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Versions: 00 01 02 03

DNA Working Group                                           S. Narayanan
Internet-Draft                                                 Panasonic
Expires: April 27, 2006                                         G. Daley
                                                  Monash University CTIE
                                                            N. Montavont
                                                             LSIIT - ULP
                                                        October 24, 2005


Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6 - Best Current Practices for hosts.
                      draft-ietf-dna-hosts-02.txt

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   Hosts experiencing rapid link-layer changes may require efficient IP
   configuration change detection procedures than traditional fixed
   hosts.  DNA is defined as the process by which a host collects
   appropriate information and detects the identity of its currently
   attached link to ascertain the validity of its IP configuration.



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   This document details best current practice for Detecting Network
   Attachment in IPv6 hosts using existing Neighbor Discovery
   procedures.  Since there is no explicit link identification mechanism
   in the existing Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6, the document
   describes implicit mechanisms for identifying the current link.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1   Structure of this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4

   2.  Terms and Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4

   3.  Background & Motivation for DNA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1   Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6

   4.  Detecting Network Attachment Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1   Making use of Prior Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2   Link identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.2.1   Same link  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.2.2   Link change  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.3   IP Hosts Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.4   Duplicate Address Detection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.5   Multicast Listener State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.6   Reachability detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

   5.  Initiation of DNA Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1   Actions Upon Hint Reception  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.2   Hints Due to Network Layer Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.3   Handling Hints from Other Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.4   Timer and Loss Based Hints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.5   Simultaneous Hints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.6   Hint Management for Inactive Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

   6.  Complications to Detecting Network Attachment  . . . . . . . . 14
     6.1   Packet Loss  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     6.2   Router Configurations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.3   Overlapping Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.4   Multicast Snooping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.5   Link Partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.1   Authorization and Detecting Network Attachment . . . . . . 16
     7.2   Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

   8.  Constants  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

   9.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17



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   10.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     10.1  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     10.2  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 21












































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1.  Introduction

   When operating in changing environments, IPv6 hosts may experience
   variations in reachability or configuration state over time.  For
   hosts accessing the Internet over wireless media, such changes may be
   caused by changes in wireless propagation or host motion.

   Detecting Network Attachment (DNA) in IPv6 is the task of checking
   for changes in the validity of a host's IP configuration [15].
   Changes may occur on establishment or disconnection of a link-layer.
   For newly connected interfaces, they may be on a link different from
   the existing configuration of the node.

   In such cases, IP addressing and default routing configuration of the
   node may become invalid preventing packet transfer.  DNA uses IPv6
   Neighbour Discovery to provide information about the reachability and
   identity of the link.

   DNA focuses on determining whether the current configuration is
   valid, leaving the actual practice of re-configuration to other
   subsystems, if the current configuration is invalid.

   This document presents the best current practices for IPv6 hosts to
   address the task of Detecting Network Attachment in changing and
   wireless environments.

1.1  Structure of this Document

   Section 3 of this document provides background and motivation for
   Detecting Network Attachment.

   Elaboration of specific practices for hosts in detecting network
   attachment continues in Section 4, while Section 5 discuss the
   initiation of DNA procedures.

   Section 7 provides security considerations, and details a number of
   issues which arise due to wireless connectivity and the changeable
   nature of DNA hosts' Internet connections.

2.  Terms and Abbreviations

   Access network: A network where hosts are present.  Especially, a
      network used for the support of visiting wireless hosts.

   Attachment: The process of entering a new cell.  Attachment (and
      detachment) may cause a link-change.





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   Cell: A system constituted by the propagation range of a wireless
      base station and its serviced hosts.  Dependent on topology, one
      or many cells may be part of the same link.

   Hint: An indication from other subsystems or protocol layers that
      link-change may have occurred.

   Link: A link is the range across which communications can pass
      without being forwarded through a router [1].

   Link-Change: Link-Change occurs when a host moves from a point-of-
      attachment on a link, to another point-of-attachment where it is
      unable to reach devices belonging to a link, without being
      forwarded through a router.

   Point-of-Attachment: A link-layer base-station, VLAN or port through
      which a device attempts to reach the network.  Changes to a
      host's point-of-attachment may cause link-change.

   Reachability Detection: Determination that a device (such as a
      router) is currently reachable, over both a wireless medium, and
      any attached fixed network.  This is typically achieved using
      Neighbor Unreachability Detection procedure [1].

   Wireless Medium: A physical layer which incorporates free space
      electromagnetic or optical propagation.  Such media are
      susceptible to mobility and interference effects, potentially
      resulting in high packet loss probabilities.


3.  Background & Motivation for DNA

   Hosts on the Internet may be connected by various media.  It has
   become common that hosts have access through wireless media and are
   mobile.  The frequency of configuration change for wireless and
   nomadic devices are high due to the vagaries of wireless propagation
   or the motion of the hosts themselves.  Detecting Network Attachment
   is a strategy to assist such rapid configuration changes by
   determining whether they are required.

   Due to these frequent link-layer changes, an IP configuration change
   detection mechanism for DNA needs to be efficient and rapid to avoid
   unnecessary configuration delays upon link-change.

   In a wireless environment, there will typically be a trade-off
   between configuration delays and the channel bandwidth utilized or
   host's energy used to transmit packets.  This trade-off affects
   choices as to whether hosts probe for configuration information, or



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   wait for network information.  DNA seeks to assist hosts by providing
   information about network state, which may allow hosts to
   appropriately make decisions regarding such trade-offs.

   Even though DNA is restricted to determining whether change is
   needed, in some circumstances the process of obtaining information
   for the new configuration may occur simultaneously with the detection
   to improve the efficiency of these two steps.

3.1  Issues

   The following features of RFC 2461 make the detection of link
   identity difficult:

      Routers are not required to include all the prefixes they support
      in a single router advertisement message [1].

      The default router address is link-local address and hence may
      only be unique within one link [1].

      While neighbor cache entries are valid only on a single link,
      link-local addresses may be duplicated across many links, and only
      global addressing can be used to identify if there is a link
      change.


4.  Detecting Network Attachment Steps

   An IPv6 host SHOULD follow the following steps when they receive a
   hint (see Section 5) indicating the possibility of link change.

      Try making use of prior information stored related to the links
      the host visited in the past (see Section 4.1).

         If the prior information implies no link change, the host MAY
         conduct reachability detection (see Section 4.6) to one of the
         default routers it is using, otherwise no action is needed.

         If the prior information implies that there is a link change or
         there is no useful prior information available, follow the
         procedure below.

      Mark all the IPv6 addresses in use as optimistic.

      Conduct link identification.  (See Section 4.2).

      If the link has changed




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         Change the IP configuration parameters of the host (see
         Section 4.3).

         Configure new address and conduct duplicate address detection
         (see Section 4.4).

         Conduct multicast listner discovery (see Section 4.5).

      If the link has NOT changed

         Restore the address configuration state of all the IPv6
         addresses known to be on the link.

         Conduct reachability detection to one of the default routers
         (see Section 4.6).


4.1  Making use of Prior Information

   A device that has recently been attached to a particular wireless
   base station may still have state regarding the IP configuration
   valid for use on that link.  This allows a host to begin any
   configuration procedures before checking the ongoing validity and
   security of the parameters.

   The experimental protocols FMIPv6 [19] and CARD [20] each provide
   ways to generate such information using network-layer signaling,
   before arrival on a link.  Additionally, the issue is the same when a
   host disconnects from one cell and returns to it immediately, or
   movement occurs between a pair of cells (the ping-pong effect).

   A IP host MAY store L2 to L3 mapping information for the links for a
   period of time in order to use the information in the future.  When a
   host attaches itself to a point-of-attachment for which it has an L2
   to L3 mapping, if the stored record doesn't contain the prefix the
   host is using, the host SHOULD conclude that it has changed link and
   initiate a new configuration procedure.

   If the host finds the prefix it is using in the stored record, a host
   MAY conclude that it is on the same link, but SHOULD undertake
   reachability testing as described in Section 4.6.  In this case, the
   host MUST undertake Duplicate Address Detection [3][8] to confirm
   that there are no duplicate addresses on the link.

   The host MUST age this cached information based on the possibility
   that the link's configuration has changed and MUST NOT store
   information beyond either the remaining router or address lifetime or
   (at the outside) MAC_CACHE_TIME time-units.



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4.2  Link identification

4.2.1  Same link

   An IP host MUST conclude that it is on the same link if any of the
   following events happen.

      Reception of a RA with the prefix known to be on the link from one
      of its default router address, even if it is the link-local
      address of the router.

      Reception of a RA from a known router's global address, present in
      a Prefix Information Option containing the R-"Router Address" flag
      [5].

   A host SHOULD conclude that it is on the same link if any of the
   following events happen.

      Reception of a RA with a prefix that is known to be on the current
      link.

      Reception of data packets addressed to its current global address
      if the message was sent from or through a device which is known to
      be fixed (such as a router).

      Confirmation of a global address entry with the Router 'R' flag
      set in its neighbor cache[1].


4.2.2  Link change

   A host makes use of Router Discovery messages to determine that it
   has moved to a new link.  Since the content of an existing received
   RA is not sufficient to identify the absence of any other prefix,
   additional inference is required for fast and accurate link-change
   detection.

   Complete Prefix Lists provide a robust mechanism for link-change
   detection if link-layer indications are available [24][18].  These
   procedures provide mechanisms to build confidence that a host knows
   all of a link's prefixes and so may rapidly identify a newly received
   RA as being from a different link.

      A host SHOULD maintain a complete prefix list as recommended by
      [24] to identify if the link has changed.






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4.3  IP Hosts Configuration

   Various protocols within IPv6 provide their own configuration
   processes.  A host will have collected various configuration
   information using these protocols during its presence on a link.
   Following is the list of steps the host needs to take if a link-
   change has occured.

   Invalidation of router and prefix list: On determining that link-
      change has occurred, the host SHOULD remove entries from the
      default router list removed which are related to unreachable
      routers.  Destination cache entries using information from these
      routers SHOULD be removed [1].  If no eligible default routers are
      in the default router list, Router Solicitations MAY be sent, in
      order to discover new routers.

   Invalidation of IPv6 addresses: Addresses which relate to invalidated
      prefix list entries SHOULD be removed.

   Removing neighbor cache entries: When link change occurs, the
      reachability of all existing neighbor cache entries is likely to
      be invalidated, if link change prevents packet reception from an
      old link.  For these links, the neighbor cache entries SHOULD be
      removed when a host moves to a new link (although it MAY be
      possible to keep keying and authorization information for such
      hosts cached on a least-recently-used basis [7]).

   Completion of DAD for Link-Local Addresses: Link-local addresses used
      for DNA purposes may be tentative or optimistic at the completion
      of change detection procedures.  Where link-change has occurred,
      these processes SHOULD continue to completion, as described in [3]
      and [8].

   Initiating mobility signaling: Any signaling required to restore end-
      to-end communications occurs after DNA, if link-change has
      occurred.


4.4  Duplicate Address Detection

   When a host connects to a new link, it needs to create a link-local
   address.  But to ensure that the link-local address is unique on a
   link, Duplication Address Detection (DAD) MUST be performed [3] by
   sending NS targeted at the link-local address undergoing validation.

   Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection allows addresses to be used
   while they are being checked, without marking addresses as tentative.
   Procedures defined in optimistic DAD [8]  ensure that persistent



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   invalid neighbour cache entries are not created.  This may allow
   faster DNA procedures, by avoiding use of unspecified source
   addresses in RS's and consequently allowing unicast Router
   Advertisements responses [8].  It is RECOMMENDED that hosts follow
   the recommendations of optimistic DAD [8] to reduce the DAD delay.

4.5  Multicast Listener State

   Multicast routers on a link are aware of which groups are in use
   within a link.  This information is used to undertake initiation of
   multicast routing for off-link multicast sources to the link [9]
   [11].

   When a node arrives on a link, it MAY need to send Multicast Listener
   Discovery (MLD) reports, if the multicast stream is not already being
   received on the link.  If it is an MLDv2 node it SHOULD send state
   change reports upon arrival on a link [11].

   Since the identity of the link is tied to the presence and identity
   of routers, initiation of these procedures may be undertaken when DNA
   procedures have been completed.  In the absence of received data
   packets from a multicast stream, it is unlikely that a host will be
   able to determine if the multicast stream is being received on a new
   link, and will have to send state change reports, in addition to
   responses to periodic multicast queries [9] [11].

   For link scoped multicast, reporting needs to be done to ensure that
   packet reception in the link is available due to multicast snoopers.
   Some interaction is possible when sending messages for the purpose of
   DNA on a network where multicast snooping is in use.  This issue is
   described in Section 6.4.

4.6  Reachability detection

   If an IP node needs to confirm bi-directional reachability to its
   default router either a NS-NA or an RS-RA message exchange can be
   used to conduct reachability testing.  It is notable that the choice
   of whether the messages are addressed to multicast or unicast address
   will have different reachability implications.  The reachability
   implications from the hosts' perspective for the four different
   message exchanges defined by RFC 2461 [1] are presented in the table
   below.  The host can confirm bi-directional reachability from the
   neighbor discovery or router discovery message exchanges except when
   a multicast RA is received at the host for its RS message.  In this
   case, using IPv6 Neighbour Discovery procedures, the host cannot know
   whether the multicast RA is in response to its solicitation message
   or whether it is a periodic un-solicited transmission from the router
   [1].



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         +-----------------+----+----+----+-----+
         |   Exchanges:    |Upstream |Downstream|
         +-----------------+----+----+----+-----+
         | multicast NS/NA |    Y    |    Y     |
         +-----------------+----+----+----+-----+
         | unicast   NS/NA |    Y    |    Y     |
         +-----------------+----+----+----+-----+
         | RS/multicast RA |    N    |    Y     |
         +-----------------+----+----+----+-----+
         | RS/unicast RA   |    Y    |    Y     |
         +-----------------+----+----+----+-----+

   Successful exchange of the messages listed in the table indicate the
   corresponding links to be operational.  Lack of reception of response
   from the router may indicate that reachability is broken for one or
   both of the transmission directions or it may indicate an ordinary
   packet loss event in either direction.

   Link-change detection incorporates message reception which may itself
   create neighbour reachability state.  When this is the case, a host
   SHOULD rely upon existing Neighbor Discovery procedures in order to
   provide and maintain reachability detection [1].

5.  Initiation of DNA Procedures

   Link change detection procedures are initiated when information is
   received either directly from the network or from other protocol
   layers within the host.  This information indicates that network
   reachability or configuration is suspect and is called a hint.

   Hints MAY be used to update a wireless host's timers or probing
   behavior in such a way as to assist detection of network attachment.
   Hints SHOULD NOT be considered to be authoritative for detecting IP
   configuration change by themselves.

   In some cases, hints will carry significant information (for example
   a hint indicating PPP IPv6CP open state [4]), although details of the
   configuration parameters may be available only after other IP
   configuration procedures.  Implementers are encouraged to treat hints
   as though they may be incorrect, and require confirmation.

   Hosts MUST ensure that untrusted hints do not cause unnecessary
   configuration changes, or significant consumption of host resources
   or bandwidth.  In order to achieve this aim, a host MAY implement
   hysteresis mechanisms such as token buckets, hint weighting or
   holddown timers in order to limit the effect of excessive hints.





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5.1  Actions Upon Hint Reception

   Upon reception of a hint that link change detection may have
   occurred, a host SHOULD send Router Solicitation messages to
   determine the routers and prefixes which exist on a link.  Hosts
   SHOULD apply rate limiting and/or hysteresis to this behaviour as
   appropriate to the link technology subject to the reliability of the
   hints.

   Router Advertisements received as a result of such solicitation have
   a role in determining if existing configuration is valid, and may be
   used to construct prefix lists for a new link [24].

5.2  Hints Due to Network Layer Messages

   Hint reception may be due to network-layer messages such as
   unexpected Router Advertisements, multicast listener queries or
   ICMPv6 error messages [1][9][6].  In these cases, the authenticity of
   the messages MUST be verified before expending resources to initiate
   DNA procedure.

   When a host arrives on a new link, hints received due to external IP
   packets will typically be due to multicast messages.  Actions based
   on multicast reception from untrusted sources are dangerous due to
   the threat of multicast response flooding.  This issue is discussed
   further in Section 7.

   State changes within the network-layer itself may initiate link-
   change detection procedures.  Existing subsystems for router and
   neighbor discovery, address leasing and multicast reception maintain
   their own timers and state variables.  Changes to the state of one or
   more of these mechanisms may hint that link change has occurred, and
   initiate detection of network attachment.

5.3  Handling Hints from Other Layers

   Events at other protocol layers may provide hints of link change to
   network attachment detection systems.  Two examples of such events
   are TCP retransmission timeout and completion of link-layer access
   procedures [18].

   While hints from other protocol layers originate from within the
   host's own stack, the network layer SHOULD NOT treat hints from other
   protocol layers as authoritative indications of link change.

   This is because state changes within other protocol layers may be
   triggered by untrusted messages, come from compromised sources (for
   example 802.11 WEP Encryption [21]) or be inaccurate with regard to



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   network-layer state.

   While these hints come from the host's own stack, such hints may
   actually be due to packet reception or non-reception events at the
   originating layers.  As such, it may be possible for other devices to
   instigate hint delivery on a host or multiple hosts deliberately, in
   order to prompt packet transmission, or configuration modification.

   Therefore, hosts SHOULD NOT change their configuration state based on
   hints from other protocol layers.  A host MAY adopt an appropriate
   link change detection strategy based upon hints received from other
   layers, with suitable caution and hysteresis.

5.4  Timer and Loss Based Hints

   Other hints may be received due to timer expiry, particularly In some
   cases the expiry of these timers may be a good hint that DNA
   procedures are necessary.

   Since DNA is likely to be used when communicating with devices over
   wireless links, suitable resilience to packet loss SHOULD be
   incorporated into the DNA initiation system.  Notably, non-reception
   of data associated with end-to-end communication over the Internet
   may be caused by reception errors at either end or because of network
   congestion.  Hosts SHOULD NOT act immediately on packet loss
   indications, delaying until it is clear that the packet losses aren't
   caused by transient events.

   Use of the Advertisement Interval Option specified in [5] follows
   these principles.  Routers sending this option indicate the maximum
   interval between successive router advertisements.  Hosts receiving
   this option monitor for multiple successive packet losses and
   initiate change discovery.

5.5  Simultaneous Hints

   Some events which generate hints may affect a number of devices
   simultaneously.

   For example, if a wireless base station goes down, all the hosts on
   that base station are likely to initiate link-layer configuration
   strategies after losing track of the last beacon or pilot signal from
   the base station.

   As described in [1][6], a host SHOULD delay randomly before acting on
   a widely receivable advertisement, in order to avoid response
   implosion.




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   Where a host considers it may be on a new link and learns this from a
   hint generated by a multicast message, the host SHOULD defer 0-1000ms
   in accordance with [1][3].  Please note though that a single
   desynchronization is required for any number of transmissions
   subsequent to a hint, regardless of which messages need to be sent.

   In link-layers where sufficient serialization occurs after an event
   experienced by multiple hosts, each host MAY avoid the random delays
   before sending solicitations specified in [1].

5.6  Hint Management for Inactive Hosts

   If a host does not expect to send or receive packets soon, it MAY
   choose to defer detection of network attachment.  This may preserve
   resources on latent hosts, by removing any need for packet
   transmission when a hint is received.

   These hosts SHOULD delay 0-1000ms before sending a solicitation, and
   MAY choose to wait up to twice the advertised Router Advertisement
   Interval (plus the random delay) before sending a solicitation [5].

   One benefit of inactive hosts' deferral of DNA procedures is that
   herd-like host configuration testing is mitigated when base-station
   failure or simultaneous motion occur.  When latent hosts defer DNA
   tests, the number of devices actively probing for data simultaneously
   is reduced to those hosts which currently support active data
   sessions.

   When a device begins sending packets, it will be necessary to test
   bidirectional reachability with the router (whose current Neighbor
   Cache state is STALE).  As described in [1], the host will delay
   before probing to allow for the probability that upper layer packet
   reception confirms reachability.

6.  Complications to Detecting Network Attachment

   Detection of network attachment procedures can be delayed or may be
   incorrect due to different factors.  This section gives some examples
   where complications may interfere with DNA processing.

6.1  Packet Loss

   Generally, packet loss introduces significant delays in validation of
   current configuration or discovery of new configuration.  Because
   most of the protocols rely on timeout to consider that a peer is not
   reachable anymore, packet loss may lead to erroneous conclusions.

   Additionally, packet loss rates for particular transmission modes



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   (multicast or unicast) may differ, meaning that particular classes of
   DNA tests have higher chance of failure due to loss.  Hosts SHOULD
   attempt to verify tests through retransmission where packet loss is
   prevalent.

6.2  Router Configurations

   Each router can have its own configuration with respect to sending
   RA, and the treatment of router and neighbor solicitations.
   Different timers and constants might be used by different routers,
   such as the delay between Router Advertisements or delay before
   replying to an RS.  If a host is changing its IPv6 link, the new
   router on that link may have a different configuration and may
   introduce more delay than the previous default router of the host.
   The time needed to discover the new link can then be longer than
   expected by the host.

6.3  Overlapping Coverage

   If a host can be attached to different links at the same time with
   the same interface, the host will probably listen to different
   routers, at least one on each link.  To be simultaneously attached to
   several links may be very valuable for a MN when it moves from one
   access network to another.  If the node can still be reachable
   through its old link while configuring the interface for its new
   link, packet loss can be minimized.

   Such a situation may happen in a wireless environment if the link
   layer technology allows the MN to be simultaneously attached to
   several points of attachment and if the coverage area of access
   points are overlapping.

   For the purposes of DNA, it is necessary to treat each of these
   points-of-attachment separately, otherwise incorrect conclusions of
   link-change may be made even if another of the link-layer connections
   is valid.

6.4  Multicast Snooping

   When a host is participating in DNA on a link where multicast
   snooping is in use, multicast packets may not be delivered to the
   LAN-segment to which the host is attached until MLD signaling has
   been performed [9][11] [17].  Where DNA relies upon multicast packet
   delivery (for example, if a router needs to send a Neighbor
   Solicitation to the host), its function will be degraded until after
   an MLD report is sent.

   Where it is possible that multicast snooping is in operation, hosts



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   MUST send MLD group joins (MLD reports) for solicited nodes'
   addresses swiftly after starting DNA procedures.

6.5  Link Partition

   Link partitioning occurs when a link's internal switching or relaying
   hardware fails, or if the internal communications within a link are
   prevented due to topology changes or wireless propagation.

   When a host is on a link which partitions, only a subset of the
   addresses or devices it is communicating with may still be available.
   Where link partitioning is rare (for example, with wired
   communication between routers on the link), existing router and
   neighbor discovery procedures may be sufficient for detecting change.

7.  Security Considerations

   Detecting Network Attachment is a mechanism which allows network
   messages to change the node's belief about its IPv6 configuration
   state.  As such, it is important that the need for rapid testing of
   link change does not lead to situations where configuration is
   invalidated by malicious third parties, nor that information passed
   to configuration processes exposes the host to other attacks.

   Since DNA relies heavily upon IPv6 Neighbor Discovery,the threats
   which are applicable to those procedures also affect Detecting
   Network Attachment.  These threats are described in [12].

   Some additional threats are outlined below.

7.1  Authorization and Detecting Network Attachment

   Hosts connecting to the Internet over wireless media may be exposed
   to a variety of network configurations with differing robustness,
   controls and security.

   When a host is determining if link change has occurred, it may
   receive messages from devices with no advertised security mechanisms
   purporting to be routers, nodes sending signed router advertisements
   but with unknown delegation, or routers whose credentials need to be
   checked [12].  Where a host wishes to configure an unsecured router,
   it SHOULD confirm bidirectional reachability with the device, and it
   MUST mark the device as unsecured as described in [7].

   In any case, a secured router SHOULD be preferred over an unsecured
   one, except where other factors (unreachability) make the router
   unsuitable.  Since secured routers' advertisement services may be
   subject to attack, alternative (secured) reachability mechanisms from



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   upper layers, or secured reachability of other devices known to be on
   the same link may be used to check reachability in the first
   instance.

7.2  Addressing

   While a DNA host is checking for link-change, and observing DAD, it
   may receive a DAD defense NA from an unsecured source.

   SEND says that DAD defenses MAY be accepted even from non SEND nodes
   for the first configured address [7].

   While this is a valid action in the case where a host collides with
   another address owner after arrival on a new link, In the case that
   the host returns immediately to the same link, such a DAD defense NA
   message can only be a denial-of-service attempt.

8.  Constants

   MAC_CACHE_TIME: 30 minutes

9.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to JinHyeock Choi and Erik Nordmark for their significant
   contributions.  Bernard Aboba's work on DNA for IPv4 strongly
   influenced this document.

10.  References

10.1  Normative References

   [1]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
        for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998.

   [2]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [3]  Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
        Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.

   [4]  Haskin, D. and E. Allen, "IP Version 6 over PPP", RFC 2472,
        December 1998.

   [5]  Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
        IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

   [6]  Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
        (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)



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        Specification", RFC2463 2463, December 1998.

   [7]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
        Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [8]  Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection for IPv6",
        draft-ietf-ipv6-optimistic-dad-02 (work in progress),
        September 2004.

10.2  Informative References

   [9]   Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast Listener
         Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October 1999.

   [10]  Haberman, B., "Source Address Selection for the Multicast
         Listener Discovery (MLD) Protocol", RFC 3590, September 2003.

   [11]  Vida, R. and L. Costa, "Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2
         (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004.

   [12]  Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
         Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756, May 2004.

   [13]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M.
         Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
         (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [14]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
         Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.

   [15]  Choi, J., "Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6 Goals",
         draft-ietf-dna-goals-04 (work in progress), December 2004.

   [16]  Fikouras, N A., K"onsgen, A J., and C. G"org, "Accelerating
         Mobile IP Hand-offs through Link-layer Information",
         Proceedings of the International Multiconference on
         Measurement, Modelling, and Evaluation of Computer-
         Communication Systems (MMB) 2001, September 2001.

   [17]  Christensen, M., Kimball, K., and F. Solensky, "Considerations
         for IGMP and MLD Snooping Switches", draft-ietf-magma-snoop-12
         (work in progress), February 2005.

   [18]  Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting
         Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-00 (work
         in progress), September 2004.

   [19]  Koodli, R., "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6",



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         draft-ietf-mipshop-fast-mipv6-03 (work in progress),
         October 2004.

   [20]  Liebsch, M., "Candidate Access Router Discovery",
         draft-ietf-seamoby-card-protocol-08 (work in progress),
         September 2004.

   [21]  O'Hara, B. and G. Ennis, "Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
         (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", ANSI/IEEE
         Std 802.11, 1999.

   [22]  Yamamoto, S., "Detecting Network Attachment Terminology",
         draft-yamamoto-dna-term-00 (work in progress), February 2004.

   [23]  Manner, J. and M. Kojo, "Mobility Related Terminology",
         draft-ietf-seamoby-mobility-terminology-06 (work in progress),
         February 2004.

   [24]  Choi, J. and E. Nordmark, "DNA with unmodified routers: Prefix
         list based approach", draft-j-dna-cpl-00 (work in progress),
         October 2005.


Authors' Addresses

   Sathya Narayanan
   Panasonic Digital Networking Lab
   Two Research Way, 3rd Floor
   Princeton, NJ  08536
   USA

   Phone: 609 734 7599
   Email: sathya@Research.Panasonic.COM
   URI:


   Greg Daley
   Centre for Telecommunications and Information Engineering
   Department of Electrical adn Computer Systems Engineering
   Monash University
   Clayton, Victoria  3800
   Australia

   Phone: +61 3 9905 4655
   Email: greg.daley@eng.monash.edu.au






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   Nicolas Montavont
   LSIIT - Univerity Louis Pasteur
   Pole API, bureau C444
   Boulevard Sebastien Brant
   Illkirch  67400
   FRANCE

   Phone: (33) 3 90 24 45 87
   Email: montavont@dpt-info.u-strasbg.fr
   URI:   http://www-r2.u-strasbg.fr/~montavont/









































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