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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 3948

IP Security Protocol Working Group (IPSEC)                   A. Huttunen
INTERNET-DRAFT                                      F-Secure Corporation
Category: Standards track                                     B. Swander
Expires: May 2003                                              Microsoft
                                                              M. Stenberg
                                         SSH Communications Security Corp
                                                                 V. Volpe
                                                            Cisco Systems
                                                               L. DiBurro
                                                          Nortel Networks
                                                            November 2002

                    UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets
                    draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-04.txt

Status of this Memo

    This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
    all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
    other groups may also distribute working documents as
    Internet-Drafts.

    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
    months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
    at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

    The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

    The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

    This Internet-Draft will expire on May, 2003.

Copyright Notice

    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

    This draft defines methods to encapsulate and decapsulate
    IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) packets inside UDP packets
    for the purpose of traversing Network Address Translators.
    ESP encapsulation as defined in this document is capable of being
    used in both IPv4 and IPv6 scenarios. The encapsulation is used
    whenever negotiated using Internet Key Exchange (IKE).

Change Log
    Version -01
    - removed everything related to the AH-protocol
    - added instructions on how to use the encapsulation with
      some other key management protocol than IKE
    Version -02
    - changed to using 4-byte non-ESP marker, removed all references
      to using this with other key management protocols
    - TCP checksum handling for transport mode related discussion
      modified
    - copied tunnel mode security considerations from the
      earlier draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt draft,
      added transport mode considerations
    Version -03
    - Clarifications to security considerations
    Version -04
    - Clarified checksum handling
    - Added an IANA considerations section
    - Added an implementation options appendix
    - Reworded 'Abstract'
    - References grouped

1. Introduction

    This draft defines methods to encapsulate and decapsulate ESP
    packets inside UDP packets for the purpose of traversing NATs.
    The UDP port numbers are the same as used by IKE traffic, as
    defined in [Kiv04].

    It is up to the need of the clients whether transport mode
    or tunnel mode is to be supported. L2TP/IPsec clients MUST support
    transport mode since [RFC 3193] defines that L2TP/IPsec MUST use
    transport mode], and IPsec tunnel mode clients MUST support tunnel
    mode.

    An IKE implementation supporting this draft MUST NOT use the
    ESP SPI field zero for ESP packets. This ensures that
    IKE packets and ESP packets can be distinguished from each other.

    UDP encapsulation of ESP packets as defined in this document is
    written in terms of IPv4 headers. There is no technical reason
    why an IPv6 header could not be used as the outer header and/or
    as the inner header.

2. Packet Formats

2.1  UDP-encapsulated ESP Header Format

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Source Port            |      Destination Port         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|           Length              |           Checksum            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                      ESP header [RFC 2406]                    |
~                                                               ~
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

The UDP header is a standard [RFC 768] header, where
- Source Port and Destination Port MUST be the same as used by
   floated IKE traffic.
- Checksum SHOULD be transmitted as a zero value.
- Receivers MUST NOT depend upon the UDP checksum being
   a zero value.

The SPI field in the ESP header must not be zero.

2.2  Floated IKE Header Format

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Source Port            |      Destination Port         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|           Length              |           Checksum            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                       Non-ESP Marker                          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                      IKE header [RFC 2409]                    |
~                                                               ~
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

The UDP header is a standard [RFC 768] header, and is used
as defined in [Kiv04]. This document does not set any new
requirements for the checksum handling of an IKE packet.

Non-ESP Marker is 4 bytes of zero aligning with the SPI field
of an ESP packet.

2.3 NAT-keepalive Packet Format

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Source Port            |      Destination Port         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|           Length              |           Checksum            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|    0xFF       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

The UDP header is a standard [RFC 768] header, where
- Source Port and Destination Port MUST be the same as used by
   UDP-ESP encapsulation of section 2.1
- Checksum SHOULD be transmitted as a zero value.
- Receivers MUST NOT depend upon the UDP checksum being
   a zero value.

The sender SHOULD use a one octet long payload with the value 0xFF.
The receiver SHOULD ignore a received NAT-keepalive packet.

3. Encapsulation and Decapsulation Procedures

3.1 Auxiliary Procedures

3.1.1 Tunnel Mode Decapsulation NAT Procedure

When a tunnel mode has been used to transmit packets, the inner
IP header can contain addresses that are not suitable for the
current network. This procedure defines how these addresses are
to be converted to suitable addresses for the current network.

Depending on local policy, one of the following MUST be done:
a) If a valid source IP address space has been defined in the policy
    for the encapsulated packets from the peer, check that the source
    IP address of the inner packet is valid according to the policy.
b) If an address has been assigned for the remote peer, check
    that the source IP address used in the inner packet is the
    same as the IP address assigned.
c) NAT is performed for the packet, making it suitable for transport
    in the local network.

3.1.2 Transport Mode Decapsulation NAT Procedure

When a transport mode has been used to transmit packets, contained
TCP or UDP headers will contain incorrect checksums due to the change
of parts of the IP header during transit. This procedure defines how
to fix these checksums.

Depending on local policy, one of the following MUST be done:
a) If the protocol header after the ESP header is a TCP/UDP
    header and the peer's real source IP address has been received
    according to [Kiv04], incrementally recompute the TCP/UDP checksum:
    - subtract the IP source address in the received packet
      from the checksum
    - add the real IP source address received via IKE to the checksum
b) If the protocol header after the ESP header is a TCP/UDP
    header, recompute the checksum field in the TCP/UDP header.
c) If the protocol header after the ESP header is an UDP
    header, zero the checksum field in the UDP header. If the protocol
    header after the ESP header is a TCP header, and there is an
    option to flag to the stack that TCP checksum does not need to
    be computed, then that flag MAY be used.  This SHOULD only be done
    for transport mode, and if the packet is integrity protected.  Tunnel
    mode TCP checksums MUST be verified.
    [This is not a violation to the spirit of section 4.2.2.7 in RFC 1122
    because a checksum is being generated by the sender, and verified
    by the receiver.  That checksum is the integrity over the packet
    performed by IPsec.]

In addition an implementation MAY fix any contained protocols that
have been broken by NAT.

3.2 Transport Mode ESP Encapsulation

               BEFORE APPLYING ESP/UDP
          ----------------------------
    IPv4  |orig IP hdr  |     |      |
          |(any options)| TCP | Data |
          ----------------------------

               AFTER APPLYING ESP/UDP
          -------------------------------------------------------
    IPv4  |orig IP hdr  | UDP | ESP |     |      |   ESP   | ESP|
          |(any options)| Hdr | Hdr | TCP | Data | Trailer |Auth|
          -------------------------------------------------------
                                    |<----- encrypted ---->|
                              |<------ authenticated ----->|

1) Ordinary ESP encapsulation procedure is used.
2) A properly formatted UDP header is inserted where shown.
3) The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the
    IP header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.

3.3 Transport Mode ESP Decapsulation

1) The UDP header is removed from the packet.
2) The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the
    new IP header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.
3) Ordinary ESP decapsulation procedure is used.
4) Transport mode decapsulation NAT procedure is used.


3.4 Tunnel Mode ESP Encapsulation

               BEFORE APPLYING ESP/UDP
          ----------------------------
    IPv4  |orig IP hdr  |     |      |
          |(any options)| TCP | Data |
          ----------------------------

               AFTER APPLYING ESP/UDP
      --------------------------------------------------------------
IPv4 |new h.| UDP | ESP |orig IP hdr  |     |      |   ESP   | ESP|
      |(opts)| Hdr | Hdr |(any options)| TCP | Data | Trailer |Auth|
      --------------------------------------------------------------
                         |<------------ encrypted ----------->|
                   |<------------- authenticated ------------>|

1) Ordinary ESP encapsulation procedure is used.
2) A properly formatted UDP header is inserted where shown.
3) The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the
    new IP header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.


3.5 Tunnel Mode ESP Decapsulation

1) The UDP header is removed from the packet.
2) The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the
    new IP header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.
3) Ordinary ESP decapsulation procedure is used.
4) Tunnel mode decapsulation NAT procedure is used.

4. NAT Keepalive Procedure

The sole purpose of sending NAT-keepalive packets is to keep
NAT mappings alive for the duration of a connection between
the peers. Reception of NAT-keepalive packets MUST NOT be
used to detect liveness of a connection.

A peer MAY send a NAT-keepalive packet if there exists one
or more phase I or phase II SAs between the peers, or such
an SA has existed at most N minutes earlier. N is a locally
configurable parameter with a default value of 5 minutes.

A peer SHOULD send a NAT-keepalive packet if a need to send such
packets is detected according to [Kiv04] and if no other packet to
the peer has been sent in M seconds. M is a locally configurable
parameter with a default value of 20 seconds.

5. Security Considerations

5.1 DoS

    On some systems ESPUDP may have DoS attack consequences,
    especially if ordinary operating system UDP-functionality is
    being used. It may be recommended not to open an ordinary UDP-port
    for this.

5.2 Tunnel Mode Conflict

    Implementors are warned that it is possible for remote peers to
    negotiate entries that overlap in a GW, an issue affecting tunnel
    mode.

           +----+            \ /
           |    |-------------|----\
           +----+            / \    \
           Ari's           NAT 1     \
           Laptop                     \
          10.1.2.3                     \
           +----+            \ /        \       +----+          +----+
           |    |-------------|----------+------|    |----------|    |
           +----+            / \                +----+          +----+
           Bob's           NAT 2                  GW            Suzy's
           Laptop                                               Server
          10.1.2.3

    Because GW will now see two possible SAs that lead to 10.1.2.3, it
    can become confused where to send packets coming from Suzy's server.
    Implementators MUST devise ways of preventing such a thing from
    occurring.

    It is recommended that GW either assign locally unique IP addresses
    to A and B using a protocol such as DHCP over IPsec, or uses NAT to
    change A's and B's source IP addresses to such locally unique
    addresses before sending packets forward to S.

5.3 Transport Mode Conflict

    Another similar issue may occur in transport mode, with 2 clients,
    Ari and Bob, behind the same NAT talking securely to the same server.

    Cliff wants to talk in the clear to the same server.

           +----+
           |    |
           +----+ \
           Ari's   \
           Laptop   \
          10.1.2.3   \
           +----+    \ /                +----+
           |    |-----+-----------------|    |
           +----+    / \                +----+
           Bob's     NAT                Server
           Laptop   /
          10.1.2.4 /
                  /
          +----+ /
          |    |/
          +----+
          Cliff's
          Laptop
         10.1.2.5



    Now, transport SAs on the server will look like:
    To Ari: S to NAT, <traffic desc1>, UDP encap <4500, Y>
    To Bob: S to NAT, <traffic desc2>, UDP encap <4500, Z>

    Cliff's traffic is in the clear, so there is no SA.

    <traffic desc> is the protocol and port information.
    The UDP encap ports are the ports used in UDP encapsulated
    ESP format of section 2.1.  Y,Z are the dynamic ports assigned
    by the NAT during the IKE negotiation.  So IKE traffic from
    Ari's laptop goes out on UDP <4500,4500>.  It reaches the server
    as UDP <Y,4500>, where Y is the dynamically assigned port.

    If the <traffic desc1> overlaps <traffic desc2>, then
    simple filter lookups may not be sufficient to determine
    which SA needs to be used to send traffic.  Implementations
    MUST handle this situation, either by disallowing
    conflicting connections, or by other means.

    Assume now that Cliff wants to connect to the server S in the
    clear.  This is going to be difficult to configure since
    the server already has a policy from S to the NAT's external
    address, for securing <traffic desc>.  For totally non-overlapping
    traffic descriptions, this is possible.

    Sample server policy could be:
    To Ari: S to NAT, All UDP, secure
    To Bob: S to NAT, All TCP, secure
    To Cliff: S to NAT, ALL ICMP, clear text

    Note, this policy also lets Ari and Bob send cleartext ICMP to the
    server.

    The server sees all clients behind the NAT as the same IP address,
    so setting up different policies for the same traffic descriptor
    is in principle impossible.

    A problematic example configuration on the server is:

    S to NAT, TCP, secure (for Ari and Bob)
    S to NAT, TCP, clear  (for Cliff)

    The problem is that the server cannot enforce his policy, since it
    is possible that misbehaving Bob sends traffic in the clear.  This
    is indistinguishable from Cliff sending traffic in the clear.
    So it is impossible to guarantee security from some clients behind
    a NAT, and also allow clear text from different clients behind the
    SAME NAT.  If the server's security policy allows, however, it can
    do  best effort security: if the client from behind the NAT
    initiates security, his connection will be secured.  If he sends
    in the clear, the server will still accept that clear text.

    So, for security guarantees, the above problematic scenario MUST NOT
    be allowed on servers.  For best effort security, this scenario MAY
    be used.

6. IANA Considerations

This document depends on the reserved SPI value of zero (0) not
being sent over the wire as a part of an ESP-packet [RFC 2406].

This document defines a "Non-ESP Marker" as 4 bytes of zero aligning
with the SPI field of an ESP packet, and generally being followed
by something that is not an ESP packet.

With regard to NAT-traversal in IKEv1 case, the Non-ESP Marker is
being followed by an IKEv1 packet as specified in section 2.2.

7.  Intellectual Property Rights

The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
regard to some or all of the specification contained in this document.
For more information consult the online list of claimed rights.

8.  Acknowledgments

Thanks to Tero Kivinen and William Dixon who contributed actively
to this document.

Thanks to Joern Sierwald, Tamir Zegman, Tatu Ylonen and
Santeri Paavolainen who contributed to the previous drafts
about NAT traversal.

9.  References

Normative references:

[RFC 768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", August 1980

[RFC 2406] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
November 1998

[RFC 2409] D. Harkins, D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", November 1998

[Kiv04] Kivinen, T. et. al., draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-04.txt,
"Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", October 2002

Non-normative references:

[RFC 1122] R. Braden (Editor), "Requirements for Internet Hosts
-- Communication Layers", October 1989

[RFC-2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997

[RFC 3193] Patel, B. et. al, "Securing L2TP using IPsec",
November 2001


10.  Authors' Addresses

     Ari Huttunen
     F-Secure Corporation
     Tammasaarenkatu 7
     FIN-00181 HELSINKI
     Finland
     E-mail: Ari.Huttunen@F-Secure.com

     Brian Swander
     Microsoft
     One Microsoft Way
     Redmond WA 98052
     E-mail: briansw@microsoft.com

     Markus Stenberg
     SSH Communications Security Corp
     Fredrikinkatu 42
     FIN-00100 HELSINKI
     Finland
     E-mail: mstenber@ssh.com

     Victor Volpe
     Cisco Systems
     124 Grove Street
     Suite 205
     Franklin, MA 02038
     E-mail: vvolpe@cisco.com

     Larry DiBurro
     Nortel Networks
     80 Central Street
     Boxborough, MA 01719
     ldiburro@nortelnetworks.com


Appendix A: Clarification of potential NAT multiple client solutions

There have been requests to clarify potential solutions to the problem
of multiple clients behind the same NAT simultaneously connecting to the
same destination IP address.
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 say that you MUST avoid this
problem. As this isn't a wire protocol matter, but a local
implementation matter, specification of the mechanisms do not belong in
the draft itself. They are instead listed in this appendix.

Choosing an option will likely depend on the scenarios for which you
use/support IPsec NAT-T.  This list is not meant to be exhaustive, so
other solutions may exist. We first describe the generic choices that
solve the problem for all upper layer protocols.

Generic choices for ESP transport mode:
Tr1) Implement a built-in NAT (network address translation) above IPsec
decapsulation.  SSH may have intellectual property rights relating to
this implementation technique.  See their IPR notice on the IETF web
site for the details.

Tr2) Implement a built-in NAPT (network address port translation) above
IPsec decapsulation. Microsoft may have intellectual property rights
relating to this implementation technique.  See the Microsoft IPR notice
on the IETF web site for the details.

Tr3) An initiator may decide not to request transport mode once NAT is
detected and instead request a tunnel mode SA.  This may be a retry
after transport mode is denied by the responder, or it may be the
initiator's choice to propose a tunnel SA initially.  This is no more
difficult than knowing whether to propose transport mode or tunnel mode
without NAT.  If for some reason the responder prefers or requires
tunnel mode for NAT traversal, it must reject the quick mode SA proposal
for transport mode.

Generic choises for ESP tunnel mode:
Tn1) Same as Tr1.

Tn2) Same as Tr2.

Tn3) This option is possible if an initiator is capable of being assigned
an address through it's tunnel SA with the responder using DHCP.  The
initiator may initially request an internal address via the DHCP-IPsec
method, regardless of whether it knows it is behind a NAT.  Or it may
re-initiate an IKE quick mode negotiation for DHCP tunnel SA after the
responder fails the quick mode SA transport mode proposal, either when
NAT-OA payload is sent or because it discovers from NAT-D the initiator
is behind a NAT and it's local configuration/policy will only accept
connecting through NAT when being assigned an address through
DHCP-IPsec.

There are also implementation choices offereing limited
interoperability. Vendors should specify what applications or
protocols should work using their NAT-T solution if these options
are selected. Note that neither Tr4 nor Tn4 are expected to work
with TCP traffic.

Limited interoperability choices for ESP transport mode:

Tr4) Implement upper layer protocol awareness of the inbound & outbound
IPsec SA so that it doesn't use the source IP and the source port as the
session identifier. (E.g. L2TP session ID mapped to the IPsec SA pair
which doesn't use the UDP source port or the source IP address for peer
uniqueness.)

Tr5) Implement application integration with IKE initiation such that it
can rebind to a different source port if the IKE quick mode SA proposal
is rejected by the responder, then repropose the new QM selector.
Microsoft may have intellectual property rights relating to this
implementation technique.  See the Microsoft IPR notice on the IETF web
site for the details.

Limited interoperability choices for ESP tunnel mode:

Tn4) Same as Tr4.


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