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Versions: (draft-narayan-isms-sshsm-radius) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 5608

Network Working Group                                         K. Narayan
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                               D. Nelson
Expires: April 15, 2009                            Elbrys Networks, Inc.
                                                        October 12, 2008


  Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) Usage for Simple
          Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Transport Models
                  draft-ietf-isms-radius-usage-04.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 15, 2009.

Abstract

   This memo describes the use of a Remote Authentication Dial-In User
   Service (RADIUS) authentication and authorization service by Simple
   Network Management Protocol (SNMP) secure Transport Models to
   authenticate users and authorize creation of secure transport
   sessions.  While the recommendations of this memo are generally
   applicable to a broad class of SNMP Transport Models, the examples
   focus on the Secure Shell Transport Model.






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Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  RADIUS Operational Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  RADIUS Usage With Secure Transports  . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.4.  SNMP Transport Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  RADIUS Usage for SNMP Transport Models . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.1.  RADIUS Authentication for Transport Protocols  . . . . . .  7
     2.2.  RADIUS Authorization for Transport Protocols . . . . . . .  7
     2.3.  SNMP Service Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.4.  SNMP Access Control Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.  Table of Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15























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1.  Introduction

1.1.  General

   This memo describes the use of a Remote Authentication Dial-In User
   Service (RADIUS) authentication and authorization service by Simple
   Network Management Protocol (SNMP) secure Transport Models to
   authenticate users and authorize creation of secure transport
   sessions.  While the recommendations of this memo are generally
   applicable to a broad class of SNMP Transport Models, the examples
   focus on the Secure Shell Transport Model.

   In the context of this document, a Network Access Server (NAS) is a
   network device or host that contains an SNMP engine implementation,
   utilizing SNMP Transport Models.  It is customary in SNMP documents
   to indicate which subsystem performs specific processing tasks.  In
   this document we leave such decisions to the implementer, as is
   customary for RADIUS documents, and simply specify NAS behavior.
   Such processing would quite likely be implemented in the secure
   transport module or, less likely, in one or more modules of the SNMP
   engine.

1.2.  RADIUS Operational Model

   The RADIUS protocol [RFC2865] provides authentication and
   authorization services for network access devices, usually referred
   to as a Network Access Server (NAS).  The RADIUS protocol operates,
   at the most simple level, as a request-response mechanism.  RADIUS
   Clients, within the NAS, initiate a transaction by sending a RADIUS
   Access-Request message to a RADIUS Server, with which the client
   shares credentials.  The RADIUS Server will respond with either an
   Access-Accept message or an Access-Reject message.

   RADIUS supports authentication methods compatible with plaintext
   username and password mechanisms, MD5 Challenge/Response mechanisms,
   Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) mechanisms, and HTTP Digest
   mechanisms.  Upon presentation of identity and credentials the user
   is either accepted or rejected.  RADIUS servers indicate a successful
   authentication by returning an Access-Accept message.  An Access-
   Reject message indicates unsuccessful authentication.

   Access-Accept messages are populated with one or more service
   provisioning attributes, that control the type and extent of service
   provided to the user at the NAS.  The authorization portion may be
   thought of as service provisioning.  Based on the configuration of
   the user's account on the RADIUS Server, upon authentication the NAS
   is provided with instructions as to what type of service to provide
   to the user.  When that service provisioning does not match the



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   capabilities of the NAS, or of the particular interface to the NAS
   over which the user is requesting access, RFC 2865 [RFC2865] requires
   that the NAS MUST reject the access request.  RFC 2865 describes
   service provisioning attributes for management access to a NAS, as
   well as various terminal emulation and packet forwarding services on
   the NAS.  This memo describes specific RADIUS service provisioning
   attributes that are useful for use with secure transports and SNMP
   Transport Models.

   RADIUS servers are often deployed on an enterprise-wide or
   organization-wide basis, covering a variety of disparate use cases.
   In such deployments, all NASes and all users are serviced by a common
   pool of RADIUS servers.  In many deployments, the RADIUS Server will
   handle requests from many different types of NASes with different
   capabilities, and different types of interfaces, services and
   protocol support.

   In order for a RADIUS server to make the correct authorization
   decision in all cases, the server will often need to know something
   about the type of NAS at which the user is requesting access, the
   type of service that the user is requesting, and the role of the user
   in the organization.  For example, many users may be authorized to
   receive network access via a Remote Access Server (RAS), Virtual
   Private Network (VPN) server, or LAN access switch.  Typically only a
   small sub-set of all users are authorized to access the
   administrative interfaces of network infrastructure devices, e.g. the
   Command Line Interface (CLI) or SNMP engine of switches and routers.

   In order for the RADIUS server to have information regarding the type
   of access being requested, it is common for the NAS (i.e. the RADIUS
   client) to include "hint" attributes in the RADIUS Access-Request
   message, describing the NAS and the type of service being requested.
   This document recommends appropriate "hint" attributes for the SNMP
   service type.

1.3.  RADIUS Usage With Secure Transports

   Some secure transport protocols that can be used with SNMP Transport
   Models have defined authentication protocols supporting several
   authentication methods.  For example, the Secure Shell (SSH)
   Authentication protocol [RFC4252] supports multiple methods (Public
   Key, Password, Host-Based) to authenticate SSH clients.

   SSH Server integration with RADIUS traditionally uses the username
   and password mechanism.

   Secure transport protocols do not, however, specify how the transport
   interfaces to authentication clients, leaving such as implementation



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   specific.  For e.g., the "password" method of SSH authentication
   primarily describes how passwords are acquired from the SSH client
   and transported to the SSH server, the interpretation of the password
   and validation against password databases is left to SSH server
   implementations.  SSH server implementations often use the Pluggable
   Authentication Modules (PAM)
   [http://www.opengroup.org/rfc/rfc86.0.html] interface provided by
   operating systems such as Linux and Solaris to integrate with
   password based network authentication mechanisms such as RADIUS,
   TACACS+, Kerberos, etc.

   Secure transports do not typically specify how to utilize
   authorization information obtained from an AAA service, such as
   RADIUS.  More often, user authentication is sufficient to cause the
   secure transport server to begin delivering service to the user.
   Access control in these situations is supplied by the application to
   which the secure transport server session is attached.  For example,
   if the application is a Linux shell, the user's access rights are
   controlled by that user account's group membership and the file
   system access protections.  This behavior does not closely follow the
   traditional service provisioning model of AAA systems, such as
   RADIUS.

1.4.  SNMP Transport Models

   The Transport Subsystem for SNMP [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] defines a
   mechanism for providing transport layer security for SNMP, allowing
   protocols such as SSH and TLS to be used to secure SNMP
   communication.  The Transport Subsystem allows the modular definition
   of Transport Models for multiple secure transport protocols.
   Transport Models rely upon the underlying secure transport for user
   authentication services.  The Transport Model (TM) then maps the
   authenticated identity to a model-independent principal, which it
   stores in the tmStateReference.  When the selected security model is
   the Transport Security Model (TSM), the expected behavior is for the
   securityName to be set by the TSM from the authenticated principal
   information stored in the tmStateReference by the TM.

   The Secure Shell protocol provides a secure transport channel with
   support for channel authentication via local accounts and integration
   with various external authentication and authorization services such
   as RADIUS, Kerberos, etc.  The Secure Shell Transport Model
   [I-D.ietf-isms-secshell] defines the use of the Secure Shell protocol
   as the basis for a Transport Model.







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2.  RADIUS Usage for SNMP Transport Models

   There are three ways in which RADIUS may be used by SNMP Transport
   Models.  These include (a) user authentication, (b) service
   authorization and (c) access control authorization.  The first two
   items are discussed in detail in this memo, while the third item is a
   topic of current research, and beyond the scope of this document.
   This document describes the way in which RADIUS attributes and
   messages are applied to the specific application area of SNMP
   Transport Models.

   User authentication for SNMP Transport Models has the same syntax and
   semantics as user authentication for any other network service.  In
   the context of SNMP the "user" is thought of as a "principal" and may
   represent a host, an application or a human.

   Service authorization allows a RADIUS server to authorize an
   authenticated principal to use SNMP over a specific secure Transport
   Model.  This memo describes mechanisms by which such information can
   be requested from a RADIUS server and enforced within the NAS.  The
   SNMP architecture, as described in RFC 3411 [RFC3411], does not make
   a distinction between user authentication and service authorization.
   In the case of existing, deployed security models, such as the User-
   based Security Model (USM), this distinction is not significant.  For
   the SNMP Transport Models and the SNMP Transport Security Model
   (TSM), this distinction is relevant and important.

   It is relevant because of the way in which SSH implementations have
   traditionally integrated with RADIUS Clients.  Those SSH
   implementations traditionally seek to obtain user authentication
   (e.g. validation of a username and password) from an outside
   authentication service, often via a Pluggable Authentication Module
   (PAM) style interface.  The service authorization in traditional SSH
   server implementations comes via the restrictions that the operating
   system (OS) shell (and file system, etc.) place on the user by means
   of access controls tied to the username or the username's membership
   in various user groups.  These OS-style access controls are distinct
   from the service provisioning features of RADIUS.  If we wish to use
   existing SSH server implementations, or slightly adapt them, for use
   with SNMP Transport Models, and we wish to support RADIUS-provisioned
   service authorization, we need to be aware that the RADIUS service
   authorization information will need to be obtained by the relevant
   SNMP modules from the SSH module.

   One reason that RADIUS-provisioned service authorization is important
   is that in many deployments the RADIUS server's back-end
   authentication database contains credentials for many classes of
   users, only a small portion of which may be authorized to access the



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   management interfaces of managed entities (NASes) via SNMP.  This is
   in contrast to the way USM for SNMP works, in which all principals
   entered to the local configuration data-store are authorized for
   access to the managed entity.  In the absence of RADIUS-provisioned
   service authorization, network management access may be granted to
   unauthorized, but properly authenticated, users.  With SNMPv3, an
   appropriately configured Access Control Model would serve to
   alleviate the risk of unauthorized access.

   Data object access control authorization in SNMP is handled by the
   Access Control Subsystem (ACS), instantiated as various Access
   Control Models.  The SNMP architecture, as described in RFC 3411
   [RFC3411], explicitly mandates the separation of authentication and
   authorization operations in order to retain modularity of the SNMP
   system.  The Abstract Service Interface (ASI) of the ACS uses method-
   independent parameters, including securityName, to determine access
   control rights.  A detailed description of how an Access Control
   Model (ACM) might utilize the services of a RADIUS client to obtain
   access control policy information is a topic of current research, and
   beyond the scope of this document.

2.1.  RADIUS Authentication for Transport Protocols

   This document will rely on implementation specific integration of the
   transport protocols with RADIUS clients for user authentication.

   It is RECOMMENDED that the integration of RADIUS clients with
   transport protocols utilize appropriate "hint" attributes in RADIUS
   Access-Request messages, to signal to the RADIUS server the type of
   service being requested over the transport session.  Specific
   attributes for use with SNMP Transport Models are recommended in this
   document.

   RADIUS servers, compliant to this specification, MAY use RADIUS hint
   attributes, as described herein, to inform the decision whether to
   accept or reject the authentication request.

2.2.  RADIUS Authorization for Transport Protocols

   In compliance with RFC 2865, NASes MUST enforce implicitly mandatory
   attributes, such as Service-Type, within an Access-Accept message.
   NASes MUST treat Access-Accept Messages that attempt to provision
   unsupported services as if they were an Access-Reject.  NASes SHOULD
   treat unknown attributes as if they were provisioning unsupported
   services.  See [RFC5080] for additional details.

   A NAS that is compliant to this specification, MUST treat any RADIUS
   Access-Accept message that provisions a transport protocol (e.g.



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   SSH) that cannot be provided, and/or application service (e.g.  SNMP)
   that cannot be provided over that transport, as if an Access-Reject
   message had been received instead.  The RADIUS Service-Type attribute
   is the primary indicator of the service being provisioned, although
   other attributes may also convey service provisioning information.
   Specific attributes for use with SNMP Transport Models are
   recommended in this document.

   For traditional SSH usage, RADIUS servers typically provision
   management access service, as SSH is often used to access the command
   line shell of a host system, e.g. the NAS.  RFC 2865 defines two
   types of management access service attributes, one for privileged
   access to the Command Line Interface (CLI) of the NAS and one for
   non-privileged CLI access.  These traditional management access
   services are not used with SNMP.
   [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization] describes further RADIUS
   service provisioning attributes for management access to the NAS,
   including SNMP access.

2.3.  SNMP Service Authorization

   The Transport Subsystem for SNMP [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] defines the
   notion of a session, although the specifics of how sessions are
   managed is left to Transport Models.  The Transport Subsystem defines
   some basic requirements for transport protocols around creation and
   deletion of sessions.  This memo specifies additional requirements
   for transport protocols during session creation, and for session
   termination.

   RADIUS servers compliant to this specification SHOULD use RADIUS
   service provisioning attributes, as described herein, to specify SNMP
   access over a secure transport protocol.  Such RADIUS servers MAY use
   RADIUS hint attributes included in the Access-Request message, as
   described herein, in determining what, if any, service to provision.

   NASes compliant to this specification MUST use RADIUS service
   provisioning attributes, as described in this section, when they are
   present in a RADIUS Access-Accept message, to determine whether the
   session can be created and MUST enforce the service provisioning
   decisions of the RADIUS server.

   The following RADIUS attributes SHOULD be used, as hint attributes
   included in the Access-Request message to signal use of SNMP over a
   secure transport (i.e. authPriv) to the RADIUS server:

   1.  Service-Type with a value of Framed-Management.





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   2.  Framed-Management-Protocol with a value of SNMP.
   3.  Management-Transport-Protection with a value of Integrity-
       Confidentiality-Protection.

   Refer to [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization] for a detailed
   description of these attributes.  From the perspective of the RADIUS
   Server, these attribute and value pairs indicate that the user is
   requesting to use SNMP over an SNMP secure Transport Model.

   The following RADIUS attributes are used in an Access-Accept message
   to provision SNMP over a secure transport (i.e. authPriv):

   1.  Service-Type with a value of Framed-Management.
   2.  Framed-Management-Protocol with a value of SNMP.
   3.  Management-Transport-Protection with a value of Integrity-
       Confidentiality-Protection.

   Refer to [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization] for a detailed
   description of these attributes.  From the perspective of the NAS,
   these attribute and value pairs indicate that the user is authorized
   to use SNMP using an SNMP secure Transport Model.

   The following RADIUS attributes MAY be optionally used, to authorize
   use of SNMP without protection (i.e. authNoPriv):

   1.  Service-Type with a value of Framed-Management.
   2.  Framed-Management-Protocol with a value of SNMP.
   3.  Management-Transport-Protection with a value of No-Protection.

   Refer to [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization] for a detailed
   description of this attribute.  From the perspective of the NAS, this
   attribute and value pair indicates that the user is authorized to use
   SNMP without a protected transport.

   There are no combinations of RADIUS attributes that denote the
   equivalent of SNMP noAuthNoPriv access, as RADIUS always involves the
   authentication of a user (i.e. a principal) as a prerequisite for
   authorization.  RADIUS can be used to to provide an "Authorize-Only"
   service, but only when the request contains a "cookie" from a
   previous successful authentication with the same RADIUS server (i.e.
   the RADIUS State Attribute).

   The following RADIUS attributes are used to limit the extent of a
   secure transport session carrying SNMP traffic, in conjunction with
   an SNMP Transport Model:






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   1.  Session-Timeout
   2.  Inactivity-Timeout.

   Refer to [RFC2865] for a detailed description of these attributes.
   From the perspective of the NAS, these attributes indicate session
   timeouts to be applied to the secure transport sessions.  The
   Session-Timeout Attribute indicates the maximum number of seconds
   that a session may exist before it is unconditionally disconnected.
   The Inactivity-Timeout Attribute indicates the maximum number of
   seconds that a transport session may exist without any protocol
   activity (messages sent or received) before the session is
   disconnected.  These timeouts are enforced by the NAS.

2.4.  SNMP Access Control Authorization

   [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization] describes a RADIUS
   attribute that can be used for SNMP access control authorization,
   however, the details of how an SNMP Access Control Model, such as the
   View-based Access Control Model (VACM) [RFC3415], might utilize
   RADIUS authorization are a topic of current research, and beyond the
   scope of this document.


3.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
   in which kinds of packets, and in what quantity.
























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  Access-
  Request Accept Reject Challenge  #    Attribute
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
  0-1     0        0        0       1   User-Name  [RFC2865]
  0-1     0        0        0       2   User-Password  [RFC2865]
  0-1     0        0        0       4   NAS-IP-Address  [RFC2865]
  0-1     0-1      0        0       6   Service-Type  [RFC2865]
  0-1     0-1      0        0-1    24   State  [RFC2865]
  0       0-1      0        0      27   Session-Timeout  [RFC2865]
  0       0-1      0        0      28   Idle-Timeout  [RFC2865]
  0-1     0-1      0-1      0-1    80   Message-Authenticator  [RFC3579]
  0-1     0-1      0        0     TBA-2 Framed-Management-Protocol
                              [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization]
  0-1     0-1      0        0     TBA-3 Management-Transport-Protection
                              [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization]
  0       0+       0        0     TBA-4 Management-Policy-Id
                              [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization]

  The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.

  0    This attribute MUST NOT be present in a packet.
  0+   Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be present in
       a packet.
  0-1  Zero or one instance of this attribute MAY be present in
       a packet.
  1    Exactly one instance of this attribute MUST be present in
       a packet.

   Note that this document does not describe the usage of RADIUS
   Accounting, nor Dynamic RADIUS Re-Authorization.  Such RADIUS usages
   are not currently envisioned for SNMP, and are beyond the scope of
   this document.


4.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no requests of IANA for new allocations, however
   there are placeholder values ("TBA-n") in Section 3, that refer to
   IANA assignments to be made in
   [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization], which should be replaced
   with actual values in this document, based on the corresponding IANA
   assignments for [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization].

   Note to RFC Editor: This section should be removed upon publication
   of this document as an RFC.






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5.  Security Considerations

   This specification describes the use of RADIUS for purposes of
   authentication and authorization.  Threats and security issues for
   this application are described in [RFC3579] and [RFC3580]; security
   issues encountered in roaming are described in [RFC2607].

   Additional security considerations for use of SNMP with secure
   Transport Models [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] and the Transport Security
   Model [I-D.ietf-isms-transport-security-model] are found in the
   Security Considerations sections of the respective documents.

   If the SNMP Message Processing Module selects the SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c
   Security Model as the security model to use (because the message is
   SNMPv1 or SNMPv2), then securityName comes from the community name,
   as per RFC3584.  This may not be what is expected when using an SNMP
   secure Transport Model.  It is NOT RECOMMENDED that a combination of
   a secure transport, RADIUS authentication/authorization, and the
   SNMPv1 and/or SNMPv2c community models be used together, as it
   necessitates the opening of an insecure access path within the Access
   Control Subsystem.

   If the SNMP User-based Security Model is selected (because the SNMPv3
   message contains a msgSecurityModel=USM), then securityName is
   determined using USM (after performing USM authentication).  This may
   not be what is expected when using an SNMP secure Transport Model
   with an external authentication service, such as RADIUS.  USM entries
   for noAuthNoPriv access would allow messages utilizing USM to bypass
   the secure transport.

   There are good reasons to provision USM access in tandem with AAA-
   based access, however.  When the network is under duress, or the AAA-
   service is unreachable, for any reason, it is important to have
   access credentials stored in the local configuration data-store of
   the managed entity.  USM credentials are a likely way to fulfill this
   requirement.  This is analogous to configuring a local "root"
   password in the "/etc/passwd" file of a UNIX workstation, to be used
   as a backup means of login, for times when the Network Information
   Service (NIS) authentication service is unreachable.

   The Message-Authenticator (80) attribute SHOULD be used with RADIUS
   messages that are described in this memo, as defined in [RFC3579].


6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of David
   Harrington and Juergen Schoenwaelder for numerous helpful discussions



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   in this space, and Wes Hardaker for his thoughtful review comments.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-isms-secshell]
              Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
              Shell Transport Model for SNMP",
              draft-ietf-isms-secshell-12 (work in progress),
              October 2008.

   [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]
              Harrington, D. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Transport Subsystem
              for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              draft-ietf-isms-tmsm-13 (work in progress), August 2008.

   [I-D.ietf-isms-transport-security-model]
              Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
              for SNMP", draft-ietf-isms-transport-security-model-09
              (work in progress), October 2008.

   [I-D.ietf-radext-management-authorization]
              Nelson, D. and G. Weber, "Remote Authentication Dial-In
              User Service (RADIUS) Authorization for  Network Access
              Server (NAS) Management",
              draft-ietf-radext-management-authorization-06 (work in
              progress), October 2008.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC4252]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2607]  Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
              Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.

   [RFC3411]  Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
              Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
              Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,



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              December 2002.

   [RFC3415]  Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based
              Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network
              Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415,
              December 2002.

   [RFC3579]  Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
              Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

   [RFC3580]  Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., and J. Roese,
              "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
              (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.

   [RFC5080]  Nelson, D. and A. DeKok, "Common Remote Authentication
              Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Implementation Issues and
              Suggested Fixes", RFC 5080, December 2007.


Authors' Addresses

   Kaushik Narayan
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   10 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Phone: +1.408.526.8168
   Email: kaushik_narayan@yahoo.com


   David Nelson
   Elbrys Networks, Inc.
   75 Rochester Ave, Unit #3,
   Portsmouth, NH  03801
   USA

   Phone: +1.603.570.2636
   Email: d.b.nelson@comcast.net











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