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Versions: (draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 6731

Internet Engineering Task Force                            T. Savolainen
Internet-Draft                                                     Nokia
Intended status: Standards Track                                 J. Kato
Expires: November 26, 2012                                           NTT
                                                                T. Lemon
                                                           Nominum, Inc.
                                                            May 25, 2012


   Improved Recursive DNS Server Selection for Multi-Interfaced Nodes
                 draft-ietf-mif-dns-server-selection-09

Abstract

   A multi-interfaced node is connected to multiple networks, some of
   which may be utilizing private DNS namespaces.  A node commonly
   receives recursive DNS server configuration information from all
   connected networks.  Some of the recursive DNS servers may have
   information about namespaces other servers do not have.  When a
   multi-interfaced node needs to utilize DNS, the node has to choose
   which of the recursive DNS servers to contact to.  This document
   describes DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 options that can be used to configure
   nodes with information required to perform informed recursive DNS
   server selection decisions.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal



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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Private namespaces and problems for multi-interfaced nodes . .  5
     2.1.  Fully qualified domain names with limited scopes . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Network interface specific IP addresses  . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.3.  A problem not fully solved by the described solution . . .  8
   3.  Deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  CPE deployment scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Cellular network scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  VPN scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.4.  Dual-stack accesses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Improved RDNSS selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Procedure for prioritizing RDNSSes and handling
           responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  RDNSS selection DHCPv6 option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.3.  RDNSS selection DHCPv4 option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.4.  Limitations on use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.5.  Coexistence of various RDNSS configuration tools . . . . . 16
     4.6.  Considerations on follow-up queries  . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   5.  Example of a node behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   6.  Scalability considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   7.  Considerations for network administrators  . . . . . . . . . . 20
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     10.1. Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     10.2. Trust levels of network interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     10.3. Importance of following the algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . 21
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   Appendix A.  Possible alternative practices for RDNSS selection  . 23
     A.1.  Sending queries out on multiple interfaces in parallel . . 23
     A.2.  Search list option for DNS forward lookup decisions  . . . 24
     A.3.  More specific routes for reverse lookup decision . . . . . 24
     A.4.  Longest matching prefix for reverse lookup decision  . . . 24



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   Appendix B.  DNSSEC and multiple answers validating with
                different trust anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
















































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1.  Introduction

   A multi-interfaced node faces several problems a single-homed node
   does not encounter, as is described in [RFC6418].  This document
   studies in detail the problems private namespaces may cause for
   multi-interfaced nodes and provides a solution.  The node may be
   implemented as a host or as a router.

   We start from the premise that network operators sometimes include
   private namespaces in the answers they provide from Recursive DNS
   Servers (RDNSS), and that those private namespaces are at least as
   useful to nodes as the answers from the public DNS.  When private
   namespaces are visible for a node, some RDNSSes have information
   other RDNSSes do not have.  The node ought to be able to ask right
   RDNSS for the information it needs.

   An example of an application that benefits from multi-interfacing is
   a web browser that commonly accesses many different destinations,
   each of which is available only on one network.  The browser
   therefore needs to be able to communicate over different network
   interfaces, depending on the destination it is trying to reach.

   In deployments where private namespaces are present, selection of
   correct route and destination and source addresses for the actual IP
   connection is crucial as well, as the resolved destination's IP
   addresses may be only usable on the network interface over which the
   name was resolved on.  Hence solution described in this document is
   assumed to be commonly used in combination with tools for delivering
   additional routing and source and destination address selection
   policies.

   This document is organized in the following manner.  Background
   information about problem descriptions and example deployment
   scenarios are included in Section 2 and Section 3.  Section 4
   contains all normative descriptions for DHCP options and node
   behavior.  Informative Section 5 illustrates behavior of a node
   implementing functionality described in the Section 4.  Section 6
   contains informational considerations about scalability.  Section 7
   contains normative guidelines related to creation of private
   namespaces.  Informational Section 10 summarizes identified security
   considerations.

   The Appendix A describes best current practices possible with tools
   preceding this document and that may be possibilities on networks not
   supporting the solution described in this document.






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1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


2.  Private namespaces and problems for multi-interfaced nodes

   This section describes two node multi-interfacing related private
   namespace scenarios for which the procedure described in Section 4
   provides a solution for.  Additionally, Section 2.3 describes a
   problem for which this document provides only partial solution.

2.1.  Fully qualified domain names with limited scopes

   A multi-interfaced node may be connected to one or more networks that
   are using private namespaces.  As an example, the node may have
   simultaneously open a wireless LAN (WLAN) connection to the public
   Internet, cellular connection to an operator network, and a virtual
   private network (VPN) connection to an enterprise network.  When an
   application initiates a connection establishment to an FQDN, the node
   needs to be able to choose the right RDNSS for making a successful
   DNS query.  This is illustrated in the figure 1.  An FQDN for a
   public name can be resolved with any RDNSS, but for an FQDN of
   enterprise's or operator's service's private name the node needs to
   be able to correctly select the right RDNSS for the DNS resolution,
   i.e. do also network interface selection already before destination's
   IP address is known.






















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                            +---------------+
                            | RDNSS with    |    |   Enterprise
   +------+                 | public +      |----|   Intranet
   |      |                 | enterprise's  |    |
   |      |===== VPN =======| private names |    |
   |      |                 +---------------+  +----+
   | MIF  |                                    | FW |
   | node |                                    +----+
   |      |                 +---------------+    |
   |      |----- WLAN ------| RDNSS with    |----|   Public
   |      |                 | public names  |    |   Internet
   |      |                 +---------------+  +----+
   |      |                                    | FW |
   |      |                 +---------------+  +----+
   |      |---- cellular ---| RDNSS with    |    |
   +------+                 | public +      |    |   Operator
                            | operator's    |----|   Intranet
                            | private names |    |
                            +---------------+

                    Private DNS namespaces illustrated

                                 Figure 1

2.2.  Network interface specific IP addresses

   In the second problem an FQDN is valid and resolvable via different
   network interfaces, but to different and not necessarily globally
   reachable IP addresses, as is illustrated in the figure 2.  Node's
   routing and source and destination address selection mechanism must
   ensure the destination's IP address is only used in combination with
   source IP addresses of the network interface the name was resolved
   on.


















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                            +--------------------|      |
   +------+   IPv6          | RDNSS A            |------| IPv6
   |      |-- interface 1 --| saying Peer is     |      |
   |      |                 | at: 2001:0db8:0::1 |      |
   | MIF  |                 +--------------------+   +------+
   | node |                                          | Peer |
   |      |                 +--------------------+   +------+
   |      |   IPv6          | RDNSS B            |      |
   |      |-- interface 2 --| saying Peer is     |      |
   +------+                 | at: 2001:0db8:1::1 |------| IPv6
                            +--------------------+      |


     Private DNS namespaces and different IP addresses for an FQDN on
                            interfaces 1 and 2.

                                 Figure 2

   Similar situation can happen with IPv6 protocol translation and AAAA
   record synthesis [RFC6147].  A synthetic AAAA record is guaranteed to
   be valid only on a network it was synthesized on.  Figure 3
   illustrates a scenario where the peer's IPv4 address is synthesized
   into different IPv6 addresses by RDNSSes A and B.


                            +-------------------|    +-------+
   +------+   IPv6          | RDNSS A           |----| NAT64 |
   |      |-- interface 1 --| saying Peer is    |    +-------+
   |      |                 | at: A_Pref96:IPv4 |       |
   | MIF  |                 +-------------------+       |   +------+
   | node |                                        IPv4 +---| Peer |
   |      |                 +-------------------+       |   +------+
   |      |   IPv6          | RDNSS B           |       |
   |      |-- interface 2 --| saying Peer is    |    +-------+
   +------+                 | at: B_Pref96:IPv4 |----| NAT64 |
                            +-------------------+    +-------+


   AAAA synthesis results in network interface specific IPv6 addresses.

                                 Figure 3

   It is worth noting is that network specific IP addresses can cause
   problems also for a single-homed node, if the node retains DNS cache
   during movement from one network to another.  After the network
   change, a node may have entries in its DNS cache that are no longer
   correct or appropriate for its new network position.




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2.3.  A problem not fully solved by the described solution

   A more complex scenario is an FQDN, which in addition to possibly
   resolving into network interface specific IP addresses, identifies on
   different network interfaces completely different peer entities with
   potentially different set of service offerings.  In even more complex
   scenario, an FQDN identifies unique peer entity, but one that
   provides different services on its different network interfaces.  The
   solution described in this document is not able to tackle these
   higher layer issues.  In fact, these problems may be solvable only by
   manual user intervention.

   However, when DNSSEC is used, the DNSSEC validation procedure may
   provide assistance for selecting correct responses for some, but not
   all, use cases.  A node may prefer to use the DNS answer that
   validates with the preferred trust anchor.


3.  Deployment scenarios

   This document has been written with three particular deployment
   scenarios in mind.  First being a Consumer Premises Equipment (CPE)
   with two or more uplink VLAN connections.  Second scenario involves a
   cellular device with two uplink Internet connections: WLAN and
   cellular.  Third scenario is for VPNs, where use of local RDNSS may
   be preferred for latency reasons, but enterprise's RDNSS must be used
   to resolve private names used by the enterprise.

3.1.  CPE deployment scenario

   A home gateway may have two uplink connections leading to different
   networks, as is described in
   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-multihoming-without-ipv6nat].  In the two
   uplinks scenario only one uplink connection leads to the Internet,
   while another uplink connection leads to a private network utilizing
   private namespaces.

   It is desirable that the CPE does not have to send DNS queries over
   both uplink connections, but instead CPE should send default queries
   to the RDNSS of the interface leading to the Internet, and queries
   related to private namespace to the RDNSS of the private network.

   In this scenario the legacy hosts can be supported by deploying DNS
   proxy on the CPE and configuring hosts in the LAN to talk to the DNS
   proxy.  However, updated hosts would be able to talk directly to the
   correct RDNSS of each uplink ISP's RDNSS.  It is deployment decision
   whether the updated hosts would be pointed to DNS proxy or to actual
   RDNSSes.



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   Depending on actual deployments, all VLAN connections might be
   considered as trusted.

3.2.  Cellular network scenario

   A cellular device may have both WLAN and cellular network interfaces
   up.  In such a case it is often desirable to use WLAN by default,
   except for those connections cellular network operator wants to go
   over cellular interface.  The cellular network may utilize private
   names and hence the cellular device needs to ask for those through
   the cellular interface.

   In this scenario cellular interface can be considered trusted and
   WLAN oftentimes untrusted.

3.3.  VPN scenario

   Depending on a deployment, there may be interest to use VPN only for
   the traffic destined to a enterprise network.  The enterprise may be
   using private namespace, and hence related DNS queries should be send
   over VPN to the enterprise's RDNSS, while by default RDNSS of a local
   access network may be used.

   In this scenario VPN interface can be considered trusted and local
   access network untrusted.

3.4.  Dual-stack accesses

   In all three scenarios one or more of the connected networks may
   support both IPv4 and IPv6.  In such a case both or either of DHCPv4
   and DHCPv6 can be used to learn RDNSS selection information.


4.  Improved RDNSS selection

   This section describes DHCP options and a procedure that a (stub /
   proxy) resolver may utilize for improved RDNSS selection in the face
   of private namespaces and multiple simultaneously active network
   interfaces.

4.1.  Procedure for prioritizing RDNSSes and handling responses

   A resolver SHALL build a priority list of RDNSSes it will contact to
   depending on the query.  To build the list in an optimal way, a node
   SHOULD ask with DHCP which RDNSSes of each network interface are most
   likely to be able to successfully serve forward lookup requests
   matching to specific domain or reverse (PTR record) lookup requests
   matching to specific network addresses (later referred as "network").



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   For security reasons the RDNSS selection information MUST be used
   only when it is safe to do so, see Section 4.4 for details.

   The node SHOULD create node specific routes for RDNSS addresses
   learned via DHCP.  The route must point to the interface each RDNSS
   address was learned on.  This is required to ensure DNS queries are
   sent out via the right network interface.

   A resolver lacking more specific information shall assume that all
   information is available from any RDNSS of any network interface.
   The RDNSSes learnt by other RDNSS address configuration methods MUST
   be handled as medium priority default RDNSSes (see also Section 4.5).

   When a DNS query needs to be made, the resolver SHOULD give highest
   precedence to the RDNSSes explicitly known to serve matching domain
   or network.  The resolver MUST take into account differences in trust
   levels of pieces of received RDNSS selection information.  The
   resolver MUST prefer RDNSSes of trusted interfaces.  The RDNSSes of
   untrusted interfaces may be of highest priority only if trusted
   interfaces specifically configure low priority RDNSSes.  The non-
   exhaustive list on figure 4 illustrates how the different trust
   levels of received RDNSS selection information SHOULD influence the
   RDNSS selection logic.

   Trustworthiness of an interface and configuration information
   received over the interface is implementation and/or node deployment
   dependent.  Trust may be based on, for example, on the nature of an
   interface.  For example, an authenticated and encrypted VPN or layer
   2 connections to a trusted home network may be considered as trusted,
   and an unauthenticated and unencrypted connection to an unknown
   visited network may be considered as untrusted.  In some occasions an
   interface may be considered trusted only if explicitly configured to
   be trusted.

   A resolver SHOULD prioritize between equally trusted RDNSSes with
   help of the DHCP option preference field.  The resolver MUST NOT
   prioritize less trusted RDNSSes higher than trusted, even in the case
   of less trusted RDNSS would apparently have additional information.
   In the case of all other things being equal the resolver shall make
   the prioritization decision based on its internal preferences.











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   Information from       | Information from       | Resulting RDNSS
   more trusted           | less trusted           | priority
   interface A            | interface B            | selection
--------------------------+------------------------+--------------------
1. Medium priority        | Medium priority        | Default:  A, then B
   default                | default                |
--------------------------+------------------------+--------------------
2. Medium priority        | High priority default  | Default:  A, then B
   default                | High priority specific | Specific: A, then B
--------------------------+------------------------+--------------------
3. Low priority default   | Medium priority        | Default:  B, then A
                          | default                |
--------------------------+------------------------+--------------------
4. Low priority default   | Medium priority        | Default:  B, then A
   High priority specific | default                | Specific: A, then B
--------------------------+------------------------+--------------------

      Figure 4: RDNSS selection in the case of different trust levels

   Because DNSSEC provides cryptographic assurance of the integrity of
   DNS data, data that can be validated under DNSSEC is necessarily to
   be preferred over data that cannot be.  There are two ways that a
   node can determine that data is valid under DNSSEC.  The first is to
   perform DNSSEC validation itself.  The second is to have a secure
   connection to an authenticated RDNSS, and to rely on that RDNSS to
   perform DNSSEC validation (signalling that it has done so using the
   AD bit).  If a DNS response is not proven to be unmolested using
   DNSSEC, then a node cannot make a decision to prefer data from any
   interface with any great assurance: any response could be forged, and
   there is no way to detect the forgery without DNSSEC.

   A node SHALL send requests to RDNSSes in the order defined by the
   priority list until an acceptable reply is received, all replies are
   received, or a time out occurs.  In the case of a requested name
   matching to a specific domain or network rule accepted from any
   interface, a DNSSEC-aware resolver MUST NOT proceed with a reply that
   cannot be validated using DNSSEC until all RDNSSes on the priority
   list have been contacted or timed out.  This protects against
   possible redirection attacks.  In the case of the requested name not
   matching to any specific domain or network, first received response
   from any RDNSS MAY be considered acceptable.  A DNSSEC-aware node MAY
   always contact all RDNSSes in an attempt to receive a response that
   can be validated, but contacting all RDNSSes is not mandated for the
   default case as in some deployments that would consume excess
   resources.

   The resolver SHOULD avoid sending queries over different network
   interfaces in parallel as that wastes resources such as energy.  The



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   amount of wasted energy can be significant, for example when radio
   interfaces has to be started just for the queries.

   In the case of validated NXDOMAIN response being received from a
   RDNSS that can provide answers for the queried name a node MUST NOT
   accept non-validated replies from other RDNSSes (see Appendix B for
   considerations related to multiple trust anchors.

4.2.  RDNSS selection DHCPv6 option

   DHCPv6 option described below can be used to inform resolvers which
   RDNSS should be contacted when initiating forward or reverse DNS
   lookup procedures.  This option is DNS record type agnostic and
   applies, for example, equally to both A and AAAA queries.





































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 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT     |         option-len            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
|            DNS-recursive-name-server (IPv6 address)           |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved  |prf|                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+          Domains and networks                 |
|                          (variable length)                    |
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

option-code:   OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT (TBD)

option-len:    Length of the option in octets

DNS-recursive-name-server: An IPv6 address of RDNSS

Reserved:      Field reserved for the future. MUST be set to zero.

prf:           RDNSS preference, for selecting between
               equally trusted RDNSSes:
                   01 High
                   00 Medium
                   11 Low
                   10 Reserved

Domains and networks:  The list of domains for forward DNS
               lookup and networks for reverse DNS lookup the RDNSS
               has special knowledge about. Field MUST be encoded as
               specified in Section "Representation and use of
               domain names" of [RFC3315].
               Special domain of "." is used to indicate
               capability to resolve global names and act as a
               default RDNSS. Lack of "."
               domain on the list indicates RDNSS only has
               information related to listed domains and networks.
               Networks for reverse mapping are encoded as
               defined for ip6.arpa [RFC3596] or in-addr.arpa [RFC2317].

              DHCPv6 option for explicit domain configuration

                                 Figure 5




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   A node SHOULD include an OPTION_ORO option in a DHCPv6 request with
   the OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT option code to inform the DHCPv6 server
   about the support for the improved RDNSS selection logic.  DHCPv6
   server receiving this information MAY then choose to provision RDNSS
   addresses only with the OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT.

   The OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT contains one or more domains the related
   RDNSS has particular knowledge of.  The option can occur multiple
   times in a single DHCPv6 message, if multiple RDNSS are to be
   configured.

   IPv6 networks should cover all the domains configured in this option.
   Networks should be as long as possible to avoid potential collision
   with information received on other option instances or with options
   received from DHCPv6 servers of other network interfaces.
   Overlapping IPv6 networks are interpreted so that the resolver can
   use any of the RDNSSes for queries matching the networks.

   If the OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT contains a RDNSS address already
   learned from other DHCPv6 servers of the same network, and contains
   new domains or networks, the node SHOULD append the information to
   the information received earlier.  The node MUST NOT remove
   previously obtained information.  However, the node SHOULD NOT extent
   lifetime of earlier information either.  In the case of conflicting
   RDNSS address is learned from less trusted interface, the node MUST
   ignore the option.

   As the RDNSS options of [RFC3646], the OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT
   option MUST NOT appear in any other than the following DHCPv6
   messages: Solicit, Advertise, Request, Renew, Rebind, Information-
   Request, and Reply.

   The information conveyed in OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT is considered
   valid until changed or refreshed by general events that trigger
   DHCPv6 action.  In the event that it is desired for the client to
   request a refresh of the information, use of generic DHCPv6
   Information Refresh Time Option, as specified in [RFC4242] is
   RECOMMENDED.

4.3.  RDNSS selection DHCPv4 option

   DHCPv4 option described below can be used to inform resolvers which
   RDNSS should be contacted when initiating forward or reverse DNS
   lookup procedures.  This option is DNS record type agnostic and
   applies, for example, equally to both A and AAAA queries.






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 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|     CODE      |     Len       | Reserved  |prf|    Primary .. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| .. DNS-recursive-name-server's IPv4 address   |  Secondary .. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| .. DNS-recursive-name-server's IPv4 address   |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
|                                                               |
+                          Domains and networks                 |
|                          (variable length)                    |
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

option-code:   OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT (TBD)

option-len:    Length of the option in octets

Reserved:      Field reserved for the future. MUST be set to zero.

prf:           RDNSSes preference, for selecting between
               equally trusted RDNSSes:
                   01 High
                   00 Medium
                   11 Low
                   10 Reserved

Primary DNS-recursive-name-server's IPv4 address: Address of
               a primary RDNSS

Secondary DNS-recursive-name-server's IPv4 address: Address of
               a secondary RDNSS or 0.0.0.0 if not configured

Domains and networks:  The list of domains for forward DNS lookup
               and networks for reverse DNS lookup the RDNSSes
               have special knowledge about. Field MUST be encoded as
               specified in Section "Representation and use of
               domain names" of [RFC3315].
               Special domain of "." is used to indicate
               capability to resolve global names and act as
               default RDNSS. Lack of "."
               domain on the list indicates RDNSSes only have
               information related to listed domains and networks.
               Networks for reverse mapping are encoded as
               defined for ip6.arpa [RFC3596] or in-addr.arpa [RFC2317].

              DHCPv4 option for explicit domain configuration



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                                 Figure 6

   The OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT contains one or more domains the primary
   and secondary RDNSSes have particular knowledge of.  If the length of
   the domains and networks field causes option length to exceed the
   maximum permissible for a single option (255 octets), then multiple
   options MAY be used, as described in "Encoding Long Options in the
   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4)" [RFC3396].  When
   multiple options are present, the data portions of all option
   instances are concatenated together.

   If the OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT contains a RDNSS address already
   learned from other DHCPv4 servers of the same network, and contains
   new domains or networks, the node SHOULD append the information to
   the information received earlier.  The node MUST NOT remove
   previously obtained information.  However, the node SHOULD NOT extent
   lifetime of earlier information either.  In the case of conflicting
   RDNSS address is learned from less trusted interface, the node MUST
   ignore the option.

4.4.  Limitations on use

   Use of OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT is ideal in the following
   environments, but SHOULD NOT be enabled by default otherwise:

   1.  The RDNSS selection option is delivered across a secure, trusted
   channel.

   2.  The RDNSS selection option is not secured, but the client on a
   node does DNSSEC validation.

   3.  The RDNSS selection option is not secured, the resolver does
   DNSSEC validation, and the client communicates with the resolver
   configured with RDNSS selection option over a secure, trusted
   channel.

   4.  The IP address of RDNSS that is being recommended in the RDNSS
   selection option is known and trusted by the client; that is, the
   RDNSS selection option serves not to introduce the client to a new
   RDNSS, but rather to inform it that RDNSS it has already been
   configured to trust is available to it for resolving certain domains.

4.5.  Coexistence of various RDNSS configuration tools

   The DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT options are designed
   to coexist between each other and with other tools used for RDNSS
   address configuration.




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   For RDNSS selection purposes information received from all tools
   should be combined together into a single list, as discussed in
   Section 4.1.

   In the case of DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 providing conflicting RDNSS
   selection information on the same interface, or on the equally
   trusted interfaces, the node SHALL firstly prefer DHCP-version
   possibly securing OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT, and secondly prefer
   DHCPv6 over DHCPv4.

   The RDNSSes learned via other tools than OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT
   MUST be handled as default RDNSSes, with medium preference, when
   building a list of RDNSSes to talk to (see Section 4.1).

   The non-exhaustive list of possible other sources for RDNSS address
   configuration are:

   (1) DHCPv6 OPTION_DNS_SERVERS defined in [RFC3646].

   (2) DHCPv4 Domain Name Server Option defined in [RFC2132].

   (3) IPv6 Router Advertisement RDNSS Option defined in [RFC6106].

   When the OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT contains default RDNSS address and
   other sources are providing RNDSS addresses, the resolver MUST make
   the decision which one to prefer based on RDNSS preference field
   value.  If OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT defines medium preference then
   RDNSS from OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT SHALL be selected.

   If multiple sources are providing same RDNSS(es) IP address(es), each
   address MUST be added to the RDNSS list only once.

   If a node had indicated support for OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT in
   DHCPv6 request, the DHCPv6 server may choose to omit sending of
   OPTION_DNS_SERVERS.  This enables offloading use case where network
   administrator wishes to only advertise low priority default RDNSSes.

4.6.  Considerations on follow-up queries

   Any follow-up queries that are performed on the basis of an answer
   received on an interface MUST continue to use the same interface,
   irrespective of the RDNSS selection settings on any other interface.
   For example, if a node receives a reply with a canonical name (CNAME)
   or delegation name (DNAME) the follow-up queries MUST be sent to
   RDNSS(es) of the same interface, or to same RDNSS, irrespectively of
   the FQDN received.  Otherwise referrals may fail.





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5.  Example of a node behavior

   Figure 7 illustrates node behavior when it initializes two network
   interfaces for parallel usage and learns domain and network
   information from DHCPv6 servers.


    Application    Node      DHCPv6 server   DHCPv6 server
                             on interface 1  on interface 2
        |             |                |
        |         +-----------+        |
   (1)  |         | open      |        |
        |         | interface |        |
        |         +-----------+        |
        |             |                |
   (2)  |             |---option REQ-->|
        |             |<--option RESP--|
        |             |                |
        |         +-----------+        |
   (3)  |         | store     |        |
        |         | domains   |        |
        |         +-----------+        |
        |             |                |
        |         +-----------+        |
   (4)  |         | open      |        |
        |         | interface |        |
        |         +-----------+        |
        |             |                |                |
   (5)  |             |---option REQ------------------->|
        |             |<--option RESP-------------------|
        |             |                |                |
        |         +----------+         |                |
   (6)  |         | store    |         |                |
        |         | domains  |         |                |
        |         +----------+         |                |
        |             |                |                |

                     Illustration of learning domains

                                 Figure 7

   Flow explanations:

   1.  A node opens its first network interface

   2.  The node obtains domain 'domain1.example.com' and IPv6 network
       '0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa' for the new interface 1 from DHCPv6
       server



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   3.  The node stores the learned domains and IPv6 networks for later
       use

   4.  The node opens its second network interface 2

   5.  The node obtains domain 'domain2.example.com' and IPv6 network
       information, say '1.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa' for the new
       interface 2 from DHCPv6 server

   6.  The node stores the learned domains and networks for later use

   Figure 8 below illustrates how a resolver uses the learned domain
   information.  Network information use for reverse lookups is not
   illustrated, but that would go as the figure 7 example.


    Application     Node     RDNSS             RDNSS
                             on interface 1    on interface 2
        |             |                |                |
   (1)  |--Name REQ-->|                |                |
        |             |                |                |
        |      +----------------+      |                |
   (2)  |      | RDNSS          |      |                |
        |      | prioritization |      |                |
        |      +----------------+      |                |
        |             |                |                |
   (3)  |             |------------DNS resolution------>|
        |             |<--------------------------------|
        |             |                |                |
   (4)  |<--Name resp-|                |                |
        |             |                |                |

               Example on choosing interface based on domain

                                 Figure 8

   Flow explanations:

   1.  An application makes a request for resolving an FQDN, e.g.
       'private.domain2.example.com'

   2.  A node creates list of RDNSSes to contact to and uses configured
       RDNSS selection information and stored domain information on
       prioritization decisions.

   3.  The node has chosen interface 2, as from DHCPv6 it was learned
       earlier that the interface 2 has domain 'domain2.example.com'.
       The node then resolves the requested name using interface 2's



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       RDNSS to an IPv6 address

   4.  The node replies to application with the resolved IPv6 address


6.  Scalability considerations

   The size limitations of DHCP messages limit the number of domains and
   networks that can be carried in configuration options.  Including the
   domains and networks in a DHCP option is best suited for deployments
   where relatively few carefully selected domains and networks are
   adequate.


7.  Considerations for network administrators

   Network administrators deploying private namespaces should assist
   advanced nodes in their RDNSS selection process by providing
   information described within this document.

   Private namespaces MUST be globally unique in order to keep DNS
   unambiguous and henceforth avoiding caching related issues and
   destination selection problems (see Section 2.3).  Exceptions to this
   rule are domains utilized for local name resolution (such as .local).

   Private namespaces MUST only consist of subdomains of domains for
   which the relevant operator provides authoritative name service.
   Thus, subdomains of example.com are permitted in the private
   namespace served by an operator's RDNSSes only if the same operator
   provides an SOA record for example.com.

   To counter against attacks against private namespaces, administrators
   utilizing this tool SHOULD deploy DNSSEC for their zone.


8.  Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank following people for their valuable
   feedback and improvement ideas: Mark Andrews, Jari Arkko, Marcelo
   Bagnulo, Brian Carpenter, Stuart Cheshire, Lars Eggert, Tomohiro
   Fujisaki, Peter Koch, Suresh Krishnan, Murray Kucherawy, Edward
   Lewis, Kurtis Lindqvist, Arifumi Matsumoto, Erik Nordmark, Steve
   Padgett, Fabien Rapin, Matthew Ryan, Dave Thaler, Margaret Wasserman,
   Dan Wing, and Dec Wojciech.  Ted Lemon and Julien Laganier receive
   special thanks for their contributions to security considerations.

   This document was prepared using xml2rfc template and the related
   web-tool.



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9.  IANA Considerations

   This memo requests IANA to assign two new option codes.  First option
   code is requested to be assigned for DHCPv4 RDNSS Selection option
   (TBD) from the DHCP option code space defined in section "New DHCP
   option codes" of RFC 2939.  Second option code is requested to be
   assigned to the DHCPv6 RDNSS Selection option (TBD) from the DHCPv6
   option code space defined in section "IANA Considerations" of RFC
   3315.


10.  Security Considerations

10.1.  Attack vectors

   It is possible that attackers might try to utilize
   OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT option to redirect some or all DNS queries
   sent by a resolver to undesired destinations.  The purpose of an
   attack might be denial-of-service, preparation for man-in-the-middle
   attack, or something akin.

   Attackers might try to lure specific traffic by advertising domains
   and networks from very small to very large scope or simply by trying
   to place attacker's RDNSS as the highest priority default RDNSS.

   The best countermeasure for nodes is to implement validating DNSSEC
   aware resolvers.  Trusting on validation done by a RDNSS is a
   possibility only if a node trusts the RDNSS and can use a secure
   channel for DNS messages.

10.2.  Trust levels of network interfaces

   Decision on trust levels of network interfaces depends very much on
   deployment scenario and types of network interfaces.  For example,
   unmanaged WLAN may be considered less trustworthy than managed
   cellular or VPN connections.  An implementation may not be able to
   determine trust levels without explicit configuration provided by
   user or administrator.  Therefore, for example, an implementation may
   not by default trust configuration received even over VPN interfaces.

   The decision on levels of trust may be made by implementation, by
   node administrators, or for example by other standards defining
   organizations as part of system design work.

10.3.  Importance of following the algorithm

   The Section 4 uses normative language for describing node internal
   behavior in order to ensure nodes would not open up new attack



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   vectors by accidental use of RDNSS selection options.  During the
   standards work consensus was that it is safer to not to enable this
   option always by default, but only when deemed useful and safe.


11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2132]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
              Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997.

   [RFC2317]  Eidnes, H., de Groot, G., and P. Vixie, "Classless IN-
              ADDR.ARPA delegation", BCP 20, RFC 2317, March 1998.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
              and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [RFC3396]  Lemon, T. and S. Cheshire, "Encoding Long Options in the
              Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4)", RFC 3396,
              November 2002.

   [RFC3596]  Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi,
              "DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6", RFC 3596,
              October 2003.

   [RFC4242]  Venaas, S., Chown, T., and B. Volz, "Information Refresh
              Time Option for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 4242, November 2005.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-multihoming-without-ipv6nat]
              Matsushima, S., Okimoto, T., Troan, O., Miles, D., and D.
              Wing, "IPv6 Multihoming without Network Address
              Translation",
              draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-multihoming-without-ipv6nat-04 (work
              in progress), February 2012.

   [RFC3397]  Aboba, B. and S. Cheshire, "Dynamic Host Configuration
              Protocol (DHCP) Domain Search Option", RFC 3397,
              November 2002.

   [RFC3646]  Droms, R., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic Host



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              Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
              December 2003.

   [RFC4191]  Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
              More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005.

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.

   [RFC6106]  Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
              "IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
              RFC 6106, November 2010.

   [RFC6147]  Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van
              Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
              Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147,
              April 2011.

   [RFC6418]  Blanchet, M. and P. Seite, "Multiple Interfaces and
              Provisioning Domains Problem Statement", RFC 6418,
              November 2011.


Appendix A.  Possible alternative practices for RDNSS selection

   On some private namespace deployments explicit policies for RDNSS
   selection are not available.  This section describes ways for nodes
   to mitigate the problem by sending wide-spread queries and by
   utilizing possibly existing indirect information elements as hints.

A.1.  Sending queries out on multiple interfaces in parallel

   A possible current practice is to send DNS queries out of multiple
   interfaces and pick up the best out of the received responses.  A
   node SHOULD implement DNSSEC in order to be able to reject responses
   that cannot be validated.  Selection between legitimate answers is
   implementation specific, but replies from trusted RDNSS should be
   preferred.

   A downside of this approach is increased consumption of resources.
   Namely power consumption if an interface, e.g. wireless, has to be
   brought up just for the DNS query that could have been resolved also
   via cheaper interface.  Also load on RDNSSes is increased.  However,
   local caching of results mitigates these problems, and a node might
   also learn interfaces that seem to be able to provide 'better'
   responses than other and prefer those - without forgetting fallback
   required for cases when node is connected to more than one network
   using private namespaces.



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A.2.  Search list option for DNS forward lookup decisions

   A node can learn the special domains of attached network interfaces
   from IPv6 Router Advertisement DNS Search List Option [RFC6106] or
   DHCP search list options; DHCPv4 Domain Search Option number 119
   [RFC3397] and DHCPv6 Domain Search List Option number 24 [RFC3646].
   The node behavior is very similar as is illustrated in the example at
   Section 5.  While these options are not intended to be used in RDNSS
   selection, they may be used by the nodes as hints for smarter RDNSS
   prioritization purposes in order to increase likelihood of fast and
   successful DNS query.

   Overloading of existing DNS search list options is not without
   problems: resolvers would obviously use the domains learned from
   search lists also for name resolution purposes.  This may not be a
   problem in deployments where DNS search list options contain few
   domains like 'example.com, private.example.com', but can become a
   problem if many domains are configured.

A.3.  More specific routes for reverse lookup decision

   [RFC4191] defines how more specific routes can be provisioned for
   nodes.  This information is not intended to be used in RDNSS
   selection, but nevertheless a node can use this information as a hint
   about which interface would be best to try first for reverse lookup
   procedures.  A RDNSS configured via the same interface as more
   specific routes is more likely capable to answer reverse lookup
   questions correctly than RDNSS of an another interface.  The
   likelihood of success is possibly higher if RDNSS address is received
   in the same RA [RFC6106] as the more specific route information.

A.4.  Longest matching prefix for reverse lookup decision

   A node may utilize the longest matching prefix approach when deciding
   which RDNSS to contact for reverse lookup purposes.  Namely, the node
   may send a DNS query to a RDNSS learned over an interface having
   longest matching prefix to the address being queried.  This approach
   can help in cases where ULA [RFC4193] addresses are used and when the
   queried address belongs to a node or server within the same network
   (for example intranet).


Appendix B.  DNSSEC and multiple answers validating with different trust
             anchors

   When validating DNS answers with DNSSEC, a validator might order the
   list of trust anchors it uses to start validation chains, in terms of
   the node's preferences for those trust anchors.  A node could use



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   this ability in order to select among alternative DNS results from
   different interfaces.  Suppose that a node has a trust anchor for the
   public DNS root, and also has a special-purpose trust anchor for
   example.com.  An answer is received on interface i1 for
   www.example.com, and the validation for that succeeds by using the
   public trust anchor.  Also, an answer is received on interface i2 for
   www.example.com, and the validation for that succeeds by using the
   trust anchor for example.com.  In this case, the node has evidence
   for relying on i2 for answers in the example.com zone.


Authors' Addresses

   Teemu Savolainen
   Nokia
   Hermiankatu 12 D
   TAMPERE,   FI-33720
   FINLAND

   Email: teemu.savolainen@nokia.com


   Jun-ya Kato
   NTT
   9-11, Midori-Cho 3-Chome Musashino-Shi
   TOKYO,   180-8585
   JAPAN

   Email: kato@syce.net


   Ted Lemon
   Nominum, Inc.
   2000 Seaport Boulevard
   Redwood City,   CA 94063
   USA

   Phone: +1 650 381 6000
   Email: Ted.Lemon@nominum.com












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