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Versions: (draft-zhu-ws-kerb) 00 01 02 draft-ietf-kitten-iakerb

NETWORK WORKING GROUP                                             L. Zhu
Internet-Draft                                     Microsoft Corporation
Updates: 4120 (if approved)                                    J. Altman
Intended status: Standards Track                        Secure Endpoints
Expires: January 31, 2010                                  July 30, 2009


 Initial and Pass Through Authentication Using Kerberos V5 and the GSS-
                              API (IAKERB)
                      draft-ietf-krb-wg-iakerb-02

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2010.

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   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Abstract

   This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol and the



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   GSS-API Kerberos mechanism that enable a GSS-API Kerberos client to
   exchange messages with the KDC using the GSS-API acceptor as the
   proxy, by encapsulating the Kerberos messages inside GSS-API tokens.
   With these extensions a client can obtain Kerberos tickets for
   services where the KDC is not accessible to the client, but is
   accessible to the application server.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  GSS-API Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  Addresses in Tickets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     8.2.  Informative references  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9






























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1.  Introduction

   When authenticating using Kerberos V5, clients obtain tickets from a
   KDC and present them to services.  This model of operation cannot
   work if the client does not have access to the KDC.  For example, in
   remote access scenarios, the client must initially authenticate to an
   access point in order to gain full access to the network.  Here the
   client may be unable to directly contact the KDC either because it
   does not have an IP address, or the access point packet filter does
   not allow the client to send packets to the Internet before it
   authenticates to the access point.

   Recent advancements in extending Kerberos permit Kerberos
   authentication to complete with the assistance of a proxy.  The
   Kerberos [RFC4120] pre-authentication framework [KRB-PAFW] prevents
   the exposure of weak client keys over the open network.  The Kerberos
   support of anonymity [KRB-ANON] provides for privacy and further
   complicates traffic analysis.  The kdc-referrals option defined in
   [KRB-PAFW] may reduce the number of messages exchanged while
   obtaining a ticket to exactly two even in cross-realm
   authentications.

   Building upon these Kerberos extensions, this document extends
   [RFC4120] and [RFC4121] such that the client can communicate with the
   KDC using a Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
   (GSS-API) [RFC2743] acceptor as the proxy.  The GSS-API acceptor
   relays the KDC request and reply messages between the client and the
   KDC.  The GSS-API acceptor, when relaying the Kerberos messages, is
   called an IAKERB proxy.  Consequently, IAKERB as defined in this
   document requires the use of GSS-API.


2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  GSS-API Encapsulation

   The mechanism Objection Identifier (OID) for GSS-API IAKERB, in
   accordance with the mechanism proposed by [RFC4178] for negotiating
   protocol variations, is id-kerberos-iakerb:

      id-kerberos-iakerb ::=
        { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
          iakerb(5) }



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   All context establishment token of IAKERB MUST have the generic token
   framing described in section 3.1 of [RFC2743] with the mechanism OID
   being id-kerberos-iakerb.

   The client starts by constructing the ticket request, and if the
   ticket request is being made to the KDC, the client, instead of
   contacting the KDC directly, encapsulates the request message into
   the output token of the GSS_Init_security_context() call and returns
   GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED [RFC2743] indicating that at least one more
   token is required in order to establish the context.  The output
   token is then passed for use as the input token to the
   GSS_Accept_sec_context() call in accordance with GSS-API.  The GSS-
   API acceptor extracts the Kerberos request in the input token,
   locates the target KDC, and sends the request on behalf of the
   client.  After receiving the KDC reply, the GSS-API acceptor then
   encapsulates the reply message into the output token of
   GSS_Accept_sec_context().  The GSS-API acceptor returns
   GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED [RFC2743] indicating that at least one more
   token is required in order to establish the context.  The output
   token is passed to the initiator in accordance with GSS-API.

          Client <---------> IAKERB proxy <---------> KDC

   The innerToken described in section 3.1 of [RFC2743] and subsequent
   GSS-API mechanism tokens have the following formats: it starts with a
   two-octet token-identifier (TOK_ID), followed by an IAKERB message or
   a Kerberos message.

   Only one IAKERB specific message, namely the IAKERB_PROXY message, is
   defined in this document.  The TOK_ID values for Kerberos messages
   are the same as defined in [RFC4121].

                 Token          TOK_ID Value in Hex
              --------------------------------------
               IAKERB_PROXY           05 01

   The content of the IAKERB_PROXY message is defined as an IAKERB-
   HEADER structure immediately followed by a Kerberos message.  The
   Kerberos message can be an AS-REQ, an AS-REP, a TGS-REQ, a TGS-REP,
   or a KRB-ERROR as defined in [RFC4120].











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           IAKERB-HEADER ::= SEQUENCE {
               target-realm      [1] UTF8String,
                  -- The name of the target realm.
               cookie            [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                  -- Opaque data, if sent by the server,
                  -- MUST be copied by the client verbatim into
                  -- the next IAKRB_PROXY message.
               ...
           }

   The IAKERB-HEADER structure and all the Kerberos messages MUST be
   encoded using Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) Distinguished
   Encoding Rules (DER) [X680] [X690].

   The IAKERB client fills out the IAKERB-HEADER structure as follows:
   the target-realm contains the realm name the ticket request is
   addressed to.  In the initial message from the client, the cookie
   field is absent.  The client MUST specify a target-realm.  If the
   client does not know the realm of the client's true principal name
   [REFERALS], it MUST specify a realm it knows.  This can be the realm
   of the client's host.

   Upon receipt of the IAKERB_PROXY message, the GSS-API acceptor
   inspects the target-realm field in the IAKERB_HEADER, and locates a
   KDC of that realm, and sends the ticket request to that KDC.

   The GSS-API server encapsulates the KDC reply message in the returned
   IAKERB message.  It fills out the target realm using the realm sent
   by the client and the KDC reply message is included immediately
   following the IAKERB-HEADER header.

   When the GSS-API acceptor is unable to obtain an IP address for a KDC
   in the client's realm, it sends a KRB_ERROR message with the code
   KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NOT_FOUND to the client and the context fails
   to establish.  There is no accompanying error data defined in this
   document for this error code.

           KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NOT_FOUND      85
               -- The IAKERB proxy could not find a KDC.

   When the GSS-API acceptor has an IP address for a KDC in the client
   realm, but does not receive a response from any KDC in the realm
   (including in response to retries), it sends a KRB_ERROR message with
   the code KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NO_RESPONSE to the client and the
   context fails to establish.  There is no accompanying error data
   defined in this document for this error code.

           KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NO_RESPONSE    86



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               -- The KDC did not respond to the IAKERB proxy.

   The IAKERB proxy can send opaque data in the cookie field of the
   IAKERB-HEADER structure in the server reply to the client, in order
   to, for example, minimize the amount of state information kept by the
   GSS-API acceptor.  The content and the encoding of the cookie field
   is a local matter of the IAKERB proxy.  The client MUST copy the
   cookie verbatim from the previous server response whenever the cookie
   is present into the subsequent tokens that contains an IAKERB_PROXY
   message.

   The client and the server can repeat the sequence of sending and
   receiving the IAKERB messages as described above, in order to allow
   the client interact with the KDC through the IAKERB proxy, and to
   obtain Kerberos tickets as needed.

   When obtaining the initial TGT, the client may start with an NT-
   ENTERPRISE name type and the client host does not have a Kerberos
   realm.  To resolve the NT-ENTERPRISE name type, the client typically
   starts with the client host realm and then finds out the true realm
   of the client based on [REFERALS].  In this case the GSS-API client
   can retrieve the realm of the GSS-API server as follows: the client
   returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED with the output token containing an
   IAKERB message with an empty target-realm in the IAKERB-HEADER and no
   Kerberos message following the IAKERB-HEADER structure.  Upon receipt
   of the realm request, the GSS-API server fills out the target realm
   field using the realm of the server, and returns
   GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED with the output token containing the IAKERB
   message with the server's realm and no Kerberos message following the
   IAKERB-HEADER header.  The GSS-API client can then use the returned
   realm in subsequent IAKERB messages to resolve the NT-ENTERPRISE name
   type.  Since the GSS-API server can act as a Kerberos acceptor, it
   always has a Kerberos realm in this case.

   When the client obtained a service ticket, the client sends a
   KRB_AP_REQ message to the server, and performs the client-server
   application exchange as defined in [RFC4120] and [RFC4121].

   For implementations conforming to this specification, both the
   authenticator subkey and the GSS_EXTS_FINISHED extension as defined
   in [PKU2U] MUST be present in the AP-REQ authenticator.  This
   checksum provides integrity protection for the messages exchanged
   including the unauthenticated clear texts in the IAKERB-HEADER
   structure.

   If the pre-authentication data is encrypted in the long-term
   password-based key of the principal, the risk of security exposures
   is significant.  Implementations SHOULD provide the AS_REQ armoring



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   as defined in [KRB-PAFW] unless an alternative protection is
   deployed.  In addition, the anonymous Kerberos FAST option is
   RECOMMENDED for the client to complicate traffic analysis.


4.  Addresses in Tickets

   In IAKERB, the machine sending requests to the KDC is the GSS-API
   acceptor and not the client.  As a result, the client should not
   include its addresses in any KDC requests for two reasons.  First,
   the KDC may reject the forwarded request as being from the wrong
   client.  Second, in the case of initial authentication for a dial-up
   client, the client machine may not yet possess a network address.
   Hence, as allowed by [RFC4120], the addresses field of the AS-REQ and
   TGS-REQ requests SHOULD be blank and the caddr field of the ticket
   SHOULD similarly be left blank.


5.  Security Considerations

   A typical IAKERB client sends the AS_REQ with pre-authentication data
   encrypted in the long-term keys of the user before the server is
   authenticated.  This enables offline attacks by un-trusted servers.
   To mitigate this threat, the client SHOULD use Kerberos
   FAST[KRB-PAFW] and require KDC authentication to protect the user's
   credentials.

   The client name is in clear text in the authentication exchange
   messages and ticket granting service exchanges according to [RFC4120]
   whereas the client name is encrypted in client- server application
   exchange messages.  By using the IAKERB proxy to relay the ticket
   requests and responses, the client's identity could be revealed in
   the client-server traffic where the same identity could have been
   concealed if IAKERB were not used.  Hence, to complicate traffic
   analysis and provide privacy for the IAKERB client, the IAKERB client
   SHOULD request the anonymous Kerberos FAST option [KRB-PAFW].

   Similar to other network access protocols, IAKERB allows an
   unauthenticated client (possibly outside the security perimeter of an
   organization) to send messages that are proxied to interior servers.
   To reduce attack surface, firewall filters can be applied to allow
   from which hosts the client requests can be proxied and the proxy can
   further restrict the set of realms to which the requests can be
   proxied.

   In a scenario where DNS SRV RR's are being used to locate the KDC,
   IAKERB is being used, and an external attacker can modify DNS
   responses to the IAKERB proxy, there are several countermeasures to



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   prevent arbitrary messages from being sent to internal servers:

   1.  KDC port numbers can be statically configured on the IAKERB
       proxy.  In this case, the messages will always be sent to KDC's.
       For an organization that runs KDC's on a static port (usually
       port 88) and does not run any other servers on the same port,
       this countermeasure would be easy to administer and should be
       effective.

   2.  The proxy can do application level sanity checking and filtering.
       This countermeasure should eliminate many of the above attacks.

   3.  DNS security can be deployed.  This countermeasure is probably
       overkill for this particular problem, but if an organization has
       already deployed DNS security for other reasons, then it might
       make sense to leverage it here.  Note that Kerberos could be used
       to protect the DNS exchanges.  The initial DNS SRV KDC lookup by
       the proxy will be unprotected, but an attack here is at most a
       denial of service (the initial lookup will be for the proxy's KDC
       to facilitate Kerberos protection of subsequent DNS exchanges
       between itself and the DNS server).


6.  Acknowledgements

   Jonathan Trostle, Michael Swift, Bernard Aboba and Glen Zorn wrote
   earlier revision of this document.

   The hallway conversations between Larry Zhu and Nicolas Williams
   formed the basis of this document.


7.  IANA Considerations

   There is no IANA action required for this document.


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [GSS-EXTS]
              Emery, S., "Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Channel Binding
              Hash Agility",
              draft-ietf-krb-wg-gss-cb-hash-agility-03.txt (work in
              progress), 2007.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate



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              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
              Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.

   [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
              Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC4121]  Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
              Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
              Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
              July 2005.

   [RFC4178]  Zhu, L., Leach, P., Jaganathan, K., and W. Ingersoll, "The
              Simple and Protected Generic Security Service Application
              Program Interface (GSS-API) Negotiation Mechanism",
              RFC 4178, October 2005.

8.2.  Informative references

   [KRB-ANON]
              Zhu, L. and P. Leach, "Kerberos Anonymity Support",
              draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-04.txt (work in progress), 2007.

   [KRB-PAFW]
              Zhu, L. and S. Hartman, "A Generalized Framework for
              Kerberos Pre-Authentication",
              draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-06.txt (work in
              progress), 2007.

   [PKU2U]    Zhu, L. and J. Altman, "Public Key Cryptography Based
              User-to-User Authentication - (PKU2U)", draft-zhu-pku2u
              (work in progress), 2007.

   [REFERALS]
              Raeburn, K. and L. Zhu, "Kerberos Principal Name
              Canonicalization and KDC-Generated Cross-Realm Referrals",
              draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referral (work in progress),
              2009.








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Authors' Addresses

   Larry Zhu
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Email: larry.zhu@microsoft.com


   Jeffery Altman
   Secure Endpoints
   255 W 94th St
   New York, NY  10025
   US

   Email: jaltman@secure-endpoints.com

































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