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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 RFC 4383

   Internet Engineering Task Force                     Baugher (Cisco)
   MSEC Working Group                               Carrara (Ericsson)
   INTERNET-DRAFT
   EXPIRES: January 2005                                     July 2004





                        The Use of TESLA in SRTP
                   <draft-ietf-msec-srtp-tesla-01.txt>



Status of this memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, the authors certify that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am (we are) aware
   have been disclosed, and any of which I (we) become aware will be
   disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668 (BCP 79).

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, the authors accept the provisions
   of Section 3 of RFC 3667 (BCP 78).

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
   reference material or cite them other than as "work in progress".

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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Abstract

   This memo describes the use of the Timed Efficient Stream loss-
   tolerant Authentication (TESLA) transform within the Secure Real-
   time Transport Protocol (SRTP), to provide data origin
   authentication for multicast and broadcast data streams.










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   TABLE OF CONTENTS

    1. Introduction...................................................2
    1.1. Notational Conventions.......................................3
    2. SRTP...........................................................3
    3. TESLA..........................................................4
    4. Usage of TESLA within SRTP.....................................4
    4.1. The TESLA extension..........................................4
    4.2. SRTP Packet Format...........................................5
    4.3. Extension of the SRTP Cryptographic Context..................7
    4.4. SRTP Processing..............................................8
    4.4.1 Sender Processing...........................................8
    4.4.2 Receiver Processing.........................................9
    4.5. SRTCP Packet Format.........................................10
    4.6. TESLA MAC...................................................12
    4.7. PRFs........................................................12
    5. TESLA Bootstrapping...........................................13
    6. SRTP TESLA Default parameters.................................13
    6.2 Transform-dependent Parameters for TESLA MAC.................14
    7. Security Considerations.......................................14
    8. IANA Considerations...........................................15
    9. Acknowledgements..............................................15
    10. Author's Addresses...........................................15
    11. References...................................................16


1. Introduction

   Multicast and broadcast communication introduce some new security
   challenges compared to unicast communication.  Many multicast and
   broadcast applications need "data origin authentication" (DOA), or
   "source authentication", in order to guarantee that a received
   message had originated from a given source, and was not manipulated
   during the transmission.  In unicast communication, a pairwise
   security association between one sender and one receiver can provide
   data origin authentication using symmetric-key cryptography (such as
   a message authentication code, MAC).  When the communication is
   strictly pairwise, the sender and receiver agree upon a key that is
   known only to them.

   In groups, however, a key is shared among more than two members, and
   this symmetric-key approach does not guarantee data origin
   authentication.  When there is a group security association
   [gkmarch] instead of a pairwise security association, any of the
   members can alter the packet and impersonate any other member.  The
   MAC in this case only guarantees that the packet was not manipulated
   by an attacker outside the group (and hence not in possession of the




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   group key), and that the packet was sent by a source within the
   group.

   Some applications cannot tolerate source ambiguity and must discern
   the true sender from any other group member.  A common way to solve
   the problem is by use of asymmetric cryptography, such as digital
   signatures. This method, unfortunately, suffers from high overhead,
   in terms of time (to sign and verify) and bandwidth (to convey the
   signature in the packet).

   Several schemes have been proposed to provide efficient data origin
   authentication in multicast and broadcast scenarios.  The Timed
   Efficient Stream loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA), is one such
   scheme.

   This memo specifies TESLA authentication for SRTP.  SRTP TESLA can
   provide data origin authentication to RTP applications that use
   group security associations (such as multicast RTP applications) so
   long as receivers abide by the TESLA security invariants [TESLA].

1.1. Notational Conventions

   The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   This specification assumes the reader familiar with both SRTP and
   TESLA.  Few of their details are explained in this document, and the
   reader can find them in their respective specifications [RFC3711],
   [TESLA].  This specification uses the same definitions as TESLA for
   common terms and assumes that the reader is familiar with the TESLA
   algorithms and protocols [TESLA].


2. SRTP

   The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC3711] is a
   profile of RTP, which can provide confidentiality, message
   authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the
   RTP control protocol, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol
   (RTCP).  Note, the term SRTP may often used to indicate SRTCP as
   well.

   SRTP is a framework that allows new security functions and new
   transforms to be added.  SRTP currently does not define any
   mechanism to provide data origin authentication for group security
   associations.  Fortunately, it is straightforward to add TESLA to
   the SRTP cryptographic framework.



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   The TESLA extension to SRTP is defined in this specification, which
   assumes that the reader is familiar with the SRTP specification
   [RFC3711], its packet structure, and processing rules.


3. TESLA

   TESLA provides delayed per-packet data authentication and is
   specified in [TESLA].  This specification assumes that the reader is
   familiar with TESLA [TESLA].

   In addition to its SRTP data-packet definition given here, TESLA
   needs an initial synchronization protocol and initial bootstrapping
   procedure.  The synchronization protocol allows the sender and the
   receiver to compare their clocks and determine an upper bound of the
   difference.  The synchronization protocol is outside the scope of
   this document.

   TESLA also requires an initial bootstrapping procedure to exchange
   needed parameters and the initial commitment to the key chain
   [TESLA].  For SRTP, it is assumed that the bootstrapping is
   performed out-of-band, possibly using the key management protocol
   that is exchanging the security parameters for SRTP, e.g. [GDOI],
   [MIKEY].  Initial bootstrapping of TESLA is outside the scope of
   this document.


4. Usage of TESLA within SRTP

   The present specification is an extension to the SRTP specification
   [RFC3711] and describes the use of TESLA with only a single key
   chain, and the delayed-authentication TESLA elements of procedure
   [TESLA].

4.1. The TESLA extension

   TESLA is an OPTIONAL authentication transform for SRTP.  When used,
   TESLA adds the fields showed in Figure 1 per-packet.  The fields
   added by TESLA are called "TESLA authentication extensions"
   altogether, whereas "authentication tag" or "integrity protection
   tag" indicate the normal SRTP integrity protection tag, when the
   SRTP master key is shared by more than two endpoints [RFC3711].








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   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                              I                                |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                         Disclosed Key                         ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                           TESLA MAC                           ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Figure 1: The "TESLA authentication extension".


   I: 32 bit, MANDATORY
       Identifier of the time interval I, corresponding to the key K_i
       that is used to calculate the TESLA MAC present in the current
       packet (and in the packets sent in the current time interval I).

   Disclosed Key: variable length, MANDATORY
       The disclosed key (K_i-d), that can be used to authenticate
       previous packets from earlier time intervals [TESLA].

   TESLA MAC (Message Authentication Code): variable length, MANDATORY
       The MAC computed using the key K'_i (derived from K_i) [TESLA],
       which is disclosed in a subsequent packet (in the Disclosed Key
       field).  The MAC coverage is defined in Section 4.6.

4.2. SRTP Packet Format

   Figure 2 illustrates the format of the SRTP packet when TESLA is
   applied.  When applied to RTP, the TESLA authentication extension
   SHALL be inserted before the (optional) SRTP MKI and (recommended)
   authentication tag.

















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     0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+<+
  |V=2|P|X|  CC   |M|     PT      |       sequence number         | | |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
  |                           timestamp                           | | |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
  |           synchronization source (SSRC) identifier            | | |
  +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | |
  |            contributing source (CSRC) identifiers             | | |
  |                               ....                            | | |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
  |                   RTP extension (OPTIONAL)                    | | |
+>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| |                          payload  ...                         | | |
| |                               +-------------------------------+ | |
| |                               | RTP padding   | RTP pad count | | |
+>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| |                            I                                  | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ |
| ~                      Disclosed Key                            ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| ~                          TESLA MAC                            ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<|-+
| ~                            MKI                              ~ | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| ~                            MAC                                ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
|                                                                   | |
+- Encrypted Portion                 TESLA Authenticated Portion ---+ |
                                                                      |
                                             Authenticated Portion ---+


   Figure 2.  The format of the SRTP packet when TESLA is applied. Note
   that it is OPTIONAL to apply TESLA, i.e. the TESLA fields are
   OPTIONAL.

   As in SRTP, the "Encrypted Portion" of an SRTP packet consists of
   the encryption of the RTP payload (including RTP padding when
   present) of the equivalent RTP packet.

   The "Authenticated Portion" of an SRTP packet consists of the RTP
   header, the Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet, and the TESLA
   authentication extension. Note that the definition is extended from
   [RFC3711] by the inclusion of the TESLA authentication extension.





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   The "TESLA Authenticated Portion" of an SRTP packet consists of the
   RTP header, the Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet, and the TESLA
   I field.

4.3. Extension of the SRTP Cryptographic Context

   When TESLA is used, the definition of cryptographic context in
   Section 3.2 of SRTP SHALL include the following extensions.

   Transform-independent Parameter

      a flag indicating the use of TESLA in SRTP.  When this bit is set,
      the following TESLA transform-dependent parameters define the
      particular TESLA configuration.

   Transform-dependent Parameters

      1. an identifier for the PRF, f, implementing the one-way function
        F(x) in TESLA (to derive the keys in the chain), e.g. to
        indicate HMAC-SHA1, see Section 6.2 for the default value.

      2. a non-negative integer n_c, determining the length of the F
        output, i.e. the length of the keys in the chain (that is also
        the key disclosed in an SRTP packet), see Section 6.2 for the
        default value.

      3. an identifier for the PRF, f', implementing the one-way
        function F'(x) in TESLA (to derive the keys for the TESLA MAC,
        from the keys in the chain), e.g. to indicate HMAC-SHA1, see
        Section 6.2 for the default value.

      4. a non-negative integer n_f, determining the length of the
        output of F', i.e. of the key for the TESLA MAC, see Section
        6.2 for the default value.

      5. an identifier for the TESLA MAC, that accepts the output of
        F'(x) as its key, e.g. to indicate HMAC-SHA1, see Section 6.2
        for the default value.

      6. a non-negative integer n_m, determining the length of the
        output of the TESLA MAC, see Section 6.2 for the default value.

      7. the beginning of the session T_0,

      8. the interval duration T_int (in msec),

      9. the key disclosure delay d (in number of intervals)




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      10. non-negative integer n_c, determining the length of the key
        chain, which is determined based up the expected duration of
        the stream.

      11. the initial key of the chain to which the sender has
        committed himself.

   F(x) is used to compute a keychain of keys in SRTP TESLA, as defined
   in Section 6.  Also according to TESLA, F'(x) computes a TESLA MAC
   key with inputs as defined in Section 6.

   Section 6 of this document defines the default values for the
   transform-independent and transform-specific TESLA parameters.

4.4. SRTP Processing

   The SRTP packet processing is described in Section 3.3 of the SRTP
   specification [RFC3711]. The use of TESLA slightly changes the
   processing, as the SRTP MAC is checked upon packet arrival for DoS
   prevention, but the current packet is not TESLA-authenticated.  Each
   packet is buffered until a subsequent packet discloses its TESLA
   key.  The TESLA verification itself consists of some steps, such as
   tests of TESLA security invariants, that are described in Section
   3.5-3.7 of [TESLA]. The words "TESLA computation" and "TESLA
   verification" hereby imply all those steps, which are not all
   spelled out in the following. In particular, notice that the TESLA
   verification implies checking the safety condition (Section 3.5 of
   [TESLA]). If the safe condition does not hold, the packet MUST be
   discarded.

4.4.1 Sender Processing

   The sender processing is as described in Section 3.3 of [RFC3711],
   up to step 5 included.  After that the following process is
   followed:

   6. When TESLA is applied, identify the key in the TESLA chain to be
   used in the current time interval, and the TESLA MAC key derived
   from it.  Execute the TESLA computation to obtain the TESLA
   authentication extension for the current packet, by appending the
   current interval time (as I field), the disclosed key of the chain
   for an earlier packet, and the TESLA MAC under the current key from
   the chain. This step uses the related TESLA parameters from the
   crypto context as for Step 4.

   7. If the MKI indicator in the SRTP crypto context is set to one,
   append the MKI to the packet.




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   8. When TESLA is applied, compute the authentication tag as
   described in step 7 of Section 3.3 of the SRTP specification, but
   with coverage as defined in this specification (see Section 4.6).

   9. If necessary, update the ROC (step 8 in Section 3.3 of
   [RFC3711]).

4.4.2 Receiver Processing

   The receiver processing is as described in Section 3.3 of [RFC3711],
   up to step 4 included.

   To authenticate and replay-protect the current packet, the
   processing is the following:

      First check if the packet has been replayed (as for Section 3.3 of
     [RFC3711]). The SRTP replay list contains SRTP indices of recently
     received packets that have been authenticated by TESLA. (I.e.
     replay list updates MUST NOT be based on SRTP MAC.) If the packet
     is judged to be replayed, then the packet MUST be discarded, and
     the event SHOULD be logged.

     Next, perform verification of the SRTP integrity protection tag
     (note, not the TESLA MAC), if present, using the rollover counter
     from the current packet, the authentication algorithm indicated in
     the cryptographic context, and the session authentication key. If
     the verification is unsuccessful, the packet MUST be discarded
     from further processing and the event SHOULD be logged.

     If the verification is successful, remove and store the MKI (if
     present) and authentication tag fields from the packet. The packet
     is buffered, awaiting disclosure of the TESLA key in a subsequent
     packet.

     TESLA authentication is performed on a packet when the key is
     disclosed in a subsequent packet. When such key is disclosed,
     perform the TESLA verification of the packet using the rollover
     counter from the packet, the TESLA security parameters from the
     cryptographic context, and the disclosed key. If the verification
     is unsuccessful, the packet MUST be discarded from further
     processing and the event SHOULD be logged. If the TESLA
     verification is successful, remove the TESLA authentication
     extension from the packet.

   To decrypt the current packet, the processing is the following:

     Decrypt the Encrypted Portion of the packet, using the decryption
     algorithm indicated in the cryptographic context, the session



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     encryption key and salt (if used) found in Step 4 with the index
     from Step 2.

   (Note that the order of decryption and TESLA verification is not
   mandated. It is up to the application if to perform decryption
   immediately after the successful SRTP integrity protection
   verification and then get informed if the TESLA authentication for
   that packet has failed, or if to wait and TESLA- verify the packet
   before further processing).

   Update the rollover counter and highest sequence number, s_l, in the
   cryptographic context, using the packet index estimated in Step 2.
   If replay protection is provided, also update the Replay List (i.e.,
   the Replay List is updated after the TESLA authentication is
   successfully verified).

4.5. SRTCP Packet Format

   Figure 3 illustrates the format of the SRTCP packet when TESLA is
   applied.  The TESLA authentication extension SHALL be inserted
   before the MKI and authentication tag.  Recall from [RFC3711] that
   in SRTCP the MKI is OPTIONAL, while the E-bit, the SRTCP index, and
   the authentication tag are MANDATORY.

   As in SRTP, the "Encrypted Portion" of an SRTCP packet consists of
   the encryption of the RTCP payload of the equivalent compound RTCP
   packet, from the first RTCP packet, i.e., from the ninth (9) octet
   to the end of the compound packet.

   The "Authenticated Portion" of an SRTCP packet consists of the
   entire equivalent (eventually compound) RTCP packet, the E flag, the
   SRTCP index (after any encryption has been applied to the payload),
   and the TESLA extension.  Note that the definition is extended from
   [RFC3711] by the inclusion of the TESLA authentication extension.

   We define the "TESLA Authenticated Portion" of an SRTCP packet as
   consisting of the RTCP header (first 8 bytes), the Encrypted Portion
   of the SRTCP packet, and the I field.

   Processing of an SRTCP packets is similar to the SRTP processing
   (Section 4.3), but there are SRTCP-specific changes described in
   Section 3.4 of the SRTP specification [RFC3711] and in Section 4.6
   of this memo.








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   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+<+
  |V=2|P|    RC   |   PT=SR or RR   |             length          | | |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
  |                         SSRC of sender                        | | |
+>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | |
| ~                          sender info                          ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| ~                         report block 1                        ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| ~                         report block 2                        ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| ~                              ...                              ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| |V=2|P|    SC   |  PT=SDES=202  |             length            | | |
| +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | |
| |                          SSRC/CSRC_1                          | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| ~                           SDES items                          ~ | |
| +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | |
| ~                              ...                              ~ | |
+>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | |
| |E|                         SRTCP index                         | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| |                              I                                | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ |
| ~                         Disclosed Key                         ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| ~                           TESLA MAC                           ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<|-+
| ~                           SRTCP MKI                           ~ | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| :                       authentication tag                      : | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
|                                                                   | |
+-- Encrypted Portion              TESLA Authenticated Portion -----+ |
                                                                      |
                                         Authenticated Portion -------+

   Figure 3.  The format of the SRTCP packet when TESLA is applied.
   Note that it is OPTIONAL to apply TESLA, i.e. the TESLA fields are
   OPTIONAL.








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4.6. TESLA MAC

   Let M' denote packet data to be TESLA-authenticated. In the case of
   SRTP, M' SHALL consist of the SRTP TESLA Authenticated Portion (RTP
   header, SRTP Encrypted Portion, and I field) shown in Figure 1 or
   Figure 2) of the packet concatenated with the ROC of the same
   packet:

   M' = ROC || TESLA Authenticated Portion.

   In the case of SRTCP, M' SHALL consist of the SRTCP TESLA
   Authenticated Portion only (RTCP header, SRTCP Encrypted Portion,
   and I field).

   The normal authentication tag SHALL be applied with the same
   coverage as specified in [RFC3711], i.e.:

   - for SRTP: Authenticated Portion || ROC (with the extended
   definition of SRTP Authentication Portion as for Section 4.2)

   - for SRTCP: Authenticated Portion (with the extended definition of
   SRTCP Authentication Portion as for Section 4.2).

   The pre-defined authentication transform in SRTP, HMAC-SHA1
   [RFC2104], is also used to generate the TESLA MAC. For SRTP
   (respectively SRTCP), the HMAC SHALL be applied to the key in the
   TESLA chain corresponding to a particular time interval, and M' as
   specified above. The HMAC output SHALL then be truncated to the n_m
   left-most bits. Default values are in Section 6.2.

4.7. PRFs

   TESLA requires two pseudo-random functions (PRFs), f and f', to
   implement

   * one one-way function F(x) to derive the key chain, and
   * one one-way function F'(x) to derive (from each key of the chain)
   the key that is actually used to calculate the TESLA MAC.

   When TESLA is used within SRTP, the default choice of the two PRFs
   SHALL be HMAC-SHA1. Default values are in Section 6.2.

   Other PRFs can be chosen, and their use SHALL follow the common
   guidelines in [RFC3711] when adding new security parameters.







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5. TESLA Bootstrapping

   The extensions to the SRTP cryptographic context include a set of
   TESLA parameters that are listed in section 4.3 of this document.
   Furthermore, TESLA MUST be bootstrapped at session set-up (for the
   parameter exchange and the initial key commitment) through a regular
   data authentication system (a digital signature algorithm is
   RECOMMENDED).  Key management procedures can take care of this
   bootstrapping prior to the commencement of an SRTP session where
   TESLA authentication is used.  The bootstrapping mechanism is out of
   scope for this document.

   A critical factor for the security of TESLA is that the sender and
   receiver need to be loosely synchronized. TESLA assumes that the
   local internal clocks do not drift too much during the session.  Use
   of TESLA in SRTP assumes that the time synchronization is guaranteed
   by out-of-band schemes (e.g. key management), i.e. it is not in the
   scope of SRTP.


6. SRTP TESLA Default parameters

   Key management procedures establish SRTP TESLA operating parameters
   listed in section 4.3 of this document.  The operating parameters
   appear in the SRTP cryptographic context and have the following
   default values.  In the future, an Internet RFC MAY define
   alternative settings for SRTP TESLA that are different than those
   specified here.  In particular, it should be noted that the settings
   defined in this memo can have a large impact on bandwidth, as it
   adds 38 bytes to each packet (when the field length values are the
   default ones).  For certain applications, this overhead may
   represent more than a 50% increase in packet size.  Alternative
   settings might seek to reduce the number and length of various TESLA
   fields and outputs.  No such optimizations are considered in this
   memo.

   It is RECOMMENDED that the SRTP MAC be truncated to 32 bits since the
   SRTP MAC provides only group authentication and serves only as
   protection against external DoS.

6.1 Transform-independent Parameters

   The value of the flag indicating the use of TESLA in SRTP is by
   default zero (TESLA not used).







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6.2 Transform-dependent Parameters for TESLA MAC

   The default values for the security parameters are listed in the
   following. "OWF" denotes a one-way function.


   Parameter                      Mandatory-to-support     Default
   ---------                      --------------------     -------
   TESLA KEYCHAIN OWF (F(x))         HMAC-SHA1             HMAC-SHA1
      OUTPUT LENGTH                     160                  160

   TESLA MAC KEY OWF (F'(F(x)))      HMAC-SHA1             HMAC-SHA1
      OUTPUT LENGTH n_f                 160                  160

   TESLA MAC                         HMAC-SHA1             HMAC-SHA1
      (TRUNCATED) OUTPUT LENGTH n_m     80                   80


   As shown above, TESLA implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 for the
   TESLA MAC, the MAC key generator, and the TESLA keychain generator
   one-way function.  The TESLA keychain generator is recursively
   defined as follows [TESLA].

                     K_i=HMAC_SHA1(K_{i+1},0), i=0..N-1

   where N-1=n_c from the cryptographic context.

   The TESLA MAC key generator is defined as follows [TESLA].

                           K'_i=HMAC_SHA1(K_i,1)

   The TESLA MAC uses a truncated output of ten bytes [RFC2104] and is
   defined as follows.

                            HMAC_SHA1(K'_i, M')

   where M' is as specified in Section 4.6.


7. Security Considerations

   Denial of Service (DoS) attacks when delayed authentication is used
   are discussed in [PCST].  TESLA requires receiver's buffering before
   authentication, therefore the receiver can suffer a denial of
   service attack due to a flood of bogus packets.  To address this
   problem, the current specification REQUIRES the use of a 32-bit SRTP
   MAC in addition to TESLA MAC.  The shorter size of the SRTP MAC is




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INTERNET-DRAFT                 TESLA-SRTP                   July, 2004


   here motivated by the fact that that MAC served purely for DoS
   prevention from attackers external to the group.

   The use of TESLA in SRTP defined in this specification is subject to
   the security considerations discussed in the SRTP specification
   [RFC3711] an in the TESLA specification [TESLA]. In particular, it
   must be noted that the all TESLA security is dependent on the
   computation of the "safety condition" as defined in Section 3.5 of
   [TESLA].

   SRTP TESLA depends on the effective security of the systems that
   perform bootstrapping (time synchronization) and key management.
   These systems are external to SRTP and are not considered in this
   specification.


8. IANA Considerations

   No IANA registration is required.


9. Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thanks Ran Canetti, Karl Norrman, Mats
   N„slund, and Fredrik Lindholm for their valuable help.


10. Author's Addresses

   Questions and comments should be directed to the authors and
   msec@ietf.org:

      Mark Baugher
      Cisco Systems, Inc.
      5510 SW Orchid Street     Phone:  +1 408-853-4418
      Portland, OR 97219 USA    Email:  mbaugher@cisco.com

      Elisabetta Carrara
      Ericsson Research
      SE-16480 Stockholm     Phone:  +46 8 50877040
      Sweden                 EMail:  elisabetta.carrara@ericsson.com










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INTERNET-DRAFT                 TESLA-SRTP                   July, 2004


11. References

   Normative

   [PCST] Perrig, A., Canetti, R., Song, D., Tygar, D., "Efficient and
   Secure Source Authentication for Multicast", in Proc. of Network and
   Distributed System Security Symposium NDSS 2001, pp. 35-46, 2001.

   [RFC1305] Mills D., Network Time Protocol  (Version 3)
   Specification, Implementation and Analysis, RFC 1305, March, 1992.
   http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1305.txt

   [RFC3711] Baugher, McGrew, Naslund, Carrara, Norrman, "The Secure
   Real-time Transport Protocol", RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [TESLA] Perrig, Canetti, Song, Tygar, Briscoe, "TESLA: Multicast
   Source Authentication Transform Introduction", October 2002, draft-
   ietf-msec-tesla-intro-02.txt.

   Informative

   [gkmarch] Baugher, Canetti, Dondeti, Lindholm, "MSEC Group Key
   Management Architecture", June 2004, <draft-ietf-msec-gkmarch-
   08.txt>.

   [GDOI] Baugher, Weis, Hardjono, Harney, "The Group Domain of
   Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

   [MIKEY] Arkko et al., "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", December
   2003, <draft-ietf-msec-mikey-08.txt>

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on
   an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
   REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
   INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
   IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

   This draft expires in January 2005.



Baugher, Carrara                                             [Page 16]


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