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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 RFC 5591

Network Working Group                                      D. Harrington
Internet-Draft                                 Huawei Technologies (USA)
Intended status: Standards Track                             W. Hardaker
Expires: November 7, 2009                                   Sparta, Inc.
                                                             May 6, 2009


                   Transport Security Model for SNMP
              draft-ietf-isms-transport-security-model-14

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may contain material
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 7, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   This memo describes a Transport Security Model for the Simple Network
   Management Protocol.

   This memo also defines a portion of the Management Information Base
   (MIB) for monitoring and managing the Transport Security Model for
   SNMP.





































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.4.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.5.  Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.  How the Transport Security Model Fits in the Architecture  . .  6
     2.1.  Security Capabilities of this Model  . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.1.1.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.1.2.  Security Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.2.  Transport Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.3.  Coexistence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.3.1.  Coexistence with Message Processing Models . . . . . .  8
       2.3.2.  Coexistence with Other Security Models . . . . . . . .  9
       2.3.3.  Coexistence with Transport Models  . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  Cached Information and References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.  Transport Security Model Cached Information  . . . . . . .  9
       3.1.1.  securityStateReference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.1.2.  tmStateReference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.1.3.  Prefixes and securityNames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Processing an Outgoing Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  Security Processing for an Outgoing Message  . . . . . . . 11
     4.2.  Elements of Procedure for Outgoing Messages  . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Processing an Incoming SNMP Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.1.  Security Processing for an Incoming Message  . . . . . . . 13
     5.2.  Elements of Procedure for Incoming Messages  . . . . . . . 14
   6.  MIB Module Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.1.  Structure of the MIB Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       6.1.1.  The snmpTsmStats Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       6.1.2.  The snmpTsmConfiguration Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.2.  Relationship to Other MIB Modules  . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       6.2.1.  MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   7.  MIB module definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     8.1.  MIB module security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Appendix A.  Notification Tables Configuration . . . . . . . . . . 25
     A.1.  Transport Security Model Processing for Notifications  . . 27
   Appendix B.  Processing Differences between USM and Secure
                Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     B.1.  USM and the RFC3411 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     B.2.  Transport Subsystem and the RFC3411 Architecture . . . . . 28



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1.  Introduction

   This memo describes a Transport Security Model for the Simple Network
   Management Protocol, for use with secure Transport Models in the
   Transport Subsystem [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm].

   This memo also defines a portion of the Management Information Base
   (MIB) for monitoring and managing the Transport Security Model for
   SNMP.

   It is important to understand the SNMP architecture and the
   terminology of the architecture to understand where the Transport
   Security Model described in this memo fits into the architecture and
   interacts with other subsystems and models within the architecture.
   It is expected that reader will have also read and understood RFC3411
   [RFC3411], RFC3412 [RFC3412], RFC3413 [RFC3413], and RFC3418
   [RFC3418].

1.1.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework

   For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
   Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
   RFC 3410 [RFC3410].

   Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
   the Management Information Base or MIB.  MIB objects are generally
   accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
   Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
   Structure of Management Information (SMI).  This memo specifies a MIB
   module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58,
   RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580
   [RFC2580].

1.2.  Conventions

   For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document
   favors terminology as defined in STD62 rather than favoring
   terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications that use
   different variations of the same terminology.  This is consistent
   with the IESG decision to not require the SNMPv3 terminology be
   modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP specifications when
   SNMPv3 was advanced to Full Standard.

   Authentication in this document typically refers to the English
   meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of" the message, not
   data source authentication or peer identity authentication.

   The terms "manager" and "agent" are not used in this document,



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   because in the RFC 3411 architecture, all SNMP entities have the
   capability of acting as either manager or agent or both depending on
   the SNMP applications included in the engine.  Where distinction is
   needed, the application names of Command Generator, Command
   Responder, Notification Originator, Notification Receiver, and Proxy
   Forwarder are used.  See "SNMP Applications" [RFC3413] for further
   information.

   While security protocols frequently refer to a user, the terminology
   used in RFC3411 [RFC3411] and in this memo is "principal".  A
   principal is the "who" on whose behalf services are provided or
   processing takes place.  A principal can be, among other things, an
   individual acting in a particular role; a set of individuals, with
   each acting in a particular role; an application or a set of
   applications, or a combination of these within an administrative
   domain.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Non uppercased versions of the keywords should be read as in normal
   English.  They will usually, but not always, be used in a context
   relating to compatibility with the RFC3411 architecture or the
   subsystem defined here, but which might have no impact on on-the-wire
   compatibility.  These terms are used as guidance for designers of
   proposed IETF models to make the designs compatible with RFC3411
   subsystems and Abstract Service Interfaces (ASIs) (see section 3.2).
   Implementers are free to implement differently.  Some usages of these
   lowercase terms are simply normal English usage.

1.3.  Modularity

   The reader is expected to have read and understood the description of
   the SNMP architecture, as defined in [RFC3411], and the architecture
   extension specified in "Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network
   Management Protocol" [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm], which enables the use of
   external "lower layer transport" protocols to provide message
   security, tied into the SNMP architecture through the Transport
   Subsystem.  The Transport Security Model is designed to work with
   such lower-layer secure Transport Models.

   In keeping with the RFC 3411 design decisions to use self-contained
   documents, this memo includes the elements of procedure plus
   associated MIB objects which are needed for processing the Transport
   Security Model for SNMP.  These MIB objects SHOULD NOT be referenced
   in other documents.  This allows the Transport Security Model to be
   designed and documented as independent and self-contained, having no



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   direct impact on other modules, and allowing this module to be
   upgraded and supplemented as the need arises, and to move along the
   standards track on different time-lines from other modules.

   This modularity of specification is not meant to be interpreted as
   imposing any specific requirements on implementation.

1.4.  Motivation

   This memo describes a Security Model to make use of Transport Models
   that use lower layer secure transports and existing and commonly
   deployed security infrastructures.  This Security Model is designed
   to meet the security and operational needs of network administrators,
   maximize usability in operational environments to achieve high
   deployment success and at the same time minimize implementation and
   deployment costs to minimize the time until deployment is possible.

1.5.  Constraints

   The design of this SNMP Security Model is also influenced by the
   following constraints:

   1.  In times of network stress, the security protocol and its
       underlying security mechanisms SHOULD NOT depend solely upon the
       ready availability of other network services (e.g., Network Time
       Protocol (NTP) or Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
       (AAA) protocols).

   2.  When the network is not under stress, the Security Model and its
       underlying security mechanisms MAY depend upon the ready
       availability of other network services.

   3.  It might not be possible for the Security Model to determine when
       the network is under stress.

   4.  A Security Model SHOULD NOT require changes to the SNMP
       architecture.

   5.  A Security Model SHOULD NOT require changes to the underlying
       security protocol.

2.  How the Transport Security Model Fits in the Architecture

   The Transport Security Model is designed to fit into the RFC3411
   architecture as a Security Model in the Security Subsystem, and to
   utilize the services of a secure Transport Model.

   For incoming messages, a secure Transport Model will pass a



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   tmStateReference cache, described later.  To maintain RFC3411
   modularity, the Transport Model will not know which securityModel
   will process the incoming message; the Message Processing Model will
   determine this.  If the Transport Security Model is used with a non-
   secure Transport Model, then the cache will not exist or not be
   populated with security parameters, which will cause the Transport
   Security Model to return an error (see section 5.2)

   The Transport Security Model will create the securityName and
   securityLevel to be passed to applications, and verify that the
   tmTransportSecurityLevel reported by the Transport Model is at least
   as strong as the securityLevel requested by the Message Processing
   Model.

   For outgoing messages, the Transport Security Model will create a
   tmStateReference cache (or use an existing one), and pass the
   tmStateReference to the specified Transport Model.

2.1.  Security Capabilities of this Model

2.1.1.  Threats

   The Transport Security Model is compatible with the RFC3411
   architecture, and provides protection against the threats identified
   by the RFC 3411 architecture.  However, the Transport Security Model
   does not provide security mechanisms such as authentication and
   encryption itself.  Which threats are addressed and how they are
   mitigated depends on the Transport Model used.  To avoid creating
   potential security vulnerabilities, operators should configure their
   system so this Security Model is always used with a Transport Model
   that provides appropriate security, where "appropriate" for a
   particular deployment is an administrative decision.

2.1.2.  Security Levels

   The RFC 3411 architecture recognizes three levels of security:

      - without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv)

      - with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv)

      - with authentication and with privacy (authPriv)

   The model-independent securityLevel parameter is used to request
   specific levels of security for outgoing messages, and to assert that
   specific levels of security were applied during the transport and
   processing of incoming messages.




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   The transport layer algorithms used to provide security should not be
   exposed to the Transport Security Model, as the Transport Security
   Model has no mechanisms by which it can test whether an assertion
   made by a Transport Model is accurate.

   The Transport Security Model trusts that the underlying secure
   transport connection has been properly configured to support security
   characteristics at least as strong as reported in
   tmTransportSecurityLevel.

2.2.  Transport Sessions

   The Transport Security Model does not work with transport sessions
   directly.  Instead the transport-related state is associated with a
   unique combination of transportDomain, transportAddress, securityName
   and securityLevel, and referenced via the tmStateReference parameter.
   How and if this is mapped to a particular transport or channel is the
   responsibility of the Transport Subsystem.

2.3.  Coexistence

   In the RFC3411 architecture, a Message Processing Model determines
   which Security Model SHALL be called.  As of this writing, IANA has
   registered four Message Processing Models (SNMPv1, SNMPv2c, SNMPv2u/
   SNMPv2*, and SNMPv3) and three other Security Models (SNMPv1,
   SNMPv2c, and the User-based Security Model).

2.3.1.  Coexistence with Message Processing Models

   The SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c message processing described in RFC3584 (BCP
   74) [RFC3584] always selects the SNMPv1(1) and SNMPv2c(2) Security
   Models.  Since there is no mechanism defined in RFC3584 to select an
   alternative Security Model, SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c messages cannot use
   the Transport Security Model.  Messages might still be able to be
   conveyed over a secure transport protocol, but the Transport Security
   Model will not be invoked.

   The SNMPv2u/SNMPv2* Message Processing Model is a historic artifact
   for which there is no existing IETF specification.

   The SNMPv3 message processing defined in RFC3412 [RFC3412], extracts
   the securityModel from the msgSecurityModel field of an incoming
   SNMPv3Message.  When this value is transportSecurityModel(YY),
   security processing is directed to the Transport Security Model.  For
   an outgoing message to be secured using the Transport Security Model,
   the application MUST specify a securityModel parameter value of
   transportSecurityModel(YY) in the sendPdu Application Service
   Interface (ASI).



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   [-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace YY with actual IANA-assigned number,
   and remove this note. ]

2.3.2.  Coexistence with Other Security Models

   The Transport Security Model uses its own MIB module for processing
   to maintain independence from other Security Models.  This allows the
   Transport Security Model to coexist with other Security Models, such
   as the User-based Security Model [RFC3414].

2.3.3.  Coexistence with Transport Models

   The Transport Security Model MAY work with multiple Transport Models,
   but the RFC3411 application service interfaces (ASIs) do not carry a
   value for the Transport Model.  The MIB module defined in this memo
   allows an administrator to configure whether or not TSM prepends a
   transport model prefix to the securityName.  This will allow SNMP
   applications to consider transport model as a factor when making
   decisions, such as access control, notification generation, and proxy
   forwarding.

   To have SNMP properly utilize the security services coordinated by
   the Transport Security Model, this Security Model MUST only be used
   with Transport Models that know how to process a tmStateReference,
   such as the Secure Shell Transport Model [I-D.ietf-isms-secshell].

3.  Cached Information and References

   When performing SNMP processing, there are two levels of state
   information that might need to be retained: the immediate state
   linking a request-response pair, and potentially longer-term state
   relating to transport and security.  "Transport Subsystem for the
   Simple Network Management Protocol" [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] defines
   general requirements for caches and references.

   This document defines additional cache requirements related to the
   Transport Security Model.

3.1.  Transport Security Model Cached Information

   The Transport Security Model has specific responsibilities regarding
   the cached information.

3.1.1.  securityStateReference

   The Transport Security Model adds the tmStateReference received from
   the processIncomingMsg ASI to the securityStateReference.  This
   tmStateReference can then be retrieved during the generateResponseMsg



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   ASI, so that it can be passed back to the Transport Model.

3.1.2.  tmStateReference

   For outgoing messages, the Transport Security Model uses parameters
   provided by the SNMP application to lookup or create a
   tmStateReference.

   For the Transport Security Model, the security parameters used for a
   response MUST be the same as those used for the corresponding
   request.  This security model uses the tmStateReference stored as
   part of the securityStateReference when appropriate.  For responses
   and reports, this security model sets the tmSameSecurity flag to true
   in the tmStateReference before passing it to a transport model.

   For incoming messages, the Transport Security Model uses parameters
   provided in the tmStateReference cache to establish a securityName,
   and to verify adequate security levels.

3.1.3.  Prefixes and securityNames

   The SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB [RFC3415], the SNMP-TARGET-MIB module
   [RFC3413], and other MIB modules contain objects to configure
   security parameters for use by applications such as access control,
   notification generation, and proxy forwarding.

   Transport domains and their corresponding prefixes are coordinated
   via the IANA registry "SNMP Transport Domains".

   If snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix is set to true then all
   securityNames provided by, or provided to, the Transport Security
   Model MUST include a valid transport domain prefix.

   If snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix is set to false then all
   securityNames provided by, or provided to, the Transport Security
   Model MUST NOT include a transport domain prefix.

   The tmSecurityName in the tmStateReference stored as part of the
   securityStateReference does not contain a prefix.

4.  Processing an Outgoing Message

   An error indication might return an OID and value for an incremented
   counter and a value for securityLevel, and values for contextEngineID
   and contextName for the counter, and the securityStateReference if
   the information is available at the point where the error is
   detected.




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4.1.  Security Processing for an Outgoing Message

   This section describes the procedure followed by the Transport
   Security Model.

   The parameters needed for generating a message are supplied to the
   Security Model by the Message Processing Model via the
   generateRequestMsg() or the generateResponseMsg() ASI.  The Transport
   Subsystem architectural extension has added the transportDomain,
   transportAddress, and tmStateReference parameters to the original
   RFC3411 ASIs.

    statusInformation =                -- success or errorIndication
          generateRequestMsg(
          IN   messageProcessingModel  -- typically, SNMP version
          IN   globalData              -- message header, admin data
          IN   maxMessageSize          -- of the sending SNMP entity
          IN   transportDomain         -- (NEW) specified by application
          IN   transportAddress        -- (NEW) specified by application
          IN   securityModel           -- for the outgoing message
          IN   securityEngineID        -- authoritative SNMP entity
          IN   securityName            -- on behalf of this principal
          IN   securityLevel           -- Level of Security requested
          IN   scopedPDU               -- message (plaintext) payload
          OUT  securityParameters      -- filled in by Security Module
          OUT  wholeMsg                -- complete generated message
          OUT  wholeMsgLength          -- length of generated message
          OUT  tmStateReference        -- (NEW)  transport info
               )






















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  statusInformation = -- success or errorIndication
          generateResponseMsg(
          IN   messageProcessingModel  -- typically, SNMP version
          IN   globalData              -- message header, admin data
          IN   maxMessageSize          -- of the sending SNMP entity
          IN   transportDomain         -- (NEW) specified by application
          IN   transportAddress        -- (NEW) specified by application
          IN   securityModel           -- for the outgoing message
          IN   securityEngineID        -- authoritative SNMP entity
          IN   securityName            -- on behalf of this principal
          IN   securityLevel           -- Level of Security requested
          IN   scopedPDU               -- message (plaintext) payload
          IN   securityStateReference  -- reference to security state
                                       -- information from original
                                       -- request
          OUT  securityParameters      -- filled in by Security Module
          OUT  wholeMsg                -- complete generated message
          OUT  wholeMsgLength          -- length of generated message
          OUT  tmStateReference        -- (NEW) transport info
               )

4.2.  Elements of Procedure for Outgoing Messages

   1) If there is a securityStateReference (Response or Report message),
   then this security model uses the cached information rather than the
   information provided by the ASI.  Extract the tmStateReference from
   the securityStateReference cache.  Set the tmRequestedSecurityLevel
   to the value of the extracted tmTransportSecurityLevel.  Set the
   tmSameSecurity parameter in the tmStateReference cache to true.  The
   cachedSecurityData for this message can now be discarded.

   2) If there is no securityStateReference (e.g., a Request-type or
   Notification message) then create a tmStateReference cache.  Set
   tmTransportDomain to the value of transportDomain, tmTransportAddress
   to the value of transportAddress, and tmRequestedSecurityLevel to the
   value of securityLevel.  (Implementers might optimize by pointing to
   saved copies of these session-specific values.)  Set the transaction-
   specific tmSameSecurity parameter to false.

   If the snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object is set to false, then set
   tmSecurityName to the value of securityName.

   If the snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object is set to true, then use
   the transportDomain to look up the corresponding prefix.  (Since the
   securityStateReference stores the tmStateReference with the
   tmSecurityName for the incoming message, and tmSecurityName never has
   a prefix, the prefix stripping step only occurs when we are not using
   the securityStateReference).



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      If the prefix lookup fails for any reason, then the
      snmpTsmUnknownPrefixes counter is incremented, an error indication
      is returned to the calling module, and message processing stops.

      If the lookup succeeds, but there is no prefix in the
      securityName, or the prefix returned does not match the prefix in
      the securityName, or the length of the prefix is less than 1 or
      greater than four US-ASCII alpha-numeric characters, then the
      snmpTsmInvalidPrefixes counter is incremented, an error indication
      is returned to the calling module, and message processing stops.

      Strip the transport-specific prefix and trailing ':' character
      (US-ASCII 0x3a) from the securityName.  Set tmSecurityName to the
      value of securityName.

   3) Set securityParameters to a zero-length OCTET STRING ('0400').

   4) Combine the message parts into a wholeMsg and calculate
   wholeMsgLength.

   5) The wholeMsg, wholeMsgLength, securityParameters and
   tmStateReference are returned to the calling Message Processing Model
   with the statusInformation set to success.

5.  Processing an Incoming SNMP Message

   An error indication might return an OID and value for an incremented
   counter and a value for securityLevel, and values for contextEngineID
   and contextName for the counter, and the securityStateReference if
   the information is available at the point where the error is
   detected.

5.1.  Security Processing for an Incoming Message

   This section describes the procedure followed by the Transport
   Security Model whenever it receives an incoming message from a
   Message Processing Model.  The ASI from a Message Processing Model to
   the Security Subsystem for a received message is:













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   statusInformation =  -- errorIndication or success
                            -- error counter OID/value if error
   processIncomingMsg(
   IN   messageProcessingModel    -- typically, SNMP version
   IN   maxMessageSize            -- from the received message
   IN   securityParameters        -- from the received message
   IN   securityModel             -- from the received message
   IN   securityLevel             -- from the received message
   IN   wholeMsg                  -- as received on the wire
   IN   wholeMsgLength            -- length as received on the wire
   IN   tmStateReference          -- (NEW) from the Transport Model
   OUT  securityEngineID          -- authoritative SNMP entity
   OUT  securityName              -- identification of the principal
   OUT  scopedPDU,                -- message (plaintext) payload
   OUT  maxSizeResponseScopedPDU  -- maximum size sender can handle
   OUT  securityStateReference    -- reference to security state
    )                         -- information, needed for response

5.2.  Elements of Procedure for Incoming Messages

   1) Set the securityEngineID to the local snmpEngineID.

   2) If tmStateReference does not refer to a cache containing values
   for tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName and
   tmTransportSecurityLevel, then the snmpTsmInvalidCaches counter is
   incremented, an error indication is returned to the calling module,
   and Security Model processing stops for this message.

   3) Copy the tmSecurityName to securityName.

   If the snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object is set to true, then use
   the tmTransportDomain to look up the corresponding prefix.

      If the prefix lookup fails for any reason, then the
      snmpTsmUnknownPrefixes counter is incremented, an error indication
      is returned to the calling module, and message processing stops.

      If the lookup succeeds, but the prefix length is less than one or
      greater than four octets, then the snmpTsmInvalidPrefixes counter
      is incremented, an error indication is returned to the calling
      module, and message processing stops.

      Set the securityName to be the concatenation of the prefix, a ':'
      character (US-ASCII 0x3a) and the tmSecurityName.

   4) Compare the value of tmTransportSecurityLevel in the
   tmStateReference cache to the value of the securityLevel parameter
   passed in the processIncomingMsg ASI.  If securityLevel specifies



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   privacy (Priv), and tmTransportSecurityLevel specifies no privacy
   (noPriv), or securityLevel specifies authentication (auth) and
   tmTransportSecurityLevel specifies no authentication (noAuth) was
   provided by the Transport Model, then the
   snmpTsmInadequateSecurityLevels counter is incremented, an error
   indication (unsupportedSecurityLevel) together with the OID and value
   of the incremented counter is returned to the calling module, and
   Transport Security Model processing stops for this message.

   5) The tmStateReference is cached as cachedSecurityData, so that a
   possible response to this message will use the same security
   parameters.  Then securityStateReference is set for subsequent
   reference to this cached data.

   6) The scopedPDU component is extracted from the wholeMsg.

   7) The maxSizeResponseScopedPDU is calculated.  This is the maximum
   size allowed for a scopedPDU for a possible Response message.

   8) The statusInformation is set to success and a return is made to
   the calling module passing back the OUT parameters as specified in
   the processIncomingMsg ASI.

6.  MIB Module Overview

   This MIB module provides objects for use only by the Transport
   Security Model.  It defines a configuration scalar and related error
   counters.

6.1.  Structure of the MIB Module

   Objects in this MIB module are arranged into subtrees.  Each subtree
   is organized as a set of related objects.  The overall structure and
   assignment of objects to their subtrees, and the intended purpose of
   each subtree, is shown below.

6.1.1.  The snmpTsmStats Subtree

   This subtree contains error counters specific to the Transport
   Security Model.

6.1.2.  The snmpTsmConfiguration Subtree

   This subtree contains a configuration object that enables
   administrators to specify if they want a transport domain prefix
   prepended to securityNames for use by applications.





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6.2.  Relationship to Other MIB Modules

   Some management objects defined in other MIB modules are applicable
   to an entity implementing the Transport Security Model.  In
   particular, it is assumed that an entity implementing the Transport
   Security Model will implement the SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [RFC3411], the
   SNMP-TARGET-MIB [RFC3413], the SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB [RFC3415], and
   the SNMPv2-MIB [RFC3418].  These are not needed to implement the
   SNMP-TSM-MIB.

6.2.1.  MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS

   The following MIB module imports items from [RFC2578], [RFC2579], and
   [RFC2580].

7.  MIB module definition


SNMP-TSM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS
    MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
    mib-2, Counter32
      FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- RFC2578
    MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP
      FROM SNMPv2-CONF -- RFC2580
    TruthValue
       FROM SNMPv2-TC -- RFC2579
    ;

snmpTsmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
    LAST-UPDATED "200903090000Z"
    ORGANIZATION "ISMS Working Group"
    CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail:   isms@lists.ietf.org
                  Subscribe:  isms-request@lists.ietf.org

                  Chairs:
                    Juergen Quittek
                    NEC Europe Ltd.
                    Network Laboratories
                    Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
                    69115 Heidelberg
                    Germany
                    +49 6221 90511-15
                    quittek@netlab.nec.de

                    Juergen Schoenwaelder
                    Jacobs University Bremen



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                    Campus Ring 1
                    28725 Bremen
                    Germany
                    +49 421 200-3587
                    j.schoenwaelder@iu-bremen.de

                  Editor:
                    David Harrington
                    Huawei Technologies USA
                    1700 Alma Dr.
                    Plano TX 75075
                    USA
                    +1 603-436-8634
                    ietfdbh@comcast.net

                    Wes Hardaker
                    Sparta, Inc.
                    P.O. Box 382
                    Davis, CA  95617
                    USA
                    +1 530 792 1913
                    ietf@hardakers.net
                 "
    DESCRIPTION "The Transport Security Model MIB

                 In keeping with the RFC 3411 design decisions
                 to use self-contained documents, the RFC which
                 contains the definition of this MIB module also
                 includes the elements of procedure which are
                 needed for processing the Transport Security
                 Model for SNMP. These MIB objects
                 SHOULD NOT be modified via other subsystems
                 or models defined in other documents.
                 This allows the Transport Security Model
                 for SNMP to be designed and documented as
                 independent and self- contained, having no
                 direct impact on other modules, and this
                 allows this module to be upgraded and
                 supplemented as the need arises, and to
                 move along the standards track on different
                 time-lines from other modules.

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
    authors of the MIB module. All rights reserved.

    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
    modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
    are met:



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    - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
    - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
      copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
      disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
      with the distribution.
    - Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor the
      names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or promote
      products derived from this software without specific prior written
      permission.

    THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND
    CONTRIBUTORS 'AS IS' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
    INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
    DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR
    CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
    SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
    LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF
    USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED
    AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
    LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
    ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

    This version of this MIB module is part of RFC XXXX;
    see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace XXXX with actual RFC number
--                     for this document and remove this note
                "

    REVISION    "200903090000Z"
    DESCRIPTION "The initial version, published in RFC XXXX.
-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace XXXX with actual RFC number
--                     for this document and remove this note
                "

    ::= { mib-2 xxxx }
-- RFC Ed.: replace xxxx with IANA-assigned number and
--          remove this note

-- ---------------------------------------------------------- --
-- subtrees in the SNMP-TSM-MIB
-- ---------------------------------------------------------- --

snmpTsmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTsmMIB 0 }
snmpTsmMIBObjects    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTsmMIB 1 }
snmpTsmConformance   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTsmMIB 2 }



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-- -------------------------------------------------------------
-- Objects
-- -------------------------------------------------------------

-- Statistics for the Transport Security Model


snmpTsmStats         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTsmMIBObjects 1 }

snmpTsmInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The number of incoming messages dropped because the
                 tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache.
                "
    ::= { snmpTsmStats 1 }

snmpTsmInadequateSecurityLevels OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The number of incoming messages dropped because
                 the securityLevel asserted by the transport model was
                 less than the securityLevel requested by the
                 application.
                "
    ::= { snmpTsmStats 2 }

snmpTsmUnknownPrefixes OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The number of messages dropped because
                 snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix was set to true and
                 there is no known prefix for the specified transport
                 domain.
                "
    ::= { snmpTsmStats 3 }

snmpTsmInvalidPrefixes OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The number of messages dropped because
                 the securityName associated with an outgoing message
                 did not contain a valid transport domain prefix.
                "



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    ::= { snmpTsmStats 4 }

-- -------------------------------------------------------------
-- Configuration
-- -------------------------------------------------------------

-- Configuration for the Transport Security Model


snmpTsmConfiguration   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTsmMIBObjects 2 }

snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      TruthValue
    MAX-ACCESS  read-write
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION "If this object is set to true then securityNames
                 passing to and from the application are expected to
                 contain a transport domain specific prefix. If this
                 object is set to true then a domain specific prefix
                 will be added by the TSM to the securityName for
                 incoming messages and removed from the securityName
                 when processing outgoing messages. Transport domains
                 and prefixes are maintained in a registry by IANA.
                 This object SHOULD persist across system reboots.
                "
    DEFVAL { false }
    ::= { snmpTsmConfiguration 1 }

-- -------------------------------------------------------------
-- snmpTsmMIB - Conformance Information
-- -------------------------------------------------------------

snmpTsmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTsmConformance 1 }

snmpTsmGroups      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTsmConformance 2 }

-- -------------------------------------------------------------
-- Compliance statements
-- -------------------------------------------------------------

snmpTsmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support
                 the SNMP-TSM-MIB
                "
    MODULE
        MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpTsmGroup }
    ::= { snmpTsmCompliances 1 }



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-- -------------------------------------------------------------
-- Units of conformance
-- -------------------------------------------------------------
snmpTsmGroup OBJECT-GROUP
    OBJECTS {
        snmpTsmInvalidCaches,
        snmpTsmInadequateSecurityLevels,
        snmpTsmUnknownPrefixes,
        snmpTsmInvalidPrefixes,
        snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix
    }
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION "A collection of objects for maintaining
                 information of an SNMP engine which implements
                 the SNMP Transport Security Model.
                "

    ::= { snmpTsmGroups 2 }


END


8.  Security Considerations

   This document describes a Security Model, compatible with the RFC3411
   architecture, that permits SNMP to utilize security services provided
   through an SNMP Transport Model.  The Transport Security Model relies
   on Transport Models for mutual authentication, binding of keys,
   confidentiality and integrity.

   The Transport Security Model relies on secure Transport Models to
   provide an authenticated principal identifier and an assertion of
   whether authentication and privacy are used during transport.  This
   Security Model SHOULD always be used with Transport Models that
   provide adequate security, but "adequate security" is a configuration
   and/or run-time decision of the operator or management application.
   The security threats and how these threats are mitigated should be
   covered in detail in the specifications of the Transport Models and
   the underlying secure transports.

   An authenticated principal identifier (securityName) is used in SNMP
   applications, for purposes such as access control, notification
   generation, and proxy forwarding.  This security model supports
   multiple transport models.  Operators might judge some transports to
   be more secure than others, so this security model can be configured
   to prepend a prefix to the securityName to indicate the transport
   model used to authenticate the principal.  Operators can use the



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   prefixed securityName when making application decisions about levels
   of access.

8.1.  MIB module security

   There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module
   with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create.  Such
   objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
   environments.  The support for SET operations in a non-secure
   environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on
   network operations.  These are the tables and objects and their
   sensitivity/vulnerability:

   o  The snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object could be modified,
      creating a denial of service or authorizing SNMP messages that
      would not have previously been authorized by an Access Control
      Model (e.g. the VACM).

   Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
   MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
   vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus important to
   control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
   to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
   the network via SNMP.  These are the tables and objects and their
   sensitivity/vulnerability:

   o  All the counters in this module refer to configuration errors and
      do not expose sensitive information.

   SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
   Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPsec),
   even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
   allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects
   in this MIB module.

   It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as
   provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410] section 8), including
   full support for the USM and Transport Security Model cryptographic
   mechanisms (for authentication and privacy).

   Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.  Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
   enable cryptographic security.  It is then a customer/operator
   responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
   instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
   the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
   rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.




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9.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to assign:

   1.  an SMI number with a prefix of mib-2, in the MIB module registry
       under http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers, for the MIB
       module in this document,

   2.  a value, preferably 4, to identify the Transport Security Model,
       in the Security Models registry at
       http://www.iana.org/assignments/snmp-number-spaces.  This should
       result in the following table of values:

   Value   Description                         References
   -----   -----------                         ----------
     0     reserved for 'any'                  [RFC3411]
     1     reserved for SNMPv1                 [RFC3411]
     2     reserved for SNMPv2c                [RFC3411]
     3     User-Based Security Model (USM)     [RFC3411]
     YY    Transport Security Model (TSM)      [RFCXXXX]

   -- NOTE to RFC editor: replace XXXX with actual RFC number
   --                     for this document and remove this note
   -- NOTE to RFC editor: replace YY with actual IANA-assigned number,
                          throughout this document and remove this note.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The editors would like to thank Jeffrey Hutzelman for sharing his SSH
   insights, and Dave Shield for an outstanding job wordsmithing the
   existing document to improve organization and clarity.

   Additionally, helpful document reviews were received from: Juergen
   Schoenwaelder.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]                 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
                             Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
                             RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2578]                 McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and
                             J. Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of
                             Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)",
                             STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999.




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   [RFC2579]                 McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and
                             J. Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions
                             for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.

   [RFC2580]                 McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J.
                             Schoenwaelder, "Conformance Statements for
                             SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999.

   [RFC3411]                 Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen,
                             "An Architecture for Describing Simple
                             Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
                             Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
                             December 2002.

   [RFC3412]                 Case, J., Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and
                             B. Wijnen, "Message Processing and
                             Dispatching for the Simple Network
                             Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
                             RFC 3412, December 2002.

   [RFC3413]                 Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart,
                             "Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
                             Applications", STD 62, RFC 3413,
                             December 2002.

   [RFC3414]                 Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based
                             Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the
                             Simple Network Management Protocol
                             (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002.

   [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]      Harrington, D. and J. Schoenwaelder,
                             "Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network
                             Management Protocol (SNMP)",
                             draft-ietf-isms-tmsm-17 (work in progress),
                             April 2009.

11.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3410]                 Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B.
                             Stewart, "Introduction and Applicability
                             Statements for Internet-Standard Management
                             Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002.

   [RFC3415]                 Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie,
                             "View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for
                             the Simple Network Management Protocol
                             (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415, December 2002.




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   [RFC3418]                 Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base
                             (MIB) for the Simple Network Management
                             Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3418,
                             December 2002.

   [RFC3584]                 Frye, R., Levi, D., Routhier, S., and B.
                             Wijnen, "Coexistence between Version 1,
                             Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-
                             standard Network Management Framework",
                             BCP 74, RFC 3584, August 2003.

   [I-D.ietf-isms-secshell]  Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W.
                             Hardaker, "Secure Shell Transport Model for
                             SNMP", draft-ietf-isms-secshell-16 (work in
                             progress), April 2009.

Appendix A.  Notification Tables Configuration

   The SNMP-TARGET-MIB and SNMP-NOTIFICATION-MIB [RFC3413] are used to
   configure notification originators with the destinations to which
   notifications should be sent.

   Most of the configuration is security-model-independent and
   transport-model-independent.

   The values we will use in the examples for the five model-independent
   security and transport parameters are:

      transportDomain = snmpSSHDomain

      transportAddress = 192.0.2.1:PPP

      securityModel = Transport Security Model

      securityName = alice

      securityLevel = authPriv

   [-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace PPP above with actual IANA-assigned
   port number for SNMP notifications over SSH, from
   draft-ietf-isms-secshell, and remove this note. ]

   The following example will configure the Notification Originator to
   send informs to a Notification Receiver at 192.0.2.1:PPP using the
   securityName "alice". "alice" is the name for the recipient from the
   standpoint of the notification originator, and is used for processing
   access controls before sending a notification.




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   [-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace PPP above with actual IANA-assigned
   port number for SNMP notifications over SSH, and remove this note. ]

   The columns marked with a "*" are the items that are Security Model
   or Transport Model specific.

   The configuration for the "alice" settings in the SNMP-VIEW-BASED-
   ACM-MIB objects are not shown here for brevity.  First we configure
   which type of notification will be sent for this taglist (toCRTag).
   In this example, we choose to send an Inform.
     snmpNotifyTable row:
          snmpNotifyName                 CRNotif
          snmpNotifyTag                  toCRTag
          snmpNotifyType                 inform
          snmpNotifyStorageType          nonVolatile
          snmpNotifyColumnStatus         createAndGo

   Then we configure a transport address to which notifications
   associated with this taglist will be sent, and we specify which
   snmpTargetParamsEntry will be used (toCR) when sending to this
   transport address.
          snmpTargetAddrTable row:
             snmpTargetAddrName              toCRAddr
         *   snmpTargetAddrTDomain           snmpSSHDomain
         *   snmpTargetAddrTAddress          192.0.2.1:PPP
             snmpTargetAddrTimeout           1500
             snmpTargetAddrRetryCount        3
             snmpTargetAddrTagList           toCRTag
             snmpTargetAddrParams            toCR   (MUST match below)
             snmpTargetAddrStorageType       nonVolatile
             snmpTargetAddrColumnStatus      createAndGo


   [-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace PPP above with actual IANA-assigned
   port number for SNMP notifications over SSH, and remove this note. ]

   Then we configure which principal at the host will receive the
   notifications associated with this taglist.  Here we choose "alice",
   who uses the Transport Security Model.
         snmpTargetParamsTable row:
             snmpTargetParamsName            toCR
             snmpTargetParamsMPModel         SNMPv3
         *   snmpTargetParamsSecurityModel   TransportSecurityModel
             snmpTargetParamsSecurityName    "alice"
             snmpTargetParamsSecurityLevel   authPriv
             snmpTargetParamsStorageType     nonVolatile
             snmpTargetParamsRowStatus       createAndGo




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A.1.  Transport Security Model Processing for Notifications

   The Transport Security Model is called using the generateRequestMsg()
   ASI, with the following parameters (* are from the above tables):

    statusInformation =                -- success or errorIndication
          generateRequestMsg(
          IN   messageProcessingModel  -- *snmpTargetParamsMPModel
          IN   globalData              -- message header, admin data
          IN   maxMessageSize          -- of the sending SNMP entity
          IN   transportDomain         -- *snmpTargetAddrTDomain
          IN   transportAddress        -- *snmpTargetAddrTAddress
          IN   securityModel           -- *snmpTargetParamsSecurityModel
          IN   securityEngineID        -- immaterial; TSM will ignore.
          IN   securityName            -- snmpTargetParamsSecurityName
          IN   securityLevel           -- *snmpTargetParamsSecurityLevel
          IN   scopedPDU               -- message (plaintext) payload
          OUT  securityParameters      -- filled in by Security Module
          OUT  wholeMsg                -- complete generated message
          OUT  wholeMsgLength          -- length of generated message
          OUT  tmStateReference        -- reference to transport info
               )

   The Transport Security Model will determine the Transport Model based
   on the snmpTargetAddrTDomain.  The selected Transport Model will
   select the appropriate transport connection using the
   tmStateReference cache created from the values of
   snmpTargetAddrTAddress, snmpTargetParamsSecurityName, and
   snmpTargetParamsSecurityLevel.

Appendix B.  Processing Differences between USM and Secure Transport

   USM and secure transports differ in the processing order and
   responsibilities within the RFC3411 architecture.  While the steps
   are the same, they occur in a different order, and might be done by
   different subsystems.  The following lists illustrate the difference
   in the flow and the responsibility for different processing steps for
   incoming messages when using USM and when using a secure transport.
   (These lists are simplified for illustrative purposes, and do not
   represent all details of processing.  Transport Models MUST provide
   the detailed elements of procedure.)

   With USM, SNMPv1, and SNMPv2c Security Models, security processing
   starts when the Message Processing Model decodes portions of the
   ASN.1 message to extract header fields that are used to determine
   which Security Model will process the message to perform
   authentication, decryption, timeliness checking, integrity checking,
   and translation of parameters to model-independent parameters.  By



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   comparison, a secure transport performs those security functions on
   the message, before the ASN.1 is decoded.

   Step 6 cannot occur until after decryption occurs.  Step 6 and beyond
   are the same for USM and a secure transport.

B.1.  USM and the RFC3411 Architecture

   1) decode the ASN.1 header (Message Processing Model)

   2) determine the SNMP Security Model and parameters (Message
      Processing Model)

   3) verify securityLevel.  [Security Model]

   4) translate parameters to model-independent parameters (Security
      Model)

   5) authenticate the principal, check message integrity and
      timeliness, and decrypt the message.  [Security Model]

   6) determine the pduType in the decrypted portions (Message
      Processing Model), and

   7) pass on the decrypted portions with model-independent parameters.

B.2.  Transport Subsystem and the RFC3411 Architecture

   1) authenticate the principal, check integrity and timeliness of the
      message, and decrypt the message.  [Transport Model]

   2) translate parameters to model-independent parameters (Transport
      Model)

   3) decode the ASN.1 header (Message Processing Model)

   4) determine the SNMP Security Model and parameters (Message
      Processing Model)

   5) verify securityLevel [Security Model]

   6) determine the pduType in the decrypted portions (Message
      Processing Model), and

   7) pass on the decrypted portions with model-independent security
      parameters

   If a message is secured using a secure transport layer, then the



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   Transport Model will provide the translation from the authenticated
   identity (e.g., an SSH user name) to a human-friendly identifier
   (tmSecurityName) in step 2.  The security model will provide a
   mapping from that identifier to a model-independent securityName.

Authors' Addresses

   David Harrington
   Huawei Technologies (USA)
   1700 Alma Dr. Suite 100
   Plano, TX 75075
   USA

   Phone: +1 603 436 8634
   EMail: dharrington@huawei.com


   Wes Hardaker
   Sparta, Inc.
   P.O. Box 382
   Davis, CA  95617
   US

   Phone: +1 530 792 1913
   EMail: ietf@hardakers.net


























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