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Versions: (draft-bellis-dnsext-dnsproxy) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 RFC 5625

DNSEXT                                                         R. Bellis
Internet-Draft                                                Nominet UK
Intended status: BCP                                       March 3, 2009
Expires: September 4, 2009


                  DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines
                     draft-ietf-dnsext-dnsproxy-03

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   This document provides guidelines for the implementation of DNS
   proxies, as found in broadband gateways and other similar network
   devices.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3

   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3

   3.  The Transparency Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3

   4.  Protocol Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.1.  Unexpected Flags and Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.2.  Label Compression  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.3.  Unknown Resource Record Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.4.  Packet Size Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       4.4.1.  TCP Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       4.4.2.  Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0) . . . . . . . . .  6
       4.4.3.  IP Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.5.  Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG) . . .  7

   5.  DHCP's Interaction with DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.1.  Domain Name Server (DHCP Option 6) . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.2.  Domain Name (DHCP Option 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.3.  DHCP Leases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8

   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.1.  Forgery Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.2.  Interface Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.3.  Packet Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

   8.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13












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1.  Introduction

   Recent research ([SAC035], [DOTSE]) has found that many commonly-used
   broadband gateways (and similar devices) contain DNS proxies which
   are incompatible in various ways with current DNS standards.

   These proxies are usual simple DNS forwarders, but do not usually
   have any caching capabilities.  The proxy serves as a convenient
   default DNS resolver for clients on the LAN, but relies on an
   upstream resolver (e.g. at an ISP) to perform recursive DNS lookups.

   This document describes the incompatibilities that have been
   discovered and offers guidelines to implementors on how to provide
   maximum interoperability.


2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  The Transparency Principle

   It is not considered practical for a simple DNS proxy to implement
   all current and future DNS features.

   There are several reasons why this is the case:

   o  broadband gateways usually have limited hardware resources
   o  firmware upgrade cycles are long, and many users do not routinely
      apply upgrades when they become available
   o  no-one knows what those future DNS features will be, nor how they
      might be implemented
   o  it would substantially complicate the configuration UI of the
      device

   Furthermore some modern DNS protocol extensions (see e.g.  EDNS0,
   below) are intended to be used as "hop-by-hop" mechanisms.  If the
   DNS proxy is considered to be such a "hop" in the resolution chain,
   then for it to function correctly, it would need to be fully
   compliant with all such mechanisms.

   Research [SAC035] has shown that the more actively a proxy
   participates in the DNS protocol then the more likely it is that it
   will somehow interfere with the flow of messages between the DNS
   client and the upstream recursive resolvers.



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   The role of the proxy should therefore be no more and no less than to
   receive DNS requests from clients on the LAN side, forward those
   verbatim to one of the known upstream recursive resolvers on the WAN
   side, and ensure that the whole response is returned verbatim to the
   original client.

   It is RECOMMENDED that proxies should be as transparent as possible,
   such that any "hop-by-hop" mechanisms or newly introduced protocol
   extensions operate as if the proxy were not there.

   Except when required to enforce an active security or network policy
   (such as maintaining a pre-authentication "walled garden"), end-users
   SHOULD be able to send their DNS queries to specified upstream
   resolvers, thereby bypassing the proxy altogether.  In this case, the
   gateway SHOULD NOT modify the DNS request or response packets in any
   way.


4.  Protocol Conformance

4.1.  Unexpected Flags and Data

   The Transparency Principle above, when combined with Postel's
   Robustness Principle [RFC0793], suggests that DNS proxies should not
   arbitrarily reject or otherwise drop requests or responses based on
   perceived non-compliance with standards.

   For example, some proxies have been observed to drop any packet
   containing either the "Authentic Data" (AD) or "Checking Disabled"
   (CD) bits from DNSSEC [RFC4035].  This may be because [RFC1035]
   originally specified that these unused "Z" flag bits "MUST" be zero.
   However these flag bits were always intended to be reserved for
   future use, so refusing to proxy any packet containing these flags
   (now that uses for those flags have indeed been defined) is not
   appropriate.

   Therefore it is RECOMMENDED that proxies SHOULD ignore any unknown
   DNS flags and proxy those packets as usual.

4.2.  Label Compression

   Compression of labels as per Section 4.1.4 of [RFC1035] is optional.

   Proxies MUST forward packets regardless of the presence or absence of
   compressed labels therein.






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4.3.  Unknown Resource Record Types

   [RFC3597] requires that resolvers MUST handle Resource Records (RRs)
   of unknown type transparently.

   All requests and responses MUST be proxied regardless of the values
   of the QTYPE and QCLASS fields.

   Similarly all responses MUST be proxied regardless of the values of
   the TYPE and CLASS fields of any Resource Record therein.

4.4.  Packet Size Limits

   [RFC1035] specifies that the maximum size of the DNS payload in a UDP
   packet is 512 octets.  Where the required portions of a response
   would not fit inside that limit the DNS server MUST set the
   "TrunCation" (TC) bit in the DNS response header to indicate that
   truncation has occurred.  There are however two standard mechanisms
   (described below) for transporting responses larger than 512 octets.

   Many proxies have been observed to truncate all responses at 512
   octets, and others at a packet size related to the WAN MTU, in either
   case doing so without correctly setting the TC bit.

   Other proxies have been observed to remove the TC bit in server
   responses which correctly had the TC bit set by the server.

   If a DNS response is truncated but the TC bit is not set then client
   failures may result, in particular a naive DNS client library might
   suffer crashes due to reading beyond the end of the data actually
   received.

   Since UDP packets larger than 512 octets are now expected in normal
   operation, proxies SHOULD NOT truncate UDP packets that exceed that
   size.  See Section 4.4.3 for recommendations for packet sizes
   exceeding the WAN MTU.

   If a proxy must unilaterally truncate a response then the proxy MUST
   set the TC bit.  Similarly, proxies MUST NOT remove the TC bit from
   responses.

4.4.1.  TCP Transport

   Should a UDP query fail because of truncation, the standard fail-over
   mechanism is to retry the query using TCP, as described in section
   6.1.3.2 of [RFC1123].

   DNS proxies SHOULD therefore be prepared to receive and forward



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   queries over TCP.

   Note that it is unlikely that a client would send a request over TCP
   unless it had already received a truncated UDP response.  Some
   "smart" proxies have been observed to first forward any request
   received over TCP to an upstream resolver over UDP, only for the
   response to be truncated, causing the proxy to retry over TCP.  Such
   behaviour increases network traffic and causes delay in DNS
   resolution since the initial UDP request is doomed to fail.

   Therefore whenever a proxy receives a request over TCP, the proxy
   SHOULD forward the query over TCP and SHOULD NOT attempt the same
   query over UDP first.

4.4.2.  Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)

   The Extension Mechanism for DNS [RFC2671] was introduced to allow the
   transport of larger DNS packets over UDP and also to allow for
   additional request and response flags.

   A client may send an OPT Resource Record (OPT RR) in the Additional
   Section of a request to indicate that it supports a specific receive
   buffer size.  The OPT RR also includes the "DNSSEC OK" (DO) flag used
   by DNSSEC to indicate that DNSSEC-related RRs should be returned to
   the client.

   However some proxies have been observed to either reject (with a
   FORMERR response code) or black-hole any packet containing an OPT RR.
   As per Section 4.1 proxies SHOULD NOT refuse to proxy such packets.

4.4.3.  IP Fragmentation

   Support for UDP packet sizes exceeding the WAN MTU depends on the
   gateway's algorithm for handling fragmented IP packets.  Several
   options are possible:

   1.  fragments are dropped
   2.  fragments are forwarded individually as they're received
   3.  complete packets are reassembled on the gateway, and then re-
       fragmented (if necessary) as they're forwarded to the client

   Option 1 above will cause compatibility problems with EDNS0 unless
   the DNS client is configured to advertise an EDNS0 buffer size
   limited to 28 octets less than the MTU.  Note that RFC 2671 does
   recommend that the path MTU should be taken into account when using
   EDNS0.

   Also, whilst the EDNS0 specification allows for a buffer size of up



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   to 65535 octets, most common DNS server implementations do not
   support a buffer size above 4096 octets.

   Therefore proxies SHOULD (whichever of options 2 or 3 above is in
   use) be capable of forwarding UDP packets up to a payload size of at
   least 4096 octets.

   NB: in theory IP fragmentation may also occur if the LAN MTU is
   smaller than the WAN MTU, although the author has not observed such a
   configuration in use on any residential broadband service.

4.5.  Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)

   [RFC2845] defines TSIG, which is a mechanism for authenticating DNS
   requests and responses at the packet level.

   Any modifications made to the DNS portions of a TSIG-signed query or
   response packet (with the exception of the Query ID) will cause a
   TSIG authentication failure.

   DNS proxies MUST implement Section 4.7 of [RFC2845] and either
   forward packets unchanged (as recommended above) or fully implement
   TSIG.

   As per Section 4.3, DNS proxies SHOULD be capable of proxying packets
   containing TKEY [RFC2930] Resource Records.

   NB: any DNS proxy (such as those commonly found in WiFi hotspot
   "walled gardens") which transparently intercepts all DNS queries, and
   which returns unsigned responses to signed queries, will also cause
   TSIG authentication failures.


5.  DHCP's Interaction with DNS

   Whilst this document is primarily about DNS proxies, most consumers
   rely on DHCP [RFC2131] to obtain network configuration settings.
   Such settings include the client machine's IP address, subnet mask
   and default gateway, but also include DNS related settings.

   It is therefore appropriate to examine how DHCP affects client DNS
   configuration.

5.1.  Domain Name Server (DHCP Option 6)

   Most gateways default to supplying their own IP address in the DHCP
   "Domain Name Server" option [RFC2132].  The net result is that
   without explicit re-configuration many DNS clients will by default



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   send queries to the gateway's DNS proxy.  This is understandable
   behaviour given that the correct upstream settings are not usually
   known at boot time.

   Most gateways learn their own DNS settings via values supplied by an
   ISP via DHCP or PPP over the WAN interface.  However whilst many
   gateways do allow the end-user to override those values, some
   gateways only use those end-user supplied values to affect the
   proxy's own forwarding function, and do not offer these values via
   DHCP.

   When using such a device the only way to avoid using the DNS proxy is
   to hard-code the required values in the client operating system.
   This may be acceptable for a desktop system but it is inappropriate
   for mobile devices which are regularly used on many different
   networks.

   As per Section 3, end-users SHOULD be able to send their DNS queries
   directly to specified upstream resolvers, ideally without hard-coding
   those settings in their stub resolver.

   It is therefore RECOMMENDED that gateways SHOULD support end-user
   configuration of values for the "Domain Name Server" DHCP option.

5.2.  Domain Name (DHCP Option 15)

   A significant amount of traffic to the DNS Root Name Servers is for
   invalid top-level domain names, and some of that traffic can be
   attributed to particular equipment vendors whose firmware defaults
   this DHCP option to specific values.

   Since no standard exists for a "local" scoped domain name suffix it
   is RECOMMENDED that the default value for this option SHOULD be
   empty, and that this option SHOULD NOT be sent to clients when no
   value is configured.

5.3.  DHCP Leases

   It is noted that some DHCP servers in broadband gateways by default
   offer their own IP address for the "Domain Name Server" option (as
   describe above) but then automatically start offering the upstream
   settings once they've been learnt over the WAN interface.

   In general this behaviour is highly desirable, but the effect for the
   end-user is that the settings used depend on whether the DHCP lease
   was obtained before or after the WAN link was established.

   If the DHCP lease is obtained whilst the WAN link is down then the



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   DHCP client (and hence the DNS client) will not receive the correct
   values until the DHCP lease is renewed.

   Whilst no specific recommendations are given here, vendors may wish
   to give consideration to the length of DHCP leases, and whether some
   mechanism for forcing a DHCP lease renewal might be appropriate.

   Another possibility is that the learnt upstream values might be
   persisted in non-volatile memory such that on reboot the same values
   can be automatically offered via DHCP.  However this does run the
   risk that incorrect values are initially offered if the device is
   moved or connected to another ISP.

   Alternatively, the DHCP server might only issue very short (i.e. 60
   second) leases while the WAN link is down, only reverting to more
   typical lease lengths once the WAN link is up and the upstream DNS
   servers are known.  Indeed with such a configuration it may be
   possible to avoid the need to implement a DNS proxy function in the
   broadband gateway at all.


6.  Security Considerations

   This document introduces no new protocols.  However there are some
   security related recommendations for vendors that are listed here.

6.1.  Forgery Resilience

   Whilst DNS proxies are not usually full-feature resolvers they
   nevertheless share some characteristics with them.

   Notwithstanding the recommendations above about transparency many DNS
   proxies are observed to pick a new Query ID for outbound requests to
   ensure that responses are directed to the correct client.

   NB: Changing the Query ID is acceptable and compatible with proxying
   TSIG-signed packets since the TSIG signature calculation is based on
   the original message ID which is carried in the TSIG RR.

   It has been standard guidance for many years that each DNS query
   should use a randomly generated Query ID.  However many proxies have
   been observed picking sequential Query IDs for successive requests.

   It is strongly RECOMMENDED that DNS proxies follow the relevant
   recommendations in [RFC5452], particularly those in Section 9.2
   relating to randomisation of Query IDs and source ports.  This also
   applies to source port selection within any NAT function.




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   If a DNS proxy is running on a broadband gateway with NAT that is
   compliant with [RFC4787] then it SHOULD also follow the
   recommendations in Section 10 of [RFC5452] concerning how long DNS
   state is kept.

6.2.  Interface Binding

   Some gateways have been observed to have their DNS proxy listening on
   both internal (LAN) and external (WAN) interfaces.  In this
   configuration it is possible for the proxy to be used to mount
   reflector attacks as described in [RFC5358]

   The DNS proxy in a gateway SHOULD NOT by default be accessible from
   the WAN interfaces of the device.

6.3.  Packet Filtering

   The Transparency and Robustness Principles are not entirely
   compatible with the Deep Packet Inspection features of security
   appliances such as firewalls which are intended to protect systems on
   the inside of a network from rogue traffic.

   However a clear distinction may be made between traffic that is
   intrinsically malformed and that which merely contains unexpected
   data.

   Examples of malformed packets which MAY be dropped include:

   o  invalid compression pointers (i.e. those that point outside of the
      current packet, or which might cause a parsing loop).
   o  incorrect counts for the Question, Answer, Authority and
      Additional Sections (although care should be taken where
      truncation is a possibility).

   Since dropped packets will cause the client to repeatedly retransmit
   the original request, it is RECOMMENDED that proxies SHOULD instead
   return a suitable DNS error response to the client (i.e.  SERVFAIL)
   instead of dropping the packet completely.


7.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no IANA actions.


8.  Change Log

   draft-ietf-dnsproxy-03



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      Editorial nits and mention of LAN MTU (from Alex Bligh)

   draft-ietf-dnsproxy-02
      Changed "router" to "gateway" throughout (David Oran)
      Updated forgery resilience reference
      Elaboration on bypassability (from Nicholas W.)
      Elaboration on NAT source port randomisation (from Nicholas W.)
      Mention of using short DHCP leases while the WAN link is down
      (from Ralph Droms)
      Further clarification on permissibility of altering QID when using
      TSIG

   draft-ietf-dnsproxy-01
      Strengthened recommendations about truncation (from Shane Kerr)
      New TSIG text (with help from Olafur)
      Additional forgery resilience text (from Olafur)
      Compression support (from Olafur)
      Correction of text re: QID changes and compatibility with TSIG

   draft-ietf-dnsproxy-00
      Changed recommended DPI error to SERVFAIL (from Jelte)
      Changed example for invalid compression pointers (from Wouter).
      Note about TSIG implications of changing Query ID (from Wouter).
      Clarified TC-bit text (from Wouter)
      Extra text about proxy bypass (Nicholas W.)

   draft-bellis-dnsproxy-00
      Initial draft


9.  Acknowledgements

   The author would particularly like to acknowledge the assistance of
   Lisa Phifer of Core Competence.  In addition the author is grateful
   for the feedback from the members of the DNSEXT Working Group.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
              RFC 793, September 1981.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC1123]  Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application



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              and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, March 1997.

   [RFC2132]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
              Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997.

   [RFC2671]  Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
              RFC 2671, August 1999.

   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

   [RFC2930]  Eastlake, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY
              RR)", RFC 2930, September 2000.

   [RFC3597]  Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record
              (RR) Types", RFC 3597, September 2003.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC4787]  Audet, F. and C. Jennings, "Network Address Translation
              (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast UDP", BCP 127,
              RFC 4787, January 2007.

   [RFC5358]  Damas, J. and F. Neves, "Preventing Use of Recursive
              Nameservers in Reflector Attacks", BCP 140, RFC 5358,
              October 2008.

   [RFC5452]  Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More
              Resilient against Forged Answers", RFC 5452, January 2009.

10.2.  Informative References

   [DOTSE]    Ahlund and Wallstrom, "DNSSEC Tests of Consumer Broadband
              Routers", February 2008,
              <http://www.iis.se/docs/Routertester_en.pdf>.

   [SAC035]   Bellis, R. and L. Phifer, "Test Report: DNSSEC Impact on
              Broadband Routers and Firewalls", September 2008,
              <http://www.icann.org/committees/security/sac035.pdf>.



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Author's Address

   Ray Bellis
   Nominet UK
   Edmund Halley Road
   Oxford  OX4 4DQ
   United Kingdom

   Phone: +44 1865 332211
   Email: ray.bellis@nominet.org.uk
   URI:   http://www.nominet.org.uk/








































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