[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 RFC 6772

GEOPRIV                                              H. Schulzrinne, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                       Columbia University
Intended status: Standards Track                      H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Expires: April 16, 2012                           Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                              J. Cuellar
                                                                 Siemens
                                                                 J. Polk
                                                                   Cisco
                                                               J. Morris

                                                              M. Thomson
                                                               Commscope
                                                        October 14, 2011


Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences
                        for Location Information
                    draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-25.txt

Abstract

   This document defines an authorization policy language for
   controlling access to location information.  It extends the Common
   Policy authorization framework to provide location-specific access
   control.  More specifically, this document defines condition elements
   specific to location information in order to restrict access based on
   the current location of the Target.

   Furthermore, this document defines two algorithms for reducing the
   granularity of returned location information.  The first algorithm is
   defined for usage with civic location information while the other one
   applies to geodetic location information.  Both algorithms come with
   limitations, i.e. they provide location obfuscation under certain
   conditions and may therefore not be appropriate for all application
   domains.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 16, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.
































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Generic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  Structure of Geolocation Authorization Documents . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Rule Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Location-specific Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Geodetic Location Condition Profile  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Civic Location Condition Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  Transformations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     6.1.  Set Retransmission-Allowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     6.2.  Set Retention-Expiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     6.3.  Set Note-Well  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     6.4.  Keep Ruleset Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.5.  Provide Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       6.5.1.  Civic Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       6.5.2.  Geodetic Location Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     7.1.  Rule Example with Civic Location Condition . . . . . . . . 18
     7.2.  Rule Example with Geodetic Location Condition  . . . . . . 19
     7.3.  Rule Example with Civic and Geodetic Location Condition  . 19
     7.4.  Rule Example with Location-based Transformations . . . . . 20
     7.5.  Location Obfuscation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   8.  XML Schema for Basic Location Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   9.  XML Schema for Geolocation Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   10. XCAP Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.1. Application Unique ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.2. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.3. Default Namespace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.4. MIME Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.5. Validation Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.6. Data Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.7. Naming Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.8. Resource Interdependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.9. Authorization Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   11. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     11.1. Geolocation Policy XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . 31
     11.2. Geolocation Policy Namespace Registration  . . . . . . . . 31
     11.3. Geolocation Policy Location Profile Registry . . . . . . . 32
     11.4. Basic Location Profile XML Schema Registration . . . . . . 32
     11.5. Basic Location Profile Namespace Registration  . . . . . . 33
     11.6. XCAP Application Usage ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   12. Internationalization Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
   13. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     13.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     13.2. Obfuscation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


     13.3. Usability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
     13.4. Location Obscuring Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
     14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
     14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
   Appendix B.  Pseudo-Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47











































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


1.  Introduction

   Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
   access to preserve the privacy of humans.  In RFC 3693 [RFC3693], a
   protocol-independent model for access to geographic information is
   defined.  The model includes a Location Generator (LG) that
   determines location information, a Location Server (LS) that
   authorizes access to location information, a Location Recipient (LR)
   that requests and receives location information, and a Rule Maker
   (RM) that writes authorization policies.  An authorization policy is
   a set of rules that regulates an entity's activities with respect to
   privacy-sensitive information, such as location information.

   The data object containing location information in the context of
   this document is referred to as a Location Object (LO).  The basic
   rule set defined in the Presence Information Data Format Location
   Object (PIDF-LO) [RFC4119] can restrict how long the Location
   Recipient is allowed to retain the information, and it can prohibit
   further distribution.  It also contains a reference to an enhanced
   rule set and a human readable privacy policy.  The basic rule set,
   however, does not allow to control access to location information
   based on specific Location Recipients.  This document describes an
   enhanced rule set that provides richer constraints on the
   distribution of LOs.

   The rule set allows the entity that uses the rules defined in this
   document to restrict the retention and to enforce access restrictions
   on location data, including prohibiting any dissemination to
   particular individuals, during particular times or when the Target is
   located in a specific region.  The RM can also stipulate that only
   certain parts of the Location Object are to be distributed to
   recipients or that the resolution of parts of the Location Object is
   reduced.

   The typical sequence of operations is as follows.  A Location Server
   receives a query for location information for a particular Target.
   The requestor's identity will likely be revealed as part of this
   request for location information.  The authenticated identity of the
   Location Recipient, together with other information provided with the
   request or generally available to the server, is then used for
   searching through the rule set.  If more than one rule matches the
   condition element, then the combined permission is evaluated
   according to the description in Section 10 of [RFC4745].  The result
   of the rule evalation is applied to the location information,
   yielding a possibly modified Location Object that is delivered to the
   Location Recipient.

   This document does not describe the protocol used to convey location



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 5]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   information from the Location Server to the Location Recipient.

   This document extends the Common Policy framework defined in
   [RFC4745].  That document provides an abstract framework for
   expressing authorization rules.  As specified there, each such rule
   consists of conditions, actions and transformations.  Conditions
   determine under which circumstances the entity executing the rules,
   for example a Location Server, is permitted to apply actions and
   transformations.  Transformations regulate in a location information
   context how a Location Server modifies the information elements that
   are returned to the requestor, for example, by reducing the
   granularity of returned location information.

   This document defines two algorithms for reducing the granularity of
   returned location information.  The first algorithm is defined for
   usage with civic location information (see Section 6.5.1) while the
   other one applies to geodetic location information (see
   Section 6.5.2).  Both algorithms come with limitations, i.e. they
   provide location obfuscation under certain conditions and may
   therefore not be appropriate for all application domains.  These
   limitations are documented within the security consideration section
   (see Section 13).  It is worth pointing out that the geodetic
   transformation algorithm Section 6.5.2 deals with privacy risks
   related to targets that are stationary, as well as to moving targets.
   However, with respect to movement there are restriction as to what
   information can be hidden from an adversary.  To cover applications
   that have more sophisticated privacy requirements additional
   algorithms may need to be defined.  This document forsees extensions
   in the form of new algorithms and therefore defines a registy (see
   Section 11.3).

   The XML schema defined in Section 9 extends the Common Policy schema
   by introducing new child elements to the condition and transformation
   elements.  This document does not define child elements for the
   action part of a rule.
















Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 6]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   This document reuses the terminology of RFC 3693 [RFC3693], such as
   Location Server (LS), Location Recipient (LR), Rule Maker (RM),
   Target, Location Generator (LG) and Location Object (LO).  This
   document uses the following terminology:

   Presentity or Target:

      RFC 3693 [RFC3693] uses the term Target to identify the object or
      person of which location information is required.  The presence
      model described in RFC 2778 [RFC2778] uses the term presentity to
      describe the entity that provides presence information to a
      presence service.  A Presentity in a presence system is a Target
      in a location information system.


   Watcher or Location Recipient:

      The receiver of location information is the Location Recipient
      (LR) in the terminology of RFC 3693 [RFC3693].  A watcher in a
      presence system, i.e., an entity that requests presence
      information about a presentity, is a Location Recipient in a
      location information system.


   Authorization policy:

      An authorization policy is given by a rule set.  A rule set
      contains an unordered list of (policy) rules.  Each rule has a
      condition, an action and a transformation component.


   Permission:

      The term permission refers to the action and transformation
      components of a rule.

   In this document we use the term Location Servers as the entities
   that evaluate the geolocation authorization policies.  The
   geolocation privacy architecture is, as motivated in RFC 4079
   [RFC4079], aligned with the presence architecture and a Presence
   Server is therefore an entity that distributes location information
   along with other presence-specific XML data elements.



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 7]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


3.  Generic Processing

3.1.  Structure of Geolocation Authorization Documents

   A geolocation authorization document is an XML document, formatted
   according to the schema defined in [RFC4745].  Geolocation
   authorization documents inherit the MIME type of common policy
   documents, application/auth-policy+xml.  As described in [RFC4745],
   this document is composed of rules which contain three parts -
   conditions, actions, and transformations.  Each action or
   transformation, which is also called a permission, has the property
   of being a positive grant of information to the Location Recipient.
   As a result, there is a well-defined mechanism for combining actions
   and transformations obtained from several sources.  This mechanism is
   privacy safe, since the lack of any action or transformation can only
   result in less information being presented to a Location Recipient.

3.2.  Rule Transport

   There are two ways how the authorization rules described in this
   document may be conveyed between different parties:

   o  RFC 4119 [RFC4119] allows enhanced authorization policies to be
      referenced via a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) in the 'ruleset-
      reference' element.  The ruleset-reference' element is part of the
      basic rules that always travel with the Location Object.

   o  Authorization policies might, for example, also be stored at a
      Location Server / Presence Server.  The Rule Maker therefore needs
      to use a protocol to create, modify and delete the authorization
      policies defined in this document.  Such a protocol is available
      with the Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access
      Protocol (XCAP) [RFC4825].


















Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 8]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


4.  Location-specific Conditions

   This section describes the location-specific conditions of a rule.
   The <conditions> element contains zero, one or an unbounded number of
   <location-condition> child element(s).  Providing more than one
   <location-condition> element may not be useful since all child
   elements of the <conditions> element must evaluate to TRUE in order
   for the <conditions> element to be TRUE.  The <location-condition>
   element MUST contain at least one <location> child element.  The
   <location-condition> element evaluates to TRUE if any of its child
   elements is TRUE, i.e., a logical OR.

   The <location> element has three attributes, namely 'profile', 'xml:
   lang' and 'label'.  The 'profile' attribute allows to indicate the
   location profile that is included as child elements in the <location>
   element and each profile needs to describe under what conditions each
   <location> element evaluates to TRUE.  This document defines two
   location profiles, one civic and one geodetic location profile, see
   Section 4.1 and Section 4.2.  The 'label' attribute allows a human
   readable description to be added to each <location> element.  The
   'xml:lang' attribute contains a language tag providing further
   information for rendering of the content of the 'label' attribute.

   The <location-condition> and the <location> elements provide
   extension points.  If an extension is not understood by the entity
   evaluating the rules then this rule evaluates to FALSE.

4.1.  Geodetic Location Condition Profile

   The geodetic location profile is identified by the token 'geodetic-
   condition'.  Rule Makers use this profile by placing a GML [GML]
   <Circle> element within the <location> element (as described in
   Section 5.2.3 of [RFC5491]).

   The <location> element containing the information for the geodetic
   location profile evaluates to TRUE if the current location of the
   Target is within the described location.  Note that the Target's
   actual location might be represented by any of the location shapes
   described in [RFC5491].  If the geodetic location of the Target is
   unknown then the <location> element containing the information for
   the geodetic location profile evaluates to FALSE.

   Implementations are REQUIRED to support the following coordinate
   reference system based on WGS 84 [NIMA.TR8350.2-3e] based on the
   European Petroleum Survey Group (EPSG) Geodetic Parameter Dataset (as
   formalized by the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC)):





Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                 [Page 9]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   2D:  WGS 84 (latitude, longitude), as identified by the URN
      "urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326".  This is a two dimensional CRS.

   A CRS MUST be specified using the above URN notation only,
   implementations do not need to support user-defined CRSs.

   Implementations MUST specify the CRS using the "srsName" attribute on
   the outermost geometry element.  The CRS MUST NOT be changed for any
   sub-elements.  The "srsDimension" attribute MUST be omitted, since
   the number of dimensions in these CRSs is known.

4.2.  Civic Location Condition Profile

   The civic location profile is identified by the token 'civic-
   condition'.  Rule Makers use this profile by placing a <civicAddress>
   element, defined in [RFC5139], within the <location> element.

   All child elements of <location> element that carry <civicAddress>
   elements MUST evaluate to TRUE (i.e., logical AND) in order for the
   <location> element to evaluate to TRUE.  For each child element, the
   value of that element is compared to the value of the same element in
   the Target's civic location.  The child element evaluates to TRUE if
   the two values are identical based on a bit-by-bit comparison.

   If the civic location of the Target is unknown, then the <location>
   element containing the information for the civic location profile
   evaluates to FALSE.  This case may occur, for example, if location
   information has been removed by earlier transmitters of location
   information or if only the geodetic location is known.  In general,
   it is RECOMMENDED behavior for a LS not to apply a translation from
   geodetic location to civic location (i.e., geocode the location).




















Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 10]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


5.  Actions

   This document does not define location-specific actions.
















































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 11]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


6.  Transformations

   This document defines several elements that allow Rule Makers to
   specify transformations that

   o  reduce the accuracy of the returned location information, and

   o  set the basic authorization policies carried inside the PIDF-LO.

6.1.  Set Retransmission-Allowed

   This element asks the LS to change or set the value of the
   <retransmission-allowed> element in the PIDF-LO.  The data type of
   the <set-retransmission-allowed> element is a boolean.

   If the value of the <set-retransmission-allowed> element is set to
   TRUE then the <retransmission-allowed> element in the PIDF-LO MUST be
   set to TRUE.  If the value of the <set-retransmission-allowed>
   element is set to FALSE, then the <retransmission-allowed> element in
   the PIDF-LO MUST be set to FALSE.

   If the <set-retransmission-allowed> element is absent then the value
   of the <retransmission-allowed> element in the PIDF-LO MUST be kept
   unchanged or, if the PIDF-LO is created for the first time, then the
   value MUST be set to FALSE.

6.2.  Set Retention-Expiry

   This transformation asks the LS to change or set the value of the
   <retention-expiry> element in the PIDF-LO.  The data type of the
   <set-retention-expiry> element is an integer.

   The value provided with the <set-retention-expiry> element indicates
   seconds and these seconds are added to the current date.

   If the <set-retention-expiry> element is absent then the value of the
   <retention-expiry> element in the PIDF-LO is kept unchanged or, if
   the PIDF-LO is created for the first time, then the value MUST be set
   to the current date.

6.3.  Set Note-Well

   This transformation asks the LS to change or set the value of the
   <note-well> element in the PIDF-LO.  The data type of the <set-note-
   well> element is a string.

   The value provided with the <set-note-well> element contains a
   privacy statement as a human readable text string and an 'xml:lang'



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 12]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   attribute denotes the language of the human readable text.

   If the <set-note-well> element is absent, then the value of the
   <note-well> element in the PIDF-LO is kept unchanged or, if the
   PIDF-LO is created for the first time, then no content is provided
   for the <note-well> element.

6.4.  Keep Ruleset Reference

   This transformation allows to influence whether the <external-
   ruleset> element in the PIDF-LO carries the extended authorization
   rules defined in [RFC4745].  The data type of the <keep-rule-
   reference> element is Boolean.

   If the value of the <keep-rule-reference> element is set to TRUE,
   then the <external-ruleset> element in the PIDF-LO is kept unchanged
   when included.  If the value of the <keep-rule-reference> element is
   set to FALSE, then the <external-ruleset> element in the PIDF-LO MUST
   NOT contain a reference to an external rule set.  The reference to
   the ruleset is removed and no rules are carried as MIME bodies (in
   case of CID URIs).

   If the <keep-rule-reference> element is absent, then the value of the
   <external-ruleset> element in the PIDF-LO is kept unchanged when
   available or, if the PIDF-LO is created for the first time then the
   <external-ruleset> element MUST NOT be included.

6.5.  Provide Location

   The <provide-location> element contains child elements of a specific
   location profile that controls the granularity of returned location
   information.  This form of location granularity reduction is also
   called 'obfuscation' and is defined in [duckham05] as

      "the means of deliberately degrading the quality of information
      about an individual's location in order to protect that
      individual's location privacy."

   Location obscuring presents a number of technical challenges.  The
   algorithms provided in this document are provided as examples only.
   A discussion of the technical constraints on location obscuring is
   included in Section 13.4.

   The functionality of location granularity reduction depends on the
   type of location provided as input.  This document defines two
   profiles for reduction, namely:





Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 13]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   o  If the <provide-location> element has a <provide-civic> child
      element then civic location information is disclosed as described
      in Section 6.5.1, subject to availability.


   o  If the <provide-location> element has a <provide-geo> child
      element then geodetic location information is disclosed as
      described in Section 6.5.2, subject to availability.


   The <provide-location> element MUST contain the 'profile' attribute
   if it contains child elements and the 'profile' attribute MUST match
   with the contained child elements.

   If the <provide-location> element has no child elements then civic,
   as well as, geodetic location information is disclosed without
   reducing its granularity, subject to availability.  In this case the
   profile attribute MUST NOT be included.

6.5.1.  Civic Location Profile

   This profile uses the token 'civic-transformation'.  This profile
   allows civic location transformations to be specified by means of the
   <provide-civic> element that restricts the level of civic location
   information the LS is permitted to disclose.  The symbols of these
   levels are: 'country', 'region', 'city', 'building', 'full'.  Each
   level is given by a set of civic location data items such as
   <country> and <A1>, ..., <POM>, as defined in [RFC5139].  Each level
   includes all elements included by the lower levels.

   The 'country' level includes only the <country> element; the 'region'
   level adds the <A1> element; the 'city' level adds the <A2> and <A3>
   elements; the 'building' level and the 'full' level add further civic
   location data as shown below.

















Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 14]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


                              full
      {<country>, <A1>, <A2>, <A3>, <A4>, <A5>, <A6>, <PRD>, <POD>,
       <STS>, <HNO>, <HNS>, <LMK>, <LOC>, <PC>, <NAM>, <FLR>,
       <BLD>,<UNIT>,<ROOM>,<PLC>, <PCN>, <POBOX>, <ADDCODE>, <SEAT>
       <RD>, <RDSEC>, <RDBR>, <RDSUBBR>, <PRM>, <POM>}
                               |
                               |
                            building
         {<country>, <A1>, <A2>, <A3>, <A4>, <A5>, <A6>, <PRD>
         <POD>, <STS>, <HNO>, <HNS>, <LMK>, <PC>,
         <RD>, <RDSEC>, <RDBR>, <RDSUBBR> <PRM>, <POM>}
                               |
                               |
                             city
                     {<country>, <A1>, <A2>, <A3>}
                               |
                               |
                             region
                        {<country>, <A1>}
                               |
                               |
                            country
                          {<country>}
                               |
                               |
                              none
                              {}

   The default value is "none".

   The schema of the <provide-civic> element is defined in Section 8.

6.5.2.  Geodetic Location Profile

   This profile uses the token 'geodetic-transformation' and refers only
   to the Coordinate Reference System (CRS) WGS 84
   (urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326, 2D).  This profile allows geodetic
   location transformations to be specified by means of the <provide-
   geo> element that may restrict the returned geodetic location
   information based on the value provided in the 'radius' attribute.
   The value of the 'radius' attribute expresses the radius in meters.

   The schema of the <provide-geo> element is defined in Section 8.

   The algorithm proceeds in 6 steps.The first two steps are independent
   of the measured position to be obscured.  Those two steps should be
   run only once or rather seldom (for every region and desired
   uncertainty).  The steps are:



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 15]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   1.  Choose a geodesic projection with Cartesian coordinates and a
       surface you want to cover.  The maximal distortion of the map may
       not be too much (see notes below).

   2.  Given uncertainty "d", choose a grid of so called "landmarks" at
       a distance (maximal) d of each other.

   3.  Given a measured location M=(m,n) in the surface, calculate its 4
       closest landmarks on the grid, with coordinates: SW = (l,b),
       SE=(r,b), NW=(l,t), NE=(r,t).  Thus l<=m<r and b<=n<t.  See notes
       below.

   4.  Let x=(m-l)/(r-l) and y=(n-b)/(t-b)

       x and y are thus the local coordinates of the point M in the
       small grid square that contains it. 0<=x,y<1.

   5.  Let P = 0.2887 (=sqrt(3)/6) and q = 0.7113 (=1-p), determine
       which of the following 8 cases holds:

     C1. x < p and y < p
     C2. p <= x < q and y < x and y < 1-x
     C3. q <= x and y < p

     C4. p <= y < q and x <= y and y < 1-x
     C5. p <= y < q and y < x and 1-x <= y

     C6. x < p and q <= y
     C7. p <= x < q and x <= y and 1-x <= y
     C8. q <= x and q <= y

   6.  Depending on the case, let C (=Center) be

     C1: SW
     C2: SW or SE
     C3: SE

     C4: SW or NW
     C5: SE or NE

     C6: NW
     C7: NW or NE
     C8: NE

   Return the circle with center C and radius d.

   Notes:




Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 16]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   Regarding Step 1:

      The scale of a map is the ratio of a distance on (a straight line)
      on the map to the corresponding air distance on the ground.  For
      maps covering larger areas, a map projection from a sphere (or
      ellipsoid) to the plane will introduce distortion and the scale of
      the map is not constant.  Also, note that the real distance on the
      ground is taken along great circles, which may not correspond to
      straight lines in the map, depending on the projection used.  Let
      us measure the (length) distortion of the map as the quotient
      between the maximal and the minimal scales in the map.  The
      distortion MUST be below 1.5.  (The minimum distortion is 1.0: If
      the region of the map is small, then the scale may be taken as a
      constant over the whole map).

   Regarding Step3:

      SW is mnemonic for south-west, b for bottom, l for left
      (SW=(l,b)), etc, but the directions of the geodesic projection may
      be arbitrary, and thus SW may be not south-west of M but it will
      be left and below M *on the map*.

   This algorithm is applied to the known location every time it
   changes.  Movement between the defined grid areas triggers a change
   in the location that is reported, which could reveal significantly
   more about the location than desired.

























Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 17]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


7.  Examples

   This section provides a few examples for authorization rules using
   the extensions defined in this document.

7.1.  Rule Example with Civic Location Condition

   This example illustrates a single rule that employs the civic
   location condition.  It matches if the current location of the Target
   equal the content of the child elements of the <location> element.
   Requests match only if the Target is at a civic location with country
   set to 'Germany', state (A1) set to 'Bavaria', city (A3) set to
   'Munich', city division (A4) set to 'Perlach', street name (A6) set
   to 'Otto-Hahn-Ring' and house number (HNO) set to '6'.

   No actions and transformation child elements are provided in this
   rule example.  The actions and transformation could include presence
   specific information when the Geolocation Policy framework is applied
   to the Presence Policy framework (see [RFC5025]).


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
     xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy">

     <rule id="AA56i09">
       <conditions>
         <gp:location-condition>
           <gp:location
             profile="civic-condition"
             xml:lang="en"
             label="Siemens Neuperlach site 'Legoland'"
             xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:civicAddr">
             <country>DE</country>
             <A1>Bavaria</A1>
             <A3>Munich</A3>
             <A4>Perlach</A4>
             <A6>Otto-Hahn-Ring</A6>
             <HNO>6</HNO>
           </gp:location>
         </gp:location-condition>
       </conditions>
       <actions/>
       <transformations/>
     </rule>
   </ruleset>





Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 18]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


7.2.  Rule Example with Geodetic Location Condition

   This example illustrates a rule that employs the geodetic location
   condition.  The rule matches if the current location of the Target is
   inside the area specified by the polygon.  The polygon uses the EPSG
   4326 coordinate reference system.  No altitude is included in this
   example.


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
     xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy"
     xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
     xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0">

     <rule id="BB56A19">
       <conditions>
         <gp:location-condition>
           <gp:location
             xml:lang="en"
             label="Sydney Opera House"
             profile="geodetic-condition">
             <gs:Circle srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
               <gml:pos>-33.8570029378 151.2150070761</gml:pos>
               <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">1500
               </gs:radius>
             </gs:Circle>
           </gp:location>
         </gp:location-condition>
       </conditions>
       <transformations/>
     </rule>
   </ruleset>

7.3.  Rule Example with Civic and Geodetic Location Condition

   This example illustrates a rule that employs a mixed civic and
   geodetic location condition.  Depending on the available type of
   location information, namely civic or geodetic location information,
   one of the location elements may match.










Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 19]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
     xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy"
     xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
     xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0">

     <rule id="AA56i09">
       <conditions>
         <gp:location-condition>
           <gp:location profile="civic-condition"
             xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:civicAddr">
             <country>DE</country>
             <A1>Bavaria</A1>
             <A3>Munich</A3>
             <A4>Perlach</A4>
             <A6>Otto-Hahn-Ring</A6>
             <HNO>6</HNO>
           </gp:location>
           <gp:location profile="geodetic-condition">
             <gs:Circle srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
                <gml:pos>-34.410649 150.87651</gml:pos>
                <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">1500
                </gs:radius>
             </gs:Circle>
           </gp:location>
         </gp:location-condition>
       </conditions>
       <actions/>
       <transformations/>
     </rule>
   </ruleset>

7.4.  Rule Example with Location-based Transformations

   This example shows the transformations specified in this document.
   The <provide-civic> element indicates that the available civic
   location information is reduced to building level granularity.  If
   geodetic location information is requested then a granularity
   reduction is provided as well.











Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 20]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
     xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy"
     xmlns:lp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:basic-location-profiles">

     <rule id="AA56i09">
       <conditions/>
       <actions/>
       <transformations>
         <gp:set-retransmission-allowed>false
         </gp:set-retransmission-allowed>
         <gp:set-retention-expiry>86400</gp:set-retention-expiry>
         <gp:set-note-well xml:lang="en">My privacy policy goes in here.
         </gp:set-note-well>
         <gp:keep-rule-reference>false
         </gp:keep-rule-reference>

         <gp:provide-location
           profile="civic-transformation">
           <lp:provide-civic>building</lp:provide-civic>
         </gp:provide-location>

         <gp:provide-location
           profile="geodetic-transformation">
           <lp:provide-geo radius="500"/>
         </gp:provide-location>

       </transformations>
     </rule>
   </ruleset>

   The following rule describes the short-hand notation for making the
   current location of the Target available to Location Recipients
   without granularity reduction.


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
       xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy">

       <rule id="AA56ia9">
           <conditions/>
           <actions/>
           <transformations>
               <gp:provide-location/>
           </transformations>
       </rule>
   </ruleset>



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 21]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


7.5.  Location Obfuscation Example

   Suppose you want a to obscure positions in the continental USA.

   Step 1:

      First you choose a geodesic projection.  If you are measuring
      location as latitude and longitude, a natural choice is to take a
      rectangular projection.  One latitudinal degree corresponds
      approximately to 110.6 kilometers, while a good approximation of a
      longitudinal degree at latitude phi is (pi/180)*M*cos(phi), where
      pi is approximately 3.1415, and M is the Earth's average
      meridional radius, approximately 6,367.5 km.  For instance, one
      longitudinal degree at 30 degrees (say, New Orleans) is 96.39 km,
      while the formula given offers an estimation of 96.24, which is
      good for our purposes.

      We will set up a grid not only for the continental US, but for the
      whole earth between latitudes 25 and 50 degrees, and thus will
      cover also the Mediterranean, South Europe, Japan and the north of
      China.  As will be seen below, the grid distortion (for not too
      large grids in this region) is approx cos(25)/cos(50), which is
      1.4099.

      As origin of our grid, we choose the point at latitude 25 degrees
      and longitude 0 (Greenwich).  The latitude 25 degrees is chosen to
      be just south of Florida and thus south of the continental US.
      (On the south hemisphere the origin should be north of the region
      to be covered; if the region crosses the Equator, the origin
      should be on the Equator.  In his way it is guaranteed that the
      latitudinal degree has largest distance at the latitude of the
      origin).

      At 25 degrees one degree in east-west direction corresponds approx
      to (pi/180)*M*cos(25) = 100.72 km.

      The same procedure, basically, produces grids for

      *  45 degrees south to 45 degrees north Tropics and subtropics

      *  25 to 50 degrees (both north or south) Continental US

      *  35 to 55 degrees (both north or south) South and Central Europe

      *  45 to 60 degrees (both north or south) Central and North Europe

      *  55 to 65 degrees (both north or south) Scandinavia




Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 22]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


      *  60 to 70 degrees (both north or south)

      Since we do not want to often change grid system (this would leak
      more information about obscured locations when they are repeatedly
      visited), the algorithm should prefer to use the grids discussed
      above, with origin at the Greenwich meridian and at latitudes o=0,
      o=25, o=35, o=45, 0=55, and o=60 degrees (north) or at latitudes
      o=-25, o=-35, o=-45, 0=-55, and o=-60 degrees (the minus to
      indicate "south").

      Our choice for the continental USA is o=25.

      For locations close to the poles, a different projection should be
      used (not discussed here).


   Step 2:

      To construct the grid points, we start with our chosen origin and
      place the along the main axes (NS and EW) grid points at a
      distance d of each other.

      We will now construct a grid for a desired uncertainty of d =
      100km.  At our origin, 100 km correspond roughly to d1 = 100/
      100.72 = 0.993 degrees on east-west direction and to d2 = 100/
      110.6 = 0.904 degrees in north-south direction.

      The (i,j)-point in the grid (i and j are integers) has longitude
      d1*i and latitude 25+d2*j, measured in degrees.  More generally,
      if the grid has origin at coordinates (0,o), measured in degrees,
      the (i,j)-point in the grid has coordinates (longitude = d1*i,
      latitude = o+d2*j).  The grid has almost no distorsion at the
      latitude of the origin, but it has as we go further away from it.

      The distance between two points in the grid at 25 degrees latitude
      is indeed approx 100 km, but just above the Canadian border, on
      the 50th degree, it is 0.993*(pi/180)*M*cos(50) = 70.92km.  Thus,
      the grid distortion is 100/70.92 = 1.41, which is acceptable
      (<1.5).  (On north-south direction the grid has roughly no
      distortion, the vertical distance between two neighboring grid
      points is approximately 100 km).


   Step 3:

      Now suppose you measure a position at M, with longitude -105 (the
      minus sign is used to denote 105 degrees *west*; without minus,
      the point is in China, 105 degrees east) and latitude 40 degrees



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 23]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


      (just north of Denver, CO).  The point M is 105 degrees west and
      15 degrees north of our origin (which has longitude 0 and latitude
      25).

      Let "floor" be the function that returns the largest integer
      smaller or equal to a floating point number.  To calculate SW, the
      closest point of the grid on the south-west of M=(m,n), we
      calculate

      i= floor(m/d1) = floor(-105/0.993) = -106

      j= floor(n-o/d2) = floor(15/0.904) = 16

      Those are the indexes of SW on the grid.  The coordinates of SW
      are then: (d1*i, 25+d2*j) = (-105.242, 39.467).

      Thus:

      l=d1*floor(m/d1) = -105.243

      r=l+d1 = -105.243+0.993 = -104.250

      b=o+d2*floor(n-o/d2) = 39.467

      t=b+d2 = 39.467+0.904 = 40.371

      These are the formulas for l,r,b, and t in the general case of
      Cartesian projections based on latitude and longitude.


   Step 4:

      Calculate x and y, the local coordinates of the point M in the
      small grid square that contains it.  This is easy:

      x=(m-l)/(r-l) = [-105 -(-105.243)]/0.993 = 0.245

      y=(n-b)/(t-b) = [40 - 39.467]/0.904 = 0.590


   Step 5:

      First compare x with p (0.2887) and (0.7113). x is smaller than p.
      Therefore, only cases 1,4 or 6 could hold.

      Also compare y with p (0.2887) and (0.7113). y is between them: p
      <= y < q.  Thus, we must be in case 4.  To check, compare y (0.59)
      with x (0.245) and 1-x. y is larger than x and smaller than 1-x.



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 24]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


      We are in case C4 (p <= y < q and x <= y and y < 1-x).


   Step 6:

      Now we choose either SW or NW as the center of the circle.

      The obscured location is the Circle with radius 100 km and center
      in SW (coordinates: -105.243, 39.467), or NW (coordinates:
      -105.243, 40.371).









































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 25]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


8.  XML Schema for Basic Location Profiles

   This section defines the location profiles used as child elements of
   the transformation element.


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <xs:schema
       targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:basic-location-profiles"
       xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
       elementFormDefault="qualified"
       attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

       <!-- profile="civic-transformation" -->

       <xs:element name="provide-civic" default="none">
           <xs:simpleType>
               <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
                   <xs:enumeration value="full"/>
                   <xs:enumeration value="building"/>
                   <xs:enumeration value="city"/>
                   <xs:enumeration value="region"/>
                   <xs:enumeration value="country"/>
                   <xs:enumeration value="none"/>
               </xs:restriction>
           </xs:simpleType>
       </xs:element>

       <!-- profile="geodetic-transformation" -->

       <xs:element name="provide-geo">
           <xs:complexType>
               <xs:attribute name="radius" type="xs:integer"/>
           </xs:complexType>
       </xs:element>

   </xs:schema>














Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 26]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


9.  XML Schema for Geolocation Policy

   This section presents the XML schema that defines the Geolocation
   Policy schema described in this document.  The Geolocation Policy
   schema extends the Common Policy schema (see [RFC4745]).


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <xs:schema
     targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy"
     xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy"
     xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
     elementFormDefault="qualified"
     attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

     <!-- Import Common Policy-->
     <xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"/>

     <!-- This import brings in the XML language attribute xml:lang-->
     <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace"
       schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/2001/xml.xsd"/>

     <!-- Geopriv Conditions -->

     <xs:element name="location-condition"
       type="gp:locationconditionType"/>

     <xs:complexType name="locationconditionType">
       <xs:complexContent>
         <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
           <xs:choice minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
             <xs:element name="location" type="gp:locationType"
               minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
             <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
               minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
           </xs:choice>
         </xs:restriction>
       </xs:complexContent>
     </xs:complexType>

     <xs:complexType name="locationType">
       <xs:complexContent>
         <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
           <xs:choice minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
             <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
               minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
           </xs:choice>
           <xs:attribute name="profile" type="xs:string"/>



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 27]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


           <xs:attribute name="label" type="xs:string"/>
           <xs:attribute ref="xml:lang" />
         </xs:restriction>
       </xs:complexContent>
     </xs:complexType>

     <!-- Geopriv transformations -->
     <xs:element name="set-retransmission-allowed"
       type="xs:boolean" default="false"/>
     <xs:element name="set-retention-expiry"
       type="xs:integer" default="0"/>
     <xs:element name="set-note-well"
       type="gp:notewellType"/>
     <xs:element name="keep-rule-reference"
       type="xs:boolean" default="false"/>

     <xs:element name="provide-location"
       type="gp:providelocationType"/>

     <xs:complexType name="notewellType">
       <xs:simpleContent>
         <xs:extension base="xs:string">
           <xs:attribute ref="xml:lang" />
         </xs:extension>
       </xs:simpleContent>
     </xs:complexType>

     <xs:complexType name="providelocationType">
       <xs:complexContent>
         <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
           <xs:choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
             <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
               minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
           </xs:choice>
           <xs:attribute name="profile" type="xs:string" />
         </xs:restriction>
       </xs:complexContent>
     </xs:complexType>

   </xs:schema>











Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 28]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


10.  XCAP Usage

   The following section defines the details necessary for clients to
   manipulate geolocation privacy documents from a server using XCAP.
   If used as part of a presence system, it uses the same AUID as those
   rules.  See [RFC5025] for a description of the XCAP usage in context
   with presence authorization rules.

10.1.  Application Unique ID

   XCAP requires application usages to define a unique application usage
   ID (AUID) in either the IETF tree or a vendor tree.  This
   specification defines the "geolocation-policy" AUID within the IETF
   tree, via the IANA registration in Section 11.

10.2.  XML Schema

   XCAP requires application usages to define a schema for their
   documents.  The schema for geolocation authorization documents is
   described in Section 9.

10.3.  Default Namespace

   XCAP requires application usages to define the default namespace for
   their documents.  The default namespace is
   urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy.

10.4.  MIME Type

   XCAP requires application usages to defined the MIME type for
   documents they carry.  Geolocation privacy authorization documents
   inherit the MIME type of common policy documents, application/
   auth-policy+xml.

10.5.  Validation Constraints

   This specification does not define additional constraints.

10.6.  Data Semantics

   This document discusses the semantics of a geolocation privacy
   authorization.

10.7.  Naming Conventions

   When a Location Server receives a request to access location
   information of some user foo, it will look for all documents within
   http://[xcaproot]/geolocation-policy/users/foo, and use all documents



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 29]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   found beneath that point to guide authorization policy.

10.8.  Resource Interdependencies

   This application usage does not define additional resource
   interdependencies.

10.9.  Authorization Policies

   This application usage does not modify the default XCAP authorization
   policy, which is that only a user can read, write or modify his/her
   own documents.  A server can allow privileged users to modify
   documents that they do not own, but the establishment and indication
   of such policies is outside the scope of this document.





































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 30]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


11.  IANA Considerations

   There are several IANA considerations associated with this
   specification.

11.1.  Geolocation Policy XML Schema Registration

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geolocation-policy

   Registrant Contact:  IETF Geopriv Working Group, Hannes Tschofenig
      (hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com).

   XML:  The XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 9.  Its
      first line is

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

      and its last line is

   </xs:schema>

11.2.  Geolocation Policy Namespace Registration

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy

   Registrant Contact:  IETF Geopriv Working Group, Hannes Tschofenig
      (hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com).

   XML:






















Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 31]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   BEGIN
   <?xml version="1.0"?>
   <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
     "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
   <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
   <head>
     <meta http-equiv="content-type"
           content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
     <title>Geolocation Policy Namespace</title>
   </head>
   <body>
     <h1>Namespace for Geolocation Authorization Policies</h1>
     <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geolocation-policy</h2>
   <p>See <a href="[URL of published RFC]">RFCXXXX
       [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR:
        Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this
       specification.]</a>.</p>
   </body>
   </html>
   END

11.3.  Geolocation Policy Location Profile Registry

   This document seeks to create a registry of location profile names
   for the Geolocation Policy framework.  Profile names are XML tokens.
   This registry will operate in accordance with RFC 2434 [RFC2434],
   Standards Action.

   This document defines the following profile names:

   geodetic-condition:  Defined in Section 4.1.

   civic-condition:  Defined in Section 4.2.

   geodetic-transformation:  Defined in Section 6.5.2.

   civic-transformation:  Defined in Section 6.5.1.

11.4.  Basic Location Profile XML Schema Registration

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:basic-location-profiles

   Registrant Contact:  IETF Geopriv Working Group, Hannes Tschofenig
      (hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com).







Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 32]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   XML:  The XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 8.  Its
      first line is

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

      and its last line is

   </xs:schema>

11.5.  Basic Location Profile Namespace Registration

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:basic-location-profiles

   Registrant Contact:  IETF Geopriv Working Group, Hannes Tschofenig
      (hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com).

   XML:

   BEGIN
   <?xml version="1.0"?>
   <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
     "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
   <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
   <head>
     <meta http-equiv="content-type"
           content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
     <title>Basic Location Profile Namespace</title>
   </head>
   <body>
     <h1>Namespace for Basic Location Profile</h1>
     <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:basic-location-profiles</h2>
   <p>See <a href="[URL of published RFC]">RFCXXXX
       [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR:
        Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this
       specification.]</a>.</p>
   </body>
   </html>
   END

11.6.  XCAP Application Usage ID

   This section registers an XCAP Application Usage ID (AUID) according
   to the IANA procedures defined in [RFC4825].

   Name of the AUID: geolocation-policy

   Description: Geolocation privacy rules are documents that describe
   the permissions that a Target has granted to Location Recipients that



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 33]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   access information about his/her geographic location.


















































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 34]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


12.  Internationalization Considerations

   The policies described in this document are mostly meant for machine-
   to-machine communications; as such, many of its elements are tokens
   not meant for direct human consumption.  If these tokens are
   presented to the end user, some localization may need to occur.  The
   policies are, however, supposed to be created with the help of humans
   and some of the elements and attributes are subject to
   internationalization considerations.  The content of the <label>
   element is meant to be provided by a human (the Rule Maker) and also
   displayed to a human.  Furthermore, the location condition element
   (using the civic location profile, see Section 4.2) and the <set-
   note-well> element (see Section 6.3) may contain non-US-ASCII
   letters.

   The geolocation polices utilize XML and all XML processors are
   required to understand UTF-8 and UTF-16 encodings, and therefore all
   entities processing these policies MUST understand UTF-8 and UTF-16
   encoded XML.  Additionally, geolocation policy aware entities MUST
   NOT encode XML with encodings other than UTF-8 or UTF-16.































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 35]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


13.  Security Considerations

13.1.  Introduction

   This document aims to allow users to prevent unauthorized access to
   location information and to restrict access to information dependent
   on geolocation (via location based conditions).  This is accomplished
   through the usage of authorization policies.  This work builds on a
   series of other documents: Security requirements are described in
   [RFC3693] and a discussion of generic security threats is available
   with [RFC3694].  Aspects of combining permissions in cases of
   multiple occurrence are treated in [RFC4745]).

   In addition to the authorization policies mechanisms for obfuscating
   location information are described.  A theoretical treatment of
   location obfuscation is provided in [duckham05] and in [ifip07].
   [duckham05] provides the foundation and [ifip07] illustrates three
   different types of location obfuscation by enlarging the radius, by
   shifting the center, and by reducing the radius.  This algorithm for
   geodetic location information obfuscation makes use of these
   techniques.

   The requirements of location information with respect to privacy
   protection vary.  While the two obfuscation algorithm in this
   document provide a basis for protection they have limitations.  There
   are certainly applications that require a different level of
   protection and for this purpose the ability to define and use
   additional algorithms has been envisioned.  New algorithms can be
   specified via the available extension mechanism.

13.2.  Obfuscation

   Whenever location information is returned to a location recipient
   then it contains the location of the Target.  This is also true when
   location is obfuscated, i.e. the location server does not lie about
   the Target's location but instead hides it within a larger location
   shape.  However, even without the Target's movement there is danger
   to reveal information over time.  While the target's location is
   hidden within the privacy region the size of that returned region
   matters as well as the precise location of the Target within that
   region.  Returning location shapes that are randomly computed will
   over time real more and more informationa bout the Target.

   Consider the drawing in Figure 1, which shows three ellipses, a
   dotted area in the middle, and the Target's true location marked as
   'x'.  The ellipses illustrate the location shapes as received by a
   potential location recipient over time for requests of a target's
   location information.  Collecting information about the returned



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 36]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   location information over time allows the location recipient to
   narrow the potential location of the target down to the dotted area
   in the center of the graph.

   For this purpose the algorithm described in Section 6.5.2 uses a grid
   that ensures to report the same location information whenever the
   target remains in the same geographical area.


                   ,-----.
           ,----,-'.      `-.
        ,-'    /    `-.      \
      ,'      / _...._ `.     \
     /       ,-'......`._\     :
    ;       /|...........\:    |
    |      / :.....x......+    ;
    :     |   \...........;|  /
     \    |    \........./ | /
      `.  \     `-.....,' ,''
        '-.\       `-----'|
           ``.-----'    ,'
              `._    _,'
                 `'''

                  Figure 1: Obfuscation: A Static Target

   When the Target is moving then the location transformations reveal
   information when switching from one privacy region to another one.
   For example, when a transformation indicates that civic location is
   provided at a 'building' level of granularity.  Consequently, floor
   levels, room numbers, etc. would be hidden.  However, when the Target
   moves from one building to the next one then the movement would still
   be recognizable as the disclosed location information would be
   reflected by the new civic location information indicating the new
   building.  With additional knowledge about building entrances and
   floor plans it would be possible to learn additional amount of
   information.

   The algorithm presented in Section 6.5.2 has some measures against
   leaking information when moving, switching from one privacy region to
   another one, and also when the user is visiting regularly the same
   location.  The first issue is the following: if you provide a
   different location information (privacy region) only when the
   previous one is not valid anymore, you will be disclosing the moment
   where you are in a certain border (namely: leaving the previous
   privacy region).  The second issue is the following: Suppose a user
   goes home every night.  If the reported obfuscated locations are all
   randomly different, an analysis will probably soon reveal the home



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 37]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   location with high precision.  Of course, the combination of an
   obscured location with public geographic information (highways,
   lakes, mountains, cities, etc) may render a much precise location
   information than desired.  But even without it, just observing
   movements, once or in a regular repetitive way, any obscuring
   algorithm will leak information about velocities or positions.
   Suppose a user wants to disclose location information with a radius
   of r.  The privacy region, a circle with that radius, has an area of
   A = pi * r^2.  An opponent, observing the movements, will deduce that
   the information that the target is, was, or regularly visits, a
   region of size A1, smaller than A. The quotient of the sizes A1/A
   should be, even in the worst case, larger than a fixed known number,
   in order that the user knows what is the maximal information leakage
   he has.  The choices of 6.5.2 are such that this maximum leakage can
   be established: by any statistical procedures, without using
   geographic information (highways, etc. as discussed above), the
   quotient A1/A is larger than 0.13 (= 1/(5*1.5) ).  Thus, for
   instance, when choosing a provided location of size 1000 km^2, he
   will be leaking, in worst case, the location within a region of size
   130 km^2.

13.3.  Usability

   There is the risk that end users are specifying their location-based
   policies in such a way that very small changes in location yields a
   significantly different level of information disclosure.  For
   example, a user might want to set authorization policies differently
   when they are in a specific geographical area (e.g., at home, in the
   office).  Location might be the only factor in the policy that
   triggers a very different action and transformation to be executed.
   The accuracy of location information is not always sufficient to
   unequivocally determine whether a location is within a specific
   boundary [I-D.thomson-geopriv-uncertainty].  In some situations
   uncertainty in location information could produce unexpected results
   for end users.  Providing adequate user feedback about potential
   errors arising from these limitation can help prevent unintentional
   information leakage.

   Users might create policies that are non-sensical.  To avoid such
   cases the software used to create the authorization policies should
   perform consistency checks and when authorization policies are
   uploaded to the policy servers then further checks are performed.
   When XCAP is used to upload authorization policies then built-in
   features of XCAP can be utilized to convey error messages back to the
   user about an error condition.  Section 8.2.5 of [RFC4825] indicates
   that some degree of application specific checking is provided when
   authorization policies are added, modified or deleted.  The XCAP
   protocol may return a 409 response with a response that may contain a



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 38]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   detailed conflict report containing the <constraint-failure> element.
   A human readable description of the problem can be indicated in the
   'phrase' attribute of that element.

13.4.  Location Obscuring Limitations

   Location obscuring attempts to remove information about the location
   of a Target.  The effectiveness of location obscuring is determined
   by how much uncertainty a Location Recipient has about the location
   of the Target.  A location obscuring algorithm is effective if the
   Location Recipient cannot recover a location with better uncertainty
   than the obscuring algorithm was instructed to add.

   Effective location obscuring is difficult.  The amount of information
   that can be recovered by a determined and resourceful Location
   Recipient can be considerably more than is immediately apparent.  A
   concise summary of the challenges is included in [duckham10].

   A Location Recipient in possession of external information about the
   Target or geographical area that is reported can make assumptions or
   guesses aided by that information to recover more accurate location
   information.  This is true even when a single location is reported,
   but it is especially true when multiple locations are reported for
   the same Target over time.

   Furthermore, a Location Recipient that attempts to recover past
   locations for a Target can use later reported locations to further
   refine any recovered location.  A location obscuring algorithm
   typically does not have any information about the future location of
   the Target.

   The degree to which location information can be effectively degraded
   by an obscuring algorithm depends on the information that is used by
   the obscuring algorithm.  If the information available to the
   obscuring algorithm is both more extensive and more effectively
   employed than the information available to the Location Recipient,
   then location obscuring might be effective.

   Obscured locations can still serve a purpose where a Location
   Recipient is willing to respect privacy.  A privacy-respecting
   Location Recipient can choose to interpret the existence of
   uncertainty as a request from a Rule Maker to not recover location.

   Location obscuring is unlikely to be effective against a more
   determined or resourceful adversary.  Withholding location
   information entirely is perhaps the most effective method of ensuring
   that it is not recovered.  However, a caution: omitted data also
   conveys some information.



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 39]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [GML]      OpenGIS, "OpenGIS Geography Markup Language (GML)
              Implementation Specification, Version 3.00, OGC 02 023r4",
               http://www.opengeospatial.org/docs/02-023r4.pdf,
              January 2003.

   [NIMA.TR8350.2-3e]
              OpenGIS, "US National Imagery and Mapping Agency,
              "Department of Defense (DoD) World Geodetic System 1984
              (WGS 84), Third Edition, NIMA TR8350.2",   , January 2000.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", March 1997.

   [RFC4745]  Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
              Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
              Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
              February 2007.

   [RFC5139]  Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, "Revised Civic Location
              Format for Presence Information Data Format Location
              Object (PIDF-LO)", RFC 5139, February 2008.

   [RFC5491]  Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., and H. Tschofenig, "GEOPRIV
              Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO)
              Usage Clarification, Considerations, and Recommendations",
              RFC 5491, March 2009.

14.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.thomson-geopriv-geo-shape]
              Thomson, M., "Geodetic Shapes for the Representation of
              Uncertainty in PIDF-LO",
              draft-thomson-geopriv-geo-shape-03 (work in progress),
              December 2006.

   [I-D.thomson-geopriv-uncertainty]
              Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, "Representation of
              Uncertainty and Confidence in PIDF-LO",
              draft-thomson-geopriv-uncertainty-06 (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [RFC2434]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
              October 1998.



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 40]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   [RFC2778]  Day, M., Rosenberg, J., and H. Sugano, "A Model for
              Presence and Instant Messaging", RFC 2778, February 2000.

   [RFC3693]  Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, J., and
              J. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.

   [RFC3694]  Danley, M., Mulligan, D., Morris, J., and J. Peterson,
              "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol", RFC 3694,
              February 2004.

   [RFC4079]  Peterson, J., "A Presence Architecture for the
              Distribution of GEOPRIV Location Objects", RFC 4079,
              July 2005.

   [RFC4119]  Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
              Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.

   [RFC4825]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
              Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.

   [RFC5025]  Rosenberg, J., "Presence Authorization Rules", RFC 5025,
              December 2007.

   [duckham05]
              Duckham, M. and L. Kulik, "A formal model of obfuscation
              and negotiation for location privacy. In Proc. of the 3rd
              International Conference PERVASIVE 2005,Munich, Germany",
              May 2005.

   [duckham10]
              Duckham, M., "Moving forward: Location privacy and
              location awareness. In Proc. 3rd ACM SIGSPATIAL GIS
              Workshop on  Security and Privacy in GIS and LBS
              (SPRINGL), ACM.", Nov 2010.

   [ifip07]   Ardagna, C., Cremonini, M., Damiani, E., De Capitani di
              Vimercati, S., and S. Samarati, "Location-privacy
              protection through obfuscation-based techniques, in:
              Proceedings of the 21st Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Working
              Conference on Data and Applications Security, Redondo
              Beach, CA, USA", July 2007.










Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 41]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   This document is informed by the discussions within the IETF GEOPRIV
   working group, including discussions at the GEOPRIV interim meeting
   in Washington, D.C., in 2003.

   We particularly want to thank Allison Mankin <mankin@psg.com>,
   Randall Gellens <rg+ietf@qualcomm.com>, Andrew Newton
   <anewton@ecotroph.net>, Ted Hardie <hardie@qualcomm.com>, Jon
   Peterson <jon.peterson@neustar.biz> for their help in improving the
   quality of this document.

   We would like to thank Christian Guenther for his help with an
   earlier version of this document.  Furthermore, we would like to
   thank Johnny Vrancken for his document reviews in September 2006,
   December 2006 and January 2007.  James Winterbottom provided a
   detailed review in November 2006.  Richard Barnes gave a detailed
   review in February 2008.

   This document uses text from [I-D.thomson-geopriv-geo-shape].
   Therefore, we would like to thank Martin Thomson for his work in
   [I-D.thomson-geopriv-geo-shape].  We would also like to thank Martin
   Thomson, Matt Lepinski and Richard Barnes for their comments
   regarding the geodetic location transformation procedure.  Richard
   provided us with a detailed text proposal.

   Robert Sparks, Martin Thomson, and Warren Kumari deserve thanks for
   their input on the location obfuscation discussion.  Robert
   implemented various versions of the algorithm in the graphical
   language "Processing" and thereby helped us tremendously to
   understand problems with the previously illustrated algorithm.

   We would like to thank Dan Romascanu, Yoshiko Chong and Jari
   Urpalainen for their last call comments.

   Finally, we would like to thank the following individuals for their
   feedback as part of the IESG, GenArt, and SecDir review: Jari Arkko,
   Eric Gray, Russ Housley, Carl Reed, Martin Thomson, Lisa Dusseault,
   Chris Newman, Jon Peterson, Sam Hartman, Cullen Jennings, Tim Polk,
   and Brian Rosen.











Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 42]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


Appendix B.  Pseudo-Code

   This section provides an informal description for the algorithm
   described in Section 6.5.2 in form of pseudo-code.


   Constants

     P = sqrt(3)/6  //  approx 0.2887
     q = 1 - p      //  approx 0.7113

   Parameters

     prob:  real  // prob is a parameter in the range
           //  0.5 <= prob <=1
           // recommended is a value for prob between 0.7 and 0.9
           // the default of prob is 0.8

   Inputs

     M = (m,n) : real * real
           // M is a pair of reals: m and n
           // m is the longitude and n the latitude,
           // respectively, of the measured location
           // The values are given as real numbers, in the
           // range: -180 < m <= 180; -90 < n < 90
           // minus values for longitude m correspond to "West"
           // minus values for latitude n correspond to "South"

     radius : integer // the 'radius' or uncertainity,
           // measured in meters

     prev-M = (prev-m1, prev-n1): real * real
           // the *previously* provided location, if available
           // prev-m1 is the longitude and
           // prev-n1 the latitude, respectively

     o : real

     // this is the reference latitude for the geodesic projection
     // The value of 'o' is chosen according to the table below.
     // The area you want to project MUST be included in
     // between a minimal latitude and a maximal latitude
     // given by the two first columns of the table.
     // (Otherwise the transformation is not available).

     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    | min  | max  |                          |       |



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 43]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


     //    | lat  | lat  |        Examples          |  o    |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      | Tropics and subtropics   |       |
     //    | -45  |  45  | Africa                   |  0    |
     //    |      |      | Australia                |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      | Continental US           |       |
     //    |  25  |  50  | Mediterranean            |   25  |
     //    |      |      | most of China            |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    |  35  |  55  | South and Central        |   35  |
     //    |      |      |      Europe              |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    |  45  |  60  | Central and North        |   45  |
     //    |      |      |       Europe             |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    |  55  |  65  | most of Scandinavia      |   55  |
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    |  60  |  70  |                          |   60  |
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      | most of                  |       |
     //    | -50  | -25  |    Chile and Argentina   |  -50  |
     //    |      |      | New Zealand              |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    | -35  | -55  |                          |  -35  |
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    | -45  | -60  |                          |  -45  |
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    | -55  | -65  |                          |  -55  |
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    | -60  | -70  |                          |  -60  |
     //    |      |      |                          |       |
     //    +------+------+--------------------------+-------+

   Outputs



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 44]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


     M1 = (m1,n1) : real * real // longitude and latitude,
           // respectively, of the provided location

   Local Variables

     d, d1, d2, l, r, b, t, x, y: real
     SW, SE, NW, NE: real * real
        // pairs of real numbers, interpreted as coordinates
        // lomgitude and latitude, respectively

     temp : Integer[1..8]

   Function
     choose(Ma, Mb: real * real): real * real;
        // This function chooses either Ma or Mb
        // depending on the parameter 'prob'
        // and on prev-M1, the previous value of M1:
        // If prev-M1 == Ma choose Ma with probability 'prob'
        // If prev-M1 == Mb choose Mb with probability 'prob'
        // Else choose Ma or Mb with probability 1/2
     Begin
     rand:= Random[0,1];
        // a real random number between 0 and 1
     If     prev-M1 == Ma Then
            If rand < prob Then choose := Ma;
                           Else choose := Mb;  EndIf
     Elseif prev-M1 == Mb Then
            If rand < prob Then choose := Mb;
                           Else choose := Ma;  EndIf
     Else
            If rand < 0.5  Then choose := Ma;
                           Else choose := Mb;  EndIf
     End // Function choose

   Main  // main procedure
     Begin
     d := radius/1000;  // uncertainity, measured in km

     d1:= (d * 180) / (pi*M*cos(o));

     d2:= d / 110.6;

     l := d1*floor(m/d1)
           // "floor"  returns the largest integer
           // smaller or equal to a floating point number
     r := l+d1;
     b := o+d2*floor(n-o/d2);
     t := b+d2;



Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 45]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


     x := (m-l)/(r-l);
     y := (n-b)/(t-b);

     SW := (l,b);
     SE := (r,b);
     NW := (l,t);
     NE := (r,t);

     If     x < p and y < p      Then M1 := SW;
     Elseif x < p and q <= y     Then M1 := NW;
     Elseif q <= x and y < p     Then M1 := SE;
     Elseif q <= x and q <= y    Then M1 := NE;
     Elseif p <= x and x < q and y < x  and y < 1-x
            Then M1 := choose(SW,SE);
     Elseif p <= y and y < q and x <= y and y < 1-x
            Then M1 := choose(SW,NW);
     Elseif p <= y and y < q and y < x  and 1-x <= y
            Then M1 := choose(SE,NE);
     Elseif p <= x and x < q and x <= y and 1-x <= y
            Then M1 := choose(NW,NE);
     Endif

     End //  Main




























Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 46]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


Authors' Addresses

   Henning Schulzrinne (editor)
   Columbia University
   Department of Computer Science
   450 Computer Science Building
   New York, NY  10027
   USA

   Phone: +1 212 939 7042
   Email: schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu
   URI:   http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~hgs


   Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Linnoitustie 6
   Espoo  02600
   Finland

   Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at


   Jorge R. Cuellar
   Siemens
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bavaria  81739
   Germany

   Email: Jorge.Cuellar@siemens.com


   James Polk
   Cisco
   2200 East President George Bush Turnpike
   Richardson, Texas  75082
   USA

   Email: jmpolk@cisco.com


   John B. Morris, Jr.


   Email: ietf@jmorris.org




Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 47]

Internet-Draft             Geolocation Policy               October 2011


   Martin Thomson
   Commscope
   Andrew Building (39)
   University of Wollongong Campus, Wollongong, NSW  2522
   AU

   Phone: +61 2 4221 2915
   Email: martin.thomson@commscope.com











































Schulzrinne, et al.      Expires April 16, 2012                [Page 48]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.107, available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/