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IPSec Working Group                        S. Blake-Wilson and P. Fahn
INTERNET-DRAFT                                          Certicom Corp.
Expires: September 14, 2001                             March 15, 2001

                     IKE Authentication Using ECDSA

                          Status of this Memo

 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
 provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
 documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
 and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
 working documents as Internet-Drafts.

 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
 or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at


 This document describes how the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
 Algorithm (ECDSA) may be used as the authentication method within
 the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. ECDSA may provide
 benefits including computational efficiency, small signature sizes,
 and minimal bandwidth, compared to other available digital signature
 methods. This document adds ECDSA capability to IKE without
 introducing any changes to existing IKE operation.

                         Table of Contents

  1.    Introduction ................................................. 2
  2.    ECDSA ........................................................ 2
  3.    Specifying ECDSA within IKE .................................. 3
  4.    Security Considerations ...................................... 4
  5.    Intellectual Property Rights ................................. 4
  6.    Acknowledgments .............................................. 4
  7.    References ................................................... 5
  8.    Authors' Addresses ........................................... 6
  9.    Full Copyright Statement ..................................... 6

Blake-Wilson, Fahn                                              [Page 1]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                             15 March 2001

1. Introduction

The Internet Key Exchange, or IKE [RFC2409], is a key agreement
and security negotiation protocol; it is used for key establishment in
IPSec. In Phase 1 of IKE, both parties must authenticate each other
using a negotiated authentication method. One option for the
authentication method is digital signatures using public key
cryptography. Currently, there are two digital signature methods
defined for use within Phase 1: RSA signatures and DSA (DSS)
signatures. This document introduces ECDSA signatures as a third

For any given level of security against the best attacks known, ECDSA
signatures are smaller than RSA signatures and ECDSA keys require less
bandwidth than DSA keys; there are also advantages of computational
speed and efficiency in many settings. Additional efficiency may be
gained by simultaneously using ECDSA for IKE authentication and using
elliptic curve groups for the IKE key exchange. Implementers of IPSec
and IKE may therefore find it desirable to use ECDSA as the Phase 1
authentication method.


The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is the elliptic
curve analogue of the DSA (also called DSS) signature method
[FIPS186-2]. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is
defined in the ANSI X9.62 standard [ANSIX962]; compatible
specifications include FIPS 186-2 [FIPS186-2], IEEE P1363 [IEEEP1363],
and SEC 1 [SEC1]. The use of ECDSA in X.509 certificates is described

ECDSA signatures are smaller than RSA signatures of similar
cryptographic strength; see [KEYS] for a security analysis of key
sizes across public key algorithms. ECDSA public keys (and
certificates) are smaller than similar strength DSA keys, resulting in
improved communications efficiency. Furthermore, on many platforms
ECDSA operations can be computed faster than similar strength RSA or
DSA operations. These advantages of signature size, bandwidth, and
computational efficiency make ECDSA an attractive choice for many IKE

Recommended elliptic curve domain parameters for use with ECDSA are
given in FIPS 186-2 [FIPS186-2] and SEC 2 [SEC2]. A subset of these
parameters are recommended in [ECC-GR] for use in the IKE key exchange.

Like DSA, ECDSA incorporates the use of a hash function; currently,
the only hash function defined for use with ECDSA is the SHA-1 message
digest algorithm [FIPS180-1].

Blake-Wilson, Fahn                                              [Page 2]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                             15 March 2001

3. Specifying ECDSA within IKE

The IKE key negotiation protocol consists of two phases, Phase 1 and
Phase 2. Within Phase 1, the two negotiating parties authenticate each
other, using either pre-shared keys, digital signatures, or public-key
encryption. For digital signatures and public-key encryption methods,
there are multiple options. The authentication method is specified as
an attribute in the negotiated Phase 1 Security Association (SA).

Until now, there have been a total of seven specific authentication
methods in Phase 1. We now add an eighth option: ECDSA signatures,
specified by attribute value 8 in the SA. The new list of
IANA-assigned attribute numbers for Phase 1 authentication is:

   - Authentication Method
      pre-shared key                      1
      DSS signatures                      2
      RSA signatures                      3
      Encryption with RSA                 4
      Revised encryption with RSA         5
      Encryption with El-Gamal            6
      Revised encryption with El-Gamal    7
      ECDSA signatures                    8

      values 9-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for
      private use among mutually consenting parties.

Phase 1 can be either Main Mode or Agressive Mode. The use and
specification of ECDSA signatures as the authentication method applies
to both modes. The sequence of Phase 1 message payloads is the same
with ECDSA signatures as with DSS or RSA signatures.

When ECDSA is used in IKE, the signature payload shall contain an
encoding of the computed signature, consisting of a pair of integers r
and s, encoded as a byte string using the ASN.1 syntax
"ECDSA-Sig-Value" with DER encoding rules as  specified in
ANSI X9.62 [ANSIX962].

Note also that, like the other digital signature methods, ECDSA
authentication requires the parties to know and trust each other's
public key. This can be done by exchanging certificates, possibly
within the Phase 1 negotiation, if the public keys of the parties are
not already known to each other. The use of Internet X.509 public key
infrastructure certificates [PKIX-CERT] is recommended; the
representation of ECDSA keys in X.509 certificates is specified in

Blake-Wilson, Fahn                                              [Page 3]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                             15 March 2001

Since ECDSA requires the use of the SHA-1 hash function,
implemententers may find it convenient to specify SHA-1 as the value
of the hash algorithm attribute when using ECDSA as the authentication
method. Implementers may also find it convenient to use ECDSA
authentication in conjunction with an elliptic curve group for the IKE
Diffie-Hellman key agreement; see [ECC-GR] for specific curves for the
key agreement.

4. Security Considerations

Implementors should ensure that appropriate security measures are in
place when they deploy ECDSA within IKE. In particular, the security
of ECDSA requires the careful selection of both key sizes and elliptic
curve domain parameters. Selection guidelines for these parameters and
some specific recommended curves that are considered safe are provided
in ANSI X9.62 [ANSIX962], FIPS 186-2 [FIPS186-2], and SEC 2 [SEC2].

5. Intellectual Property Rights

The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
regard to the specification contained in this document. For more
information, consult the online list of claimed rights

The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain
to the implementation or use of the technology described in this
document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or
might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any
effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's
procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary
rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained
from the IETF Secretariat.

6. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Paul Lambert and Prakash Panjwani for
their comments and suggestions.

Blake-Wilson, Fahn                                              [Page 4]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                             15 March 2001

7. References

[ANSIX962]   ANSI X9.62-1999, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial
             Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
             Algorithm (ECDSA)", Americal National Standards Institute,

[ECC-GR]     S. Blake-Wilson, M. Salter, and Y. Poeluev, "Additional
             ECC Groups for IKE", IPSEC Working Group Internet-Draft
             draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-ecc-groups-03.txt. September 1999.

[FIPS180-1]  FIPS 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of
             Standards and Technology, 1995.

[FIPS186-2]  FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National Institute
             of Standards and Technology, 2000.

[IEEEP1363]   IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
             Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and Electronics
             Engineers, 2000.

[KEYS]       A. Lenstra and E. Verheul, "Selecting Cryptographic Key
             Sizes", October 1999. Presented at Public Key Cryptography
             Conference, Melbourne, Australia, January 2000. Available
             at <http://www.cryptosavvy.com/>.

[PKIX-ALG]   L. Bassham, R. Housley and W. Polk, "Algorithms and
             Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", PKIX Working
             Group Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-pkalgs-02.txt,
             March 2001.

[PKIX-CERT]  W. Ford, R. Housley, W. Polk and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
             Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", PKIX
             Working Group Internet-Draft,
             draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-05.txt, March 2001.

[RFC2409]    D. Harkins and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange",
             IETF RFC 2409,  November 1998.

[SEC1]       SEC 1, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for Efficient
             Cryptography Group, 2000.

[SEC2]       SEC 2, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
             Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.

Blake-Wilson, Fahn                                              [Page 5]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                             15 March 2001

8. Author's Address

   Simon Blake-Wilson
   Certicom Corp.

   Paul Fahn
   Certicom Corp.

9. Full Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999).  All Rights Reserved.

This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

This document and the information contained herein is provided on an

Blake-Wilson, Fahn                                              [Page 6]

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