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Versions: (draft-boucadair-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 6967

INTAREA WG                                                  M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft                                            France Telecom
Intended status: Informational                                  J. Touch
Expires: October 26, 2013                                        USC/ISI
                                                                P. Levis
                                                          France Telecom
                                                                R. Penno
                                                                   Cisco
                                                          April 24, 2013


Analysis of Solution Candidates to Reveal a Host Identifier (HOST_ID) in
                       Shared Address Deployments
               draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-10

Abstract

   This document is a collection of solutions to reveal a host
   identifier (denoted as HOST_ID) when a Carrier Grade NAT (CGN) or
   application proxies are involved in the path.  This host identifier
   could be used by a remote server to sort out the packets by sending
   host.  The host identifier must be unique to each host under the same
   shared IP address.

   This document analyzes a set of solution candidates to reveal a host
   identifier; no recommendation is sketched in the document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 26, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.



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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  On HOST_ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  HOST_ID and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Detailed Solutions Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Use the Identification Field of IPv4 Header (IP-ID) . . .   7
       4.1.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Define an IP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.2.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.2.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Define a TCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.3.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.3.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Inject Application Protocol Message Headers . . . . . . .  10
       4.4.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.4.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.5.  PROXY Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.5.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.5.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.6.  Assign Port Sets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.6.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.6.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.7.  Host Identity Protocol (HIP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.7.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.7.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.8.  Use of a Notification Channel (e.g., ICMP)  . . . . . . .  14
       4.8.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.8.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.9.  Use Out-of-Band Mechanisms (e.g., IDENT)  . . . . . . . .  15
       4.9.1.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.9.2.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Solutions Analysis: Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19



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     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22

1.  Introduction

   As reported in [RFC6269], several issues are encountered when an IP
   address is shared among several subscribers.  These issues are
   encountered in various deployment contexts: e.g., Carrier Grade NAT
   (CGN), application proxies, or A+P [RFC6346].  Examples of such
   issues are: implicit identification (Section 13.2 of [RFC6269]), spam
   (Section 13.3 of [RFC6269]), blacklisting a mis-behaving host
   (Section 13.1 of [RFC6269]) or redirect users with infected machines
   to a dedicated portal (Section 5.1 of [RFC6269]).

   In particular, some servers use the source IPv4 address as an
   identifier to treat some incoming connections differently.  Due to
   the deployment of CGNs (e.g., NAT44 [RFC3022], NAT64 [RFC6146]), that
   address will be shared.  In particular, when a server receives
   packets from the same source address, because this address is shared,
   the server does not know which host is the sending host [RFC6269].
   The sole use of the IPv4 address is not sufficient to uniquely
   distinguish a host.  As a mitigation, it is tempting to investigate
   means which would help in disclosing information to be used by the
   remote server as a means to uniquely disambiguate packets of hosts
   using the same IPv4 address.

   The risk of not mitigating these issues include: OPEX (Operational
   Expenditure) increase for IP connectivity service providers (costs
   induced by calls to a hotline), revenue loss for content providers
   (loss of users audience) and customers' dissatisfaction (low quality
   of experience, service segregation, etc.).

   The purpose of this document is to analyze a set of alternative
   channels to convey a host identifier and to assess to what extent
   they solve the problem described in Section 2.  The evaluation is
   intended to be comprehensive regardless of the maturity or validity
   of any currently known or proposed solution.  Below are listed the
   alternatives analyzed in the document:

   o  Use the Identification field of IP header (denoted as IP-ID,
      Section 4.1).
   o  Define a new IP option (Section 4.2).
   o  Define a new TCP Option (Section 4.3).
   o  Inject application headers (Section 4.4).
   o  Enable Proxy Protocol (Section 4.5).
   o  Assign port sets (Section 4.6).
   o  Activate HIP (Host Identity Protocol, Section 4.7).



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   o  Use a notification channel (Section 4.8).
   o  Use an out-of-band mechanism (Section 4.9).

   A synthesis is provided in Section 5 while the detailed analysis is
   elaborated in Section 4.

   Section 3 discusses privacy issues common to all candidate solutions.
   It is out of scope of this document to elaborate on privacy issues
   specific to each solution.

   This document does not include any recommendation because the working
   group felt it is too premature to include one.

2.  On HOST_ID

   Policies relying on source IP address which are enforced by some
   servers will be applied to all hosts sharing the same IP address.
   For example, blacklisting the IP address of a spammer host will
   result in all other hosts sharing that address having their access to
   the requested service restricted.  [RFC6269] describes the issues in
   detail.  Therefore, due to address sharing, servers need extra
   information beyond the source IP address to differentiate the sending
   host.  We call this information the HOST_ID.

   HOST_ID identifies a host under a shared IP address.  Privacy-related
   considerations are discussed in Section 3.

   Within this document, a host can be any computer located behind a
   Home Gateway or directly connected to an address-sharing function
   located in the network provider's domain (typically this would be the
   Home Gateway itself).

   Because HOST_ID is used by a remote server to sort out the packets by
   sending host, HOST_ID must be unique to each host under the same
   shared IP address, where possible.  In the case where only the Home
   Gateway is revealed to the operator side of the translation function,
   HOST_ID need only be unique to the Home Gateway.  HOST_ID does not
   need to be globally unique.  Of course, the combination of the
   (public) IP source address and the identifier (i.e., HOST_ID) ends up
   being unique.

   If the HOST_ID is conveyed at the IP level, all packets will have to
   bear the identifier.  If it is conveyed at a higher connection-
   oriented level, the identifier is only needed once in the session
   establishment phase (for instance TCP three-way-handshake), then, all
   packets received in this session will be attributed to the HOST_ID
   designated during the session opening.




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   Within this document, we assume the operator-side address-sharing
   function injects the HOST_ID.  Another deployment option to avoid
   potential performance degradation is to let the host or Home Gateway
   inject its HOST_ID but the address-sharing function will check its
   content (just like an IP anti-spoofing function).  For some
   proposals, the HOST_ID is retrieved using an out-of-band mechanism or
   signaled in a dedicated notification channel.

   For A+P [RFC6346] and its variants, port set announcements may be
   needed as discussed in Section 4.6.

   Security considerations are common to all analyzed solutions (see
   Section 7).  Privacy-related aspects are discussed in Section 3.

   HOST_ID can be ambiguous for hosts with multiple interfaces, or
   multiple addresses assigned to a single interface.  HOST_IDs that are
   the same may be used by to imply or infer the same end system, but
   HOST_IDs that are different should not be used to imply or infer
   whether the end systems are the same or different.

3.  HOST_ID and Privacy

   IP address sharing is motivated by a number of different factors.
   For years, many network operators have conserved the use of public
   IPv4 addresses by making use of Customer Premises Equipment (CPE)
   that assigns a single public IPv4 address to all hosts within the
   customer's local area network and uses NAT [RFC3022] to translate
   between locally unique private IPv4 addresses and the CPE's public
   address.  With the exhaustion of IPv4 address space, address sharing
   between customers on a much larger scale is likely to become much
   more prevalent.  While many individual users are unaware of and
   uninvolved in decisions about whether their unique IPv4 addresses get
   revealed when they send data via IP, some users realize privacy
   benefits associated with IP address sharing, and some may even take
   steps to ensure that NAT functionality sits between them and the
   public Internet.  IP address sharing makes the actions of all users
   behind the NAT function unattributable to any single host, creating
   room for abuse but also providing some identity protection for non-
   abusive users who wish to transmit data with reduced risk of being
   uniquely identified.

   The proposals considered in this document add a measure of
   identifiability back to hosts that share a public IP address.  The
   extent of that identifiability depends on what information is
   included in the HOST_ID.

   The volatility of the HOST_ID information is similar to that of the
   internal IP address: a distinct HOST_ID may be used by the address-



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   sharing function when the host reboots or gets a new internal IP
   address.  As with persistent IP addresses, persistent HOST_IDs
   facilitate user tracking over time.

   As a general matter, the HOST_ID proposals do not seek to make hosts
   any more identifiable than they would be if they were using a public,
   non-shared IP address.  However, depending on the solution proposal,
   the addition of HOST_ID information may allow a device to be
   fingerprinted more easily than it otherwise would be.  To prevent
   this, the following design considerations are to be taken into
   account:

   o  It is recommended that HOST_IDs be limited to providing local
      uniqueness rather than global uniqueness.

   o  Address-sharing function should not use permanent HOST_ID values.

   Should multiple solutions be combined (e.g., TCP Option and Forwarded
   header) that include different pieces of information in the HOST_ID,
   fingerprinting may become even easier.  To prevent this, an address-
   sharing function, able to inject HOST_IDs in several layers, should
   reveal the same subsets of information at each layer.  For example,
   if one references the lower 16 bits of an IPv4 address, the other
   should reference these 16 bits too.

   A HOST_ID can be spoofed as this is also the case for spoofing an IP
   address.  Furthermore, users of network-based anonymity services
   (like Tor) may be capable of stripping HOST_ID information before it
   reaches its destination.

   In order to control the information revealed to external parties, an
   address-sharing function should be able to strip, rewrite and add
   HOST_ID fields.

   An address-sharing function may be configured to enforce different
   end-user preferences with regards to HOST_ID injection.  For example,
   HOST_ID injection can be disabled for some users.  This feature is
   policy-based and deployment-specific.

   HOST_ID specification document(s) should explain the privacy impact
   of the solutions they specify, including the extent of HOST_ID
   uniqueness and persistence, assumptions made about the lifetime of
   the HOST_ID, whether and how the HOST_ID can be obfuscated or
   recycled, whether location information can be exposed, and the impact
   of the use of the HOST_ID on device or implementation fingerprinting.
   [I-D.iab-privacy-considerations] provides further guidance.

   For more discussion about privacy, refer to [RFC6462].



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4.  Detailed Solutions Analysis

4.1.  Use the Identification Field of IPv4 Header (IP-ID)

4.1.1.  Description

   The IPv4 ID (Identification field of IP header, i.e., IP-ID) can be
   used to insert information which uniquely distinguishes a host among
   those sharing the same IPv4 address.  The use of IP-ID as a channel
   to convey HOST_ID is a theoretical construct (i.e., it is an
   undocumented proposal).

   An address-sharing function can re-write the IP-ID field to insert a
   value unique to the host (16 bits are sufficient to uniquely
   disambiguate hosts sharing the same IP address).  The address-sharing
   function injecting the HOST_ID must follow the rules defined in
   [RFC6864]; in particular the same HOST_ID is not re-assigned to
   another host sharing the same IP address during a given time
   interval.

   A variant of this approach relies upon the format of certain packets,
   such as TCP SYN, where the IP-ID can be modified to contain a 16 bit
   HOST_ID.

   Address-sharing devices using this solution would be required to
   indicate that they do so, possibly using a special DNS record.

4.1.2.  Analysis

   This usage is not consistent with the fragment reassembly use of the
   Identification field [RFC0791] or the updated handling rules for the
   Identification field [RFC6864].

   Complications may arise if the packet is fragmented before reaching
   the device injecting the HOST_ID.  To appropriately handle those
   packet fragments, the address-sharing function will need to maintain
   a lot of state.

   Another complication to be encountered is where translation is
   balanced among several NATs; setting the appropriate HOST_ID by a
   given NAT would alter the coordination between those NATs.  Of
   course, one can argue this coordinated NAT scenario is not a typical
   deployment scenario; regardless, using IP-ID as a channel to convey a
   HOST_ID is ill-advised.

4.2.  Define an IP Option





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4.2.1.  Description

   A solution alternative to convey the HOST_ID is to define an IP
   option [RFC0791].  A HOST_ID IP option can be inserted by the
   address-sharing function to uniquely distinguish a host among those
   sharing the same IP address.  An example of such option is documented
   in [I-D.chen-intarea-v4-uid-header-option].  This IP option allows
   the conveyance of an IPv4 address, an IPv6 prefix, a GRE (Generic
   Routing Encapsulation) key, an IPv6 Flow Label, etc.

   Another way for using an IP option has been described in Section 4.6
   of [RFC3022].

4.2.2.  Analysis

   This proposal can apply to any transport protocol.  Nevertheless, it
   is widely known that routers and other middleboxes filter IP options
   (e.g., drop IP packets with unknown IP options, strip unknown IP
   options, etc.).

   Injecting the HOST_ID IP Option introduces some implementations
   complexity in the following cases:

   o  If the packet is at or close to the MTU size.

   o  The options space is exhausted.

   Previous studies demonstrated that "IP Options are not an option"
   (Refer to [Not_An_Option], [Options]).

   In conclusion, using an IP option to convey a HOST_ID is not viable.

4.3.  Define a TCP Option

4.3.1.  Description

   HOST_ID may be conveyed in a dedicated TCP Option.  An example is
   specified in [I-D.wing-nat-reveal-option].  This option encloses the
   TCP client's identifier (e.g., the lower 16 bits of its IPv4 address,
   its VLAN ID, VRF ID, or subscriber ID).  The address-sharing device
   inserts this TCP Option into the TCP SYN packet.

4.3.2.  Analysis

   Using a new TCP Option to convey the HOST_ID does not require any
   modification to the applications but it is applicable only for TCP-
   based applications.  Applications relying on other transport
   protocols are therefore left unsolved.



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   [I-D.wing-nat-reveal-option] discusses the interference with other
   TCP Options.

   The risk to experience session failures due to handling a new TCP
   Option is low as measured in [Options].
   [I-D.abdo-hostid-tcpopt-implementation] provides a detailed
   implementation and experimentation report of a HOST_ID TCP Option.
   This document investigated in depth the impact of activation HOST_ID
   on the host, the address-sharing function, and the enforcement of
   policies at the server side.  It also reports a failure ratio of
   0.103% among top 100000 websites.

   Some downsides have been raised against defining a TCP Option to
   reveal a host identity:

   o  Conveying an IP address in a TCP Option may be seen as a violation
      of OSI layers but since IP addresses are already used for the
      checksum computation, this is not seen as a blocking point.
      Moreover, updated version of [I-D.wing-nat-reveal-option] no
      longer allows conveyance of a full IP address as the HOST_ID is
      encoded in 16 bits.

   o  TCP Option space is limited and might be consumed by the TCP
      client.  [I-D.abdo-hostid-tcpopt-implementation] discusses two
      approaches to sending the HOST_ID: sending the HOST_ID in the TCP
      SYN (which consumes more bytes in the TCP header of the TCP SYN)
      and sending the HOST_ID in a TCP ACK (which consumes only two
      bytes in the TCP SYN).

   o  Content providers may find it more desirable to receive the
      HOST_ID in the TCP SYN, as that more closely preserves the HOST_ID
      received in the source IP address as per current practices.
      Moreover, sending the HOST_ID in the TCP SYN does not interfere
      with [I-D.ietf-tcpm-fastopen].  In the ACK mode, If the server is
      configured to deliver different data based on HOST_ID, then it
      would have to wait for the ACK before transmitting data.

   o  HOST_ID mechanisms need to be aware of E2E (End-to-End) issues and
      avoid interfering with them.  One example of such interference
      would be injecting or removing TCP options of transited packets;
      another such interference involves terminating and re-originating
      TCP connections not belonging to the transit device.  HOST_ID TCP
      option handled by the source node avoids this issue.

   o  Injecting the HOST_ID TCP Option introduces some implementations
      complexity if the options space is exhausted.  Specification
      document(s) should specify in detail the behavior of the address-
      sharing function in such case.



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   o  It is more complicated to implement sending the HOST_ID in a TCP
      ACK as it can introduce MTU issues if the ACK packet also contains
      TCP data, or a TCP segment is lost.  Note, MTU complications can
      be experienced also if user data is included in a SYN packet
      (e.g., [I-D.ietf-tcpm-fastopen]).

   o  When there are several NATs in the path, the original HOST_ID may
      be lost.  The loss of the original HOST_ID may not be a problem as
      the target usage is between proxies or a CGN and server.  Only the
      information leaked in the last communication leg (i.e., between
      the last address-sharing function and the server) is likely to be
      useful.

   o  Interference with usages such as Forwarded HTTP header (see
      Section 4.4) should be elaborated to specify the behavior of
      servers when both options are used; in particular, specify which
      information to use: the content of the TCP Option or what is
      conveyed in the application headers.

   o  When load-balancers or proxies are in the path, this option does
      not allow the preservation of the original source IP address and
      source port.  Preserving such information is required for logging
      purposes for instance (e.g., [RFC6302]).
      [I-D.abdo-hostid-tcpopt-implementation] defines a TCP Option which
      allows revealing various combinations of source information (e.g.,
      source port, source port and source IP address, source IPv6
      prefix, etc.).

   More discussion about issues raised when extending TCP can be found
   at [ExtendTCP].

4.4.  Inject Application Protocol Message Headers

4.4.1.  Description

   Another option is not to require any change within the transport nor
   the IP levels but to convey at the application payload the required
   information that will be used to disambiguate hosts.  The format of
   the conveyed information and the related semantics depend on its
   application (e.g., HTTP, SIP, SMTP, etc.).

   Related mechanisms could be developed for other application-layer
   protocols, but the discussion in this document is limited to HTTP and
   similar protocols.

   For HTTP, Forwarded header ([I-D.ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded]) can be
   used to display the original IP address when an address-sharing
   device is involved.  Service Providers operating address-sharing



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   devices can enable the feature of injecting the Forwarded header
   which will enclose the original IPv4 address or the IPv6 prefix part
   (see the example shown in Figure 1).  The address-sharing device has
   to strip all included Forwarded headers before injecting its own.
   Servers may rely on the contents of this field to enforce some
   policies such as blacklisting misbehaving users.

   Note that the X-Forwarded-For (XFF) header is obsoleted by
   [I-D.ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded].

                Forwarded: for=192.0.2.1,for=[2001:db8::1]
                Forwarded: proto=https;by=192.0.2.15

                    Figure 1: Example of Forwarded-For

4.4.2.  Analysis

   Not all applications impacted by address sharing can support the
   ability to disclose the original IP address.  Only a subset of
   protocols (e.g., HTTP) can rely on this solution.

   For the HTTP case, to prevent users injecting invalid HOST_IDs, an
   initiative has been launched by Wikipedia to maintain a list of
   trusted ISPs (Internet Service Providers) using XFF (See the list
   available at [Trusted_ISPs]).  If an address-sharing device is on the
   trusted XFF ISPs list, users editing Wikipedia located behind the
   address-sharing device will appear to be editing from their
   "original" IP address and not from the NATed IP address.  If an
   offending activity is detected, individual hosts can be blacklisted
   instead of all hosts sharing the same IP address.

   XFF header injection is a common practice of load balancers.  When a
   load balancer is in the path, the original content of any included
   XFF header should not be stripped.  Otherwise the information about
   the "origin" IP address will be lost.

   When several address-sharing devices are crossed, the Forwarded
   header can convey the list of IP addresses (e.g., Figure 1).  The
   origin HOST_ID can be exposed to the target server.

   Injecting Forwarded header also introduces some implementations
   complexity if the HTTP message is at or close to the MTU size.

   It has been reported that "poor" HTTP proxy implementations may
   encounter parsing issues when injecting an XFF header.

   Injecting Forwarded header for all HTTPS traffic is infeasible.  This
   may be problematic given the current HTTPS usage trends.



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4.5.  PROXY Protocol

4.5.1.  Description

   The solution, referred to as Proxy Protocol [Proxy], does not require
   any application-specific knowledge.  The rationale behind this
   solution (Proxy Protocol Version 1) is to insert identification data
   directly into the application data stream prior to the actual
   protocol data being sent, regardless of the protocol.  Every
   application protocol would begin with a textual string of "PROXY",
   followed by some textual identification data, ending with a CRLF, and
   only then the application data would be inserted.  Figure 2 shows an
   example of a line of data used for this, in this case for a TCP over
   IPv4 connection received from 192.0.2.1:56324 and destined to
   192.0.2.15:443.

                 PROXY TCP4 192.0.2.1 192.0.2.15 56324 443\r\n

               Figure 2: Example of PROXY connection report

   Upon receipt of a message conveying this line, the server removes the
   line.  The line is parsed to retrieve the transported protocol.  The
   content of this line is recorded in logs and used to enforce
   policies.

   Proxy Protocol Version 2 is designed to accommodate IPv4/IPv6 and
   also non-TCP protocols (see [Proxy] for more details).

4.5.2.  Analysis

   This solution can be deployed in a controlled environment but it can
   not be deployed to all access services available in the Internet.  If
   the remote server does not support the Proxy Protocol, the session
   will fail.  Other complications will arise due to the presence of
   firewalls, for instance.

   As a consequence, this solution is infeasible and can not be
   recommended.

4.6.  Assign Port Sets

4.6.1.  Description

   This solution does not require any action from the address-sharing
   function to disclose a host identifier.  Instead of assuming all
   transport ports are associated with one single host, each host under
   the same external IP address is assigned a restricted port set.
   These port sets are then advertised to remote servers using off-line



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   means.  This announcement is not required for the delivery of
   internal services (i.e., offered by the service provider deploying
   the address-sharing function) relying on implicit identification.

   Port sets assigned to hosts may be static or dynamic.

   Port set announcements to remote servers are not required to reveal
   the identity of individual hosts but only to advertise the enforced
   policy to generate non-overlapping port sets (e.g., the transport
   space associated with an IP address is fragmented to contiguous
   blocks of 2048 port numbers).

   Examples of such an option are documented in [RFC6346] and
   [I-D.donley-behave-deterministic-cgn].

4.6.2.  Analysis

   The solution does not require defining new fields nor options; it is
   policy-based.

   The solution may contradict the port randomization ([RFC6056]) as
   identified in [RFC6269].  A mitigation would be to avoid assigning
   static port sets to individual hosts.

   The method is convenient for the delivery of services offered by the
   service provider also offering the Internet access service.

4.7.  Host Identity Protocol (HIP)

4.7.1.  Description

   [RFC5201] specifies an architecture which introduces a new namespace
   to convey identity information.

4.7.2.  Analysis

   This solution requires both the client and the server to support HIP
   [RFC5201].  Additional architectural considerations are to be taken
   into account such as the key exchanges, etc.

   An alternative deployment model, which does not require the client to
   be HIP-enabled, is having the address-sharing function behave as a
   UDP/TCP-HIP relay.  This model is also not viable as it assumes all
   servers are HIP-enabled.

   This solution is a theoretical construct (i.e., the proposal is not
   documented).




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4.8.  Use of a Notification Channel (e.g., ICMP)

4.8.1.  Description

   Another alternative is to convey the HOST_ID using a separate
   notification channel than the packets issued to invoke the service.

   An implementation example is defined in
   [I-D.yourtchenko-nat-reveal-ping].  This solution relies on a
   mechanism where the address-sharing function encapsulates the
   necessary host-identifying information into an ICMP Echo Request
   packet that it sends in parallel with the initial session creation
   (e.g., SYN).  The information included in the ICMP Request Data
   portion describes the five-tuples as seen on both of the sides of the
   address-sharing function.

4.8.2.  Analysis

   o  This ICMP proposal is valid for any transport protocol that uses a
      port number.  The address-sharing function may be configured with
      the transport protocols which will trigger issuing those ICMP
      messages.
   o  A hint should be provided to the ultimate server (or intermediate
      nodes) that the ICMP Echo Request conveys a HOST_ID.  This may be
      implemented using magic numbers.
   o  Even if ICMP packets are blocked in the communication path, the
      user connection does not have to be impacted.
   o  Implementations requiring delay of the establishment of a session
      until receipt of the companion ICMP Echo Request may lead to some
      user experience degradation.
   o  Because of the presence of load-balancers in the path, the
      ultimate server receiving the SYN packet may not be the one which
      receives the ICMP message conveying the HOST_ID.
   o  Because of the presence of load-balancers in the path, the port
      number assigned by address sharing may be lost.  Therefore the
      mapping information conveyed in the ICMP may not be sufficient to
      associate a SYN packet with a received ICMP.
   o  The proposal is not compatible with the presence of cascaded NAT.
      The main reason is each NAT in the path will generate an ICMP
      message to reveal the internal host identifier.  Because these
      messages will be translated by the downstream address-sharing
      devices, the remote server will receive multiple ICMP messages and
      will need to decide which host identifier to use.
   o  The ICMP proposal will add traffic overhead for both the server
      and the address-sharing device.
   o  The ICMP proposal is similar to other mechanisms (e.g., Syslog
      [I-D.ietf-behave-ipfix-nat-logging], IPFIX
      [I-D.ietf-behave-syslog-nat-logging]) for reporting dynamic



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      mappings to a mediation platform (mainly for legal traceability
      purposes).  Performance degradation is likely to be experienced by
      address-sharing functions because ICMP messages are sent for each
      new instantiated mapping (and also even if the mapping exists).
   o  In some scenarios (e.g., Section 3 of
      [I-D.boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal]), HOST_ID should be interpreted by
      intermediate devices which embed Policy Enforcement Points (PEP,
      [RFC2753]) responsible for granting access to some services.
      These PEPs need to inspect all received packets in order to find
      the companion (traffic) messages to be correlated with ICMP
      messages conveying HOST_IDs.  This induces more complexity to
      these intermediate devices.

4.9.  Use Out-of-Band Mechanisms (e.g., IDENT)

4.9.1.  Description

   Another alternative is to retrieve the HOST_ID using a dedicated
   query channel.

   An implementation example may rely on the Identification Protocol
   (IDENT, [RFC1413]).  This solution assumes the address-sharing
   function implements the server part of IDENT, while remote servers
   implement the client part of the protocol.  IDENT needs to be updated
   (see [IDENT_NAT]) to be able to return a host identifier instead of
   the user-id as defined in [RFC1413].  The IDENT response syntax uses
   the same USERID field described in [RFC1413] but rather than
   returning a username, a host identifier (e.g., a 16-bit value) is
   returned [IDENT_NAT].  For any new incoming connection, the server
   contacts the IDENT server to retrieve the associated identifier.
   During that phase, the connection may be delayed.

4.9.2.  Analysis

   o  IDENT is specific to TCP.  Alternative out-of-band mechanisms may
      be designed to cover other transport protocols such as UDP.
   o  This solution requires the address-sharing function to embed an
      IDENT server.
   o  A hint should be provided to the ultimate server (or intermediate
      nodes) that the address-sharing function implements the IDENT
      protocol.  A solution example is to publish this capability using
      DNS; other solutions can be envisaged.
   o  An out-of-band mechanism may require some administrative setup
      (e.g., contract agreement) between the entity managing the
      address-sharing function and the entity managing the remote
      server.  Such a deployment is not feasible in the Internet at
      large because establishing and maintaining agreements between ISPs
      and all service actors is burdensome and not scalable.



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   o  Implementations requiring delay of the establishment of a session
      until receipt of the companion IDENT response may lead to some
      user experience degradation.
   o  The IDENT proposal will add traffic overhead for both the server
      and the address-sharing device.
   o  Performance degradation is likely to be experienced by address-
      sharing functions embedding the IDENT server.  This is further
      exacerbated if the address-sharing function has to handle an IDENT
      query for each new instantiated mapping (and also even if the
      mapping exists).
   o  In some scenarios (e.g., Section 3 of
      [I-D.boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal]), HOST_ID should be interpreted by
      intermediate devices which embed Policy Enforcement Points (PEP,
      [RFC2753]) responsible for granting access to some services.
      These PEPs need to inspect all received packets in order to
      generate the companion IDENT queries.  This may induce more
      complexity to these intermediate devices.
   o  IDENT queries may be generated by illegitimate TCP servers.  This
      would require the address-sharing function to enforce some
      policies (e.g., rate limit queries, filter based on the source IP
      address, etc.).

5.  Solutions Analysis: Synthesis

   The following Table 1 summarizes the approaches analyzed in this
   document.

   o  "Encrypted Traffic" refers to TLS.  The use of IPsec and its
      complications to traverse NATs are discussed in Section 2.2 of
      [I-D.ietf-behave-64-analysis].  Similar to what is suggested in
      Section 13.5 of [RFC6269], HOST_ID specification document(s)
      should analyze in detail the compatibility of each IPsec mode.
   o  "Success ratio" indicates the ratio of successful communications
      with remote servers when the HOST_ID is injected using a candidate
      solution.  More details are provided below to explain how the
      success ratio is computed for each candidate solution.
   o  "Possible Perf Impact" indicates the level of expected performance
      degradation.  The rationale behind the indicated potential
      performance degradation is whether the injection requires some
      treatment at the IP level or not.
   o  "OS TCP/IP Modif" indicates whether a modification of the OS TCP/
      IP stack is required at the server side.
   o  "Deployable today" indicates if the solution can be generalized
      without any constraint on current architectures and practices.

             +-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
             |IP-ID| IP   | TCP  |HTTP  |PROXY|Port | HIP |ICMP |IDENT|
             |     |Option|Option|Header|     | Set |     |     |     |



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   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   UDP       | Yes | Yes  | No   | No   | No  | Yes |     | Yes | No  |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   TCP       | Yes | Yes  | Yes  | No   | Yes | Yes |     | Yes | Yes |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   HTTP      | Yes | Yes  | Yes  | Yes  | Yes | Yes |     | Yes | Yes |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   Encrypted | Yes | Yes  | Yes  | No   | Yes | Yes |     | Yes | Yes |
   Traffic   |     |      |      |      |     |     |     |     |     |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   Success   | High| Low  | High | High | Low | 100%|Low  |High |High |
   Ratio     |     |      |      |      |     |     |     |     |     |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   Possible  | Low | High | Low  |  Med | High| No  | N/A | High|High |
   Perf      |  to |      |  to  |   to |     |     |     |     |     |
   Impact    | Med |      | Med  | High |     |     |     |     |     |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   OS TCP/IP | Yes | Yes  | Yes  | No   | No  | No  |     | Yes | Yes |
   Modif     |     |      |      |      |     |     |     |     |     |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   Deployable| Yes | Yes  | Yes  | Yes  | No  | Yes | No  | Yes | Yes |
   Today     |     |      |      |      |     |     |     |     |     |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
   Notes     | (1) |  (8) | (8)  |  (2) | (8) | (1) | (4) | (6) | (1) |
             | (7) |      |      |      |     | (3) | (7) | (8) | (6) |
             |     |      |      |      |     |     |     |     | (8) |
   ----------+-----+------+------+------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
    Notes:
    (1)  Requires mechanism to advertise NAT is participating in this
         scheme (e.g., DNS PTR record).
    (2)  This solution is widely deployed (e.g., HTTP Severs,
         Load-Balancers, etc.).
    (3)  When the port set is not advertised, the solution is less
         efficient for third-party services.
    (4)  Requires the client and the server to be HIP-compliant and HIP
         infrastructure to be deployed. If the client and the server are
         HIP-enabled, the address-sharing function does not need to
         insert an identifier. If the client is not HIP-enabled,
         designing the device that performs address sharing to act
         as a UDP/TCP-HIP relay is not viable.
    (6)  The solution is inefficient in some scenarios (see Section 5)
    (7)  The solution is a theoretical construct (i.e., the solution
         is not documented).
    (8)  The solution is a documented proposal.

                  Table 1: Summary of analyzed solutions.





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   Provided success ratio figures for TCP and IP options are based on
   the results documented in [Options] and
   [I-D.abdo-hostid-tcpopt-implementation].

   The provided success ratio for IP-ID is theoretical; it assumes the
   address-sharing function follows the rules in [RFC6864] to re-write
   the IP Identification field.

   Since PROXY and HIP are not widely deployed, the success ratio for
   establishing a communication with remote servers using these
   protocols is low.

   The success ratio for the ICMP-based solution is implementation-
   specific but it is likely to be close to 100%. The success ratio
   depends on how efficient the solution is implemented on the server
   side.  A remote server which does not support the ICMP-based solution
   will ignore received companion ICMP messages.  An upgraded server
   will need to delay accepting a session until receiving the companion
   ICMP message.

   The success ratio for IDENT solution is implementation-specific but
   it is likely to be close to 100%. The success ratio depends on how
   efficient the solution is implemented on the server side.  A remote
   server which does not support IDENT will accept a session
   establishment request following its normal operation.  An upgraded
   server will need to delay accepting a session until receipt of the
   response to the IDENT request it will send to the host.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any action from IANA.

7.  Security Considerations

   The same security concerns apply for the injection of an IP option,
   TCP Option and application-related content (e.g., Forwarded HTTP
   header) by the address-sharing device.  If the server trusts the
   content of the HOST_ID field, a third party user can be impacted by a
   misbehaving user to reveal a "faked" HOST_ID (e.g., original IP
   address).

   HOST_ID may be used to leak information about the internal structure
   of a network behind an address-sharing function.  If this behavior is
   undesired for the network administrator, the address-sharing function
   can be configured to strip any existing HOST_ID in received packets
   from internal hosts.





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   HOST_ID specification documents should elaborate further on threats
   inherent to each individual solution used to convey the HOST_ID
   (e.g., use of the IP-ID field to count hosts behind a NAT [Count]).

   For more discussion of privacy issues related to HOST_ID, see
   Section 3.

8.  Acknowledgments

   Many thanks to D.  Wing, C.  Jacquenet, J.  Halpern, B.  Haberman,
   and P.  Yee for their review, comments and inputs.

   Thanks also to P.  McCann, T.  Tsou, Z.  Dong, B.  Briscoe, T.
   Taylor, M.  Blanchet, D.  Wing, and A.  Yourtchenko for the
   discussions in Prague.

   Some of the issues related to defining a new TCP Option have been
   raised by L.  Eggert.

   The privacy text was provided by A.  Cooper.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September
              1981.

   [RFC3022]  Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
              Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, January
              2001.

   [RFC6056]  Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Recommendations for Transport-
              Protocol Port Randomization", BCP 156, RFC 6056, January
              2011.

9.2.  Informative References

   [Count]    , "A technique for counting NATted hosts", ,
              <http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/fnat.pdf>.

   [ExtendTCP]
              Honda, M., Nishida, Y., Raiciu, C., Greenhalgh, A.,
              Handley, M. and H. Tokuda,, "Is it still possible to
              extend TCP?", November 2011,
              <http://nrg.cs.ucl.ac.uk/mjh/tmp/mboxes.pdf>.

   [I-D.abdo-hostid-tcpopt-implementation]



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              Abdo, E., Boucadair, M., and J. Queiroz, "HOST_ID TCP
              Options: Implementation & Preliminary Test Results",
              draft-abdo-hostid-tcpopt-implementation-03 (work in
              progress), July 2012.

   [I-D.boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal]
              Boucadair, M., Reddy, T., Patil, P., and D. Wing, "Using
              PCP to Reveal a Host behind NAT", draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-
              reveal-00 (work in progress), November 2012.

   [I-D.chen-intarea-v4-uid-header-option]
              Wu, Y., Ji, H., Chen, Q., and T. ZOU), "IPv4 Header Option
              For User Identification In CGN Scenario", draft-chen-
              intarea-v4-uid-header-option-00 (work in progress), March
              2011.

   [I-D.donley-behave-deterministic-cgn]
              Donley, C., Grundemann, C., Sarawat, V., Sundaresan, K.,
              and O. Vautrin, "Deterministic Address Mapping to Reduce
              Logging in Carrier Grade NAT Deployments", draft-donley-
              behave-deterministic-cgn-05 (work in progress), January
              2013.

   [I-D.iab-privacy-considerations]
              Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", draft-iab-privacy-
              considerations-03 (work in progress), July 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded]
              Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension",
              draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-10 (work in progress),
              October 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-behave-64-analysis]
              Penno, R., Saxena, T., Boucadair, M., and S. Sivakumar,
              "Analysis of Stateful 64 Translation", draft-ietf-
              behave-64-analysis-07 (work in progress), March 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-behave-ipfix-nat-logging]
              Sivakumar, S. and R. Penno, "IPFIX Information Elements
              for logging NAT Events", draft-ietf-behave-ipfix-nat-
              logging-00 (work in progress), March 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-behave-syslog-nat-logging]
              Chen, Z., Zhou, C., Tsou, T., and T. Taylor, "Syslog
              Format for NAT Logging", draft-ietf-behave-syslog-nat-
              logging-00 (work in progress), February 2013.



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   [I-D.ietf-tcpm-fastopen]
              Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
              Fast Open", draft-ietf-tcpm-fastopen-03 (work in
              progress), February 2013.

   [I-D.wing-nat-reveal-option]
              Yourtchenko, A. and D. Wing, "Revealing hosts sharing an
              IP address using TCP option", draft-wing-nat-reveal-
              option-03 (work in progress), December 2011.

   [I-D.yourtchenko-nat-reveal-ping]
              Yourtchenko, A., "Revealing hosts sharing an IP address
              using ICMP Echo Request", draft-yourtchenko-nat-reveal-
              ping-00 (work in progress), March 2012.

   [IDENT_NAT]
              Wing, D., "Using the Identification Protocol with an
              Address Sharing Device", August 2012, <draft-wing-intarea-
              ident>.

   [Not_An_Option]
              R. Fonseca, G. Porter, R. Katz, S. Shenker, and I.
              Stoica,, "IP options are not an option", 2005, <http://
              www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2005/
              EECS-2005-24.html>.

   [Options]  Alberto Medina, Mark Allman, Sally Floyd, "Measuring
              Interactions Between Transport Protocols and Middleboxes",
              2005, <http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2004/papers/
              p336-medina.pdf>.

   [Proxy]    Tarreau, W., "The PROXY protocol", November 2010, <http://
              haproxy.1wt.eu/download/1.5/doc/proxy-protocol.txt>.

   [RFC1413]  St. Johns, M.C., "Identification Protocol", RFC 1413,
              February 1993.

   [RFC2753]  Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis, D., and R. Guerin, "A Framework
              for Policy-based Admission Control", RFC 2753, January
              2000.

   [RFC5201]  Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
              "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.

   [RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, April 2011.




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   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and P.
              Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269, June
              2011.

   [RFC6302]  Durand, A., Gashinsky, I., Lee, D., and S. Sheppard,
              "Logging Recommendations for Internet-Facing Servers", BCP
              162, RFC 6302, June 2011.

   [RFC6346]  Bush, R., "The Address plus Port (A+P) Approach to the
              IPv4 Address Shortage", RFC 6346, August 2011.

   [RFC6462]  Cooper, A., "Report from the Internet Privacy Workshop",
              RFC 6462, January 2012.

   [RFC6864]  Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field",
              RFC 6864, February 2013.

   [Trusted_ISPs]
              , "Trusted XFF list", , <http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/
              XFF_project#Trusted_XFF_list>.

Authors' Addresses

   Mohamed Boucadair
   France Telecom
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com


   Joe Touch
   USC/ISI

   Email: touch@isi.edu


   Pierre Levis
   France Telecom
   Caen  14000
   France

   Email: pierre.levis@orange.com








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   Reinaldo Penno
   Cisco
   USA

   Email: repenno@cisco.com













































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