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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 RFC 6738

Network Working Group                                         V. Cakulev
Internet-Draft                                            Alcatel Lucent
Intended status: Standards Track                                 A. Lior
Expires: December 16, 2011                           Bridgewater Systems
                                                           June 14, 2011


  Diameter IKEv2 PSK: Pre-Shared Key-based Support for IKEv2 Server to
                      Diameter Server Interaction
               draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-08.txt

Abstract

   The Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) is a component
   of the IPsec architecture and is used to perform mutual
   authentication as well as to establish and to maintain IPsec security
   associations (SAs) between the respective parties.  IKEv2 supports
   several different authentication mechanisms, such as the Extensible
   Authentication Protocol (EAP), certificates, and pre-shared keys.

   Diameter interworking for Mobile IPv6 between the Home Agent, as a
   Diameter client, and the Diameter server has been specified.
   However, that specification focused on the usage of EAP and did not
   include support for pre-shared key based authentication available
   with IKEv2.  This document specifies IKEv2 server, as a Diameter
   client, to the Diameter server communication for IKEv2 with pre-
   shared key based authentication.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 16, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the



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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  Support for IKEv2 and Pre-Shared Keys  . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  Session Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       4.2.1.  Session-Termination-Request/Answer . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.2.2.  Abort-Session-Request/Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Command Codes for Diameter IKEv2 with PSK  . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.1.  IKEv2-PSK-Request (IKEPSKR) Command  . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.2.  IKEv2-PSK-Answer (IKEPSKA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Attribute Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     6.1.  IKEv2-Nonces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       6.1.1.  Ni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       6.1.2.  Nr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  AVP Occurrence Tables  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  AVP Flag Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     9.1.  Command Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     9.2.  AVP Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     9.3.  AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     9.4.  Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18








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1.  Introduction

   The Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol [RFC5996] is
   used to mutually authenticate two parities and to establish a
   security association (SA) that can be used to efficiently secure the
   communication between the IKEv2 Peer and Server, for example, using
   Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] and/or Authentication
   Header (AH) [RFC4302].  The IKEv2 protocol allows several different
   mechanisms for authenticating a IKEv2 Peer to be used, such as the
   Extensible Authentication Protocol, certificates, and pre-shared key.

   From a service provider perspective, it is important to ensure that a
   user is authorized to use the services.  Therefore, the IKEv2 Server
   must verify that the IKEv2 Peer is authorized for the requested
   services possibly with the assistance of the operator's Diameter
   servers.  [RFC5778] defines the home agent as a Diameter client to
   the Diameter server communication when the mobile node authenticates
   using the IKEv2 protocol with the Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (EAP) [RFC3748] or using the Mobile IPv6 Authentication Protocol
   [RFC4285].  This document specifies IKEv2 server, as a Diameter
   client, to the Diameter server communication for IKEv2 with pre-
   shared key based authentication.

   This document does not assume that the IKEv2 Server has the pre-
   shared key (PSK) with the IKEv2 Peer.  Instead, it allows for PSK to
   be derived for a specific IKEv2 session and exchanged between IKEv2
   Server and Home Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (HAAA)
   server.  This is accomplished through the use of a new Diameter
   application specifically designed for performing IKEv2 authorization
   decisions.  This document focuses on the IKEv2 server, as a Diameter
   client, communicating to the Diameter server and specifies the
   Diameter application needed for this communication.  The derivation
   of the PSK used in IKEv2 authentication is not specified in this
   document.  Instead, it is left to protocols leveraging this Diameter
   application to specify PSK derivation.  For example see [X.S0047] and
   [X.S0058].















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2.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.1.  Abbreviations

   AH        Authentication Header

   AVP       Attribute Value Pair

   EAP       Extensible Authentication Protocol

   ESP       Encapsulating Security Payload

   ESP       Home Authentication, Authorization and Accounting

   IKEv2     Internet Key Exchange version 2

   NAI       Network Access Identifier

   PSK       Pre-Shared Key

   SA        Security Association

   SPI       Security Parameter Index
























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3.  Application Identifier

   This specification defines a new Diameter application and its
   respective Application Identifier:

      Diameter IKE PSK  (IKEPSK)  TBD1 by IANA


   The IKEPSK Application Identifier is used when the IKEv2 Peer is to
   be authenticated and authorized using IKEv2 with PSK-based
   authentication.








































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4.  Protocol Description

4.1.  Support for IKEv2 and Pre-Shared Keys

   When IKEv2 is used with PSK-based initiator authentication, the
   Diameter commands IKEv2-PSK-Request/Answer defined in this document
   are used between IKEv2 server and a Home AAA server (HAAA) to
   authorize the IKEv2 Peer for the services.  Upon receiving the
   IKE_AUTH message from the IKEv2 Peer, the IKEv2 Server uses the
   information received in IDi [RFC5996] to identify the IKEv2 Peer and
   the SPI if available to determine the correct PSK for this IKEv2
   Peer.  If there is no PSK found associated with this IKEv2 Peer, the
   IKEv2 Server MUST send an Authorize-Only (Auth-Request-Type set to
   "Authorize-Only") Diameter IKEv2-PSK message with the IKEv2 Peer's
   IDi payload and SPI if available to the HAAA to obtain the PSK.  The
   IDi payload extracted from the IKE_AUTH message contains an identity
   that is meaningful for the Diameter infrastructure, such as a Network
   Access Identifier (NAI), and SHALL be used by the IKEv2 Server to
   populate the User-Name AVP in the Diameter message.  The IKEv2 Server
   also includes in the IKEv2-Nonces AVP of the same Diameter message
   the initiator and responder nonces (Ni and Nr) exchanged during
   initial IKEv2 exchange.

   The IKEv2 Server sends the IKEv2-PSK-Request message to the IKEv2
   Peer's HAAA.  The Diameter message is routed to the correct HAAA as
   per RFC 3588.  Upon receiving Diameter IKEv2-PSK-Request message from
   the IKEv2 Server, the HAAA SHALL use the User-Name AVP to retrieve
   the associated keying material.  It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the
   HAAA uses the nonces Ni and Nr received in IKEv2-Nonces AVP to
   generate the PSK.  The HAAA returns the PSK to the IKEv2 Server using
   the Key AVP as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran].  It is
   outside of scope of this document how the HAAA obtains or generates
   the PSK.  For example, if the HAAA previously performed EAP based
   access authentication and authorization of the IKEv2 Peer, it can use
   the available EMSK to generate the PSK [RFC5295].

   Once the IKEv2 Server receives the PSK from the HAAA, the IKEv2
   Server verifies the IKE_AUTH message received from the IKEv2 Peer.
   If the verification of AUTH is successful, the IKEv2 Server sends the
   IKE message back to the IKEv2 Peer.

4.2.  Session Management

   The HAAA may maintain Diameter session state or may be stateless.
   This is indicated by the presence or absence of the Auth-Session-
   State AVP included in the Answer message.  The IKEv2 Server MUST
   support the Authorization Session State Machine defined in [RFC3588].




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4.2.1.  Session-Termination-Request/Answer

   In the case where HAAA is maintaining session state, when the IKEv2
   Server terminates the SA it SHALL send a Session-Termination-Request
   (STR) message [RFC3588] to inform the HAAA that the authorized
   session has been terminated.

   The Session-Termination-Answer (STA) message [RFC3588] is sent by the
   HAAA to acknowledge the notification that the session has been
   terminated.

4.2.2.  Abort-Session-Request/Answer

   The Abort-Session-Request (ASR) message [RFC3588] is sent by the HAAA
   to the IKEv2 Server to terminate the authorized session.  When the
   IKEv2 Server receives the ASR message, it MUST delete the
   corresponding IKE_SA and all CHILD_SAs set up through it.

   The Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) message [RFC3588] is sent by the IKEv2
   Server in response to an ASR message.































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5.  Command Codes for Diameter IKEv2 with PSK

   This section defines new Command-Code values that MUST be supported
   by all Diameter implementations conforming to this specification.

    +-------------------+---------+------+-------------+-------------+
    |    Command-Name   | Abbrev. | Code |  Reference  | Application |
    +-------------------+---------+------+-------------+-------------+
    | IKEv2-PSK-Request | IKEPSKR | TBD2 | Section 5.1 |    IKEPSK   |
    |                   |         |      |             |             |
    |  IKEv2-PSK-Answer | IKEPSKA | TBD2 | Section 5.2 |    IKEPSK   |
    +-------------------+---------+------+-------------+-------------+

                          Table 1: Command Codes

5.1.  IKEv2-PSK-Request (IKEPSKR) Command

   The IKEv2-PSK-Request message, indicated with the Command-Code set to
   TBD2 and the 'R' bit set in the Command Flags field, is sent from the
   IKEv2 Server to the HAAA to initiate IKEv2 with PSK authorization.
   In this case, the Application-ID field of the Diameter Header MUST be
   set to the Diameter IKE PSK Application ID (value of TDB1).

   Message format


         <IKEv2-PSK-Request> ::= < Diameter Header: TBD2, REQ, PXY >
                                 < Session-Id >
                                 { Auth-Application-Id }
                                 { Origin-Host }
                                 { Origin-Realm }
                                 { Destination-Realm }
                                 { Auth-Request-Type }
                                 [ Destination-Host ]
                                 [ NAS-Identifier ]
                                 [ NAS-IP-Address ]
                                 [ NAS-IPv6-Address ]
                                 [ NAS-Port ]
                                 [ Origin-State-Id ]
                                 { User-Name }
                                 [ Key-SPI ]
                                 [ Auth-Session-State ]
                                 { IKEv2-Nonces }
                               * [ Proxy-Info ]
                               * [ Route-Record ]
                                 ...
                               * [ AVP ]




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   The IKEv2-PSK-Request message MUST include a IKEv2-Nonces AVP
   containing the Ni and Nr nonces exchanged during initial IKEv2
   exchange.  The IKEv2-PSK-Request message MAY contain a Key-SPI AVP
   (Key-SPI AVP is specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]).  If
   included, it contains the Security Parameter Index (SPI) that HAAA
   SHALL use to identify the appropriate PSK.

5.2.  IKEv2-PSK-Answer (IKEPSKA) Command

   The IKEv2-PSK-Answer (IKEPSKA) message, indicated by the Command-Code
   field set to TBD2 and the 'R' bit cleared in the Command Flags field,
   is sent by the HAAA to the IKEv2 Server in response to the IKEPSKR
   command.  In this case, the Application-ID field of the Diameter
   Header MUST be set to the Diameter IKE PSK Application ID (value of
   TDB1).

   Message format


           <IKEv2-PSK-Answer> ::= < Diameter Header: TBD2, PXY >
                                  < Session-Id >
                                  { Auth-Application-Id }
                                  { Auth-Request-Type }
                                  { Result-Code }
                                  { Origin-Host }
                                  { Origin-Realm }
                                  [ User-Name ]
                                  [ Key ]
                                  [ Auth-Session-State ]
                                  [ Error-Message ]
                                  [ Error-Reporting-Host ]
                                * [ Failed-AVP ]
                                  [ Origin-State-Id ]
                                * [ Redirect-Host ]
                                  [ Redirect-Host-Usage ]
                                  [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ]
                                * [ Proxy-Info ]
                                * [ Route-Record ]
                                  ...
                                * [ AVP ]

   If the authorization procedure is successful then the IKEv2-PSK-
   Answer message SHALL include the Key AVP as specified in
   [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran].  The value of the Key-Type AVP SHALL
   be set to IKEv2-PSK (TBD3).  The Keying-Material AVP SHALL contain
   the PSK.  If Key-SPI AVP is received in IKEv2-PSK-Request, Key-SPI
   AVP SHALL be included in Key AVP.  Exactly how the PSK is derived is
   beyond the scope of this document.  The Key-Lifetime AVP may be



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   included and if it is included then the associated key SHALL NOT be
   used by the receiver of the answer if the lifetime has expired.

















































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6.  Attribute Value Pair Definitions

   This section defines new AVPs for the IKEv2 with PSK.

6.1.  IKEv2-Nonces

   The IKEv2-Nonces AVP (Code TBD4) is of type Grouped and contains the
   nonces exchanged between the IKEv2 Peer and the IKEv2 Server during
   IKEv2 initial exchange.  The nonces are used for PSK generation.


               IKEv2-Nonces ::= < AVP Header: TBD4>
                                {Ni}
                                {Nr}
                               *[AVP]

6.1.1.  Ni

   The Ni AVP (AVP Code TBD5) is of type Unsigned32 and contains the
   IKEv2 initiator nonce.

6.1.2.  Nr

   The Nr AVP (AVP Code TBD6) is of type Unsigned32 and contains the
   IKEv2 responder nonce.


























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7.  AVP Occurrence Tables

   The following tables present the AVPs defined or used in this
   document and their occurrences in Diameter messages.  Note that AVPs
   that can only be present within a Grouped AVP are not represented in
   this table.

   The table uses the following symbols:

   0:

      The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.


   0+:

      Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the message.


   0-1:

      Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.


   1:

      One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.



                                     +-------------------+
                                     |   Command-Code    |
                                     |---------+---------+
      AVP Name                       | IKEPSKR | IKEPSKA |
      -------------------------------|---------+---------+
      Key                            |    0    |   0-1   |
      Key-SPI                        |   0-1   |    0    |
      IKEv2-Nonces                   |    1    |    0    |
                                     +---------+---------+

                  IKEPSKR and IKEPSKA Commands AVP Table










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8.  AVP Flag Rules

   The following table describes the Diameter AVPs, their AVP Code
   values, types, and possible flag values.  The Diameter base [RFC3588]
   specifies the AVP Flag rules for AVPs in Section 4.5.


                                               +--------------------+
                                               |   AVP Flag rules   |
                                               +----+---+------+----+
                      AVP  Defined             |    |   |SHOULD|MUST|
    Attribute Name    Code in       Value Type |MUST|MAY| NOT  | NOT|
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |Key               TBD  Note 1   Grouped    |  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |Keying-Material   TBD  Note 1   OctetString|  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |Key-Lifetime      TBD  Note 1   Integer64  |  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |Key-SPI           TBD  Note 1   Unsigned32 |  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |Key-Type          TBD  Note 1   Enumerated |  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |IKEv2-Nonces      TBD4 6.2      Grouped    |  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |Ni                TBD5 6.2.1    Unsigned32 |  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+
   |Nr                TBD6 6.2.2    Unsigned32 |  M | P |      | V  |
   +-------------------------------------------+----+---+------+----+

                           AVP Flag Rules Table

   Note 1: Key, Keying-Material, Key-Type, Key-SPI and Key-Lifetime AVPs
   are defined in [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran].

















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9.  IANA Considerations

   Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign
   values as described in the following sections.

9.1.  Command Codes

   IANA is requested to allocate a command code value for the following
   new command from the Command Code namespace defined in [RFC3588].

      Command Code                     | Value
      ---------------------------------+------
      IKEv2-PSK-Request/Answer         | TBD2



9.2.  AVP Codes

   This specification requires IANA to register the following new AVPs
   from the AVP Code namespace defined in [RFC3588].


   o  IKEv2-Nonces - TBD4

   o  Ni - TBD5

   o  Nr - TBD6


   The AVPs are defined in Section 6.

9.3.  AVP Values

   IANA is requested to create a new value for the Key-Type AVP.  The
   new value TBD3 signifies that IKEv2 PSK is being sent.

9.4.  Application Identifier

   This specification requires IANA to allocate one new value "Diameter
   IKE PSK" from the Application Identifier namespace defined in
   [RFC3588].

   Application Identifier         | Value
   -------------------------------+------
   Diameter IKE PSK (IKEPSK)      | TBD1






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10.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of the Diameter Base protocol [RFC3588]
   are applicable to this document.

   In addition, the assumption is that the IKEv2 Server and the Diameter
   Server where the PSK is generated are in a trusted relationship.
   Hence, the assumption is that there is an appropriate security
   mechanism to protect the communication between these servers.  For
   example the IKEv2 Server and the Diameter server would be deployed in
   the same secure network or would utilize transport layer security as
   specified in [RFC3588].

   The Diameter messages between the IKEv2 Server and the HAAA may be
   transported via one or more AAA brokers or Diameter agents.  In this
   case, the IKEv2 Server to the Diameter server AAA communication
   relies on the security properties of the intermediating AAA inter-
   connection networks, AAA brokers, and Diameter agents.  Furthermore,
   any agents that process IKEv2-PSK-Answer messages can see the
   contents of the Key AVP.  For this reason, this specification
   strongly recommends using Diameter agents that can be trusted.

   This specification expects that the HAAA derives and returns the
   associated PSK to the IKEv2 Server.  Given that PSK derivation is
   security-critical, for the PSK derivation this specification
   recommends the use of short lived secrets, possibly based on a
   previous network access authentication, if such secrets are
   available.  To ensure key freshness and to limit the key scope, this
   specification strongly recommends the use of nonces included in
   IKEv2-PSK-Request.  The specifics of key derivation depend on the
   security characteristics of the system that is leveraging this
   specification (for example see [X.S0047] and [X.S0058]), therefore
   this specification does not define how the Diameter server derives
   required keys.

















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11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]
              Wu, W. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for
              Cryptographic Key Transport",
              draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-01 (work in progress),
              January 2010.

   [RFC3588]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
              Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC5996]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
              "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
              RFC 5996, September 2010.

11.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4285]  Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K.
              Chowdhury, "Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6",
              RFC 4285, January 2006.

   [RFC5295]  Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri,
              "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an
              Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
              August 2008.

   [RFC5778]  Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Bournelle, J., Giaretta, G.,
              and M. Nakhjiri, "Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for Home
              Agent to Diameter Server Interaction", RFC 5778,
              February 2010.

   [X.S0047]  3GPP2: X.S0047, "Mobile IPv6 Enhancements", February 2009.




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   [X.S0058]  3GPP2: X.S0058, "WiMAX-HRPD Interworking: Core Network
              Aspects", June 2010.

















































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Authors' Addresses

   Violeta Cakulev
   Alcatel Lucent
   600 Mountain Ave.
   3D-517
   Murray Hill, NJ  07974
   US

   Phone: +1 908 582 3207
   Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com


   Avi Lior
   Bridgewater Systems
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   Canada

   Phone: +1 613-591-6655
   Email: avi@bridgewatersystems.com






























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