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Versions: (draft-aboba-pppext-key-problem) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 RFC 5247

EAP Working Group                                          Bernard Aboba
INTERNET-DRAFT                                                 Dan Simon
Category: Standards Track                                      Microsoft
<draft-ietf-eap-keying-11.txt>                                  J. Arkko
3 April 2006                                                    Ericsson
                                                               P. Eronen
                                                                   Nokia
                                                       H. Levkowetz, Ed.
                                                             ipUnplugged



   Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 10, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2006.

Abstract

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
   enables extensible network access authentication.  This document
   provides a framework for the transport and usage of keying material
   generated by EAP authentication algorithms, known as "methods".  It
   also specifies the EAP key hierarchy.



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Table of Contents

   1.     Introduction ..........................................    3
      1.1       Requirements Language ...........................    3
      1.2       Terminology .....................................    3
      1.3       Overview ........................................    5
      1.4       EAP Key Hierarchy ...............................    8
      1.5       Security Goals ..................................   11
      1.6       EAP Invariants ..................................   12
   2.     Lower Layer Operation .................................   15
      2.1       Transient Session Keys ..........................   16
      2.2       Authenticator Architecture ......................   18
   3.     Key Management ........................................   22
      3.1       Secure Association Protocol .....................   22
      3.2       Key Scope .......................................   25
      3.3       Parent-Child Relationships ......................   26
      3.4       Local Key Lifetimes .............................   26
      3.5       Exported and Calculated Key Lifetimes ...........   27
      3.6       Key Cache Synchronization .......................   28
      3.7       Key Strength ....................................   29
      3.8       Key Wrap ........................................   29
   4.     Handoff Vulnerabilities ...............................   30
      4.1       Authorization ...................................   30
      4.2       Correctness .....................................   32
   5.     Security Considerations  ..............................   34
      5.1       Threat Model ....................................   35
      5.2       Authenticator Compromise ........................   36
      5.3       Spoofing ........................................   36
      5.4       Downgrade Attacks ...............................   37
      5.5       Unauthorized Disclosure .........................   38
      5.6       Replay Protection ...............................   39
      5.7       Key Freshness ...................................   40
      5.8       Elevation of Privilege ..........................   41
      5.9       Man-in-the-Middle Attacks .......................   42
     5.10       Denial of Service Attacks .......................   42
     5.11       Impersonation ...................................   43
     5.12       Channel Binding .................................   44
   6.     IANA Considerations ...................................   45
   7.     References ............................................   45
      7.1       Normative References ............................   45
      7.2       Informative References ..........................   46
   Acknowledgments ..............................................   50
   Author's Addresses ...........................................   50
   Appendix A - Exported Parameters in Existing Methods .........   52
   Intellectual Property Statement ..............................   53
   Disclaimer of Validity .......................................   54
   Copyright Statement ..........................................   54




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1.  Introduction

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
   was designed to enable extensible authentication for network access
   in situations in which the IP protocol is not available.  Originally
   developed for use with PPP [RFC1661], it has subsequently also been
   applied to IEEE 802 wired networks [IEEE-802.1X], wireless networks
   such as [IEEE-802.11i] and [IEEE-802.16e], and IKEv2 [RFC4306].

   This document provides a framework for the transport and usage of
   keying material generated by EAP authentication algorithms, known as
   "methods".  In EAP, keying material is generated by EAP methods.
   Part of this keying material may be used by EAP methods themselves
   and part of this material may be exported.  The exported keying
   material may be transported by AAA protocols and used by Secure
   Association Protocols in the generation or transport of session keys
   which are used by lower layer ciphersuites.  This document describes
   each of these elements and provides a system-level security analysis.
   It also specifies the EAP key hierarchy.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Terminology

   This document frequently uses the following terms:

AAA  Authentication, Authorization and Accounting.  AAA protocols with
     EAP support include RADIUS [RFC3579] and Diameter [RFC4072].  In
     this document, the terms "AAA server" and "backend authentication
     server" are used interchangeably.

authenticator
     The end of the link initiating EAP authentication.  The term
     Authenticator is used in [IEEE-802.1X], and authenticator has the
     same meaning in this document.

peer The end of the link that responds to the authenticator.

backend authentication server
     A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an
     authentication service to an authenticator.  When used, this server
     typically executes EAP methods for the authenticator.  This
     terminology is also used in [IEEE-802.1X].




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Channel Binding
     The communication within an EAP method of integrity-protected
     channel properties such as endpoint identifiers which can be
     compared to values communicated via out of band mechanisms (such as
     via a AAA or lower layer protocol).

EAP server
     The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the
     peer.  In the case where no backend authentication server is used,
     the EAP server is part of the authenticator.  In the case where the
     authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is
     located on the backend authentication server.

Long Term Credential
     EAP methods frequently make use of long term secrets in order to
     enable authentication between the peer and server.  In the case of
     a method based on pre-shared key authentication, the long term
     credential is the pre-shared key.  In the case of a public-key
     based method, the long term credential is the corresponding private
     key.

Master Session Key (MSK)
     Keying material that is derived between the EAP peer and server and
     exported by the EAP method.  The MSK is at least 64 octets in
     length.

AAA-Key
     The term AAA-Key is synonymous with MSK.

Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
     Additional keying material derived between the peer and server that
     is exported by the EAP method.  The EMSK is at least 64 octets in
     length, and is never shared with a third party.

Initialization Vector (IV)
     A quantity of at least 64 octets, suitable for use in an
     initialization vector field, that is derived between the peer and
     EAP server.  Since the IV is a known value in methods such as EAP-
     TLS [RFC2716], it cannot be used by itself for computation of any
     quantity that needs to remain secret.  As a result, its use has
     been deprecated and EAP methods are not required to generate it.
     However, when it is generated it MUST be unpredictable.

Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
     Lower layers use the MSK in lower-layer dependent manner.  For
     instance, in [IEEE-802.11i] Octets 0-31 of the MSK are known as the
     Pairwise Master Key (PMK). In [IEEE-802.11i] the TKIP and AES CCMP
     ciphersuites derive their Transient Session Keys (TSKs) solely from



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     the PMK, whereas the WEP ciphersuite as noted in [RFC3580], derives
     its TSKs from both halves of the MSK.  In [802.16e], the MSK is
     truncated to 20 octets for PMK and 20 octets for PMK2.

security association
     A set of policies and cryptographic state used to protect
     information.  Elements of a security association may include
     cryptographic keys, negotiated ciphersuites and other parameters,
     counters, sequence spaces, authorization attributes, etc.

Transient EAP Keys (TEKs)
     Session keys which are used to establish a protected channel
     between the EAP peer and server during the EAP authentication
     exchange. The TEKs are appropriate for use with the ciphersuite
     negotiated between EAP peer and server for use in protecting the
     EAP conversation.  The TEKs are stored locally by the EAP method
     and are not exported.  Note that the ciphersuite used to set up the
     protected channel between the EAP peer and server during EAP
     authentication is unrelated to the ciphersuite used to subsequently
     protect data sent between the EAP peer and authenticator.

Transient Session Keys (TSKs)
     Session keys used to protect data exchanged after EAP
     authentication has successfully completed, using the ciphersuite
     negotiated between the EAP peer and authenticator.

1.3.  Overview

   Where EAP key derivation is supported, the conversation typically
   takes place in three phases:

      Phase 0: Discovery
      Phase 1: Authentication
               1a: EAP authentication
               1b: AAA Key Transport (optional)
      Phase 2: Secure Association Protocol
               2a: Unicast Secure Association
               2b: Multicast Secure Association (optional)

   Of these phases, Phase 0, 1b and Phase 2 are handled external to EAP.
   Phases 0 and 2 are handled by the lower layer protocol and phase 1b
   is typically handled by a AAA protocol.

   In the discovery phase (phase 0),  peers locate authenticators and
   discover their capabilities.  A peer may locate an authenticator
   providing access to a particular network, or a peer may locate an
   authenticator behind a bridge with which it desires to establish a
   Secure Association.  Discovery can occur manually or automatically,



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   depending on the lower layer over which EAP runs.

   EAP peer                   Authenticator               Auth. Server
   --------                   -------------               ------------
    |<----------------------------->|                               |
    |     Discovery (phase 0)       |                               |
    |<----------------------------->|<----------------------------->|
    |   EAP auth (phase 1a)         |  AAA pass-through (optional)  |
    |                               |                               |
    |                               |<----------------------------->|
    |                               |       AAA Key transport       |
    |                               |      (optional; phase 1b)     |
    |<----------------------------->|                               |
    |  Unicast Secure association   |                               |
    |          (phase 2a)           |                               |
    |                               |                               |
    |<----------------------------->|                               |
    | Multicast Secure association  |                               |
    |     (optional; phase 2b)      |                               |
    |                               |                               |

                  Figure 1: Conversation Overview

   The authentication phase (phase 1) may begin once the peer and
   authenticator discover each other.  This phase, if it occurs, always
   includes EAP authentication (phase 1a).  Where the chosen EAP method
   supports key derivation, in phase 1a EAP keying material is derived
   on both the peer and the EAP server.

   An additional step (phase 1b) is required in deployments which
   include a backend authentication server, in order to transport keying
   material from the backend authentication server to the authenticator.
   In order to obey the principle of Mode Independence (see Section
   1.6.1), where a backend server is present, all keying material which
   is required by the lower layer needs to be transported from the EAP
   server to the authenticator.  Since existing TSK derivation and
   transport techniques depend solely on the MSK, in existing
   implementations, this is the only keying material replicated in the
   AAA key transport phase 1b.

   Successful completion of EAP authentication and key derivation by a
   peer and EAP server does not necessarily imply that the peer is
   committed to joining the network associated with an EAP server.
   Rather, this commitment is implied by the creation of a security
   association between the EAP peer and authenticator, as part of the
   Secure Association Protocol (phase 2).  The Secure Association
   Protocol exchange (phase 2) occurs between the peer and authenticator
   in order to manage the creation and deletion of unicast (phase 2a)



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   and multicast (phase 2b) security associations between the peer and
   authenticator.  The conversation between the parties is shown in
   Figure 1.

1.3.1.  Examples

   Existing EAP lower layers implement phase 0, 2a and 2b in different
   ways:

PPP  PPP, defined in [RFC1661] does not support discovery, nor does it
     include a Secure Association Protocol.

PPPOE
     PPPOE, defined in [RFC2516], includes support for a Discovery stage
     (phase 0).  In this step, the EAP peer sends a PPPoE Active
     Discovery Initiation (PADI) packet to the broadcast address,
     indicating the service it is requesting.  The Access Concentrator
     replies with a PPPOE Active Discovery Offer (PADO) packet
     containing its name, the service name and an indication of the
     services offered by the concentrator.  The discovery phase is not
     secured.  PPPOE, like PPP, does not include a Secure Association
     Protocol.

IKEv2
     IKEv2, defined in [RFC4306], handles the establishment of unicast
     security associations (phase 2a), while the establishment of
     multicast security associations (phase 2b) may be handled by a
     group key management protocol such as GDOI [RFC3547], GSAKMP
     [GSAKMP], MIKEY [RFC3830], or GKDP [GKDP].  Several mechanisms have
     been proposed for discovery of IPsec security gateways.  [RFC2230]
     discusses the use of KX Resource Records (RRs) for IPsec gateway
     discovery; while KX RRs are supported by many DNS server
     implementations, they have not yet been widely deployed.
     Alternatively, DNS SRV [RFC2782] can be used for this purpose.
     Where DNS is used for gateway location, DNS security mechanisms
     such as DNSSEC ([RFC2535], [RFC2931]), TSIG [RFC2845], and Simple
     Secure Dynamic Update [RFC3007] are available.

IEEE 802.11i
     IEEE 802.11, defined in [IEEE-802.11], handles discovery via the
     Beacon and Probe Request/Response mechanisms.  IEEE 802.11 access
     points periodically announce their Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs)
     as well as capabilities using Beacon frames.  Stations can query
     for access points by sending a Probe Request to the broadcast
     address.  Neither Beacon nor Probe Request/Response frames are
     secured.  The 4-way handshake defined in [IEEE-802.11i] enables the
     derivation of unicast (phase 2a) and multicast/broadcast (phase 2b)
     secure associations.  Since the group key exchange transports a



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     group key from the access point to the station, two 4-way
     handshakes may be required in order to support peer-to-peer
     communications.  A proof of the security of the IEEE 802.11i 4-way
     handshake when used with EAP-TLS [RFC2716], is provided in [He].

IEEE 802.1X
     IEEE 802.1X-2004, defined in [IEEE-802.1X] does not support
     discovery (phase 0), nor does it provide for derivation of unicast
     or multicast secure associations.

1.4.  EAP Key Hierarchy

   EAP, defined in [RFC3748], is a two-party protocol spoken between the
   EAP peer and server.  Within EAP, keying material is generated by EAP
   methods.  Part of this keying material may be used by EAP methods
   themselves and part of this material may be exported.  In addition to
   export of keying material, EAP methods may also export associated
   parameters, and may import and export Channel Bindings from the lower
   layer.

   As illustrated in Figure 2, the EAP method key derivation has at the
   root the long term credential utilized by the selected EAP method.
   If authentication is based on a pre-shared key, the parties store the
   EAP method to be used and the pre-shared key.  The EAP server also
   stores the peer's identity as well as other information associated
   with it. This information may be used to determine whether access to
   some service should be granted. The peer stores information necessary
   to choose which secret to use for which service.

   If authentication is based on proof of possession of the private key
   corresponding to the public key contained within a certificate, the
   parties store the EAP method to be used and the trust anchors used to
   validate the certificates.  The EAP server also stores the peer's
   identity and the peer stores information necessary to choose which
   certificate to use for which service.

   Based on the long term credential established between the peer and
   the server, EAP methods derive two types of keys:

    [1] Keys calculated locally by the EAP method but not exported
        by the EAP method, such as the TEKs.
    [2] Keying material exported by the EAP method: MSK, EMSK, IV.

   As noted in [RFC3748] Section 7.10, EAP methods generating keys are
   required to calculate and export the MSK and EMSK, which must be at
   least 64 octets in length.  EAP methods also may export the IV;
   however, the use of the IV is deprecated.




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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+         ---+
|                                                         |            ^
|                EAP Method                               |            |
|                                                         |            |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |            |
| |                                 |   |             |   |            |
| |       EAP Method Key            |<->| Long-Term   |   |            |
| |         Derivation              |   | Credential  |   |            |
| |                                 |   |             |   |            |
| |                                 |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |  Local to  |
| |                                 |                     |       EAP  |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                     |     Method |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |         +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |            |
|   |         | TEK       | |MSK, EMSK  | |IV           | |            |
|   |         |Derivation | |Derivation | |Derivation   | |            |
|   |         |           | |           | |(Deprecated) | |            |
|   |         +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |            |
|   |                 ^           |               |       |            |
|   |                 |           |               |       |            V
+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+         ---+
    |                 |           |               |                    ^
    | Peer-ID,        |           |               |           Exported |
    | Server-ID,      | Channel   | MSK (64+B)    | IV (64B)      by   |
    | Session-ID,     | Bindings  | EMSK (64+B)   | (Optional)    EAP  |
    | Key-Lifetime    | & Result  |               |             Method |
    V                 V           V               V                    V

     Figure 2:  EAP Method Parameter Import/Export

   EAP methods also MAY export method-specific peer and server
   identifiers (peer-ID and server-ID), a method-specific EAP
   conversation identifier known as the Session-ID, and the lifetime of
   the exported keys, known as the Key-Lifetime.   EAP methods MAY also
   support the import and export of Channel Bindings.  New EAP method
   specifications MUST define the Peer-ID, Server-ID and Method-ID.  The
   combination of the Peer-ID and Server-ID uniquely specifies the
   endpoints of the EAP method exchange when they are provided.  The
   Peer-ID, Server-ID, and Method-ID for existing EAP methods is defined
   in Appendix A.

Peer-ID

   As described in [RFC3748] Section 7.3, the identity provided in the
   EAP-Response/Identity, may be different from the peer identity



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   authenticated by the EAP method.  Where the EAP method authenticates
   the peer identity, that identity is exported by the method as the
   Peer-ID.  A suitable EAP peer name may not always be available.
   Where an EAP method does not define a method-specific peer identity,
   the Peer-ID is the null string.

Server-ID

   Where the EAP method authenticates the server identity, that identity
   is exported by the method as the Server-ID.  A suitable EAP server
   name may not always be available.  Where an EAP method does not
   define a method-specific peer identity, the Server-ID is the null
   string.

Method-ID

   EAP method specifications deriving keys MUST specify a temporally
   unique method identifier known as the Method-ID.  The EAP Method-ID
   uniquely identifies an EAP session of a given Type between an EAP
   peer and server.  The Method-ID is typically constructed from nonces
   or counters used within the EAP method exchange.

Session-ID

   The Session-ID uniquely identifies an EAP session between an EAP peer
   (as identified by the Peer-ID) and server (as identified by the
   Server-ID).  The EAP Session-ID consists of the concatenation of the
   Expanded EAP Type Code (including the Type, Vendor-ID and Vendor-Type
   fields defined in [RFC3748] Section 5.7) and the Method-ID.  The
   inclusion of the Expanded Type Code in the EAP Session-ID ensures
   that each EAP method has a distinct Session-ID space.  Since an EAP
   session is not bound to a particular authenticator or specific ports
   on the peer and authenticator, the authenticator port or identity are
   not included in the Session-ID.

Key-Lifetime

   While EAP itself does not support key lifetime negotiation, it is
   possible to specify methods that do.  However, systems that rely on
   such negotiation for exported keys would only function with these
   methods.  As a result, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use this approach as
   the sole way to determine key lifetimes.

Channel Bindings

   Channel Bindings include lower layer parameters that are verified for
   consistency between the EAP peer and server.  In order to avoid
   introducing media dependencies, EAP methods that transport Channel



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   Binding data MUST treat this data as opaque octets.  Typically the
   EAP method imports Channel Bindings from the lower layer on the peer,
   and transmits them securely to the EAP server, which exports them to
   the lower layer or AAA layer.  However, transport may occur from EAP
   server to peer, or may be bi-directional.  On the side of the
   exchange (peer or server) where Channel Bindings are verified, the
   lower layer or AAA layer passes the result of the verification (TRUE
   or FALSE) up to the EAP method.  While the verification can be done
   either by the peer or the server, typically only the server has the
   knowledge to determine the correctness of the values, as opposed to
   merely verifying their equality.

1.4.1.  Key Naming

   Each key created within the EAP key management framework has a name
   (a unique identifier), as well as a scope (the parties to whom the
   key is available).  The scope of exported parameters is defined by
   the EAP peer name (if securely exchanged within the method) and the
   EAP server name (also only if securely exchanged).  Where a peer or
   server name is missing the null string is used.

MSK and EMSK Names
     These parameters are exported by the EAP peer and EAP server, and
     can be referred to using the EAP Session-ID and a binary or textual
     indication of the parameter being referred to.

PMK Name
     This document does not specify a naming scheme for the PMK.  The
     PMK is only identified by the key from which it is derived.

     Note: IEEE 802.11i names the PMKID for the purposes of being able
     to refer to it in the Secure Association protocol; this naming is
     based on a hash of the PMK itself as well as some other parameters
     (see Section 8.5.1.2 [IEEE-802.11i]).

TEK Name
     The TEKs may or may not be named.  Their naming is specified in the
     EAP method.

TSK Name
     The TSKs are typically named.  Their naming is specified in the
     lower layer so that the correct set of transient session keys can
     be identified for processing a given packet.

1.5.  Security Goals

   The goal of the EAP conversation is to derive fresh session keys
   between the EAP peer and authenticator that are known only to those



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   parties, and for both the EAP peer and authenticator to demonstrate
   that they are authorized to perform their roles either by each other
   or by a trusted third party (the backend authentication server).

   Completion of an EAP method exchange (Phase 1a) supporting key
   derivation results in the derivation of EAP keying material (MSK,
   EMSK, TEKs) known only to the EAP peer (identified by the Peer-ID)
   and server (identified by the Server-ID).  Both the EAP peer and EAP
   server know the exported keying material to be fresh.  Key freshness
   is discussed in Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 5.7.

   Completion of the AAA exchange (Phase 1b) results in the transport of
   EAP keying material from the EAP server (identified by the Server-ID)
   to the EAP authenticator (identified by the NAS-Identifier) without
   disclosure to any other party.  Both the EAP server and EAP
   authenticator know this keying material to be fresh.  Disclosure
   issues are discussed in Section 5.6; security properties of AAA
   protocols are discussed in Sections 5.2-5.8, and 5.11.

   Completion of the Secure Association Protocol (Phase 2) results in
   the derivation or transport of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) known
   only to the EAP peer (identified by the Peer-ID) and authenticator
   (identified by the NAS-Identifier).  Both the EAP peer and
   authenticator know the TSKs to be fresh.  Both the EAP peer and
   authenticator demonstrate that they are authorized to perform their
   roles.  Authorization issues are discussed in Section 5.8 and 5.9;
   security properties of Secure Association Protocols are discussed in
   Section 3.1.

1.6.  EAP Invariants

   Certain basic characteristics, known as "EAP Invariants", hold true
   for EAP implementations on all media:

      Mode independence
      Media independence
      Method independence
      Ciphersuite independence

1.6.1.  Mode Independence

   EAP is typically deployed to support extensible network access
   authentication in situations where a peer desires network access via
   one or more authenticators.  Where authenticators are deployed
   standalone, the EAP conversation occurs between the peer and
   authenticator, and the authenticator must locally implement an EAP
   method acceptable to the peer.  However, when utilized in "pass-
   through" mode, EAP enables deployment of new authentication methods



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   without requiring development of new code on the authenticator.

   While the authenticator may implement some EAP methods locally and
   use those methods to authenticate local users, it may at the same
   time act as a pass-through for other users and methods, forwarding
   EAP packets back and forth between the backend authentication server
   and the peer.  This is accomplished by encapsulating EAP packets
   within the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
   protocol, spoken between the authenticator and backend authentication
   server.  AAA protocols supporting EAP include RADIUS [RFC3579] and
   Diameter [RFC4072].

   It is a fundamental property of EAP that at the EAP method layer, the
   conversation between the EAP peer and server is unaffected by whether
   the EAP authenticator is operating in "pass-through" mode.  EAP
   methods operate identically in all aspects, including key derivation
   and parameter import/export, regardless of whether the authenticator
   is operating as a pass-through or not.

   The successful completion of an EAP method that supports key
   derivation results in the export of keying material and parameters on
   the EAP peer and server.  Even though the EAP peer or server may
   import Channel-Bindings that may include the identity of the EAP
   authenticator,  this information is treated as opaque octets.  As a
   result, within EAP the only relevant identities are the Peer-ID and
   Server-ID.  Channel Bindings are only interpreted by the lower layer.

   Within EAP, the primary function of the AAA protocol is to maintain
   the principle of Mode Independence, so that as far as the EAP peer is
   concerned, its conversation with the EAP authenticator, and all
   consequences of that conversation, are identical, regardless of the
   authenticator mode of operation.

1.6.2.  Media Independence

   One of the goals of EAP is to allow EAP methods to function on any
   lower layer meeting the criteria outlined in [RFC3748], Section 3.1.
   For example, as described in [RFC3748], EAP authentication can be run
   over PPP [RFC1661],  IEEE 802 wired networks [IEEE-802.1X], and
   wireless networks such as 802.11 [IEEE-802.11i] and 802.16
   [IEEE-802.16e].

   In order to maintain media independence, it is necessary for EAP to
   avoid consideration of media-specific elements.  For example, EAP
   methods cannot be assumed to have knowledge of the lower layer over
   which they are transported, and cannot be restricted to identifiers
   associated with a particular usage environment (e.g. MAC addresses).




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   Note that media independence may be retained within EAP methods that
   support Channel-Bindings or method-specific identification.  An EAP
   method need not be aware of the content of an identifier in order to
   use it.  This enables an EAP method to use media-specific identifiers
   such as MAC addresses without compromising media independence.
   Channel-Bindings are treated as opaque octets by EAP methods, so that
   handling them does not require media-specific knowledge.

1.6.3.  Method Independence

   By enabling pass-through, authenticators can support any method
   implemented on the peer and server, not just locally implemented
   methods.  This allows the authenticator to avoid implementing code
   for each EAP method required by peers.  In fact, since a pass-through
   authenticator is not required to implement any EAP methods at all, it
   cannot be assumed to support any EAP method-specific code.

   As a result, as noted in [RFC3748], authenticators must by default be
   capable of supporting any EAP method.  This is useful where there is
   no single EAP method that is both mandatory-to-implement and offers
   acceptable security for the media in use.  For example, the [RFC3748]
   mandatory-to-implement EAP method (MD5-Challenge) does not provide
   dictionary attack resistance, mutual authentication or key
   derivation, and as a result is not appropriate for use in wireless
   LAN authentication [RFC4017].  However, despite this it is possible
   for the peer and authenticator to interoperate as long as a suitable
   EAP method is supported on the EAP server.

1.6.4.  Ciphersuite Independence

   Ciphersuite Independence is a requirement for Media Independence.
   Since lower layer ciphersuites vary between media, media independence
   requires that EAP keying material needs to be large enough (with
   sufficient entropy) to handle any ciphersuite.

   While EAP methods may negotiate the ciphersuite used in protection of
   the EAP conversation, the ciphersuite used for the protection of the
   data exchanged after EAP authentication has completed is negotiated
   between the peer and authenticator within the lower layer, outside of
   EAP.

   For example, within PPP, the ciphersuite is negotiated within the
   Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) defined in [RFC1968], after EAP
   authentication is completed.  Within [IEEE-802.11i], the AP
   ciphersuites are advertised in the Beacon and Probe Responses prior
   to EAP authentication, and are securely verified during a 4-way
   handshake exchange.




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   Since the ciphersuites used to protect data depend on the lower
   layer, requiring EAP methods have knowledge of lower layer
   ciphersuites would compromise the principle of Media Independence.
   Since ciphersuite negotiation occurs in the lower layer, there is no
   need for lower layer ciphersuite negotiation within EAP, and EAP
   methods generate keying material that is ciphersuite-independent.

   In order to allow a ciphersuite to be usable within the EAP keying
   framework, a specification MUST be provided describing how TSKs
   suitable for use with the ciphersuite are derived from exported EAP
   keying parameters.  To maintain Method Independence, algorithms for
   deriving TSKs MUST NOT depend on the EAP method, although algorithms
   for TEK derivation MAY be specific to the EAP method.

   Advantages of ciphersuite-independence include:

Reduced update requirements
     If EAP methods were to specify how to derive transient session keys
     for each ciphersuite, they would need to be updated each time a new
     ciphersuite is developed.  In addition, backend authentication
     servers might not be usable with all EAP-capable authenticators,
     since the backend authentication server would also need to be
     updated each time support for a new ciphersuite is added to the
     authenticator.

Reduced EAP method complexity
     Requiring each EAP method to include ciphersuite-specific code for
     transient session key derivation would increase method complexity
     and result in duplicated effort.

Simplified configuration
     The ciphersuite is negotiated between the peer and authenticator
     outside of EAP.  Where the authenticator operates in "pass-through"
     mode, the EAP server is not a party to this negotiation, nor is it
     involved in the data flow between the EAP peer and authenticator.
     As a result, the EAP server may not have knowledge of the
     ciphersuites and negotiation policies implemented by the peer and
     authenticator, or be aware of the ciphersuite negotiated between
     them.  For example, since ECP negotiation occurs after
     authentication, when run over PPP, the EAP peer and server may not
     anticipate the negotiated ciphersuite and therefore this
     information cannot be provided to the EAP method.

2.  Lower Layer Operation

   On completion of EAP authentication, keying material and material and
   parameters exported by the EAP method are provided to the lower layer
   and AAA layer (if present).  These include the Master Session Key



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   (MSK), Extended Master Session Key (EMSK), Peer-ID, Server-ID,
   Session-ID and Key-Lifetime. The Initialization Vector (IV) is
   deprecated.

   In order to preserve the security of keys derived within EAP methods,
   lower layers MUST NOT export keys passed down by EAP methods.  This
   implies that EAP keying material or parameters passed down to a lower
   layer are for the exclusive use of that lower layer and MUST NOT be
   used within another lower layer.  This prevents compromise of one
   lower layer from compromising other applications using EAP keying
   parameters.

   EAP keying material and parameters provided to a lower layer MUST NOT
   be transported to another entity.  For example, EAP keying material
   and parameters passed down to the EAP peer lower layer MUST NOT leave
   the peer;  EAP keying material and parameters passed down or
   transported to the EAP authenticator lower layer MUST NOT leave the
   authenticator.

   On the EAP server, keying material requested by and passed down to
   the AAA layer may be replicated to the AAA layer on the
   authenticator.  On the authenticator, the AAA layer provides the
   replicated keying material to the lower layer over which the EAP
   authentication conversation took place.  This enables "mode
   independence" to be maintained.

   The EMSK MUST NOT be provided to an entity outside the EAP server or
   peer,  nor is it permitted to pass any quantity to an entity outside
   the EAP server or peer from which the EMSK could be computed without
   breaking some cryptographic assumption, such as inverting a one-way
   function.  The EMSK MUST NOT be transported by the AAA layer.  As
   noted in [RFC3748] Section 7.10:

      The EMSK is reserved for future use and MUST remain on the EAP
      peer and EAP server where it is derived; it MUST NOT be
      transported to, or shared with, additional parties, or used to
      derive any other keys.

   The EAP layer as well as the peer and authenticator layers MUST NOT
   modify or cache keying material or parameters (including Channel
   Bindings) passing in either direction between the EAP method layer
   and the lower layer or AAA layer.

2.1.  Transient Session Keys

   Where explicitly supported by the lower layer, lower layers MAY cache
   the exported EAP keying material and parameters and/or TSKs.  The
   structure of this key cache is defined by the lower layer.  So as to



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   enable interoperability, new lower layer specifications MUST describe
   EAP key caching behavior.  Unless explicitly specified by the lower
   layer, the EAP peer, server and authenticator MUST assume that peers
   and authenticators do not cache exported EAP keying parameters or
   TSKs.  Existing EAP lower layers and AAA layers handle the caching of
   EAP keying material and the generation of transient session keys in
   different ways:

IEEE 802.1X-2004
     IEEE 802.1X-2004, defined in [IEEE-802.1X] does not support caching
     of EAP keying material or parameters.  Once EAP authentication
     completes, it is assumed that EAP keying material and parameters
     are discarded.

PPP  PPP, defined in [RFC1661] does not support caching of EAP keying
     material or parameters.  PPP ciphersuites derive their TSKs
     directly from the MSK, as described in [RFC2716]. This method is
     NOT RECOMMENDED, since were PPP to support caching, this could
     result in stale TSKs.  As a result, once the PPP session is
     terminated, EAP keying material and parameters MUST be discarded.
     Since caching of EAP keying material is not permitted, within PPP
     there is no way to handle TSK rekey without EAP re-authentication.
     Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is only possible within PPP if the
     negotiated EAP method supports this.

IKEv2
     IKEv2, defined in [RFC4306] only uses the MSK for authentication
     purposes and not key derivation.  The EMSK, IV, Peer-ID, Server-ID
     or Session-ID are not used.  As a result, the keying material
     derived within IKEv2 is independent of the EAP keying material and
     rekey of IPsec SAs can be handled without requiring EAP re-
     authentication.  Since generation of keying material is independent
     of EAP, within IKEv2 it is possible to negotiate PFS, regardless of
     the EAP method that is used.  IKEv2 does not cache EAP keying
     material or parameters; once IKEv2 authentication completes it is
     assumed that EAP keying material and parameters are discarded.  The
     Session-Timeout attribute is therefore interpreted as a limit on
     the VPN session time, rather than an indication of the MSK key
     lifetime.

IEEE 802.11i
     IEEE 802.11i enables caching of the MSK, but not the EMSK, IV,
     Peer-ID, Server-ID, or Session-ID.  More details about the
     structure of the cache are available in [IEEE-802.11i].  In IEEE
     802.11i, TSKs are derived from the MSK using the 4-way handshake,
     which includes a nonce exchange.  This guarantees TSK freshness
     even if the MSK is reused.  The 4-way handshake also enables TSK
     rekey without EAP re-authentication.  PFS is only possible within



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     IEEE 802.11i if the negotiated EAP method supports this.

IEEE 802.16e
     IEEE 802.16e, defined in [IEEE-802.16e] supports caching of the
     MSK, but not the EMSK, IV, Peer-ID, Server-ID or Session-ID.  In
     IEEE 802.16e, TSKs are generated by the authenticator without any
     contribution by the peer.  The TSKs are encrypted, authenticated
     and integrity protected using the MSK.  As a result, TSK rekey is
     possible without EAP re-authentication.  PFS is not possible even
     if the negotiated EAP method supports it.

AAA  Existing implementations of RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579] or Diameter EAP
     [RFC4072] do not support caching of EAP keying material or
     parameters.  In existing AAA client, proxy and server
     implementations, exported EAP keying material (MSK, EMSK and IV) as
     well as parameters and derived keys are not cached and MUST be
     presumed lost after the AAA exchange completes.

     In order to avoid key reuse, the AAA layer MUST delete transported
     keys once they are sent.  The AAA layer MUST NOT retain keys that
     it has previously sent.  For example, a AAA layer that has
     transported the MSK MUST delete it, and keys MUST NOT be derived
     from the MSK from that point forward.

2.2.  Authenticator Architecture

   This specification does not impose constraints on the architecture of
   the EAP authenticator or peer.  Any of the authenticator
   architectures described in [RFC4118] can be used.  For example, it is
   possible for multiple base stations and a "controller" (e.g. WLAN
   switch) to comprise a single EAP authenticator.  In such a situation,
   the "base station identity" is irrelevant to the EAP method
   conversation, except perhaps as an opaque blob to be used in Channel
   Bindings.  Many base stations can share the same authenticator
   identity.  As a result, lower layers need to identify EAP peers and
   authenticators unambiguously, without incorporating implicit
   assumptions about peer and authenticator architectures.

   It should be understood that an EAP authenticator or peer:

   [a] may contain one or more physical or logical ports;
   [b] may advertise itself as one or more "virtual"
       authenticators or peers;
   [c] may utilize multiple CPUs;
   [d] may support clustering services for load balancing or failover.

   Both the EAP peer and authenticator may have more than one physical
   or logical port.  A peer may simultaneously access the network via



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   multiple authenticators, or via multiple physical or logical ports on
   a given authenticator.  Similarly, an authenticator may offer network
   access to multiple peers, each via a separate physical or logical
   port.  When a single physical authenticator advertises itself as
   multiple "virtual authenticators",  it is possible for a single
   physical port to belong to multiple "virtual authenticators".  The
   situation is illustrated in Figure 3.

                               +-+-+-+-+
                               | EAP   |
                               | Peer  |
                               +-+-+-+-+
                                 | | |  Peer Ports
                                /  |  \
                               /   |   \
                              /    |    \
                             /     |     \
                            /      |      \
                           /       |       \
                          /        |        \
                         /         |         \
                      | | |      | | |      | | | Authenticator Ports
                    +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+
                    |       |  |       |  |       |
                    | Auth. |  | Auth. |  | Auth. |
                    |       |  |       |  |       |
                    +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+
                         \         |         /
                          \        |        /
                           \       |       /
             EAP over AAA   \      |      /
               (optional)    \     |     /
                              \    |    /
                               \   |   /
                                \  |  /
                               +-+-+-+-+
                               |  EAP  |
                               |Server |
                               +-+-+-+-+

   Figure 3:  Relationship between EAP peer, authenticator and server

2.2.1.  Authenticator Identification

   The EAP method conversation is between the EAP peer and server, as
   identified by the Peer-ID and Server-ID.  The authenticator identity,
   if considered at all by the EAP method, is treated as an opaque blob
   for the purposes of Channel bindings.  However, the Secure



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   Association Protocol conversation is between the peer and the
   authenticator, and therefore the authenticator and peer identities
   are relevant to that exchange, and define the scope of use of the EAP
   keying material passed down to the lower layer.

   Where the EAP peer and authenticator cannot unambiguously identify
   each other they may not be able to determine the scope of transported
   EAP keying material.  This is particularly problematic for lower
   layers where key caching is supported.

   For example, if the EAP peer cannot identify the EAP authenticator,
   it will be unable to determine whether transported EAP keying
   material has been shared outside of its authorized scope, and
   therefore needs to be considered compromised.  There is also a
   practical problem because the EAP peer will be unable to utilize the
   EAP authenticator key cache in an efficient way.  Where the peer and
   authenticator identify themselves within the lower layer using a port
   identifier such as a link layer address, this creates a number of
   problems:

[1]  It may not be obvious to the peer which authenticator ports are
     associated with which authenticators.

[2]  It may not be obvious to the authenticator which peer ports are
     associated with which peers.

[3]  It may not be obvious to the peer which "virtual authenticator" it
     is communicating with.

[4]  It may not be obvious to the authenticator which "virtual peer" it
     is communicating with.

     Since an authenticator may have multiple ports, the authenticator
     identifier used within the Secure Association Protocol exchange
     SHOULD be distinct from any port identifier (e.g. MAC address).
     Similarly, where a peer may have multiple ports, and sharing of EAP
     keying material and parameters between peer ports of the same link
     type is allowed, the peer identifier used within the Secure
     Association Protocol exchange SHOULD also be distinct from any port
     identifier.

     AAA protocols such as RADIUS [RFC3579] and Diameter [RFC4072]
     provide a mechanism for the identification of AAA clients; since
     the EAP authenticator and AAA client are always co-resident, this
     mechanism is applicable to the identification of EAP
     authenticators.

     RADIUS [RFC2865] requires that an Access-Request packet contain one



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     or more of the NAS-Identifier, NAS-IP-Address and NAS-IPv6-Address
     attributes.  Since a NAS may have more than one IP address, the
     NAS-Identifier attribute is RECOMMENDED for the unambiguous
     identification of the EAP authenticator.

     From the point of view of the AAA server, EAP keying material and
     parameters are transported to the EAP authenticator identified by
     the NAS-Identifier attribute.  Since an EAP authenticator MUST NOT
     share EAP keying material or parameters with another party, if the
     EAP peer or AAA server detects use of EAP keying material and
     parameters outside the scope defined by the NAS-Identifier, the
     keying material MUST be considered compromised.

     In order to ensure that lower layer identifies are securely
     verified by all parties, it is recommended that lower layers:

[a]  Specify the lower layer parameters used to identify the
     authenticator and peer;

[b]  Communicate the lower layer identities between the peer and
     authenticator within phase 0;

[c]  Communicate the lower layer authenticator identity between the
     authenticator and backend server within the NAS-Identifier
     attribute;

[d]  Include the lower layer identities within channel bindings (if
     supported) in phase 1a, ensuring that they are communicated between
     the EAP peer and server;

[e]  Securely verify the lower layer identities within phase 2a;

[f]  Utilize the advertised lower layer identities to enable the peer
     and authenticator to verify that keys are maintained within the
     advertised scope;

2.2.2.  Virtual Authenticators

   When a single physical authenticator advertises itself as multiple
   "virtual authenticators", the EAP peer and authenticator may not be
   able to agree on the scope of the EAP keying material, creating a
   security vulnerability.  For example, the peer may assume that the
   "virtual authenticators" are distinct and do not share a key cache,
   whereas, depending on the architecture of the physical authenticator,
   a shared key cache may or may not be implemented.

   Where EAP keying material is shared between "virtual authenticators"
   an attacker acting as a peer could authenticate with the "Guest"



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   "virtual authenticator" and derive EAP keying material.  If the
   virtual authenticators share a key cache, then the peer can utilize
   the EAP keying material derived for the "Guest" network to obtain
   access to the "Corporate Intranet" virtual authenticator.

   Several measures are recommended to address these issues:

[g]  Authenticators are REQUIRED to cache associated authorizations
     along with EAP keying material and parameters and to apply
     authorizations consistently.  This ensures that an attacker cannot
     obtain elevated privileges even where the key cache is shared
     between "virtual authenticators".

[h]  It is RECOMMENDED that physical authenticators maintain separate
     key caches for each "virtual authenticator".

[i]  It is RECOMMENDED that each "virtual authenticator" identify itself
     distinctly to the backend authentication server, such as by
     utilizing a distinct NAS-Identifier attribute.  This enables the
     backend authentication server to utilize a separate credential to
     authenticate each "virtual authenticator".

3.  Key Management

   EAP as defined in [RFC3748] supports key derivation, but not key
   management.  While EAP methods may derive keying material, EAP does
   not provide for the management of exported or derived keys.  Although
   EAP methods may support "fast reconnect" as defined in [RFC3748]
   Section 7.2.1, EAP does not support re-key of exported keys without
   re-authentication.  Existing EAP methods do not export the Key-
   Lifetime parameter; in the interest of method independence, key
   management of exported or derived keys SHOULD NOT be provided within
   EAP methods.

3.1.  Secure Association Protocol

   Since neither EAP nor EAP methods provide key management support, it
   is RECOMMENDED that key management facilities be provided within the
   Secure Association Protocol.  This includes:

[a]  Entity Naming.  A basic feature of a Secure Association Protocol is
     the explicit naming of the parties engaged in the exchange.
     Without explicit identification, the parties engaged in the
     exchange are not identified and the scope of the EAP keying
     parameters negotiated during the EAP exchange is undefined.  As
     shown in Figure 3, both the peer and authenticator may have more
     than one physical or virtual port, and as a result SHOULD identify
     themselves in a manner that is independent of their attached ports.



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[b]  Mutual proof of possession of EAP keying material.  During the
     Secure Association Protocol the EAP peer and authenticator MUST
     demonstrate possession of the keying material transported between
     the backend authentication server and authenticator (e.g. MSK), in
     order to demonstrate that the peer and authenticator have been
     authorized.  Since mutual proof of possession is not the same as
     mutual authentication, the peer cannot verify authenticator
     assertions (including the authenticator identity) as a result of
     this exchange.

[c]  Secure capabilities negotiation.  In order to protect against
     spoofing during the discovery phase, ensure selection of the "best"
     ciphersuite, and protect against forging of negotiated security
     parameters, the Secure Association Protocol MUST support secure
     capabilities negotiation.  This includes the secure negotiation of
     usage modes, session parameters (such as security association
     identifiers (SAIDs) and key lifetimes), ciphersuites and required
     filters, including confirmation of security-relevant capabilities
     discovered during phase 0.  As part of secure capabilities
     negotiation, the Secure Association Protocol MUST support integrity
     and replay protection of all messages.

[d]  Key naming and selection.  Where key caching is supported, it may
     be possible for the EAP peer and authenticator to share more than
     one key of a given type.  As a result, the Secure Association
     Protocol MUST explicitly name the keys used in the proof of
     possession exchange, so as to prevent confusion when more than one
     set of keying material could potentially be used as the basis for
     the exchange.  Use of the key naming mechanism described in this
     document is RECOMMENDED.

     In order to support the correct processing of phase 2 security
     associations, the Secure Association (phase 2) protocol MUST
     support the naming of phase 2 security associations and associated
     transient session keys, so that the correct set of transient
     session keys can be identified for processing a given packet.  The
     phase 2 Secure Association Protocol also MUST support transient
     session key activation and SHOULD support deletion, so that
     establishment and re-establishment of transient session keys can be
     synchronized between the parties.

[e]  Generation of fresh transient session keys (TSKs).  Where the lower
     layer supports caching of exported EAP keying material, the EAP
     peer lower layer may initiate a new session using keying material
     that was derived in a previous session.  Were the TSKs to be
     derived from a portion of the exported EAP keying material, this
     would result in reuse of the session keys which could expose the
     underlying ciphersuite to attack.



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     In lower layers where caching of EAP keying material is supported,
     the Secure Association Protocol phase is REQUIRED, and MUST support
     the derivation of fresh unicast and multicast TSKs, even when the
     keying material provided by the backend authentication server is
     not fresh.  This is typically supported via the exchange of nonces
     or counters, which are then mixed with the exported keying material
     in order to generate fresh unicast (phase 2a) and possibly
     multicast (phase 2b) session keys.  By not using EAP keying
     material directly to protect data, the Secure Association Protocol
     protects it against compromise.

[f]  Key lifetime management.  This includes explicit key lifetime
     negotiation or seamless re-key.  EAP does not support re-key
     without re-authentication and existing EAP methods do not support
     key lifetime negotiation.  As a result, the Secure Association
     Protocol may handle re-key and determination of the key lifetime.
     Where key caching is supported, secure negotiation of key lifetimes
     is RECOMMENDED.  Lower layers that support re-key, but not key
     caching, may not require key lifetime negotiation.  For example, a
     difference between IKEv1 [RFC2409] and IKEv2 [RFC4306] is that in
     IKEv1 SA lifetimes were negotiated; in IKEv2, each end of the SA is
     responsible for enforcing its own lifetime policy on the SA and re-
     keying the SA when necessary.

[g]  Key resynchronization.  It is possible for the peer or
     authenticator to reboot or reclaim resources, clearing portions or
     all of the key cache.  Therefore, key lifetime negotiation cannot
     guarantee that the key cache will remain synchronized, and the peer
     may not be able to determine before attempting to use a key whether
     it exists within the authenticator cache.  It is therefore
     RECOMMENDED for the Secure Association Protocol to provide a
     mechanism for key state resynchronization.  Since in this situation
     one or more of the parties initially do not possess a key with
     which to protect the resynchronization exchange, securing this
     mechanism may be difficult.

[h]  Key scope synchronization.  To support key scope determination, the
     Secure Association Protocol SHOULD provide a mechanism by which the
     peer can determine the scope of the key cache on each
     authenticator, and by which the authenticator can determine the
     scope of the key cache on a peer.  This includes negotiation of
     restrictions on key usage.

[i]  Direct operation.  Since the phase 2 Secure Association Protocol is
     concerned with the establishment of security associations between
     the EAP peer and authenticator, including the derivation of
     transient session keys, only those parties have "a need to know"
     the transient session keys.  The Secure Association Protocol MUST



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     operate directly between the peer and authenticator, and MUST NOT
     be passed-through to the backend authentication server, or include
     additional parties.

[j]  Bi-directional operation.  While some ciphersuites only require a
     single set of transient session keys to protect traffic in both
     directions, other ciphersuites require a unique set of transient
     session keys in each direction. The phase 2 Secure Association
     Protocol SHOULD provide for the derivation of unicast and multicast
     keys in each direction, so as not to require two separate phase 2
     exchanges in order to create a bi-directional phase 2 security
     association.

3.2.  Key Scope

   Absent explicit specification within the lower layer, after the
   completion of phase 1b, EAP keying material and parameters are bound
   to the EAP peer and authenticator, but are not bound to a specific
   peer or authenticator port.

   While EAP Keying Material passed down to the lower layer is not
   intrinsically bound to particular authenticator and peer ports,
   Transient Session Keys MAY be bound to particular authenticator and
   peer ports by the Secure Association Protocol.  However, a lower
   layer MAY also permit TSKs to be used on multiple peer and/or
   authenticator ports, providing that TSK freshness is guaranteed (such
   as by keeping replay counter state within the authenticator).

   In order to further limit the key scope the following measures are
   suggested:

[a]  The lower layer MAY specify additional restrictions on key usage,
     such as limiting the use of EAP keying material and parameters on
     the EAP peer to the port over which on the EAP conversation was
     conducted.

[b]  The backend authentication server and authenticator MAY implement
     additional attributes in order to further restrict the scope of EAP
     keying material.  For example, in 802.11, the backend
     authentication server may provide the authenticator with a list of
     authorized Called or Calling-Station-Ids and/or SSIDs for which EAP
     keying material is valid.

[c]  Where the backend authentication server provides attributes
     restricting the key scope, it is RECOMMENDED that restrictions be
     securely communicated by the authenticator to the peer.  This can
     be accomplished using the Secure Association Protocol,  but also
     can be accomplished via the EAP method or the lower layer.



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3.3.  Parent-Child Relationships

   When keying material exported by EAP methods expires,  all keying
   material derived from the exported keying material expires, including
   the TSKs.

   When an EAP re-authentication takes place, new keying material is
   derived and exported by the EAP method, which eventually results in
   replacement of calculated keys, including the TSKs.

   As a result, while the lifetime of calculated keys can be less than
   or equal that of the exported keys they are derived from, it cannot
   be greater.  For example, when EAP re-authentication occurs, TSK re-
   key will also occur.  However, this does not prohibit TSK re-key from
   occurring prior to expiration of the lifetime of exported keys.  For
   example, TSK re-key may occur prior to EAP re-authentication.

   Failure to mutually prove possession of keying material during the
   Secure Association Protocol exchange need not be grounds for deletion
   of the keying material by both parties; rate-limiting Secure
   Association Protocol exchanges could be used to prevent a brute force
   attack.

3.4.  Local Key Lifetimes

   The Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) are session keys used to protect the
   EAP conversation.  The TEKs are internal to the EAP method and are
   not exported.  TEKs are typically created during an EAP conversation,
   used until the end of the conversation and then discarded.  However,
   methods may re-key TEKs during a conversation.

   When using TEKs within an EAP conversation or across conversations,
   it is necessary to ensure that replay protection and key separation
   requirements are fulfilled.  For instance, if a replay counter is
   used, TEK re-key MUST occur prior to wrapping of the counter.
   Similarly, TSKs MUST remain cryptographically separate from TEKs
   despite TEK re-keying or caching. This prevents TEK compromise from
   leading directly to compromise of the TSKs and vice versa.

   EAP methods may cache local keying material which may persist for
   multiple EAP conversations when fast reconnect is used [RFC 3748].
   For example, EAP methods based on TLS (such as EAP-TLS [RFC2716])
   derive and cache the TLS Master Secret, typically for substantial
   time periods.  The lifetime of other local keying material calculated
   within the EAP method is defined by the method.  Note that in
   general, when using fast reconnect, there is no guarantee to that the
   original long-term credentials are still in the possession of the
   peer.  For instance, a card hold holding the private key for EAP-TLS



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   may have been removed.  EAP servers SHOULD also verify that the long-
   term credentials are still valid, such as by checking that
   certificate used in the original authentication has not yet expired.

3.5.  Exported and Calculated Key Lifetimes

   All EAP methods generating keys are required to generate the MSK and
   EMSK, and may optionally generate the IV.  However, EAP, defined in
   [RFC3748], does not itself support the negotiation of lifetimes for
   exported keying material such as the MSK, EMSK and IV.

   Several mechanisms exist for managing key lifetimes:

[a]  AAA attributes.  AAA protocols such as RADIUS [RFC2865] and
     Diameter [RFC4072] support the Session-Timeout attribute.  The
     Session-Timeout value represents the maximum lifetime of the
     exported keys, and all keys calculated from it, on the
     authenticator.  Since existing backend authentication servers do
     not cache keys exported by EAP methods, or keys calculated from
     exported keys, the value of the Session-Timeout attribute has no
     bearing on the key lifetime within the backend authentication
     server.

     On the authenticator,  where EAP is used for authentication, the
     Session-Timeout value represents the maximum session time prior to
     re-authentication, as described in [RFC3580].  Where EAP is used
     for pre-authentication, the session may not start until some future
     time, or may never occur.  Nevertheless, the Session-Timeout value
     represents the maximum time after which transported EAP keying
     material, and all keys calculated from it, will have expired on the
     authenticator.  If the session subsequently starts, re-
     authentication will be initiated once the Session-Time has expired.
     If the session never started, or started and ended, by default keys
     transported by AAA and all keys calculated from them will be
     expired by the authenticator prior to the future time indicated by
     Session-Timeout.  Note that in future additional attributes may be
     specified to control the lifetime of cached keys; these attributes
     may modify the meaning of the Session-Timeout attribute in specific
     circumstances.

     Since the TSK lifetime is often determined by authenticator
     resources, the backend authentication server has no insight into
     the TSK derivation process, and by the principle of ciphersuite
     independence, it is not appropriate for the backend authentication
     server to manage any aspect of the TSK derivation process,
     including the TSK lifetime.





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[b]  Lower layer mechanisms.  While AAA attributes can communicate the
     maximum exported key lifetime, this only serves to synchronize the
     key lifetime between the backend authentication server and the
     authenticator.  Lower layer mechanisms such as the Secure
     Association Protocol can then be used to enable the lifetime of
     exported and calculated keys to be negotiated between the peer and
     authenticator.

     Where TSKs are established as the result of a Secure Association
     Protocol exchange, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secure Association
     Protocol include support for TSK resynchronization.  Where the TSK
     is taken from the MSK, there is no need to manage the TSK lifetime
     as a separate parameter, since the TSK lifetime and MSK lifetime
     are identical.

[c]  System defaults.  Where the EAP method does not support the
     negotiation of the exported key lifetime, and a key lifetime
     negotiation mechanism is not provided by the lower lower, there may
     be no way for the peer to learn the exported key lifetime.  In this
     case it is RECOMMENDED that the peer assume a default value of the
     exported key lifetime; 8 hours is recommended.  Similarly, the
     lifetime of calculated keys can also be managed as a system
     parameter on the authenticator.

[d]  Method specific negotiation within EAP.  While EAP itself does not
     support lifetime negotiation, it would be possible to specify
     methods that do.  However, systems that rely on such negotiation
     for exported keys would only function with these methods.  As a
     result, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use this approach as the sole way
     to determine key lifetimes.

3.6.  Key cache synchronization

   Issues arise when attempting to synchronize the key cache on the peer
   and authenticator.

   While the AAA protocol can enable the backend authentication server
   to provide guidance on the lifetime of transported EAP keying
   material to the authenticator, this does not address the problem of
   key lifetime synchronization between the peer and authenticator.
   Where the EAP method does not export the Key-Lifetime parameter, the
   lifetime of the EAP keying material may not be defined until
   completion of the Secure Association Protocol, if ever.  This can
   leave the peer uncertain how long the authenticator will maintain EAP
   keying material within the key cache.

   However, key lifetime negotiation alone cannot guarantee key cache
   synchronization.  Even where the Secure Association Protocol is run



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   immediately after EAP and determines the lifetime of EAP keying
   material, it is still possible for the authenticator to reclaim
   resources.

   The lower layer may utilize the Discovery phase 0 to improve key
   cache synchronization.  For example, if the authenticator manages the
   key cache by deleting the oldest key first (LIFO), the relative
   creation time of the last key to be deleted could be advertised
   within the Discovery phase, enabling the peer to determine whether
   keying material had been prematurely expired from the authenticator
   key cache.

3.7.  Key Strength

   In order to guard against brute force attacks, EAP methods deriving
   keys need to be capable of generating keys with an appropriate
   effective symmetric key strength.  In order to ensure that key
   generation is not the weakest link, it is RECOMMENDED that EAP
   methods utilizing public key cryptography choose a public key that
   has a cryptographic strength meeting the symmetric key strength
   requirement.

   As noted in [RFC3766] Section 5, this results in the following
   required RSA or DH module and DSA subgroup size in bits, for a given
   level of attack resistance in bits:

        Attack Resistance     RSA or DH Modulus     DSA subgroup
           (bits)              size (bits)          size (bits)
        -----------------     -----------------     ------------
        70                          947                 128
        80                         1228                 145
        90                         1553                 153
        100                        1926                 184
        150                        4575                 279
        200                        8719                 373
        250                       14596                 475

3.8.  Key Wrap

   The key wrap specified in [RFC2548], which is based on an MD5-based
   stream cipher, has known problems, as described in [RFC3579] Section
   4.3.  RADIUS uses the shared secret for multiple purposes, including
   per-packet authentication and attribute hiding, considerable
   information is exposed about the shared secret with each packet.
   This exposes the shared secret to dictionary attacks. MD5 is used
   both to compute the RADIUS Response Authenticator and the Message-
   Authenticator attribute, and concerns exist relating to the security
   of this hash [MD5Collision].



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   As discussed in [RFC3579] Section 4.3, the security vulnerabilities
   of RADIUS are extensive, and therefore development of an alternative
   key wrap technique based on the RADIUS shared secret would not
   substantially improve security.  As a result, [RFC3759] Section 4.2
   recommends running RADIUS over IPsec.  The same approach is taken in
   Diameter EAP [RFC4072], which defines cleartext key attributes, to be
   protected by IPsec or TLS.

   Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is present (such as a RADIUS
   proxy or a Diameter agent), and data object security is not used,
   transported keying material may be recovered by an attacker in
   control of the untrusted intermediary.  Possession of transported
   keying material enables decryption of data traffic sent between the
   peer and a specific authenticator.  However, as long as EAP keying
   material or keys derived from it are only utilized by a single
   authenticator, compromise of the transported keying material does not
   enable an attacker to impersonate the peer to another authenticator.
   Vulnerability to an untrusted AAA intermediary can be mitigated by
   implementation of redirect functionality, as described in [RFC3588]
   and [RFC4072].

4.  Handoff Vulnerabilities

   With EAP, several mechanisms are available to reduce the latency in
   handoff between authenticators:

[1]  EAP pre-authentication.  This utilizes EAP to pre-establish EAP
     keying material on an authenticator prior to arrival of the peer.
     Use of pre-authentication within IEEE 802.11 is described in
     [8021XHandoff] and [IEEE-802.11i].

[2]  Key caching.  This mechanism enables an EAP peer to re-attach to an
     authenticator without requiring EAP re-authentication.

[3]  Context transfer, such as is defined in [IEEE-802.11F] (now
     deprecated) and [RFC4067].  Use of context transfer for handoff
     latency improvement is described in [IEEE-02-758].

[4]  Proactive key distribution, such as is described in [IEEE-02-758]
     and [I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff].

   The sections that follow discuss the security vulnerabilities
   introduced by the above mechanisms.

4.1.  Authorization

   In a typical network access scenario (dial-in, wireless LAN, etc.)
   access control mechanisms are typically applied. These mechanisms



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   include user authentication as well as authorization for the offered
   service.

   As a part of the authentication process, the backend authentication
   server determines the user's authorization profile.  The user
   authorizations are transmitted by the backend authentication server
   to the EAP authenticator (also known as the Network Access Server or
   authenticator) along with the transported EAP keying material, in
   Phase 1b of the EAP conversation.  Typically, the profile is
   determined based on the user identity, but a certificate presented by
   the user may also provide authorization information.

   The backend authentication server is responsible for making a user
   authorization decision, which requires answering the following
   questions:

[a]  Is this a legitimate user for this particular network?

[b]  Is the user allowed the type of access he or she is requesting?

[c]  Are there any specific parameters (mandatory tunneling, bandwidth,
     filters, and so on) that the access network should be aware of for
     this user?

[d]  Is the user operating within the time of day subscription rules?

[e]  Is the user within his limits for concurrent sessions?

[f]  Are there any fraud, credit limit, or other concerns that indicate
     that access should be denied?

   While the authorization decision is in principle simple, the process
   is complicated by the distributed nature of the decision making.
   Where brokering entities or proxies are involved, all of the AAA
   entities in the chain from the authenticator to the home backend
   authentication server are involved in the decision.  For instance, a
   broker can disallow access even if the home backend authentication
   server would allow it, or a proxy can add authorizations (e.g.,
   bandwidth limits).

   Decisions can be based on static policy definitions and profiles as
   well as dynamic state (e.g. time of day or limits on the number of
   concurrent sessions).  In addition to the Accept/Reject decision made
   by the AAA chain, parameters or constraints can be communicated to
   the authenticator.

   The criteria for Accept/Reject decisions or the reasons for choosing
   particular authorizations are typically not communicated to the



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   authenticator, only the final result.  As a result, the authenticator
   has no way to know what the decision was based on.  Was a set of
   authorization parameters sent because this service is always provided
   to the user, or was the decision based on the time/day and the
   capabilities of the requesting authenticator device?

4.2.  Correctness

   When the AAA exchange is bypassed via use of techniques such as key
   caching, it can be challenging to ensure that authorization is
   properly handled.  Challenges include:

[a]  Consistent application of session time limits.  Bypassing AAA
     should not automatically increase the available session time,
     allowing a user to endlessly extend their network access by
     changing the point of attachment.

[b]  Avoidance of privilege elevation.   Bypassing AAA should not result
     in a user being granted access to services which they are not
     entitled to.

[c]  Consideration of dynamic state.  In situations in which dynamic
     state is involved in the access decision (day/time, simultaneous
     session limit) it should be possible to take this state into
     account either before or after access is granted. Note that
     consideration of network-wide state such as simultaneous session
     limits can typically only be taken into account by the backend
     authentication server.

[d]  Encoding of restrictions.  Since a authenticator may not be aware
     of the criteria considered by a backend authentication server when
     allowing access, in order to ensure consistent authorization during
     a fast handoff it may be necessary to explicitly encode the
     restrictions within the authorizations provided by the backend
     authentication server.

[e]  State validity.  The introduction of fast handoff should not render
     the authentication server incapable of keeping track of network-
     wide state.

   A handoff mechanism capable of addressing these concerns is said to
   be "correct".  One condition for correctness is as follows:

      For a handoff to be "correct" it MUST establish on the new device
      the same context as would have been created had the new device
      completed a AAA conversation with the backend authentication
      server.




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   A properly designed handoff scheme will only succeed if it is
   "correct" in this way.  If a successful handoff would establish
   "incorrect" state, it is preferable for it to fail, in order to avoid
   creation of incorrect context.

   Some authenticator and backend authentication server configurations
   are incapable of meeting this definition of "correctness".  For
   example, if the old and new device differ in their capabilities, a
   handoff mechanism that bypasses AAA may find it difficult to meet
   this definition of correctness.  Backend authentication servers often
   perform conditional evaluation, in which the authorizations returned
   in an Access-Accept message are contingent on the authenticator or on
   dynamic state such as the time of day or number of simultaneous
   sessions.  For example, in a heterogeneous deployment, the backend
   authentication server might return different authorizations depending
   on the authenticator making the request, in order to make sure that
   the requested service is consistent with the authenticator
   capabilities.

   If differences between the new and old device would result in the
   backend authentication server sending a different set of messages to
   the new device than were sent to the old device, then if the handoff
   mechanism bypasses AAA, the handoff cannot be carried out correctly.

   For example, if some authenticators support dynamic VLANs while
   others do not, then attributes present in the Access-Request (such as
   the NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address, NAS-Identifier, etc.) could be
   examined to determine when VLAN attributes will be returned, as
   described in [RFC3580].   VLAN support is defined in [IEEE-802.1Q].
   If a handoff bypassing the backend authentication server were to
   occur between a authenticator supporting dynamic VLANs and another
   authenticator which does not, then a guest user with access
   restricted to a guest VLAN could be given unrestricted access to the
   network.

   Similarly, in a network where access is restricted based on the day
   and time, Service Set Identifier (SSID), Calling-Station-Id or other
   factors, unless the restrictions are encoded within the
   authorizations, or a partial AAA conversation is included, then a
   handoff could result in the user bypassing the restrictions.

   In practice, these considerations limit the situations in which fast
   handoff mechanisms bypassing AAA can be expected to be successful.
   Where the deployed devices implement the same set of services, it may
   be possible to do successful handoffs within such mechanisms.
   However, where the supported services differ between devices, the
   handoff may not succeed.  For example, [RFC2865] section 1.1 states:




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      "A authenticator that does not implement a given service MUST NOT
      implement the RADIUS attributes for that service.  For example, a
      authenticator that is unable to offer ARAP service MUST NOT
      implement the RADIUS attributes for ARAP.  A authenticator MUST
      treat a RADIUS access-accept authorizing an unavailable service as
      an access-reject instead."

   Note that this behavior only applies to attributes that are known,
   but not implemented.  For attributes that are unknown, [RFC2865]
   Section 5 states:

      "A RADIUS server MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type.  A
      RADIUS client MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type."

   In order to perform a correct handoff, if a new device is provided
   with RADIUS context for a known but unavailable service, then it MUST
   process this context the same way it would handle a RADIUS Access-
   Accept requesting an unavailable service.  This MUST cause the
   handoff to fail.  However, if a new device is provided with RADIUS
   context that indicates an unknown attribute, then this attribute MAY
   be ignored.

   Although it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, failure is indeed
   the "correct" result where a known but unsupported service is
   requested.  Presumably a correctly configured backend authentication
   server would not request that a device carry out a service that it
   does not implement.  This implies that if the new device were to
   complete a AAA conversation that it would be likely to receive
   different service instructions.  In such a case, failure of the
   handoff is the desired result.  This will cause the new device to go
   back to the backend server in order to receive the appropriate
   service definition.

   In practice, this implies that handoff mechanisms which bypass AAA
   are most likely to be successful within a homogeneous device
   deployment within a single administrative domain. For example, it
   would not be advisable to carry out a fast handoff bypassing AAA
   between a authenticator providing confidentiality and another
   authenticator that does not support this service.  The correct result
   of such a handoff would be a failure, since if the handoff were
   blindly carried out, then the user would be moved from a secure to an
   insecure channel without permission from the backend authentication
   server.  Thus the definition of a "known but unsupported service"
   MUST encompass requests for unavailable security services.  This
   includes vendor-specific attributes related to security, such as
   those described in [RFC2548].





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5.  Security Considerations

   In order to analyze whether the EAP conversation achieves its
   security goals, it is first necessary to describe the threat model.
   The terms "Cryptographic binding", "Cryptographic separation", "Key
   strength" and "Mutual authentication" are defined in [RFC3748] and
   are used with the same meaning here.

5.1.  Threat Model

   The EAP threat model is described in [RFC3748] Section 7.1.  The
   security properties of EAP methods (known as "security claims",
   described in [RFC3784] Section 7.2.1), address these threats.  EAP
   method requirements for applications such as Wireless LAN
   authentication are described in [RFC4017].  The RADIUS threat model
   is described in [RFC3579] Section 4.1, and responses to these threats
   are described in [RFC3579] Sections 4.2 and 4.3.

   However, in addition to threats against EAP and AAA, there are other
   system-level threats worth discussing.  These include:

[1]  An attacker may compromise or steal an EAP authenticator, in an
     attempt to gain access to other EAP authenticators or obtain long-
     term secrets.

[2]  An attacker may compromise an EAP authenticator in an effort to
     commit fraud.  For example, a compromised authenticator may provide
     incorrect information to the EAP peer and/or server via out-of-band
     mechanisms (such as via a AAA or lower layer protocol).  This
     includes impersonating another authenticator, or providing
     inconsistent information to the peer and EAP server.

[3]  An attacker may try to modify or spoof packets, including Discovery
     or Secure Association Protocol frames, EAP or AAA packets.

[4]  An attacker may attempt a downgrade attack in order to exploit
     known weaknesses in an authentication method or cryptographic
     transform.

[5]  An attacker may attempt to induce an EAP peer, authenticator or
     server to disclose keying material to an unauthorized party, or
     utilize keying material outside the context that it was intended
     for.

[6]  An attacker may replay packets.

[7]  An attacker may cause an EAP peer, authenticator or server to reuse
     an stale key.  Use of stale keys may also occur unintentionally.



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     For example, a poorly implemented backend authentication server may
     provide stale keying material to an authenticator, or a poorly
     implemented authenticator may reuse nonces.

[8]  An authenticated attacker may attempt to obtain elevated privilege
     in order to access information that it does not have rights to.

   In order to address these threats, [Housley] provides a description
   of mandatory system security properties.  Issues relating system
   security requirements are discussed in the sections that follow.

5.2.  Authenticator Compromise

   In the event that an authenticator is compromised or stolen, an
   attacker may gain access to the network via that authenticator, or
   may obtain the credentials required for that authenticator/AAA client
   to communicate with one or more backend authentication servers.
   However, this should not allow the attacker to compromise other
   authenticators or the backend authentication server, or obtain long-
   term user credentials.

   The implications of this requirement are many, but some of the more
   important are as follows:

No Key Sharing
     An EAP authenticator MUST NOT share any keying material with
     another EAP authenticator, since if one EAP authenticator were
     compromised, this would enable the compromise of keying material on
     another authenticator.  In order to be able to determine whether
     keying material has been shared, it is necessary for the identity
     of the EAP authenticator to be defined and understood by all
     parties that communicate with it.

No AAA Credential Sharing
     AAA credentials (such as RADIUS shared secrets, IPsec pre-shared
     keys or certificates) MUST NOT be shared between AAA clients, since
     if one AAA client were compromised, this would enable an attacker
     to impersonate other AAA clients to the backend authentication
     server, or even to impersonate a backend authentication server to
     other AAA clients.

No Compromise of Long-Term Credentials
     An attacker obtaining TSKs, TEKs or EAP keying material such as the
     MSK MUST NOT be able to obtain long-term user credentials such as
     pre-shared keys, passwords or private-keys without breaking a
     fundamental cryptographic assumption.





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5.3.  Spoofing

   The use of per-packet authentication and integrity protection
   provides protection against spoofing attacks.  Diameter [RFC3588]
   provides support for per-packet authentication and integrity
   protection via use of IPsec or TLS.  RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579] provides
   for per-packet authentication and integrity protection via use of the
   Message-Authenticator attribute.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "integrity protection" security
   claim and [RFC4017] requires use of EAP methods supporting this
   claim.

   In order to prevent forgery of Secure Association Protocol frames,
   per-frame authentication and integrity protection is RECOMMENDED on
   all messages.  [IEEE-802.11i] supports per-frame integrity protection
   and authentication on all messages within the 4-way handshake except
   the first message.  An attack leveraging this ommission is described
   in [Analysis].

5.4.  Downgrade Attacks

   The ability to negotiate the use of a particular cryptographic
   algorithm provides resilience against compromise of a particular
   cryptographic algorithm.  This is usually accomplished by including
   an algorithm identifier in the protocol, and by specifying the
   algorithm requirements in the protocol specification.  In order to
   prevent downgrade attacks, secure confirmation of the "best"
   ciphersuite is required.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "protected ciphersuite
   negotiation" security claim that refers to the ability of an EAP
   method to negotiate the ciphersuite used to protect the EAP
   conversation, as well as to integrity protect the negotiation.
   [RFC4017] requires EAP methods satisfying this security claim.

   Diameter [RFC3588] provides support for cryptographic algorithm
   negotiation via use of IPsec or TLS.  RADIUS [RFC3579] does not
   support the negotiation of cryptographic algorithms, and relies on
   MD5 for integrity protection, authentication and confidentiality,
   despite known weaknesses in the algorithm [MD5Collision].  This issue
   can be addressed via use of RADIUS over IPsec, as described in
   [RFC3579] Section 4.2.

   As a result, EAP methods and AAA protocols are capable of addressing
   downgrade attacks.  To ensure against downgrade attacks within lower
   layer protocols, algorithm independence is REQUIRED with lower layers
   using EAP for key derivation.  For interoperability, at least one



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   suite of mandatory-to-implement algorithm MUST be selected.   Lower
   layer protocols supporting EAP for key derivation SHOULD also support
   secure ciphersuite negotiation.  As described in [RFC1968], PPP ECP
   does not provide support for secure ciphersuite negotiation.
   However, [IEEE-802.11i] does support secure ciphersuite negotiation.

5.5.  Unauthorized Disclosure

   While preserving algorithm independence, confidentiality of all
   keying material MUST be maintained.  To prevent unauthorized disclose
   of keys, each party in the EAP conversation MUST be authenticated to
   the other parties with whom it communicates.  Keying material MUST be
   bound to the appropriate context.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "mutual authentication" and
   "dictionary attack resistance" claims, and [RFC4017] requires EAP
   methods satisfying these claims.  EAP methods complying with
   [RFC4017] therefore provide for mutual authentication between the EAP
   peer and server.  Binding of EAP keying material (MSK, EMSK) to the
   appropriate context is provided by the Peer-ID and Server-ID which
   are exported along with the keying material.

   Diameter [RFC3588] provides for per-packet authentication and
   integrity protection via IPsec or TLS, and RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579] also
   provides for per-packet authentication and integrity protection.
   Where the NAS/authenticator and backend authentication server
   communicate directly and credible keywrap is used (see Section 3.8),
   this ensures that the AAA Key Transport phase achieves its security
   objectives: mutually authenticating the AAA client/authenticator and
   backend authentication server and providing EAP keying material to
   the EAP authenticator and to no other party.  [RFC2607] Section 7
   describes the security issues ocurring when the authenticator and
   backend authentication server do not communicate directly.

   As noted in Section 3.1, the Secure Association Protocol does not by
   itself provide for mutual authentication between the EAP peer and
   authenticator, even if mutual possession of EAP keying material is
   proven.  Where the NAS/authenticator and backend authentication
   server communicate directly, the backend authentication server can
   verify the correspondence between NAS identification attributes, the
   source address of packets sent by the NAS, and the AAA credentials.
   As long as the NAS has not shared its AAA credentials with another
   NAS, this allows the backend authentication server to authenticate
   the NAS.  Using Channel Bindings, the EAP peer can then determine
   whether the NAS/authenticator has provided the same identifying
   information to the EAP peer and backend authentication server.

   Peer and authenticator authorization MUST be performed.



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   Authorization is REQUIRED whenever a peer associates with a new
   authenticator.  Authorization checking prevents an elevation of
   privilege attack, and ensures that an unauthorized authenticator is
   detected.  Authorizations SHOULD be synchronized between the EAP
   peer, server, authenticator.  Once the EAP conversation exchanges are
   complete, all of these parties should hold the same view of the
   authorizations associated the other parties.  If peer authorization
   is restricted, then the peer SHOULD be made aware of the restriction.

   The AAA exchange provides the EAP authenticator with authorizations
   relating to the EAP peer.  However, neither the EAP nor AAA exchanges
   provides authorizations to the EAP peer.  In order to ensure that all
   parties hold the same view of the authorizations it is RECOMMENDED
   that the Secure Association Protocol enable communication of
   authorizations between the EAP authenticator and peer.

   In order to enable key binding and authorization of all parties, it
   is RECOMMENDED that the parties use a set of identities that are
   consistent between the conversation phases.  Consistently identifying
   the EAP authenticator enables the EAP peer to determine whether EAP
   keying material has been shared between EAP authenticators as well as
   to confirm with the backend authentication server that an EAP
   authenticator proving possession of EAP keying material during the
   Secure Association Protocol was authorized to obtain it.
   Identification issues are discussed in Section 2.2 and key scope
   issues are discussed in Section 3.2.

5.6.  Replay Protection

   Replay protection allows a protocol message recipient to discard any
   message that was recorded during a previous legitimate dialogue and
   presented as though it belonged to the current dialogue.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "replay protection" security
   claim and [RFC4017] requires use of EAP methods supporting this
   claim.

   Diameter [RFC3588] provides support for replay protection via use of
   IPsec or TLS.  RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579] protects against replay of keying
   material via the Request Authenticator.  However, some RADIUS packets
   are not replay protected.  In Accounting, Disconnect and CoA-Request
   packets the Request Authenticator contains a keyed MAC rather than a
   Nonce.  The Response Authenticator in Accounting, Disconnect and CoA
   Response packets also contains a keyed MAC whose calculation does not
   depend on a Nonce in either the Request or Response packets.
   Therefore unless an Event-Timestamp attribute is included or IPsec is
   used, the recipient may not be able to determine whether these
   packets have been replayed.



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   In order to prevent replay of Secure Association Protocol frames,
   replay protection is REQUIRED on all messages.  [IEEE-802.11i]
   supports replay protection on all messages within the 4-way
   handshake.

5.7.  Key Freshness

   A session key should be considered compromised if it remains in use
   too long.  As noted in [Housley], session keys MUST be strong and
   fresh, while preserving algorithm independence.  A fresh
   cryptographic key is one that is generated specifically for the
   intended use.  Each session deserves an independent session key;
   disclosure of one session key MUST NOT aid the attacker in
   discovering any other session keys.

   Fresh keys are required even when a long replay counter (that is, one
   that "will never wrap") is used to ensure that loss of state does not
   cause the same counter value to be used more than once with the same
   session key.

   EAP, AAA and the lower layer each bear responsibility for ensuring
   the use of fresh, strong session keys:

EAP  EAP methods need to ensure the freshness and strength of EAP keying
     material provided as an input to session key derivation.  [RFC3748]
     Section 7.10 states that "EAP methods SHOULD ensure the freshness
     of the MSK and EMSK, even in cases where one party may not have a
     high quality random number generator.  A RECOMMENDED method is for
     each party to provide a nonce of at least 128 bits, used in the
     derivation of the MSK and EMSK."  The contribution of nonces
     enables the EAP peer and server to ensure that exported EAP keying
     material is fresh.

     [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "key strength" and "session
     independence" security claims, and and [RFC4017] requires use of
     EAP methods supporting these claims as well as being capable of
     providing an equivalent key strength of 128 bits or greater.

AAA  The AAA protocol needs to ensure that transported keying material
     is fresh and is not utilized outside its recommended lifetime.
     Replay protection is necessary for key freshness, but an attacker
     can deliver a stale (and therefore potentially compromised) key in
     a replay-protected message, so replay protection is not sufficient.

     The EAP Session-ID, derived from the EAP Type and Method-ID (based
     on the nonces contributed by the peer and server) enables the EAP
     peer, authenticator and server to distinguish EAP conversations.
     However, unless the authenticator keeps track of EAP Session-IDs,



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     the authenticator cannot use the Session-ID to guarantee the
     freshness of EAP keying material.

     As described in [RFC3580] Section 3.17, When sent in an Access-
     Accept along with a Termination-Action value of RADIUS-Request, the
     Session-Timeout attribute specifies the maximum number of seconds
     of service provided prior to re-authentication.  [IEEE-802.11i]
     also utilizes the Session-Timeout attribute to limit the maximum
     time that EAP keying material may be cached.  Therefore the use of
     the Session-Timeout attribute enables the backend authentication
     server to limit the exposure of EAP keying material.

Lower Layer
     As described in Section 3.1, the lower layer Secure Association
     Protocol MUST generate a fresh session key for each session, even
     if the keying material and parameters provided by EAP methods are
     cached, or either the peer or authenticator lack a high entropy
     random number generator. A RECOMMENDED method is for the peer and
     authenticator to each provide a nonce or counter used in session
     key derivation.  If a nonce is used, it is RECOMMENDED that it be
     at least 128 bits.

5.8.  Elevation of Privilege

   Parties MUST NOT have access to keying material that is not needed to
   perform their own role.  A party has access to a particular key if it
   has access to all of the secret information needed to derive it.  If
   a Secure Association Protocol is used to establish session keys, it
   MUST specify the scope for session keys.

   Transported EAP keying material is permitted to be accessed by the
   EAP peer, authenticator and server.  The EAP peer and server derive
   the transported keying material during the process of mutually
   authenticating each other using the selected EAP method.  During the
   Secure Association Protocol, the EAP peer utilizes the transported
   EAP keying material to demonstrate to the authenticator that it is
   the same party that authenticated to the EAP server and was
   authorized by it.  The EAP authenticator utilizes the transported EAP
   keying material to prove to the peer not only that the EAP
   conversation was transported through it (this could be demonstrated
   by a man-in-the-middle), but that it was uniquely authorized by the
   EAP server to provide the peer with access to the network.  Unique
   authorization can only be demonstrated if the EAP authenticator does
   not share the transported keying material with a party other than the
   EAP peer and server.

   TSKs are permitted to be accessed only by the EAP peer and
   authenticator (see Section 1.5).  As discussed in Section 2.1, PPP



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   and 802.11i derive the TSKs from transported EAP keying material;
   802.16e utilizes transported EAP keying material for TSK keywrap;
   IKEv2 utilizes transported EAP keying material only to authenticate
   the derivation of TSKs.

   Where demonstration of authorization depends entirely on possession
   of transported EAP keying material (such as in PPP, 802.11i and
   802.16e), this enables the backend server to masquerade as the
   authenticator, and possibly to obtain the TSKs unless the backend
   server deletes the transported EAP keying material after sending it.

5.9.  Man-in-the-middle Attacks

   As described in [I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding], EAP method sequences
   and compound authentication mechanisms may be subject to man-in-the-
   middle attacks.  When such attacks are successfully carried out, the
   attacker acts as an intermediary between a victim and a legitimate
   authenticator.  This allows the attacker to authenticate successfully
   to the authenticator, as well as to obtain access to the network.

   In order to prevent these attacks, [I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding]
   recommends derivation of a compound key by which the EAP peer and
   server can prove that they have participated in the entire EAP
   exchange.  Since the compound key must not be known to an attacker
   posing as an authenticator, and yet must be derived from quantities
   that are exported by EAP methods, it may be desirable to derive the
   compound key from a portion of the EMSK.  In order to provide proper
   key hygiene, it is recommended that the compound key used for man-in-
   the-middle protection be cryptographically separate from other keys
   derived from the EMSK.

5.10.  Denial of Service Attacks

   Key caching may result in vulnerability to denial of service attacks.
   For example, EAP methods that create persistent state may be
   vulnerable to denial of service attacks on the EAP server by a rogue
   EAP peer.

   To address this vulnerability, EAP methods creating persistent state
   may wish to limit the persistent state created by an EAP peer.  For
   example, for each peer an EAP server may choose to limit persistent
   state to a few EAP conversations, distinguished by the EAP Session-
   ID.  This prevents a rogue peer from denying access to other peers.

   Similarly, to conserve resources an authenticator may choose to limit
   the persistent state corresponding to each peer.  This can be
   accomplished by limiting each peer to persistent state corresponding
   to a few EAP conversations, distinguished by the EAP Session-ID.



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   Depending on the media, creation of new TSKs may or may not imply
   deletion of previously derived TSKs.  Where there is no implied
   deletion, the authenticator may choose to limit the number of TSKs
   and associated state that can be stored for each peer.

5.11.  Impersonation

   Both the RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC3588] protocols are
   potentially vulnerable to impersonation by a rogue authenticator.
   While both protocols support mutual authentication between the
   authenticator (known as the AAA client) and the backend
   authentication server (known as the backend authentication server),
   the security mechanisms vary.

   In RADIUS, the shared secret used for authentication is determined by
   the source address of the RADIUS packet.  As noted in [RFC3579]
   Section 4.3.7, it is highly desirable that the source address be
   checked against one or more NAS identification attributes so as to
   detect and prevent impersonation attacks.

   When RADIUS Access-Requests are forwarded by a proxy, the NAS-IP-
   Address or NAS-IPv6-Address attributes may not correspond to the
   source address.  Since the NAS-Identifier attribute need not contain
   an FQDN, it also may not correspond to the source address, even
   indirectly.  [RFC2865] Section 3 states:

         A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS
         UDP packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that
         RADIUS requests can be proxied.

   This implies that it is possible for a rogue authenticator to forge
   NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address or NAS-Identifier attributes within
   a RADIUS Access-Request in order to impersonate another
   authenticator.  Among other things, this can result in messages (and
   transported keying material) being sent to the wrong authenticator.
   Since the rogue authenticator is authenticated by the RADIUS proxy or
   server purely based on the source address, other mechanisms are
   required to detect the forgery.  In addition, it is possible for
   attributes such as the Called-Station-Id and Calling-Station-Id to be
   forged as well.

   [RFC3579] Section 4.3.7 describes how an EAP pass-through
   authenticator acting as a AAA client can be detected if it attempts
   to impersonate another authenticator (such by sending incorrect
   Called-Station-ID [RFC2865], NAS-Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address
   [RFC2865] or NAS-IPv6-Address [RFC3162] attributes via the AAA
   protocol).  This vulnerabilityh can be mitigated by having RADIUS
   proxies check NAS identification attributes against the source



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   address.

   While [RFC3588] requires use of the Route-Record AVP, this utilizes
   FQDNs, so that impersonation detection requires DNS A, AAAA and PTR
   Resource Records (RRs) to be properly configured.  As a result,
   Diameter is as vulnerable to this attack as RADIUS, if not more so.
   To address this vulnerability, it is necessary to allow the backend
   authentication server to communicate with the authenticator directly,
   such as via the redirect functionality supported in [RFC3588].

5.12.  Channel Binding

   It is possible for a compromised or poorly implemented EAP
   authenticator to communicate incorrect information to the EAP peer
   and/or server.  This may enable an authenticator to impersonate
   another authenticator or communicate incorrect information via out-
   of-band mechanisms (such as via AAA or the lower layer).

   Where EAP is used in pass-through mode, the EAP peer does not verify
   the identity of the pass-through authenticator.  Within the Secure
   Association Protocol, the EAP peer and authenticator only demonstrate
   mutual possession of the transported EAP keying material.  This
   creates a potential security vulnerability, described in [RFC3748]
   Section 7.15.

   As described in the previous section, it is possible for a proxy to
   detect a AAA client attempting to impersonate another authenticator
   (such by sending incorrect Called-Station-ID [RFC2865], NAS-
   Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address [RFC2865] or NAS-IPv6-Address
   [RFC3162] attributes via the AAA protocol).  However, it is possible
   for a pass-through authenticator acting as a AAA client to provide
   correct information to the backend authentication server while
   communicating misleading information to the EAP peer via the lower
   layer.

   For example, a compromised authenticator can utilize another
   authenticator's Called-Station-Id or NAS-Identifier in communicating
   with the EAP peer via the lower layer.  Also, a pass-through
   authenticator acting as a AAA client can provide an incorrect peer
   Calling-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580] to the AAA server via the AAA
   protocol.

   As noted in [RFC3748] Section 7.15, this vulnerability can be
   addressed by EAP methods that support a protected exchange of channel
   properties such as endpoint identifiers, including (but not limited
   to): Called-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580], Calling-Station-Id
   [RFC2865][RFC3580], NAS-Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address
   [RFC2865], and NAS-IPv6-Address [RFC3162].



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   Using such a protected exchange, it is possible to match the channel
   properties provided by the authenticator via out-of-band mechanisms
   against those exchanged within the EAP method.  For example, see [I-
   D.arkko-eap-service-identity-auth].

   It is also possible to achieve Channel Bindings without transporting
   data over EAP.  For example, see [I-D.draft-ohba-eap-aaakey-binding].
   In this approach the authenticator informs the backend server about
   the Channel Binding parameters using AAA, and the backend server
   calculates transported keying material based on this parameter set,
   making it impossible for the peer and authenticator to complete the
   Secure Association Protocol if there was a mismatch in the
   parameters.

   The main difference between these approaches is that Channel Binding
   support within an EAP method may require upgrading or changing the
   EAP method, impacting both the peer and the server.   Where Channel
   Bindings are implemented in AAA,  the peer, authenticator and the
   backend server need to be upgraded, but the EAP method need not be
   modified.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This specification does not request the creation of any new parameter
   registries, nor does it require any other IANA assignments.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

[RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3748]    Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
             Lefkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
             3748, June 2004.

7.2.  Informative References

[Analysis]   He, C. and J. Mitchell, "Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way
             Handshake", Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on
             Wireless Security, pp. 43-50, ISBN: 1-58113-925-X.

[GKDP]       Dondeti, L., Xiang, J. and S. Rowles, "GKDP: Group Key
             Distribution Protocol", Internet draft (work in progress),
             draft-ietf-msec-gkdp-01, March 2006.





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[GSAKMP]     Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A., and G. Gross, "GSAKMP:
             Group Secure Association Group Management Protocol",
             Internet draft (work in progress), draft-ietf-msec-gsakmp-
             sec-10, May 2005.

[He]         He, C., Sundararajan, M., Datta, A. Derek, A. and J. C.
             Mitchell, "A Modular Correctness Proof of TLS and IEEE
             802.11i", ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
             Security (CCS '05), November, 2005.

[Housley]    Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "AAA Key Management", draft-
             housley-aaa-key-mgmt-01.txt, Internet draft (work in
             progress), November 2005.

[IEEE-802.11]
             Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
             "Information technology - Telecommunications and
             information exchange between systems - Local and
             metropolitan area networks - Specific Requirements Part 11:
             Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer
             (PHY) Specifications", IEEE IEEE Standard 802.11-2003,
             2003.

[IEEE-802.1X]
             Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Local
             and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access
             Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2004, December 2004.

[IEEE-802.1Q]
             Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
             Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Draft
             Standard for Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks", IEEE
             Standard 802.1Q/D8, January 1998.  [IEEE802.11i] Institute
             of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Supplement to
             Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange
             Between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific Requirements - Part 11:
             Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer
             (PHY) Specifications: Specification for Enhanced Security",
             IEEE 802.11i, July 2004.

[IEEE-802.11F]
             Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
             "Recommended Practice for Multi-Vendor Access Point
             Interoperability via an Inter-Access Point Protocol Across
             Distribution Systems Supporting IEEE 802.11 Operation",
             IEEE 802.11F, July 2003 (now deprecated).





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[IEEE-802.16e]
             Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
             Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Part 16:
             Air Interface for Fixed and Mobile Broadband Wireless
             Access Systems: Amendment for Physical and Medium Access
             Control Layers for Combined Fixed and Mobile Operations in
             Licensed Bands" IEEE 802.16e, August 2005.

[IEEE-02-758]
             Mishra, A., Shin, M., Arbaugh, W., Lee, I. and K. Jang,
             "Proactive Caching Strategies for IAPP Latency Improvement
             during 802.11 Handoff", IEEE 802.11 Working Group,
             IEEE-02-758r1-F Draft 802.11I/D5.0, November 2002.

[IEEE-03-084]
             Mishra, A., Shin, M., Arbaugh, W., Lee, I. and K. Jang,
             "Proactive Key Distribution to support fast and secure
             roaming", IEEE 802.11 Working Group, IEEE-03-084r1-I,
             http://www.ieee802.org/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/
             3-084.zip, January 2003.

[I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding]
             Puthenkulam, J., "The Compound Authentication Binding
             Problem", draft-puthenkulam-eap-binding-04 (work in
             progress), October 2003.

[I-D.arkko-eap-service-identity-auth]
             Arkko, J. and P. Eronen, "Authenticated Service Information
             for the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", draft-
             arkko-eap-service-identity-auth-02.txt (work in progress),
             May 2005.

[I-D.ohba-eap-aaakey-binding]
             Ohba, Y., "AAA-Key Derivation with Channel Binding", draft-
             ohba-eap-aaakey-binding-00.txt (work in progress), May
             2005.

[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff]
             Arbaugh, W. and B. Aboba, "Handoff Extension to RADIUS",
             draft-irtf-aaaarch-handoff-04.txt (work in progress),
             October 2003.

[MD5Collision]
             Klima, V., "Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions
             Within a Minute", Cryptology ePrint Archive, March 2006,
             http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf





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[RFC1661]    Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51,
             RFC 1661, July 1994.

[RFC1968]    Meyer, G. and K. Fox, "The PPP Encryption Control Protocol
             (ECP)", RFC 1968, June 1996.

[RFC2409]    Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
             (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

[RFC2516]    Mamakos, L., Lidl, K., Evarts, J., Carrel, D., Simone, D.
             and R. Wheeler, "A Method for Transmitting PPP Over
             Ethernet (PPPoE)", RFC 2516, February 1999.

[RFC2535]    Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
             2535, March 1999.

[RFC2548]    Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
             RFC 2548, March 1999.

[RFC2607]    Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
             Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.

[RFC2716]    Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication
             Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.

[RFC2782]    Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
             specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
             February 2000.

[RFC2845]    Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B.
             Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
             (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

[RFC2865]    Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson, "Remote
             Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
             June 2000.

[RFC2931]    Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
             (SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, September 2000.

[RFC3007]    Wellington, B., "Simple Secure Domain Name System (DNS)
             Dynamic Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.

[RFC3547]    Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T. and H. Harney, "The
             Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

[RFC3579]    Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
             Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication



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             Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

[RFC3580]    Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G. and J. Roese,
             "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
             (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.

[RFC3588]    Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G. and J.
             Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

[RFC3766]    Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For Public
             Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric  Keys", RFC 3766, April
             2004.

[RFC3830]    Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M. and K.
             Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
             August 2004.

[RFC4017]    Stanley, D., Walker, J. and B. Aboba, "EAP Method
             Requirements for Wireless LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.

[RFC4046]    Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L. and F. Lindholm,
             "Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
             Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.

[RFC4067]    Loughney, J., Nakhjiri, M., Perkins, C. and R. Koodli,
             "Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP)", RFC 4067, July 2005.

[RFC4072]    Eronen, P., Hiller, T. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
             Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
             August 2005.

[RFC4118]    Yang, L., Zerfos, P. and E. Sadot, "Architecture Taxonomy
             for Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
             (CAPWAP)", RFC 4118, June 2005.

[RFC4186]    Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
             Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile Communications
             (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-SIM)", RFC 4186,
             January 2006.

[RFC4187]    Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
             Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key
             Agreement (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.

[RFC4306]    Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC
             4306, December 2005.





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[8021XHandoff]
             Pack, S. and Y. Choi, "Pre-Authenticated Fast Handoff in a
             Public Wireless LAN Based on IEEE 802.1X Model", School of
             Computer Science and Engineering, Seoul National
             University, Seoul, Korea, 2002.

Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Arun Ayyagari, Ashwin Palekar, and Tim Moore of Microsoft,
   Dorothy Stanley of Agere, Bob Moskowitz of TruSecure, Jesse Walker of
   Intel, Joe Salowey of Cisco and Russ Housley of Vigil Security for
   useful feedback.

Authors' Addresses

   Bernard Aboba
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052

   EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
   Phone: +1 425 706 6605
   Fax:   +1 425 936 7329

   Dan Simon
   Microsoft Research
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052

   EMail: dansimon@microsoft.com
   Phone: +1 425 706 6711
   Fax:   +1 425 936 7329

   Jari Arkko
   Ericsson
   Jorvas 02420
   Finland

   Phone:
   EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com

   Pasi Eronen
   Nokia Research Center
   P.O. Box 407
   FIN-00045 Nokia Group
   Finland




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   EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com

   Henrik Levkowetz (editor)
   ipUnplugged AB
   Arenavagen 27
   Stockholm  S-121 28
   SWEDEN

   Phone: +46 708 32 16 08
   EMail: henrik@levkowetz.com









































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Appendix A - Exported Parameters in Existing Methods

   This Appendix specifies Method-ID, Peer-ID, Server-ID and Key-
   Lifetime for EAP methods that have been published prior to this
   specification.  Future EAP method specifications MUST include a
   definition of the Method-ID,  Peer-ID, and Server-ID (could be the
   empty string) and MAY also define the Key-Lifetime (assumed to be
   indeterminate if not described).

   EAP-Identity

      The EAP-Identity method is defined in [RC3748].  It does not
      derive keys, and therefore does not define the Key-Lifetime or
      Method-ID. The Peer-ID exported by the Identity method is
      determined by the octets included within the EAP-
      Response/Identity.  The Server-ID is the empty string (zero
      length).

   EAP-Notification

      The EAP-Notification method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not
      derive keys and therefore does not define the Key-Lifetime and
      Method-ID.  The Peer-ID and Server-ID are the empty string (zero
      length).

   EAP-GTC

      The EAP-GTC method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not derive
      keys and therefore does not define the Key-Lifetime and Method-ID.
      The Peer-ID and Server-ID are the empty string.

   EAP-OTP

      The EAP-OTP method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not derive
      keys and therefore does not define the Key-Lifetime and Method-ID.
      The Peer-ID and Server-ID are the empty string.

   EAP-TLS

      EAP-TLS is defined in [RFC2716].  The EAP-TLS Method-Id is the
      concatenation of the peer and server nonces.  The Peer-ID and
      Server-ID are the contents of the altSubjectName in the peer and
      server certificates.  EAP-TLS does not negotiate a Key-Lifetime.

   EAP-AKA

      EAP-AKA is defined in [RFC4187].  The EAP-AKA Method-Id is the
      contents of the RAND field from the AT_RAND attribute, followed by



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      the contents of the AUTN field in the AT_AUTN attribute.

      The Peer-ID is the contents of the Identity field from the
      AT_IDENTITY attribute, using only the Actual Identity Length
      octets from the beginning, however.  Note that the contents are
      used as they are transmitted, regardless of whether the
      transmitted identity was a permanent, pseudonym, or fast re-
      authentication identity.  The Server-ID is an empty string.  EAP-
      AKA does not negotiate a key lifetime.

   EAP-SIM

      EAP-SIM is defined in [RFC4186].  The EAP-SIM Method-Id is the
      contents of the RAND field from the AT_RAND attribute, followed by
      the contents of the NONCE_MT field in the AT_NONCE_MT attribute.

      The Peer-ID is the contents of the Identity field from the
      AT_IDENTITY attribute, using only the Actual Identity Length
      octets from the beginning, however.  Note that the contents are
      used as they are transmitted, regardless of whether the
      transmitted identity was a permanent, pseudonym, or fast re-
      authentication identity.  The Server-ID is an empty string.  EAP-
      SIM does not negotiate a key lifetime.

Intellectual Property Statement

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   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
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   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
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   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
   ipr@ietf.org.




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Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

Open Issues

   Open issues relating to this specification are tracked on the
   following web site:

   http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/eapissues.html
























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