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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 5920

   Network Working Group                            Luyuan Fang, Ed.
   Internet Draft                                Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Category: Informational
   Expires: September 8, 2010

                                                       March 8, 2010


              Security Framework for MPLS and GMPLS Networks
         draft-ietf-mpls-mpls-and-gmpls-security-framework-09.txt


Abstract

   This document provides a security framework for Multiprotocol Label
   Switching (MPLS) and Generalized Multiprotocol Label Switching
   (GMPLS) Networks. This document addresses the security aspects that
   are relevant in the context of MPLS and GMPLS. It describes the
   security threats, the related defensive techniques, and the
   mechanisms for detection and reporting. This document emphasizes
   RSVP-TE and LDP security considerations, as well as Inter-AS and
   Inter-provider security considerations for building and maintaining
   MPLS and GMPLS networks across different domains or different
   Service Providers.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with
   the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
   at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2010.

Copyright Notice


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   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   than English.



Table of Contents

   1. Introduction..................................................3
   Authors and Contributors.........................................4
   2. Terminology...................................................5
   2.1.  Acronyms and Abbreviations.................................5
   2.2.  Terminology................................................6
   3. Security Reference Models.....................................8
   4. Security Threats.............................................10
   4.1.  Attacks on the Control Plane..............................11
   4.2.  Attacks on the Data Plane.................................15
   4.3.  Attacks on Operation and Management Plane.................17
   4.4.  Insider Attacks Considerations............................19
   5. Defensive Techniques for MPLS/GMPLS Networks.................19
   5.1.  Authentication............................................20
   5.2.  Cryptographic Techniques..................................22
   5.3.  Access Control Techniques.................................33
   5.4.  Use of Isolated Infrastructure............................37


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   5.5.  Use of Aggregated Infrastructure..........................38
   5.6.  Service Provider Quality Control Processes................39
   5.7.  Deployment of Testable MPLS/GMPLS Service.................39
   5.8.  Verification of Connectivity..............................39
   6. Monitoring, Detection, and Reporting of Security Attacks.....39
   7. Service Provider General Security Requirements...............41
   7.1.  Protection within the Core Network........................42
   7.2.  Protection on the User Access Link........................46
   7.3.  General User Requirements for MPLS/GMPLS Providers........48
   8. Inter-provider Security Requirements.........................48
   8.1.  Control Plane Protection..................................48
   8.2.  Data Plane Protection.....................................52
   9. Summary of MPLS and GMPLS Security...........................54
   9.1.  MPLS and GMPLS Specific Security Threats..................54
   9.2.  Defense Techniques........................................55
   9.3.  Service Provider MPLS and GMPLS Best Practice Outlines....56
   10.  Security Considerations....................................57
   11.  IANA Considerations........................................58
   12.  Normative References.......................................58
   13.  Informative References.....................................59
   14.  Author's Addresses.........................................61
   15.  Acknowledgements...........................................63



1. Introduction

   Security is an important aspect of all networks, MPLS and GMPLS
   networks being no exception.

   MPLS and GMPLS are described in [RFC3031] and [RFC3945]. Various
   security considerations have been addressed in each of the many
   RFCs on MPLS and GMPLS technologies, but no single document covers
   general security considerations. The motivation for creating this
   document is to provide a comprehensive and consistent security
   framework for MPLS and GMPLS networks. Each individual document may
   point to this document for general security considerations in
   addition to providing security considerations specific to the
   particular technologies the document is describing.

   In this document, we first describe the security threats relevant
   in the context of MPLS and GMPLS and the defensive techniques to
   combat those threats. We consider security issues resulting both
   from malicious or incorrect behavior of users and other parties and
   from negligent or incorrect behavior of providers. An important

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   part of security defense is the detection and reporting of a
   security attack, which is also addressed in this document.

   We then discuss possible service provider security requirements in
   a MPLS or GMPLS environment. Users have expectations for the
   security characteristics of MPLS or GMPLS networks. These include
   security requirements for equipment supporting MPLS and GMPLS and
   operational security requirements for providers. Service providers
   must protect their network infrastructure and make it secure to the
   level required to provide services over their MPLS or GMPLS
   networks.

   Inter-AS and Inter-provider security are discussed with special
   emphasis, because the security risk factors are higher with inter-
   provider connections. Note that Inter-carrier MPLS security is also
   considered in [MFA MPLS ICI].

   Depending on different MPLS or GMPLS techniques used, the degree of
   risk and the mitigation methodologies vary. This document discusses
   the security aspects and requirements for certain basic MPLS and
   GMPLS techniques and inter-connection models. This document does
   not attempt to cover all current and future MPLS and GMPLS
   technologies, as it is not within the scope of this document to
   analyze the security properties of specific technologies.

   It is important to clarify that, in this document, we limit
   ourselves to describing the providers' security requirements that
   pertain to MPLS and GMPLS networks, not including the connected
   user sites. Readers may refer to the "Security Best Practices
   Efforts and Documents" [opsec effort] and "Security Mechanisms for
   the Internet" [RFC3631] for general network operation security
   considerations. It is not our intention, however, to formulate
   precise "requirements" for each specific technology in terms of
   defining the mechanisms and techniques that must be implemented to
   satisfy such security requirements.

   This document has used relevant content from RFC 4111 "Security
   Framework of Provider Provisioned VPN for Provider-Provisioned
   Virtual Private Networks (PPVPNs)" [RFC4111]. We acknowledge the
   authors of RFC 4111 for the valuable information and text.


   Authors and Contributors

   Authors:
   Luyuan Fang, Ed., Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Michael Behringer, Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Ross Callon, Juniper Networks

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   Richard Graveman, RFG Security, LLC
   J. L. Le Roux, France Telecom
   Raymond Zhang, British Telecom
   Paul Knight, Individual Contributor
   Yaakov Stein, RAD Data Communications
   Nabil Bitar, Verizon
   Monique Morrow, Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Adrian Farrel, Old Dog Consulting

   As a design team member for the MPLS Security Framework, Jerry Ash
   also made significant contributions to this document.


2. Terminology

   2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations

      AS        Autonomous System
      ASBR      Autonomous System Border Router
      ATM       Asynchronous Transfer Mode
      BGP       Border Gateway Protocol
      BFD       Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
      CE        Customer-Edge device
      CoS       Class of Service
      CPU       Central Processing Unit
      DNS       Domain Name System
      DoS       Denial of Service
      ESP       Encapsulating Security Payload
      FEC       Forwarding Equivalence Class
      GMPLS     Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching
      GCM       Galois Counter Mode
      GRE       Generic Routing Encapsulation
      ICI       InterCarrier Interconnect
      ICMP      Internet Control Message Protocol
      ICMPv6    ICMP in IP Version 6
      IGP       Interior Gateway Protocol
      IKE       Internet Key Exchange
      IP        Internet Protocol
      IPsec     IP Security
      IPVPN     IP-based VPN
      LDP       Label Distribution Protocol
      L2TP      Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
      LMP       Link Management Protocol
      LSP       Label Switched Path
      LSR       Label Switching Router
      MD5       Message Digest Algorithm
      MPLS      MultiProtocol Label Switching
      MP-BGP    Multi-Protocol BGP

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      NTP       Network Time Protocol
      OAM       Operations, Administration, and Management
      PCE       Path Computation Element
      PE        Provider-Edge device
      PPVPN     Provider-Provisioned Virtual Private Network
      PSN       Packet-Switched Network
      PW        Pseudowire
      QoS       Quality of Service
      RR        Route Reflector
      RSVP      Resource Reservation Protocol
      RSVP-TE   Resource Reservation Protocol with Traffic Engineering
                     Extensions
      SLA       Service Level Agreement
      SNMP      Simple Network Management Protocol
      SP        Service Provider
      SSH       Secure Shell
      SSL       Secure Sockets Layer
      SYN       Synchronize packet in TCP
      TCP       Transmission Control Protocol
      TDM       Time Division Multiplexing
      TE        Traffic Engineering
      TLS       Transport Layer Security
      ToS       Type of Service
      TTL       Time-To-Live
      UDP       User Datagram Protocol
      VC        Virtual Circuit
      VPN       Virtual Private Network
      WG        Working Group of IETF
      WSS       Web Services Security

   2.2.  Terminology

   This document uses MPLS and GMPLS specific terminology. Definitions
   and details about MPLS and GMPLS terminology can be found in
   [RFC3031] and [RFC3945]. The most important definitions are
   repeated in this section; for other definitions the reader is
   referred to [RFC3031] and [RFC3945].

   Core network: A MPLS/GMPLS core network is defined as the central
   network infrastructure which consists of P and PE routers. A
   MPLS/GMPLS core network may consist of one or more networks
   belonging to a single SP.

   Customer Edge (CE) device: A Customer Edge device is a router or a
   switch in the customer's network interfacing with the Service
   Provider's network.



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   Forwarding Equivalence Class (FEC): A group of IP packets that are
   forwarded in the same manner (e.g., over the same path, with the
   same forwarding treatment).

   Label: A short, fixed length, physically contiguous identifier,
   usually of local significance.
   Label merging: the replacement of multiple incoming labels for a
   particular FEC with a single outgoing label.

   Label Switched Hop: A hop between two MPLS nodes, on which
   forwarding is done using labels.

   Label Switched Path (LSP): The path through one or more LSRs at one
   level of the hierarchy followed by a packets in a particular FEC.

   Label Switching Routers (LSRs): An MPLS/GMPLS node assumed to have
   a forwarding plane that is capable of (a) recognizing either packet
   or cell boundaries, and (b) being able to process either packet
   headers or cell headers.

   Loop Detection: A method of dealing with loops in which loops are
   allowed to be set up, and data may be transmitted over the loop,
   but the loop is later detected.

   Loop Prevention: A method of dealing with loops in which data is
   never transmitted over a loop.

   Label Stack: An ordered set of labels.

   Merge Point: A node at which label merging is done.

   MPLS Domain: A contiguous set of nodes that perform MPLS routing
   and forwarding and are also in one Routing or Administrative
   Domain.

   MPLS Edge Node: A MPLS node that connects a MPLS domain with a node
   outside of the domain, either because it does not run MPLS, or
   because it is in a different domain.  Note that if a LSR has a
   neighboring host not running MPLS, then that LSR is a MPLS edge
   node.

   MPLS Egress Node: A MPLS edge node in its role in handling traffic
   as it leaves a MPLS domain.

   MPLS Ingress Node: A MPLS edge node in its role in handling traffic
   as it enters a MPLS domain.



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   MPLS Label: A label carried in a packet header, which represents
   the packet's FEC.

   MPLS Node: A node running MPLS.  A MPLS node is aware of MPLS
   control protocols, runs one or more routing protocols, and is
   capable of forwarding packets based on labels. A MPLS node may
   optionally be also capable of forwarding native IP packets.

   MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS): An IETF working group and the
   effort associated with the working group.

   P: Provider Router. A Provider Router is a router in the Service
   Provider's core network that does not have interfaces directly
   towards the customer. A P router is used to interconnect the PE
   routers and/or other P routers within the core network.

   PE: Provider Edge device. A Provider Edge device is the equipment
   in the Service Provider's network that interfaces with the
   equipment in the customer's network.

   PPVPN: Provider-Provisioned Virtual Private Network, including
   Layer 2 VPNs and Layer 3 VPNs.

   VPN: Virtual Private Network, which restricts communication between
   a set of sites, making use of an IP backbone shared by traffic not
   going to or not coming from those sites ([RFC4110]).


3. Security Reference Models
   This section defines a reference model for security in MPLS/GMPLS
   networks.

   This document defines each MPLS/GMPLS core in a single domain to be
   a trusted zone. A primary concern is about security aspects that
   relate to breaches of security from the "outside" of a trusted zone
   to the "inside" of this zone. Figure 1 depicts the concept of
   trusted zones within the MPLS/GMPLS framework.












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                      /-------------\
   +------------+    /               \         +------------+
   | MPLS/GMPLS +---/                 \--------+ MPLS/GMPLS |
   | user          |  MPLS/GMPLS Core  |         user       |
   | site       +---\                 /XXX-----+ site       |
   +------------+    \               / XXX     +------------+
                      \-------------/  | |
                                       | |
                                       | +------\
                                       +--------/  "Internet"

                   |<-  Trusted zone ->|

       MPLS/GMPLS Core with user connections and Internet connection

   Figure 1: The MPLS/GMPLS trusted zone model.


   The trusted zone is the MPLS/GMPLS core in a single AS within a
   single Service Provider.
   A trusted zone contains elements and users with similar security
   properties, such as exposure and risk level. In the MPLS context,
   an organization is typically considered as one trusted zone.

   The boundaries of a trust domain should be carefully defined when
   analyzing the security properties of each individual network, e.g.,
   the boundaries can be at the link termination, remote peers, areas,
   or quite commonly, ASes.

   In principle, the trusted zones should be separate; however,
   typically MPLS core networks also offer Internet access, in which
   case a transit point (marked with "XXX" in Figure 1) is defined. In
   the case of MPLS/GMPLS inter-provider connections or InterCarrier
   Interconnect (ICI), the trusted zone of each provider ends at the
   respective ASBRs (ASBR1 and ASBR2 for Provider A and ASBR3 and
   ASBR4 for Provider B in Figure 2).

   A key requirement of MPLS and GMPLS networks is that the security
   of the trusted zone not be compromised by interconnecting the
   MPLS/GMPLS core infrastructure with another provider's core
   (MPLS/GMPLS or non-MPLS/GMPLS), the Internet, or end users.

   In addition, neighbors may be trusted or untrusted. Neighbors may
   be authorized or unauthorized. Authorized neighbor is the neighbor
   one established peering relationship with. Even though a neighbor
   may be authorized for communication, it may not be trusted. For
   example, when connecting with another provider's ASBRs to set up


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   inter-AS LSPs, the other provider is considered an untrusted but
   authorized neighbor.


                +---------------+        +----------------+
                |               |        |                |
                | MPLS/GMPLS   ASBR1----ASBR3  MPLS/GMPLS |
          CE1--PE1   Network    |        |     Network   PE2--CE2
                | Provider A   ASBR2----ASBR4  Provider B |
                |               |        |                |
                +---------------+        +----------------+
                                InterCarrier
                                Interconnect (ICI)

   For Provider A:
        Trusted Zone: Provider A MPLS/GMPLS network
        Authorized but untrusted neighbor: provider B
        Unauthorized neighbors: CE1, CE2

   Figure 2. MPLS/GMPLS trusted zone and authorized neighbor.


   All aspects of network security independent of whether a network is
   a MPLS/GMPLS network are out of scope. For example, attacks from
   the Internet to a user's web-server connected through the
   MPLS/GMPLS network are not considered here, unless the way the
   MPLS/GMPLS network is provisioned could make a difference to the
   security of this user's server.

4. Security Threats

   This section discusses the various network security threats that
   may endanger MPLS/GMPLS networks. RFC 4778 [RFC4778] provided the
   best current operational security practices in Internet Service
   Provider environments.

   A successful attack on a particular MPLS/GMPLS network or on a SP's
   MPLS/GMPLS infrastructure may cause one or more of the following
   ill effects:

    - Observation, modification, or deletion of a provider's or user's
      data.
    - Replay of a provider's or user's data.
    - Injection of inauthentic data into a provider's or user's
      traffic stream.
    - Traffic pattern analysis on a provider's or user's traffic.
    - Disruption of a provider's or user's connectivity.
    - Degradation of a provider's service quality.

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    - Probing a provider's network to determine its configuration,
      capacity, or usage.

   It is useful to consider that threats, whether malicious or
   accidental, may come from different categories of sources.  For
   example they may come from:

    - Other users whose services are provided by the same MPLS/GMPLS
      core.
    - The MPLS/GMPLS SP or persons working for it.
    - Other persons who obtain physical access to a MPLS/GMPLS SP's
      site.
    - Other persons who use social engineering methods to influence
      the behavior of a SP's personnel.
    - Users of the MPLS/GMPLS network itself, e.g., intra-VPN threats.
      (Such threats are beyond the scope of this document.)
    - Others, e.g., attackers from the Internet at large.
    - Other SPs in the case of MPLS/GMPLS Inter-provider connection.
      The core of the other provider may or may not be using
      MPLS/GMPLS.
    - Those who create, deliver, install, and maintain software for
      network equipment.


   Given that security is generally a tradeoff between expense and
   risk, it is also useful to consider the likelihood of different
   attacks occurring.  There is at least a perceived difference in the
   likelihood of most types of attacks being successfully mounted in
   different environments, such as:

    - A MPLS/GMPLS core inter-connecting with another provider's core
    - A MPLS/GMPLS configuration transiting the public Internet

   Most types of attacks become easier to mount and hence more likely
   as the shared infrastructure via which service is provided expands
   from a single SP to multiple cooperating SPs to the global
   Internet.  Attacks that may not be of sufficient likeliness to
   warrant concern in a closely controlled environment often merit
   defensive measures in broader, more open environments. In closed
   communities, it is often practical to deal with misbehavior after
   the fact: an employee can be disciplined, for example.

   The following sections discuss specific types of exploits that
   threaten MPLS/GMPLS networks.

   4.1. Attacks on the Control Plane



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   This category encompasses attacks on the control structures
   operated by the SP with MPLS/GMPLS cores.

   It should be noted that while connectivity in the MPLS control plane
   uses the same links and network resources as are used by the data
   plane, the GMPLS control plane may be provided by separate resources
   from those used in the data plane. That is, the GMPLS control plane
   may be physically separate from the data plane.

   The different cases of physically congruent and physically separate
   control/data planes lead to slightly different possibilities of
   attack, although most of the cases are the same. Note that, for
   example, the data plane cannot be directly congested by an attack on
   a physically separate control plane as it could be if the control
   and data planes shared network resources. Note also that if the
   control plane uses diverse resources from the data plane, no
   assumptions should be made about the security of the control plane
   based on the security of the data plane resources.

   This section is focused outsider attach. The insider attack is
   discussed in section 4.4.


   4.1.1.       LSP creation by an unauthorized element

   The unauthorized element can be a local CE or a router in another
   domain.  An unauthorized element can generate MPLS signaling
   messages.  At the least, this can result in extra control plane and
   forwarding state, and if successful, network bandwidth could be
   reserved unnecessarily. This may also result in theft of service or
   even compromise the entire network.

   4.1.2.       LSP message interception

   This threat might be accomplished by monitoring network traffic,
   for example, after a physical intrusion. Without physical
   intrusion, it could be accomplished with an unauthorized software
   modification. Also, many technologies such as terrestrial
   microwave, satellite, or free-space optical could be intercepted
   without physical intrusion. If successful, it could provide
   information leading to label spoofing attacks.  It also raises
   confidentiality issues.

   4.1.3.       Attacks against RSVP-TE

   RSVP-TE, described in [RFC3209], is the control protocol used to
   set up GMPLS and traffic engineered MPLS tunnels.


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   There are two major types of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
   against a MPLS domain based on RSVP-TE. The attacker may set up
   numerous unauthorized LSPs or may send a storm of RSVP messages.
   It has been demonstrated that unprotected routers running RSVP can
   be effectively disabled by both types of DoS attacks.

   These attacks may even be combined, by using the unauthorized LSPs
   to transport additional RSVP (or other) messages across routers
   where they might otherwise be filtered out.  RSVP attacks can be
   launched against adjacent routers at the border with the attacker,
   or against non-adjacent routers within the MPLS domain, if there is
   no effective mechanism to filter them out.

   4.1.4.       Attacks against LDP

   LDP, described in [RFC5036], is the control protocol used to set up
   MPLS tunnels without TE.

   There are two significant types of attack against LDP.  An
   unauthorized network element can establish a LDP session by sending
   LDP Hello and LDP Init messages, leading to the potential setup of
   a LSP, as well as accompanying LDP state table consumption.  Even
   without successfully establishing LSPs, an attacker can launch a
   DoS attack in the form of a storm of LDP Hello messages or LDP TCP
   SYN messages, leading to high CPU utilization or table space
   exhaustion on the target router.


   4.1.5.       Denial of Service Attacks on the Network
   Infrastructure

   DoS attacks could be accomplished through a MPLS signaling storm,
   resulting in high CPU utilization and possibly leading to control
   plane resource starvation.

   Control plane DoS attacks can be mounted specifically against the
   mechanisms the SP uses to provide various services, or against the
   general infrastructure of the service provider, e.g., P routers or
   shared aspects of PE routers.  (An attack against the general
   infrastructure is within the scope of this document only if the
   attack can occur in relation with the MPLS/GMPLS infrastructure;
   otherwise is not a MPLS/GMPLS-specific issue.)

   The attacks described in the following sections may each have
   denial of service as one of their effects.  Other DoS attacks are
   also possible.



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   4.1.6.       Attacks on the SP's MPLS/GMPLS Equipment via
   Management Interfaces

   This includes unauthorized access to a SP's infrastructure
   equipment, for example to reconfigure the equipment or to extract
   information (statistics, topology, etc.) pertaining to the network.


   4.1.7.       Cross-Connection of Traffic between Users

   This refers to the event in which expected isolation between
   separate users (who may be VPN users) is breached.  This includes
   cases such as:

    - A site being connected into the "wrong" VPN
    - Traffic being replicated and sent to an unauthorized user
    - Two or more VPNs being improperly merged together
    - A point-to-point VPN connecting the wrong two points
    - Any packet or frame being improperly delivered outside the VPN
      to which it belongs

   Mis-connection or cross-connection of VPNs may be caused by service
   provider or equipment vendor error, or by the malicious action of
   an attacker. The breach may be physical (e.g., PE-CE links mis-
   connected) or logical (e.g., improper device configuration).

   Anecdotal evidence suggests that the cross-connection threat is one
   of the largest security concerns of users (or would-be users).

   4.1.8.       Attacks against Routing Protocols

   This encompasses attacks against underlying routing protocols that
   are run by the SP and that directly support the MPLS/GMPLS core.
   (Attacks against the use of routing protocols for the distribution
   of backbone routes are beyond the scope of this document.)
   Specific attacks against popular routing protocols have been widely
   studied and described in [RFC4593].

   4.1.9.       Other Attacks on Control Traffic

   Besides routing and management protocols (covered separately in the
   previous sections), a number of other control protocols may be
   directly involved in delivering services by the MPLS/GMPLS core.
   These include but may not be limited to:

    - MPLS signaling (LDP, RSVP-TE) discussed above in subsections
      4.1.4 and 4.1.3
    - PCE signaling

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    - IPsec signaling (IKE and IKEv2)
    - ICMP and ICMPv6
    - L2TP
    - BGP-based membership discovery
    - Database-based membership discovery (e.g., RADIUS)
    - Other protocols that may be important to the control
      infrastructure, e.g., DNS, LMP, NTP, SNMP, and GRE.

   Attacks might subvert or disrupt the activities of these protocols,
   for example via impersonation or DoS.

   Note that all of the data plane attacks can also be carried out
   against the packets of the control and management planes:
   insertion, spoofing, replay, deletion, pattern analysis, and other
   attacks mentioned above.

   4.2. Attacks on the Data Plane

   This category encompasses attacks on the provider's or end user's
   data.  Note that from the MPLS/GMPLS network end user's point of
   view, some of this might be control plane traffic, e.g. routing
   protocols running from user site A to user site B via IP or non-IP
   connections, which may be some type of VPN.


   4.2.1.       Unauthorized Observation of Data Traffic

   This refers to "sniffing" provider or end user packets and
   examining their contents.  This can result in exposure of
   confidential information.  It can also be a first step in other
   attacks (described below) in which the recorded data is modified
   and re-inserted, or simply replayed later.

   4.2.2.       Modification of Data Traffic

   This refers to modifying the contents of packets as they traverse
   the MPLS/GMPLS core.

   4.2.3.       Insertion of Inauthentic Data Traffic: Spoofing
   and Replay

   Spoofing refers to sending a user or inserting into a data stream
   packets that do not belong, with the objective of having them
   accepted by the recipient as legitimate.  Also included in this
   category is the insertion of copies of once-legitimate packets that
   have been recorded and replayed.



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   4.2.4.       Unauthorized Deletion of Data Traffic

   This refers to causing packets to be discarded as they traverse the
   MPLS/GMPLS networks.  This is a specific type of Denial of Service
   attack.

   4.2.5.       Unauthorized Traffic Pattern Analysis

   This refers to "sniffing" provider or user packets and examining
   aspects or meta-aspects of them that may be visible even when the
   packets themselves are encrypted.  An attacker might gain useful
   information based on the amount and timing of traffic, packet
   sizes, source and destination addresses, etc.  For most users, this
   type of attack is generally considered to be significantly less of
   a concern than the other types discussed in this section.

   4.2.6.       Denial of Service Attacks

   Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are those in which an attacker
   attempts to disrupt or prevent the use of a service by its
   legitimate users.  Taking network devices out of service, modifying
   their configuration, or overwhelming them with requests for service
   are several of the possible avenues for DoS attack.

   Overwhelming the network with requests for service, otherwise known
   as a "resource exhaustion" DoS attack, may target any resource in
   the network, e.g., link bandwidth, packet forwarding capacity,
   session capacity for various protocols, CPU power, table size,
   storage overflows, and so on.

   DoS attacks of the resource exhaustion type can be mounted against
   the data plane of a particular provider or end user by attempting
   to insert (spoofing) an overwhelming quantity of inauthentic data
   into the provider or end user's network from the outside of the
   trusted zone. Potential results might be to exhaust the bandwidth
   available to that provider or end user or to overwhelm the
   cryptographic authentication mechanisms of the provider or end
   user.

   Data plane resource exhaustion attacks can also be mounted by
   overwhelming the service provider's general (MPLS/GMPLS-
   independent) infrastructure with traffic.  These attacks on the
   general infrastructure are not usually a MPLS/GMPLS-specific issue,
   unless the attack is mounted by another MPLS/GMPLS network user
   from a privileged position.  (E.g., a MPLS/GMPLS network user might
   be able to monopolize network data plane resources and thus disrupt
   other users.)


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   Many DoS attacks use amplification, whereby the attacker co-opts
   otherwise innocent parties to increase the effect of the attack.
   The attacker may, for example, send packets to a broadcast or
   multicast address with the spoofed source address of the victim,
   and all of the recipients may then respond to the victim.

   4.2.7.       Misconnection

   Misconnection may arise through deliberate attack, or through
   misconfiguration or misconnection of the network resources. The
   result is likely to be delivery of data to the wrong destination or
   black-holing of the data.

   In GMPLS with physically diverse control and data planes, it may be
   possible for data plane misconnection to go undetected by the
   control plane.

   In optical networks under GMPLS control, misconnection may give rise
   to physical safety risks as unprotected lasers may be activated
   without warning.


   4.3. Attacks on Operation and Management Plane

   Attacks on OAM have been discussed extensively as general network
   security issues over the last 20 years. RFC 4778 [RFC4778] may
   serve as the best current operational security practices in Internet
   Service Provider environments. RFC 4377 [RFC4377] provided OAM
   Requirements for MPLS networks. See also the Security
   Considerations of RFC 4377 and Section 7 of RFC 4378 [RFC4378].

   OAM Operations across the MPLS-ICI could also be the source of
   security threats on the provider infrastructure as well as the
   service offered over the MPLS-ICI. A large volume of OAM messages
   could overwhelm the processing capabilities of an ASBR if the ASBR
   is not properly protected. Maliciously generated OAM messages could
   also be used to bring down an otherwise healthy service (e.g., MPLS
   Pseudo Wire), and therefore affect service security. LSP ping does
   not support authentication today, and that support should be
   subject for future considerations. Bidirectional Forwarding
   Detection (BFD), however, does have support for carrying an
   authentication object. It also supports Time-To-Live (TTL)
   processing as an anti-replay measure. Implementations conformant
   with this MPLS-ICI should support BFD authentication and must
   support the procedures for TTL processing.




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   Regarding GMPLS OAM consideration in optical interworking, there is
   a good discussion on security for management interfaces to Network
   Elements [OIF Sec Mag].

   Network elements typically have one or more (in some cases many) OAM
   interfaces used for network management, billing and accounting,
   configuration, maintenance, and other administrative activities.

   Remote access to a network element through these OAM interfaces is
   frequently a requirement. Securing the control protocols while
   leaving these OAM interfaces unprotected opens up a huge security
   vulnerability. Network elements are an attractive target for
   intruders who want to disrupt or gain free access to
   telecommunications facilities. Much has been written about this
   subject since the 1980s. In the 1990s, telecommunications facilities
   were identified in the U.S. and other countries as part of the
   "critical infrastructure," and increased emphasis was placed on
   thwarting such attacks from a wider range of potentially well-funded
   and determined adversaries.

   At one time, careful access controls and password management were a
   sufficient defense, but no longer. Networks using the TCP/IP
   protocol suite are vulnerable to forged source addresses, recording
   and later replay, packet sniffers picking up passwords, re-routing
   of traffic to facilitate eavesdropping or tampering, active
   hijacking attacks of TCP connections, and a variety of denial of
   service attacks.  The ease of forging TCP/IP packets is the main
   reason network management protocols lacking strong security have not
   been used to configure network elements (e.g., with the SNMP SET
   command).

   Readily available hacking tools exist that let an eavesdropper on a
   LAN take over one end of any TCP connection, so that the legitimate
   party is cut off. In addition, enterprises and Service Providers in
   some jurisdictions need to safeguard data about their users and
   network configurations from prying. An attacker could eavesdrop and
   observe traffic to analyze usage patterns and map a network
   configuration; an attacker could also gain access to systems and
   manipulate configuration data or send malicious commands.

   Therefore, in addition to authenticating the human user, more
   sophisticated protocol security is needed for OAM interfaces,
   especially when they are configured over TCP/IP stacks. Finally,
   relying on a perimeter defense, such as firewalls, is insufficient
   protection against "insider attacks," or penetrations that
   compromise a system inside the firewall as a launching pad to attack
   network elements. The insider attack is discussed in the following
   session.

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   4.4. Insider Attacks Considerations

   The chain of trust model means that MPLS and GMPLS networks are
   particularly vulnerable to insider attacks. These can be launched by
   any malign person with access to any LSR in the trust domain.
   Insider attacks could also be launched by compromised software
   within the trust domain. Such attacks could, for example, advertise
   non-existent resources, modify advertisements from other routers,
   request unwanted LSPs that use network resources, or deny or modify
   legitimate LSP requests.

   Protection against insider attacks is largely for future study in
   MPLS and GMPLS networks. Some protection can be obtained by
   providing strict security for software upgrades, tight OAM access
   control procedures. Further protection can be achieved by strict
   control of user (i.e. operator) access to LSRs. Software change
   management and change tracking (e.g. CVS diffs from text-based
   configuration files) helps in spotting irregularities and human
   errors.  In some cases, configuration change approval processes may
   also be warranted.  Software tools could be used to check
   configurations for consistency and compliance. Software tools may
   also be used to monitor and report network behavior and activity in
   order to quickly spot any irregularities that may be the result of
   an insider attack.




5. Defensive Techniques for MPLS/GMPLS Networks

   The defensive techniques discussed in this document are intended to
   describe methods by which some security threats can be addressed.
   They are not intended as requirements for all MPLS/GMPLS
   implementations.  The MPLS/GMPLS provider should determine the
   applicability of these techniques to the provider's specific
   service offerings, and the end user may wish to assess the value of
   these techniques to the user's service requirements. The
   operational environment determines the security requirements.
   Therefore, protocol designers need to provide a full set of
   security services, which can be used where appropriate.

   The techniques discussed here include encryption, authentication,
   filtering, firewalls, access control, isolation, aggregation, and
   others.

   Often, security is achieved by careful protocol design, rather than
   by adding a security method. For example, one method of mitigating

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   DoS attacks is to make sure that innocent parties cannot be used to
   amplify the attack. Security works better when it is "designed in"
   rather than "added on."

   Nothing is ever 100% secure.  Defense therefore involves protecting
   against those attacks that are most likely to occur or that have
   the most direct consequences if successful.  For those attacks that
   are protected against, absolute protection is seldom achievable;
   more often it is sufficient just to make the cost of a successful
   attack greater than what the adversary will be willing or able to
   expend.

   Successfully defending against an attack does not necessarily mean
   the attack must be prevented from happening or from reaching its
   target.  In many cases the network can instead be designed to
   withstand the attack.  For example, the introduction of inauthentic
   packets could be defended against by preventing their introduction
   in the first place, or by making it possible to identify and
   eliminate them before delivery to the MPLS/GMPLS user's system.
   The latter is frequently a much easier task.


   5.1. Authentication

   To prevent security issues arising from some DoS attacks or from
   malicious or accidental misconfiguration, it is critical that
   devices in the MPLS/GMPLS should only accept connections or control
   messages from valid sources.  Authentication refers to methods to
   ensure that message sources are properly identified by the
   MPLS/GMPLS devices with which they communicate.  This section
   focuses on identifying the scenarios in which sender authentication
   is required and recommends authentication mechanisms for these
   scenarios.

   Cryptographic techniques (authentication, integrity, and
   encryption) do not protect against some types of denial of service
   attacks, specifically resource exhaustion attacks based on CPU or
   bandwidth exhaustion. In fact, the processing required to decrypt
   or check authentication may, in the case of software-based
   cryptographic processing, in some cases increase the effect of
   these resource exhaustion attacks. With a hardware cryptographic
   accelerator, attack packets can be dropped at line speed without a
   cost of software cycles. Cryptographic techniques may, however, be
   useful against resource exhaustion attacks based on exhaustion of
   state information (e.g., TCP SYN attacks).




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   The MPLS data plane, as presently defined, is not amenable to
   source authentication as there are no source identifiers in the
   MPLS packet to authenticate. The MPLS label is only locally
   meaningful. It may be assigned by a downstream node or upstream
   node for multicast support.

   When the MPLS payload carries identifiers that may be authenticated
   (e.g., IP packets), authentication may be carried out at the client
   level, but this does not help the MPLS SP, as these client
   identifiers belong to an external, untrusted network.


  5.1.1. Management System Authentication

   Management system authentication includes the authentication of a
   PE to a centrally-managed network management or directory server
   when directory-based "auto-discovery" is used.  It also includes
   authentication of a CE to the configuration server, when a
   configuration server system is used.

   Authentication should be bi-directional, including PE or CE to
   configuration server authentication for PE or CE to be certain it
   is communicating with the right server.


  5.1.2. Peer-to-Peer Authentication

   Peer-to-peer authentication includes peer authentication for
   network control protocols (e.g., LDP, BGP, etc.), and other peer
   authentication (i.e., authentication of one IPsec security gateway
   by another).

   Authentication should be bi-directional, including PE or CE to
   configuration server authentication for PE or CE to be certain it
   is communicating with the right server.

   As indicated in Section 5.1.1, authentication should be bi-
   directional.

  5.1.3. Cryptographic Techniques for Authenticating Identity

   Cryptographic techniques offer several mechanisms for
   authenticating the identity of devices or individuals. These
   include the use of shared secret keys, one-time keys generated by
   accessory devices or software, user-ID and password pairs, and a

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   range of public-private key systems. Another approach is to use a
   hierarchical Certification Authority system to provide digital
   certificates.

   This section describes or provides references to the specific
   cryptographic approaches for authenticating identity.  These
   approaches provide secure mechanisms for most of the authentication
   scenarios required in securing a MPLS/GMPLS network.


   5.2. Cryptographic Techniques

   MPLS/GMPLS defenses against a wide variety of attacks can be
   enhanced by the proper application of cryptographic techniques.
   These same cryptographic techniques are applicable to general
   network communications and can provide confidentiality (encryption)
   of communication between devices, authenticate the identities of the
   devices, and detect whether the data being communicated has been
   changed during transit or replayed from previous messages.

   Several aspects of authentication are addressed in some detail in a
   separate "Authentication" section.

   Cryptographic methods add complexity to a service and thus, for a
   few reasons, may not be the most practical solution in every case.
   Cryptography adds an additional computational burden to devices,
   which may reduce the number of user connections that can be handled
   on a device or otherwise reduce the capacity of the device,
   potentially driving up the provider's costs.  Typically,
   configuring encryption services on devices adds to the complexity
   of their configuration and adds labor cost. Some key management
   system is usually needed. Packet sizes are typically increased when
   the packets are encrypted or have integrity checks or replay
   counters added, increasing the network traffic load and adding to
   the likelihood of packet fragmentation with its increased overhead.
   (This packet length increase can often be mitigated to some extent
   by data compression techniques, but at the expense of additional
   computational burden.) Finally, some providers may employ enough
   other defensive techniques, such as physical isolation or filtering
   and firewall techniques, that they may not perceive additional
   benefit from encryption techniques.

   Users may wish to provide confidentiality end to end. Generally,
   encrypting for confidentiality must be accompanied with
   cryptographic integrity checks to prevent certain active attacks
   against the encrypted communications. On today's processors,
   encryption and integrity checks run extremely quickly, but key


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   management may be more demanding in terms of both computational and
   administrative overhead.

   The trust model among the MPLS/GMPLS user, the MPLS/GMPLS provider,
   and other parts of the network is a major element in determining
   the applicability of cryptographic protection for any specific
   MPLS/GMPLS implementation. In particular, it determines where
   cryptographic protection should be applied:

   -  If the data path between the user's site and the
      provider's PE is not trusted, then it may be used on the
      PE-CE link.
   -  If some part of the backbone network is not trusted,
      particularly in implementations where traffic may travel
      across the Internet or multiple providers' networks, then
      the PE-PE traffic may be cryptographically protected. One
      also should consider cases where L1 technology may be
      vulnerable to eavesdropping.
   -  If the user does not trust any zone outside of its
      premises, it may require end-to-end or CE-CE cryptographic
      protection. This fits within the scope of this MPLS/GMPLS
      security framework when the CE is provisioned by the
      MPLS/GMPLS provider.
   -  If the user requires remote access to its site from a
      system at a location that is not a customer location (for
      example, access by a traveler) there may be a requirement
      for cryptographically protecting the traffic between that
      system and an access point or a customer's site. If the
      MPLS/GMPLS provider supplies the access point, then the
      customer must cooperate with the provider to handle the
      access control services for the remote users. These access
      control services are usually protected cryptographically,
      as well.

   Access control usually starts with authentication of the
   entity. If cryptographic services are part of the scenario,
   then it is important to bind the authentication to the key
   management. Otherwise the protocol is vulnerable to being
   hijacked between the authentication and key management.

   Although CE-CE cryptographic protection can provide integrity and
   confidentiality against third parties, if the MPLS/GMPLS provider
   has complete management control over the CE (encryption) devices,
   then it may be possible for the provider to gain access to the
   user's traffic or internal network. Encryption devices could
   potentially be reconfigured to use null encryption, bypass
   cryptographic processing altogether, reveal internal configuration,
   or provide some means of sniffing or diverting unencrypted traffic.

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   Thus an implementation using CE-CE encryption needs to consider the
   trust relationship between the MPLS/GMPLS user and provider.
   MPLS/GMPLS users and providers may wish to negotiate a service
   level agreement (SLA) for CE-CE encryption that provides an
   acceptable demarcation of responsibilities for management of
   cryptographic protection on the CE devices. The demarcation may
   also be affected by the capabilities of the CE devices. For
   example, the CE might support some partitioning of management, a
   configuration lock-down ability, or shared capability to verify the
   configuration. In general, the MPLS/GMPLS user needs to have a
   fairly high level of trust that the MPLS/GMPLS provider will
   properly provision and manage the CE devices, if the managed CE-CE
   model is used.

  5.2.1. IPsec in MPLS/GMPLS

   IPsec [RFC4301] [RFC4302] [RFC4835] [RFC4306] [RFC4309] [RFC2411]
   [ipsecme-roadmap] is the security protocol of choice for protection
   at the IP layer.  IPsec provides robust security for IP traffic
   between pairs of devices.  Non-IP traffic such as IS-IS routing
   must be converted to IP (e.g., by encapsulation) in order to use
   IPsec. When the MPLS is encapsulating IP traffic then IPsec covers
   the encryption of the IP client layer, while for non-IP client
   traffic see section 5.2.4 (MPLS PWs).

   In the MPLS/GMPLS model, IPsec can be employed to protect IP
   traffic between PEs, between a PE and a CE, or from CE to CE.  CE-
   to-CE IPsec may be employed in either a provider-provisioned or a
   user-provisioned model.  Likewise, IPsec protection of data
   performed within the user's site is outside the scope of this
   document, because it is simply handled as user data by the
   MPLS/GMPLS core. However, if the SP performs compression, pre-
   encryption will have a major effect on that operation.

   IPsec does not itself specify cryptographic algorithms.  It can use
   a variety of integrity or confidentiality algorithms (or even
   combined integrity and confidentiality algorithms), with various
   key lengths, such as AES encryption or AES message integrity
   checks.  There are trade-offs between key length, computational
   burden, and the level of security of the encryption.  A full
   discussion of these trade-offs is beyond the scope of this
   document.  In practice, any currently recommended IPsec protection
   offers enough security to reduce the likelihood of its being
   directly targeted by an attacker substantially; other weaker links
   in the chain of security are likely to be attacked first.
   MPLS/GMPLS users may wish to use a Service Level Agreement (SLA)
   specifying the SP's responsibility for ensuring data integrity and

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   confidentiality, rather than analyzing the specific encryption
   techniques used in the MPLS/GMPLS service.

   Encryption algorithms generally come with two parameters: mode such
   as Cipher Block Chaining and key length such as AES-192. (This
   should not be confused with two other senses in which the word
   "mode" is used: IPsec itself can be used in Tunnel Mode or
   Transport Mode, and IKE [version 1] uses Main Mode, Aggressive
   Mode, or Quick Mode). It should be stressed that IPsec encryption
   without an integrity check is a state of sin.

   For many of the MPLS/GMPLS provider's network control messages and
   some user requirements, cryptographic authentication of messages
   without encryption of the contents of the message may provide
   appropriate security.  Using IPsec, authentication of messages is
   provided by the Authentication Header (AH) or through the use of
   the Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) with NULL encryption.
   Where control messages require integrity but do not use IPsec,
   other cryptographic authentication methods are often available.
   Message authentication methods currently considered to be secure
   are based on hashed message authentication codes (HMAC) [RFC2104]
   implemented with a secure hash algorithm such as Secure Hash
   Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) [RFC3174]. No attacks against HMAC SHA-1 are
   likely to play out in the near future, but it is possible that
   people will soon find SHA-1 collisions. Thus, it is important that
   mechanisms be designed to be flexible about the choice of hash
   functions and message integrity checks. Also, many of these
   mechanisms do not include a convenient way to manage and update
   keys.

   A mechanism to provide a combination of confidentiality, data
   origin authentication, and connectionless integrity is the use of
   AES in GCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) mode (RFC 4106) [RFC4106].

   5.2.2.       MPLS / GMPLS DiffServ and IPsec

   MPLS and GMPLS, which provide differentiated services based on
   traffic type, may encounter some conflicts with IPsec encryption of
   traffic.  Because encryption hides the content of the packets, it
   may not be possible to differentiate the encrypted traffic in the
   same manner as unencrypted traffic.  Although DiffServ markings are
   copied to the IPsec header and can provide some differentiation,
   not all traffic types can be accommodated by this mechanism. Using
   IPsec without IKE or IKEv2 (the better choice) is not advisable.
   IKEv2 provides IPsec Security Association creation and management,
   entity authentication, key agreement, and key update. It works with
   a variety of authentication methods including pre-shared keys,
   public key certificates, and EAP. If DoS attacks against IKEv2 are

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   considered an important threat to mitigate, the cookie-based anti-
   spoofing feature of IKEv2 should be used. IKEv2 has its own set of
   cryptographic methods, but any of the default suites specified in
   [RFC4308] or [RFC4869] provides more than adequate security.

  5.2.3. Encryption for Device Configuration and Management

   For configuration and management of MPLS/GMPLS devices, encryption
   and authentication of the management connection at a level
   comparable to that provided by IPsec is desirable.

   Several methods of transporting MPLS/GMPLS device management
   traffic offer authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.

   -  Secure Shell (SSH) offers protection for TELNET [STD-8] or
      terminal-like connections to allow device configuration.
   -  SNMPv3 [STD62] provides encrypted and authenticated protection
      for SNMP-managed devices.
   -  Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] and the closely-related
      Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) are widely used for securing HTTP-
      based communication, and thus can provide support for most XML-
      and SOAP-based device management approaches.
   -  Since 2004, there has been extensive work proceeding in several
      organizations (OASIS, W3C, WS-I, and others) on securing device
      management traffic within a "Web Services" framework, using a
      wide variety of security models, and providing support for
      multiple security token formats, multiple trust domains,
      multiple signature formats, and multiple encryption
      technologies.
   -  IPsec provides security services including integrity and
      confidentiality at the network layer. With regards to device
      management, its current use is primarily focused on in-band
      management of user-managed IPsec gateway devices.
   -  There are recent work in the ISMS WG (Integrated Security Model
      for SNMP Working Group) to define how to use SSH to secure SNMP,
      due to the limited deployment of SNMPv3; and the possibility of
      using Kerberos, particularly for interfaces like TELNET, where
      client code exists.

  5.2.4.  Security Considerations for MPLS Pseudowires

   In addition to IP traffic, MPLS networks may be used to transport
   other services such as Ethernet, ATM, Frame Relay, and TDM. This is
   done by setting up pseudowires (PWs) that tunnel the native service
   through the MPLS core by encapsulating at the edges. The PWE
   architecture is defined in [RFC3985].

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   PW tunnels may be set up using the PWE control protocol based on
   LDP [RFC4447], and thus security considerations for LDP will most
   likely be applicable to the PWE3 control protocol as well.

   PW user packets contain at least one MPLS label (the PW label) and
   may contain one or more MPLS tunnel labels.  After the label stack,
   there is a four-byte control word (which is optional for some PW
   types), followed by the native service payload.  It must be
   stressed that encapsulation of MPLS PW packets in IP for the
   purpose of enabling use of IPsec mechanisms is not a valid option.

   The following is a non-exhaustive list of PW-specific threats:

   - Unauthorized setting up a PW (e.g. to gain access to a customer
   network)
   - Unauthorized tearing down of a PW (thus causing denial of service)
   - Malicious rerouting of a PW
   - Unauthorized observation of PW packets
   -

     Traffic analysis of PW connectivity
   -
    Unauthorized insertion of PW packets
   -
    Unauthorized modification of PW packets
   - Unauthorized deletion of PW packets replay of PW packets
   -
    Denial of service or significantly impacting PW service quality.

   These threats are not mutually exclusive, for example, rerouting can
   be used for snooping or insertion/deletion/replay, etc. Multisegment
   PWs introduce additional weaknesses at their stitching points.

   The PW user plane suffers from the following inherent security
   weaknesses:

   -  Since the PW label is the only identifier in the packet
      there is no authenticatable source address
   -  Since guessing a valid PW label is not difficult
   -  it is relatively easy to introduce seemingly valid foreign
      packets
   -  Since the PW packet is not self-describing, minor
      modification of control plane packets renders the data
      plane traffic useless
   -  The control word sequence number processing algorithm is
      susceptible to a DoS attack.

   The PWE control protocol introduces its own weaknesses:
   -  No (secure) peer autodiscovery technique has been
      standardized

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   -  PE authentication is not mandated, so an intruder can
      potentially impersonate a PE, after impersonating a PE,
      unauthorized PWs may be set up, consuming resources and
      perhaps allowing access to user networks
   -  Alternately, desired PWs may be torn down, giving rise to
      denial of service.

   The following characteristics of PWs can be considered security
   strengths:
   -  The most obvious attacks require compromising edge or core
      routers (although not necessarily those along PW path)
   -  Adequate protection of the control plane messaging is
      sufficient to rule out many types of attacks
   -  PEs are usually configured to reject MPLS packets from the
      outside the service provider network, thus ruling out
      insertion of PW packets from the outside (since IP packets
      can not masquerade as PW packets).



   5.2.5.       End-to-End versus Hop-by-Hop Protection Tradeoffs
   in MPLS/GMPLS

   In MPLS/GMPLS, cryptographic protection could potentially be
   applied to the MPLS/GMPLS traffic at several different places.
   This section discusses some of the tradeoffs in implementing
   encryption in several different connection topologies among
   different devices within a MPLS/GMPLS network.

   Cryptographic protection typically involves a pair of devices that
   protect the traffic passing between them.  The devices may be
   directly connected (over a single "hop"), or intervening devices
   may transport the protected traffic between the pair of devices.
   The extreme cases involve using protection between every adjacent
   pair of devices along a given path (hop-by-hop), or using
   protection only between the end devices along a given path (end-to-
   end).  To keep this discussion within the scope of this document,
   the latter ("end-to-end") case considered here is CE-to-CE rather
   than fully end-to-end.

   Figure 3 depicts a simplified topology showing the Customer Edge
   (CE) devices, the Provider Edge (PE) devices, and a variable number
   (three are shown) of Provider core (P) devices, which might be
   present along the path between two sites in a single VPN operated
   by a single service provider (SP).




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   Site_1---CE---PE---P---P---P---PE---CE---Site_2

   Figure 3: Simplified topology traversing through MPLS/GMPLS core.


   Within this simplified topology, and assuming that the P devices
   are not involved with cryptographic protection, four basic,
   feasible configurations exist for protecting connections among the
   devices:

   1) Site-to-site (CE-to-CE) - Apply confidentiality or integrity
      services between the two CE devices, so that traffic will be
      protected throughout the SP's network.

   2) Provider edge-to-edge (PE-to-PE) - Apply confidentiality or
      integrity services between the two PE devices.  Unprotected
      traffic is received at one PE from the customer's CE, then it is
      protected for transmission through the SP's network to the other
      PE, and finally it is decrypted or checked for integrity and
      sent to the other CE.

   3) Access link (CE-to-PE) - Apply confidentiality or integrity
      services between the CE and PE on each side or on only one side.

   4) Configurations 2 and 3 above can also be combined, with
      confidentiality or integrity running from CE to PE, then PE to
      PE, and then PE to CE.

   Among the four feasible configurations, key tradeoffs in
   considering encryption include:

   - Vulnerability to link eavesdropping or tampering - assuming an
     attacker can observe or modify data in transit on the links,
     would it be protected by encryption?

   - Vulnerability to device compromise - assuming an attacker can get
     access to a device (or freely alter its configuration), would the
     data be protected?

   - Complexity of device configuration and management - given the
      number of sites per VPN customer as Nce and the number of PEs
      participating in a given VPN as Npe, how many device
      configurations need to be created or maintained, and how do those
      configurations scale?

   - Processing load on devices - how many cryptographic operations
      must be performed given N packets? - This raises considerations
      of device capacity and perhaps end-to-end delay.

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   - Ability of the SP to provide enhanced services (QoS, firewall,
      intrusion detection, etc.) - Can the SP inspect the data to
      provide these services?

   These tradeoffs are discussed for each configuration, below:

   1) Site-to-site (CE-to-CE)

   Link eavesdropping or tampering - protected on all links.
   Device compromise - vulnerable to CE compromise.

   Complexity - single administration, responsible for one device per
        site (Nce devices), but overall configuration per VPN scales as
        Nce**2.
        Though the complexity may be reduced: 1) In practice, as Nce
        grows, the number of VPNs falls off from being a full clique;
        2) If the CEs run an automated key management protocol, then
        they should be able to set up and tear down secured VPNs
        without any intervention.

   Processing load - on each of two CEs, each packet is
        cryptographically processed (2P), though the protection may be
        "integrity check only" or "integrity check plus encryption."

   Enhanced services - severely limited; typically only Diffserv
        markings are visible to the SP, allowing some QoS services. The
        CEs could also use the IPv6 Flow Label to identify traffic
        classes.

   2) Provider Edge-to-Edge (PE-to-PE)

   Link eavesdropping or tampering - vulnerable on CE-PE links;
        protected on SP's network links.

   Device compromise - vulnerable to CE or PE compromise.

   Complexity - single administration, Npe devices to configure.
        (Multiple sites may share a PE device so Npe is typically much
        smaller than Nce.)  Scalability of the overall configuration
        depends on the PPVPN type: If the cryptographic protection is
        separate per VPN context, it scales as Npe**2 per customer VPN.
        If it is per-PE, it scales as Npe**2 for all customer VPNs
        combined.

   Processing load - on each of two PEs, each packet is
        cryptographically processed (2P).


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   Enhanced services - full; SP can apply any enhancements based on
        detailed view of traffic.

   3) Access Link (CE-to-PE)

   Link eavesdropping or tampering - protected on CE-PE link;
        vulnerable on SP's network links
   Device compromise - vulnerable to CE or PE compromise
   Complexity - two administrations (customer and SP) with device
        configuration on each side (Nce + Npe devices to configure) but
        because there is no mesh the overall configuration scales as
        Nce.
   Processing load - on each of two CEs, each packet is
        cryptographically processed, plus on each of two PEs, each
        packet is cryptographically processed (4P)
   Enhanced services - full; SP can apply any enhancements based on
        detailed view of traffic

   4) Combined Access link and PE-to-PE (essentially hop-by-hop)

   Link eavesdropping or tampering - protected on all links
   Device compromise - vulnerable to CE or PE compromise
   Complexity - two administrations (customer and SP) with device
        configuration on each side (Nce + Npe devices to configure).
        Scalability of the overall configuration depends on the PPVPN
        type: If the cryptographic processing is separate per VPN
        context, it scales as Npe**2 per customer VPN.  If it is per-
        PE, it scales as Npe**2 for all customer VPNs combined.
   Processing load - on each of two CEs, each packet is
        cryptographically processed, plus on each of two PEs, each
        packet is cryptographically processed twice (6P)
   Enhanced services - full; SP can apply any enhancements based on
        detailed view of traffic

   Given the tradeoffs discussed above, a few conclusions can be
   drawn:

   - Configurations 2 and 3 are subsets of 4 that may be appropriate
      alternatives to 4 under certain threat models; the remainder of
      these conclusions compare 1 (CE-to-CE) versus 4 (combined access
      links and PE-to-PE).

   - If protection from link eavesdropping or tampering is all that is
      important, then configurations 1 and 4 are equivalent.

   - If protection from device compromise is most important and the
      threat is to the CE devices, both cases are equivalent; if the
      threat is to the PE devices, configuration 1 is better.

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   -  If reducing complexity is most important, and the size of the
      network is small, configuration 1 is better.  Otherwise
      configuration 4 is better because rather than a mesh of CE
      devices it requires a smaller mesh of PE devices.  Also, under
      some PPVPN approaches the scaling of 4 is further improved by
      sharing the same PE-PE mesh across all VPN contexts. The scaling
      advantage of 4 may be increased or decreased in any given
      situation if the CE devices are simpler to configure than the PE
      devices, or vice-versa.

   -  If the overall processing load is a key factor, then 1 is
      better, unless the PEs come with a hardware encryption
      accelerator and the CEs do not.

   -  If the availability of enhanced services support from the
      SP is most important, then 4 is best.

   -  If users are concerned with having their VPNs misconnected
      with other users' VPNs, then encryption with 1 can provide
      protection.

   As a quick overall conclusion, CE-to-CE protection is better
   against device compromise, but this comes at the cost of enhanced
   services and at the cost of operational complexity due to the
   Order(n**2) scaling of a larger mesh.

   This analysis of site-to-site vs. hop-by-hop tradeoffs does not
   explicitly include cases of multiple providers cooperating to
   provide a PPVPN service, public Internet VPN connectivity, or
   remote access VPN service, but many of the tradeoffs are similar.

   In addition to the simplified models, the following should also be
   considered:
   - There are reasons, perhaps, to protect a specific P-to-P or PE-
   to-P.
   - There may be reasons to do multiple encryptions over certain
   segments. One may be using an encrypted wireless link under our
   IPsec VPN to access a SSL-secured web site to download encrypted
   email attachments: four layers.)
   - It may be appropriate that, for example, cryptographic integrity
   checks are applied end to end, and confidentiality over a shorter
   span.
   - Different cryptographic protection may be required for control
   protocols and data traffic.
   - Attention needs to be given to how auxiliary traffic is
   protected, e.g., the ICMPv6 packets that flow back during PMTU
   discovery, among other examples.

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   5.3. Access Control Techniques

   Access control techniques include packet-by-packet or packet-flow-
   by-packet-flow access control by means of filters and firewalls on
   IPv4/IPv6 packets, as well as by means of admitting a "session" for
   a control, signaling, or management protocol. Enforcement of access
   control by isolated infrastructure addresses is discussed in
   section 5.4 of this document.

   In this document, we distinguish between filtering and firewalls
   based primarily on the direction of traffic flow.  We define
   filtering as being applicable to unidirectional traffic, while a
   firewall can analyze and control both sides of a conversation.

   The definition has two significant corollaries:
   - Routing or traffic flow symmetry: A firewall typically requires
   routing symmetry, which is usually enforced by locating a firewall
   where the network topology assures that both sides of a
   conversation will pass through the firewall.  A filter can operate
   upon traffic flowing in one direction, without considering traffic
   in the reverse direction. Beware that this concept could result in
   a single point of failure.
   - Statefulness: Because it receives both sides of a conversation, a
   firewall may be able to interpret a significant amount of
   information concerning the state of that conversation and use this
   information to control access.  A filter can maintain some limited
   state information on a unidirectional flow of packets, but cannot
   determine the state of the bi-directional conversation as precisely
   as a firewall.

   For general description on filtering and rate limiting for IP
   networks, please also see [opsec filter].

   5.3.1.       Filtering

   It is relatively common for routers to filter packets. That is,
   routers can look for particular values in certain fields of the IP
   or higher level (e.g., TCP or UDP) headers. Packets matching the
   criteria associated with a particular filter may either be
   discarded or given special treatment. Today, not only routers, most
   end hosts have filters, and every instance of IPsec is also a
   filter [RFC4301].

   In discussing filters, it is useful to separate the Filter
   Characteristics that may be used to determine whether a packet
   matches a filter from the Packet Actions applied to those packets
   matching a particular filter.

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   o Filter Characteristics

   Filter characteristics or rules are used to determine whether a
   particular packet or set of packets matches a particular filter.

   In many cases filter characteristics may be stateless. A stateless
   filter determines whether a particular packet matches a filter
   based solely on the filter definition, normal forwarding
   information (such as the next hop for a packet), the interface on
   which a packet arrived, and the contents of that individual packet.
   Typically, stateless filters may consider the incoming and outgoing
   logical or physical interface, information in the IP header, and
   information in higher layer headers such as the TCP or UDP header.
   Information in the IP header to be considered may for example
   include source and destination IP addresses; Protocol field,
   Fragment Offset, and TOS field in IPv4; or Next Header, Extension
   Headers, Flow label, etc. in IPv6. Filters also may consider fields
   in the TCP or UDP header such as the Port numbers, the SYN field in
   the TCP header, as well as ICMP and ICMPv6 type.

   Stateful filtering maintains packet-specific state information to
   aid in determining whether a filter rule has been met. For example,
   a device might apply stateless filtering to the first fragment of a
   fragmented IPv4 packet. If the filter matches, then the data unit
   ID may be remembered and other fragments of the same packet may
   then be considered to match the same filter. Stateful filtering is
   more commonly done in firewalls, although firewall technology may
   be added to routers. Data unit ID can also be Fragment Extension
   Header Identification field in IPv6.

   o Actions based on Filter Results

   If a packet, or a series of packets, matches a specific filter,
   then a variety of actions which may be taken based on that match.
   Examples of such actions include:

     - Discard

   In many cases, filters are set to catch certain undesirable
   packets. Examples may include packets with forged or invalid source
   addresses, packets that are part of a DoS or Distributed DoS (DDoS)
   attack, or packets trying to access unallowed resources (such as
   network management packets from an unauthorized source). Where such
   filters are activated, it is common to discard the packet or set of
   packets matching the filter silently. The discarded packets may of
   course also be counted or logged.


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     - Set CoS

   A filter may be used to set the Class of Service associated with
   the packet.

     - Count packets or bytes

     - Rate Limit

   In some cases the set of packets matching a particular filter may
   be limited to a specified bandwidth. In this case, packets or bytes
   would be counted, and would be forwarded normally up to the
   specified limit. Excess packets may be discarded or may be marked
   (for example, by setting a "discard eligible" bit in the IPv4 ToS
   field, or change the EXP value to identify as out of contract
   traffic).

     - Forward and Copy

   It is useful in some cases to forward some set of packets normally,
   but also to send a copy to a specified other address or interface.
   For example, this may be used to implement a lawful intercept
   capability or to feed selected packets to an Intrusion Detection
   System.

   o Other Packet Filters Issues

   Filtering performance may vary widely according to implementation
   and the types and number of rules. Without acceptable performance,
   filtering is not useful.

   The precise definition of "acceptable" may vary from SP to SP, and
   may depend upon the intended use of the filters. For example, for
   some uses a filter may be turned on all the time to set CoS, to
   prevent an attack, or to mitigate the effect of a possible future
   attack. In this case it is likely that the SP will want the filter
   to have minimal or no impact on performance. In other cases, a
   filter may be turned on only in response to a major attack (such as
   a major DDoS attack). In this case a greater performance impact may
   be acceptable to some service providers.

   A key consideration with the use of packet filters is that they can
   provide few options for filtering packets carrying encrypted data.
   Because the data itself is not accessible, only packet header
   information or other unencrypted fields can be used for filtering.

   5.3.2.       Firewalls


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   Firewalls provide a mechanism for controlling traffic passing
   between different trusted zones in the MPLS/GMPLS model or between
   a trusted zone and an untrusted zone.  Firewalls typically provide
   much more functionality than filters, because they may be able to
   apply detailed analysis and logical functions to flows, and not
   just to individual packets.  They may offer a variety of complex
   services, such as threshold-driven DoS attack protection, virus
   scanning, acting as a TCP connection proxy, etc.

   As with other access control techniques, the value of firewalls
   depends on a clear understanding of the topologies of the
   MPLS/GMPLS core network, the user networks, and the threat model.
   Their effectiveness depends on a topology with a clearly defined
   inside (secure) and outside (not secure).

   Firewalls may be applied to help protect MPLS/GMPLS core network
   functions from attacks originating from the Internet or from
   MPLS/GMPLS user sites, but typically other defensive techniques
   will be used for this purpose.

   Where firewalls are employed as a service to protect user VPN sites
   from the Internet, different VPN users, and even different sites of
   a single VPN user, may have varying firewall requirements.  The
   overall PPVPN logical and physical topology, along with the
   capabilities of the devices implementing the firewall services, has
   a significant effect on the feasibility and manageability of such
   varied firewall service offerings.

   Another consideration with the use of firewalls is that they can
   provide few options for handling packets carrying encrypted data.
   Because the data itself is not accessible, only packet header
   information, other unencrypted fields, or analysis of the flow of
   encrypted packets can be used for making decisions on accepting or
   rejecting encrypted traffic.

   Two approaches are to move the firewall outside of the encrypted
   part of the path or to register and pre-approve the encrypted
   session with the firewall.

   Handling DoS attacks has become increasingly important. Useful
   guidelines include the following:
   1. Perform ingress filtering everywhere. Upstream detection and
   prevention are better.
   2. Be able to filter DoS attack packets at line speed.
   3. Do not allow oneself to amplify attacks.
   4. Continue processing legitimate traffic. Over provide for heavy
   loads. Use diverse locations, technologies, etc.


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   5.3.3.       Access Control to Management Interfaces

   Most of the security issues related to management interfaces can be
   addressed through the use of authentication techniques as described
   in the section on authentication.  However, additional security may
   be provided by controlling access to management interfaces in other
   ways.

   The Optical Internetworking Forum has done relevant work on
   protecting such interfaces with TLS, SSH, Kerberos, IPsec, WSS,
   etc. See OIF-SMI-01.0 "Security for Management Interfaces to
   Network Elements" [OIF-SMI-01.0], and "Addendum to the Security for
   Management Interfaces to Network Elements" [OIF-SMI-02.1]. See also
   the work in the ISMS WG.

   Management interfaces, especially console ports on MPLS/GMPLS
   devices, may be configured so they are only accessible out-of-band,
   through a system which is physically or logically separated from
   the rest of the MPLS/GMPLS infrastructure.

   Where management interfaces are accessible in-band within the
   MPLS/GMPLS domain, filtering or firewalling techniques can be used
   to restrict unauthorized in-band traffic from having access to
   management interfaces.  Depending on device capabilities, these
   filtering or firewalling techniques can be configured either on
   other devices through which the traffic might pass, or on the
   individual MPLS/GMPLS devices themselves.


   5.4. Use of Isolated Infrastructure

   One way to protect the infrastructure used for support of
   MPLS/GMPLS is to separate the resources for support of MPLS/GMPLS
   services from the resources used for other purposes (such as
   support of Internet services). In some cases this may involve using
   physically separate equipment for VPN services, or even a
   physically separate network.

   For example, PE-based IP VPNs may be run on a separate backbone not
   connected to the Internet, or may use separate edge routers from
   those supporting Internet service. Private IPv4 addresses (local to
   the provider and non-routable over the Internet) are sometimes used
   to provide additional separation. For a discussion of comparable
   techniques for IPv6, see "Local Network Protection for IPv6," RFC
   4864 [RFC4864].




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   In a GMPLS network it is possible to operate the control plane using
   physically separate resources from those used for the data plane.
   This means that the data plane resources can be physically protected
   and isolated from other equipment to protect users' data while the
   control and management traffic uses network resources that can be
   accessed by operators to configure the network. Conversely, the
   separation of control and data traffic may lead the operator to
   consider that the network is secure because the data plane resources
   are physically secure. However, this is not the case if the control
   plane can be attacked through a shared or open network, and control
   plane protection techniques must still be applied.


   5.5. Use of Aggregated Infrastructure

   In general, it is not feasible to use a completely separate set of
   resources for support of each service. In fact, one of the main
   reasons for MPLS/GMPLS enabled services is to allow sharing of
   resources between multiple services and multiple users. Thus, even
   if certain services use a separate network from Internet services,
   nonetheless there will still be multiple MPLS/GMPLS users sharing
   the same network resources. In some cases MPLS/GMPLS services will
   share network resources with Internet services or other services.

   It is therefore important for MPLS/GMPLS services to provide
   protection between resources used by different parties. Thus, a
   well-behaved MPLS/GMPLS user should be protected from possible
   misbehavior by other users. This requires several security
   measurements to be implemented. Resource limits can be placed on a
   per service and per user basis. Possibilities include, for example,
   using virtual router or logical router to define hardware or
   software resource limits per service or per individual user; using
   rate limiting per VRF or per Internet connection to provide
   bandwidth protection; or using resource reservation for control
   plane traffic. In addition to bandwidth protection, separate
   resource allocation can be used to limit security attacks only to
   directly impacted service(s) or customer(s). Strict, separate, and
   clearly defined engineering rules and provisioning procedures can
   reduce the risks of network-wide impact of a control plane attack,
   DoS attack, or mis-configuration.

   In general, the use of aggregated infrastructure allows the service
   provider to benefit from stochastic multiplexing of multiple bursty
   flows, and also may in some cases thwart traffic pattern analysis
   by combining the data from multiple users. However, service
   providers must minimize security risks introduced from any
   individual service or individual users.


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   5.6. Service Provider Quality Control Processes

   Deployment of provider-provisioned VPN services in general requires
   a relatively large amount of configuration by the SP. For example,
   the SP needs to configure which VPN each site belongs to, as well
   as QoS and SLA guarantees. This large amount of required
   configuration leads to the possibility of misconfiguration.

   It is important for the SP to have operational processes in place
   to reduce the potential impact of misconfiguration. CE-to-CE
   authentication may also be used to detect misconfiguration when it
   occurs. CE-to-CE encryption may also limit the damage when it
   occurs.

   5.7. Deployment of Testable MPLS/GMPLS Service.

   This refers to solutions that can be readily tested to make sure
   they are configured correctly.  For example, for a point-to-point
   connection, checking that the intended connectivity is working
   pretty much ensures that there is no unintended connectivity to
   some other site.

   5.8. Verification of Connectivity

   In order to protect against deliberate or accidental misconnection,
   mechanisms can be put in place to verify both end-to-end
   connectivity and hop-by-hop resources. These mechanisms can trace
   the routes of LSPs in both the control plane and the data plane.

   It should be noted that if there is an attack on the control plane,
   data plane connectivity test mechanisms that rely on the control
   plane can also be attacked. This may hide faults through false
   positives or to disrupt functioning services through false
   negatives.

6. Monitoring, Detection, and Reporting of Security Attacks

   MPLS/GMPLS network and service may be subject to attacks from a
   variety of security threats.  Many threats are described in Section
   4 of this document.  Many of the defensive techniques described in
   this document and elsewhere provide significant levels of
   protection from a variety of threats.  However, in addition to
   employing defensive techniques silently to protect against attacks,
   MPLS/GMPLS services can also add value for both providers and
   customers by implementing security monitoring systems to detect and
   report on any security attacks, regardless of whether the attacks
   are effective.


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   Attackers often begin by probing and analyzing defenses, so systems
   that can detect and properly report these early stages of attacks
   can provide significant benefits.

   Information concerning attack incidents, especially if available
   quickly, can be useful in defending against further attacks.  It
   can be used to help identify attackers or their specific targets at
   an early stage.  This knowledge about attackers and targets can be
   used to strengthen defenses against specific attacks or attackers,
   or to improve the defenses for specific targets on an as-needed
   basis.  Information collected on attacks may also be useful in
   identifying and developing defenses against novel attack types.

   Monitoring systems used to detect security attacks in MPLS/GMPLS
   typically operate by collecting information from the Provider Edge
   (PE), Customer Edge (CE), and/or Provider backbone (P) devices.
   Security monitoring systems should have the ability to actively
   retrieve information from devices (e.g., SNMP get) or to passively
   receive reports from devices (e.g., SNMP notifications). The
   systems may actively retrieve information from devices (e.g., SNMP
   get) or passively receive reports from devices (e.g., SNMP
   notifications). The specific information exchanged depends on the
   capabilities of the devices and on the type of VPN technology.
   Particular care should be given to securing the communications
   channel between the monitoring systems and the MPLS/GMPLS devices.
   Syslog WG is specifying "Logging Capabilities for IP Network
   Infrastructure". (The specific references will be made only if the
   draft(s) became RFC before this draft.)

   The CE, PE, and P devices should employ efficient methods to
   acquire and communicate the information needed by the security
   monitoring systems.  It is important that the communication method
   between MPLS/GMPLS devices and security monitoring systems be
   designed so that it will not disrupt network operations.  As an
   example, multiple attack events may be reported through a single
   message, rather than allowing each attack event to trigger a
   separate message, which might result in a flood of messages,
   essentially becoming a DoS attack against the monitoring system or
   the network.


   The mechanisms for reporting security attacks should be flexible
   enough to meet the needs of MPLS/GMPLS service providers,
   MPLS/GMPLS customers, and regulatory agencies, if applicable.  The
   specific reports should depend on the capabilities of the devices,
   the security monitoring system, the type of VPN, and the service
   level agreements between the provider and customer.


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   While SNMP/syslog type monitoring and detection mechanisms can
   detect some attacks (usually resulting from flapping protocol
   adjacencies, CPU overload scenarios, etc.), other techniques, such
   as netflow-based traffic fingerprinting, are needed for more
   detailed detection and reporting.

   With netflow-based traffic fingerprinting, each packet that is
   forwarded within a device is examined for a set of IP packet
   attributes. These attributes are the IP packet identity or
   fingerprint of the packet and determine if the packet is unique or
   similar to other packets.

   The flow information is extremely useful for understanding network
   behavior, detecting and reporting security attacks:
   -  Source address allows the understanding of who is
      originating the traffic
   -  Destination address tells who is receiving the traffic
   -  Ports characterize the application utilizing the traffic
   -  Class of service examines the priority of the traffic
   -  The device interface tells how traffic is being utilized
      by the network device
   -  Tallied packets and bytes show the amount of traffic
   -  Flow timestamps to understand the life of a flow;
      timestamps are useful for calculating packets and bytes
      per second
   -  Next hop IP addresses including BGP routing Autonomous
      Systems (AS)
   -  Subnet mask for the source and destination addresses to
      calculate prefixes
   -  TCP flags to examine TCP handshakes


7. Service Provider General Security Requirements

   This section covers security requirements the provider may have for
   securing its MPLS/GMPLS network infrastructure including LDP and
   RSVP-TE specific requirements.

   The MPLS/GMPLS service provider's requirements defined here are for
   the MPLS/GMPLS core in the reference model.  The core network can
   be implemented with different types of network technologies, and
   each core network may use different technologies to provide the
   various services to users with different levels of offered
   security. Therefore, a MPLS/GMPLS service provider may fulfill any
   number of the security requirements listed in this section. This
   document does not state that a MPLS/GMPLS network must fulfill all
   of these requirements to be secure.


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   These requirements are focused on: 1) how to protect the MPLS/GMPLS
   core from various attacks originating outside the core including
   those from network users, both accidentally and maliciously, and 2)
   how to protect the end users.

   7.1. Protection within the Core Network

   7.1.1.       Control Plane Protection - General

   - Filtering spoofed infrastructure IP addresses at edges

   Many attacks on protocols running in a core involve spoofing a
   source IP address of a node in the core (e.g. TCP-RST attacks).  It
   makes sense to apply anti-spoofing filtering at edges, e.g. using
   strict unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) [RFC3704] and/or by
   preventing using infrastructure addresses as source.  If this is
   done comprehenstively, the need to cryptographically secure these
   protocols is smaller. See [rtgwg backbone attacks] for more
   elaborate description.

   - Protocol authentication within the core:

   The network infrastructure must support mechanisms for
   authentication of the control plane messages. If a MPLS/GMPLS core
   is used, LDP sessions may be authenticated with TCP MD5. In
   addition, IGP and BGP authentication should be considered. For a
   core providing various IP, VPN, or transport services, PE-to-PE
   authentication may also be performed via IPsec. See the above
   discussion of protocol security services: authentication, integrity
   (with replay detection), confidentiality. Protocols need to provide
   a complete set of security services from which the SP can choose.
   Also, the important but often harder part is key management.
   Considerations, guidelines, and strategies regarding key management
   are discussed in [RFC3562], [RFC4107], [RFC4808].

   With today's processors, applying cryptographic authentication to
   the control plane may not increase the cost of deployment for
   providers significantly, and will help to improve the security of
   the core. If the core is dedicated to MPLS/GMPLS enabled services
   without any interconnects to third parties, then this may reduce
   the requirement for authentication of the core control plane.


   - Infrastructure Hiding

   Here we discuss means to hide the provider's infrastructure nodes.



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   A MPLS/GMPLS provider may make its infrastructure routers (P and PE
   routers) unreachable from outside users and unauthorized internal
   users. For example, separate address space may be used for the
   infrastructure loopbacks.

   Normal TTL propagation may be altered to make the backbone look
   like one hop from the outside, but caution needs to be taken for
   loop prevention. This prevents the backbone addresses from being
   exposed through trace route; however this must also be assessed
   against operational requirements for end-to-end fault tracing.

   An Internet backbone core may be re-engineered to make Internet
   routing an edge function, for example, by using MPLS label
   switching for all traffic within the core and possibly making the
   Internet a VPN within the PPVPN core itself. This helps to detach
   Internet access from PPVPN services.

   Separating control plane, data plane, and management plane
   functionality in hardware and software may be implemented on the PE
   devices to improve security. This may help to limit the problems
   when attacked in one particular area, and may allow each plane to
   implement additional security measures separately.

   PEs are often more vulnerable to attack than P routers, because PEs
   cannot be made unreachable from outside users by their very nature.
   Access to core trunk resources can be controlled on a per user
   basis by using of inbound rate-limiting or traffic shaping; this
   can be further enhanced on a per Class of Service basis (see
   Section 8.2.3)

   In the PE, using separate routing processes for different services,
   for example, Internet and PPVPN service, may help to improve the
   PPVPN security and better protect VPN customers. Furthermore, if
   resources, such as CPU and memory, can be further separated based
   on applications, or even individual VPNs, it may help to provide
   improved security and reliability to individual VPN customers.

   7.1.2.       Control Plane Protection with RSVP-TE

   - General RSVP Security Tools

   Isolation of the trusted domain is an important security mechanism
   for RSVP, to ensure that an untrusted element cannot access a
   router of the trusted domain.  However, ASBR-ASBR communication for
   inter-AS LSPs needs to be secured specifically.  Isolation
   mechanisms might also be bypassed by IPv4 Router Alert or IPv6
   using Next Header 0 packets. A solution could consists of disabling
   the processing of IP options. This drops or ignores all IP packets

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   with IPv4 options, including the router alert option used by RSVP;
   however, this may have an impact on other protocols using IPv4
   options. An alternative is to configure access-lists on all
   incoming interfaces dropping IPv4 protocol or IPv6 next header 46
   (RSVP).

   RSVP security can be strengthened by deactivating RSVP on
   interfaces with neighbors who are not authorized to use RSVP, to
   protect against adjacent CE-PE attacks. However, this does not
   really protect against DoS attacks or attacks on non-adjacent
   routers.  It has been demonstrated that substantial CPU resources
   are consumed simply by processing received RSVP packets, even if
   the RSVP process is deactivated for the specific interface on which
   the RSVP packets are received.

   RSVP neighbor filtering at the protocol level, to restrict the set
   of neighbors that can send RSVP messages to a given router,
   protects against non-adjacent attacks.  However, this does not
   protect against DoS attacks and does not effectively protect
   against spoofing of the source address of RSVP packets, if the
   filter relies on the neighbor's address within the RSVP message.

   RSVP neighbor filtering at the data plane level, with an access
   list to accept IP packets with port 46 only for specific neighbors
   requires Router Alert mode to be deactivated and does not protect
   against spoofing.

   Another valuable tool is RSVP message pacing, to limit the number
   of RSVP messages sent to a given neighbor during a given period.
   This allows blocking DoS attack propagation.

   - Another approach is to limit the impact of an attack on control
   plane resources.

   To ensure continued effective operation of the MPLS router even in
   the case of an attack that bypasses packet filtering mechanisms
   such as Access Control Lists in the data plane, it is important
   that routers have some mechanisms to limit the impact of the
   attack.  There should be a mechanism to rate limit the amount of
   control plane traffic addressed to the router, per interface.  This
   should be configurable on a per-protocol basis, (and, ideally, on a
   per-sender basis) to avoid letting an attacked protocol or a given
   sender blocking all communications.  This requires the ability to
   filter and limit the rate of incoming messages of particular
   protocols, such as RSVP (filtering at the IP protocol level), and
   particular senders.  In addition, there should be a mechanism to
   limit CPU and memory capacity allocated to RSVP, so as to protect
   other control plane elements.  To limit memory allocation, it will

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   probably be necessary to limit the number of LSPs that can be set
   up.

   - Authentication for RSVP messages

   RSVP message authentication is described in RFC 2747 [RFC2747] and
   RFC 3097 [RFC3097]. It is one of the most powerful tools for
   protection against RSVP-based attacks. It applies cryptographic
   authentication to RSVP messages based on a secure message hash
   using a key shared by RSVP neighbors.  This protects against LSP
   creation attacks, at the expense of consuming significant CPU
   resources for digest computation.  In addition, if the neighboring
   RSVP speaker is compromised, it could be used to launch attacks
   using authenticated RSVP messages. These methods, and certain other
   aspects of RSVP security, are explained in detail in RFC 4230
   [RFC4230]. Key management must be implemented. Logging and auditing
   as well as multiple layers of cryptographic protection can help
   here. IPsec can also be used in some cases. See [RFC4230]..

   One challenge using RSVP message authentication arises in many
   cases where non-RSVP nodes are present in the network. In such
   cases the RSVP neighbor may not be known up front, thus neighbor
   based keying approaches fail, unless the same key is used
   everywhere, which is not recommended for security reasons. Group
   keying may help in such cases. The security properties of various
   keying approaches are discussed in detail in [RSVP-key].


   7.1.3.       Control Plane Protection with LDP

   The approaches to protect MPLS routers against LDP-based attacks
   are similar to those for RSVP, including isolation, protocol
   deactivation on specific interfaces, filtering of LDP neighbors at
   the protocol level, filtering of LDP neighbors at the data plane
   level (with an access list that filters the TCP and UDP LDP ports),
   authentication with a message digest, rate limiting of LDP messages
   per protocol per sender, and limiting all resources allocated to
   LDP-related tasks. LDP protection could be considered easier in
   certain sense. UDP port matching may be sufficient for LDP
   protection. Router alter options and beyond might be involved in
   RSVP protection.

   7.1.4.       Data Plane Protection

   IPsec can provide authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and
   replay detection for provider or user data. It also has an
   associated key management protocol.


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   In today's MPLS/GMPLS, ATM, or Frame Relay networks, encryption is
   not provided as a basic feature. Mechanisms described in section 5
   can be used to secure the MPLS data plane traffic carried over a
   MPLS core. Both the Frame Relay Forum and the ATM Forum
   standardized cryptographic security services in the late 1990s, but
   these standards are not widely implemented.

   7.2. Protection on the User Access Link

   Peer or neighbor protocol authentication may be used to enhance
   security. For example, BGP MD5 authentication may be used to
   enhance security on PE-CE links using eBGP. In the case of Inter-
   provider connections, cryptographic protection mechanisms, such as
   IPsec, may be used between ASes.

   If multiple services are provided on the same PE platform,
   different WAN address spaces may be used for different services
   (e.g., VPN and non-VPN) to enhance isolation.

   Firewall and Filtering: access control mechanisms can be used to
   filter any packets destined for the service provider's
   infrastructure prefix or eliminate routes identified as
   illegitimate. Filtering should also be applied to prevent sourcing
   packets with infrastructure IP addresses from outside.


   Rate limiting may be applied to the user interface/logical
   interfaces as a defense against DDoS bandwidth attack. This is
   helpful when the PE device is supporting both multiple services,
   especially VPN and Internet Services, on the same physical
   interfaces through different logical interfaces.

   7.2.1.       Link Authentication

   Authentication can be used to validate site access to the network
   via fixed or logical connections, e.g., L2TP or IPsec,
   respectively. If the user wishes to hold the authentication
   credentials for access, then provider solutions require the
   flexibility for either direct authentication by the PE itself or
   interaction with a customer authentication server. Mechanisms are
   required in the latter case to ensure that the interaction between
   the PE and the customer authentication server is appropriately
   secured.

   7.2.2.       Access Routing Control

   Choice of routing protocols, e.g., RIP, OSPF, or BGP, may be used
   to provide control access between a CE and a PE. Per neighbor and

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   per VPN routing policies may be established to enhance security and
   reduce the impact of a malicious or non-malicious attack on the PE;
   the following mechanisms, in particular, should be considered:
    - Limiting the number of prefixes that may be advertised on
       a per access basis into the PE. Appropriate action may be
       taken should a limit be exceeded, e.g., the PE shutting
       down the peer session to the CE
    - Applying route dampening at the PE on received routing
       updates
    - Definition of a per VPN prefix limit after which
       additional prefixes will not be added to the VPN routing
       table.

   In the case of Inter-provider connection, access protection, link
   authentication, and routing policies as described above may be
   applied. Both inbound and outbound firewall or filtering mechanism
   between ASes may be applied. Proper security procedures must be
   implemented in Inter-provider interconnection to protect the
   providers' network infrastructure and their customers. This may be
   custom designed for each Inter-Provider peering connection, and
   must be agreed upon by both providers.

   7.2.3.       Access QoS

   MPLS/GMPLS providers offering QoS-enabled services require
   mechanisms to ensure that individual accesses are validated against
   their subscribed QoS profile and as such gain access to core
   resources that match their service profile.  Mechanisms such as per
   Class of Service rate limiting or traffic shaping on ingress to the
   MPLS/GMPLS core are two options for providing this level of
   control.  Such mechanisms may require the per Class of Service
   profile to be enforced either by marking, or remarking, or
   discarding of traffic outside of the profile.

   7.2.4.       Customer Service Monitoring Tools

   End users needing specific statistics on the core, e.g., routing
   table, interface status, or QoS statistics, place requirements on
   mechanisms at the PE both to validate the incoming user and limit
   the views available to that particular user.  Mechanisms should
   also be considered to ensure that such access cannot be used as
   means to construct DoS attack (either maliciously or accidentally)
   on the PE itself. This could be accomplished either through
   separation of these resources within the PE itself or via the
   capability to rate-limit such traffic on a per physical or logical
   connection basis.



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   7.3. General User Requirements for MPLS/GMPLS Providers

   MPLS/GMPLS providers must support end users' security requirements.
   Depending on the technologies used, these requirements may include:

   - User control plane separation through routing isolation
      when applicable, for example, in the case of MPLS VPNs.
   - Protection against intrusion, DoS attacks, and spoofing
   - Access Authentication
   - Techniques highlighted throughout this document that
      identify methodologies for the protection of resources and
      the MPLS/GMPLS infrastructure.

   Hardware or software errors in equipment leading to breaches in
   security are not within the scope of this document.


8. Inter-provider Security Requirements

   This section discusses security capabilities that are important at
   the MPLS/GMPLS Inter-provider connections and at devices (including
   ASBR routers) supporting these connections. The security
   capabilities stated in this section should be considered as
   complementary to security considerations addressed in individual
   protocol specifications or security frameworks.

   Security vulnerabilities and exposures may be propagated across
   multiple networks because of security vulnerabilities arising in
   one peer's network. Threats to security originate from accidental,
   administrative, and intentional sources. Intentional threats
   include events such as spoofing and Denial of Service (DoS)
   attacks.

   The level and nature of threats, as well as security and
   availability requirements, may vary over time and from network to
   network. This section, therefore, discusses capabilities that need
   to be available in equipment deployed for support of the MPLS
   InterCarrier Interconnect (MPLS-ICI). Whether any particular
   capability is used in any one specific instance of the ICI is up to
   the service providers managing the PE equipment offering or using
   the ICI services.

   8.1. Control Plane Protection

   This section discusses capabilities for control plane protection,
   including protection of routing, signaling, and OAM capabilities.



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   8.1.1.       Authentication of Signaling Sessions

   Authentication may be needed for signaling sessions (i.e., BGP,
   LDP, and RSVP-TE) and routing sessions (e.g., BGP), as well as OAM
   sessions across domain boundaries. Equipment must be able to
   support the exchange of all protocol messages over IPsec ESP, with
   NULL encryption and authentication, between the peering ASBRs.
   Support for message authentication for LDP, BGP, and RSVP-TE
   authentication must also be provided. Manual keying of IPsec should
   not be used. IKEv2 with pre-shared secrets or public key methods
   should be used. Replay detection should be used.

   Mechanisms to authenticate and validate a dynamic setup request
   must be available. For instance, if dynamic signaling of a TE-LSP
   or PW is crossing a domain boundary, there must be a way to detect
   whether the LSP source is who it claims to be and that it is
   allowed to connect to the destination.

   Message authentication support for all TCP-based protocols within
   the scope of the MPLS-ICI (i.e., LDP signaling and BGP routing) and
   Message authentication with the RSVP-TE Integrity Object must be
   provided to interoperate with current practices.
   Equipment should be able to support exchange of all signaling and
   routing (LDP, RSVP-TE, and BGP) protocol messages over a single
   IPsec security association pair in tunnel or transport mode with
   authentication but with NULL encryption, between the peering ASBRs.
   IPsec, if supported, must be supported with HMAC-SHA-1 and
   alternatively with HMAC-SHA-2 and optionally SHA-1.  It is expected
   that authentication algorithms will evolve over time and support
   can be updated as needed.

   OAM Operations across the MPLS-ICI could also be the source of
   security threats on the provider infrastructure as well as the
   service offered over the MPLS-ICI. A large volume of OAM messages
   could overwhelm the processing capabilities of an ASBR if the ASBR
   is not properly protected. Maliciously generated OAM messages could
   also be used to bring down an otherwise healthy service (e.g., MPLS
   Pseudo Wire), and therefore affect service security. LSP ping does
   not support authentication today, and that support should be
   subject for future considerations. Bidirectional Forwarding
   Detection (BFD), however, does have support for carrying an
   authentication object. It also supports Time-To-Live (TTL)
   processing as an anti-replay measure. Implementations conformant
   with this MPLS-ICI should support BFD authentication and must
   support the procedures for TTL processing.




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   8.1.2.       Protection Against DoS Attacks in the Control
   Plane

   Implementations must have the ability to prevent signaling and
   routing DoS attacks on the control plane per interface and
   provider. Such prevention may be provided by rate-limiting
   signaling and routing messages that can be sent by a peer provider
   according to a traffic profile and by guarding against malformed
   packets.

   Equipment must provide the ability to filter signaling, routing,
   and OAM packets destined for the device, and must provide the
   ability to rate limit such packets. Packet filters should be
   capable of being separately applied per interface, and should have
   minimal or no performance impact. For example, this allows an
   operator to filter or rate-limit signaling, routing, and OAM
   messages that can be sent by a peer provider and limit such traffic
   to a given profile.

   During a control plane DoS attack against an ASBR, the router
   should guarantee sufficient resources to allow network operators to
   execute network management commands to take corrective action, such
   as turning on additional filters or disconnecting an interface
   under attack. DoS attacks on the control plane should not adversely
   affect data plane performance.

   Equipment running BGP must support the ability to limit the number
   of BGP routes received from any particular peer. Furthermore, in
   the case of IPVPN, a router must be able to limit the number of
   routes learned from a BGP peer per IPVPN. In the case that a device
   has multiple BGP peers, it should be possible for the limit to vary
   between peers.

   8.1.3.       Protection against Malformed Packets

   Equipment should be robust in the presence of malformed protocol
   packets. For example, malformed routing, signaling, and OAM packets
   should be treated in accordance with the relevant protocol
   specification.

   8.1.4.       Ability to Enable/Disable Specific Protocols

   Equipment must have the ability to drop any signaling or routing
   protocol messages when these messages are to be processed by the
   ASBR but the corresponding protocol is not enabled on that
   interface.



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   Equipment must allow an administrator to enable or disable a
   protocol (by default, the protocol is disabled unless
   administratively enabled) on an interface basis.

   Equipment must be able to drop any signaling or routing protocol
   messages when these messages are to be processed by the ASBR but
   the corresponding protocol is not enabled on that interface. This
   dropping should not adversely affect data plane or control plane
   performance.

   8.1.5.       Protection Against Incorrect Cross Connection

   The capability of detecting and locating faults in a LSP cross-
   connect must be provided. Such faults may cause security violations
   as they result in directing traffic to the wrong destinations. This
   capability may rely on OAM functions. Equipment must support MPLS
   LSP ping [RFC4379]. This may be used to verify end-to-end
   connectivity for the LSP (e.g., PW, TE Tunnel, VPN LSP, etc.), and
   to verify PE-to-PE connectivity for IP VPN services.

   When routing information is advertised from one domain to the
   other, operators must be able to guard against situations that
   result in traffic hijacking, black-holing, resource stealing (e.g.,
   number of routes), etc. For instance, in the IPVPN case, an
   operator must be able to block routes based on associated route
   target attributes. In addition, mechanisms to against routing
   protocol attack must exist to verify whether a route advertised by
   a peer for a given VPN is actually a valid route and whether the
   VPN has a site attached to or reachable through that domain.

   Equipment (ASBRs and Route Reflectors (RRs)) supporting operation
   of BGP must be able to restrict which Route Target attributes are
   sent to and accepted from a BGP peer across an ICI. Equipment
   (ASBRs, RRs) should also be able to inform the peer regarding which
   Route Target attributes it will accept from a peer, because sending
   an incorrect Route Target can result in incorrect cross-connection
   of VPNs. Also, sending inappropriate route targets to a peer may
   disclose confidential information. This is another example of
   defense against routing protocol attack.

   8.1.6.       Protection Against Spoofed Updates and Route
   Advertisements

   Equipment must support route filtering of routes received via a BGP
   peer session by applying policies that include one or more of the
   following: AS path, BGP next hop, standard community, or extended
   community.


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   8.1.7.       Protection of Confidential Information

   The ability to identify and block messages with confidential
   information from leaving the trusted domain that can reveal
   confidential information about network operation (e.g., performance
   OAM messages or LSP ping messages) is required. SPs must have the
   flexibility of handling these messages at the ASBR.

   Equipment should be able to identify and restrict where it sends
   messages that can reveal confidential information about network
   operation (e.g., performance OAM messages, LSP Traceroute
   messages). Service Providers must have the flexibility of handling
   these messages at the ASBR. For example, equipment supporting LSP
   Traceroute may limit to which addresses replies can be sent.
   Note: This capability should be used with care. For example, if a
   SP chooses to prohibit the exchange of LSP ping messages at the
   ICI, it may make it more difficult to debug incorrect cross-
   connection of LSPs or other problems.
   A SP may decide to progress these messages if they arrive from a
   trusted provider and are targeted to specific, agreed-on addresses.
   Another provider may decide to traffic police, reject, or apply
   other policies to these messages. Solutions must enable providers
   to control the information that is relayed to another provider
   about the path that a LSP takes. For example, when using the RSVP-
   TE record route object or LSP ping / trace, a provider must be able
   to control the information contained in corresponding messages when
   sent to another provider.

   8.1.8.       Protection Against Over-provisioned Number of
   RSVP-TE LSPs and Bandwidth Reservation

   In addition to the control plane protection mechanisms listed in
   the previous section on Control plane protection with RSVP-TE, the
   ASBR must be able both to limit the number of LSPs that can be set
   up by other domains and to limit the amount of bandwidth that can
   be reserved. A provider's ASBR may deny a LSP set up request or a
   bandwidth reservation request sent by another provider's whose the
   limits have been reached.

   8.2. Data Plane Protection

   8.2.1.       Protection against DoS in the Data Plane

   This is described in Section 5 of this document.

   8.2.2.       Protection Against Label Spoofing



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   Equipment must be able to verify that a label received across an
   interconnect was actually assigned to a LSP arriving across that
   interconnect. If a label not assigned to a LSP arrives at this
   router from the correct neighboring provider, the packet must be
   dropped.  This verification can be applied to the top label only.
   The top label is the received top label and every label that is
   exposed by label popping to be used for forwarding decisions.

   Equipment must provide the capability of dropping MPLS-labeled
   packets if all labels in the stack are not processed.  This lets
   SPs guarantee that every label that enters its domain from another
   carrier was actually assigned to that carrier.

   The following requirements are not directly reflected in this
   document but must be used as guidance for addressing further work.

   Solutions must NOT force operators to reveal reachability
   information to routers within their domains. <note: It is believed
   that this requirement is met via other requirements specified in
   this section plus the normal operation of IP routing, which does
   not reveal individual hosts.>

   Mechanisms to authenticate and validate a dynamic setup request
   must be available. For instance, if dynamic signaling of a TE-LSP
   or PW is crossing a domain boundary, there must be a way to detect
   whether the LSP source is who it claims to be and that it is
   allowed to connect to the destination.

   8.2.3.       Protection Using Ingress Traffic Policing and
   Enforcement

   The following simple diagram illustrates a potential security issue
   on the data plane across a MPLS interconnect:

   SP2 - ASBR2 - labeled path - ASBR1 - P1 - SP1's PSN - P2 - PE1
   |         |                   |                             |
   |<  AS2  >|<MPLS interconnect>|<             AS1           >|

   Traffic flow direction is from SP2 to SP1

   In the case of down stream label assignment, the transit label used
   by ASBR2 is allocated by ASBR1,  which in turn advertises it to
   ASB2 (downstream unsolicited or on-demand), this label is used for
   a service context (VPN label, PW VC label, etc.), and this LSP is
   normally terminated at a forwarding table belonging to the service
   instance on PE (PE1) in SP1.



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   In the example above, ASBR1 would not know whether the label of an
   incoming packet from ASBR2 over the interconnect is a VPN label or
   PSN label for AS1. So it is possible (though unlikely) that ASBR2
   can be accidentally or intentionally configured such that the
   incoming label could match a PSN label (e.g., LDP) in AS1. Then,
   this LSP would end up on the global plane of an infrastructure
   router (P or PE1), and this could invite a unidirectional attack on
   that P or PE1 where the LSP terminates.

   To mitigate this threat, implementations should be able to do a
   forwarding path look-up for the label on an incoming packet from an
   interconnect in a Label Forwarding Information Base (LFIB) space
   that is only intended for its own service context or provide a
   mechanism on the data plane that would ensure the incoming labels
   are what ASBR1 has allocated and advertised.

   A similar concept has been proposed in "Requirements for Multi-
   Segment Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3)" [RFC5254].


   When using upstream label assignment, the upstream source must be
   identified and authenticated so the labels can be accepted as from a
   trusted source.


9. Summary of MPLS and GMPLS Security

   The following summary provides a quick check list of MPLS and GMPLS
   security threats, defense techniques, and the best practice guide
   outlines for MPLS and GMPLS deployment.

   9.1. MPLS and GMPLS Specific Security Threats

9.1.1. Control Plane Attacks

   Types of attacks on the control plane:
     - Unauthorized LSP creation
     - LSP message interception











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   Attacks against RSVP-TE: DoS attack with setting up
   unauthorized LSP and/or LSP messages.

   Attacks against LDP: DoS attack with storms of LDP Hello
   messages or LDP TCP SYN messages.

   Attacks may be launched from external or internal sources, or
   through a SP's management systems.

   Attacks may be targeted at the SP's routing protocols or
   infrastructure elements.

   In general, control protocols may be attacked by:
     - MPLS signaling (LDP, RSVP-TE)
     - PCE signaling
     - IPsec signaling (IKE and IKEv2)
     - ICMP and ICMPv6
     - L2TP
     - BGP-based membership discovery
     - Database-based membership discovery (e.g., RADIUS)
     - OAM and diagnostic protocols such as LSP ping and LMP
     - Other protocols that may be important to the control
           infrastructure, e.g., DNS, LMP, NTP, SNMP, and GRE.


9.1.2. Data Plane Attacks

     - Unauthorized observation of data traffic
     - Data traffic modification
     - Spoofing and replay
     - Unauthorized Deletion
     - Unauthorized Traffic Pattern Analysis
     - Denial of Service

   9.2. Defense Techniques

     1) Authentication:

        - Bi-directional authentication
        - Key management
        - Management System Authentication
        - Peer-to-peer authentication

     2) Cryptographic techniques
     3) Use of IPsec in MPLS/GMPLS networks
     4) Encryption for device configuration and management
     5) Cryptographic Techniques for MPLS Pseudowires

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     6) End-to-End versus Hop-by-Hop Protection (CE-CE, PE-PE, PE-CE)
     7) Access Control techniques

        - Filtering
        - Firewalls
        - Access Control to management interfaces

     8) Infrastructure isolation
     9) Use of aggregated infrastructure
     10) Quality Control Processes
     11) Testable MPLS/GMPLS Service
     12) End-to-end connectivity verification
     13) Hop-by-hop resource configuration verification and discovery


   9.3. Service Provider MPLS and GMPLS Best Practice Outlines

9.3.1. SP Infrastructure Protection

     1) General control plane protection
        - Filtering out infrastructure source addresses at edges
        - Protocol authentication within the core
        - Infrastructure hiding (e.g. disable TTL propagation)
     2) RSVP control plane protection
        - RSVP security tools
        - Isolation of the trusted domain
        - Deactivating RSVP on interfaces with neighbors who are not
           authorized to use RSVP
        - RSVP neighbor filtering at the protocol level and data plane
           level
        - Authentication for RSVP messages
        - RSVP message pacing
     3) LDP control plane protection (similar techniques as for RSVP)
     4) Data plane protection
        - User access link protection
        - Link authentication
        - Access routing control (e.g., prefix limits, route
           dampening, routing table limits (such as VRF limits)
        - Access QoS control
        - Customer service monitoring tools
        - Use of LSP ping (with its own control plane security) to
           verify end-to-end connectivity of MPLS LSPs
        - LMP (with its own security) to verify hop-by-hop
           connectivity.

9.3.2.  Inter-provider Security



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   Inter-provider connections are high security risk areas. Similar
   techniques and procedures as described for SP's general core
   protection are listed below for Inter-provider connections.

     1) Control plane protection at Inter-provider connections
        - Authentication of signaling sessions
        - Protection against DoS attacks in the control plane
        - Protection against malformed packets
        - Ability to enable/disable specific protocols
        - Protection against incorrect cross connection
        - Protection against spoofed updates and route advertisements
        - Protection of confidential information
        - Protection against over-provisioned number of RSVP-TE LSPs
           and bandwidth reservation

     2) Data Plane Protection at the inter-provider connections
        - Protection against DoS in the data plane
        - Protection against label spoofing

   For MPLS VPN inter-connections [RFC4364], in practice, inter-AS
   option a) VRF-to-VRF connections at the AS (Autonomous System)
   border is commonly used for inter-provider connections. Option c)
   Multi-hop EBGP redistribution of labeled VPN-IPv4 routes between
   source and destination ASes, with EBGP redistribution of labeled
   IPv4 routes from AS to neighboring AS, on the other hand, is not
   normally used for inter-provider connections due to higher security
   risks. For more details, please see [RFC4111].


10.     Security Considerations


   Security considerations constitute the sole subject of this memo
   and hence are discussed throughout.  Here we recap what has been
   presented and explain at a high level the role of each type of
   consideration in an overall secure MPLS/GMPLS system.

   The document describes a number of potential security threats.
   Some of these threats have already been observed occurring in
   running networks; others are largely hypothetical at this time.

   DoS attacks and intrusion attacks from the Internet against SPs'
   infrastructure have been seen.  DoS "attacks" (typically not
   malicious) have also been seen in which CE equipment overwhelms PE
   equipment with high quantities or rates of packet traffic or
   routing information.  Operational or provisioning errors are cited
   by SPs as one of their prime concerns.


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   The document describes a variety of defensive techniques that may
   be used to counter the suspected threats.  All of the techniques
   presented involve mature and widely implemented technologies that
   are practical to implement.

   The document describes the importance of detecting, monitoring, and
   reporting attacks, both successful and unsuccessful.  These
   activities are essential for "understanding one's enemy",
   mobilizing new defenses, and obtaining metrics about how secure the
   MPLS/GMPLS network is.  As such, they are vital components of any
   complete PPVPN security system.

   The document evaluates MPLS/GMPLS security requirements from a
   customer's perspective as well as from a service provider's
   perspective.  These sections re-evaluate the identified threats
   from the perspectives of the various stakeholders and are meant to
   assist equipment vendors and service providers, who must ultimately
   decide what threats to protect against in any given configuration
   or service offering.


11.     IANA Considerations

   This document contains no new IANA considerations.


12.     Normative References

   [RFC2747] F. Baker, et al., "RSVP Cryptographic Authentication",
   RFC 2747, January 2000.

   [RFC3031] E. Rosen, A. Viswanathan, R. Callon, "Multiprotocol Label
   Switching Architecture", RFC 3031, January 2001.

   [RFC3097] R. Braden and L. Zhang, "RSVP Cryptographic
   Authentication - Updated Message Type Value", RFC 3097, April 2001.

   [RFC3209] Awduche, et al., "RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP
   Tunnels", December 2001.

   [RFC3945] E. Mannie, "Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching
   (GMPLS) Architecture", RFC 3945, October 2004.

   [RFC4106] J. Viega, D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
   (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", June 2005.

   [RFC4301] S. Kent, K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
   Protocol," December 2005.

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   [RFC4302] S. Kent, "IP Authentication Header," December 2005.

   [RFC4306] C. Kaufman, "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,"
   December 2005.

   [RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
   CCM Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", December
   2005.

   [RFC4364] E. Rosen and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
   Networks (VPNs)," February 2006.

   [RFC4379] K. Kompella and G. Swallow, "Detecting Multi-Protocol
   Label Switched (MPLS) Data Plane Failures," February 2006.

   [RFC4447] Martini, et al., "Pseudowire Setup and Maintenance Using
   the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)," April 2006.

   [RFC4835] V. Manral, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
   Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
   Authentication Header (AH)," April 2007.

   [RFC5246] T. Dierks and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2," August 2008.

   [RFC5036] Andersson, et al., "LDP Specification", October 2007.

   [STD62] "Simple Network Management Protocol, Version 3,", December
   2002.

   [STD-8] J. Postel and J. Reynolds, "TELNET Protocol Specification",
   STD 8, May 1983.


13.     Informative References

   [OIF-SMI-01.0] Renee Esposito, "Security for Management Interfaces
   to Network Elements", Optical Internetworking Forum, Sept. 2003.

   [OIF-SMI-02.1] Renee Esposito, "Addendum to the Security for
   Management Interfaces to Network Elements", Optical Internetworking
   Forum, March 2006.

   [RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
   for Message Authentication," February 1997.



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   [RFC2411] R. Thayer, N. Doraswamy, R. Glenn, "IP Security Document
   Roadmap," November 1998.

   [RFC3174] D. Eastlake, 3rd, and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm
   1 (SHA1)," September 2001.

   [RFC3562] M. Leech, "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
   Signature Option", July 2003.

   [RFC3631] S. Bellovin, C. Kaufman, J. Schiller, "Security
   Mechanisms for the Internet," December 2003.

   [RFC3704] F. Baker and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
   Networks," March 2004.

   [RFC3985] S. Bryant and P. Pate, "Pseudo Wire Emulation Edge-to-
   Edge (PWE3) Architecture", March 2005.

   [RFC4107] S. Bellovin, R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
   Key Management", June 2005.

   [RFC4110]  R. Callon and M. Suzuki, "A Framework for Layer 3
   Provider-Provisioned Virtual Private Networks (PPVPNs)", July 2005.

   [RFC4111] L. Fang, "Security Framework of Provider Provisioned
   VPN", July 2005.

   [RFC4230] H. Tschofenig and R. Graveman, "RSVP Security
   Properties", December 2005.

   [RFC4308] P. Hoffman, "Cryptographic Suites for IPsec", December
   2005.

   [RFC4377] T. Nadeau, M. Morrow, G. Swallow, D. Allan, S.
   Matsushima, "Operations and Management (OAM) Requirements for
   Multi-Protocol Label Switched (MPLS) Networks," February 2006.

   [RFC4378] D. Allan, T. Nadeau, "A Framework for Multi-Protocol Label
   Switching (MPLS)," February 2006

   [RFC4593] A. Barbir, S. Murphy, Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to Routing
   Protocols," October 2006.

   [RFC4778] M. Kaeo, "Current Operational Security Practices in
   Internet Service Provider Environments," January 2007.

   [RFC4808] S. Bellovin, "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", March
   2007.

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   [RFC4864] G. Van de Velde, T. Hain, R. Droms, "Local Network
   Protection for IPv6," May 2007.

   [RFC4869] L. Law and J. Solinas, "Suite B Cryptographic Suites for
   IPsec," April 2007.

   [RFC5254] N. Bitar, M. Bocci, L. Martini, "Requirements for Multi-
   Segment Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3)," October 2008.

   [MFA MPLS ICI] N. Bitar, "MPLS InterCarrier Interconnect Technical
   Specification," IP/MPLS Forum 19.0.0, April 2008.

   [OIF Sec Mag] R. Esposito, R. Graveman, and B. Hazzard, "Security
   for Management Interfaces to Network Elements," OIF-SMI-01.0,
   September 2003.

   [rtgwg backbone attacks] P. Savola, "Backbone Infrastructure
   Attacks and Protections," draft-savola-rtgwg-backbone-attacks-
   03.txt, January, 2007.

   [opsec filter], C. Morrow, "Filtering and Rate Limiting
   Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure," draft-ietf-opsec-
   filter-caps-09, July 2007.

   [ipsecme-roadmap], S. Frankel and S. Krishnan, "IP Security (IPsec)
   and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap," draft-ietf-
   ipsecme-roadmap, February, 2010.

   [opsec efforts] C. Lonvick and D. Spak, "Security Best Practices
   Efforts and Documents", draft-ietf-opsec-efforts-11.txt, November
   2009.

   [RSVP-key] M. Behringer, F. Le Faucheur, "Applicability of Keying
   Methods for RSVP Security", draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-security-
   groupkeying-05.txt, June 2009.



14.     Author's Addresses

   Luyuan Fang
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   300 Beaver Brook Road
   Boxborough, MA 01719
   USA

   Email: lufang@cisco.com

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   Michael Behringer
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Village d'Entreprises Green Side
   400, Avenue Roumanille, Batiment T 3
   06410 Biot, Sophia Antipolis
   FRANCE

   Email: mbehring@cisco.com

   Ross Callon
   Juniper Networks
   10 Technology Park Drive
   Westford, MA 01886
   USA

   Email: rcallon@juniper.net

   Richard Graveman
   RFG Security
   15 Park Avenue
   Morristown, NJ  07960

   Email: rfg@acm.org


   Jean-Louis Le Roux
   France Telecom
   2, avenue Pierre-Marzin
   22307 Lannion Cedex
   FRANCE

   Email: jeanlouis.leroux@francetelecom.com

   Raymond Zhang
   British Telecom
   BT Center
   81 Newgate Street
   London, EC1A 7AJ
   United Kingdom

   Email: raymond.zhang@bt.com

   Paul Knight
   39 N. Hancock St.
   Lexington, MA 02420

   Email: paul.the.knight@gmail.com

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   Yaakov (Jonathan) Stein
   RAD Data Communications
   24 Raoul Wallenberg St., Bldg C
   Tel Aviv  69719
   ISRAEL

   Email: yaakov_s@rad.com

   Nabil Bitar
   Verizon
   40 Sylvan Road
   Waltham, MA 02145
   Email: nabil.bitar@verizon.com

   Monique Morrow
   Glatt-com
   CH-8301 Glattzentrum
   Switzerland
   Email: mmorrow@cisco.com

   Adrian Farrel
   Old Dog Consulting
   Email: adrian@olddog.co.uk



15.     Acknowledgements

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).

   The authors and contributors would also like to acknowledge the
   helpful comments and suggestions from Sam Hartman, Dimitri
   Papadimitriou, Kannan Varadhan, Stephen Farrell, Mircea Pisica,
   Scott Brim in particular for his comments and discussion through
   GEN-ART review,as well as Suresh Krishnan for his GEN-ART review and
   comments.  The authors would like to thank Sandra Murphy and Tim
   Polk for their comments and help through Security AD review, thank
   Pekka Savola for his comments through ops-dir review, and Amanda
   Baber for her IANA review.







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