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Versions: (draft-marques-idr-flow-spec) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 5575

IDR Working Group                                             P. Marques
Internet-Draft                                                  N. Sheth
Intended status: Standards Track                               R. Raszuk
Expires: October 23, 2009                                      B. Greene
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                                J. Mauch
                                                               NTT/Verio
                                                            D. McPherson
                                                          Arbor Networks
                                                          April 21, 2009


               Dissemination of flow specification rules
                      draft-ietf-idr-flow-spec-08

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.



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Abstract

   This document defines a new BGP NLRI encoding format that can be used
   to distribute traffic flow specifications.  This allows the routing
   system to propagate information regarding more-specific components of
   the traffic aggregate defined by an IP destination prefix.

   Additionally it defines two applications of that encoding format.
   One that can be used to automate inter-domain coordination of traffic
   filtering, such as what is required in order to mitigate
   (distributed) denial of service attacks.  And a second application to
   traffic filtering in the context of a BGP/MPLS VPN service.

   The information is carried via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP),
   thereby reusing protocol algorithms, operational experience and
   administrative processes such as inter-provider peering agreements.



































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Table of Contents

   1.  Definitions of Terms Used in this Memo . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Flow specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Dissemination of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Traffic filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.1.  Order of traffic filtering rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Validation procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Traffic Filtering Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  Traffic filtering in RFC2547bis networks . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   9.  Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   10. Security considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   11. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   12. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   13. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22


































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1.  Definitions of Terms Used in this Memo

   NLRI - Network Layer Reachability Information

   RIB - Routing Information Base

   Loc-RIB - Local RIB

   AS - Autonomous System Number

   VRF - Virtual Routing and Forwarding instance

   PE - Provider Edge router


2.  Introduction

   Modern IP routers contain both the capability to forward traffic
   according to aggregate IP prefixes as well as to classify, shape,
   rate limit, filter or redirect packets based on administratively
   defined policies.

   While forwarding information is, typically, dynamically signaled
   across the network via routing protocols, there is no agreed upon
   mechanism to dynamically signal flow information across autonomous-
   systems.

   For several applications, it may be necessary to exchange control
   information pertaining to aggregated traffic flow definitions which
   cannot be expressed using destination address prefixes only.

   An aggregated traffic flow is considered to be an n-tuple consisting
   of several matching criteria such as source and destination address
   prefixes, IP protocol and transport protocol port numbers.

   The intention of this document is to define a general procedure to
   encode such flow specification rules as a BGP [RFC4271] NLRI which
   can be reused for several different control applications.
   Additionally, we define the required mechanisms to utilize this
   definition to the problem of immediate concern to the authors: intra
   and inter provider distribution of traffic filtering rules to filter
   (Distributed) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.

   By expanding routing information with flow specifications, the
   routing system can take advantage of the ACL/firewall capabilities in
   the router's forwarding path.  Flow specifications can be seen as
   more specific routing entries to an unicast prefix and are expected
   to depend upon the existing unicast data information.



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   A flow specification received from a external autonomous-system will
   need to be validated against unicast routing before being accepted.
   If the aggregate traffic flow defined by the unicast destination
   prefix is forwarded to a given BGP peer, then the local system can
   safely install more specific flow rules which may result in different
   forwarding behavior, as requested by this system.

   The key technology components required to address the class of
   problems targeted by this document are:

   1.  Efficient point to multi-point distribution of control plane
       information.

   2.  Inter-domain capabilities and routing policy support.

   3.  Tight integration with unicast routing, for verification
       purposes.

   Items 1 and 2 have already been addressed using BGP for other types
   of control plane information.  Close integration with BGP also makes
   it feasible to specific a mechanism to automatically verify flow
   information against unicast routing.  These factors are behind the
   choice of BGP as the carrier of flow specification information.

   As with previous extensions to the BGP protocol, this specification
   makes it possible to add additional information to Internet routers.
   These are limited in terms of the maximum number of data elements
   they can hold as well as the number of events they are able to
   process in a given unit of time.  The authors believe that, as with
   previous extensions, service providers will be careful to keep
   information levels bellow the maximum capacity of their devices.

   It is also expected that in many initial deployments flow
   specification information will replace existing host length route
   advertisements rather than add additional information.

   Experience with previous BGP extensions has also shown that the
   maximum capacity of BGP speakers has been gradually increased
   according to expected loads.  Taking into account Internet unicast
   routing as well as additional applications as they gain popularity.

   From an operational perspective, the utilization of BGP as the
   carrier for this information, allows a network service provider to
   reuse both internal route distribution infrastructure (e.g.: route
   reflector or confederation design) and existing external
   relationships (e.g.: inter-domain BGP sessions to a customer
   network).




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   While it is certainly possible to address this problem using other
   mechanisms, the authors believe that this solution offers the
   substantial advantage of being an incremental addition to already
   deployed mechanisms.

   In current deployments, the information distributed by the flow-spec
   extension is originated both manually as well as automatically.  The
   latter by systems which are able to detect malicious flows.  When
   automated systems are used care should be taken to ensure their
   correctness as well as to limit the advertisement rate of flow
   routes.

   This specification defines required protocol extensions to address
   most common applications of IPv4 unicast and VPNv4 unicast filtering.
   The same mechanism can be reused and new match criteria added to
   address similar filtering needs for other BGP address families (for
   example IPv6 unicast).  Authors believe that those would be best to
   be addressed in a separate document.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


3.  Flow specifications

   A flow specification is an n-tuple consisting of several matching
   criteria that can be applied to IP traffic.  A given IP packet is
   said to match the defined flow if it matches all the specified
   criteria.

   A given flow may be associated with a set of attributes, depending on
   the particular application, such attributes may or may not include
   reachability information (i.e.  NEXT_HOP).  Well-known or AS-specific
   community attributes can be used to encode a set of predetermined
   actions.

   A particular application is identified by a specific (AFI, SAFI) pair
   [RFC4760] and corresponds to a distinct set of RIBs.  Those RIBs
   should be treated independently from each other in order to assure
   non-interference between distinct applications.

   BGP itself treats the NLRI as an opaque key to an entry in its
   databases.  Entries that are placed in the Loc-RIB are then
   associated with a given set of semantics which is application
   dependent.  This is consistent with existing BGP applications.  For
   instance IP unicast routing (AFI=1, SAFI=1) and IP multicast reverse-
   path information (AFI=1, SAFI=2) are handled by BGP without any



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   particular semantics being associated with them until installed in
   the Loc-RIB.

   Standard BGP policy mechanisms, such as UPDATE filtering by NLRI
   prefix and community matching, SHOULD apply to the newly defined
   NLRI-type.  Network operators can also control propagation of such
   routing updates by enabling or disabling the exchange of a particular
   (AFI, SAFI) pair on a given BGP peering session.


4.  Dissemination of Information

   We define a "Flow Specification" NLRI type that may include several
   components such as destination prefix, source prefix, protocol,
   ports, etc.  This NLRI is treated as an opaque bit string prefix by
   BGP.  Each bit string identifies a key to a database entry which a
   set of attributes can be associated with.

   This NLRI information is encoded using MP_REACH_NLRI and
   MP_UNREACH_NLRI attributes as defined in RFC4760 [RFC4760].  Whenever
   the corresponding application does not require Next Hop information,
   this shall be encoded as a 0 octet length Next Hop in the
   MP_REACH_NLRI attribute and ignored on receipt.

   The NLRI field of the MP_REACH_NLRI and MP_UNREACH_NLRI is encoded as
   a 1 or 2 octet NLRI length field followed by a variable length NLRI
   value.  The NLRI length is expressed in octets.

   +------------------------------+
   |    length (0xnn or 0xfn nn)  |
   +------------------------------+
   |    NLRI value  (variable)    |
   +------------------------------+

                              flow-spec NLRI

   If the NLRI length value is smaller than 240 (0xf0 hex), the length
   field can be encoded as a single octet.  Otherwise, it is encoded as
   a extended length 2 octet value in which the most significant nibble
   of the first byte is all ones.

   The Flow Specification NLRI-type consists of several optional
   subcomponents.  A specific packet is considered to match the flow
   specification when it matches the intersection (AND) of all the
   components present in the specification.

   The following component types are defined:




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      Type 1 - Destination Prefix

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), prefix length (1 octet), prefix>

         Defines the destination prefix to match.  Prefixes are encoded
         as in BGP UPDATE messages, a length in bits is followed by
         enough octets to contain the prefix information.

      Type 2 - Source Prefix

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), prefix-length (1 octet), prefix>

         Defines the source prefix to match.

      Type 3 - IP Protocol

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Contains a set of {operator, value} pairs that are used to
         match IP protocol value byte in IP packets.

         The operator byte is encoded as:


                       0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
                     | e | a |  len  | 0 |lt |gt |eq |
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

                               Numeric operator

      *  End of List bit.  Set in the last {op, value} pair in the list.

      *  AND bit.  If unset the previous term is logically ORed with the
         current one.  If set the operation is a logical AND.  It should
         be unset in the first operator byte of a sequence.  The AND
         operator has higher priority than OR for the purposes of
         evaluating logical expressions.

      *  The length of value field for this operand is given as (1 <<
         len).

      *  Lt - less than comparison between data and value.

      *  gt - greater than comparison between data and value.

      *  eq - equality between data and value.




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      *  The bits lt, gt, and eq can be combined to produce "less or
         equal", "greater or equal" and inequality values.

      Type 4 - Port

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Defines a list of {operation, value} pairs that matches source
         OR destination TCP/UDP ports.  This list is encoded using the
         numeric operand format defined above.  Values are encoded as 1
         or 2 byte quantities.

         Port, source port and destination port components evaluate to
         FALSE if the IP protocol field of the packet has a value other
         than TCP or UDP, if the packet is fragmented and this is not
         the first fragment or if the system in unable to locate the
         transport header.  Different implementations may or may not be
         able to decode the transport header in the presence of IP
         options or ESP NULL [RFC4303] encryption.

      Type 5 - Destination port

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Defines a list of {operation, value} pairs used to match the
         destination port of a TCP or UDP packet.  Values are encoded as
         1 or 2 byte quantities.

      Type 6 - Source port

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Defines a list of {operation, value} pairs used to match the
         source port of a TCP or UDP packet.  Values are encoded as 1 or
         2 byte quantities.

      Type 7 - ICMP type

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Defines a list of {operation, value} pairs used to match the
         type field of an icmp packet.  Values are encoded using a
         single byte.

         The ICMP type and code specifiers evaluate to FALSE whenever
         the protocol value is not ICMP





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      Type 8 - ICMP code

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Defines a list of {operation, value} pairs used to match the
         code field of an icmp packet.  Values are encoded using a
         single byte.

      Type 9 - TCP flags

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, bitmask]+>

         Bitmask values can be encoded as a one or two byte bitmask.
         When a single byte is specified it matches byte 13 of the TCP
         header [RFC0793] which contains (bits 8 though 15 of the 4th
         32bit word).  When a 2 byte encoding is used it matches bytes
         12 and 13 of the TCP header with the data offset field having a
         "don't care" value.

         As with port specifiers, this component evaluates to FALSE for
         packets that are not TCP packets.

         This type uses the bitmask operand format, which differs from
         the numeric operator format in the lower nibble.


                       0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
                     | e | a |  len  | 0 | 0 |not| m |
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

      *  Most significant nibble: (End of List bit, AND bit and Length
         field), as defined for in the numeric operator format.

      *  NOT bit.  If set, logical negation of operation.

      *  Match bit.  If set this is a bitwise match operation defined as
         "(data & value) == value"; if unset (data & value) evaluates to
         true if any of the bits in the value mask are set in the data.

      Type 10 - Packet length

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Match on the total IP packet length (excluding L2 but including
         IP header).  Values are encoded using as 1 or 2 byte
         quantities.




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      Type 11 - DSCP

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

         Defines a list of {operation, value} pairs used to match the
         6-bit DSCP field [RFC2474].  Values are encoded using a single
         byte, where the two most significant bits are zero and the six
         least significant bits contain the DSCP value.

      Type 12 - Fragment

         Encoding: <type (1 octet), [op, bitmask]+>

         Uses bitmask operand format defined above.

                       0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
                     |   Reserved    |LF |FF |IsF|DF |
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

         Bitmask values:

         +  Bit 7 - Dont fragment

         +  Bit 6 - Is a fragment

         +  Bit 5 - First fragment

         +  Bit 4 - Last fragment

   Flow specification components must follow strict type ordering.  A
   given component type may or may not be present in the specification,
   but if present it MUST precede any component of higher numeric type
   value.

   If a given component type within a prefix in unknown, the prefix in
   question cannot be used for traffic filtering purposes by the
   receiver.  Since a Flow Specification has the semantics of a logical
   AND of all components, if a component is FALSE by definition it
   cannot be applied.  However for the purposes of BGP route propagation
   this prefix should still be transmitted since BGP route distribution
   is independent on NLRI semantics.

   The <type, value> encoding is chosen in order to account for future
   extensibility.






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   An example of a Flow Specification encoding for: "all packets to
   10.0.1/24 and TCP port 25".

   +------------------+----------+----------+
   | destination      | proto    | port     |
   +------------------+----------+----------+
   | 0x01 18 0a 00 01 | 03 81 06 | 04 81 19 |
   +------------------+----------+----------+

   Decode for protocol:

   +-------+----------+------------------------------+
   | Value |          |                              |
   +-------+----------+------------------------------+
   |  0x03 | type     |                              |
   |  0x81 | operator | end-of-list, value size=1, = |
   |  0x06 | value    |                              |
   +-------+----------+------------------------------+

   An example of a Flow Specification encoding for: "all packets to
   10.0.1/24 from 192/8 and port {range [137, 139] or 8080}".

   +------------------+----------+-------------------------+
   | destination      | source   | port                    |
   +------------------+----------+-------------------------+
   | 0x01 18 0a 01 01 | 02 08 c0 | 04 03 89 45 8b 91 1f 90 |
   +------------------+----------+-------------------------+

   Decode for port:

   +--------+----------+------------------------------+
   |  Value |          |                              |
   +--------+----------+------------------------------+
   |   0x04 | type     |                              |
   |   0x03 | operator | size=1, >=                   |
   |   0x89 | value    | 137                          |
   |   0x45 | operator | &, value size=1, <=          |
   |   0x8b | value    | 139                          |
   |   0x91 | operator | end-of-list, value-size=2, = |
   | 0x1f90 | value    | 8080                         |
   +--------+----------+------------------------------+

   This constitutes a NLRI with an NLRI length of 16 octets.

   Implementations wishing to exchange flow specification rules MUST use
   BGP's Capability Advertisement facility to exchange the Multiprotocol
   Extension Capability Code (Code 1) as defined in RFC4760 [RFC4760].
   The (AFI, SAFI) pair carried in the Multiprotocol Extension



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   capability MUST be the same as the one used to identify a particular
   application that uses this NLRI-type.


5.  Traffic filtering

   Traffic filtering policies have been traditionally considered to be
   relatively static.

   The popularity of traffic-based denial of service (DoS) attacks,
   which often requires the network operator to be able to use traffic
   filters for detection and mitigation, brings with it requirements
   that are not fully satisfied by existing tools.

   Increasingly, DoS mitigation, requires coordination among several
   Service Providers, in order to be able to identify traffic source(s)
   and because the volumes of traffic may be such that they will
   otherwise significantly affect the performance of the network.

   Several techniques are currently used to control traffic filtering of
   DoS attacks.  Among those, one of the most common is to inject
   unicast route advertisements corresponding to a destination prefix
   being attacked.  One variant of this technique marks such route
   advertisements with a community that gets translated into a discard
   next-hop by the receiving router.  Other variants, attract traffic to
   a particular node that serves as a deterministic drop point.

   Using unicast routing advertisements to distribute traffic filtering
   information has the advantage of using the existing infrastructure
   and inter-as communication channels.  This can allow, for instance, a
   service provider to accept filtering requests from customers for
   address space they own.

   There are several drawbacks, however.  An issue that is immediately
   apparent is the granularity of filtering control: only destination
   prefixes may be specified.  Another area of concern is the fact that
   filtering information is intermingled with routing information.

   The mechanism defined in this document is designed to address these
   limitations.  We use the flow specification NLRI defined above to
   convey information about traffic filtering rules for traffic that
   should be discarded.

   This mechanism is designed to, primarily, allow an upstream
   autonomous system to perform inbound filtering, in their ingress
   routers of traffic that a given downstream AS wishes to drop.

   In order to achieve that goal, we define an application specific NLRI



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   identifier (AFI=1, SAFI=133) along with specific semantic rules.

   BGP routing updates containing this identifier use the flow
   specification NLRI encoding to convey particular aggregated flows
   that require special treatment.

   Flow routing information received via this (afi, safi) pair is
   subject to the validation procedure detailed below.

5.1.  Order of traffic filtering rules

   With traffic filtering rules, more than one rule may match a
   particular traffic flow.  Thus it is necessary to define the order at
   which rules get matched and applied to a particular traffic flow.
   This ordering function must be such that it must not depend on the
   arrival order of the flow specifications rules and must be constant
   in the network.

   The relative order of two flow specification rules is determined by
   comparing their respective components.  The algorithm starts by
   comparing the left-most components of the rules.  If the types
   differ, the rule with lowest numeric type value has higher precedence
   (and thus will match before) the rule that doesn't contain that
   component type.  If the component types are the same, then a type
   specific comparison is performed.

   For IP prefix values (IP destination and source prefix) precedence is
   given to lowest IP value of the common prefix length; if the common
   prefix is equal then the most specific prefix has precedence.

   For all other component types, unless otherwise specified, the
   comparison is performed by comparing the component data as a binary
   string using the the memcmp() function as defined by the ISO C
   standard.  For strings of different lengths, the common prefix is
   compared.  If equal the longest string is considered to have higher
   precedence than the shorter one.















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   Pseudocode:

   flow_rule_cmp (a, b)
   {
       comp1 = next_component(a);
       comp2 = next_component(b);
       while (comp1 || comp2) {
           // component_type returns infinity on end-of-list
           if (component_type(comp1) < compnent_type(comp2)) {
               return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE;
           }
           if (component_type(comp1) > component_type(comp2)) {
               return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE;
           }

           if (component_type(comp1) == IP_DESTINATION || IP_SOURCE) {
               common = MIN(prefix_length(comp1), prefix_length(comp2));
               cmp = prefix_compare(comp1, comp2, common);
               // not equal, lowest value has precedence
               // equal, longest match has precedence
           } else {
               common = MIN(component_length(comp1), component_length(comp2));
               cmp = memcmp(data(comp1), data(comp2), common);
               // not equal, lowest value has precedence
               // equal, longest string has precedence
           }
       }

       return EQUAL;
   }


6.  Validation procedure

   Flow specifications received from a BGP peer and which are accepted
   in the respective Adj-RIB-In are used as input to the route selection
   process.  Although the forwarding attributes of two routes for the
   same Flow Specification prefix may be the same, BGP is still required
   to perform its path selection algorithm in order to select the
   correct set of attributes to advertise.

   The first step of the BGP Route Selection procedure (section 9.1.2 of
   [RFC4271]) is to exclude from the selection procedure routes that are
   considered non-feasible.  In the context of IP routing information
   this step is used to validate that the NEXT_HOP attribute of a given
   route is resolvable.

   The concept can be extended, in the case of Flow Specification NLRI,



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   to allow other validation procedures.

   A flow specification NLRI must be validated such that it is
   considered feasible if and only if:

   a) The originator of the flow specification matches the originator of
      the best-match unicast route for the destination prefix embedded
      in the flow specification.

   b) There are no more-specific unicast routes, when compared with the
      flow destination prefix, that have been received from a different
      neighboring AS than the best-match unicast route, which has been
      determined in step a).

   By originator of a BGP route, we mean either the BGP originator path
   attribute, as used by route reflection, or the transport address of
   the BGP peer, if this path attribute is not present.

   The underlying concept is that the neighboring AS that advertises the
   best unicast route for a destination is allowed to advertise flow-
   spec information that conveys a more or equally specific destination
   prefix.  Thus, as long as there are no more-specific unicast routes,
   received from a different neighbor AS, which would be affected by
   that filtering rule.

   The neighboring AS is the immediate destination of the traffic
   described by the Flow Specification.  If it requests these flows to
   be dropped that request can be honored without concern that it
   represents a denial of service in itself.  Supposedly, the traffic is
   being dropped by the downstream autonomous-system and there is no
   added value in carrying the traffic to it.

   BGP implementations MUST also enforce that the AS_PATH attribute of a
   route received via eBGP contains the neighboring AS in the left-most
   position of the AS_PATH attribute.  While this rule is optional in
   the BGP specification, it becomes necessary to enforce it for
   security reasons.


7.  Traffic Filtering Actions

   This specification defines a minimum set of filtering actions that it
   standardizes as BGP extended community values [RFC4360].  This is not
   meant to be an inclusive list of all the possible actions but only a
   subset that can be interpreted consistently across the network.

   Implementations should provide mechanisms that map an arbitrary BGP
   community value (normal or extended) to filtering actions that



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   require different mappings in different systems in the network.  For
   instance, providing packets with a worse than best-effort per-hop
   behavior is a functionality that is likely to be implemented
   differently in different systems and for which no standard behavior
   is currently known.  Rather than attempting to define it here, this
   can be accomplished by mapping a user defined community value to
   platform / network specific behavior via user configuration.

   The default action for a traffic filtering flow specification is to
   accept IP traffic that matches that particular rule.

      The following extended community values can be used to specify
                            particular actions.

        +--------+--------------------+--------------------------+
        | type   | extended community | encoding                 |
        +--------+--------------------+--------------------------+
        | 0x8006 | traffic-rate       | 2-byte as#, 4-byte float |
        | 0x8007 | traffic-action     | bitmask                  |
        | 0x8008 | redirect           | 6-byte Route Target      |
        | 0x8009 | traffic-marking    | DSCP value               |
        +--------+--------------------+--------------------------+

   Traffic-rate  The traffic-rate extended community is a non-transitive
      extended community across the Autonomous system boundary and uses
      following extended community encoding:

         The first two octets carry the 2 octet id which can be assigned
         from a 2 byte AS number.  When 4 byte AS number is locally
         present 2 least significant bytes of such AS number can be
         used.  This value is purely informational and should not be
         interpreted by the implementation.

         The remaining 4 octets carry the rate information in IEEE
         floating point [IEEE.754.1985] format , units being bytes per
         second.  A traffic-rate of 0 should result on all traffic for
         the particular flow to be discarded.

   Traffic-action  The traffic-action extended community consists of 6
      bytes of which only the 2 least significant bits of the 6th byte
      (from left to right) are currently defined.

                       0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
                     |        reserved       | S | T |
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+





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      *  Terminal action (bit 7).  When this bit is set the traffic
         filtering engine will apply any subsequent filtering rules (as
         defined by the ordering procedure).  If not set the evaluation
         of the traffic filter stops when this rule is applied.

      *  Sample (bit 6).  Enables traffic sampling and logging for this
         flow specification.

   Redirect  The redirect extended community allows the traffic to be
      redirected to a VRF routing instance that list the specified
      route-target in its import policy.  If several local instances
      match this criteria, the choice between them is a local matter
      (for example, the instance with the lowest Route Distinguisher
      value can be elected).  This extended community uses the same
      encoding as the Route Target extended community [RFC4360]

   Traffic Marking  The traffic marking extended community instructs a
      system to modify the DSCP bits of a transiting IP packet to the
      corresponding value.  This extended community is encoded as a
      sequence of 5 zero bytes followed by the DSCP value encoded in the
      6 least significant bits of 6th byte.


8.  Traffic filtering in RFC2547bis networks

   Provider-based layer 3 VPN networks, such as the ones using an BGP/
   MPLS IP VPN [RFC4364] control plane, have different traffic filtering
   requirements than internet service providers.

   In these environments, the VPN customer network often has traffic
   filtering capabilities towards their external network connections
   (e.g. firewall facing public network connection).  Less common is the
   presence of traffic filtering capabilities between different VPN
   attachment sites.  In an any-to-any connectivity model, which is the
   default, this means that site to site traffic is unfiltered.

   In circumstances where a security threat does get propagated inside
   the VPN customer network, there may not be readily available
   mechanisms to provide mitigation via traffic filter.

   This document proposes an additional BGP NLRI type (afi=1, safi=134)
   value, which can be used to propagate traffic filtering information
   in a BGP/MPLS VPN environment.

   The NLRI format for this address family consists of a fixed length
   Route Distinguisher field (8 bytes) followed by a flow specification,
   following the encoding defined in this document.  The NLRI length
   field shall include both the 8 bytes of the Route Distinguisher as



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   well as the subsequent flow specification.

   Propagation of this NLRI is controlled by matching Route Target
   extended communities associated with the BGP path advertisement with
   the VRF import policy, using the same mechanism as described in "BGP/
   MPLS IP VPNs" [RFC4364] .

   Flow specification rules received via this NLRI apply only to traffic
   that belongs to the VRF(s) in which it is imported.  By default,
   traffic received from a remote PE is switched via an mpls forwarding
   decision and is not subject to filtering.

   Contrary to the behavior specified for the non-VPN NLRI, flow rules
   are accepted by default, when received from remote PE routers.


9.  Monitoring

   Traffic filtering applications require monitoring and traffic
   statistics facilities.  While this is an implementation specific
   choice, implementations SHOULD provide:

   o  A mechanism to log the packet header of filtered traffic,

   o  A mechanism to count the number of matches for a given Flow
      Specification rule.


10.  Security considerations

   Inter-provider routing is based on a web of trust.  Neighboring
   autonomous-systems are trusted to advertise valid reachability
   information.  If this trust model is violated, a neighboring
   autonomous system may cause a denial of service attack by advertising
   reachability information for a given prefix for which it does not
   provide service.

   As long as traffic filtering rules are restricted to match the
   corresponding unicast routing paths for the relevant prefixes, the
   security characteristics of this proposal are equivalent to the
   existing security properties of BGP unicast routing.

   Where it not the case, this would open the door to further denial of
   service attacks.

   Enabling firewall like capabilities in routers without centralized
   management could make certain failures harder to diagnose.  For
   example, it is possible to allow TCP packets to pass between a pair



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   of addresses but not ICMP packets.  It is also possible to permit
   packets smaller than 900 or greater than 1000 bytes to pass between a
   pair of addresses, but not packets whose length is in the range 900-
   1000.  Such behavior may be confusing and these capabilities should
   be used with care whether manually configured or coordinated through
   the protocol extensions described in this document.


11.  IANA Considerations

   A flow specification consists of a sequence of flow components, which
   are identified by a an 8-bit component type.  Types must be assigned
   and interpreted uniquely.  The current specification defines types 1
   though 12, with the value 0 being reserved.

   For the purpose of this work IANA has allocated values for two SAFIs:
   SAFI 133 for IPv4 and SAFI 134 for VPNv4 dissemination of flow
   specification rules.

   The following traffic filtering flow specification rules are to be
   allocated by IANA from BGP Extended Communities Type - Experimental
   Use registry.  Authors recommend the following type values:

      0x8006 - Flow spec traffic-rate

      0x8007 - Flow spec traffic-action

      0x8008 - Flow spec redirect

      0x8009 - Flow spec traffic-remarking

   Authors would like to ask IANA to create and maintain a new registry
   entitled: "Flow Spec Component Type".  Authors recommend to allocate
   the following component types:

      Type 1 - Destination Prefix

      Type 2 - Source Prefix

      Type 3 - IP Protocol

      Type 4 - Port

      Type 5 - Destination port

      Type 6 - Source port





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      Type 7 - ICMP type

      Type 8 - ICMP code

      Type 9 - TCP flags

      Type 10 - Packet length

      Type 11 - DSCP

      Type 12 - Fragment

   In order to manage the limited number space and accommodate several
   usages the following policies defined by RFC 5226 [RFC5226] are used:

   +--------------+-------------------------------+
   | Range        | Policy                        |
   +--------------+-------------------------------+
   | 0            | Invalid value                 |
   | [1 .. 12]    | Defined by this specification |
   | [13 .. 127]  | Specification Required        |
   | [128 .. 255] | Private Use                   |
   +--------------+-------------------------------+

   The specification of a particular "flow component type" must clearly
   identify what is the criteria used to match packets forwarded by the
   router.  This criteria should be meaningful across router hops and
   not depend on values that change hop-by-hop such as ttl or layer-2
   encapsulation.

   The "Traffic-action" extended community defined in this document has
   6 unused bits which can be used to convey additional meaning.
   Authors would like to ask IANA to create and maintain a new registry
   entitled: "Traffic Action Fields".  These values should be assigned
   via IETF Review rules only.  Authors recommend to allocate the
   following traffic action fields:

      0 Terminal Action

      1 Sample

      2-47 Unassigned


12.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Yakov Rekhter, Dennis Ferguson, Chris
   Morrow, Charlie Kaufman and David Smith for their comments.



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   Chaitanya Kodeboyina helped design the flow validation procedure.

   Steven Lin and Jim Washburn ironed out all the details necessary to
   produce a working implementation.


13.  Normative References

   [IEEE.754.1985]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
              "Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic",
              IEEE Standard 754, August 1985.

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
              RFC 793, September 1981.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2474]  Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
              "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
              Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
              December 1998.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
              Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, February 2006.

   [RFC4364]  Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
              Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, February 2006.

   [RFC4760]  Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
              "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760,
              January 2007.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.








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Authors' Addresses

   Pedro Marques
   Juniper Networks
   1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   US

   Email: roque@juniper.net


   Nischal Sheth
   Juniper Networks
   1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   US

   Email: nsheth@juniper.net


   Robert Raszuk
   Juniper Networks
   1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   US

   Email: raszuk@juniper.net


   Barry Greene
   Juniper Networks
   1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   US

   Email: bgreene@juniper.net


   Jared Mauch
   NTT/Verio
   8285 Reese Lane
   Ann Arbor, MI  48103-9753
   US

   Email: jared@puck.nether.net






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   Danny McPherson
   Arbor Networks

   Email: danny@arbor.net















































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