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Versions: (draft-ljunggren-dps-framework) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 RFC 6841

Network Working Group                                       F. Ljunggren
Internet-Draft                                                  Kirei AB
Intended status: Informational                       AM. Eklund Lowinder
Expires: April 2, 2013                                               .SE
                                                                T. Okubo
                                                                   ICANN
                                                      September 29, 2012


     A Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements
                draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-dps-framework-09

Abstract

   This document presents a framework to assist writers of DNSSEC
   Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements, such as Domain Managers and
   Zone Operators on both the top-level and secondary level, who are
   managing and operating a DNS zone with Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
   implemented.

   In particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics
   that should be considered for inclusion into a DNSSEC Policy
   definition and Practice Statement.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Purpose  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  DNSSEC Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  DNSSEC Practice Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Relationship between DNSSEC Policy and Practice
           Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  Set of Provisions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Contents of a Set of Provisions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.2.  Publication and repositories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.3.  Operational requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.4.  Facility, management and operational controls  . . . . . . 13
     4.5.  Technical security controls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.6.  Zone signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     4.7.  Compliance audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     4.8.  Legal matters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   5.  Outline of a Set of Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   6.  IANA considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   7.  Security considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     9.1.  Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     9.2.  Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27












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1.  Introduction

1.1.  Background

   The Domain Name System (DNS) was not originally designed with strong
   security mechanisms to provide integrity and authenticity of its
   data.  Over the years, a number of vulnerabilities have been
   discovered that threaten the reliability and trustworthiness of the
   system.

   The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC, [RFC4033],
   [RFC4034], [RFC4035]) address these vulnerabilities by using public
   key cryptography to add data origin authentication, data integrity
   verification, and authenticated denial of existence capabilities to
   the DNS.  In short, DNSSEC provides a way for software to verify the
   origin of DNS data and validate that it has not been modified in
   transit or by intermediaries.

   To provide a means for users who rely on signed responses from the
   DNS ("relying parties") to evaluate the strength and security of the
   DNSSEC chain of trust, an entity operating a DNSSEC enabled zone may
   choose to publish a DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS), comprising
   statements describing critical security controls and procedures
   relevant for scrutinizing the trustworthiness of the system.  The DPS
   may also identify any DNSSEC Policies it supports, explaining how it
   meets their requirements.

   Even though this document is heavily inspired by the Internet X.509
   Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification
   Practices Framework [RFC3647], with large parts being drawn from that
   document, the properties and structure of the DNSSEC trust model are
   fundamentally different from those of the X.509 PKI.

   For example, in the DNSSEC trust model there is no central control of
   assurance or trust levels.  Each zone manager selects their own way
   of managing keys and operations, there being no necessity to have any
   coordination of security practices between different zones.  The
   degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in the
   DNSSEC chain of trust is dependent on the weakest link of that chain.
   This implies that the security of zones is generally more critical
   higher up in the DNS hierarchy.

1.2.  Purpose

   The purpose of this document is twofold.  Firstly, the document
   explains the concepts of a DNSSEC Policy (DP) and of a DNSSEC
   Practice Statement (DPS), and to describe the relationship between
   the two.  Secondly, it presents a framework to encourage and assist



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   writers of Policies and Practice Statements in creating consistent
   and comparable documents.  In particular, the framework identifies
   the elements that should be considered in formulating a DP or a DPS.
   It does not, however, define a particular Policy or Practice
   Statement, nor does it seek to provide legal advice or
   recommendations as to the contents.

1.3.  Scope

   The scope of this document is limited to discussion of the topics
   that can be covered in a DP or a DPS, but does not go into the
   specific details that could possibly be included in each one.  In
   particular, this document describes the types of information that
   should be considered for inclusion in them.

   The DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement framework should be viewed
   and used as a checklist of factors that ought be taken in to
   consideration prior to deploying DNSSEC, and as an outline to create
   an operational practices disclosure document.  As such, it focuses on
   the topics affected by the introduction of DNSSEC into a zone.  Other
   aspects, such as the operations of name servers and registry systems,
   are considered out of scope.  The framework is primarily aimed at TLD
   managers and organizations providing registry services, but may be
   used by high-value domain holders and so serve as a checklist for
   DNSSEC readiness at a high level.

   This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the general
   concepts of DNS, DNSSEC and PKI.


2.  Definitions

   This document makes use of the following defined terms:

   Audit logs - Control evidence information to prove the integrity of
   processes.  This may be generated by DNS and DNSSEC-related systems,
   supplied by the surrounding facility, or obtained from manually
   generated, non-electronic documentation.  Audit logs will be examined
   by the internal and/or external auditors.

   Activation data - Data values, other than keys, required to operate
   the cryptographic modules used to protect the keys from unauthorized
   use.

   Chain of Trust - A hierarchical structure of trust consisting of DNS
   keys, signatures, and delegation signer records that, when validated
   in a series, can provide proof of authenticity of the last element in
   the chain, providing that the first element is trusted.  Usually, the



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   first element is a trust anchor.

   Compromise (Key Compromise) - Key Compromise is a situation where the
   private component of a Signing Key is lost, stolen, exposed, modified
   or used in an unauthorized manner.  More strictly, even a suspicion
   that one of these has occurred will be enough to be considered as key
   compromise.

   DNS - The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical global naming
   catalog for computers, services, or any resource connected to the
   Internet.

   DNS Zone - A portion of the global Domain Name System (DNS) namespace
   for which administrative responsibility has been delegated.

   DNSSEC - DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is a set of IETF
   specifications [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035] that use public key
   cryptography to add data origin authentication, data integrity
   verification, and authenticated denial of existence capabilities to
   DNS.

   DNSSEC Policy - A DNSSEC Policy (DP) sets forth the security
   requirements and standards to be implemented for a DNSSEC signed
   zone.

   DNSSEC Practice Statement - A DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) is a
   practices disclosure document that may support and be a supplemental
   document to the DNSSEC Policy (if such exists), and states how the
   management of a given zone implements procedures and controls at a
   high level.

   Key rollover - An operational process to change one of the DNSSEC
   keys used for signing a zone via distribution of public keys in a
   trusted manner.

   Multi-person control - A security concept to distribute the authority
   of an operation over multiple persons, to mitigate threats caused by
   a single authorized individual.  For example, a key recovery function
   may require some number of authorized individuals (m) out of the (n)
   to whom a portion of the recovery key was distributed, to combine
   their key fragments, before key recovery can occur.

   PKI - Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a concept that makes use of
   asymmetric cryptography to provide a system with integrity,
   authentication, confidentiality and via distribution of public keys
   in a trusted manner.

   Policy Authority - The body responsible for setting and administering



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   a DNSSEC Policy, and for determining whether a DPS is suitable for
   that Policy.

   Relying Party - An entity that relies on a signed response from the
   DNS.

   Repository - A location on the Internet to store DP, DPS, Trust
   Anchors and other related information that should be kept public.

   Security Posture - A Security Posture is an indicator of how secure
   an entity is and how secure the entity should be.  It is the result
   of an adequate threat model and risk assessment.

   Separation of Duties - A security concept that limits the influence
   of a single person by segregating roles and responsibilities.

   Signing Key - Private component of an asymmetric key-pair that is
   used for signing of resource records within the zone.  Note that the
   other component, called public key, is used for signature validation.

   TLD - A Top-Level Domain (TLD) is one of the domains at the highest
   level below the root in the hierarchy of the DNS.

   Trust Anchor - Public portion of a key-pair that is the authoritative
   entity used to authenticate the first element in a chain of trust.


3.  Concepts

   This section describes the concepts of a DNSSEC Policy and of a
   DNSSEC Practices Statement.  Other related concepts are described as
   well.

3.1.  DNSSEC Policy

   A DNSSEC Policy (DP) sets forth requirements that are appropriate for
   a specified level of assurance.  For example, a DP may encompass all
   topics of this framework, each with a certain set of security
   requirements, possibly grouped according to impact.  The progression
   from medium to high levels of assurance would correspond to
   increasing security requirements and corresponding increasing levels
   of assurance.

   A DP also constitues a basis for an audit, accreditation, or another
   assessment of an entity.  Each entity can be assessed against one or
   more DPs that it claims to implement.





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3.2.  DNSSEC Practice Statement

   Most zone managers using DNSSEC will not have the need to create a
   thorough and detailed statement of practices.  For example, a
   registrant may be the sole relying party of its own zone and would
   already be aware of the nature and trustworthiness of its services.
   In other cases, a zone manager may provide registration services with
   only a very low level of assurances where the domain names being
   secured may pose only marginal risks if compromised.  Publishing a
   DPS is most relevant for entities operating a zone that contains a
   significant number of delegations to other entities.

   A DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) should contain information that is
   relevant to the stakeholders of the relevant zone(s).  Since these
   generally include the Internet community, it should not contain such
   information that could be considered to be sensitive details of an
   entity's operations.

   A DNSSEC Practice Statement may identify a supported DP, which may
   subsequently be used by a relying party to evaluate the
   trustworthiness of any digital signatures verified using the public
   key of that entity.

3.3.  Relationship between DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement

   A DNSSEC Policy and a DNSSEC Practice Statement address the same set
   of topics that are of interest to the stakeholders in terms of the
   degree to which a DNSSEC digital signature may be trusted.  The
   primary difference is in the focus of their provisions.  A Policy
   sets forth the requirements and standards to be implemented for a
   DNSSEC signed zone, and may be used to communicate requirements that
   must be met by complying parties; as such it may also be used to
   determine or establish equivalency between policies associated with
   different zones.  A Practice Statement, by contrast, describes how a
   zone operator (and possibly other participants in the management of a
   given zone) implements procedures and controls to meet the
   requirements of applicable Policies.  In other words, the Policy says
   what needs to be done, the Practice Statement says what is being
   done.

   An additional difference between a Policy and a Practice Statement
   relates to the scope of coverage of the two kinds of documents, in
   terms of its applicability.  A Policy may apply to multiple
   organizations or multiple zones.  By contrast, a Practice Statement
   would usually apply only to a single zone operator or a single
   organization, since it describes the actual controls in place that
   meet the requirements of applicable Policy.




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   For example, a TLD Manager or regulatory authority may define
   requirements in a Policy for the operation of one or more zones.  The
   Policy will be a broad statement of the general requirements for
   managing the zone.  A zone operator may be required to write its own
   Practice Statement to support the Policy, explaining how it meets the
   requirements of the Policy.  Alternatively, a zone operator that is
   also the manager of that zone, and not governed by any external
   Policy may still choose to disclose operational practices by
   publishing a DPS.  The zone operator might do so to provide
   transparency and to gain community trust in its operations.

   A Policy and a Practice Statement also differ in the level of detail
   each expresses: although there may be variations, a Practice
   Statement will provide a description of procedures and controls and
   so will usually be more detailed than a Policy, which provides
   general principles.

   The main differences between a Policy and Practice Statement can be
   summarized as follows:


   (a)  Operation of a DNS zone with DNSSEC may be governed by a Policy
        that establishes requirements stating what the entity operating
        that zone must do.  An entity can use a Practice Statement to
        disclose how it meets the requirements of a Policy or how it has
        implemented critical processes and controls, absent a
        controlling Policy

   (b)  A Policy may serve the purpose of establishing a common basis of
        trusted operation throughout a set of zones in the DNS
        hierarchy.  By contrast, a Practice Statement is a statement of
        a single zone operator or organization.

   (c)  A Practice Statement is generally more detailed than a Policy
        and specifies how the zone operator or organization implements
        critical processes and controls, and how the entity meets any
        requirements specified in the one or more Policies under which
        it operates DNSSEC.

3.4.  Set of Provisions

   A set of provisions is a collection of Policy requirements or
   Practice statements, which may employ the approach described in this
   framework by covering the topics appearing in Section 5 below.  The
   topics are described in detail in section 4.

   A Policy can be expressed as a single set of provisions.




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   A Practice Statement can also be expressed as a single set of
   provisions with each component addressing the requirements of one or
   more Policies.  Alternatively, it could be a set of provisions that
   do not reference any particular policy but instead describe a set of
   self-imposed controls to the relying parties.  For example, a
   Practice Statement could be expressed as a combination of the
   following:


   (a)  a list of Policies supported by the DPS;

   (b)  for each Policy in (a), a set of provisions that contains
        statements addressing the requirements by filling in details not
        stipulated in that policy or expressly left to the discretion of
        the implementer.  Such statements serve to show how this
        particular Practice Statement implements the requirements of the
        particular Policy; or

   (c)  a set of provisions that contains statements regarding the
        DNSSEC operations practices, independent of any Policy.


   The statements provided in (b) may augment or refine the stipulations
   of an applicable Policy, but generally they must not conflict with
   the stipulations.  In certain cases however, a Policy Authority may
   permit exceptions because certain compensating controls of the entity
   disclosed in its Practices Statement allow it to provide a level of
   assurance equivalent to full compliance with the policy.

   The framework outlines the contents of a set of provisions, in terms
   of eight primary components, as follows:


   1.  Introduction

   2.  Publication and Repositories

   3.  Operational Requirements

   4.  Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

   5.  Technical Security Controls

   6.  Zone Signing







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   7.  Compliance Audit

   8.  Legal Matters


   This framework can be used by Policy Authorities to write DNSSEC
   Policies and by zone operators to write a DNSSEC Practice Statements.
   Having a set of documents with the same structure facilitates
   comparisons with the corresponding documents of other zones.


4.  Contents of a Set of Provisions

   This section describes the contents of a set of provisions.  Refer to
   Section 5 for the complete outline.

   Drafters of DPSs conforming to this framework are permitted to add
   additional levels of subcomponents below those described here to meet
   specific needs.  All components listed in Section 5 should be
   present, but drafters may leave components empty, only stating "no
   stipulation", if so required.

4.1.  Introduction

   This component identifies and introduces the set of provisions, and
   indicates the types of entities and applications for which the
   document (either Policy or Practice Statement) is targeted.

4.1.1.  Overview

   This subcomponent provides a general introduction to the document.
   It can also be used to provide a description of entities to which the
   Policy or Practice Statement applies.

4.1.2.  Document name and identification

   This subcomponent provides any applicable names or other identifiers
   of the document.

4.1.3.  Community and applicability

   This subcomponent identifies the stakeholders along with their
   expected roles and responsibilities.  These include (but are not
   limited to) an entity signing the zone, entities relying on the
   signed zone, other entities that have operational dependency on the
   signed zone, and an entity that entrusted the zone signing.





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4.1.4.  Specification administration

   This subcomponent contains the contact details of the organization
   responsible for managing the DP/DPS, as well as the specification
   change procedures.  These procedures may include the description of
   the notification mechanisms used to provide advance notice of
   amendments which are deemed to materially affect the assurance
   provided by the entity, and how/when such amendments will be
   communicated to the stakeholders.

   If a Policy Authority is responsible for determining whether a DPS is
   suitable for the Policy, this subcomponent may include the name and
   contact information of the entity in charge of making such a
   determination.  In this case, the subcomponent also includes the
   procedures by which this determination is made.

4.2.  Publication and repositories

   The component describes the requirements for an entity to publish
   information regarding its practices, public keys, the current status
   of such keys together with details relating to the repositories in
   which the information is held.  This may include the responsibilities
   of publishing the DPS and of identifying documents that are not made
   publicly available owing to their sensitive nature, e.g. security
   controls, clearance procedures, or business information.

4.2.1.  Repositories

   This subcomponent describes the repository mechanisms used for making
   information available to the stakeholders, and may include:


   o  The locations of the repositories and the means by which they may
      be accessed;

   o  An identification of the entity or entities that operate
      repositories, such as a zone operator or a TLD Manager;

   o  Access control on published information objects.

   o  Any notification services which may be subscribed to by the
      stakeholders;









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4.2.2.  Publication of public keys

   This subcomponent contains information relating to the publication of
   public keys:


   o  Whether the public keys are included in a key hierarchy, published
      as Trust Anchors or both;

   o  The data formats and methods available to validate the
      authenticity of public keys;

   o  The frequency and timing of publishing new information
      (principally as advance notice for stakeholders relying on the
      public keys).


4.3.  Operational requirements

   This component describes the operational requirements when operating
   a DNSSEC signed zone.

4.3.1.  Meaning of domain names

   This subcomponent describes the overall policy of child zone naming,
   if any.

4.3.2.  Identification and authentication of child zone manager

   This subcomponent describes how the child zone manager has initially
   been identified, and how any subsequent change request is
   authenticated as originating from the manager or their authorized
   representative.

4.3.3.  Registration of delegation signer (DS) resource records

   This subcomponent describes the process of establishing the chain-of-
   trust to the child zone by incorporating delegation signer (DS)
   record(s) into the zone.

4.3.4.  Method to prove possession of private key

   This subcomponent describes whether, and if so under what
   circumstances, the child zone manager is required to provide proof of
   the possession of the private component of any current or subsequent
   child zone Signing Key corresponding to a DS record they wish to
   incorporate into the parent zone.




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4.3.5.  Removal of DS resource records

   This subcomponent will explain how, when, and under what
   circumstances the DS records may be removed from the zone.

4.4.  Facility, management and operational controls

   This component describes non-technical security controls (i.e.,
   physical, procedural, and personnel) in use by the entity to securely
   perform the DNSSEC related functions.  Such controls include physical
   access, key management, disaster recovery, auditing, and archiving.

   These non-technical security controls are critical for trusting the
   DNSSEC signatures, since lack of security may compromise DNSSEC
   operations.  For example, it could result in the creation of
   signatures with erroneous information or in the compromise of the
   Signing Key.

   Within each subcomponent, separate consideration will usually need to
   be given to each entity type.

4.4.1.  Physical controls

   In this subcomponent, the physical controls on the facility housing
   the entity systems are described.  Topics addressed may include:


   o  Site location and construction, such as requirements for multiple
      tiers of physical barriers, construction requirements for high-
      security areas etc.  It may also describe the use of locked rooms,
      cages, safes, and cabinets etc.;

   o  Physical access, i.e. mechanisms to control access from one area
      of the facility to another or additional controls for reaching
      into higher tiers, such as dual-access control and two-factor
      authentication;

   o  Power and air conditioning;

   o  Water exposures;

   o  Fire prevention and protection;

   o  Media storage, e.g. requiring the storage of backup media in a
      separate location that is physically secure and protected from
      fire, smoke, particle, and water damage;





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   o  Waste disposal; and

   o  Off-site backup.


4.4.2.  Procedural controls

   In this subcomponent, requirements for recognizing trusted roles are
   described, together with a description of the responsibilities of
   each role.  Examples of trusted roles include system administrators,
   security officers, crypto officers and system auditors.

   For each task identified, the number of individuals required to
   perform the task (m of n rule, if applicable) should be stated for
   each role.  Identification and authentication requirements for each
   role may also be defined.

   This subcomponent also includes the separation of duties in terms of
   the roles that cannot be performed by the same individuals.

4.4.3.  Personnel controls

   This subcomponent addresses the following:


   o  Qualifications, experience, and clearances that personnel must
      have as a condition of filling trusted roles or other important
      roles.  Examples include credentials, job experiences, and
      official government clearances;

   o  Background checks and clearance procedures that are required in
      connection with the hiring of personnel filling trusted roles or
      other important roles.  Such roles may require a check of their
      criminal records, financial records, references, and any
      additional clearances required for the position in question;

   o  Training requirements and training procedures for each role
      following the hiring of personnel;

   o  Any retraining period and retraining procedures for each role
      after completion of initial training;

   o  Frequency and sequence for job rotation among various roles;

   o  Sanctions against personnel for unauthorized actions, such as
      unauthorized use of authority, or unauthorized use of the entity
      systems;




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   o  Controls on personnel that are contractors rather than employees
      of the entity; examples include:


      *  Bonding requirements on contract personnel;

      *  Contractual requirements including indemnification for damages
         due to the actions of the contractor personnel;

      *  Auditing and monitoring of contractor personnel; and

      *  Other controls on contracting personnel.


   o  Documentation to be supplied to personnel during initial training,
      retraining, or otherwise.


4.4.4.  Audit logging procedures

   This subcomponent is used to describe event logging and audit
   systems, implemented for the purpose of maintaining an audit trail
   and to provide evidence of process integrity.  Elements include the
   following:


   o  Types of events recorded, such as records of key roll over and
      other key management operations, the personnel assigned to various
      roles, attempts to access the system and requests made to the
      system;

   o  Frequency with which audit logs are processed or archived, for
      example, weekly, following an alarm or anomalous event, or
      whenever the audit log size reaches a particular size;

   o  Period for which audit logs are kept;

   o  Protection of audit logs:


      *  Who can view audit logs, for example only the audit
         administrator;

      *  Protection against modification of audit logs, for instance a
         requirement that no one may modify or delete the audit records
         or that only an audit administrator may delete an audit file as
         part of audit file rotation; and




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      *  Protection against deletion of audit logs.


   o  Audit log backup procedures;

   o  Whether the audit log collection function is internal or external
      to the system;

   o  Whether the subject who caused an audit event to occur is notified
      of the audit action; and

   o  Vulnerability assessments, for example, where audit data is run
      through a tool that identifies potential attempts to breach the
      security of the system.


4.4.5.  Compromise and disaster recovery

   This subcomponent describes requirements relating to notification and
   recovery procedures in the event of compromise or disaster.  Each of
   the following may need to be addressed separately:


   o  Identification or listing of the applicable incident and
      compromise reporting and handling procedures, which may include
      the investigation of measures to prevent the event from
      reoccurring

   o  The recovery procedures used if computing resources, software,
      and/or data are corrupted or suspected to have been corrupted.
      These procedures describe how, and under what circumstances
      operations of the system are to be suspended, how and when normal
      operations are resumed, how the stakeholders are to be informed
      and how to assess the damage and carry out the root cause
      analysis.

   o  The recovery procedures used if any keys are compromised.  These
      procedures describe how a secure environment is re-established,
      how the keys are rolled over, how a new Trust Anchor is provided
      to the community (if applicable), and how new zone information is
      published.

   o  The entity's capabilities to ensure business continuity following
      a natural or other disaster.  Such capabilities may include the
      availability of a disaster recovery site at which operations may
      be recovered.  They may also include procedures for securing its
      facility during the period of time following a natural or other
      disaster and before a secure environment is re-established, either



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      at the original site or at a disaster recovery site.  For example,
      procedures to protect against theft of sensitive materials from an
      earthquake-damaged site.


4.4.6.  Entity termination

   This subcomponent describes requirements relating to procedures for
   termination of a contract with an entity, termination notification
   and transition of responsibilities to another entity.  The purpose
   may be to ensure that the transition process will be transparent to
   the relying parties and will not affect the services.

4.5.  Technical security controls

   This component is used to define the security measures taken to
   protect the cryptographic keys and activation data (e.g., PINs,
   passwords, or manually-held key shares) relevant to DNSSEC
   operations.  Secure key management is critical to ensure that all
   secret and private keys and activation data are protected and used
   only by authorized personnel.

   Also described here are other technical security controls used to
   perform the functions of key generation, authentication,
   registration, auditing, and archiving.  Technical controls include
   life-cycle security controls, software development environment
   security, and operational security controls.

   If applicable, other technical security controls on repositories,
   authoritative name servers, or other participants may also be
   documented here.

4.5.1.  Key pair generation and installation

   Key pair generation and installation need to be considered, which may
   involve answering the following questions:


   1.  Who generates the zone's public/private key pairs?  How is the
       key generation performed?  Is the key generation performed by
       hardware or software?

   2.  How is the private key installed in all parts of the key
       management system?







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   3.  How are the zone's public keys provided securely to the parent
       zone and potential relying parties?

   4.  Who generates the public key parameters.  Is the quality of the
       parameters checked during key generation?

   5.  For what purposes may the keys be used, and/or for what purposes
       should usage of the key be restricted?


4.5.2.  Private key protection and cryptographic module engineering
        controls

   Requirements for private key protection and cryptographic modules
   need to be considered for key generation and creation of signatures.
   The following questions may need to be answered:


   1.   What standards, if any, are required for the cryptographic
        module used to generate the keys?  A cryptographic module can be
        composed of hardware, software, firmware, or any combination of
        them.  For example, are the zone's signatures required to be
        generated using modules compliant with the US FIPS 140-2
        standard?  If so, what is the required FIPS 140-2 level of the
        module?  Are there any other engineering or other controls
        relating to a cryptographic module, such as the identification
        of the cryptographic module boundary, input/output, roles and
        services, finite state machine, physical security, software
        security, operating system security, algorithm compliance,
        electromagnetic compatibility, and self tests.

   2.   Is the private key under m of n multi-person control?  If yes,
        provide m and n (two person control is a special case of m of n,
        where m = 2 and n >= 2).

   3.   Is the private key escrowed?  If so, who is the escrow agent, in
        what form is the key escrowed (e.g. plaintext, encrypted, split
        key), and what are the security controls on the escrow system?

   4.   Is the private key backed up?  If so, who is the backup agent,
        in what form is the key backed up (e.g. plaintext, encrypted,
        split key), and what are the security controls on the backup
        system?

   5.   Is the private key archived?  If so, who is the archival agent,
        in what form is the key archived (e.g. plaintext, encrypted,
        split key), and what are the security controls on the archival
        system?



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   6.   Under what circumstances, if any, can a private key be
        transferred into or from a cryptographic module?  Who is
        permitted to perform such a transfer operation?  In what form is
        the private key during the transfer (e.g., plaintext, encrypted,
        or split key)?

   7.   How is the private key stored in the module (e.g., plaintext,
        encrypted, or split key)?

   8.   Who can activate (use) the private key?  What actions must be
        performed to activate the private key (e.g., login, power on,
        supply PIN, insert token/key, automatic, etc.)?  Once the key is
        activated, is the key active for an indefinite period, active
        for one time, or active for a defined time period?

   9.   Who can deactivate the private key and how?  Examples of methods
        of deactivating private keys include logging out, turning the
        power off, removing the token/key, automatic deactivation, and
        time expiration.

   10.  Who can destroy the private key and how?  Examples of methods of
        destroying private keys include token surrender, token
        destruction, and zeroizing the key.


4.5.3.  Other aspects of key pair management

   Other aspects of key management need to be considered for the zone
   operator and other participants.  For each of these types of
   entities, the following questions may need to be answered:


   1.  What are the life-cycle states for the management of any Signing
       Keys?

   2.  What is the operational period of these keys?  What are the usage
       periods or active lifetimes for the pairs?


4.5.4.  Activation data

   Activation data refers to data values other than whole private keys
   that are required to operate private keys or cryptographic modules
   containing private keys, such as a PIN, passphrase, or portions of a
   private key used in a key-splitting scheme.  Protection of activation
   data prevents unauthorized use of the private key and potentially
   needs to be considered for the zone operator and other participants.
   Such a consideration may need to address the entire life-cycle of the



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   activation data from generation through archival and destruction.
   For each of the entity types, all of the questions listed in 4.5.1
   through 4.5.3 potentially need to be answered with respect to
   activation data rather than with respect to keys.

4.5.5.  Computer security controls

   This subcomponent is used to describe computer security controls such
   as:


   1.  use of the trusted computing base concept or equivalent;

   2.  discretionary access control, labels, mandatory access controls;

   3.  object re-use;

   4.  auditing;

   5.  identification and authentication;

   6.  trusted path; and

   7.  security testing.

   This subcomponent may also address requirements for product
   assurance, product evaluation analysis, testing, profiling, product
   certification, and/or product accreditation.

4.5.6.  Network security controls

   This subcomponent addresses network security related controls,
   including firewalls, routers and remote access.

4.5.7.  Timestamping

   This subcomponent addresses requirements or practices relating to the
   use of timestamps on various data.  It may also discuss whether or
   not the time-stamping application must use a trusted time source.

4.5.8.  Life cycle technical controls

   This subcomponent addresses system development controls and security
   management controls.

   System development controls include development environment security,
   development personnel security, configuration management security
   during product maintenance, software engineering practices, software



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   development methodology, modularity, layering, use of failsafe design
   and implementation techniques (e.g. defensive programming) and
   development facility security.

   Security management controls include execution of tools and
   procedures to ensure that the operational systems and networks adhere
   to configured security.  These tools and procedures include checking
   the integrity of the security software, firmware, and hardware to
   ensure their correct operation.

4.6.  Zone signing

   This component covers all aspects of zone signing, including the
   cryptographic specification surrounding the Signing Keys, signing
   scheme, and methodology for key rollover and the actual zone signing.
   Child zones and other relying parties may depend on the information
   in this section to understand the expected data in the signed zone
   and determine their own behavior.  In addition, this section will be
   used to state the compliance to the cryptographic and operational
   requirements pertaining to zone signing, if any.

4.6.1.  Key lengths, key types and algorithms

   This subcomponent describes the key generation algorithm, the key
   types used for signing the key set and zone data, and key lengths
   used to create the keys.  It should also cover how changes to these
   key lengths, key types and algorithms may be performed.

4.6.2.  Authenticated denial of existence

   Authenticated denial of existence refers to the usage of NSEC
   [RFC4034], NSEC3 [RFC5155] or any other mechanism defined in the
   future that is used to authenticate the denial of existence of
   resource records.  This subcomponent describes what mechanisms are
   used, any parameters associated with that mechanism, and how these
   mechanisms and parameters may be changed.

4.6.3.  Signature format

   This subcomponent is used to describe the signing method and
   algorithms used for the zone signing.

4.6.4.  Key rollover

   This subcomponent explains the key rollover scheme for each key type.






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4.6.5.  Signature life-time and re-signing frequency

   This subcomponent describes the life-cycle of the Resource Record
   Signature (RRSIG) record.

4.6.6.  Verification of resource records

   This subsection addresses the controls around the verification of the
   resource records in order to validate and authenticate the data to be
   signed.  This may include a separate key set verification process if
   using a split key signing scheme.

4.6.7.  Resource records time-to-live

   This subcomponent specifies the resource records' time-to-live (TTL)
   for all types relevant to DNSSEC, as well as any global parameters
   that affect the caching mechanisms of the resolvers.

4.7.  Compliance audit

   To prove the compliance with a Policy or the statements in the
   Practices Statement, a compliance audit can be conducted.  This
   component describes how the audit is to be conducted at the zone
   operator and, possibly, at other involved entities.

4.7.1.  Frequency of entity compliance audit

   This subcomponent describes the frequency of the compliance audit.

4.7.2.  Identity/qualifications of auditor

   This subcomponent addresses what qualifications are required of the
   auditor.  For instance it may that an auditor must belong to a
   specific association or that they have certain certifications.

4.7.3.  Auditor's relationship to audited party

   This subcomponent is used to clarify the relationship between the
   auditor and the entity being audited.  This becomes important if
   there are any requirements or guidelines for the selection of the
   auditor.

4.7.4.  Topics covered by audit

   Topics covered by audit depends on the scope of the audit.  Since the
   DNSSEC Policy and Practices Statement is the document to be audited
   against, it is ideal to set the scope of the audit to the scope of
   the DP/DPS.  However, the scope may be narrowed down or expanded as



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   needed; for example, if there are not enough resources to conduct a
   full audit, or some portion is under development and not ready for
   the audit.

4.7.5.  Actions taken as a result of deficiency

   This subcomponent specifies the action taken in order to correct any
   discrepancy that has a security impact.  This could be the
   remediation process for the audit findings or any other action to
   correct any discrepancy with the DNSSEC Policy or Practices
   Statement.

4.7.6.  Communication of results

   This subcomponent specifies how the results of the audit are
   communicated to the stakeholders.

4.8.  Legal matters

   The introduction of DNSSEC into a zone may have legal implications.
   Consequently, it may be appropriate to declare the legal status of
   the binding embodied in the DNSSEC digital signatures and to clarify
   on any limitations of liability asserted by the Registry Manager.

   In most cases, the DPS is not a contract or part of a contract;
   instead, it is laid out so that its terms and conditions are applied
   to the parties by separate documents, such as registrar or registrant
   agreements.  In other cases, its contents may form part of a legal
   contract between parties (either directly or via other agreements).
   In this case, legal expertise should be consulted when drawing up
   sections of the document that may have contractual implications.

   At a minimum, the legal matters section should indicate under what
   jurisdiction the registry is operated, and provide references to any
   associated agreements that are in force.  It may also be appropriate
   to inform of any identified implications on the protection of
   personally identifiable private information.


5.  Outline of a Set of Provisions

   This section contains a recommended outline for a set of provisions,
   intended to serve as a checklist or a standard template for use by DP
   or DPS writers.  Such a common outline will facilitate:







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   (a)  Comparison of a DPS with a DP to ensure that the DPS faithfully
        implements the policy.

   (b)  Comparison of two DPSs.

   Section 4 of this document is structured so that it provides guidance
   for each corresponding component and sub-component of the outline.


      1.  INTRODUCTION
        1.1.  Overview
        1.2.  Document name and identification
        1.3.  Community and applicability
        1.4.  Specification administration
          1.4.1.  Specification administration organization
          1.4.2.  Contact information
          1.4.3.  Specification change procedures
      2.  PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORIES
        2.1.  Repositories
        2.2.  Publication of public keys
      3.  OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
        3.1.  Meaning of domain names
        3.2.  Identification and authentication of child zone manager
        3.3.  Registration of delegation signer (DS) resource records
        3.4.  Method to prove possession of private key
        3.5.  Removal of DS resource records
          3.5.1.  Who can request removal
          3.5.2.  Procedure for removal request
          3.5.3.  Emergency removal request
      4.  FACILITY, MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
        4.1.  Physical controls
          4.1.1.  Site location and construction
          4.1.2.  Physical access
          4.1.3.  Power and air conditioning
          4.1.4.  Water exposures
          4.1.5.  Fire prevention and protection
          4.1.6.  Media storage
          4.1.7.  Waste disposal
          4.1.8.  Off-site backup
        4.2.  Procedural controls
          4.2.1.  Trusted roles
          4.2.2.  Number of persons required per task
          4.2.3.  Identification and authentication for each role
          4.2.4.  Tasks requiring separation of duties
        4.3.  Personnel controls
          4.3.1.  Qualifications, experience, and clearance
                  requirements
          4.3.2.  Background check procedures



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          4.3.3.  Training requirements
          4.3.4.  Job rotation frequency and sequence
          4.3.5.  Sanctions for unauthorized actions
          4.3.6.  Contracting personnel requirements
          4.3.7.  Documentation supplied to personnel
        4.4.  Audit logging procedures
          4.4.1.  Types of events recorded
          4.4.2.  Frequency of processing log
          4.4.3.  Retention period for audit log information
          4.4.4.  Protection of audit log
          4.4.5.  Audit log backup procedures
          4.4.6.  Audit collection system
          4.4.7.  Vulnerability assessments
        4.5.  Compromise and disaster recovery
          4.5.1.  Incident and compromise handling procedures
          4.5.2.  Corrupted computing resources, software, and/or
                  data
          4.5.3.  Entity private key compromise procedures
          4.5.4.  Business continuity and IT disaster recovery
                  capabilities
        4.6.  Entity termination
      5.  TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
        5.1.  Key pair generation and installation
          5.1.1.  Key pair generation
          5.1.2.  Public key delivery
          5.1.3.  Public key parameters generation and quality
                  checking
          5.1.4.  Key usage purposes
        5.2.  Private key protection and cryptographic module
              engineering controls
          5.2.1.  Cryptographic module standards and controls
          5.2.2.  Private key (m-of-n) multi-person control
          5.2.3.  Private key escrow
          5.2.4.  Private key backup
          5.2.5.  Private key storage on cryptographic module
          5.2.6.  Private key archival
          5.2.7.  Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
                  module
          5.2.8.  Method of activating private key
          5.2.9.  Method of deactivating private key
          5.2.10. Method of destroying private key
        5.3.  Other aspects of key pair management
        5.4.  Activation data
          5.4.1.  Activation data generation and installation
          5.4.2.  Activation data protection
          5.4.3.  Other aspects of activation data
        5.5.  Computer security controls
        5.6.  Network security controls



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        5.7.  Timestamping
        5.8.  Life cycle technical controls
      6.  ZONE SIGNING
        6.1.  Key lengths, key types and algorithms
        6.2.  Authenticated denial of existence
        6.3.  Signature format
        6.4.  Key rollover
        6.5.  Signature life-time and re-signing frequency
        6.6.  Verification of resource records
        6.7.  Resource records time-to-live
      7.  COMPLIANCE AUDIT
        7.1.  Frequency of entity compliance audit
        7.2.  Identity/qualifications of auditor
        7.3.  Auditor's relationship to audited party
        7.4.  Topics covered by audit
        7.5.  Actions taken as a result of deficiency
        7.6.  Communication of results
      8.  LEGAL MATTERS



6.  IANA considerations

   No action required.


7.  Security considerations

   The sensitivity of the information protected by DNSSEC at different
   tiers in the DNS tree varies significantly.  In addition, there are
   no restrictions as to what types of information (i.e., DNS records)
   that can be protected using DNSSEC.  Each relying party must evaluate
   its own environment and the chain of trust originating from a Trust
   Anchor, the associated threats and vulnerabilities, to determine the
   level of risk it is willing to accept when relying on DNSSEC-
   protected objects.

   Secondly, there is no way of determining under what policy (if any)
   DNS data has been signed.  Interested parties must stay informed
   using the methods which should be described in section 1.4.3
   (Specification change procedures) of the DPS.

   If there are changes made to the policy which materially affect the
   security posture of the zone, as well as communicating the change
   through the methods previously mentioned, it may be appropriate to
   signal these changes by rolling the key(s).  In this case, the actual
   time at which the new policy takes effect is indicated by the
   presence of signatures created by the new key.



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8.  Acknowledgements

   This document is inspired by RFC 3647 and its predecessor (RFC 2527),
   and the authors acknowledge the work in the development of these
   documents.

   In addition, the authors would like to acknowledge the contributions
   made by Richard Lamb, Jakob Schlyter and Stephen Morris.


9.  References

9.1.  Normative references

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

9.2.  Informative references

   [RFC3647]  Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
              Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
              November 2003.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.


Authors' Addresses

   Fredrik Ljunggren
   Kirei AB
   P.O. Box 53204
   Goteborg  SE-400 16
   Sweden

   Email: fredrik@kirei.se




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   Anne-Marie Eklund Lowinder
   .SE (The Internet Infrastructure Foundation)
   P.O. Box 7399
   Stockholm  SE-103 91
   Sweden

   Email: amel@iis.se


   Tomofumi Okubo
   Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers
   4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
   Marina del Ray, CA  90292
   USA

   Email: tomofumi.okubo@icann.org



































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