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Versions: (draft-allman-dkim-ssp) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 5617

DKIM Working Group                                             E. Allman
Internet-Draft                                            Sendmail, Inc.
Intended status:  Standards Track                              M. Delany
Expires:  March 20, 2008                                     Yahoo! Inc.
                                                               J. Fenton
                                                     Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                      September 17, 2007


                     DKIM Sender Signing Practices
                         draft-ietf-dkim-ssp-01

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 20, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a domain-level
   authentication framework for email using public-key cryptography and
   key server technology to permit verification of the source and
   contents of messages by either Mail Transport Agents (MTAs) or Mail
   User Agents (MUAs).  The primary DKIM protocol is described in



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   [RFC4871].

   This document describes the records that senders may use to advertise
   how they sign their outgoing mail, and how verifiers should access
   and interpret those results.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

(Unresolved Issues/To Be Done)

   Need to consider handling of multiple responses to a DNS query for
   the SSP record.



































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Language and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Terms Imported from DKIM Signatures Specification  . . . .  5
     2.2.  Valid Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  Originator Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.4.  Originator Domain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.5.  Alleged Signer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.6.  Alleged Originator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.7.  Sender Signing Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.8.  Originator Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.9.  Suspicious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.10. Third-Party Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.11. Verifier Acceptable Third-Party Signature  . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Operation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Detailed Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  DNS Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  Publication of SSP Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.3.  Record Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.4.  Sender Signing Practices Check Procedure . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.1.  Fraudulent Sender Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     6.2.  DNS Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix B.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     B.1.  Changes since -ietf-dkim-ssp-00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     B.2.  Changes since -allman-ssp-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     B.3.  Changes since -allman-ssp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     B.4.  Changes since -allman-ssp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 18















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1.  Introduction

   DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a mechanism by which email
   messages can be cryptographically signed, permitting a signing domain
   to claim responsibility for the introduction of a message into the
   mail stream.  Message recipients can verify the signature by querying
   the signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key,
   and thereby confirm that the message was attested to by a party in
   possession of the private key for the signing domain.

   However, the legacy of the Internet is such that not all messages
   will be signed, and the absence of a signature on a message is not an
   a priori indication of forgery.  In fact, during early phases of
   deployment it must be expected that most messages will remain
   unsigned.  However, some domains may choose to sign all of their
   outgoing mail, for example, to protect their brand name.  It is
   highly desirable for such domains to be able to advertise that fact
   to verifiers, and that messages claiming to be from them that do not
   have a valid signature are likely to be forgeries.  This is the topic
   for sender signing practices.

   In the absence of a valid DKIM signature on behalf of the "From"
   address [RFC2822], message verifiers implementing this specification
   MUST determine whether messages from that sender are expected to be
   signed, and what signatures are acceptable.  In particular, whether a
   domain signs all outbound email must be made available to the
   verifier.  Without such a mechanism, the benefit of message signing
   techniques such as DKIM is limited since unsigned messages will
   always need to be considered to be potentially legitimate.  This
   determination is referred to as a Sender Signing Practices check.

   Conceivably, such expressions might be imagined to be extended in the
   future to include information about what hashing algorithms a domain
   uses, what kind of messages might be sent (e.g., bulk vs. personal
   vs. transactional), etc.  Such concerns are out of scope of this
   standard, because they can be expressed in the key record
   ("Selector") with which the signature is verified.  In contrast, this
   specification focuses on information which is relevant in the absence
   of a valid signature.  Expressions of signing practice which require
   outside auditing are similarly out of scope for this specification
   because they fall under the purview of reputation and accreditation.

   The detailed requirements for Sender Signing Practices are given in
   [I-D.ietf-dkim-ssp-requirements], which the protocol described in
   this document attempts to satisfy.  This document refers extensively
   to [RFC4871], which should be read as a prerequisite to this
   document.




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2.  Language and Terminology

2.1.  Terms Imported from DKIM Signatures Specification

   Some terminology used herein is derived directly from [RFC4871].
   Briefly,

   o  A "Signer" is the agent that signs a message.  In many cases it
      will correspond closely with the original author of the message or
      an agent working on the author's behalf.

   o  A "Verifier" is the agent that verifies a message by checking the
      actual signature against the message itself and the public key
      published by the Alleged Signer.  The Verifier also looks up the
      Sender Signing Practices published by the domain of the Originator
      Address if the message is not correctly signed by the Alleged
      Originator.

   o  A "Selector" specifies which of the keys published by a signing
      domain should be queried.  It is essentially a way of subdividing
      the address space to allow a single sending domain to publish
      multiple keys.

2.2.  Valid Signature

   A "Valid Signature" is any signature on a message which correctly
   verifies using the procedure described in section 6.1 of [RFC4871].

2.3.  Originator Address

   The "Originator Address" is the email address in the From header
   field of a message [RFC2822], or if and only if the From header field
   contains multiple addresses, the first address in the From header
   field.

      NON-NORMATIVE RATIONALE:  The alternative option when there are
      multiple addresses in the From header field is to use the value of
      the Sender header field.  This would be closer to the semantics
      indicated in [RFC2822] than using the first address in the From
      header field.  However, the large number of deployed Mail User
      Agents that do not display the Sender header field value argues
      against that.  Multiple addresses in the From header field are
      rare in real life.

      Even when there is only one address in the From header field, this
      address is chosen as the reference address for SSP lookups because
      it represents the author of the message and is more widely
      displayed by Mail User Agents as a result.  The Sender header



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      field frequently has other meanings.

2.4.  Originator Domain

   The "Originator Domain" is everything to the right of the "@" in the
   Originator Address (excluding the "@" itself).

2.5.  Alleged Signer

   An "Alleged Signer" is the identity of the signer claimed in a DKIM-
   Signature header field in a message received by a Verifier; it is
   "alleged" because it has not yet been verified.

2.6.  Alleged Originator

   An "Alleged Originator" is the Originator Address of a message
   received by a Verifier; it is "alleged" because it has not yet been
   verified.

2.7.  Sender Signing Practices

   "Sender Signing Practices" (or just "practices") consist of a
   machine-readable record published by the domain of the Alleged
   Originator which includes information about whether or not that
   domain signs all of their email, and whether signatures from third
   parties are sanctioned by the Alleged Originator.

2.8.  Originator Signature

   An "Originator Signature" is any Valid Signature where the signing
   address (listed in the "i=" tag if present, otherwise its default
   value, consisting of the null address, representing an unknown user,
   followed by "@", followed by the value of the "d=" tag) matches the
   Originator Address.  If the signing address does not include a local-
   part, then only the domains must match; otherwise, the two addresses
   must be identical.

2.9.  Suspicious

   Messages that do not contain a valid Originator Signature and which
   are inconsistent with a Sender Signing Practices check (e.g., are
   received without a Valid Signature and the sender's signing practices
   indicate all messages from the domain are signed) are referred to as
   "Suspicious".  The handling of such messages is at the discretion of
   the Verifier or final recipient.  "Suspicious" applies only to the
   DKIM evaluation of the message; a Verifier may decide the message
   should be accepted on the basis of other information beyond the scope
   of this document.  Conversely, messages not deemed Suspicious may be



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   rejected for other reasons.

2.10.  Third-Party Signature

   A "Third-Party Signature" is a Valid Signature which is not an
   Originator Signature.

2.11.  Verifier Acceptable Third-Party Signature

   A Verifier Acceptable Third-Party Signature is a Third-Party
   Signature that the Verifier is willing to accept as meaningful for
   the message under consideration.  The Verifier may use any criteria
   it deems appropriate for making this determination.


3.  Operation Overview

   Sender Signing Practices checks MUST be based on the Originator
   Address.  If the message contains a valid Originator Signature, no
   Sender Signing Practices check need be performed:  the Verifier
   SHOULD NOT look up the Sender Signing Practices and the message MUST
   NOT be considered Suspicious.

   Verifiers checking messages that do not have at least one valid
   Originator Signature MUST perform a Sender Signing Practices check on
   the domain specified by the Originator Address as described in
   Section 4.4.

   A Sender Signing Practices check produces one of four possible
   results:

   1.  Some messages from this domain are not signed; the message MUST
       NOT be considered Suspicious, even in the absence of a valid
       signature.  This is the default.

   2.  All messages from this domain are signed.  Messages containing a
       Verifier Acceptable Third-Party Signature MUST NOT be considered
       Suspicious.

          NON-NORMATIVE RATIONALE:  Third-party signatures, since they
          can potentially represent any domain, are considered more
          likely to be abused by attackers seeking to spoof a specific
          address.  It may therefore be desirable for verifiers to apply
          other criteria outside the scope of this specification in
          deciding to accept a given third-party signature.  For
          example, a list of known mailing list domains used by
          addresses served by the verifier might be specifically
          considered acceptable third-party signers.



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   3.  All valid messages from this domain are signed; the domain of the
       Alleged Originator requests that only messages with valid
       Originator Signatures be considered not Suspicious; Third-Party
       Signatures are irrelevant.  This practice would typically be used
       by domains which send only transactional email (i.e., do not use
       mailing lists and such that are likely to break signatures) and
       which wish to emphasize security over deliverability of their
       messages.  In the absence of a valid Originator Signature, the
       message MUST be considered Suspicious.

   4.  The domain does not exist; the message MUST be considered
       Suspicious.

   If the Sender Signing Practices record for the domain does not exist
   but the domain does exist, Verifier systems MUST assume that some
   messages from this domain are not signed and the message MUST NOT be
   considered Suspicious.


4.  Detailed Description

4.1.  DNS Representation

   Sender Signing Practices records are published using the DNS TXT
   resource record type.

      NON-NORMATIVE DISCUSSION:  There has been considerable discussion
      on the DKIM WG mailing list regarding the relative advantages of
      TXT and a new resource record (RR) type.  Many DNS server and
      resolver implementations are incapable of quickly and easily
      supporting new resource record types.  For this reason, support of
      TXT records is required whether a new RR type is defined or not.
      However, without a "flag day" on which SSP TXT record support is
      to be withdrawn, such support is likely to continue indefinitely.
      As a result, this specification defines no new RR type for SSP.

      Another alternative proposed by P. Hallam-Baker is the publication
      of both a TXT record and, when implementations permit, a new RR,
      referred to as XPTR, which gives the location from which SSP and
      other policy information relating to a give domain can be
      retrieved.  This has the advantage of supporting a variety of
      policies in a scalable manner, with better handling of wildcards
      and centralized publication of policy records, with caching
      advantages.  However, the above implementation issues also apply
      to XPTR, and an additional lookup is required to retrieve SSP via
      the XPTR method.  At the time of publication of this draft,
      consensus on this proposal was unclear.




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   The RDATA for SSP resource records is textual in format, with
   specific syntax and semantics relating to their role in describing
   sender signing practices.  The "Tag=Value List" syntax described in
   section 3.2 of [RFC4871] is used.  Records not in compliance with
   that syntax or the syntax of individual tags described in Section 4.3
   MUST be ignored (considered equivalent to a NODATA result) for
   purposes of message disposition, although they MAY cause the logging
   of warning messages via an appropriate system logging mechanism.

   SSP records for a domain are published at a location in the domain's
   DNS hierarchy prefixed by _ssp._domainkey; e.g., the SSP record for
   example.com would be a TXT record that is published at
   _ssp._domainkey.example.com.

4.2.  Publication of SSP Records

   Sender Signing Practices are intended to apply to all mail sent from
   the domain of an Alleged Originator, and to the greatest extent
   possible, to all subdomains of that domain.  There are several cases
   that need to be considered in that regard:

   o  The domain itself

   o  Subdomains which may or may not be used for email

   o  Hostnames which may or may not be used for email

   o  Other named resource records in the domain

   o  Multi-level examples of the above, e.g., a.b.example.com

   o  Non-existent cases, i.e., a subdomain or hostname that does not
      actually exist within the domain

   Normally, a domain expressing Sender Signing Practices will want to
   do so for both itself and all of its "descendents" (child domains and
   hosts, at all lower levels).  Domains wishing to do so MUST publish
   SSP records as follows:

      Publish an SSP record for the domain itself

      Publish an SSP record for any existing subdomain

   Note that since the lookup algorithm described below references the
   immediate parent of the alleged originating domain, it is not
   necessary to publish SSP records for every single-level label within
   the domain.  This has been done to relieve domain administrators of
   the burden of publishing an SSP record for every other record in the



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   domain, which would be otherwise required.

   Wildcards within a domain, including but not limited to wildcard MX
   records, pose a particular problem.  While referencing the immediate
   parent domain allows the discovery of an SSP record corresponding to
   an unintended immediate-child subdomain, wildcard records apply at
   multiple levels.  For example, if there is a wildcard MX record for
   example.com, the domain foo.bar.example.com can receive mail through
   the named mail exchanger.  Conversely, the existence of the record
   makes it impossible to tell whether foo.bar.example.com is a
   legitimate name since a query for that name will not return an
   NXDOMAIN error.  For that reason, SSP coverage for subdomains of
   domains containing a wildcard record is incomplete.

      NON-NORMATIVE NOTE:  Complete SSP coverage of domains containing
      (or where any parent contains) wildcards generally cannot be
      guaranteed.

4.3.  Record Syntax

   SSP records follow the "tag=value" syntax described in section 3.2 of
   [RFC4871].  The SSP record syntax is a tag-list as defined in that
   section, including the restriction on duplicate tags, the use of
   white space, and case sensitivity.

   Tags used in SSP records are as follows.  Unrecognized tags MUST be
   ignored.  In the ABNF below, the FWS token is inherited from
   [RFC2822] with the exclusion of obs-FWS.  The ALPHA and DIGIT tokens
   are imported from [RFC4234].

   dkim=  Outbound signing practices for the domain (plain-text;
      REQUIRED).  Possible values are as follows:

      unknown  The domain may sign some or all email.

      all  All mail from the domain is signed; unsigned email MUST be
         considered Suspicious.  The domain may send messages through
         agents that may modify and re-sign messages, so email signed
         with a Verifier Acceptable Third-Party Signature SHOULD NOT be
         considered Suspicious.

      strict  All mail from the domain is signed; messages lacking a
         valid Originator Signature MUST be considered Suspicious.  The
         domain does not expect to send messages through agents that may
         modify and re-sign messages.






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            NON-NORMATIVE RATIONALE:  Strict practices may be used by
            entities which send only transactional email to individual
            addresses and which are willing to accept the consequence of
            having some mail which is re-signed appear suspicious in
            return for additional control over their addresses.  Strict
            practices may also be used by entities which do not send
            (and therefore do not sign) any email.

      ABNF:

         ssp-dkim-tag = "dkim" [FWS] "=" [FWS] ("unknown" /
                             "all" / "strict")

   handling=  Non-compliant message handling request for the domain
      (plain-text; OPTIONAL).  Possible values are as follows:

      process  Messages which are Suspicious from this domain SHOULD be
         processed by the verifier, although the SSP failure MAY be
         considered in subsequent evaluation of the message.  This is
         the default value.

      deny  Messages which are Suspicious from this domain MAY be
         rejected, bounced, or otherwise not delivered at the option of
         the verifier.

            NON-NORMATIVE EXPLANATION:  The "deny" practice is intended
            for use by domains that value security over deliverability.
            For example, a domain used by a financial institution to
            send transactional email, which signs all of its messages,
            might consider their concern about phishing messages
            purporting to come from their domain to be higher than their
            concern about some some legitimate messages not being
            delivered.  The "handling=deny" practice allows them to
            express that concern in a way that can be acted upon by
            verifiers, if they so choose.

      ABNF:

        ssp-handling-tag = "handling" [FWS] "=" [FWS] ("process" /
                               "deny")

   t= Flags, represented as a colon-separated list of names (plain-text;
      OPTIONAL, default is that no flags are set).  Flag values are:

      y  The domain is testing signing practices, and the Verifier
         SHOULD NOT consider a message suspicious based on the record.





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      s  The signing practices apply only to the named domain, and not
         to subdomains.

      ABNF:

        ssp-t-tag     = %x75 [FWS] "=" [FWS] ssp-t-tag-flag
                           0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] ssp-t-tag-flag )
        ssp-t-tag-flag = "y" / "s" / hyphenated-word
                           ; for future extension
        hyphenated-word =  ALPHA [ *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
                                (ALPHA / DIGIT) ]

      Unrecognized flags MUST be ignored.

4.4.  Sender Signing Practices Check Procedure

   Verifiers MUST produce a result that is semantically equivalent to
   applying the following steps in the order listed.  In practice,
   several of these steps can be performed in parallel in order to
   improve performance.

   1.   If a valid Originator Signature exists, the message is not
        Suspicious, and the algorithm terminates.

   2.   The Verifier MUST query DNS for a TXT record corresponding to
        the Originator Domain prefixed by "_ssp._domainkey.".  If the
        result of this query is a NOERROR response with one or more
        answers which are syntactically-valid SSP responses, proceed to
        step 7.

   3.   The Verifier MUST query DNS for an MX record corresponding to
        the Originator Domain (with no prefix).  This query is made only
        to check the existence of the domain name and MAY be done in
        parallel with the query made in step 2.  If the result of this
        query is an NXDOMAIN error, the message is Suspicious and the
        algorithm terminates.

           NON-NORMATIVE DISCUSSION:  Any resource record type could be
           used for this query since the existence of a resource record
           of any type will prevent an NXDOMAIN error.  The choice of MX
           for this purpose is because this record type is thought to be
           the most common for likely domains, and will therefore result
           in a result which can be more readily cached than a negative
           result.

   4.   If the immediate parent of the Originator Domain is a top-level
        domain (a domain consisting of a single element such as "com",
        "us", or "jp"), then the message is not Suspicious (because no



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        SSP record was found) and the algorithm terminates.  The
        verifier MAY also compare the parent domain against a locally-
        maintained list of known address suffixes (e.g., .co.uk) and
        terminate the algorithm with a not Suspicious result if the
        parent domain matches an entry on the list.

   5.   The Verifier MUST query DNS for a TXT record for the immediate
        parent domain, prefixed with "_ssp._domainkey."  If the result
        of this query is a NOERROR response with one or more answers
        which are syntactically-valid SSP responses, proceed to step 6.
        Otherwise, the message is not Suspicious and the algorithm
        terminates.

   6.   If the SSP "t" tag exists in the response and any of the flags
        is "s" (indicating it should not apply to a subdomain), the
        message is not Suspicious and the algorithm terminates.

   7.   If the SSP "t" tag exists in the response and any of the flags
        is "y" (indicating testing), the message is not Suspicious and
        the algorithm terminates.

   8.   If the value of the SSP "dkim" tag is "unknown", the message is
        not Suspicious and the algorithm terminates.

   9.   If the value of the SSP "dkim" tag is "all", and one or more
        Verifier Acceptable Third-Party Signatures are present on the
        message, the message is not Suspicious and the algorithm
        terminates.

   10.  The message is Suspicious and the algorithm terminates.

   If any of the queries involved in the Sender Signing Practices Check
   result in a SERVFAIL error response, the verifier MAY either queue
   the message or return an SMTP error indicating a temporary failure.


5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to create a "DKIM selector name" registry and to
   reserve the selector name "_ssp" to avoid confusion between DKIM key
   records and SSP records.


6.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations in the Sender Signing Practices are mostly
   related to attempts on the part of malicious senders to represent
   themselves as other senders, often in an attempt to defraud either



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   the recipient or the Alleged Originator.

   Additional security considerations regarding Sender Signing Practices
   may be found in the DKIM threat analysis [RFC4686].

6.1.  Fraudulent Sender Address

   [[Assuming 3rd party signature is based on Sender header field]] If
   the Sender Signing Practices sanction third-party signing, an
   attacker can create a message with a From header field of an
   arbitrary sender and a legitimately signed Sender header field

6.2.  DNS Attacks

   An attacker might attack the DNS infrastructure in an attempt to
   impersonate SSP records.  However, such an attacker is more likely to
   attack at a higher level, e.g., redirecting A or MX record lookups in
   order to capture traffic that was legitimately intended for the
   target domain.  Domains concerned about this should use DNSSEC
   [RFC4033].

   Because SSP operates within the framework of the legacy e-mail
   system, the default result in the absence of an SSP record is that
   the domain does not sign all of its messages.  Therefore, a DNS
   attack which is successful in suppressing the SSP response to the
   verifier is sufficient to cause the verifier to see unsigned messages
   as non-suspicious, even when that is not intended by the alleged
   originating domain.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2822]  Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822,
              April 2001.

   [RFC4234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, October 2005.

   [RFC4871]  Allman, E., Callas, J., Delany, M., Libbey, M., Fenton,
              J., and M. Thomas, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)



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              Signatures", RFC 4871, May 2007.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dkim-ssp-requirements]
              Thomas, M., "Requirements for a DKIM Signing Practices
              Protocol", draft-ietf-dkim-ssp-requirements-05 (work in
              progress), April 2007.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4686]  Fenton, J., "Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys
              Identified Mail (DKIM)", RFC 4686, September 2006.


Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank many members of the ietf-dkim mailing list,
   in particular Arvel Hathcock and Eliot Lear, for valuable suggestions
   and constructive criticism of earlier versions of this draft.


Appendix B.  Change Log

B.1.  Changes since -ietf-dkim-ssp-00

   o  Clarified Operation Overview and eliminated use of Legitimate as
      the counterpart of Suspicious since the words have different
      meanings.

   o  Improved discussion (courtesy of Arvel Hathcock) of the use of TXT
      records in DNS vs. a new RR type.

   o  Clarified publication rules for multilevel names.

   o  Better description of overall record syntax, in particular that
      records with unknown tags are considered syntactically correct.

   o  Clarified Sender Signing Practices Check Procedure, primarily by
      use of new term Originator Domain.

   o  Eliminated section "Third-Party Signatures and Mailing Lists" that
      is better included in the DKIM overview document.

   o  Added "handling" tag to express alleged sending domain's
      preference about handling of Suspicious messages.



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   o  Clarified handling of SERVFAIL error in SSP check.

   o  Replaced "entity" with "domain", since with the removal of user-
      granularity SSP, the only entities having sender signing policies
      are domains.

B.2.  Changes since -allman-ssp-02

   o  Removed user-granularity SSP and u= tag.

   o  Replaced DKIMP resource record with a TXT record.

   o  Changed name of the primary tag from "p" to "dkim".

   o  Replaced lookup algorithm with one which traverses upward at most
      one level.

   o  Added description of records which must be published, and effect
      of wildcard records within the domain, on SSP.

B.3.  Changes since -allman-ssp-01

   o  Changed term "Sender Signing Policy" to "Sender Signing
      Practices".

   o  Changed query methodology to use a separate DNS resource record
      type, DKIMP.

   o  Changed tag values from SPF-like symbols to words.

   o  User level policies now default to that of the domain if not
      specified.

   o  Removed the "Compliance" section since we're still not clear on
      what goes here.

   o  Changed the "parent domain" policy to only search up one level
      (assumes that subdomains will publish SSP records if appropriate).

   o  Added detailed description of SSP check procedure.

B.4.  Changes since -allman-ssp-00

   From a "diff" perspective, the changes are extensive.  Semantically,
   the changes are:

   o  Added section on "Third-Party Signatures and Mailing Lists"




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   o  Added "Compliance" (transferred from -base document).  I'm not
      clear on what needs to be done here.

   o  Extensive restructuring.


Authors' Addresses

   Eric Allman
   Sendmail, Inc.
   6475 Christie Ave, Suite 350
   Emeryville, CA  94608
   USA

   Phone:  +1 510 594 5501
   Email:  eric+dkim@sendmail.org
   URI:


   Mark Delany
   Yahoo! Inc.
   701 First Avenue
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   USA

   Phone:  +1 408 349 6831
   Email:  markd+dkim@yahoo-inc.com
   URI:


   Jim Fenton
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   MS SJ-9/2
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134-1706
   USA

   Phone:  +1 408 526 5914
   Email:  fenton@cisco.com
   URI:











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