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Versions: (draft-barnes-geopriv-policy-uri) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 7199

GEOPRIV                                                        R. Barnes
Internet-Draft                                          BBN Technologies
Intended status: Standards Track                              M. Thomson
Expires: March 25, 2013                                        Microsoft
                                                         J. Winterbottom
                                                      Andrew Corporation
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                  Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                      September 21, 2012


        Location Configuration Extensions for Policy Management
                  draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-uri-06.txt

Abstract

   Current location configuration protocols are capable of provisioning
   an Internet host with a location URI that refers to the host's
   location.  These protocols lack a mechanism for the target host to
   inspect or set the privacy rules that are applied to the URIs they
   distribute.  This document extends the current location configuration
   protocols to provide hosts with a reference to the rules that are
   applied to a URI, so that the host can view or set these rules.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Policy URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  Policy URI Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Policy URI Allocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Policy Defaults  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Location Configuration Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  HELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.3.  Client Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.1.  HELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.2.  DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.3.  Basic Access Control Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     6.1.  URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
           urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy . . . . . . . . 13
     6.2.  XML Schema Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.3.  DHCP LuriType Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.1.  Integrity and Confidentiality for Authorization Policy
           Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.2.  Access Control for Authorization Policy  . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.3.  Location URI Allocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.4.  Policy URI Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Appendix A.  Example Policy URI Generation Algorithm . . . . . . . 19
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20









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1.  Introduction

   A critical step in enabling Internet hosts to access location-based
   services is to provision those hosts with information about their own
   location.  This is accomplished via a Location Configuration Protocol
   (LCP) [RFC5687], which allows a location provider (e.g., a local
   access network) to inform a host about its location.

   There are two basic patterns for location configuration, namely
   configuration "by value" and "by reference" [RFC5808].  Configuration
   by value provisions a host directly with its location, by providing
   it location information that is directly usable (e.g., coordinates or
   a civic address).  Configuration by reference provides a host with a
   URI that references the host's location, i.e., one that can be
   dereferenced to obtain the location (by value) of the host.

   In some cases, location by reference offers a few benefits over
   location by value.  From a privacy perspective, the required
   dereference transaction provides a policy enforcement point, so that
   if suitable privacy policies have been provisioned, the opaque
   location URI can be safely conveyed over untrusted media.  (If the
   location URI is not subject to privacy rules, then conveying the
   location URI may pose even greater risk than sending location by
   value [RFC5606]) If the target host is mobile, an application
   provider can use a single reference to obtain the location of the
   host multiple times, saving bandwidth to the host.  For some
   configuration protocols, the location object referenced by a location
   URI provides a much more expressive syntax for location values than
   the configuration protocol itself (e.g., DHCP geodetic location
   [RFC6225] versus GML in a PIDF-LO [RFC4119]).

   From a privacy perspective, however, current LCPs are limited in
   their flexibility, in that they do not provide hosts (the clients in
   an LCP) with a way to inform the Location Server with policy for how
   his location information should be handled.  This document addresses
   this gap by defining a simple mechanism for referring to and
   manipulating policy, and by extending current LCPs to carry policy
   references.  Using the mechanisms defined in this document, an LCP
   server (acting for the Location Server (LS) or Location Information
   Server (LIS)) can inform a host as to which policy document controls
   a given location resource, and the host (in its Rule Maker role) can
   inspect this document and modify it as necessary.

   In the following figure, adapted from RFC 5808, this document extends
   the Location Configuration Protocols (1) and defines a simple
   protocol for policy exchange (4).





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       +---------+---------+   Location    +-----------+
       |         |         |  Dereference  | Location  |
       |      LIS/LS       +---------------+ Recipient |
       |         |         |   Protocol    |           |
       +----+----+----+----+      (3)      +-----+-----+
            |         |                          |
            |         |                          |
      Policy|         |Location                  |Location
    Exchange|         |Configuration             |Conveyance
         (4)|         |Protocol                  |Protocol
            |         |(1)                       |(2)
            |         |                          |
     +------+----+----+----+                     |
     |  Rule     | Target/ |                     |
     |  Maker    | Host    +---------------------+
     |           |         |
     +-----------+---------+


   The remainder of this document is structured as follows: After
   introducing a few relevant terms, we define policy URIs as a channel
   for referencing, inspecting, and updating policy documents.  We then
   define extensions to the HELD protocol and the DHCP option for
   location by reference to allow these protocols to carry policy URIs.
   Examples are given that demonstrate how policy URIs are carried in
   these protocols and how they can be used by clients.


2.  Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


3.  Policy URIs

   A policy URI is an HTTP [RFC2616] or HTTPS [RFC2818]URI that
   identifies a policy resource that contains the authorization policy
   for a linked location resource.  Access to the location resource is
   governed by the contents of the authorization policy.

   A policy URI identifies an HTTP resource that a Rule Maker can use to
   inspect and install policy documents that tell a Location Server how
   it should protect the associated location resource.  A policy URI
   always identifies a resource that can be represented as a common-
   policy document [RFC4745] (possibly including some extensions; e.g.,
   for geolocation policy [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]).



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   Note:  RFC 3693 [RFC3693] identified the Rule Holder role as the one
      that stores policy information.  In this document, the Location
      Server is also a Rule Holder.

3.1.  Policy URI Usage

   A Location Server that is the authority for policy URIs MUST support
   GET, PUT, and DELETE requests to these URIs, in order to allow
   clients to inspect, replace, and delete policy documents.  Clients
   support the three request methods as they desire to perform these
   operations.

   Knowledge of the policy URI can be considered adequate evidence of
   authorization; a policy URI functions as a shared secret between the
   client and the server (see Section 7).  A Location Server SHOULD
   allow all requests, but it MAY deny certain requests based on local
   policy.  For instance, a Location Server might allow clients to
   inspect policy (GET), but not to update it (PUT).  Or a Location
   Server might require clients to authenticate using HTTP or TLS client
   authentication.  Clients implementing this specification SHOULD
   support HTTP client authentication [RFC2617] and MAY support TLS
   client certificates.

   A GET request to a policy URI is a request for the referenced policy
   information.  If the request is authorized, then the Location Server
   sends an HTTP 200 response containing the complete policy identified
   by the URI.

   A PUT request to a policy URI is a request to replace the current
   policy.  The entity-body of a PUT request includes a complete policy
   document.  When a Location Server receives a PUT request, it MUST
   validate the policy document included in the body of the request.  If
   the request is valid and authorized, then the Location Server MUST
   replace the current policy with the policy provided in the request.

   A DELETE request to a policy URI is a request to delete the
   referenced policy document.  If the request is authorized, then the
   Location Server MUST delete the policy referenced by the URI and
   disallow access to the location URIs it governs until a new policy
   document has been put in place via a PUT request.

   A policy URI is only valid while the corresponding location URI set
   is valid.  A location server MUST NOT respond to any requests to a
   policy URIs once the corresponding location URI set has expired.
   This expiry time is specified by the 'expires' attribute in the HELD
   locationResponse or the 'Valid-For' LuriType in DHCP.





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      A location URI can thus become invalid in three ways: By the
      expiration of a validity interval in policy, by the removal of a
      policy document with a DELETE request, or by the expiry of the
      LCP-specified validity interval.  The former two are temporary,
      since the policy URI can be used to update the policy.  The latter
      one is permanent, since the expiry causes the policy URI to be
      invalidated as well.

   The Location Server MUST support policy documents in the common-
   policy format [RFC4745], as identified by the MIME media type of
   "application/auth-policy+xml".  The common-policy format MUST be
   provided as the default format in response to GET requests that do
   not include specific "Accept" headers, but content negotiation MAY be
   used to allow for other formats.

   This usage of HTTP is generally compatible with the use of XCAP
   [RFC4825] or WebDAV [RFC4918] to manage policy documents, but this
   document does not define or require the use of these protocols.

3.2.  Policy URI Allocation

   A Location Server creates a policy URI for a specific location
   resource at the time that the location resource is created; that is,
   a policy URI is created at the same time as the location URI that it
   controls.  The URI of the policy resource MUST be different from the
   location URI.

   A policy URI is provided in response to location configuration
   requests.  A policy URI MUST NOT be provided to an entity that is not
   authorized to view or set policy.  This document does not describe
   how policy might be provided to entities other than for location
   configuration, for example, in responses to dereferencing requests
   [I-D.ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol] or requests from third parties
   [RFC6155].

   Each location URI has either one policy URI or no policy URI.  The
   initial policy that is referenced by a policy URI MUST be identical
   to the policy that would be applied in the absence of a policy URI.
   A client that does not support policy URIs can continue to use the
   location URI as they would have if no policy URI were provided.

      For DHCP and HELD, the client assumes that the default policy
      grants any requester access to location information, as long as
      the request possesses the location URI.  To ensure that the
      authorization policy is less permissive, a client updates the
      policy prior to distributing the location URI.

   A Location Server chooses whether or not to provide a policy URI



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   based on local policy.  A HELD-specific extension also allows a
   requester to specifically ask for a policy URI.

   A policy URI is effectively a shared secret between Location Server
   and its clients.  Knowledge of a policy URI is all that is required
   to perform any operations allowed on the policy.  Thus, a policy URI
   should be constructed so that it is hard to predict and
   confidentiality-protected when transmitted (see Section 7).  To avoid
   re-using these shared secrets, the Location Server MUST generate a
   new policy URI whenever it generates a new location URI set.

3.3.  Policy Defaults

   Client implementors should keep in mind that setting no policy (never
   performing an HTTP request to a policy URI) is very different from
   setting an empty policy (performing a PUT with the empty policy).  By
   "the empty policy", we mean a policy containing no rules, which would
   be represented by the following policy document:

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy">
   </ruleset>

                        Figure 1: The empty policy

   If no policy is set, then the client tacitly accepts whatever policy
   the server applies to location URIs, including a policy that provides
   location to anyone that makes a dereference request.  If the empty
   policy is set, then the opposite is true; the client directs the
   server to never provide access to location.  (Since there are no
   rules to allow access, and the policy language is default-deny.)

   Implementors should thus consider carefully how to handle the case
   where the user provides no privacy policy input.  On the one hand, an
   implementation might treat this case as if the user had no privacy
   preferences, and thus set no policy.  On the other hand, another
   implementation might decide that if a user provides no positive
   authorization, then the empty policy should be installed.

   The same reasoning could also be applied to servers, with the caveat
   that servers do not know whether a given HELD client supports the use
   of policy URIs.  A client that does not understand policy URIs will
   not be able to set its own policy, and so the server must choose a
   default that is open enough that clients will find it useful.  On the
   other hand, once a client indicates that it understands policy URIs
   (e.g., by sending an HTTP request to a policy URI), the server may
   change its default policy to something more restrictive -- even the
   empty, default-deny policy -- since the client can specify something



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   more permissive if desired.


4.  Location Configuration Extensions

   Location configuration protocols can provision hosts with location
   URIs that refer to the host's location.  If the target host is to
   control policy on these URIs, it needs a way to access the policy
   that the Location Server uses to guide how it serves location URIs.
   This section defines extensions to LCPs to carry policy URIs that the
   target can use to control access to location resources.

4.1.  HELD

   The HELD protocol [RFC5985] defines a "locationUriSet" element, which
   contain a set of one or more location URIs that reference the same
   resource and share a common access control policy.  The schema in
   Figure 2 defines two extension elements for HELD: an empty
   "requestPolicyUri" element that is added to a location request to
   indicate that a Device desires that a policy URI be allocated; and a
   "policyUri" element that is included in the location response.

 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <xs:schema
      targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy"
      xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
      xmlns:hp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy"
      elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

   <xs:element name="requestPolicyUri">
     <xs:complexType name="empty"/>
   </xs:element>

   <xs:element name="policyUri" type="xs:anyURI"/>

 </xs:schema>

             Figure 2: XML Schema for the policy URI extension

   The URI carried in a "policyUri" element refers to the common access
   control policy for location URIs in the location response.  The URI
   MUST be a policy URI as described in Section 3.  A policy URI MUST
   use the "http:" or "https:" scheme, and the Location Server MUST
   support the specified operations on the URI.

   A HELD request MAY contain an explicit request for a policy URI.  The
   presence of the "requestPolicyUri" element in a location request
   indicates that a policy URI is desired.



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4.2.  DHCP

   The DHCP location by reference option
   [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option] provides location URIs in
   sub-options called LuriElements.  This document defines a new
   LuriElement type for policy URIs.

   LuriType=TBD   Policy-URI - This is a policy URI that refers to the
              access control policy for the location URIs.

   [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace TBD above with the assigned
   LuriType value and remove this note]

   A Policy-URI LuriElement uses a UTF-8 character encoding.

   A Policy-URI LuriElement identifies the policy resource for all
   location URIs included in the location URI option.  The URI MUST be a
   policy URI as described in Section 3: It MUST use either the "http:"
   or "https:" scheme, and the Location Server MUST support the
   specified operations on the URI.

4.3.  Client Processing

   It is possible that this document will be updated to allow the use of
   policy URIs that use protocols other than the HTTP-based protocol
   described above.  To ensure that they fail safely when presented with
   such a URI, clients implementing this specification MUST verify that
   a policy URI received from either HELD or DHCP uses either the
   "http:" or "https:" scheme.  If the URI does not match those schemes,
   then the client MUST discard the URI and behave as if no policy URI
   was provided.


5.  Examples

   In this section, we provide some brief illustrations of how policy
   URIs are delivered to target hosts and used by those hosts to manage
   policy.

5.1.  HELD

   A HELD request that explicitly requests the creation of a policy URI
   has the following form:

   <locationRequest xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held">
     <locationType exact="true">locationURI</locationType>
     <requestPolicyUri
       xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy"/>



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   </locationRequest>

   A HELD response providing a single "locationUriSet", containing two
   URIs under a common policy, would have the following form:

   <locationResponse xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held">
     <locationUriSet expires="2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z">
       <locationURI>
         https://ls.example.com:9768/357yc6s64ceyoiuy5ax3o
       </locationURI>
       <locationURI>
         sip:9769+357yc6s64ceyoiuy5ax3o@ls.example.com:
       </locationURI>
     </locationUriSet>
     <policyUri xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy">
       https://ls.example.com:9768/policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b
     </policyUri>
   </locationResponse>

5.2.  DHCP

   A DHCP option providing one of the location URIs and the
   corresponding policy URI from the previous example would have the
   following form:

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |          option-code          |              110              |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |   1   |   0   |       1       |      49       |     'h'       |
      +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
      |      't'      |      't'      |      'p'      |     's'       |
      +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
      |      ':'      |      '/'      |      '/'      |     'l'       |
      +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
      |      's'      |      '.'      |              ...              |
      +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
      |      TBD      |      56       |      'h'            't'       |
      +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
      |      't'      |      'p'      |      's'      |     ':'       |
      +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
      |      '/'      |      '/'      |              ...              |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace TBD above with the assigned
   LuriType value and remove this note]




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5.3.  Basic Access Control Policy

   Consider a client that gets the policy URI
   <https://ls.example.com:9768/policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b>, as in the
   above LCP example.  The first thing this allows the client to do is
   inspect the default policy that the LS has assigned to this URI:

   GET /policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b HTTP/1.1
   Host: ls.example.com:9768


   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-type: application/auth-policy+xml
   Content-length: 388

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
            xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy">
     <rule id="AA56ia9">
       <conditions>
         <validity>
           <until>2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z</until>
         </validity>
       </conditions>
       <actions/>
       <transformations>
         <gp:provide-location/>
         <gp:set-retransmission-allowed>
           false
         </gp:set-retransmission-allowed>
         <gp:set-retention-expiry>0</gp:set-retention-expiry>
       </transformations>
     </rule>
   </ruleset>

   This policy allows any requester to obtain location information, as
   long as they know the location URI.  If the user disagrees with this
   policy, and prefers for example, to only provide location to one
   friend, at a city level of granularity, then the client can install
   this policy on the Location Server:











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   PUT /policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b HTTP/1.1
   Host: ls.example.com:9768
   Content-type: application/auth-policy+xml
   Content-length: 462

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy">
     <rule id="f3g44r1">
       <conditions>
         <identity>
           <one id="sip:friend@example.com"/>
         </identity>
         <validity>
           <until>2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z</until>
         </validity>
       </conditions>
       <actions/>
       <transformations>
         <gp:provide-location
             profile="civic-transformation">
           <lp:provide-civic>city</lp:provide-civic>
         </gp:provide-location>
       </transformations>
     </rule>
   </ruleset>


   HTTP/1.1 200 OK


   Finally, after using the URI for a period, the user wishes to
   permanently invalidate the URI.

   DELETE /policy/357lp6f64prlbvhl5nk3b HTTP/1.1
   Host: ls.example.com:9768


   HTTP/1.1 200 OK



6.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires several IANA registrations, detailed below.







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6.1.  URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
      urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy

   This section registers a new XML namespace,
   "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy", per the guidelines in
   [RFC3688].

      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy

      Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group,
      (geopriv@ietf.org), Richard Barnes (rbarnes@bbn.com).

      XML:

         BEGIN
           <?xml version="1.0"?>
           <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
             "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
           <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
             <head>
               <title>HELD Policy URI Extension</title>
             </head>
             <body>
               <h1>Namespace for HELD Policy URI Extension</h1>
               <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy</h2>
       [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace XXXX
       with the RFC number for this specification.]
               <p>See RFCXXXX</p>
             </body>
           </html>
         END

6.2.  XML Schema Registration

   This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in
   [RFC3688].

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geopriv:held:policy

   Registrant Contact:  IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org),
      Richard Barnes (rbarnes@bbn.com)

   Schema:  The XML for this schema can be found in Section Section 4.1.








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6.3.  DHCP LuriType Registration

   IANA is requested to add a value to the LuriTypes registry, as
   follows:

     +------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+
     |  LuriType  |   Name                                 | Reference |
     +------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+
     |    TBD*    |   Policy-URI                           | RFC XXXX**|
     +------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+

      * TBD is to be replaced with the assigned value
     ** RFC XXXX is to be replaced with this document's RFC number.


7.  Security Considerations

   There are two main classes of risks associated with access control
   policy management: The risk of unauthorized grants or denial of
   access to the protected resource via manipulation of the policy
   management process, and the risk of disclosure of policy information
   itself.

   Protecting the policy management process from manipulation entails
   two primary requirements: First, the policy URI has to be faithfully
   and confidentially transmitted to the client, and second, the policy
   document has to be faithfully and confidentially transmitted to the
   Location Server.  The mechanism also needs to ensure that only
   authorized entities are able to acquire or alter policy.

7.1.  Integrity and Confidentiality for Authorization Policy Data

   Each LCP ensures integrity and confidentiality through different
   means (see [RFC5985] and [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option]).
   These measures ensure that a policy URI is conveyed to the client
   without modification or interception.

   In general, the requirements for transport-layer security on policy
   transactions are the same as for the dereference transactions they
   set policy for [I-D.ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol].  To protect the
   integrity and confidentiality of policy data during management, the
   Location Server SHOULD provide policy URIs with the "https:" scheme
   and require the use of HTTP over TLS [RFC2818].  The cipher suites
   required by TLS [RFC5246] provide both integrity protection and
   confidentiality.  If other means of protection are available, an
   "http:" URI MAY be used, but location servers SHOULD reject PUT and
   DELETE requests for policy URIs that use the "http:" URI scheme.




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7.2.  Access Control for Authorization Policy

   Access control for the policy resource is based on knowledge of its
   URI.  The URI of a policy resource operates under the same
   constraints as a possession model location URI [RFC5808] and is
   subject to the same constraints:

   o  Knowledge of a policy URI MUST be restricted to authorized Rule
      Makers.  Confidentiality and integrity protections SHOULD be used
      when policy URIs are conveyed in a location configuration
      protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or
      delete the policy resource.  Note that in some protocols (such as
      DHCP), these protections may arise from limiting the use of the
      protocol to the local network, thus relying on lower-layer
      security mechanisms.  When neither application-layer or network-
      layer security is provided, location servers MUST reject requests
      using the PUT and DELETE methods.

   o  The Location Server MUST ensure that it is not practical for an
      attacker to guess a policy URI value, even if the attacker has
      requested many policy URIs from the Location Server over time.
      The policy URI MUST NOT be derived solely from information that
      might be public, including the Target identity or any location
      URI.  The addition of 128 bits or more of random entropy is
      RECOMMENDED to make it infeasible for a third party to guess a
      policy URI.

   o  Servers SHOULD apply rate limits in order to make brute-force
      guessing infeasible.  If a server allocates location URIs that
      include N bits of entropy with a lifetime of T seconds, then the
      server should limit clients to (2^(N/2))/T queries per second.
      (The lifetime T of a location URI set is specified by the
      "expires" attribute in HELD or the "Valid-For" LuriType in DHCP.)

   One possible algorithm for generating appropriately unpredictable
   policy URIs for a location URI set is described in Appendix A.

   The goal of the above recommendation on rate limiting is to bound the
   probability that an attacker can guess a policy URI during its
   lifetime.  If an attacker is limited to (2^(N/2))/T queries per
   second, then he will be able to make at most 2^(N/2) guesses over the
   lifetime of the URI.  Assuming these guesses are distinct, the
   probability of the attacker guessing any given URI is
   (2^(N/2))/(2^N), so the probability of compromise over the T-second
   lifetime of the URI is at most 2^(-N/2).  (Of course, if the attacker
   guesses the URI after the policy URI has expired, then there is no
   risk.)  With N=128, the probability of compromise is 5.4e-20 under
   this rate-limiting scheme.  Operators should choose values for N so



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   that the corresponding risk of compromise presents an acceptable
   level of risk.

   If M distinct URIs are issued within the same namespace, then the
   probability of any of the M URIs being compromised is M*2^(N/2).  The
   example algorithm for generating policy URIs (see Appendix A) places
   them in independent namespaces (i.e., below the corresponding
   location URIs), so this compounding does not occur.

   Note that the chosen entropy level will also affect how quickly
   legitimate clients can query a given URI, especially for very long-
   lived URIs.  If the default lifetime T is greater than 2^(N/2), then
   clients will have to wait multiple seconds between queries.
   Operators should choose entropy and lifetime values that result in
   acceptable high maximum query rates and acceptably low probability of
   compromise.  For example, with 32 bits of entropy (much less than
   recommended above), the one-query-per-second policy URI lifetime is
   around 18 hours.

7.3.  Location URI Allocation

   A policy URI enables the authorization by access control lists model
   [RFC5808] for associated location URIs.  Under this model, it might
   be possible to more widely distribute a location URI, relying on the
   authorization policy to constrain access to location information.

   To allow for wider distribution, authorization by access control
   lists places additional constraints on the construction of location
   URIs.

   If multiple Targets share a location URI, an unauthorized location
   recipient that acquires location URIs for the Targets can determine
   that the Targets are at the same location by comparing location URIs.
   With shared policy URIs, Targets are able to see and modify
   authorization policy for other Targets.

   To allow for the creation of Target-specific authorization policies
   that are adequately privacy-protected, each location URI and policy
   URI that is issued to a different Target MUST be different from other
   location URIs and policy URIs.  That is, two clients MUST NOT receive
   the same location URI or the same policy URI.

   In some deployments, it is not always apparent to a LCP server that
   two clients are different.  In particular, where a middlebox
   [RFC3234] exists two or more clients might appear as a single client.
   An example of a deployment scenario of this nature is described in
   [RFC5687].  An LCP server MUST create a different location URI and
   policy URI for every request, unless the requests can be reliably



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   identified as being from the same client.

7.4.  Policy URI Handling

   Although servers may choose to implement access controls on policy
   URIs, by default, any holder of a policy URI is authorized to access
   and modify the referenced policy document, and thus, to control
   access to the associated location resources.  Because policy URIs
   function as shared secrets, clients SHOULD protect them as they would
   passwords.  For example, policy URIs SHOULD NOT be transmitted to
   other hosts or stored in plaintext.

   It should be noted that one of the benefits of the policy URI
   construct is that in most cases, there is not a policy URI to leave
   the client device to which it is provided.  Without policy URIs,
   location URIs are subject to the "authorization by possession model",
   and location URIs must be conveyed to another entity in order to be
   useful.  With policy URIs, location URIs can have more nuanced access
   controls, and the shared secret used to authenticate the client
   (i.e., the policy URI) can simply be stored on the client and used to
   set the access control policy on the location URI.  So while policy
   URIs do use a default model of authorization by possession, they
   reduce the overall risk to location privacy posed by leakage of
   shared secret URIs.


8.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Mary Barnes and Alissa Cooper for providing critical
   commentary and input on the ideas described in this document, and to
   Ted Hardie and Adam Roach for helping clarify the relationships
   between policy URIs, policy documents, and location resources.
   Thanks to Stephen Farrell for a helpful discussion on security and
   privacy challenges.


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option]
              Polk, J., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) IPv4
              and IPv6 Option for a Location Uniform Resource Identifier
              (URI)", draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option-15 (work
              in progress), May 2012.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.



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   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              January 2004.

   [RFC4745]  Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
              Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
              Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
              February 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5985]  Barnes, M., "HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)",
              RFC 5985, September 2010.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol]
              Winterbottom, J., Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and M.
              Thomson, "A Location Dereferencing Protocol Using HELD",
              draft-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol-07 (work in progress),
              July 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]
              Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Cuellar, J., Polk, J.,
              Morris, J., and M. Thomson, "Geolocation Policy: A
              Document Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences for
              Location Information", draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-27 (work
              in progress), August 2012.

   [RFC3234]  Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and
              Issues", RFC 3234, February 2002.

   [RFC3693]  Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, J., and
              J. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.

   [RFC4119]  Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
              Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.



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   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC4825]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
              Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.

   [RFC4918]  Dusseault, L., "HTTP Extensions for Web Distributed
              Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV)", RFC 4918, June 2007.

   [RFC5606]  Peterson, J., Hardie, T., and J. Morris, "Implications of
              'retransmission-allowed' for SIP Location Conveyance",
              RFC 5606, August 2009.

   [RFC5687]  Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7
              Location Configuration Protocol: Problem Statement and
              Requirements", RFC 5687, March 2010.

   [RFC5808]  Marshall, R., "Requirements for a Location-by-Reference
              Mechanism", RFC 5808, May 2010.

   [RFC6155]  Winterbottom, J., Thomson, M., Tschofenig, H., and R.
              Barnes, "Use of Device Identity in HTTP-Enabled Location
              Delivery (HELD)", RFC 6155, March 2011.

   [RFC6225]  Polk, J., Linsner, M., Thomson, M., and B. Aboba, "Dynamic
              Host Configuration Protocol Options for Coordinate-Based
              Location Configuration Information", RFC 6225, July 2011.


Appendix A.  Example Policy URI Generation Algorithm

   One possible algorithm for generating appropriately unpredictable
   policy URIs for a location URI set is as follows:

   1.  Choose parameters:

       *  A cryptographic hash function H, e.g., SHA256

       *  A number N of bits of entropy to add, such that N is no more
          than the length of the output of the hash function

   2.  On allocation of a location URI, generate a policy URI in the
       following way:

       1.  Generate a random value NONCE at least N/8 bytes long

       2.  Compute hash = H( Location-URI-Set || NONCE ) using some
           cryptographic hash function H and some serialization of the



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           location URI set (e.g., the XML from a HELD response)

       3.  Form the policy URI by appending the base64url-encoded form
           of the hash [RFC4648] to one of the location URIs, e.g., as a
           query parameter: "http://example.com/loc/
           foo?policy=j3WTGUb3smxcZA6eKIqmqdV3ALE"


Authors' Addresses

   Richard Barnes
   BBN Technologies
   9861 Broken Land Parkway
   Columbia, MD  21046
   US

   Phone: +1 410 290 6169
   Email: rbarnes@bbn.com


   Martin Thomson
   Microsoft
   3210 Porter Drive
   Palo Alto, CA  94304
   US

   Phone: +1 650-353-1925
   Email: martin.thomson@outlook.com


   James Winterbottom
   Andrew Corporation
   Andrew Building (39)
   Wollongong University Campus
   Northfields Avenue
   Wollongong, NSW  2522
   AU

   Phone: +61 242 212938
   Email: james.winterbottom@andrew.com











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   Hannes Tschofenig
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Linnoitustie 6
   Espoo  02600
   Finland

   Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at










































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