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Versions: (draft-weis-esp-group-counter-cipher) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 RFC 6054

MSEC Working Group                                             D. McGrew
Internet-Draft                                                   B. Weis
Intended status: Standards Track                           Cisco Systems
Expires: May 18, 2008                                  November 15, 2007


   Using Counter Modes with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
          Authentication Header (AH) to Protect Group Traffic
              draft-ietf-msec-ipsec-group-counter-modes-01

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 18, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).













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Abstract

   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) counter modes use a counter, which
   is typically assumed to be incremented by a single sender.  This memo
   describes the use of AES counter modes when applied to the
   Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)
   in multiple-sender group applications.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3

   2.  Problem Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4

   3.  Recommended IV Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

   4.  Group Key Management Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6

   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8

   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9

   Appendix A.  Rationale for the Recommended IV Formation  . . . . . 11

   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13



















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1.  Introduction

   Several new AES encryption modes of operation have been specified for
   the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303]: ESP: Counter
   Mode (CTR) [RFC3686], Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [RFC4106], Counter
   with CBC-MAC Mode (CCM) [RFC4309]; and one that has been specified
   for both ESP and the Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302]: Galois MAC
   Mode (GMAC) [RFC4543].  These new modes offer advantages over
   traditional modes of operation.  However, they all have restrictions
   on their use in situations in which multiple senders are protecting
   traffic using the same key.  This document addresses this restriction
   and describes how these modes can be used with group key management
   protocols such as the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol
   [RFC3547] and the Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol
   (GSAKMP) [RFC4535].

1.1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].






























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2.  Problem Statement

   The counter mode of operation (CTR) [FIPS.800-38A.2001] has become
   important because of its performance and implementation advantages.
   It is the basis for several modes of operation that combine
   encryption, including CCM and GCM.  All of the counter-based modes
   require that, if a single key is shared by multiple encryption
   engines, those engines must coordinate to ensure that every
   initialization vector (IV) used with that key is distinct.  That is,
   for each key, no IV value can be used more than once.  This
   restriction on IV usage is imposed on ESP CTR, ESP GCM, and ESP CCM.
   In cryptographic terms, the IV is a nonce.

   All ESP and AH transforms using an AES counter mode have a
   restriction that an application must not use the same key, IV, and
   Salt values to protect two different data payloads.  Notwithstanding
   this security condition, AES counter mode transforms are often
   preferred because of their favorable performance characteristics as
   compared to other AES modes.

   Each of the AES counter mode transforms specify the construction of
   keying material for point-to-point applications which are keyed by
   the Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKE) [RFC2409] or version 2
   (IKEv2) [RFC4306].  The specified constructions guarantee that the
   security condition is not violated by a single sender.  However,
   group applications, where multiple senders encrypt using a single
   IPsec Security Association (SA) [I-D.ietf-msec-ipsec-extensions],
   also may find AES counter mode transforms to be valuable.  Such
   groups are possible when IPsec is used to protect network traffic
   between members of a multiple sender IP multicast application, known
   as a Many-to-Many Application [RFC3170].  Some Many-to-many
   Applications are comprised of a large number of senders such that
   defining an individual IPsec SA for each sender is unmanageable.


















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3.  Recommended IV Formation

   This section specifies a particular construction of the IV that
   enables a group of senders to safely share a single IPsec SA.  This
   construction conforms to the recommendations of
   [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc].  A rationale for this method is given in
   Appendix A.  In the recommended construction, each IV is formed by
   concatenating a Sender Identifier (SID) field with a Sender-Specific
   IV (SSIV) field.  The value of the SID MUST be unique for each
   sender, across all of the senders sharing a particular Security
   Association.  The value of the SSIV field MUST be unique for each IV
   constructed by a particular sender for use with a particular SA.  The
   SSIV MAY be chosen in any manner convenient to the sender, e.g.
   successive values of a counter.  The leftmost bits of the IV contain
   the SID, and the remaining bits contain the SSIV.

   The number of bits used by the SID may vary depending on group
   policy, though for each particular Security Association, each SID
   used with that SA MUST have the same length.  Additionally, a
   conforming implementation MUST support SID lengths of 8, 12, and 16
   bits.  It should be noted that the size of the SID associated with an
   SA provides a tradeoff between the number of possible senders and the
   number of packets that each sending station is able to send using
   that SA.



























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4.  Group Key Management Conventions

   Group applications use a Group Key Management System (GKMS) composed
   of one or more Group Controller Key Server (GCKS) entities [RFC3740].
   The GKMS distributes IPsec transform policy and associated keying
   material to authorized group members.  This document RECOMMENDS that
   the GKMS both allocate unique SIDs to group members and distribute
   them to group members using a GKM protocol such as GDOI or GSAKMP.

   The following requirements apply to a GKMS that manages SIDs.

   o  The GKMS MUST NOT give the same sender identifier to more than one
      active group member.  If the GKMS is uncertain as to the SID
      associated with a group member it MUST allocate it a new one.  If
      more than one entity within the GKMS is distributing sender
      identifiers, then the sets of identifiers distributed by each
      entity MUST NOT overlap.  If the entire set of sender identifiers
      has been exhausted, the GKMS MUST refuse to allow new group
      members to join.

   o  The GKMS SHOULD allocate a single sender identifier for each group
      member, and issue this value to the sender for all group SAs for
      which that member is a sender.  This strategy simplifies the
      rekeying process.

   o  When a GKMS determines that a particular group member is no longer
      a part of the group, then it MAY re-allocate any sender identifier
      associated with that group member for use with new group member.
      In this case, the GKMS MUST first delete and replace any active AH
      or ESP SAs with which the SID may have been used.  This is
      necessary to avoid re-use of an IV with the cipher key associated
      with the SA.

   A GKMS MUST support a group member notifying the GCKS that its IV
   space will soon be exhausted and requires a new SA to be distributed.
   A group member SHOULD notify the GCKS in advance of its IV space
   being exhausted.  A GCKS MAY choose to ignore this notification based
   on policy (e.g., if the group member appears to be asking for new SAs
   so frequent as to negatively affect group communications).












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5.  IANA Considerations

   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
   RFC.

   This memo has no IANA considerations.













































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6.  Security Considerations

   This specification provides a method for securely using cryptographic
   algorithms that require a unique IV, such as a block cipher mode of
   operation based on counter mode, in a scenario in which there are
   multiple cryptographic devices that each generate IVs.  This is done
   by partitioning the set of possible IV values such that each
   cryptographic device has exclusive use of a set of IV values.  When
   the recommendation in this specification are followed, the security
   of the cryptographic algorithms is equivalent to the conventional
   case in which there is a single sender.

   The security of a group depends upon the correct operation of the
   group members.  Any group member using an SID not allocated to it may
   reduce the security of the system.

   As is the case with a single sender, a cryptographic device storing
   keying material over a reboot is responsible for storing a counter
   value such that upon resumption it never re-uses counters.  In the
   context of this specification, the cryptographic device would need to
   store both SID and SSIV values used with a particular IPsec SA in
   addition to policy associated with the IPsec SA.

   This specification does not address virtual machine rollbacks that
   may cause the cryptographic device to re-use nonce values.

   Other security considerations applying to IPsec SAs with multiple
   senders are described in [I-D.ietf-msec-ipsec-extensions].























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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3686]  Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
              Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
              (ESP)", RFC 3686, January 2004.

   [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
              (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4106, June 2005.

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4309]  Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
              Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4309, December 2005.

   [RFC4543]  McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
              Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
              May 2006.

7.2.  Informative References

   [FIPS.800-38A.2001]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation",
              FIPS PUB 800-38A, December 2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/
              publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-msec-ipsec-extensions]
              Weis, B., "Multicast Extensions to the Security
              Architecture for the Internet  Protocol",
              draft-ietf-msec-ipsec-extensions-06 (work in progress),
              July 2007.

   [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc]
              McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", draft-mcgrew-auth-enc-04 (work in progress),
              October 2007.




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   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC3170]  Quinn, B. and K. Almeroth, "IP Multicast Applications:
              Challenges and Solutions", RFC 3170, September 2001.

   [RFC3547]  Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
              Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

   [RFC3740]  Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group Security
              Architecture", RFC 3740, March 2004.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [RFC4535]  Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A., and G. Gross,
              "GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Key Management
              Protocol", RFC 4535, June 2006.

































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Appendix A.  Rationale for the Recommended IV Formation

   The two main alternatives for ensuring the uniqueness of IVs in a
   multi-sender environment are to have each sender include a Sender
   Identifier (SID) value in either the Salt value or in the explicit IV
   field (recall that the IV used as input to the crypto algorithm is
   constructed by concatenating the Salt and the explicit IV).  The
   explicit IV field was chosen as the location for the SID because it
   is explicitly present in the packet.  If the SID had been included in
   the Salt, then a receiver would need to infer the SID value for a
   particular ESP packet by recognizing which sender had sent that
   packet.  This inference could be made on the IP source address, if
   ESP is transported directly over IP.  However, if an alternate
   transport mechanism such as UDP is being used (e.g. for NAT
   traversal), the method used to infer the sender would need to take
   that mechanism into account.  It is simpler to use the explicit IV
   field, and thus avoid the need to infer the sender from the packet at
   all.

   The normative requirement that all of the SID values used with a
   particular Security Association must have the same length is not
   strictly necessary, but was added to promote simplicity of
   implementation.  Alternatively, it would be acceptable to have the
   SID values be chosen to be the codewords of a variable-length prefix
   free code.  This approach preserves security since the distinctness
   of the IVs follows from the fact that no SID is a prefix of another;
   thus any pair of IVs has a subset of bits that are distinct.  If a
   Huffman code is used to form the SIDs, then a set of optimal SIDs can
   be found, in the sense that the number of SIDs can be maximized for a
   given distribution of SID lengths.  Additionally, there are simple
   methods for generating efficient prefix free codes whose codewords
   are octet strings.  Nevertheless, these methods were disallowed in
   order to favor simplicity over generality.


















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Authors' Addresses

   David A. McGrew
   Cisco Systems
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95134-1706
   USA

   Phone: +1-408-525-8651
   Email: mcgrew@cisco.com


   Brian Weis
   Cisco Systems
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95134-1706
   USA

   Phone: +1-408-526-4796
   Email: bew@cisco.com































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