
        contains an Ack Vector, as defined in Section 8 on
        Acknowledgements.  These packets also include Confirm L options
        answering any Ack Ratio requests from the server.

        The DCCP-Acks are also sent as ECN-Capable, with either ECT(0)
        or ECT(1).  The client's Ack Vector echoes the accumulated ECN
        Nonce for the server's packets.

    (6) The server must occasionally acknowledge the client's
        acknowledgements, so the client can clean its acknowledgement
        state.  It can do so by sending separate DCCP-Acks as allowed by
        CCID 2, or by piggybacking acknowledgement information on its
        data packets with the DCCP-DataAck packet type.  The
        acknowledgement information may contain detailed Ack Vectors,



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 4.5.1.  [Page 20]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


        like the client's acknowledgements; but if the client is sending
        nothing but acknowledgements, the server's acks-of-acks can be
        more lightweight.  See Section 8.1 for more information.

        Like the server's DCCP-Data packets, the server's DCCP-DataAck
        and DCCP-Ack packets are sent as ECN-Capable.

    (7) The server continues sending DCCP-Data packets as controlled by
        the congestion window.  Upon receiving DCCP-Ack packets, the
        server examines the Ack Vector to learn about marked or dropped
        data packets, and adjusts its congestion window accordingly, as
        described in [CCID 2 PROFILE]. Because this is unreliable
        transfer, the server does not retransmit dropped packets.

    (8) Because DCCP-Ack packets use sequence numbers, the server has
        direct information about the fraction of loss or marked DCCP-Ack
        packets.  [CCID 2 PROFILE] defines how the server modifies the
        client's Ack Ratio in response to any congestion on the
        acknowledgement stream.

    (9) The server estimates round-trip times and calculates a TimeOut
        (TO) value much as the RTO (Retransmit Timeout) is calculated in
        TCP.  Again, the specification for this is in [CCID 2 PROFILE].
        The TO is used to determine when a new DCCP-Data packet can be
        transmitted when the server has been limited by the congestion
        window and no feedback has been received from the client.

    (10)
        The DCCP-CloseReq, DCCP-Close, and DCCP-Reset packets to close
        the connection are as in the example above.

4.5.2.  DCCP with TFRC Congestion Control

    This example is of a connection where both half-connections use TFRC
    Congestion Control, specified by CCID 3 [CCID 3 PROFILE].

    (1) The DCCP-Request and DCCP-Response packets specifying the use of
        CCID 3 and the initial DCCP-DataAck packet are similar to those
        in the CCID 2 example above.

    (2) The server sends DCCP-Data packets, where the number of packets
        sent is governed by an allowed transmit rate, as in TFRC.  The
        details of the allowed transmit rate are defined in the profile
        for CCID 3, which is a separate document [CCID 3 PROFILE]. Each
        DCCP-Data packet has a sequence number and a window counter
        value.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 4.5.2.  [Page 21]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


        Some of these data packets are DCCP-DataAck packets
        acknowledging packets from the client, but for simplicity we
        will not discuss the half-connection of data from the client to
        the server in this example.

        The use of ECN follows TCP-like Congestion Control, above, and
        is described further in [CCID 3 PROFILE].

    (3) The receiver sends DCCP-Ack packets at least once per round-trip
        time acknowledging the data packets, unless the server is
        sending at a rate of less than one packet per RTT, as specified
        by [CCID 3 PROFILE]. These acknowledgements may be piggybacked
        on data packets, producing DCCP-DataAck packets.  Each DCCP-Ack
        packet uses a sequence number and identifies the most recent
        packet received from the server.  Each DCCP-Ack packet includes
        feedback about the loss event rate calculated by the client, as
        specified by [CCID 3 PROFILE].

    (4) The server continues sending DCCP-Data packets as controlled by
        the allowed transmit rate.  Upon receiving DCCP-Ack packets, the
        server updates its allowed transmit rate as specified by [CCID 3
        PROFILE].

    (5) The server estimates round-trip times and calculates a TimeOut
        (TO) value much as the RTO (Retransmit Timeout) is calculated in
        TCP.  Again, the specification for this is in [CCID 3 PROFILE].

    (6) The DCCP-CloseReq, DCCP-Close, and DCCP-Reset packets to close
        the connection are as in the examples above.

5.  Packet Formats

5.1.  Generic Packet Header

    All DCCP packets begin with a generic DCCP packet header:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          Source Port          |           Dest Port           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Data Offset  | CCVal | CsCov |           Checksum            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type  |X|# NDP|              Sequence Number                  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+






Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.1.  [Page 22]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Source and Destination Ports: 16 bits each
        These fields identify the connection, similar to the
        corresponding fields in TCP and UDP.  The Source Port represents
        the relevant port on the endpoint that sent this packet, the
        Destination Port the relevant port on the other endpoint.

    Data Offset: 8 bits
        The offset from the start of the DCCP header to the beginning of
        the packet's payload, measured in 32-bit words.

    CCVal: 4 bits
        This field is reserved for use by the sending CCID.  In
        particular, the A-to-B CCID's sender, which is active at DCCP A,
        MAY send information to the receiver at DCCP B by encoding that
        information in CCVal.  If the relevant CCID does not specify its
        value, it MUST be set to zero.

    Checksum Coverage (CsCov): 4 bits
        The Checksum Coverage field specifies what parts of the packet
        are covered by the Checksum field, as follows:

        CsCov = 0
            Checksum covers the DCCP header, DCCP options, network-layer
            pseudoheader (described below), and the entire DCCP payload,
            possibly padded on the right with zeros to an even number of
            bytes.

        CsCov = 1-15
            Checksum covers the DCCP header, DCCP options, network-layer
            pseudoheader, and the initial (CsCov-1)*4 bytes of the DCCP
            payload.

        Thus, if CsCov is 1, none of the DCCP payload is protected by
        the header checksum.  The value (CsCov-1)*4 MUST be less than or
        equal to the length of the DCCP payload.  Packets with invalid
        CsCov values MUST be ignored; in particular, their options MUST
        NOT be processed.  The meanings of values other than 0 and 1
        should be considered experimental.

        Values other than 0 specify that corruption is acceptable in
        some or all of the DCCP packet's payload.  In fact, DCCP cannot
        even detect corruption in areas not covered by the header
        checksum, unless the Payload Checksum option is used (Section
        8.8). Applications should not make any assumptions about the
        correctness of received data not covered by the checksum, and
        should if necessary introduce their own appropriate validity
        checks.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.1.  [Page 23]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


        A DCCP application interface should let sending applications
        suggest a value for CsCov for sent packets, defaulting to 0
        (full coverage).  It should also let receiving applications
        refuse delivery of packets with checksum coverage less than a
        value provided by the application; by default, only packets with
        fully-covered payloads should be accepted.  Lower layers that
        support partial error detection MAY use the Checksum Coverage
        field as a hint of where errors do not need to be detected.
        Lower layers MUST use a strong error detection mechanism to
        detect at least errors that occur in the sensitive part of the
        packet, and discard damaged packets.  The sensitive part
        consists of the bytes between the first byte of the IP header
        and the last byte identified by Checksum Coverage.  For more
        details on application and lower-layer interface issues relating
        to partial checksumming, see [UDP-LITE], from which this text
        was summarized.

        See Appendix B.1 for further motivation of partial checksums and
        discussion of partial checksumming issues.  Partial checksums
        introduce some security considerations, which are described in
        Section 16.2. DCCP partial checksumming was inspired by UDP-Lite
        [UDP-LITE].

    Checksum: 16 bits
        DCCP uses the TCP/IP checksum algorithm.  The Checksum field
        equals the 16 bit one's complement of the one's complement sum
        of all 16 bit words in the DCCP header, DCCP options, a
        pseudoheader taken from the network-layer header, and, depending
        on the value of the Checksum Coverage field, some or all of the
        payload.  When calculating the checksum, the Checksum field
        itself is treated as 0.  If a packet contains an odd number of
        header and text bytes to be checksummed, 8 zero bits are added
        on the right to form a 16 bit word for checksum purposes.  The
        pad byte is not transmitted as part of the packet.

        The pseudoheader is calculated as for TCP.  For IPv4, it is 96
        bits long, and consists of the IPv4 source and destination
        addresses, the IP protocol number for DCCP (padded on the left
        with 8 zero bits), and the DCCP length as a 16-bit quantity (the
        length of the DCCP header with options, plus the length of any
        data); see Section 3.1 of [RFC 793]. For IPv6, it is 320 bits
        long, and consists of the IPv6 source and destination addresses,
        the DCCP length as a 32-bit quantity, and the IP protocol number
        for DCCP (padded on the left with 24 zero bits); see Section 8.1
        of [RFC 2460].

        Packets with invalid header checksums MUST be ignored.  In
        particular, their options MUST NOT be processed.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.1.  [Page 24]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Type: 4 bits
        The type field specifies the type of the DCCP message.  The
        following values are defined:

        0   DCCP-Request packet.

        1   DCCP-Response packet.

        2   DCCP-Data packet.

        3   DCCP-Ack packet.

        4   DCCP-DataAck packet.

        5   DCCP-CloseReq packet.

        6   DCCP-Close packet.

        7   DCCP-Reset packet.

        8   DCCP-Move packet.

        9   DCCP-Sync packet.

        10-15
            Reserved.

    Extended Sequence Numbers (X): 1 bit
        This bit is set to one to indicate the use of an extended
        generic header with 48-bit Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers.
        The format described in the section has X set to zero.  Section
        5.3 describes the extended generic header.

    Number of Non-Data Packets (# NDP): 3 bits
        DCCP sets this field to the number of non-data packets it has
        sent so far on its sequence, modulo 8  A non-data packet is
        simply any packet not containing user data; DCCP-Ack, DCCP-
        Close, DCCP-CloseReq, and DCCP-Reset are always non-data
        packets, while DCCP-Request, DCCP-Response, and DCCP-Move might
        or might not be.  When sending a non-data packet, DCCP
        increments the # NDP counter before storing its value in the
        packet header.

        This field can help the receiving DCCP decide whether a lost
        packet contained any user data.  (An application may want to
        know when it has lost data.  DCCP could report every packet loss
        as a potential data loss, but that would cause false loss
        reports when non-data packets were lost.)  For example, say that



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.1.  [Page 25]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


        packet 10 had # NDP set to 5; packet 11 was lost; and packet 12
        had # NDP set to 5.  Then the receiving DCCP could deduce that
        packet 11 contained data, since # NDP did not change.  Likewise,
        if # NDP had gone up to 6 (and packet 12 contained user data),
        then packet 11 must not have contained any data.

        # NDP can overflow, causing ambiguities.  For example, if 8
        packets are dropped in a row but # NDP does not change, the
        receiver will not be able to tell whether or not any of the lost
        packets contained data.  Thus, applications SHOULD NOT depend on
        the availability of unambiguous # NDP information.  DCCP itself
        uses # NDP only as a hint of when a connection has left
        unidirectional mode; potential ambiguities are not harmful
        there.

    Sequence Number: 24 bits
        The sequence number field is initialized by a DCCP-Request or
        DCCP-Response packet, and increases by one (modulo 16777216)
        with every packet sent.  The receiver uses this information to
        determine whether packet losses have occurred.  Even packets
        containing no data update the sequence number.  Sequence numbers
        also provide some protection against old and malicious packets
        and half-open connections; see Section 5.2 on sequence number
        validity.

        The two subflows' initial sequence numbers are set by the first
        DCCP-Request and DCCP-Response packets sent, and SHOULD be
        chosen as for TCP.  In particular, initial sequence number
        choice MUST include a random or pseudorandom component to make
        it harder for attackers to complete sequence number attacks [RFC
        1948]. The initial sequence number chosen for a given connection
        identifier (source address and port plus destination address and
        port) SHOULD increase over time, as TCP suggests [RFC 793], to
        prevent inappropriate delivery of old packets.

        If the header's X bit equals one, the Sequence Number field
        extends for another 24 bits for a total of 48.  Very-high-rate
        connections SHOULD use these extended 48-bit sequence numbers to
        protect against wrapped sequence numbers; see Section 5.3.

    Many packet types also carry an Acknowledgement Number in the four
    bytes following the generic header.  Its format is as follows:

     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.1.  [Page 26]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Acknowledgement Number: 24 bits
        The Acknowledgement Number field acknowledges the greatest valid
        sequence number received so far on this connection.  ("Greatest"
        is, of course, measured in circular sequence space.)
        Acknowledgement numbers make no attempt to provide precise
        information about which packets have arrived; options such as
        the Ack Vector do this.

        The Acknowledgement Number MUST correspond to a "received"
        packet, where a packet is classified as "received" if and only
        if its options were processed by the receiving DCCP.  (This
        means, for example, that received packets must be both header-
        checksum-valid and sequence-valid.)  Even "received" packets may
        have their payloads dropped, due to receive buffer overflow or
        payload corruption, for instance.  The HC-Receiver will send
        Data Dropped options when this happens (see Section 8.7); the
        HC-Sender will reduce its sending rate or congestion window as
        appropriate.  This issue is discussed further in Sections 8.5
        and 8.7.

        If the header's X bit equals one, the Acknowledgement Number
        field extends for another 24 bits for a total of 48.  Again, see
        Section 5.3.

    Reserved: 8 bits
        The version of DCCP specified here MUST ignore this field on
        received packets, and MUST set it to all zeroes on generated
        packets.

5.2.  Sequence Number Synchronization

    DCCP implementations must react to packets that are not intended for
    the current connection.  This can happen if the network delivers an
    old packet, if an attacker attempts to hijack a connection, during
    the cleanup of a half-open connection, or for other reasons.  DCCP,
    like TCP, uses sequence number checks and Reset packets to defend
    against these packets.  Every DCCP packet sent uses a new sequence
    number, however; thus, given large enough bursts of loss, a
    connection's endpoints might get out of sync relative to any window,
    requiring a mechanism to restore synchronization.  This section
    describes the algorithms that determine when DCCP packets are
    intended for the current connection, and the actions taken on
    unintended packets.

5.2.1.  Variables

    DCCP sequence number synchronization depends on the following
    variables, which are maintained by each endpoint.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 5.2.1.  [Page 27]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    GSS The Greatest Sequence Number Sent by this endpoint so far.
        ("Greatest" is of course measured in circular sequence space.)

    GSR The Greatest Sequence Number Received from the other endpoint so
        far.

    GAR (Optional) The Greatest Acknowledgement Number Received from the
        other endpoint so far.

    Some other variables are derived from these primitives.

    SWL and SWR
        (Sequence Number Window Left and Right)  The two endpoints of
        the window within which Sequence Numbers are appropriate.

    AWL and AWR
        (Acknowledgement Number Window Left and Right)  The two
        endpoints of the window within which Acknowledgement Numbers are
        appropriate.

5.2.2.  Appropriate Sequence Numbers

    A sequence number S is appropriate iff SWL <= S <= SWR in circular
    sequence space.  This resembles TCP's receive window.  However, in
    DCCP, sequence numbers change with each packet sent, even pure
    acknowledgements.  Thus, a loss event that dropped many consecutive
    packets could cause two DCCPs to get out of sync relative to any
    window, and a packet beyond the window is not necessarily a hard
    error.  DCCP-Sync packets help in this situation.

    DCCP A sets SWL and SWR to a loss window of W consecutive sequence
    numbers containing GSR.  ("Consecutive", like "greatest", is
    measured in circular sequence space.)  One-third of the loss window,
    rounded down, is placed at and before GSR, with two-thirds after
    GSR.  Sequence numbers outside this loss window are inappropriate.

     inapprop. |    appropriate Sequence Numbers    | inapprop.
    <---------*|*===========*======================*|*--------->
          GSR -|GSR + 1 -   GSR                GSR +|GSR + 1 +
     floor(W/3)|floor(W/3)                ceil(2W/3)|ceil(2W/3)
                = SWL                          = SWR


    During connection startup, DCCP A MUST adjust SWL so that it is not
    less than DCCP B's initial sequence number.

    DCCP B informs DCCP A of W, the loss window width DCCP A should use,
    via the Loss Window feature (Section 6.10). W defaults to 1000, but



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 5.2.2.  [Page 28]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    a proper value should reflect how many packets the sender expects to
    be in flight.  Only the sender can anticipate this number.  Too-
    small values increase the risk of the endpoints getting out sync
    after bursts of loss; too-large values increase the risk of
    connection hijacking.  One good guideline is to set it to about 3 or
    4 times the maximum number of packets the sender expects to send in
    a round-trip time.  This value may not be available at connection
    initiation, when the round-trip time is unknown, but the sender can
    always send updates as the connection progresses.

5.2.3.  Appropriate Acknowledgement Numbers

    The Acknowledgement Number on a packet from DCCP B is appropriate
    iff it lies within the window [AWL, AWR], where AWR = GSS, and the
    window is W' packets wide.  W' is the value of DCCP A's Loss Window
    feature, which it defined in its role as HC-Sender for the other
    half-connection.

     inapprop. | appropriate Acknowledgement Numbers | inapprop.
    <---------*|*===================================*|*---------->
       GSS - W'|GSS - W' + 1                      GSS|GSS + 1
                = AWL                           = AWR


    During connection startup, DCCP A MUST adjust AWL so that it is not
    less than its initial sequence number.

5.2.4.  Sequence-Validity By State

    A packet is called sequence-valid when its sequence numbers indicate
    that it is intended for the current connection.  The rules for
    sequence-validity depend on the state of the connection.  The
    baseline rules for sequence-validity are as follows:

    CLOSED and LISTEN states
        All packets are sequence-valid (but most packet types will cause
        a Reset to be generated by later validity checks).

    REQUEST state
        A packet is sequence-valid if and only if it has an appropriate
        Acknowledgement Number.

    All other states

        (1) DCCP-Data packets are sequence-valid if and only if their
            Sequence Numbers are appropriate.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 5.2.4.  [Page 29]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


        (2) DCCP-Sync and DCCP-Reset packets are sequence-valid if and
            only if their Acknowledgement Numbers are appropriate.

        (3) The sequence-validity of DCCP-Move packets is discussed in
            Section 5.10.

        (4) All other packets are sequence-valid if and only if both
            their Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers are appropriate.

    DCCP implementations MAY implement additional checks to protect
    against packets that have valid sequence numbers, but are not part
    of this connection.  The additional checks provide an incremental
    security advantage at a moderate complexity cost.

    o DCCP-Reset packets may not have valid Sequence Numbers because
      they might be generated by a closed connection in response to
      DCCP-Data packets, which have no Acknowledgement Number.  However,
      DCCP implementations MUST supply a valid Sequence Number when one
      is available (either from connection information or the
      Acknowledgement Number), and use Sequence Number 0 otherwise.
      Thus, valid DCCP-Reset packets fall into two categories: Either
      they contain an appropriate Sequence Number, or they have Sequence
      Number 0 and their Acknowledgement Number corresponds to a DCCP-
      Request or DCCP-Data packet.  Implementations that check this
      invariant MUST ignore DCCP-Resets that don't fit.  (Do not, for
      example, send a DCCP-Sync in response to such a Reset.)

    o DCCP implementations transition to CLOSED state after sending a
      DCCP-Reset packet, and will not send further non-Reset packets on
      that connection.  Therefore, valid DCCP-Reset packets have
      Sequence Numbers greater than GSR (except for those with Sequence
      Number 0, as mentioned above), and Acknowledgement Numbers greater
      than or equal to GAR.  Again, implementations that check this
      invariant MUST ignore DCCP-Resets that don't fit.

    o Implementations that can detect duplicate sequence numbers within
      the current Loss Window should ignore duplicate packets.  (Of
      course, sequence number space can wrap; this refers to packets
      whose sequence numbers have recently been seen.)

    o DCCP-Sync packets with Sequence Number less than GSR, or with
      Acknowledgement Number less than GAR, are stale and MUST be
      ignored when detected.

    Implementing these checks should not cause interoperability
    problems, but augmenting the list with additional ad-hoc checks is
    NOT RECOMMENDED.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 5.2.4.  [Page 30]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


5.2.5.  Handling Sequence-Invalid Packets

    Sequence-invalid DCCP-Move, DCCP-Reset, and DCCP-Sync packets MUST
    be ignored.

    Otherwise, on receiving a sequence-invalid packet, a DCCP endpoint
    (say DCCP A) MUST reply with a DCCP-Sync packet, as allowed by the
    congestion control mechanism in use.  This packet MUST acknowledge
    the packet's Sequence Number (not GSR!).  Any DCCP-Sync MUST use a
    new Sequence Number, and thus will increase GSS; GSR will not
    change, however, since the packet was sequence-invalid.  DCCP A MUST
    NOT otherwise process sequence-invalid packets.

    On receiving the DCCP-Sync, DCCP B will update its GSR variable and
    reply with a DCCP-Sync of its own.  When DCCP A receives this DCCP-
    Sync, which acknowledges its DCCP-Sync (and is therefore sequence-
    valid), it will update its GSR variable, thus getting the endpoints
    back into sync.  Alternatively, if the connection was half-open,
    DCCP B will send a Reset.

    To protect itself against denial-of-service attacks (where an
    attacker sends purposefully invalid packets, thereby forcing the
    receiver to send DCCP-Syncs), a DCCP implementation MAY ignore
    packets with inappropriate Sequence Numbers if the connection is
    still active.  By "ignore", we mean that the packet is discarded
    without sending a DCCP-Sync.  A connection is "active" when
    appropriate Sequence Numbers have been recently received; "recently"
    might mean within the last second or the last RTT, whichever is
    shorter.

    Similarly, a DCCP MAY rate-limit the DCCP-Syncs sent in response to
    sequence-invalid packets.

5.2.6.  Examples

    In this first example, DCCP A and DCCP B recover from a large burst
    of loss that runs DCCP A's sequence numbers out of DCCP B's
    appropriate sequence number window.













Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 5.2.6.  [Page 31]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


                    Recovery from Burst of Loss
    DCCP A                                            DCCP B
    (GSS=1,GSR=10)                                    (GSS=10,GSR=1)
               --->   DCCP-Data(seq 2)     XXX
                          ...
               --->   DCCP-Data(seq 100)   XXX
               --->   DCCP-Data(seq 101)           --->  ???
                                                      seqno out of range;
                                                      send Sync
       OK      <---   DCCP-Sync(seq 11, ack 101)   <---
                                                      (GSS=11,GSR=1)
               --->   DCCP-Sync(seq 102, ack 11)   --->   OK
    (GSS=102,GSR=11)                                  (GSS=11,GSR=102)


    In this example, a DCCP connection recovers from a simple attack.
    The attacker cannot guess sequence numbers.  (DCCP is not robust to
    attackers who can guess sequence numbers.)

                        Recovery from Attack
    DCCP A                                            DCCP B
    (GSS=1,GSR=10)                                    (GSS=10,GSR=1)
                 *ATTACKER*  --->  DCCP-Data(seq 10^6)  --->  ???
                                                      seqno out of range;
                                                      send Sync
       ???     <---   DCCP-Sync(seq 11, ack 10^6)   <---
    ackno out of range; ignore
    (GSS=1,GSR=10)                                    (GSS=11,GSR=1)


    The final example demonstrates recovery from a half-open connection.

                   Recovery from a Half-Open Connection
    DCCP A                                            DCCP B
    (GSS=1,GSR=10)                                    (GSS=10,GSR=1)
    (Crash)
    CLOSED                                               OPEN
    REQUEST    --->   DCCP-Request(seq 400)       --->   ???
    !!         <---   DCCP-Sync(seq 11, ack 400)  <---   OPEN
    REQUEST    --->   DCCP-Reset(seq 401, ack 11) --->   (Abort)
    REQUEST                                    CLOSED
    REQUEST    --->   DCCP-Request(seq 402)       --->   ...


5.3.  Extended Sequence Numbers

    A 10 Gb/s flow of 1500-byte DCCP packets will send 2^24 packets in
    about 20 seconds.  This is a long time, in terms of likely round-



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.3.  [Page 32]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    trip times that could possibly achieve such a sustained rate, but it
    is not without risk.  DCCP's current congestion control mechanisms
    are designed for congestion windows (or equivalents) of at most a
    few hundred thousand packets, leaving at least 32 RTTs before 24-bit
    sequence numbers wrap.  However, very-high rate connections SHOULD
    use extended sequence numbers to gain more protection.

    DCCP extended sequence numbers are activated when the header's X bit
    is set to one.  This extends the Sequence Number and Acknowledgement
    Number fields by an additional 24 bits, for a total of 48 bits.  A
    flow of 1500-byte DCCP packets would have to send more than 28
    petabits per second to overflow 48-bit sequence numbers within the
    2-minute maximum segment lifetime.  The 48-bit numbers are stored in
    network order, with most significant bit first.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          Source Port          |           Dest Port           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Data Offset  | CCVal | CsCov |           Checksum            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type  |1|# NDP|         Sequence Number (high bits)           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |           Sequence Number (low bits)          |  Reserved   |T|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

    All packet types except for DCCP-Data and DCCP-Request will follow
    this generic header with an extended Acknowledgement Number:

     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |      Acknowledgement Number (high bits)       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


    Once an endpoint has sent any packet with 48-bit sequence numbers
    (X=1), it MUST send all succeeding packets with 48-bit sequence
    numbers.  Furthermore, once an endpoint has received any packet with
    48-bit sequence numbers, it MUST either send all succeeding packets
    with 48-bit sequence numbers, or reset the connection with Reason
    set to "Extended Sequence Numbers" (15).

    Clients SHOULD decide whether to use extended sequence numbers
    before sending their DCCP-Requests.  That is, connections SHOULD NOT
    transition from 24-bit to 48-bit sequence numbers; they SHOULD
    contain only 24-bit sequence numbers, or only 48-bit sequence



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.3.  [Page 33]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    numbers.  The Transition bit (T) supports transitioning to extended
    sequence numbers during an active connection, however, in case this
    proves necessary; see below.

    Extended sequence numbers are treated simply as longer sequence
    numbers.  For instance, the sequence-validity mechanisms work the
    same way whether or not sequence numbers are extended.  Care is
    required when comparing a 24-bit sequence number with an 48-bit
    sequence number; see below.

    Extended sequence numbers improve security against attackers by
    making it harder to guess a valid sequence number, as well as
    protecting against benign wrapping.

5.3.1.  Transitioning to Extended Sequence Numbers

    The Transition bit (T) following the extended Sequence Number field
    makes it possible to transition to 48-bit sequence numbers in the
    middle of a connection.  T is set to one only during such a
    transition.  When DCCP A switches to 48-bit sequence numbers, it
    MUST set the T bit to one on all of its packets for some period.
    This period SHOULD last on the order of a few round trip times, or
    until DCCP A receives an acknowledgement from DCCP B proving that
    one of its 48-bit-sequence-number packets has been received,
    whichever comes later.

    Each DCCP MUST choose its first 48-bit sequence number to have its
    lower 24 bits equal the 24-bit sequence number it expected to send
    (GSS+1).  If DCCP A sends an extended packet containing an
    Acknowledgement Number before DCCP B sends it a 48-bit Sequence
    Number, DCCP A may send any value for the upper 24 bits of that
    Acknowledgement Number, but the lower 24 bits MUST equal the
    expected 24-bit Acknowledgement Number (GSR).  Furthermore, DCCP A
    MUST leave GSR as a 24-bit number until receiving an extended packet
    from DCCP B.  If DCCP B transitions to extended sequence numbers
    because it receives a valid packet with extended sequence numbers,
    it MAY set the upper 24 bits of its extended sequence number based
    on the upper 24 bits of the received Acknowledgement Number, but it
    can also choose a different upper 24 bits.

    Switching to 48-bit sequence numbers in the middle of a connection
    raises the issue of comparing a 24-bit sequence number with a 48-bit
    sequence number.  (This may also occur if the network delivers a
    packet from an old connection, or given a malicious attacker.)  Let
    P be the packet sequence number received from DCCP B, and E be the
    sequence number DCCP A expects.  During sequence-validity
    computations, for example, P might be the packet's Acknowledgement
    Number and E might be AWL, the left edge of the appropriate



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 5.3.1.  [Page 34]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    acknowledgement number window.  Then DCCP A should perform the
    comparison as follows.

    o If P and E are both 24 bits, compare them modulo 2^24.

    o If P and E are both 48 bits, the packet's Transition bit is set,
      and the last packet sent by DCCP A had its Transition bit set,
      then compare P and E modulo 2^24.  This covers the case where both
      endpoints transitioned simultaneously, so P and E's upper 24 bits
      might disagree.

    o Otherwise, if P and E are both 48 bits, compare them modulo 2^48.

    o If P is 48 bits but E is 24, the remote DCCP may want to
      transition to extended sequence numbers.  If the packet's
      Transition bit is not set, the packet is definitely sequence-
      invalid; otherwise, compare P with E modulo 2^24.  If the packet
      proves sequence-valid, then it is OK; transition to extended
      sequence numbers, and set E according to the full 48 bits of P.
      If the packet does not prove sequence-valid, send an (extended)
      DCCP-Sync as required (with T set to one), but do not yet
      transition to extended sequence numbers.

    o If P is 24 bits but E is 48, there may have been benign packet
      reordering.  The correct action depends on whether the last packet
      seen from the remote DCCP had the Transition bit set.

      o If Transition was not set, then the packet is sequence-invalid;
        send an (extended) DCCP-Sync as required.

      o If Transition was set, extend P to a 48-bit value P'.  First,
        let EH equal the upper 24 bits of E, and EL equal the lower 24
        bits of E.  Then:

          If  EL > P,  set  P' = (EH << 24) | P.
          Otherwise,   set  P' = (((EH - 1) mod 2^24) << 24) | P.

        If the packet proves sequence-valid when comparing with P'
        modulo 2^48, then it is OK; the packet was reordered from before
        the transition.  If it does not, send an (extended) DCCP-Sync
        (with T set to one) as required.

    DCCP implementations can, of course, avoid most of this complexity
    by disallowing transitions to extended sequence numbers (and by
    resetting the connection when the other endpoint attempts such a
    transition).  Connections that use 48-bit sequence numbers
    throughout, starting with the DCCP-Request, MUST have T set to zero
    on all their packets.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 5.3.1.  [Page 35]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


5.4.  DCCP State Diagram

    In this section we present a DCCP state diagram showing how a DCCP
    connection should progress, and the proper responses for packets or
    timeout events in various connection states.  The state diagram is
    illustrative; the text should be considered definitive.


                    +----------------------------------+
                    | Figure omitted from text version |
                    +----------------------------------+


    All receive events on the diagram represent receipt of sequence-
    valid packets with correct header checksums.  For example, receiving
    a Reset with a bad Acknowledgement Number MUST NOT cause DCCP to
    transition to the TIME-WAIT state.  DCCP implementations SHOULD send
    Acks as described above in response to sequence-invalid packets.

    Otherwise-valid packets without explicit transitions in the state
    diagram SHOULD be treated according to the table below.  Particular
    actions are "OK", meaning the packet MUST be processed according to
    this document; "Rst", meaning the receiver SHOULD respond with a
    (possibly rate-limited) Reset; and "-", meaning the packet SHOULD be
    ignored.  Entries may take the form "Old/New", where "Old" applies
    to old packets and "New" to new packets (whose sequence numbers are
    greater than GSR, the greatest valid sequence number seen so far).

                                     Data/Ack/
                                     DataAck/                   Reset/
    State          Request  Response Move     CloseReq Close    Sync
    -------------  -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
    CLOSED          Rst      Rst      Rst      Rst      Rst       OK
    LISTEN          OK       Rst      Rst(1)   Rst      Rst       OK
    REQUEST         Rst      OK       Rst      Rst      Rst       OK
    RESPOND         -/OK     Rst      Rst/OK   Rst      OK        OK
    SERVER-OPEN     -/Rst    Rst      OK       Rst      OK        OK
    CLIENT-OPEN     Rst      -/Rst    OK       OK       OK        OK
    CLOSEREQ        -/Rst    Rst      OK       Rst      OK        OK
    CLOSING         Rst      -/Rst    OK       OK       OK        OK
    TIME-WAIT       Rst      Rst      Rst      Rst      Rst       OK


    Again, we note that the table only applies to valid packets.
    Sequence-invalid packets SHOULD be treated as described above.

    A DCCP endpoint that implements the Init Cookie option (Section 6.6)
    may change the Reset action marked (1).  Init Cookie lets the server



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.4.  [Page 36]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    package all state for a requested connection into an option that the
    client will echo.  A server with Init Cookie need not implement the
    RESPOND state.  Instead, it may reply to each DCCP-Request packet
    with a DCCP-Response containing an Init Cookie.  When a DCCP-Data,
    Ack, or DataAck packet carrying a valid Init Cookie arrives from the
    client, the server will move directly from LISTEN to OPEN.  Like TCP
    SYN cookies [SYNCOOKIES], Init Cookies let servers avoid keeping any
    state for clients whose addresses have not been verified.

    A DCCP endpoint in the CLOSED or LISTEN state may not have a proper
    sequence number available to send a Reset.  In these cases, it MUST
    set the Reset's Sequence Number to zero.  Resets sent in the CLOSED,
    LISTEN, and TIME-WAIT states SHOULD use Reset Reason "No
    Connection"; other Resets SHOULD use Reason "Invalid Packet".  A
    DCCP MAY send Resets not listed in the diagram if it detects an
    inconsistency---for example, if it receives two DCCP packets with
    the same sequence number, but different packet types.

    The Open state does not signify that a DCCP connection is ready for
    data transfer.  In particular, incomplete feature negotiations might
    prevent data transfer.  Feature negotiation takes place in parallel
    with the state transitions on this diagram.

    Only the server may take the transition from the OPEN state to the
    CLOSEREQ state.  (The server is the DCCP endpoint that began in the
    LISTEN state.)  Similarly, only the client must transition to CLOSE
    after receiving a CloseReq packet.

5.5.  DCCP-Request Packet Format

    A DCCP connection is initiated by sending a DCCP-Request packet.
    The format of a DCCP request packet is:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                   with Type=0 (DCCP-Request)                  /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                         Service Code                          |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             data                              |
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.5.  [Page 37]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Service Code: 32 bits
        The Service Code field describes the service to which the sender
        is trying to connect.  Service Codes are 32-bit numbers
        allocated by IANA; they are meant to correspond to application
        services and protocols, such as FTP and HTTP, and are not
        intended to be DCCP-specific.  With Service Codes, stateful
        middleboxes, such as firewalls, can identify the application
        running on a nonstandard port (assuming the DCCP header has not
        been encrypted).  A Service Code of zero is a wildcard, matching
        any service.  The host operating system MAY force every DCCP
        socket, both actively and passively opened, to specify a nonzero
        Service Code.  Connection requests MUST fail if the Destination
        Port on the receiver has a different Service Code from that
        given in the packet, and both Service Codes are nonzero.  In
        this case, the receiver will respond with a DCCP-Reset packet
        (with Reason set to "Bad Service Code").  A server or stateful
        middlebox MAY also send a "Bad Service Code" DCCP-Reset in
        response to packets whose Service Code is considered unsuitable.

    Options
        DCCP-Request packets will usually include a "Change R(Connection
        Nonce)" option, to inform the server of the client's connection
        nonce; see Section 6.5.

    The client MAY send new DCCP-Request packets if no response is
    received after some timeout.  The retransmission strategy SHOULD be
    similar to that for retransmitting TCP SYNs; for instance, a first
    timeout on the order of a second, with an exponential backoff timer.
    Each retransmission MUST increment the Sequence Number, and possibly
    # NDP, by one.

    A client MAY decide to give up after some number of DCCP-Requests.
    If so, it SHOULD send a DCCP-Reset packet to the server, to clean up
    state in case one or more of the Requests actually arrived.  The
    DCCP-Reset SHOULD have Reason set to "Aborted".

5.6.  DCCP-Response Packet Format

    In the second phase of the three-way handshake, the server sends a
    DCCP-Response message to the client.  In this phase, a server will
    often specify the options it would like to use, either from among
    those the client requested, or in addition to those.  Among these
    options is the congestion control mechanism the server expects to
    use.







Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.6.  [Page 38]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                  with Type=1 (DCCP-Response)                  /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
    (+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+)Iff
    (|       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |)X=1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             data                              |
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


    Acknowledgement Number: 24 bits
        In the case of a DCCP-Response packet, the Acknowledgement
        Number field will equal the sequence number from the
        corresponding DCCP-Request.

    Options
        The Data Dropped and Init Cookie options are particularly useful
        for DCCP-Response packets (Sections 8.7 and 6.6). In addition,
        DCCP-Response, or early DCCP-Data or DCCP-Ack packets, may
        include "Confirm L(Connection Nonce)" and "Change R(Connection
        Nonce)" options, to negotiate connection nonces (Section 6.5),
        as well as options to negotiate CCIDs and other relevant
        features.

    The receiver MAY respond to a DCCP-Request packet with a DCCP-Reset
    packet to refuse the connection.  Relevant Reset Reasons for
    refusing a connection include "Connection Refused", when the DCCP-
    Request's Destination Port did not correspond to a DCCP port open
    for listening; "Bad Service Code", when the DCCP-Request's Service
    Code did not correspond to the service code registered with the
    Destination Port; and "Too Busy", when the server is currently too
    busy to respond to requests.  The server SHOULD limit the rate at
    which it generates these resets.

    The receiver SHOULD NOT retransmit DCCP-Response packets; the sender
    will retransmit the DCCP-Request if necessary.  (Note that the
    "retransmitted" DCCP-Request will have, at least, a different
    sequence number from the "original" DCCP-Request; the receiver can
    thus distinguish true retransmissions from network duplicates.)  The
    responder will detect that the retransmitted DCCP-Request applies to
    an existing connection because of its Source and Destination Ports.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.6.  [Page 39]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Every valid DCCP-Request received while the server is in the RESPOND
    state MUST elicit a new DCCP-Response.  Each new DCCP-Response MUST
    increment the responder's Sequence Number, and possibly # NDP, by
    one.

    The responder SHOULD NOT accept any data accompanying a
    retransmitted DCCP-Request.  In particular, the DCCP-Response sent
    in reply to a retransmitted DCCP-Request with data SHOULD contain a
    Data Dropped option, in which the retransmitted DCCP-Request is
    reported as "data dropped due to protocol constraints" (Drop Code
    0).  The original DCCP-Request SHOULD also be reported in the Data
    Dropped option, either in a Normal Block (if the responder accepted
    the data, or there was no data), or in a Drop Code 0 Drop Block (if
    the responder refused the data the first time as well).

5.7.  DCCP-Data, DCCP-Ack, and DCCP-DataAck Packet Formats

    The payload of a DCCP connection is sent in DCCP-Data and DCCP-
    DataAck packets, and DCCP-Ack packets are used for acknowledgements
    when there is no payload to be sent.  DCCP-Data packets look like
    this:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                    with Type=2 (DCCP-Data)                    /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             data                              |
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


    DCCP-Ack packets dispense with the data, but contain an
    acknowledgement number:














Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.7.  [Page 40]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                    with Type=3 (DCCP-Ack)                     /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
    (+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+)Iff
    (|       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |)X=1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


    DCCP-DataAck packets contain both data and an acknowledgement
    number: acknowledgement information is piggybacked on a data packet.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                  with Type=4 (DCCP-DataAck)                   /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
    (+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+)Iff
    (|       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |)X=1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             data                              |
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


    A DCCP-Data or DCCP-DataAck packet may contain no data bytes if the
    application sends a zero-length datagram.

    DCCP A sends DCCP-Data and DCCP-DataAck packets to DCCP B due to
    application events on host A.  These packets are congestion-
    controlled by the CCID for the A-to-B half-connection.  In contrast,
    DCCP-Ack packets sent by DCCP A are controlled by the CCID for the
    B-to-A half-connection.  Generally, DCCP A will piggyback
    acknowledgement information on data packets when acceptable,
    creating DCCP-DataAck packets.  DCCP-Ack packets are used when there
    is no data to send from DCCP A to DCCP B, or when the congestion
    state of the A-to-B CCID will not allow data to be sent.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.7.  [Page 41]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    DCCP-Ack and DCCP-DataAck packets often include additional
    acknowledgement options, such as Ack Vector, as required by the
    congestion control mechanism in use.

    Section 8, below, describes acknowledgements in DCCP.


5.8.  DCCP-CloseReq and DCCP-Close Packet Format

    The DCCP-CloseReq and DCCP-Close packets have the same format except
    for Type.  However, only the server can send a DCCP-CloseReq packet.
    Either client or server may send a DCCP-Close packet.  The receiver
    of a valid DCCP-Close packet SHOULD respond with a DCCP-Reset
    packet, with Reason set to "Closed"; the endpoint that originally
    sent the DCCP-Close will hold Time-Wait state.  The receiver of a
    valid DCCP-CloseReq packet SHOULD respond with a DCCP-Close packet;
    that receiving endpoint will expect to hold Time-Wait state after
    later receiving a DCCP-Reset.


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /           with Type=5 or 6 (DCCP-CloseReq or Close)           /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
    (+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+)Iff
    (|       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |)X=1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




5.9.  DCCP-Reset Packet Format

    DCCP-Reset packets unconditionally shut down a connection.  Every
    normal connection ends with a DCCP-Reset, but resets may be sent for
    other reasons, including bad port numbers, bad option behavior,
    incorrect ECN Nonce Echoes, and so forth.  The reason for a reset is
    represented by an eight-bit number, the Reason field, and 24 bits of
    additional data.  The endpoint that receives a valid DCCP-Reset
    packet will hold Time-Wait state for the connection.  The optional
    DCCP-Reset payload, if present, is a human-readable text string,
    preferably in English and encoded in Unicode UTF-8, that describes
    the error in more detail.  DCCP-Reset packets MUST NOT be generated



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.9.  [Page 42]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    in response to received DCCP-Reset packets.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                   with Type=7 (DCCP-Reset)                    /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
    (+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+)Iff
    (|       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |)X=1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |    Reason     |    Data 1     |    Data 2     |    Data 3     |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                          error text                           |
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


    Reason: 8 bits
        The Reason field represents the reason that the sender reset the
        DCCP connection.

    Data 1, Data 2, and Data 3: 8 bits each
        The Data fields provide additional information about why the
        sender reset the DCCP connection.  The meanings of these fields
        depend on the value of Reason.

    The following Reasons are currently defined.  The "Data" columns
    describe what the Data fields should contain for a given Reason.  In
    those columns, N/A means the Data field SHOULD be set to 0 by the
    sender of the DCCP-Reset, and ignored by its receiver.

















Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 5.9.  [Page 43]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


                                                               Section
         Reason  Name                   Data 1 Data 2 Data 3  Reference
         ------  ----                   ------ ------ ------  ---------
            0    Unspecified             N/A    N/A    N/A
            1    Closed                  N/A    N/A    N/A      3.2
            2    Invalid Packet         packet  N/A    N/A      5.4
                                         type
            3    Option Error           option  option data
                                        number   (if any)
            4    Feature Error         feature  feature data
                                        number   (if any)
            5    Connection Refused      N/A    N/A    N/A      5.6
            6    Bad Service Code        N/A    N/A    N/A      5.5
            7    Too Busy                N/A    N/A    N/A      5.6
            8    Bad Init Cookie         N/A    N/A    N/A      6.6
           10    Unanswered Challenge    N/A    N/A    N/A      6.5.4
           11    Fruitless Negotiation feature  feature data    6.4.8
                                        number   (optional)
           12    Aggression Penalty      N/A    N/A    N/A      9.2
           13    No Connection           N/A    N/A    N/A      5.4
           14    Aborted                 N/A    N/A    N/A      5.4
           15    Extended Seqnos         N/A    N/A    N/A      5.3
           16    Mandatory Failure      option  option data     6.3
                                        number   (if any)
          17-127 Reserved
         128-255 CCID-specific reasons    ... variable ...      7.4


    A DCCP-Reset packet completes every DCCP connection, whether the
    termination is clean (due to application close; Reset Reason
    "Closed") or unclean.  Unlike TCP, which has two distinct
    termination mechanisms (FIN and RST), DCCP ends all connections in a
    uniform manner.  This is justified because some responses to
    connection termination close are the same no matter whether
    termination was clean.  For instance, the endpoint that receives a
    valid DCCP-Reset should hold Time-Wait state for the connection.
    Processors that must distinguish between clean and unclean
    termination can examine the Reset Reason.

    DCCP implementations MUST transition to the CLOSED state after
    sending a DCCP-Reset packet.

5.10.  DCCP-Move Packet Format

    The DCCP-Move packet type is part of DCCP's support for multihoming
    and mobility, which is described further in Section 10. DCCP A sends
    a DCCP-Move packet to DCCP B after changing its address and/or port
    number.  The DCCP-Move packet requests that DCCP B start sending



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section 5.10.  [Page 44]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    packets to the new address and port number.  The new address and
    port come from the packet's network header and generic DCCP header;
    the old address and port are defined through a Mobility ID, which
    must have been set earlier via a Mobility ID feature.  The Mobility
    ID and a mandatory Identification option provide some protection
    against hijacked connections.  See Section 10 for more on security
    and DCCP's mobility support.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                    with Type=8 (DCCP-Move)                    /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
    (+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+)Iff
    (|       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |)X=1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                    Mobility ID (high bits)                    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                    Mobility ID (low bits)                     |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |        Options, including Identification      /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             data                              |
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


    Mobility ID: 64 bits
        The value of the sender's Mobility ID feature.  This value
        uniquely identifies the current connection among the set of
        connections terminating at the receiver; it MUST have been set
        by the receiver in an earlier exchange.

    Options
        Every DCCP-Move packet MUST include a valid Identification
        option (see Section 6.5).

    DCCP B MUST ignore the DCCP-Move if it has no record for the
    packet's Mobility ID; if the Identification option is not present or
    invalid; if the Sequence Number is not greater than GSR; or if the
    Acknowledgement Number is greater than GSS.  DCCP B SHOULD NOT
    respond to invalid Moves with DCCP-Reset or DCCP-Ack packets, since
    any such response would leak information about the connection, such
    as the current sequence number, to a possibly malicious host.  After
    receiving an invalid DCCP-Move, DCCP B MAY ignore subsequent DCCP-
    Move packets, valid or not, for a short period of time, such as one



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section 5.10.  [Page 45]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    second or one round-trip time.  This protects DCCP B against denial-
    of-service attacks from floods of invalid DCCP-Moves.

    DCCP-Move packets do not follow the usual sequence-validity rules.
    This is to support endpoints that react to long bursts of loss by
    moving.  Such moves will often happen after the endpoints get out of
    sync, causing DCCP-Move packets to frequently have inappropriate
    Sequence Numbers.  But the usual DCCP-Sync mechanism is
    inappropriate in response to Moves, since it could leak sequence
    numbers to possibly malicious hosts.  DCCP B MUST set its GSR
    variable to the Sequence Number on a valid DCCP-Move.

    DCCP B SHOULD acknowledge valid DCCP-Move packets with DCCP-Ack or
    DCCP-DataAck packets.  If DCCP B accepts the move, it MUST send this
    acknowledgement to the packet's network source address and DCCP
    Source Port; if it rejects the move, which it MAY do for any reason,
    it MUST send this acknowledgement to the old address and old port.
    The moving endpoint, DCCP A, can determine whether or not its move
    was accepted by checking the acknowledgement's destination address
    and Port.

    If the acknowledgement is lost, DCCP A might resend the DCCP-Move
    packet (using a new sequence number).  DCCP B will detect this case
    because the network source address and Source Port correspond to a
    valid connection, for which the Sequence Number and Acknowledgement
    Number fields are appropriate; the Identification option is valid
    for that connection; and the Mobility ID refers to that connection.
    It SHOULD respond by sending another acknowledgement, as allowed by
    the congestion control mechanism in use.

    Once DCCP B receives a non-Move packet from DCCP A, it MUST choose a
    new Mobility ID for the connection and send a new Change R(Mobility
    ID) option to DCCP A.  This reduces the risk of replay.

    We note that DCCP mobility, as provided by DCCP-Move, may not be
    useful in the context of IPv6, with its mandatory support for Mobile
    IP.

5.11.  DCCP-Sync Packet Format

    DCCP-Sync packets are sent when the sequence numbers of the
    endpoints of a connection appear to have gotten out of sync.  On
    receiving a valid DCCP-Sync packet, DCCP will update its GSR
    variable, thus restoring synchronization, and possibly send another
    DCCP-Sync packet to acknowledge the synchronization.  DCCP-Sync
    packets look like this:





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section 5.11.  [Page 46]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /              Generic DCCP Header (12 or 16 bytes)             /
     /                    with Type=9 (DCCP-Sync)                    /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Reserved    |           Acknowledgement Number              |
    (+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+)Iff
    (|       Acknowledgement Number (low bits)       |   Reserved    |)X=1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     Options                   /   [padding]   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


6.  Options and Features

    All DCCP packets may contain options, which occupy space at the end
    of the DCCP header.  Each option is a multiple of 8 bits in length.
    The combination of all options MUST add up to a multiple of 32 bits.
    Individual options are not padded to multiples of 32 bits, however;
    any option may begin on any byte boundary.  All options are always
    included in the checksum.

    The first byte of an option is the option type.  Options with types
    0 through 31 are single-byte options.  Other options are followed by
    a byte indicating the option's length.  This length value includes
    the two bytes of option-type and option-length as well as any
    option-data bytes, and MUST therefore be greater than or equal to
    two.

    Options are processed sequentially, starting at the earliest option
    in the packet header.

    The following options are currently defined:

















Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                        Section 6.  [Page 47]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


                  Option                            Section
          Type    Length     Meaning               Reference
          ----    ------     -------               ---------
            0        1       Padding                 6.1
            1        1       Mandatory               6.3
            2        1       Slow Receiver           8.6
           32     variable   Ignored                 6.2
           33     variable   Change L                6.4
           34     variable   Confirm L               6.4
           35     variable   Change R                6.4
           36     variable   Confirm R               6.4
           37     variable   Init Cookie             6.6
           38     variable   Ack Vector [Nonce 0]    8.5
           39     variable   Ack Vector [Nonce 1]    8.5
           40     variable   Data Dropped            8.7
           41        6       Timestamp               6.7
           42       6-10     Timestamp Echo          6.9
           43     variable   Identification          6.5.3
           44     variable   Challenge               6.5.4
           45        4       Payload Checksum        8.8
           46       4-6      Elapsed Time            6.8
         128-255  variable   CCID-specific options   7.4


6.1.  Padding Option

    The Padding option, with type 0, is a single byte option used to pad
    between or after options.  It either ensures the payload begins on a
    32-bit boundary (as required), or ensures alignment of following
    options (not mandatory).

    +--------+
    |00000000|
    +--------+
      Type=0


6.2.  Ignored Option

    The Ignored option, with type 32, signals that a DCCP did not
    understand some option.  This can happen, for example, when one DCCP
    converses with another, extended DCCP.  Each Ignored option has one
    or more bytes of data.  The first byte contains the offending option
    type; the second and subsequent, if present, contain the first bytes
    of the offending option's data.  If the offending option had data,
    the Ignored option MUST include at least one byte of that data, but
    the Ignored option MUST NOT carry more Opt Data than the offending
    option had data.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 6.2.  [Page 48]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Ignored options should preferably concern options sent on the packet
    acknowledged by the Acknowledgement Number.  Packets without
    Acknowledgement Numbers (that is, DCCP-Request and DCCP-Data) SHOULD
    NOT carry Ignored options.

    +--------+--------+--------+
    |00100000|00000011|Opt Type|
    +--------+--------+--------+
     Type=32  Length=3

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00100000| Length |Opt Type|  Opt Data ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=32


6.3.  Mandatory Option

    The Mandatory option, with type 1, is a single byte option that
    indicates that the immediately following option is mandatory.  If
    the receiving DCCP does not understand that following option, it
    MUST reset the connection with Reset Reason set to "Mandatory
    Failure".  For instance, say DCCP A receives a packet with two
    options: a Mandatory option, and immediately following, another
    option O.  Then DCCP A would reset the connection (rather than, for
    example, sending an Ignored(O) option) if it did not understand O's
    type; if it understood O's type, but not O's data; if O's data was
    invalid for O's type; if O was a feature negotiation option, and
    DCCP A did not understand the enclosed feature number; if DCCP A
    understood O, but chose not to perform the action O implies; and so
    forth.

    +--------+
    |00000001|
    +--------+
      Type=1


6.4.  Feature Negotiation

    DCCP contains a mechanism for reliably negotiating features, notably
    the congestion control mechanism in use on each half-connection.
    The motivation is to implement reliable feature negotiation once, so
    that different options need not reinvent that wheel.

    Features are identified by feature number and owning endpoint.  The
    notation (F,E) represents the feature with feature number F that is
    owned by DCCP E.  A connection generally has two features for each



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 6.4.  [Page 49]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    feature number, one per endpoint (or, equivalently, one per half-
    connection).  Given a feature owned by DCCP A, we call DCCP A the
    feature location and DCCP B the feature remote.  Both endpoints keep
    track of the values of all features, since the point of feature
    negotiation is to ensure agreement.

    Four options, Change L, Confirm L, Change R, and Confirm R,
    implement feature negotiation.  The "L" options are sent by the
    feature location, the "R" options are sent by the feature remote.
    Change options initiate a negotiation, Confirm options complete the
    negotiation.  Change options are retransmitted to ensure
    reliability.

    Feature values MUST NOT change apart from feature negotiation.  This
    property, retransmissions, and value priority rules ensure that both
    endpoints eventually agree on every feature's value.

    Negotiations for multiple features may take place simultaneously.
    For instance, a packet may contain multiple Change options that
    refer to different features.  The endpoints may also simultaneously
    open negotiations for the same feature; they will still agree on a
    single value.

    Feature negotiation generally takes place using packet types that
    carry no user data, such as DCCP-Ack, particularly when the relevant
    feature may affect how data will be treated.

    Here are three example feature negotiations for features located at
    DCCP B, the first two for the Congestion Control ID feature, the
    last for the Ack Ratio:





















Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 6.4.  [Page 50]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


                DCCP A                     DCCP B
     1. Change R(CCID, 2 3 1) --->
        ("2 3 1" is DCCP A's value preference list)
     2.                       <--- Confirm L(CCID, 3, 3 2 1)
                              (3 is the negotiated value;
                              "3 2 1" is B's pref list)
                 * agreement that (CCID,B) = 3 *

     1.                   XXX <--- Change L(CCID, 3 2 1)
     2.                            Retransmission:
                              <--- Change L(CCID, 3 2 1)
     3. Confirm R(CCID, 3, 2 3 1) --->
                 * agreement that (CCID,B) = 3 *

     1. Change R(Ack Ratio, 3) --->
     2.                       <--- Confirm L(Ack Ratio, 3)
              * agreement that (Ack Ratio,B) = 3 *


6.4.1.  Value Types

    The feature negotiation options are the same for every feature
    number, but the format for feature values, and the value priority
    rules that determine the result of a negotiation, differ from
    feature to feature.  All current DCCP features fit one of two value
    types, non-negotiable ("NN") or server-priority ("SP"), although
    other value types are possible.

    o Non-negotiable features: The feature value is a byte string.  Each
      option contains exactly one feature value.  The feature remote
      changes the value by sending Change R options.  The feature
      location has no preferred value for the feature, and MUST accept
      the proposed value (as long as it is valid), responding with a
      Confirm L option containing the new value.  Change L and Confirm R
      options MUST NOT be sent for non-negotiable features.

    o Server-priority features: The feature value is a fixed-length byte
      string (length determined by the feature number).  Each Change
      option contains a prioritized list of values, with the most
      preferred value coming first.  Each Confirm option contains the
      confirmed value, followed by the confirmer's value preference
      list.  The value priority rule is server priority: Given both
      preference lists, select the first entry in the server's list that
      also occurs in the client's list.  If there is no shared entry,
      the connection MUST be reset with Reason set to Fruitless
      Negotiation.  All four option types are meaningful for server-
      priority features.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.4.1.  [Page 51]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


      DCCP endpoints need not calculate their value preference lists
      before feature negotiation begins.  Thus, a server might adjust
      its preference list based on the client's preference list,
      assuming the client opened the negotiation.  Once a negotiation
      for a feature has begun, however, that feature's preference lists
      MUST remain stable until the negotiation has closed.

6.4.2.  Feature Numbers

    The first data byte of every Change or Confirm option is a feature
    number, defining the type of feature being negotiated. The remainder
    of the data gives one or more values for the feature, and is
    interpreted according to the feature. The current set of feature
    numbers is as follows:

                                           Value Initial  Section
    Number   Meaning                       Type   Value  Reference
    ------   -------                       -----  -----  ---------
       1     Congestion Control ID (CCID)   SP      2      7
       2     ECN Capable                    SP      1      9.1
       3     Ack Ratio                      NN      2      8.3
       4     Use Ack Vector                 SP      0      8.4
       5     Mobility Capable               SP      0      10.1
       6     Loss Window                    NN    1000     6.10
       7     Connection Nonce               NN   random    6.5.2
       8     Identification Regime          SP      1      6.5.1
       9     Mobility ID                    NN      0      10.2
    128-255  CCID-specific features          ?      ?      7.4


6.4.3.  Change L Option

    DCCP A sends a Change L option to DCCP B to initiate a negotiation
    for a feature located at DCCP A.  DCCP B SHOULD respond to a Change
    option for a known feature with a Confirm R option.  In special
    circumstances, such as a Change option whose value is inappropriate
    for the listed feature number, DCCP B MAY respond instead by
    ignoring the Change (with or without sending an Ignored option), or
    by resetting the connection with Reason set to "Fruitless
    Negotiation" or "Feature Error".  DCCP A SHOULD retransmit the
    Change L option until it receives one of those responses.  It could
    send at least one option per round-trip time, for instance, or it
    could add the Change L option to every Kth packet.  DCCP A MAY reset
    the connection with Reason set to "Fruitless Negotiation" or
    "Feature Error" if retransmission fails (no meaningful response is
    received after 10 attempts or more).  The format of the option's
    data ("Value or Values") depends on the feature's value type.
    Change L options are invalid for non-negotiable features.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.4.3.  [Page 52]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00100001| Length |Feature#| Value or Values ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=33


    An example Change L option follows.

    33,5,1,2,3
        I want to change my CC feature (feature number 1, a server-
        priority feature); my preferred values are 2 and 3, in that
        preference order.

6.4.4.  Confirm L Option

    DCCP A sends a Confirm L option to DCCP B in response to a valid
    Change R option sent by DCCP B.  The Confirm L option will complete
    the negotiation for a feature located at DCCP A.  Confirm L need not
    be retransmitted, since Change R will be retransmitted as necessary.
    Again, the format of "Value or Values" depends on the feature's
    value type.

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00100010| Length |Feature#| Value or Values ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=34


    Example Confirm L options follow.

    34,6,1,2,2,3
        I have changed my CC feature (feature number 1, a server-
        priority feature) to value 2; my preferred values are 2 and 3,
        in that preference order.

    34,9,7,239,48,2,188
        I have changed my Connection Nonce feature (feature number 7, a
        non-negotiable feature) to the 4-byte string 239,48,2,188.

6.4.5.  Change R Option

    DCCP A sends a Change R option to DCCP B to initiate a negotiation
    for a feature located at DCCP B.  The possible responses to Change R
    are analogous to those for Change L (Confirm L, Ignored, or Reset).
    As with Change L, DCCP A SHOULD retransmit the Change R option until
    it receives a response, or the retransmission times out.  Again, the
    format of "Value or Values" depends on the feature's value type.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.4.5.  [Page 53]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00100011| Length |Feature#| Value or Values ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=35


    Example Change R options follow.

    35,5,1,3,2
        Please change your CC feature (feature number 1, a server-
        priority feature); my preferred values are 3 and 2, in that
        preference order.

    35,9,7,239,48,2,188
        Change your Connection Nonce feature (feature number 1, a non-
        negotiable feature) to the 4-byte string 239,48,2,188.

6.4.6.  Confirm R Option

    DCCP A sends a Confirm R option to DCCP B in response to a valid
    Change L option sent by DCCP B.  The Confirm R option will complete
    the negotiation for a feature located at DCCP B.  Confirm R need not
    be retransmitted, since Change L will be retransmitted as necessary.
    Again, the format of "Value or Values" depends on the feature's
    value type.

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00100100| Length |Feature#| Value or Values ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=36


    An example Confirm R option follows.

    36,6,1,2,3,2
        Change your CC feature (feature number 1, a server-priority
        feature) to 2; my preferred values are 3 and 2, in that
        preference order.

6.4.7.  Unknown Features

    If a DCCP receives a Change option referring to a feature number it
    does not understand, it SHOULD respond with an Ignored option.  This
    informs the remote DCCP that the local DCCP does not implement the
    feature.  No other action need be taken.  (Ignored may also indicate
    that the DCCP endpoint could not respond to a CCID-specific feature
    request because the CCID was in flux; see Section 7.4.)




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.4.7.  [Page 54]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


6.4.8.  State Diagram

    These state diagrams present the legal transitions in a DCCP feature
    negotiation. They define a DCCP's states and transitions with
    respect to the negotiation of a single feature it understands. There
    are two diagrams, corresponding to the two endpoints: the feature
    location, DCCP A, and the feature remote, DCCP B.

    Each endpoint can be in one of three states, STABLE, CHANGING, and
    FAILED.  The STABLE state means that a value is known for the
    feature and no negotiation is in progress.  Every feature starts out
    in the STABLE state.  The CHANGING state means that a negotiation
    started by this endpoint is in progress for the feature.  This is
    the only state in which retransmissions happen.  Finally, the FAILED
    state means that the other endpoint does not understand the feature
    in question.

    Transitions between states are triggered by receiving a valid packet
    containing some valid negotiation option, or by an application or
    protocol event.  Receiving a Change option causes the new feature
    value to be calculated, and a Confirm option sent.  The details of
    this calculation, and the contents of Confirm, depend on the value
    type of the feature in question.  Endpoints that receive valid
    Confirm options can simply trust the values they contain, or they
    could redo the feature value calculation; again, this is feature-
    specific.

























Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.4.8.  [Page 55]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


              FEATURE LOCATION STATE DIAGRAM (DCCP A)

  rcv Confirm R   app/protocol evt : snd Change L
  : ignore        +---------------------------+
         +----+   |                           |
         |    v   |   rcv Confirm R           v
      +------------+  : accept value    +------------+
      |            |<-------------------|            |
      |   STABLE   |                    |  CHANGING  |------+
      |            |<-------------------|            |      |
      +------------+  rcv Change R      +------------+      |
          |     ^     : calc new value,     |     ^         |
          +-----+       snd Confirm L       +-----+         |
       rcv Change R                    timeout/rcv non-ack  |
       : calc new value,               : snd Change L       |
         snd Confirm L                                      |
                                  rcv Ignored/timeout fails |
                                  : snd Reset/ignore/other  v
                                                       +----------+
                                                       |  FAILED  |
                                                       +----------+


              FEATURE REMOTE STATE DIAGRAM (DCCP B)

  rcv Confirm L   app/protocol evt : snd Change R
  : ignore        +---------------------------+
         +----+   |                           |
         |    v   |   rcv Confirm L           v
      +------------+  : calc new value  +------------+
      |            |<-------------------|            |
      |   STABLE   |                    |  CHANGING  |------+
      |            |<-------------------|            |      |
      +------------+  rcv Change L      +------------+      |
          |     ^     : calc new value,     |     ^         |
          +-----+       snd Confirm R       +-----+         |
       rcv Change L                    timeout/rcv non-ack  |
       : calc new value,               : snd Change R       |
         snd Confirm R                                      |
                                  rcv Ignored/timeout fails |
                                  : snd Reset/ignore/other  v
                                                       +----------+
                                                       |  FAILED  |
                                                       +----------+


    DCCP implementations MUST sanity-check options' data as appropriate
    for the feature before acting according to the diagram.  For



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.4.8.  [Page 56]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    example, Ack Ratio takes two-byte, non-zero integer values, so a
    "Confirm(Ack Ratio, 0)" option is never valid.  Server-priority
    features can tolerate some unknown values in the priority list, as
    long as the selected value is understood.  Invalid options SHOULD
    cause a transition to the FAILED state, with an appropriate
    accompanying action, such as sending a reset with Reason set to
    "Feature Error".

    The "snd" actions request the sending of a negotiation option.  They
    do not force DCCP to immediately generate a packet; rather, they say
    which feature option SHOULD be sent on the next packet generated.  A
    DCCP MAY choose to generate a packet, such as a DCCP-Ack, in
    response to some "snd" action, rather than piggyback on another
    packet.  In some cases, this may be required---if adding an option
    would bump a packet over the PMTU, for instance.   However, it MUST
    NOT generate a packet if doing so would violate the congestion
    control mechanism in use.

    Retransmissions of Change options happen according to an
    exponential-backoff timer, and/or when the CHANGING DCCP realizes
    that the packet containing a Change option was not received.  A
    Change option MAY additionally be piggybacked on other packets sent
    during the negotiation.  After too many timer backoff events, or
    when an explicit Ignored option is received, the CHANGING DCCP MUST
    transition to the FAILED state, as shown.  The CHANGING DCCP MUST
    NOT transition to the FAILED state simply because the other DCCP
    seems to be ignoring its Change options (for example, by
    acknowledging the packet containing the options, but not including a
    Confirm); reordering can cause this behavior even if the endpoint
    understands the options.  The timeout value might initially be set
    to a small multiple of round-trip times (or 0.2 seconds, if no RTT
    is available).  Backoff should be pinned at roughly 32 RTTs; timer
    failure should occur after at least 12 retransmissions.

    Feature negotiation options for a given feature MUST be processed in
    increasing order by Sequence Number.  Say that the last processed
    negotiation option for a feature (F,X) came on a packet with
    sequence number S.  Then any negotiation options on received packets
    with Sequence Number less than or equal to S MUST be ignored.  This
    requirement MAY be implemented per-feature, or implementations MAY
    compare against a single Sequence Number---the most recent
    negotiation option processed for any feature.  Feature negotiation
    options on safely reordered packets (with last-negotiation-seqno < S
    < GSR) SHOULD be accepted, to provide some robustness against
    reordering.

    Simultaneous negotiation problems can arise if value preferences
    change too frequently, particularly for server-priority features.  A



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.4.8.  [Page 57]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    DCCP endpoint MUST NOT change its value preferences while in the
    CHANGING state: it MUST instead complete any extant negotiation,
    then open a new one.

    If the result of some feature negotiation is that a feature has an
    unacceptable value---for example, for a server-priority feature,
    none of the client's choices were acceptable to the server, and the
    prior value is unacceptable to the client---a DCCP endpoint MAY
    reset the connection, with DCCP-Reset Reason set to "Fruitless
    Negotiation".

    The CHANGING state signals that the relevant feature's value is in
    flux.  DCCP MAY change its behavior when certain features are
    CHANGING---for example, by refusing to send data until reentering
    STABLE.

6.4.9.  Streamlined Negotiation

    This section provides guidance for implementations that do not wish
    to implement full feature negotiation, although general-purpose DCCP
    implementations SHOULD implement negotiation fully.

    Minimal DCCP implementations, such as those for embedded devices,
    might force all negotiation to take place on the first packet
    exchange.  The DCCP-Request would contain Change R options for all
    server-located features, and Change L options for all client-located
    features; the DCCP-Response would Confirm each of these requests, or
    reset the connection if any Change was unexpected or unacceptable.
    Changes for CCID-specific features MUST follow Changes for the
    Congestion Control ID feature in the option list, since options are
    processed in order.  Once the connection is set up, minimal
    implementations might respond to all feature negotiation options
    with Ignored, except that even minimal implementations SHOULD
    support "Change R(Ack Ratio)" and "Confirm L(Ack Ratio)".

    Even general-purpose implementations might refuse to renegotiate the
    Congestion Control ID feature in the middle of the connection, by
    responding to "Change(CCID)" options with Ignored.

6.5.  Identification Options

    The Identification options provide a way for DCCP endpoints to
    confirm each others' identities, even after changes of address
    (Section 10) or long bursts of loss that get the endpoints out of
    sync (Section 5.2). Again, DCCP as specified here does not provide
    cryptographic security guarantees, and attackers that can see every
    packet are still capable of manipulating DCCP connections
    inappropriately, but the Identification options make it more



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 6.5.  [Page 58]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    difficult for some kinds of attacks to succeed.

    The Identification option is used to prove an endpoint's identity,
    while a Challenge option elicits an Identification from the other
    endpoint.  An Identification Regime determines how the
    Identifications are calculated.  In the default MD5 Regime, the
    calculation involves an MD5 hash over packet data and two Connection
    Nonces, either exchanged at the beginning of the connection or
    implicitly agreed upon.

6.5.1.  Identification Regime Feature

    Identification Regime has feature number 8.  The ID Regime feature
    located at DCCP B specifies the algorithm that DCCP B will use for
    its Identification options, and that DCCP A will use for its
    Challenge options.  Each endpoint must keep track of both its ID
    regime and, via the ID Regime feature, the regime used by the other
    endpoint.  ID Regime is a server-priority feature.

    The value of ID Regime is a two-byte number, so valid Confirm and
    Change(ID Regime) options take at least five bytes.  Change options
    MAY list multiple ID Regimes in descending order of preference.
    This document defines two ID Regimes:

         ID Regime   Meaning
         ---------   -------
             0       Null Regime
             1       MD5 Regime (default)


    In the Null Regime, every Identification or Challenge option is
    invalid.  The Null Regime makes it impossible for endpoints to get
    back into sync after bursts of loss larger than two-thirds of the
    Loss Window (Section In the MD5 Regime, which is the default, valid
    Identification and Challenge options contain an MD5 hash of the
    Connection Nonce feature values with some packet data.  Applications
    preferring different security guarantees, particularly around
    mobility issues, may prefer to implement another identification
    algorithm and allocate a new ID Regime value for it.

    If the endpoints cannot agree on mutually acceptable ID Regimes, the
    connection SHOULD be reset due to "Fruitless Negotiation".

6.5.2.  Connection Nonce Feature

    Connection Nonce has feature number 7.  The Connection Nonce feature
    located at DCCP B is the value of DCCP A's connection nonce, a value
    used by Identification Regime 1.  Each endpoint SHOULD keep track of



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.5.2.  [Page 59]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    its own nonce and, via the Connection Nonce feature, the other
    endpoint's nonce.  Connection Nonce is a non-negotiable feature.

    The Connection Nonce feature takes arbitrary values of at least 4
    bytes long.  A Change or Confirm(Connection Nonce) option therefore
    takes at least 7 bytes.

    Connection Nonce defaults to a random 8-byte string.  To prevent
    spoofing, this string MUST NOT have any trivially predictable value.
    For example, it MUST NOT be set deterministically to zero, and it
    SHOULD change on every connection.  DCCP endpoints MAY, however,
    exchange Connection Nonces via some mechanism other than the
    plaintext, snoopable Connection Nonce option.  For example, two
    DCCPs might exchange nonces over a secure channel; or, assuming
    neither endpoint is behind a network address translator, they might
    encrypt the source and destination ports with a shared secret key.

6.5.3.  Identification Option

    The Identification option serves as confirmation that a packet was
    sent by an endpoint involved in the initiation of the DCCP
    connection.  It is permitted in any DCCP packet, but it might not be
    useful until the endpoints have exchanged security information such
    as connection nonces. The option takes the following form:

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00101011| Length |  Identification Data ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=43


    The particular data included in an Identification option sent by
    DCCP A depends on the ID Regime in force for the A-to-B sequence,
    which is the value of the ID Regime feature located at DCCP B.  The
    remainder of this section describes ID Regime 1, the default MD5
    Regime.

    The Identification data provided for the MD5 Regime consists of a
    16-byte MD5 digest of: the 32-bit words in the DCCP header that
    include the Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers (this will be words
    3-4 or 3-6, depending on whether sequence numbers are extended); the
    value of the sender's Connection Nonce; and the value of the other
    endpoint's Connection Nonce, in that order.  The total length of the
    option is therefore 18 bytes, and the option may only be provided on
    packets that contain Acknowledgement Numbers, such as DCCP-Ack.
    Inclusion of the two Connection Nonces ensures that attackers cannot
    fake an Identification Option, unless they snooped on the beginning
    of the connection when nonces are exchanged.  (No mechanism protects



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.5.3.  [Page 60]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    against snoopers who know Connection Nonces, since DCCP as specified
    here does not provide strong cryptographic security guarantees; see
    Section 16.) Inclusion of the Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers
    protects against replay attacks within the connection.

    To check an Identification option's value, the receiver simply
    calculates the MD5 digest itself and compares that against the
    option data.  The MD5 calculation can be expensive, so an attacker
    could conceivably disable a DCCP endpoint by sending it a flood of
    invalid packets with bad Identification options.  Rate limits
    described in Sections 5.2 and 10 mitigate this issue.  The receiver
    MAY ignore an Identification option if it occurs on a packet that
    would otherwise be considered valid.

    Example C code for constructing the option's value before
    transmitting a packet follows.

        unsigned char *packet_data;
        int packet_length;
        int id_option_offset; /* offset of option in packet_data */

        const unsigned char *my_nonce, *other_nonce;
        int my_nonce_length, other_nonce_length;

        MD5_CTX md5_context;

        MD5_Init(&md5_context);
        MD5_Update(&md5_context, packet_data + 8, 8);
              /* assuming 24-bit sequence numbers */
        MD5_Update(&md5_context, my_nonce, my_nonce_length);
        MD5_Update(&md5_context, other_nonce, other_nonce_length);
        packet_data[id_option_offset] = 42;   /* option value */
        packet_data[id_option_offset+1] = 18; /* option length */
        MD5_Final(packet_data + id_option_offset + 2, &md5_context);


6.5.4.  Challenge Option

    This option informs the receiving DCCP that one of its packets was
    ignored, and that succeeding packets will be ignored until the
    endpoint sends a correct Identification option.  The receiving DCCP
    SHOULD include an Identification option on the next packet it sends.
    The option takes the following form:








Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 6.5.4.  [Page 61]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00101100| Length |  Identification Data ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=44


    The Identification Data sent with a Challenge option depends on the
    active Identification Regime.  For the default MD5 Regime (Regime
    1), the Identification Data on a packet sent by DCCP B is the same
    as that for an Identification option sent by DCCP B.  The receiver
    SHOULD ignore a Challenge option, and the packet the Challenge
    option contains, if the Identification Data is incorrect.  The
    purpose of this mechanism is to prevent denial-of-service attacks
    where an attacker could cause the receiver to send many packets with
    expensive-to-compute Identification options, since the receiver MAY
    ignore Challenge options for some time after receiving an invalid
    Challenge.

    If, after several Challenge options, a DCCP is unable to elicit a
    valid Identification from its partner, it MAY reset the connection
    with Reason "Unanswered Challenge".

6.6.  Init Cookie Option

    This option is permitted in DCCP-Response, DCCP-Data, DCCP-Ack, and
    DCCP-DataAck messages.  The server MAY include an Init Cookie option
    in its DCCP-Response.  If so, then the client MUST echo the same
    Init Cookie option in each succeeding DCCP packet until one of those
    packets is acknowledged or the connection is reset.  The server
    SHOULD design its Init Cookie format so that Init Cookies can be
    checked for tampering; it SHOULD respond to an tampered Init Cookie
    option by resetting the connection with Reason set to "Bad Init
    Cookie".

    The purpose of this option is to allow a DCCP server to avoid having
    to hold any state until the three-way connection setup handshake has
    completed.  The server wraps up the service code, server port, and
    any options it cares about from both the DCCP-Request and DCCP-
    Response in an opaque cookie.  Typically the cookie will be
    encrypted using a secret known only to the server and include a
    cryptographic checksum or magic value so that correct decryption can
    be verified.  When the server receives the cookie back in the
    response, it can decrypt the cookie and instantiate all the state it
    avoided keeping.

    The precise implementation of the Init Cookie does not need to be
    specified here; since Init Cookies are opaque to the client, there
    are no interoperability concerns.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 6.6.  [Page 62]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Init Cookies are limited to at most 253 bytes in length.

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00100101| Length |         Init Cookie Value   ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=37


6.7.  Timestamp Option

    This option is permitted in any DCCP packet.  The length of the
    option is 6 bytes.

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
    |00101001|00000110|          Timestamp Value          |
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
     Type=41  Length=6

    The four bytes of option data carry the timestamp of this packet in
    some undetermined form.  A DCCP receiving a Timestamp option SHOULD
    respond with a Timestamp Echo option on the next packet it sends.

6.8.  Elapsed Time Option

    This option is permitted in any DCCP packet that contains an
    Acknowledgement Number.  It indicates how much time, in tenths of
    milliseconds, has elapsed since the packet being acknowledged---the
    packet with the given Acknowledgement Number---was received.  The
    option may take 4 or 6 bytes, depending on the size of the Elapsed
    Time value.  Elapsed Time helps correct round-trip time estimates
    when the gap between receiving a packet and acknowledging that
    packet may be long---in CCID 3, for example, where acknowledgements
    are sent infrequently.

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
    |00101110|00000100|   Elapsed Time  |
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
     Type=46    Len=4

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
    |00101110|00000110|            Elapsed Time           |
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
     Type=46    Len=6

    The option data, Elapsed Time, represents an estimated upper bound
    on the amount of time elapsed since the packet being acknowledged
    was received, with units of tenths of milliseconds.  If Elapsed Time
    is less than a second, the first, smaller form of the option SHOULD



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 6.8.  [Page 63]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    be used.  Elapsed Times of more than 6.5535 seconds MUST be sent
    using the second form of the option.  DCCP endpoints MUST NOT report
    Elapsed Times that are significantly larger than the true elapsed
    times.  A connection MAY be reset, with Reason set to "Aggression
    Penalty", if one endpoint determines that the other is reporting a
    much-too-large Elapsed Time.

    Elapsed Time is measured in tenths of milliseconds as a compromise
    between two conflicting goals.  First, it provides enough
    granularity to reduce rounding error when measuring elapsed time
    over fast LANs.  Second, Elapsed Time allows most reasonable elapsed
    times to fit into two bytes of data.

6.9.  Timestamp Echo Option

    This option is permitted in any DCCP packet, as long as at least one
    packet carrying the Timestamp option has been received.  Generally,
    a DCCP endpoint should send one Timestamp Echo option for each
    Timestamp option it receives; and it should send that option as soon
    as is convenient.  The length of the option is between 6 and 10
    bytes, depending on whether Elapsed Time is included and how large
    it is.

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
    |00101010|00000110|           Timestamp Echo          |
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
     Type=42    Len=6

    +--------+--------+------- ... -------+--------+--------+
    |00101010|00001000|  Timestamp Echo   |   Elapsed Time  |
    +--------+--------+------- ... -------+--------+--------+
     Type=42    Len=8       (4 bytes)

    +--------+--------+------- ... -------+------- ... -------+
    |00101010|00001010|  Timestamp Echo   |    Elapsed Time   |
    +--------+--------+------- ... -------+------- ... -------+
     Type=42   Len=10       (4 bytes)           (4 bytes)

    The first four bytes of option data, Timestamp Echo, carry a
    Timestamp Value taken from a preceding received Timestamp option.
    Usually, this will be the last packet that was received---the packet
    indicated by the Acknowledgement Number, if any---but it might be a
    preceding packet.

    The Elapsed Time field is similar to the value stored in the Elapsed
    Time option.  If present, it indicates the amount of time elapsed
    since receiving the packet whose timestamp is being echoed.  This
    time MUST be in tenths of milliseconds.  Elapsed Time is meant to



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 6.9.  [Page 64]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    help the Timestamp sender separate the network round-trip time from
    the Timestamp receiver's processing time.  This may be particularly
    important for CCIDs where acknowledgements are sent infrequently, so
    that there might be considerable delay between receiving a Timestamp
    option and sending the corresponding Timestamp Echo.  A missing
    Elapsed Time field is equivalent to an Elapsed Time of zero.  The
    smallest version of the option SHOULD be used that can hold the
    relevant Elapsed Time value.

6.10.  Loss Window Feature

    Loss Window has feature number 6.  The Loss Window feature located
    at DCCP B is the width of the window DCCP B uses to determine
    whether packets from DCCP A are valid.  Packets outside this window
    will be dropped by DCCP B as old duplicates or spoofing attempts;
    see Section 5.2 for more information.  DCCP A sends a "Change R(Loss
    Window, W)" option to DCCP B to set DCCP B's Loss Window to W.  Loss
    Window is non-negotiable.

    The Loss Window feature takes 3- or 6-byte integer values, like DCCP
    sequence numbers.  Change and Confirm options for Loss Window are
    therefore either 6 or 9 bytes long.

    Loss Window defaults to 1000 for new connections.  The Loss Window
    value is the total width of the loss window.  The receiver positions
    the loss window asymmetrically around GSR, the greatest sequence
    number received, with one-third of the loss window width (rounded
    down) reserved for GSR and older sequence numbers and two-thirds
    reserved for newer sequence numbers.  See Section 5.2.

7.  Congestion Control IDs

    Each congestion control mechanism supported by DCCP is assigned a
    congestion control identifier, or CCID: a number from 0 to 255.
    During connection setup, and optionally thereafter, the endpoints
    negotiate their congestion control mechanisms by negotiating the
    values for their Congestion Control ID features.  Congestion Control
    ID has feature number 1.  The feature located at DCCP A is the CCID
    in use for the A-to-B half-connection.  DCCP B sends a
    "Change R(CCID, K)" option to DCCP A to ask A to use CCID K for its
    data packets.  CCID is a server-priority feature.

    The data byte of Congestion Control ID feature negotiation options
    form a list of acceptable CCIDs, sorted in descending order of
    priority.  For example, the option "Change R(CCID, 1 2 3)" asks the
    receiver to use CCID 1 for its packets, although CCIDs 2 and 3 are
    also acceptable.  (This corresponds to the bytes "35, 6, 1, 1, 2,
    3": Change R option (35), option length (6), feature ID (1), CCIDs



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                        Section 7.  [Page 65]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    (1, 2, 3).)  Similarly, "Confirm L(CCID, 1, 1 2 3)" tells the
    receiver that the sender is using CCID 1 for its packets, but that
    CCIDs 2 or 3 might also be acceptable.

    The CCIDs defined by this document are:

         CCID   Meaning
         ----   -------
           0    Reserved
           1    Unspecified Sender-Based Congestion Control
           2    TCP-like Congestion Control
           3    TFRC Congestion Control


    A new connection starts with CCID 2 for both DCCPs.  If this is
    unacceptable for a DCCP endpoint, that endpoint MUST send
    "Change(CCID)" options on its first packets, and MUST Reset the
    connection if the results of those negotiations are unacceptable.

    All CCIDs standardized for use with DCCP will correspond to
    congestion control mechanisms previously standardized by the IETF.
    We expect that for quite some time, all such mechanisms will be TCP-
    friendly, but TCP-friendliness is not an explicit DCCP requirement.

    A DCCP implementation intended for general use---in a general-
    purpose operating system kernel, for example---SHOULD implement at
    least CCIDs 1 and 2.  The intent is to make these CCIDs broadly
    available for interoperability, although any given application might
    disallow their use via the feature negotiation process.

7.1.  Unspecified Sender-Based Congestion Control

    CCID 1 denotes an unspecified sender-based congestion control
    mechanism.  Separate features negotiate the corresponding congestion
    acknowledgement options---for example, Ack Vector.  This provides a
    limited, controlled form of interoperability for new IETF-approved
    CCIDs.

    Implementors MUST NOT use CCID 1 in production environments as a
    proxy for congestion control mechanisms that have not entered the
    IETF standards process.  We intend that any production use of CCID 1
    would have to be explicitly approved first by the IETF.  Middleboxes
    MAY choose to treat the use of CCID 1 as experimental or
    unacceptable.

    For example, say that CCID 98, a new sender-based congestion control
    mechanism using Ack Vector for acknowledgements, has entered the
    IETF standards process, and the IETF has approved the use of CCID 1



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 7.1.  [Page 66]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    as a backup for CCID 98.  Now, DCCP A, which understands and would
    like to use CCID 98, is trying to communicate with DCCP B, which
    doesn't yet know about CCID 98.  DCCP A can simply negotiate use of
    CCID 1 and, separately, negotiate Use Ack Vector.  DCCP B will
    provide the feedback DCCP A requires for CCID 98, namely Ack Vector,
    without needing to understand the congestion control mechanism in
    use.

    CCID 1 has no sender implementation; it is exclusively meaningful at
    the receiver to support forward compatibility.  The sender always
    uses a specific congestion control mechanism whose CCID is not 1.
    However, the code implementing a CCID that requires only generic
    feedback, such as Ack Vector, MAY add CCID 1 to the list of
    acceptable CCIDs sent to the receiver (following the actual CCID),
    facilitating communication with receivers that do not understand the
    actual CCID.

    Any CCID feature negotiation in which the sender proposes the use of
    CCID 1 without any other CCID is considered erroneous, and SHOULD
    result in connection reset, with Reason set to "Fruitless
    Negotiation".

    Many DCCP APIs will allow applications to suggest preferred CCIDs
    for sending and receiving data.  Applications might be able to allow
    or prevent the use of CCID 1 for sending and receiving.  For
    sending, however, it makes sense to let the code implementing a
    particular CCID silently suggest CCID 1 when appropriate.

    CCID 1 places no restrictions on how often the HC-Receiver may send
    DCCP-Ack packets.  This applies wherever we say "send a DCCP-Ack as
    allowed by the congestion control mechanism in use".  A careful
    implementation SHOULD implement a liberal rate limit on DCCP-Acks to
    prevent ack storms, however.

7.2.  TCP-like Congestion Control

    CCID 2, TCP-like Congestion Control, denotes Additive Increase,
    Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD) congestion control with behavior
    modelled directly on TCP, including congestion window, slow start,
    timeouts, and so forth.  CCID 2 achieves maximum bandwidth over the
    long term, consistent with the use of end-to-end congestion control,
    but halves its congestion window in response to each congestion
    event.  This leads to the abrupt rate changes typical of TCP.
    Applications should use CCID 2 if they prefer maximum bandwidth
    utilization to steadiness of rate.  This is often the case for
    applications that are not playing their data directly to the user.
    For example, a hypothetical application that transferred files over
    DCCP, using application-level retransmissions for lost packets,



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 7.2.  [Page 67]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    would prefer CCID 2 to CCID 3.  On-line games may also prefer CCID
    2.

    CCID 2 is further described in [CCID 2 PROFILE].

7.3.  TFRC Congestion Control

    CCID 3 denotes TCP-Friendly Rate Control (TFRC), an equation-based
    rate-controlled congestion control mechanism.  TFRC is designed to
    be reasonably fair when competing for bandwidth with TCP-like flows,
    where a flow is "reasonably fair" if its sending rate is generally
    within a factor of two of the sending rate of a TCP flow under the
    same conditions.  However, TFRC has a much lower variation of
    throughput over time compared with TCP, which makes CCID 3 more
    suitable than CCID 2 for applications such as telephony or streaming
    media where a relatively smooth sending rate is of importance.

    CCID 3 is further described in [CCID 3 PROFILE]. The TFRC congestion
    control algorithms were initially described in [RFC 3448].

7.4.  CCID-Specific Options, Features, and Reset Reasons

    Option types, feature numbers, and Reset Reasons 128 through 255 are
    available for CCID-specific use.  CCIDs may often need new option
    types---for communicating acknowledgement or rate information, for
    example.  CCID-specific option types let them create options at will
    without polluting the global option space.  Option 128 might have
    different meanings on a half-connection using CCID 4 and a half-
    connection using CCID 8.  CCID-specific options and features will
    never conflict with global options and features introduced by later
    versions of this specification.

    Any packet may contain information meant for either half-connection,
    so CCID-specific option types, feature numbers, and Reset Reasons
    explicitly signal the half-connection to which they apply.

    o Option numbers 128 through 191 are for options sent from the HC-
      Sender to the HC-Receiver; option numbers 192 through 255 are for
      options sent from the HC-Receiver to the HC-Sender.

    o Reset Reasons 128 through 191 indicate that the HC-Sender reset
      the connection (most likely because of some problem with
      acknowledgements sent by the HC-Receiver); Reset Reasons 192
      through 255 indicate that the HC-Receiver reset the connection
      (most likely because of some problem with data packets sent by the
      HC-Sender).





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 7.4.  [Page 68]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    o Finally, feature numbers 128 through 191 are used for features
      located at the HC-Sender; feature numbers 192 through 255 are for
      features located at the HC-Receiver.  Since Change L and Confirm L
      options for a feature are sent by the feature location, we know
      that any Change L(128) option was sent by the HC-Sender, while any
      Change L(192) option was sent by the HC-Receiver.  Similarly,
      Change R(128) options are sent by the HC-Receiver, while
      Change R(192) options are sent by the HC-Sender.

    For example, consider a DCCP connection where the A-to-B half-
    connection uses CCID 4 and the B-to-A half-connection uses CCID 5.
    Here is how a sampling of CCID-specific options and features are
    assigned to half-connections:

                                    Relevant    Relevant
         Packet  Option             Half-conn.  CCID
         ------  ------             ----------  ----
         A > B   128                  A-to-B     4
         A > B   192                  B-to-A     5
         A > B   Change L(128, ...)   A-to-B     4
         A > B   Change R(192, ...)   A-to-B     4
         A > B   Confirm L(128, ...)  A-to-B     4
         A > B   Confirm R(192, ...)  A-to-B     4
         A > B   Change R(128, ...)   B-to-A     5
         A > B   Change L(192, ...)   B-to-A     5
         A > B   Confirm R(128, ...)  B-to-A     5
         A > B   Confirm L(192, ...)  B-to-A     5

         B > A   128                  B-to-A     5
         B > A   192                  A-to-B     4
         B > A   Change L(128, ...)   B-to-A     5
         B > A   Change R(192, ...)   B-to-A     5
         B > A   Confirm L(128, ...)  B-to-A     5
         B > A   Confirm R(192, ...)  B-to-A     5
         B > A   Change R(128, ...)   A-to-B     4
         B > A   Change L(192, ...)   A-to-B     4
         B > A   Confirm R(128, ...)  A-to-B     4
         B > A   Confirm L(192, ...)  A-to-B     4


    CCID-specific options and features have no clear meaning when a
    nontrivial negotiation for the relevant CCID is in progress.  This
    can happen when a CCID-specific option follows a Change(CCID)
    option.  Say the Change option prefers CCID X.  Then the negotiation
    is nontrivial if and only if its result is not X.  CCID-specific
    options and features MUST be ignored during a nontrivial CCID
    negotiation---for instance, by responding Ignored options---except
    that Mandatory CCID-specific options and features MUST induce a



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 7.4.  [Page 69]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    DCCP-Reset with Reason "Mandatory Error".

8.  Acknowledgements

    Congestion control requires receivers to transmit information about
    packet losses and ECN marks to senders.  DCCP receivers MUST report
    all congestion they see, as defined by the relevant CCID profile.
    Each CCID says when acknowledgements should be sent, what options
    they must use, how they should be congestion controlled, and so on.

    Most acknowledgements use DCCP options.  For example, on a half-
    connection with CCID 2 (TCP-like), the receiver reports
    acknowledgement information using the Ack Vector option.  This
    section describes common acknowledgement options and shows how acks
    using those options will commonly work.  Full descriptions of the
    acknowledgement mechanisms used for each CCID are laid out in the
    CCID profile specifications.

    Acknowledgement options, such as Ack Vector, generally depend on the
    DCCP Acknowledgement Number, and are thus only allowed on packet
    types that carry that number (all packets except DCCP-Request and
    DCCP-Data).  Detailed acknowledgement options are not necessarily
    required on every packet that carries an Acknowledgement Number,
    however.

8.1.  Acks of Acks and Unidirectional Connections

    DCCP was designed to work well for both bidirectional and
    unidirectional flows of data, and for connections that transition
    between these states.  However, acknowledgements required for a
    unidirectional connection are very different from those required for
    a bidirectional connection.  In particular, unidirectional
    connections need to worry about acks of acks.

    The ack-of-acks problem arises because some acknowledgement
    mechanisms are reliable.  For example, an HC-Receiver using CCID 2,
    TCP-like Congestion Control, sends Ack Vectors containing completely
    reliable acknowledgement information.  The HC-Sender should
    occasionally inform the HC-Receiver that it has received an ack.  If
    it did not, the HC-Receiver might resend complete Ack Vector
    information, going back to the start of the connection, with every
    DCCP-Ack packet!  However, note that acks-of-acks need not be
    reliable themselves: when an ack-of-acks is lost, the HC-Receiver
    will simply maintain, and periodically retransmit, old
    acknowledgement-related state for a little longer.  Therefore, there
    is no need for acks-of-acks-of-acks.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.1.  [Page 70]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    When communication is bidirectional, any required acks-of-acks are
    automatically contained in normal acknowledgements for data packets.
    On a unidirectional connection, however, the receiver DCCP sends no
    data, so the sender would not normally send acknowledgements.
    Therefore, the CCID in force on that half-connection must explicitly
    say whether, when, and how the HC-Sender should generate acks-of-
    acks.

    For example, consider a bidirectional connection where both half-
    connections use the same CCID (either 2 or 3), and where DCCP B goes
    "quiescent".  This means that the connection becomes unidirectional:
    DCCP B stops sending data, and sends only sends DCCP-Ack packets to
    DCCP A.  For CCID 2, TCP-like Congestion Control, DCCP B uses Ack
    Vector to reliably communicate which packets it has received.  As
    described above, DCCP A must occasionally acknowledge a pure
    acknowledgement from DCCP B, so that DCCP B can free old Ack Vector
    state.  For instance, DCCP A might send a DCCP-DataAck packet every
    now and then, instead of DCCP-Data.  In contrast, for CCID 3, TFRC
    Congestion Control, DCCP B's acknowledgements generally need not be
    reliable, since they contain cumulative loss rates; TFRC works even
    if every DCCP-Ack is lost.  Therefore, DCCP A need never acknowledge
    an acknowledgement.

    When communication is unidirectional, a single CCID---in the
    example, the A-to-B CCID---controls both DCCPs' acknowledgements, in
    terms of their content, their frequency, and so forth.  For
    bidirectional connections, the A-to-B CCID governs DCCP B's
    acknowledgements (including its acks of DCCP A's acks), while the B-
    to-A CCID governs DCCP A's acknowledgements.

    DCCP A switches its ack pattern from bidirectional to unidirectional
    when it notices that DCCP B has gone quiescent.  It switches from
    unidirectional to bidirectional when it must acknowledge even a
    single DCCP-Data or DCCP-DataAck packet from DCCP B.  (This includes
    the case where a single DCCP-Data or DCCP-DataAck packet was lost in
    transit, which is detectable using the # NDP field in the DCCP
    packet header.)

    Each CCID defines how to detect quiescence on that CCID, and how
    that CCID handles acks-of-acks on unidirectional connections.  The
    B-to-A CCID defines when DCCP B has gone quiescent.  Usually, this
    happens when a period has passed without B sending any data packets.
    For CCID 2, this period is the maximum of 0.2 seconds and two round-
    trip times.  The A-to-B CCID defines how DCCP A handles acks-of-acks
    once DCCP B has gone quiescent.






Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.1.  [Page 71]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


8.2.  Ack Piggybacking

    Acknowledgements of A-to-B data MAY be piggybacked on data sent by
    DCCP B, as long as that does not delay the acknowledgement longer
    than the A-to-B CCID would find acceptable.  However, data
    acknowledgements often require more than 4 bytes to express.  A
    large set of acknowledgements prepended to a large data packet might
    exceed the path's MTU.  In this case, DCCP B SHOULD send separate
    DCCP-Data and DCCP-Ack packets, or wait, but not too long, for a
    smaller datagram.

    Piggybacking is particularly common at DCCP A when the B-to-A half-
    connection is quiescent---that is, when DCCP A is just acknowledging
    DCCP B's acknowledgements, as described above.  There are three
    reasons to acknowledge DCCP B's acknowledgements: to allow DCCP B to
    free up information about previously acknowledged data packets from
    A; to shrink the size of future acknowledgements; and to manipulate
    the rate at which future acknowledgements are sent.  Since these are
    secondary concerns, DCCP A can generally afford to wait indefinitely
    for a data packet to piggyback its acknowledgement onto.

    Any restrictions on ack piggybacking are described in the relevant
    CCID's profile.

8.3.  Ack Ratio Feature

    Ack Ratio provides a common mechanism by which CCIDs that clock
    acknowledgements off data packets can perform rudimentary congestion
    control on the acknowledgement stream.  CCID 2, TCP-like Congestion
    Control, uses Ack Ratio to limit the rate of its acknowledgement
    stream, for example.  Some CCIDs ignore Ack Ratio, performing
    congestion control on acknowledgements in some other way.

    Ack Ratio has feature number 3.  The Ack Ratio feature located at
    DCCP B equals the rough ratio of data packets sent by DCCP A to
    acknowledgement packets sent back by DCCP B.  For example, if it is
    set to four, then DCCP B will send at least one acknowledgement
    packet for every four data packets DCCP A sends.  DCCP A sends a
    "Change R(Ack Ratio)" option to DCCP B to change DCCP B's ack ratio.
    Ack Ratio is a non-negotiable feature.

    An Ack Ratio option contains two bytes of data: a sixteen-bit
    integer representing the ratio.  A new connection starts with Ack
    Ratio 2 for both DCCPs.

    Implementations should treat Ack Ratio as a loose guideline.  For
    instance, a DCCP endpoint might implement a delayed acknowledgement
    timer like TCP's, whereby each packet is acknowledged within at most



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.3.  [Page 72]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    T seconds of its receipt.  (In TCP, T is commonly set to 200
    milliseconds.)  This is explicitly allowed even though it might lead
    to sending more acknowledgement packets than Ack Ratio would
    suggest.  Particular algorithms for setting and using Ack Ratio are
    discussed in the relevant CCID drafts.

8.4.  Use Ack Vector Feature

    The Use Ack Vector feature lets DCCPs negotiate whether they should
    use Ack Vector options to report congestion.  Ack Vector provides
    detailed loss information, and lets senders report back to their
    applications whether particular packets were dropped.  Use Ack
    Vector is mandatory for some CCIDs, and optional for others.

    Use Ack Vector has feature number 4.  The Use Ack Vector feature
    located at DCCP B specifies whether DCCP B MUST use Ack Vector
    options on its acknowledgements to DCCP A, although DCCP B may send
    Ack Vector options even when Use Ack Vector is false.  DCCP A sends
    a "Change R(Use Ack Vector, 1)" option to DCCP B to ask B to send
    Ack Vector options as part of its acknowledgement traffic.  Use Ack
    Vector is a server-priority feature.

    Use Ack Vector feature values are a single byte long.  The receiver
    MUST send Ack Vector options if this byte is nonzero.  A new
    connection starts with Use Ack Vector 0 for both DCCPs.

8.5.  Ack Vector Options

    The Ack Vector gives a run-length encoded history of data packets
    received at the client.  Each byte of the vector gives the state of
    that data packet in the loss history, and the number of preceding
    packets with the same state.  The option's data looks like this:

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |0010011?| Length |SSLLLLLL|SSLLLLLL|SSLLLLLL|  ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    Type=38/39         \___________ Vector ___________...


    The two Ack Vector options (option types 38 and 39) differ only in
    the values they imply for ECN Nonce Echo.  Section 9.2 describes
    this further.

    The vector itself consists of a series of bytes, each of whose
    encoding is:






Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.5.  [Page 73]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |St | Run Length|
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


        St[ate]: 2 bits

        Run Length: 6 bits

    State occupies the most significant two bits of each byte, and can
    have one of four values:

        0   Packet received (and not ECN marked).

        1   Packet received ECN marked.

        2   Reserved.

        3   Packet not yet received.

    The first byte in the first Ack Vector option refers to the packet
    indicated in the Acknowledgement Number; subsequent bytes refer to
    older packets.  (Ack Vector MUST NOT be sent on DCCP-Data and DCCP-
    Request packets, which lack an Acknowledgement Number.)  If an Ack
    Vector contains the decimal values 0,192,3,64,5 and the
    Acknowledgement Number is decimal 100, then:

        Packet 100 was received (Acknowledgement Number 100, State 0,
        Run Length 0).

        Packet 99 was lost (State 3, Run Length 0).

        Packets 98, 97, 96 and 95 were received (State 0, Run Length 3).

        Packet 94 was ECN marked (State 1, Run Length 0).

        Packets 93, 92, 91, 90, 89, and 88 were received (State 0, Run
        Length 5).

    Run lengths of more than 64 must be encoded in multiple bytes.  A
    single Ack Vector option can acknowledge up to 16192 data packets.
    Should more packets need to be acknowledged than can fit in 253
    bytes of Ack Vector, then multiple Ack Vector options can be sent.
    The second Ack Vector option will begin where the first Ack Vector
    option left off, and so forth.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.5.  [Page 74]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Ack Vector states are subject to two general constraints.  (These
    principles SHOULD also be followed for other acknowledgement
    mechanisms; referring to Ack Vector states simplifies their
    explanation.)

    (1) Packets reported as State 0 or State 1 MUST have been processed
        by the receiving DCCP stack.  In particular, their options must
        have been processed.  Any data on the packet need not have been
        delivered to the receiving application; in fact, the data may
        have been dropped.

    (2) Packets reported as State 3 MUST NOT have been received by DCCP.
        Feature negotiations and options on such packets MUST NOT have
        been processed, and the Acknowledgement Number MUST NOT
        correspond to such a packet.

    Packets dropped in the application's receive buffer SHOULD be
    reported as Received or Received ECN Marked (States 0 and 1),
    depending on their ECN state; such packets' ECN Nonces MUST be
    included in the Nonce Echo.  The Data Dropped option informs the
    sender that some packets reported as received actually had their
    payloads dropped.

    One or more Ack Vector options that, together, report the status of
    more packets than have actually been sent SHOULD be considered
    invalid.  The receiving DCCP SHOULD either ignore the options or
    reset the connection with Reason set to "Option Error".  Packets
    whose status has not reported by any Ack Vector option SHOULD be
    treated as "not yet received" (State 3) by the sender.

    Appendix A provides a non-normative description of the details of
    DCCP acknowledgement handling, in the context of an abstract Ack
    Vector implementation.

8.5.1.  Ack Vector Consistency

    A DCCP sender will commonly receive multiple acknowledgements for
    some of its data packets.  For instance, an HC-Sender might receive
    two DCCP-Acks with Ack Vectors, both of which contained information
    about sequence number 24.  (Because of cumulative acking,
    information about a sequence number is repeated in every ack until
    the HC-Sender acknowledges an ack.  Perhaps the HC-Receiver is
    sending acks faster than the HC-Sender is acknowledging them.)  In a
    perfect world, the two Ack Vectors would always be consistent.
    However, there are many reasons why they might not be:

    o The HC-Receiver received packet 24 between sending its acks, so
      the first ack said 24 was not received (State 3) and the second



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 8.5.1.  [Page 75]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


      said it was received or ECN marked (State 0 or 1).

    o The HC-Receiver received packet 24 between sending its acks, and
      the network reordered the acks.  In this case, the packet will
      appear to transition from State 0 or 1 to State 3.

    o The network duplicated packet 24, and one of the duplicates was
      ECN marked.  This might show up as a transition between States 0
      and 1.

    To cope with these situations, HC-Sender DCCP implementations SHOULD
    combine multiple received Ack Vector states according to this table:

                                Received State
                                  0   1   3
                                +---+---+---+
                              0 | 0 |0/1| 0 |
                        Old     +---+---+---+
                              1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
                       State    +---+---+---+
                              3 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
                                +---+---+---+


    To read the table, choose the row corresponding to the packet's old
    state and the column corresponding to the packet's state in the
    newly received Ack Vector, then read the packet's new state off the
    table.  For an old state of 0 (received non-marked) and received
    state of 1 (received ECN marked), the packet's new state may be set
    to either 0 or 1.  The HC-Sender implementation will be indifferent
    to ack reordering if it chooses new state 1 for that cell.

    The HC-Receiver should collect information about received packets,
    which it will eventually report to the HC-Sender on one or more
    acknowledgements, according to the following table:

                               Received Packet
                                  0   1   3
                                +---+---+---+
                              0 | 0 |0/1| 0 |
                      Stored    +---+---+---+
                              1 |0/1| 1 | 1 |
                       State    +---+---+---+
                              3 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
                                +---+---+---+






Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 8.5.1.  [Page 76]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    This table equals the sender's table, except that when the stored
    state is 1 and the received state is 0, the receiver is allowed to
    switch its stored state to 0.

    A HC-Sender MAY choose to throw away old information gleaned from
    the HC-Receiver's Ack Vectors, in which case it MUST ignore newly
    received acknowledgements from the HC-Receiver for those old
    packets.  It is often kinder to save recent Ack Vector information
    for a while, so that the HC-Sender can undo its reaction to presumed
    congestion when a "lost" packet unexpectedly shows up (the
    transition from State 3 to State 0).

8.5.2.  Ack Vector Coverage

    We can divide the packets that have been sent from an HC-Sender to
    an HC-Receiver into four roughly contiguous groups.  From oldest to
    youngest, these are:

    (1) Packets already acknowledged by the HC-Receiver, where the HC-
        Receiver knows that the HC-Sender has definitely received the
        acknowledgements.

    (2) Packets already acknowledged by the HC-Receiver, where the HC-
        Receiver cannot be sure that the HC-Sender has received the
        acknowledgements.

    (3) Packets not yet acknowledged by the HC-Receiver.

    (4) Packets not yet received by the HC-Receiver.

    The union of groups 2 and 3 is called the Acknowledgement Window.
    Generally, every Ack Vector generated by the HC-Receiver will cover
    the whole Acknowledgement Window: Ack Vector acknowledgements are
    cumulative.  (This simplifies Ack Vector maintenance at the HC-
    Receiver; see Section A, below.)  As packets are received, this
    window both grows on the right and shrinks on the left.  It grows
    because there are more packets, and shrinks because the data
    packets' Acknowledgement Numbers will acknowledge previous
    acknowledgements, moving packets from group 2 into group 1.

8.6.  Slow Receiver Option

    An HC-Receiver sends the Slow Receiver option to its sender to
    indicate that it is having trouble keeping up with the sender's
    data.  The HC-Sender SHOULD NOT increase its sending rate for
    approximately one round-trip time after seeing a packet with a Slow
    Receiver option.  However, the Slow Receiver option does not
    indicate congestion, and the HC-Sender need not reduce its sending



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.6.  [Page 77]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    rate.  (If necessary, the receiver can force the sender to slow down
    by dropping packets, with or without Data Dropped, or reporting
    false ECN marks.)  APIs should let receiver applications set Slow
    Receiver, and sending applications determine whether or not their
    receivers are Slow.

    The Slow Receiver option takes just one byte:

    +--------+
    |00000010|
    +--------+
     Type=2


    Slow Receiver does not specify why the receiver is having trouble
    keeping up with the sender.  Possible reasons include lack of buffer
    space, CPU overload, and application quotas.  A sending application
    might react to Slow Receiver by reducing its sending rate or by
    switching to a lossier compression algorithm.  The sending
    application should not react to Slow Receiver by sending more data,
    however.  For example, the optimal response to a CPU-bound receiver
    might be to increase the sending rate, by switching to a less-
    compressed sending format, since a highly-compressed data format
    might overwhelm a slow CPU more seriously than the higher memory
    requirements of a less-compressed data format.  The Slow Receiver
    option is not appropriate for this case; a CPU-bound receiver should
    not ask for Slow Receiver options to be sent.

    Slow Receiver implements a portion of TCP's receive window
    functionality.  We believe receiver operating systems and
    applications will find it easier to send Slow Receiver when
    appropriate than they currently find it to correctly set a TCP
    receive window.

8.7.  Data Dropped Option

    The Data Dropped option indicates that some packets reported as
    received actually had their data dropped before it reached the
    application.  The sender's congestion control mechanism may respond
    to data-dropped packets less severely than to lost or marked
    packets.  For instance, a windowed mechanism might subtract a
    constant value from its congestion window, rather than cut it in
    half.

    Data Dropped lets a sender differentiate between different kinds of
    loss (network and endpoint), but it does not allow total freedom in
    how to react.  The congestion control response to a Data Dropped
    packet must be approved by the IETF.  Each congestion control



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.7.  [Page 78]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    mechanism MUST react to a Data Dropped packet as if the packet were
    ECN marked, unless explicitly specified otherwise.

    If a received packet's payload is dropped for one of the reasons
    listed below, this SHOULD be reported using a Data Dropped option.
    Alternatively, the receiver MAY choose to report as "received" only
    those packets whose payloads were not dropped, subject to the
    constraint that packets not reported as received MUST NOT have had
    their options processed.

    The option's data looks like this:

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
    |00101000| Length | Block  | Block  | Block  |  ...
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
     Type=40          \___________ Vector ___________ ...

    The vector itself consists of a series of bytes, called Blocks, each
    of whose encoding corresponds to one of these choices:

     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7                  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |0| Run Length  |       or       |1|DrpCd|Run Len|
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      Normal Block                      Drop Block


    The first byte in the first Data Dropped option refers to the packet
    indicated in the Acknowledgement Number; subsequent bytes refer to
    older packets.  (Data Dropped MUST NOT be sent on DCCP-Data or DCCP-
    Request packets, which lack an Acknowledgement Number.)  Normal
    Blocks, which have high bit 0, indicate that any received packets in
    the Run Length had their data delivered to the application.  Drop
    Blocks, which have high bit 1, indicate that received packets in the
    Run Len[gth] were not delivered as usual.  The 3-bit Drop Code
    [DrpCd] field says what happened; generally, no data from that
    packet reached the application.  Packets reported as "not yet
    received" MUST be included in Normal Blocks; packets not covered by
    any Data Dropped option are treated as if they were in a Normal
    Block.  Defined Drop Codes for Drop Blocks are:

        0   Packet data dropped due to protocol constraints.  For
            example, the data was included on a DCCP-Request packet, and
            the receiving application does not allow that piggybacking;
            or the data was sent during an important feature
            negotiation.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.7.  [Page 79]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


        1   Packet data dropped because the application is no longer
            listening.

        2   Packet data dropped in the receive buffer.

        3   Packet data dropped due to corruption.

        4-6 Reserved.

        7   Packet data corrupted, but delivered to the application
            anyway.

    For example, if a Data Dropped option contains the decimal values
    0,160,3,162, the Acknowledgement Number is 100, and an Ack Vector
    reported all packets as received, then:

        Packet 100 was received (Acknowledgement Number 100, Normal
        Block, Run Length 0).

        Packet 99 was dropped in the receive buffer (Drop Block, Drop
        Code 2, Run Length 0).

        Packets 98, 97, 96, and 95 were received (Normal Block, Run
        Length 3).

        Packets 95, 94, and 93 were dropped in the receive buffer (Drop
        Block, Drop Code 2, Run Length 2).

    Run lengths of more than 128 (for Normal Blocks) or 16 (for Drop
    Blocks) must be encoded in multiple Blocks.  A single Data Dropped
    option can acknowledge up to 32384 Normal Block data packets,
    although the receiver SHOULD NOT send a Data Dropped option when all
    relevant packets fit into Normal Blocks.  Should more packets need
    to be acknowledged than can fit in 253 bytes of Data Dropped, then
    multiple Data Dropped options can be sent.  The second option will
    begin where the first option left off, and so forth.

    One or more Data Dropped options that, together, report the status
    of more packets than have been sent, or that change the status of a
    packet, or that disagree with Ack Vector or equivalent options (by
    reporting a "not yet received" packet as "dropped in the receive
    buffer", for example), SHOULD be considered invalid.  The receiving
    DCCP SHOULD respond to invalid Data Dropped options by ignoring them
    or by resetting the connection with Reason set to "Option Error".

    A DCCP application interface should let receiving applications
    specify the Drop Codes corresponding to received packets.  For
    example, this would let applications calculate their own checksums,



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.7.  [Page 80]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    but still report "dropped due to corruption" packets via the Data
    Dropped option.  The interface should not let applications reduce
    the "seriousness" of a packet's Drop Code; for example, the
    application should not be able to upgrade a packet from delivered
    corrupt (Drop Code 7) to delivered normally (no Drop Code).

8.7.1.  Data Dropped and Normal Congestion Response

    When deciding on a response to a particular acknowledgement or set
    of acknowledgements containing Data Dropped packets, a congestion
    control mechanism MUST consider dropped packets and ECN marks
    (including ECN-marked packets that are included in Data Dropped), as
    well as the Data Dropped packets.  For window-based mechanisms, the
    valid response space is defined as follows.

    Assume an old window of W.  Independently calculate a new window
    W_new1 that assumes no packets were Data Dropped (so W_new1 contains
    only the normal congestion response), and a new window W_new2 that
    assumes no packets were lost or marked (so W_new2 contains only the
    Data Dropped response).  We are assuming that Data Dropped
    recommended a reduction in congestion window, so W_new2 < W.

    Then the actual new window W_new MUST NOT be larger than the minimum
    of W_new1 and W_new2; and the sender MAY combine the two responses,
    by setting
    W_new = W + min(W_new1 - W, 0) + min(W_new2 - W, 0).

    Non-window-based congestion control mechanisms MUST behave
    analogously.

8.7.2.  Particular Drop Codes

    Drop Code 0 ("protocol constraints") does not indicate any kind of
    congestion, so the sender's CCID SHOULD react to non-marked packets
    with Drop Code 0 as if they were received.  However, the sending
    DCCP SHOULD NOT send more data until it believes the relevant
    protocol constraint has passed.

    Drop Code 1 ("application no longer listening") means the
    application running at the endpoint that sent the option is no
    longer listening for data.  For example, a server might close its
    receiving half-connection to new data after receiving a complete
    request from the client.  This would limit the amount of state the
    server would expend on incoming data, and thus reduce the potential
    damage from certain denial-of-service attacks.  A Data Dropped
    option containing Drop Code 1 SHOULD be sent whenever received data
    is ignored due to a non-listening application.  Once a DCCP reports
    Drop Code 1 for a packet, it SHOULD report Drop Code 1 for every



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section 8.7.2.  [Page 81]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    succeeding data packet on that half-connection; once a DCCP receives
    a Drop State 1 report, it SHOULD expect that no more data will ever
    be delivered to the other endpoint's application, so it SHOULD NOT
    send more data.  A DCCP receiving Drop Code 1 MAY report this event
    to the application.  (Previous versions of this specification used a
    "Buffer Closed" option instead of Drop Code 1.)

    Drop Code 2 ("receive buffer drop") indicates congestion inside the
    receiving host.  Every packet newly acknowledged as Drop Code 2
    SHOULD reduce the sender's instantaneous rate by one packet per
    round trip time, using whatever mechanism is appropriate for the
    relevant CCID.  Further details may be available in CCID documents.

8.8.  Payload Checksum Option

    The Payload Checksum option holds the Internet checksum (the 16 bit
    one's complement of the one's complement sum) of all 16 bit words in
    the DCCP payload (the data contained in a DCCP-Request, DCCP-
    Response, DCCP-Data, DCCP-DataAck, or DCCP-Move packet).  When
    combined with a nonzero Checksum Coverage, this lets DCCP
    distinguish between corruption in a packet's payload and corruption
    in its header.  Corrupted-header packets MUST be treated as dropped
    by the network, while corrupted-payload packets MAY be treated
    differently; for example, the sender's response to corruption might
    be less stringent than its response to congestion.  A low Checksum
    Coverage lets DCCP process packets with valid headers, even if the
    payload is corrupt, avoiding the congestion response to corruption.
    The Payload Checksum option then lets DCCP detect payload
    corruption, and therefore avoid delivering bad data to the
    application.

    The option looks like this:

    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
    |00101101|00000100|    Checksum     |
    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
     Type=45  Length=4


    The receiving DCCP MUST check the Payload Checksum's value against
    the actual payload checksum.  If the values differ, the packet's
    data SHOULD be dropped, and reported as dropped due to corruption
    (Drop Code 3) using a Data Dropped option (Section 8.7). Optionally,
    DCCP MAY provide an API through which the receiving application
    could request delivery of known-corrupt data.  When that API is
    active, the packet's data SHOULD be delivered, but reported as
    delivered corrupt (Drop Code 7) using a Data Dropped option.  In
    either case, the packet will be reported as Received or Received ECN



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 8.8.  [Page 82]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Marked by Ack Vector or equivalent options.

    A packet processor with access to link-layer error detection
    mechanisms might explicitly set Payload Checksum to zero when the
    link layer reported that a portion of the payload was corrupted.  No
    actual Internet checksum has value zero, so this reliably informs
    the receiver that the payload is corrupt.

    Note that Payload Checksum's value is included in the header
    checksum.

    The Internet checksum used by the Payload Checksum option is
    generally considered weak, but it has the advantage that all IP
    processors can already calculate it.  Applications desiring a
    stronger Payload Checksum should either send a checksum with the
    payload (reporting any checksum violations via the Data Dropped
    API), or propose a new checksum option.

    See Section B.1 for a discussion of the issues related to the use of
    this option.

9.  Explicit Congestion Notification

    The DCCP protocol is fully ECN-aware.  Each CCID specifies how its
    endpoints respond to ECN marks.  Furthermore, DCCP, unlike TCP,
    allows senders to control the rate at which acknowledgements are
    generated (with options like Ack Ratio); this means that
    acknowledgements are generally congestion-controlled, and may have
    ECN-Capable Transport set.

    A CCID profile describes how that CCID interacts with ECN, both for
    data traffic and pure-acknowledgement traffic.  A sender SHOULD set
    ECN-Capable Transport on its packets whenever the receiver has its
    ECN Capable feature turned on and the relevant CCID allows it,
    unless the sending application indicates that ECN should not be
    used.

    The rest of this section describes the ECN Capable feature and the
    interaction of the ECN Nonce with acknowledgement options such as
    Ack Vector.

9.1.  ECN Capable Feature

    The ECN Capable feature lets a DCCP inform its partner that it
    cannot read ECN bits from received IP headers, so the partner must
    not set ECN-Capable Transport on its packets.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 9.1.  [Page 83]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    ECN Capable has feature number 2.  The ECN Capable feature located
    at DCCP A indicates whether or not A can successfully read ECN bits
    from received frames' IP headers.  (This is independent of whether
    it can set ECN bits on sent frames.)  DCCP A sends a "Change L(ECN
    Capable, 0)" option to DCCP B to inform B that A cannot read ECN
    bits.  The ECN Capable feature is a server-priority feature.

    An ECN Capable feature contains a single byte of data.  ECN
    capability is on if and only if this byte is nonzero.

    A new connection starts with ECN Capable 1 (that is, ECN capable)
    for both DCCPs.  If a DCCP is not ECN capable, it MUST send
    "Change L(ECN Capable, 0)" options to the other endpoint until
    acknowledged (by "Confirm R(ECN Capable, 0)") or the connection
    closes.  Furthermore, it MUST NOT accept any data until the other
    endpoint sends "Confirm R(ECN Capable, 0)".  It SHOULD send Data
    Dropped options on its acknowledgements, with Drop Code 0 ("protocol
    constraints"), if the other endpoint does send data inappropriately.

9.2.  ECN Nonces

    Congestion avoidance will not occur, and the receiver will sometimes
    get its data faster, when the sender is not told about any
    congestion events.  Thus, the receiver has some incentive to falsify
    acknowledgement information, reporting that marked or dropped
    packets were actually received unmarked.  This problem is more
    serious with DCCP than with TCP, since TCP provides reliable
    transport: it is more difficult with TCP to lie about lost packets
    without breaking the application.

    ECN Nonces are a general mechanism to prevent ECN cheating (or loss
    cheating).  Two values for the two-bit ECN header field indicate
    ECN-Capable Transport, 01 and 10.  The second code point, 10, is the
    ECN Nonce.  In general, a protocol sender chooses between these code
    points randomly on its output packets, remembering the sequence it
    chose.  The protocol receiver reports, on every acknowledgement, the
    number of ECN Nonces it has received thus far.  This is called the
    ECN Nonce Echo.  Since ECN marking and packet dropping both destroy
    the ECN Nonce, a receiver that lies about an ECN mark or packet drop
    has a 50% chance of guessing right and avoiding discipline.  The
    sender may react punitively to an ECN Nonce mismatch, possibly up to
    dropping the connection.  The ECN Nonce Echo field need not be an
    integer; one bit is enough to catch 50% of infractions.

    In DCCP, the ECN Nonce Echo field is encoded in acknowledgement
    options.  For example, the Ack Vector option comes in two forms, Ack
    Vector [Nonce 0] (option 38) and Ack Vector [Nonce 1] (option 39),
    corresponding to the two values for a one-bit ECN Nonce Echo.  The



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                      Section 9.2.  [Page 84]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Nonce Echo for a given Ack Vector equals the one-bit sum (exclusive-
    or, or parity) of ECN nonces for packets reported by that Ack Vector
    as received and not ECN marked.  Thus, only packets marked as State
    0 matter for this calculation (that is, valid received packets that
    were not ECN marked).  Every Ack Vector option is detailed enough
    for the sender to determine what the Nonce Echo should have been.
    It can check this calculation against the actual Nonce Echo, and
    complain if there is a mismatch.

    (The Ack Vector could conceivably report every packet's ECN Nonce
    state, but this would severely limit Ack Vector's compressibility
    without providing much extra protection.)

    Consider a half-connection from DCCP A to DCCP B.  DCCP A SHOULD set
    ECN Nonces on its packets, and remember which packets had nonces,
    whenever DCCP B reports that it is ECN Capable.  An ECN-capable
    endpoint MUST calculate and use the correct value for ECN Nonce Echo
    when sending acknowledgement options.  An ECN-incapable endpoint,
    however, SHOULD treat the ECN Nonce Echo as always zero.  When a
    sender detects an ECN Nonce Echo mismatch, it SHOULD behave as if
    the receiver had reported one or more packets as ECN-marked (instead
    of unmarked).  It MAY take more punitive action, such as resetting
    the connection.  The Reason for such DCCP-Reset packets SHOULD be
    set to "Aggression Penalty".

    An ECN-incapable DCCP SHOULD ignore received ECN nonces and generate
    ECN nonces of zero.  For instance, out of the two Ack Vector
    options, an ECN-incapable DCCP SHOULD generate Ack Vector [Nonce 0]
    (option 38) exclusively.  (Again, the ECN Capable feature MUST be
    set to zero in this case.)

9.3.  Other Aggression Penalties

    The ECN Nonce provides one way for a DCCP sender to discover that a
    receiver is misbehaving.  There may be other mechanisms, and a
    receiver or middlebox may also discover that a sender is
    misbehaving---sending more data than it should.  In any of these
    cases, the entity that discovers the misbehavior MAY react by
    resetting the connection, with Reason set to "Aggression Penalty".
    A receiver that detects marginal (meaning possibly spurious) sender
    misbehavior MAY instead react with a Slow Receiver option, or by
    reporting some packets as ECN marked that were not, in fact, marked.

10.  Multihoming and Mobility

    DCCP provides primitive support for multihoming and mobility via a
    mechanism for transferring a connection endpoint from one address to
    another.  The moving endpoint must negotiate mobility support



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 10.  [Page 85]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    beforehand, and both endpoints must share their Connection Nonces.
    When the moving endpoint gets a new address, it sends a DCCP-Move
    packet from that address to the stationary endpoint.  The stationary
    endpoint then changes its connection state to use the new address.

    DCCP's support for mobility is intended to solve only the simplest
    multihoming and mobility problems.  For instance, DCCP has no
    support for simultaneous moves.  Applications requiring more complex
    mobility semantics, or more stringent security guarantees, should
    use an existing solution like Mobile IP or [SB00].

10.1.  Mobility Capable Feature

    A DCCP uses the Mobility Capable feature to inform its partner that
    it would like to be able to change its address and/or port during
    the course of the connection.

    Mobility Capable has feature number 5.  The Mobility Capable feature
    located at DCCP A indicates whether or not A will accept a DCCP-Move
    packet sent by B.  DCCP B sends a "Change R(Mobility Capable, 1)"
    option to DCCP A to inform it that B might like to move later.
    Mobility Capable is a server-priority feature.

    A Mobility Capable feature contains a single byte of data.  Mobility
    is allowed if and only if this byte is nonzero.  A DCCP MUST reject
    a DCCP-Move packet referring to a connection when Mobility Capable
    is 0; however, it MAY reject a valid DCCP-Move packet even when
    Mobility Capable is 1.

    A new connection starts with Mobility Capable 0 (that is, mobility
    is not allowed) for both DCCPs.

10.2.  Mobility ID

    A DCCP uses the Mobility ID feature to inform its partner of a
    64-bit number that will act as identification, should the partner
    need to change its address and/or port during the course of the
    connection.

    Mobility ID has feature number 9.  The Mobility ID feature located
    at DCCP A is the identifier that A will use on DCCP-Move packets it
    sends to B.  DCCP B sends a "Change R(Mobility ID, N)" option to
    DCCP A to inform it that of the ID A has chosen for B's use.
    Mobility ID is a non-negotiable feature.

    A Mobility ID feature contains eight bytes of data.  The feature
    remote, say DCCP A, chooses the value of Mobility ID to uniquely
    identify a connection; its value must not equal the value of any



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section 10.2.  [Page 86]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    other Mobility ID currently maintained by DCCP A.  For security,
    DCCP A MUST choose Mobility ID randomly.  Furthermore, it MUST
    reassign Mobility ID after each successful move by DCCP B, and it
    MAY reassign Mobility ID more frequently.

    A new connection starts with Mobility ID 0 for both DCCPs.  Zero is
    not a valid Mobility ID.


10.3.  Security

    The DCCP mobility mechanism, like DCCP in general, does not provide
    cryptographic security guarantees.  Nevertheless, mobile hosts must
    use valid Mobility IDs and include valid Identifications in their
    DCCP-Move packets, providing protection against some classes of
    attackers.  Specifically, an attacker cannot move a DCCP connection
    to a new address unless they know valid Mobility IDs and how to
    generate valid Identifications.  Even with the default MD5
    Identification Regime, this means that an attacker must have snooped
    on every packet in the connection to get a reasonable probability of
    success, assuming that initial sequence numbers and Connection
    Nonces are chosen well (that is, randomly).  Section 16 further
    describes DCCP security considerations.

10.4.  Congestion Control State

    Once an endpoint has transitioned to a new address, the connection
    is effectively a new connection in terms of its congestion control
    state: the accumulated information about congestion between the old
    endpoints no longer applies.  Both DCCPs MUST initialize their
    congestion control state (windows, rates, and so forth) to that of a
    new connection---that is, they must "slow start".

    Similarly, the endpoints' configured MTUs (see 11) SHOULD be
    reinitialized, and PMTU discovery performed again, following an
    address change.

10.5.  Loss During Transition

    Several loss and delay events may affect the transition of a DCCP
    connection from one address to another.  The DCCP-Move packet itself
    might be lost; the acknowledgement to that packet might be lost,
    leaving the mobile endpoint unsure of whether the transition has
    completed; and data from the old endpoint might continue to arrive
    at the receiver even after the transition.

    To protect against lost DCCP-Move packets, the mobile host SHOULD
    retransmit a DCCP-Move packet if it does not receive an



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section 10.5.  [Page 87]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    acknowledgement within a reasonable time period.  Section 5.10
    describes the mechanism used to protect against duplicate DCCP-Move
    packets.

    A receiver MAY drop all data received from the old address/port pair
    once a DCCP-Move has successfully completed.  Alternately, it MAY
    accept one Loss Window's worth of this data.  Congestion and loss
    events on this data SHOULD NOT affect the new connection's
    congestion control state.  The receiver MUST NOT accept data with
    the old address/port pair past one Loss Window, and SHOULD send
    DCCP-Resets in response to those packets.

    During some transition period, acknowledgements from the receiver to
    the mobile host will contain information about packets sent both
    from the old address/port pair, and from the new address/port pair.
    The mobile DCCP should not let loss events on packets from the old
    address/port pair affect the new congestion control state.

11.  Maximum Packet Size

    A DCCP implementation MUST maintain the maximum packet size (MPS)
    allowed for each active DCCP session.  The MPS is influenced by the
    maximum packet size allowed by the current congestion control
    mechanism (CCMPS), the maximum packet size supported by the path's
    links (PMTU, the Path Maximum Transfer Unit) [RFC 1191], and the
    lengths of the IP and DCCP headers.

    A DCCP application interface should let the application discover
    DCCP's current MPS.  DCCP applications should use the API to
    discover the MPS.  Generally, the DCCP implementation will refuse to
    send any packet bigger than the MPS, returning an appropriate error
    to the application.

    A DCCP interface may allow applications to request that packets
    larger than PMTU be fragmented.  This only matters when CCMPS >
    PMTU; packets larger than CCMPS MUST be rejected regardless.
    Fragmentation should not be the default.  The rest of this section
    assumes the application has not requested fragmentation.

    The MPS reported to the application SHOULD be influenced by the size
    expected to be required for DCCP headers and options.  If the
    application provides data that, when combined with the options the
    DCCP implementation would like to include, would exceed the MPS, the
    implementation should either send the options on a separate packet
    (such as a DCCP-Ack) or lower the MPS, drop the data, and return an
    appropriate error to the application.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 11.  [Page 88]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    The PMTU SHOULD be initialized from the interface MTU that will be
    used to send packets.  The MPS will be initialized with the minimum
    of the PMTU and the CCMPS, if any.

    To perform PMTU discovery, the DCCP sender sets the IP Don't
    Fragment (DF) bit.  However, it is undersirable for MTU discovery to
    occur on the initial connection setup handshake, as the connection
    setup process may not be representative of packet sizes used during
    the connection, and performing MTU discovery on the initial
    handshake might unnecessarily delay connection establishment.  Thus,
    DF SHOULD NOT be set on DCCP-Request and DCCP-Response packets. In
    addition DF SHOULD NOT be set on DCCP-Reset packets, although
    typically these would be small enough to not be a problem.  On all
    other DCCP packets, DF SHOULD be set.

    As specified in [RFC 1191], when a router receives a packet with DF
    set that is larger than the next link's MTU, it sends an ICMP
    Destination Unreachable message to the source of the datagram with
    the Code indicating "fragmentation needed and DF set" (also known as
    a "Datagram Too Big" message).  When a DCCP implementation receives
    a Datagram Too Big message, it decreases its PMTU to the Next-Hop
    MTU value given in the ICMP message.  If the MTU given in the
    message is zero, the sender chooses a value for PMTU using the
    algorithm described in Section 7 of [RFC 1191]. If the MTU given in
    the message is greater than the current PMTU, the Datagram Too Big
    message is ignored, as described in [RFC 1191]. (We are aware that
    this may cause problems for DCCP endpoints behind certain
    firewalls.)

    If the DCCP implementation has decreased the PMTU, and the sending
    application attempts to send a packet larger than the new MPS, the
    API MUST cause the send to fail returning an appropriate error to
    the application, and the application SHOULD then use the API to
    query the new value of MPS.  When this occurs, it is possible that
    the kernel has some packets buffered for transmission that are
    smaller than the old MPS, but larger than the new MPS.  The kernel
    MAY send these packets with the DF bit cleared, or it MAY discard
    these packets; it MUST NOT transmit these datagrams with the DF bit
    set.

    A DCCP implementation may allow the application to occasionally
    request that PMTU discovery be performed again.  This will reset the
    PMTU to the outgoing interface's MTU.  Such requests SHOULD be rate
    limited, to one per two seconds, for example.  A successful DCCP-
    Move will also reset the PMTU.

    A DCCP sender MAY optionally treat the reception of an ICMP Datagram
    Too Big message as an indication that the packet being reported was



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 11.  [Page 89]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    not lost due congestion, and so for the purposes of congestion
    control it MAY ignore the DCCP receiver's indication that this
    packet did not arrive.  However, if this is done, then the DCCP
    sender MUST check the ECN bits of the IP header echoed in the ICMP
    message, and only perform this optimization if these ECN bits
    indicate that the packet did not experience congestion prior to
    reaching the router whose link MTU it exceeded.

    With application support, DCCP also allows for upward probing of
    PMTU [PMTUD]: the application would start by sending small packets,
    then gradually increase their sizes.  A DCCP implementation
    supporting this upward probing MAY treat the loss of packets after a
    packet-size increase as an indication of MTU limitation, rather than
    congestion.  XXX

12.  Middlebox Considerations

    This section describes properties of DCCP that firewalls, network
    address translators, and other middleboxes should consider,
    including parts of the packet that middleboxes should not change.
    The intent is to draw attention to aspects of DCCP that may be
    useful, or dangerous, for middleboxes, or that differ significantly
    from TCP.

    The Service Code field in DCCP-Request packets provide information
    that may be useful for stateful middleboxes.  With Service Code, a
    middlebox can tell what protocol a connection will use without
    relying on port numbers.  Middleboxes can disallow attempted
    connections accessing unexpected services by sending a DCCP-Reset
    with Reason set to "Bad Service Code".  Middleboxes probably
    shouldn't modify the Service Code, unless they are really changing
    the service a connection is accessing.

    The Source and Destination Port fields are in the same packet
    locations as the corresponding fields in TCP and UDP, which may
    simplify some middlebox implementations.

    Modifying DCCP Sequence Numbers and Acknowledgement Numbers is more
    tedious and dangerous than modifying TCP sequence numbers.  A
    middlebox that added packets to, or removed packets from, a DCCP
    connection would have to modify, at least: (1) acknowledgement
    options, such as Ack Vector; (2) CCID-specific options, such as
    TFRC's Loss Intervals; and (3) Identification options---for example,
    the default MD5 Identification Regime includes sequence numbers in
    its cryptographic hash.  On ECN-capable connections, the middlebox
    would have to keep track of ECN Nonce information for packets it
    introduced or removed, so that the relevant acknowledgement options
    continued to have correct ECN Nonce Echoes, or risk the connection



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 12.  [Page 90]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    being reset for "Aggression Penalty".  We therefore recommend that
    middleboxes not modify packet streams by adding or removing packets.

    Note that there is less need to modify DCCP's per-packet sequence
    numbers than TCP's per-byte sequence numbers; for example, a
    middlebox can change the contents of a packet without changing its
    sequence number.  (In TCP, sequence number modification is required
    to support protocols like FTP that carry variable-length addresses
    in the data stream.  If such an application were deployed over DCCP,
    middleboxes would simply grow or shrink the relevant packets as
    necessary, without changing their sequence numbers.  This might
    involve fragmenting the packet.)

    Middleboxes may, of course, reset connections in progress.  Clearly
    this requires inserting a packet into one or both packet streams,
    but the difficult issues do not arise.

    DCCP is somewhat unfriendly to "connection splicing" [SHHP00], in
    which clients' connection attempts are intercepted, but possibly
    later "spliced in" to external server connections via sequence
    number manipulations.  A connection splicer at minimum would have to
    ensure that the spliced connections agreed on all relevant feature
    values, which might take some renegotiation.

    Middleboxes that want to trivially support the MD5 Identification
    Regime (Section 6.5.3) should not alter packets' Sequence Number,
    Type, # NDP, Acknowledgement Number, and Reserved fields, or the
    Connection Nonce feature values, which are included in the MD5 hash
    sent with Identification and Challenge options.

    The contents of this section should not be interpreted as a
    wholesale endorsement of stateful middleboxes.

13.  Abstract API

    API issues for DCCP are discussed in another Internet-Draft, in
    progress.

14.  Multiplexing Issues

    In contrast to TCP, DCCP does not offer reliable ordered delivery.
    As a consequence, with DCCP there are no inherent performance
    penalties in layering functionality above DCCP to multiplex several
    sub-flows into a single DCCP connection.

    If it is desired to share congestion control state among multiple
    DCCP flows that share the same source and destination addresses, the
    possibilities are to add DCCP-specific mechanisms to enable this, or



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 14.  [Page 91]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    to use a generic multiplexing facility like the Congestion Manager
    [RFC 3124] residing below the transport layer.  For some DCCP flows,
    the ability to specify the congestion control mechanism might be
    critical, and for these flows the Congestion Manager will only be a
    viable tool if it allows DCCP to specify the congestion control
    mechanism used by the Congestion Manager for that flow.  Thus, to
    allow the sharing of congestion control state among multiple DCCP
    flows, the alternatives seem to be to add DCCP-specific
    functionality to the Congestion Manager, or to add a similar layer
    below DCCP that is specific to DCCP.  We defer issues of DCCP
    operating over a revised version of the Congestion Manager, or over
    a DCCP-specific module for the sharing of congestion control state,
    to later work.

15.  DCCP and RTP

    The Real-Time Transport Protocol, RTP [RFC 3550], is currently used
    over UDP by many of DCCP's target applications (for instance,
    streaming media).  This section therefore discusses the relationship
    between DCCP and RTP, and in particular, the question of whether any
    changes in RTP are necessary or desirable when it is layered over
    DCCP instead of UDP.

    There are two potential sources of overhead in the RTP-over-DCCP
    combination, duplicated acknowledgement information and duplicated
    sequence numbers.  We argue that together, these sources of overhead
    add slightly more than 4 bytes per packet relative to RTP-over-UDP,
    and that eliminating the redundancy would not reduce the overhead.

    First, consider acknowledgements.  Both RTP and DCCP report feedback
    about loss rates to data senders, via Real-Time Control Protocol
    Sender and Receiver Reports (RTCP SR/RR packets) and via DCCP
    acknowledgement options.  These feedback mechanisms are potentially
    redundant.  However, RTCP SR/RR packets contain information not
    present in DCCP acknowledgements, such as "interarrival jitter", and
    DCCP's acknowledgements contain information not transmitted by RTCP,
    such as the ECN Nonce Echo.  Neither feedback mechanism encompasses
    the other.

    Sending both types of feedback isn't particularly costly either.
    RTCP reports are sent relatively infrequently: once every 5 seconds,
    for low-bandwidth flows.  In DCCP, some feedback mechanisms are
    expensive---Ack Vector, for example, is frequent and verbose---but
    others are relatively cheap: CCID 3 (TFRC) acknowledgements take
    between 16 and 32 bytes of options sent once per round trip time.
    (Reporting less frequently than once per RTT would make congestion
    control less responsive to loss.)  We therefore conclude that
    acknowledgement overhead in RTP-over-DCCP is not significantly



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 15.  [Page 92]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    higher than for RTP-over-UDP, at least for CCID 3.

    One clear redundancy can be addressed at the application level.  The
    verbose packet-by-packet loss reports sent in RTCP Extended Reports
    (RTCP XR) Loss RLE Blocks can be derived from DCCP's Ack Vector
    options.  (The converse is not true, since Loss RLE Blocks contain
    no ECN information.)  Since DCCP implementations should provide an
    API for application access to Ack Vector information, RTP-over-DCCP
    applications might request either DCCP Ack Vectors or RTCP Extended
    Report Loss RLE Blocks, but not both.

    Now consider sequence number redundancy on data packets.  The
    embedded RTP header contains a 16-bit RTP sequence number.  Most
    data packets will use the DCCP-Data type; DCCP-DataAck and DCCP-Ack
    packets need not usually be sent.  The DCCP-Data header is 12 bytes
    long without options, including a 24-bit sequence number.  This is 4
    bytes more than a UDP header.  Any options required on data packets
    would add further overhead, although many CCIDs (for instance, CCID
    3, TFRC) don't require options on most data packets.

    The DCCP sequence number cannot be inferred from the RTP sequence
    number since it increments on non-data packets as well as data
    packets.  The RTP sequence number cannot be inferred from the DCCP
    sequence number either; for instance, RTP sequence numbers might be
    sent out of order.  Furthermore, removing RTP's sequence number
    would not save any header space because of alignment issues.  We
    therefore recommend that RTP transmitted over DCCP use the same
    headers currently defined.  The 4 byte header cost is a reasonable
    tradeoff for DCCP's congestion control features and access to ECN.
    Truly bandwidth-starved endpoints should use header compression.

16.  Security Considerations

    DCCP does not provide cryptographic security guarantees.
    Applications desiring hard security should use IPsec or end-to-end
    security of some kind.  Nevertheless, DCCP is intended to protect
    against some classes of attackers.

    Attackers cannot hijack a mobility-incapable DCCP connection (close
    the connection unexpectedly, or cause attacker data to be accepted
    by an endpoint as if it came from the sender) unless they can guess
    valid sequence numbers.  Thus, as long as endpoints choose initial
    sequence numbers well, a DCCP attacker must snoop on data packets to
    get any reasonable probability of success.  The sequence number
    validity (Section 5.2) mechanism provide this guarantee.  We also
    avoid leaking sequence numbers to possibly malicious endpoints.
    This is why invalid DCCP-Moves are ignored rather than reset, for
    example.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 16.  [Page 93]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


16.1.  Security Considerations for Mobility

    Mobility slightly changes this security guarantee by introducing a
    new mechanism by which an attacker can hijack a connection.  This
    mechanism, DCCP-Move, has the unfortunate property that, given a
    successful attack, the victim could not realize that the connection
    has been stolen---its connection would simply be reset unexpectedly.

    Nevertheless, a DCCP attacker still must snoop on data packets to
    get any reasonable probability of success.  Specifically, an
    attacker can send a valid DCCP-Move packet if it can guess a valid
    Mobility ID AND it can generate valid Identification options.  DCCP-
    Move packets need not contain valid Sequence or Acknowledgement
    Numbers, since a move might often follow a long burst of loss, so
    endpoints must choose these values well to prevent attack.  Randomly
    choosing Connection Nonces and Mobility IDs should suffice, although
    we are concerned about the fact that Mobility IDs do not expire like
    sequence numbers do [[XXX]].

16.2.  Security Considerations for Partial Checksums

    The partial checksum facility has separate security impact,
    particularly in its interaction with authentication and encryption
    mechanisms.  The impact is the same in DCCP as in the UDP-Lite
    protocol, and what follows was adapted from the corresponding text
    in the UDP-Lite specification [UDP-LITE].

    When a DCCP packet's Checksum Coverage field is not zero, the
    uncovered portion of a packet may change in transit.  This is
    contrary to the idea behind most authentication mechanisms:
    authentication succeeds if the packet has not changed in transit.
    Unless authentication mechanisms that operate only on the sensitive
    part of packets are developed and used, authentication will always
    fail for partially-checksummed DCCP packets whose uncovered part has
    been damaged.

    The IPsec integrity check (Encapsulation Security Protocol, ESP, or
    Authentication Header, AH) is applied (at least) to the entire IP
    packet payload.  Corruption of any bit within that area will then
    result in the IP receiver discarding a DCCP packet, even if the
    corruption happened in an uncovered part of the DCCP payload.

    When IPsec is used with ESP payload encryption, a link can not
    determine the specific transport protocol of a packet being
    forwarded by inspecting the IP packet payload.  In this case, the
    link MUST provide a standard integrity check covering the entire IP
    packet and payload.  DCCP partial checksums provide no benefit in
    this case.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section 16.2.  [Page 94]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Encryption (e.g., at the transport or application levels) may be
    used.  Note that omitting an integrity check can, under certain
    circumstances, compromise confidentiality [BEL98].

    If a few bits of an encrypted packet are damaged, the decryption
    transform will typically spread errors so that the packet becomes
    too damaged to be of use.  Many encryption transforms today exhibit
    this behavior.  There exist encryption transforms, stream ciphers,
    which do not cause error propagation.  Proper use of stream ciphers
    can be quite difficult, especially when authentication-checking is
    omitted [BB01]. In particular, an attacker can cause predictable
    changes to the ultimate plaintext, even without being able to
    decrypt the ciphertext.

17.  IANA Considerations

    DCCP introduces several sets of numbers whose values should be
    allocated by IANA.  The following sets of numbers should require an
    IETF standards-track specification as a prerequisite for new
    registrations.

    o DCCP Packet Types 9 through 15 (Section 5.1).

    o 8-bit DCCP-Reset Reasons (Section 5.9).

    o 8-bit DCCP Option Types (Section 6). The CCID-specific options 128
      through 255 need not be allocated by IANA, although particular
      CCIDs may request that IANA allocate their CCID-specific options.

    o 8-bit DCCP Feature Numbers (Section 6.4). The CCID-specific
      features 128 through 255 need not be allocated by IANA, although
      particular CCIDs may request that IANA allocate their CCID-
      specific features.

    o 8-bit DCCP Congestion Control Identifiers (CCIDs) (Section 7).

    o 16-bit Identification Regimes, for use with DCCP Identification
      and Challenge options (Section 6.5).

    o Ack Vector States (Section 8.5). Only State 2 remains unallocated.

    o Data Dropped Drop Codes 4 through 6 (Section 8.7).

    32-bit Service Codes (Section 5.5), which are not specific to DCCP,
    will require more liberal registration rules.  Service Codes are
    meant to correspond to application-level services.  For example,
    there might be a Service Code for HTTP connections, one for FTP
    control connections, and one for FTP data connections.  However, a



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 17.  [Page 95]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    special-purpose Web server might use a Service Code different from
    HTTP's to indicate its function.  We suggest that IANA allocate
    Service Codes to anyone who asks, subject to the following
    guidelines.

    o No specification, standards-track or otherwise, is required to
      request a Service Code.

    o Service Codes should be allocated one at a time, or in small
      blocks.  A particular intended service should be described, in a
      short English phrase, before a Service Code can be allocated.

    o IANA should maintain an association of Service Codes to the
      corresponding short English phrases.

    o Users may request specific Service Code values.  The requested
      values should be assigned first-come first-serve.  We suggest that
      users request Service Codes that can be interpreted as meaningful
      four-byte ASCII strings.  Thus, the "Frobodyne Plotz Protocol"
      might correspond to "fdpz", or the number 1717858426.  The
      canonical interpretation of a Service Code field is numeric.

    o The subset of Service Codes in which the high-order byte has a
      value between 65 and 90, inclusive---the capital letters in
      ASCII---should be reserved for international standard or
      standards-track specifications, IETF or otherwise.

    o Furthermore, the subset of Service Codes in which the high-order
      byte has the value 63---ASCII '?'---should never be allocated.
      These Service Codes are reserved for private use.

    o Service Code 0 should never be allocated either.  It represents
      the absence of a meaningful Service Code.

    This design for Service Code allocation is based on the allocation
    of 4-byte identifiers for Macintosh resources, PNG chunks, and
    TrueType and OpenType tables.

    Finally, DCCP requires a Protocol Number to be added to the registry
    of Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers.  Experimental implementors
    should use Protocol Number 33 for DCCP, but this number may change
    in future.

18.  Thanks

    There is a wealth of work in this area, including the Congestion
    Manager.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                       Section 18.  [Page 96]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    We thank the staff and interns of ICIR and, formerly, ACIRI, the
    members of the End-to-End Research Group, and the members of the
    Transport Area Working Group for their feedback on DCCP.  We
    especially thank the DCCP expert reviewers: Greg Minshall, Eric
    Rescorla, and Magnus Westerlund for detailed written comments and
    problem spotting, and Rob Austein and Steve Bellovin for verbal
    comments and written notes.

    We also thank those who provided comments and suggestions via the
    DCCP BOF, Working Group, and mailing lists, including Damon
    Lanphear, Patrick McManus, Sara Karlberg, Kevin Lai, Youngsoo Choi,
    Dan Duchamp, Gorry Fairhurst, Derek Fawcus, David Timothy Fleeman,
    John Loughney, Ghyslain Pelletier, Tom Phelan, Stanislav Shalunov,
    Yufei Wang, and Michael Welzl.  In particular, Michael Welzl
    suggested the Payload Checksum option.

A.  Appendix: Ack Vector Implementation Notes

    This appendix discusses particulars of DCCP acknowledgement
    handling, in the context of an abstract implementation for Ack
    Vector.  It is informative rather than normative.

    The first part of our implementation runs at the HC-Receiver, and
    therefore acknowledges data packets.  It generates Ack Vector
    options.  The implementation has the following characteristics:

    o At most one byte of state per acknowledged packet.

    o O(1) time to update that state when a new packet arrives (normal
      case).

    o Cumulative acknowledgements.

    o Quick removal of old state.

    The basic data structure is a circular buffer containing information
    about acknowledged packets.  Each byte in this buffer contains a
    state and run length; the state can be 0 (packet received), 1
    (packet ECN marked), or 3 (packet not yet received).  The buffer
    grows from right to left.  The implementation maintains five
    variables, aside from the buffer contents:

    o "buf_head" and "buf_tail", which mark the live portion of the
      buffer.

    o "buf_ackno", the Acknowledgement Number of the most recent packet
      acknowledged in the buffer.  This corresponds to the "head"
      pointer.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                        Section A.  [Page 97]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    o "buf_nonce", the one-bit sum (exclusive-or, or parity) of the ECN
      Nonces received on all packets acknowledged by the buffer with
      State 0.

    We draw acknowledgement buffers like this:

      +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
      |S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|   |   |   |   |   |S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|
      +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
                    ^                       ^
                 buf_tail         buf_head, buf_ackno = A     buf_nonce = E

                   <=== Head and Tail move this way <===


    Each `S,L' represents a State/Run length byte.  We will draw these
    buffers showing only their live portion, and will add an annotation
    showing the Acknowledgement Number for the last live byte in the
    buffer.  For example:

       +-----------------------------------------------+
     A |S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L|S,L| T    BN[E]
       +-----------------------------------------------+


    Here, buf_nonce equals E and buf_ackno equals A.  This smaller
    Example Buffer contains actual data.

             +---------------------------+
          10 |0,0|3,0|3,0|3,0|0,4|1,0|0,0| 0    BN[1]   [Example Buffer]
             +---------------------------+


    In concrete terms, its meaning is as follows:

        Packet 10 was received.  (The head of the buffer has sequence
        number 10, state 0, and run length 0.)

        Packets 9, 8, and 7 have not yet been received.  (The three
        bytes preceding the head each have state 3 and run length 0.)

        Packets 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2 were received.

        Packet 1 was ECN marked.

        Packet 0 was received.





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                        Section A.  [Page 98]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


        The one-bit sum of the ECN Nonces on packets 10, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2,
        and 0 equals 1.

    Additionally, the HC-Receiver must keep some information about the
    Ack Vectors it has recently sent.  For each packet sent carrying an
    Ack Vector, it remembers four variables:

    o "ack_seqno", the Sequence Number used for the packet.  This is an
      HC-Receiver sequence number.

    o "ack_ptr", the value of buf_head at the time of acknowledgement.

    o "ack_ackno", the Acknowledgement Number "A" used for the packet.
      This is an HC-Sender sequence number.  Since acknowledgements are
      cumulative, this single number completely specifies all necessary
      information about the packets acknowledged by this Ack Vector.

    o "ack_nonce", the one-bit sum of the ECN Nonces for all State 0
      packets in the buffer from Head to "A", inclusive.  Initially,
      this equals the Nonce Echo of the acknowledgement's Ack Vector
      (or, if the ack packet contained more than one Ack Vector, the
      exclusive-or of all the acknowledgement's Ack Vectors), but it can
      change as information about old acknowledgements is removed, or as
      old packets arrive (so they change from State 3 or State 1 to
      State 0).

A.1.  Packet Arrival

    This section describes how the HC-Receiver updates its
    acknowledgement buffer as packets arrive from the HC-Sender.

A.1.1.  New Packets

    When a packet with Sequence Number greater than buf_ackno arrives,
    the HC-Receiver updates buf_head (by moving it to the left
    appropriately), buf_ackno (which is set to the new packet's Sequence
    Number), and possibly buf_nonce (if the packet arrived unmarked with
    ECN Nonce 1), in addition to the buffer itself.  For example, if HC-
    Sender packet 11 arrived ECN marked, the Example Buffer above would
    enter this new state (changes are marked with stars):

          ** +***----------------------------+
          11 |1,0|0,0|3,0|3,0|3,0|0,4|1,0|0,0| 0    BN[1]
          ** +***----------------------------+


    If the packet's state equals the state at the head of the buffer,
    the HC-Receiver may choose to increment its run length (up to the



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                    Section A.1.1.  [Page 99]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    maximum).  For example, if HC-Sender packet 11 arrived without ECN
    marking and with ECN Nonce 0, the Example Buffer might enter this
    state instead:

              ** +--*------------------------+
              11 |0,1|3,0|3,0|3,0|0,4|1,0|0,0| 0    BN[1]
              ** +--*------------------------+


    Of course, the new packet's sequence number might not equal the
    expected sequence number.  In this case, the HC-Receiver will enter
    the intervening packets as State 3.  If several packets are missing,
    the HC-Receiver may prefer to enter multiple bytes with run length
    0, rather than a single byte with a larger run length; this
    simplifies table updates if one of the missing packets arrives.  For
    example, if HC-Sender packet 12 arrived with ECN Nonce 1, the
    Example Buffer would enter this state:

      ** +*******----------------------------+         *
      12 |0,0|3,0|0,1|3,0|3,0|3,0|0,4|1,0|0,0| 0    BN[0]
      ** +*******----------------------------+         *


    Of course, the circular buffer may overflow, either when the HC-
    Sender is sending data at a very high rate, when the HC-Receiver's
    acknowledgements are not reaching the HC-Sender, or when the HC-
    Sender is forgetting to acknowledge those acks (so the HC-Receiver
    is unable to clean up old state).  In this case, the HC-Receiver
    should either compress the buffer (by increasing run lengths when
    possible), transfer its state to a larger buffer, or, as a last
    resort, drop all received packets, without processing them
    whatsoever, until its buffer shrinks again.

A.1.2.  Old Packets

    When a packet with Sequence Number S arrives, and S <= buf_ackno,
    the HC-Receiver will scan the table for the byte corresponding to S.
    (Indexing structures could reduce the complexity of this scan.)  If
    S was previously lost (State 3), and it was stored in a byte with
    run length 0, the HC-Receiver can simply change the byte's state.
    For example, if HC-Sender packet 8 was received with ECN Nonce 0,
    the Example Buffer would enter this state:

                 +--------*------------------+
              10 |0,0|3,0|0,0|3,0|0,4|1,0|0,0| 0    BN[1]
                 +--------*------------------+





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                   Section A.1.2.  [Page 100]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    If S was not marked as lost, or if it was not contained in the
    table, the packet is probably a duplicate, and should be ignored.
    (The new packet's ECN marking state might differ from the state in
    the buffer; Section 8.5.1 describes what is allowed then.)  If S's
    buffer byte has a non-zero run length, then the buffer might need be
    reshuffled to make space for one or two new bytes.

    The ack_nonce fields may also need manipulation when old packets
    arrive.  In particular, when S transitions from State 3 or State 1
    to State 0, and S had ECN Nonce 1, then the implementation should
    flip the value of ack_nonce for every acknowledgement with ack_ackno
    >= S.

    It is impossible with this data structure to shift packets from
    State 0 to State 1, since the buffer doesn't store individual
    packets' ECN Nonces.

A.2.  Sending Acknowledgements

    Whenever the HC-Receiver needs to generate an acknowledgement, the
    buffer's contents can simply be copied into one or more Ack Vector
    options.  Copied Ack Vectors might not be maximally compressed; for
    example, the Example Buffer above contains three adjacent 3,0 bytes
    that could be combined into a single 3,2 byte.  The HC-Receiver
    might, therefore, choose to compress the buffer in place before
    sending the option, or to compress the buffer while copying it;
    either operation is simple.

    Every acknowledgement sent by the HC-Receiver SHOULD include the
    entire state of the buffer.  That is, acknowledgements are
    cumulative.

    If the acknowledgement fits in one Ack Vector, that Ack Vector's
    Nonce Echo simply equals buf_nonce.  For multiple Ack Vectors, more
    care is required.  The Ack Vectors should be split at points
    corresponding to previous acknowledgements, since the stored
    ack_nonce fields provide enough information to calculate correct
    Nonce Echoes.  The implementation should therefore acknowledge data
    at least once per 253 bytes of buffer state.  (Otherwise, there'd be
    no way to calculate a Nonce Echo.)

    For each acknowledgement it sends, the HC-Receiver will add an
    acknowledgement record.  ack_seqno will equal the HC-Receiver
    sequence number it used for the ack packet; ack_ackno will equal
    buf_ackno; and ack_nonce will equal buf_nonce.






Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section A.2.  [Page 101]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


A.3.  Clearing State

    Some of the HC-Sender's packets will include acknowledgement
    numbers, which ack the HC-Receiver's acknowledgements.  When such an
    ack is received, the HC-Receiver finds the acknowledgement record R
    with the appropriate ack_seqno, then:

    o Sets buf_tail to R.ack_ptr + 1.

    o If R.ack_nonce is 1, it flips buf_nonce, and the value of every
      ack_nonce for later ack record.

    o Throws away R and every preceding ack record.

    (The HC-Receiver may choose to keep some older information, in case
    a lost packet shows up late.)  For example, say that the HC-Receiver
    storing the Example Buffer had sent two acknowledgements already:

    (1) ack_seqno = 59, ack_ackno = 3, ack_nonce = 1.

    (2) ack_seqno = 60, ack_ackno = 10, ack_nonce = 0.

    Say the HC-Receiver then received a DCCP-DataAck packet with
    Acknowledgement Number 59 from the HC-Sender.  This informs the HC-
    Receiver that the HC-Sender received, and processed, all the
    information in HC-Receiver packet 59.  This packet acknowledged HC-
    Sender packet 3, so the HC-Sender has now received HC-Receiver's
    acknowledgements for packets 0, 1, 2, and 3. The Example Buffer
    should enter this state:

                 +------------------*+ *       *
              10 |0,0|3,0|3,0|3,0|0,2| 4    BN[0]
                 +------------------*+ *       *


    The tail byte's run length was adjusted, since packet 3 was in the
    middle of that byte.  Since R.ack_nonce was 1, the buf_nonce field
    was flipped, as were the ack_nonce fields for later acknowledgements
    (here, the HC-Receiver Ack 60 record, not shown, has its ack_nonce
    set to 1).  The HC-Receiver can also throw away stored information
    about HC-Receiver Ack 59 and any earlier acknowledgements.

    A careful implementation might try to ensure reasonable robustness
    to reordering.  Suppose that the Example Buffer is as before, but
    that packet 9 now arrives, out of sequence.  The buffer would enter
    this state:





Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section A.3.  [Page 102]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


                 +----*----------------------+
              10 |0,0|0,0|3,0|3,0|0,4|1,0|0,0| 0     BN[1]
                 +----*----------------------+

    The danger is that the HC-Sender might acknowledge the P2's previous
    acknowledgement (with sequence number 60), which says that Packet 9
    was not received, before the HC-Receiver has a chance to send a new
    acknowledgement saying that Packet 9 actually was received.
    Therefore, when packet 9 arrived, the HC-Receiver might modify its
    acknowledgement record to:

    (1) ack_seqno = 59, ack_ackno = 3, ack_nonce = 1.

    (2) ack_seqno = 60, ack_ackno = 3, ack_nonce = 1.

    That is, Ack 60 is now treated like a duplicate of Ack 59.  This
    would prevent the Tail pointer from moving past packet 9 until the
    HC-Receiver knows that the HC-Sender has seen an Ack Vector
    indicating that packet's arrival.

A.4.  Processing Acknowledgements

    When the HC-Sender receives an acknowledgement, it generally cares
    about the number of packets that were dropped and/or ECN marked.  It
    simply reads this off the Ack Vector. Additionally, it may check the
    ECN Nonce for correctness.  (As described in Section 8.5.1, it may
    want to keep more detailed information about acknowledged packets in
    case packets change states between acknowledgements, or in case the
    application queries whether a packet arrived.)

    The HC-Sender must also acknowledge the HC-Receiver's
    acknowledgements so that the HC-Receiver can free old Ack Vector
    state.  (Since Ack Vector acknowledgements are reliable, the HC-
    Receiver must maintain and resend Ack Vector information until it is
    sure that the HC-Sender has received that information.)  A simple
    algorithm suffices: since Ack Vector acknowledgements are
    cumulative, a single acknowledgement number tells HC-Receiver how
    much ack information has arrived.  Assuming that the HC-Receiver
    sends no data, the HC-Sender can simply ensure that at least once a
    round-trip time, it sends a DCCP-DataAck packet acknowledging the
    latest DCCP-Ack packet it has received.  Of course, the HC-Sender
    only needs to acknowledge the HC-Receiver's acknowledgements if the
    HC-Sender is also sending data.  If the HC-Sender is not sending
    data, then the HC-Receiver's Ack Vector state is stable, and there
    is no need to shrink it.  The HC-Sender must watch for drops and ECN
    marks on received DCCP-Ack packets so that it can adjust the HC-
    Receiver's ack-sending rate---for example, with Ack Ratio---in
    response to congestion.



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section A.4.  [Page 103]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    If the other half-connection is not quiescent---that is, the HC-
    Receiver is sending data to the HC-Sender, possibly using another
    CCID---then the acknowledgements on that half-connection are
    sufficient for the HC-Receiver to free its state.

B.  Appendix: Design Motivation

    In the section we attempt to capture some of the rationale behind
    specific details of DCCP design.

B.1.  CsCov and Partial Checksumming

    A great deal of discussion has taken place regarding the utility of
    allowing a DCCP sender to restrict the checksum so that it does not
    cover the complete packet.

    Many of the applications that we envisage using DCCP are resilient
    to some degree of data loss, or they would typically have chosen a
    reliable transport.  Some of these applications may also be
    resilient to data corruption---some audio payloads, for example.
    These resilient applications might prefer to receive corrupted data
    than to have DCCP drop a corrupted packet.  This is particularly
    because of congestion control: DCCP cannot tell the difference
    between packets dropped due to corruption and packets dropped due to
    congestion, and so it must reduce the transmission rate accordingly.
    This response may cause the connection to receive less bandwidth
    than it is due; corruption in some networking technologies is
    independent of, or at least not always correlated to, congestion.
    Therefore, corrupted packets do not need to cause as strong a
    reduction in transmission rate as the congestion response would
    dictate (so long as the DCCP header and options are not corrupt).

    Thus DCCP allows the checksum to cover all of the packet, just the
    DCCP header, or both the DCCP header and some number of bytes from
    the payload.  If the application cannot tolerate any payload
    corruption, then the checksum MUST cover the whole packet.  If the
    application would prefer to tolerate some corruption rather than
    have the packet dropped, then it can set the checksum to cover only
    part of the packet (but always the DCCP header).  In addition, if
    the application wishes to decouple checksumming of the DCCP header
    from checksumming of the payload, it may do so by including the
    Payload Checksum option.  This would allow payload corruption to
    cause DCCP to discard a corrupted payload, but still not mistake the
    corruption for network congestion.

    Thus, from the application point of view, partial checksums seem to
    be a desirable feature.  However, the usefulness of partial
    checksums depends on partially corrupted packets being delivered to



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                     Section B.1.  [Page 104]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    the receiver.  If the link-layer CRC always discards corrupted
    packets, then this will not happen, and so the usefulness of partial
    checksums would be restricted to corruption that occurred in routers
    and other places not covered by link CRCs.  There does not appear to
    be consensus on how likely it is that future network links that
    suffer significant corruption will not cover the entire packet with
    a single strong CRC.  DCCP makes it possible to tailor such links to
    the application, but it is difficult to predict if this will be
    compelling for future link technologies.

    In addition, partial checksums do not co-exist well with IP-level
    authentication mechanisms such as IPsec AH, which cover the entire
    packet with a cryptographic hash.  Thus, if cryptographic
    authentication mechanisms are required to co-exist with partial
    checksums, the authentication must be carried in the DCCP payload.
    A possible mode of usage would appear to be similar to that of
    Secure RTP.  However, such "application-level" authentication does
    not protect the DCCP option negotiation and state machine from
    forged packets.  An alternative would be to use IPsec ESP, and use
    encryption to protect the DCCP headers against attack, while using
    the DCCP header validity checks to authenticate that the header is
    from someone who possessed the correct key.  However, while this is
    resistant to replay (due to the DCCP sequence number), it is not by
    itself resistant to some forms of man-in-the-middle attacks because
    the payload is not tightly coupled to the packet header.  Thus an
    application-level authentication probably needs to be coupled with
    IPsec ESP or a similar mechanism to provide a reasonably complete
    security solution.  The overhead of such a solution might be
    unacceptable for some applications that would otherwise wish to use
    partial checksums.

    On balance, the authors believe that DCCP partial checksums have the
    potential to enable some future uses that would otherwise be
    difficult.  As the cost and complexity of supporting them is small,
    it seems worth including them at this time.  It remains to be seen
    whether they are useful in practice.

Normative References

    [RFC 793] J. Postel, editor.  Transmission Control Protocol.  RFC
        793.

    [RFC 1191] J. C. Mogul and S. E. Deering.  Path MTU Discovery.  RFC
        1191.

    [RFC 2026] S. Bradner.  The Internet Standards Process---Revision 3.
        RFC 2026.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                   [Page 105]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    [RFC 2119] S. Bradner.  Key Words For Use in RFCs to Indicate
        Requirement Levels.  RFC 2119.

    [RFC 2460] S. Deering and R. Hinden.  Internet Protocol, Version 6
        (IPv6) Specification.  RFC 2460.

    [RFC 3168] K.K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd, and D. Black.  The Addition
        of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP. RFC 3168.
        September 2001.

Informative References

    [BB01] S.M. Bellovin and M. Blaze.  Cryptographic Modes of Operation
        for the Internet.  2nd NIST Workshop on Modes of Operation,
        August 2001.

    [BEL98] S.M. Bellovin.  Cryptography and the Internet.  Proc. CRYPTO
        '98 (LNCS 1462), pp46-55, August, 1988.

    [CCID 2 PROFILE] S. Floyd and E. Kohler.  Profile for DCCP
        Congestion Control ID 2: TCP-like Congestion Control.  draft-
        ietf-dccp-ccid2-04.txt, work in progress, October 2003.

    [CCID 3 PROFILE] S. Floyd, E. Kohler, and J. Padhye.  Profile for
        DCCP Congestion Control ID 3: TFRC Congestion Control.  draft-
        ietf-dccp-ccid3-04.txt, work in progress, October 2003.

    [ECN NONCE] David Wetherall, David Ely, and Neil Spring.  Robust ECN
        Signaling with Nonces.  draft-ietf-tsvwg-tcp-nonce-04.txt, work
        in progress, October 2002.

    [PMTUD] Matt Mathis, John Heffner, and Kevin Lahey.  Path MTU
        Discovery.  draft-ietf-pmtud-method-00.txt, work in progress,
        October 2003.

    [RFC 1948] S. Bellovin.  Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks.
        RFC 1948.

    [RFC 2960] R. Stewart, Q. Xie, K. Morneault, C. Sharp, H.
        Schwarzbauer, T. Taylor, I.  Rytina, M. Kalla, L. Zhang, and V.
        Paxson.  Stream Control Transmission Protocol.  RFC 2960.

    [RFC 3124] H. Balakrishnan and S. Seshan.  The Congestion Manager.
        RFC 3124.

    [RFC 3448] M. Handley, S. Floyd, J. Padhye, and J. Widmer.  TCP
        Friendly Rate Control (TFRC): Protocol Specification.  RFC 3448.




Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                   [Page 106]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    [RFC 3550] H. Schulzrinne, S. Casner, R. Frederick, and V. Jacobson.
        RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications.  RFC 3550.

    [SB00] Alex C. Snoeren and Hari Balakrishnan.  An End-to-End
        Approach to Host Mobility.  Proc. 6th Annual ACM/IEEE
        International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking
        (MOBICOM '00), August 2000.

    [SHHP00] Oliver Spatscheck, Jorgen S. Hansen, John H. Hartman, and
        Larry L.  Peterson.  Optimizing TCP Forwarder Performance.
        IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 8(2):146-157, April 2000.

    [SYNCOOKIES] Daniel J. Bernstein.  SYN Cookies.
        http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html, as of July 2003.

    [UDP-LITE] L-A. Larzon, M. Degermark, S. Pink, L-E. Jonsson
        (editor), and G. Fairhurst (editor).  The UDP-Lite Protocol.
        draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-lite-02.txt, work in progress, August 2003.

Authors' Addresses

    Eddie Kohler <kohler@icir.org>
    Mark Handley <mjh@icir.org>
    Sally Floyd <floyd@icir.org>

    ICSI Center for Internet Research
    1947 Center Street, Suite 600
    Berkeley, CA 94704 USA

    Jitendra Padhye <padhye@microsoft.com>

    Microsoft Research
    One Microsoft Way
    Redmond, WA 98052 USA


Full Copyright Statement

    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

    This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
    others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
    or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
    and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
    kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
    are included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
    document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
    the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other



Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                   [Page 107]

INTERNET-DRAFT             Expires: April 2004              October 2003


    Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
    developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
    copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
    followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
    English.

    The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
    revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

    This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
    "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
    TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
    BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
    HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
    MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.




































Kohler/Handley/Floyd/Padhye                                   [Page 108]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.109, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/