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Versions: 01 02 03 04 RFC 4082

Internet Engineering Task Force                                    IETF MSEC
Internet Draft                         Perrig, Canetti, Song, Tygar, Briscoe
draft-ietf-msec-tesla-intro-02.txt UC Berkeley / Digital Fountain / IBM / BT
May 2004
Expires: November 2004


     TESLA: Multicast Source Authentication Transform Introduction

STATUS OF THIS MEMO

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
   or to cite them other than as "work in progress".

   To view the list Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

   Data authentication is an important component for many applications,
   for example audio and video Internet broadcasts, or data distribution
   by satellite. This document introduces TESLA, a secure source
   authentication mechanism for multicast or broadcast data streams. This
   document provides an algorithmic description of the scheme for
   informational purposes, and in particular, it is intended to assist
   in writing standardizable and secure specifications for protocols
   based on TESLA in different contexts.

   The main deterrents so far for a data authentication mechanism for
   multicast were the seemingly conflicting requirements: loss tolerance,
   high efficiency, no per-receiver state at the sender. The problem
   is particularly hard in settings with high packet loss rates and
   where lost packets are not retransmitted, and where the receiver
   wants to authenticate each packet it receives.

   TESLA provides authentication of individual data packets, regardless
   of the packet loss rate. In addition, TESLA features low overhead for



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   both sender and receiver, and does not require per-receiver state at
   the sender. TESLA is secure as long as the sender and receiver are
   loosely time synchronized.



                           Table of Contents

1          Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
1.1        Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
2          Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
2.1        Threat Model and Security Guarantee . . . . . . . . . . .   4
2.2        Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
3          The Basic TESLA Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
3.1        Sketch of protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
3.2        Sender Setup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
3.3        Bootstrapping Receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
3.3.1      Time Synchronization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
3.4        Broadcasting Authenticated Messages . . . . . . . . . . .   8
3.5        Authentication at Receiver  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
3.6        Determining the Key Disclosure Delay  . . . . . . . . . .   9
3.7        An alternative delay description method . . . . . . . . .  10
3.8        Some extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
4          Layer placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
5          Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
6          Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
7          Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
A          Author Contact Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
B          Full Copyright Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1 Introduction

   The power of multicast is that one packet can reach millions of
   receivers. This great property is unfortunately also a great danger:
   an attacker that sends one malicious packet can also potentially
   reach millions of receivers. Receivers need multicast source
   authentication to ensure that a given packet originates from the correct
   source.

   In unicast communication, we can achieve data authentication through
   a purely symmetric mechanism: the sender and the receiver share a
   secret key to compute a message authentication code (MAC) of all
   communicated data. When a message with a correct MAC arrives, the
   receiver is assured that the sender generated that message. Standard
   mechanisms achieve unicast authentication this way, for example TLS
   or IPsec [1,2].

   The symmetric MAC authentication is not secure in a broadcast
   setting. Consider a sender that broadcasts authentic data to mutually
   untrusting receivers. The symmetric MAC is not secure: every receiver


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   knows the MAC key, and hence could impersonate the sender and forge
   messages to other receivers. Intuitively, we need an asymmetric
   mechanism to achieve authenticated broadcast, such that every receiver
   can verify the authenticity of messages it receives, without being
   able to generate authentic messages. Achieving this in an efficient
   way is a challenging problem [3].

   The standard approach to achieve such asymmetry for authentication is
   to use asymmetric cryptography, for instance a digital signature.
   Digital signatures have the required asymmetric property: the sender
   generates the signature with its private key, and all receivers can
   verify the signature with the sender's public key, but a receiver
   with the public key alone cannot generate a digital signature for a
   new message. A digital signature provides non-repudiation, which is a
   stronger property than authentication. Unfortunately, digital
   signatures have a high cost: they have a high computation overhead for
   both the sender and the receiver, as well as a high communication
   overhead. Since we assume broadcast settings where the sender does
   not retransmit lost packets, and the receiver still wants to
   immediately authenticate each packet it receives, we would need to
   attach a digital signature to each message. Because of the high
   overhead of asymmetric cryptography, this approach would restrict
   us to low-rate streams, and to senders and receivers with powerful
   workstations. To deal with the high overhead of asymmetric cryptography,
   we can try to amortize one digital signature over multiple messages.
   However, such an approach is still expensive in contrast to symmetric
   cryptography, since symmetric cryptography is in general 3 to 5 orders
   of magnitude more efficient than asymmetric cryptography. In addition,
  the straight-forward amortization of one digital signature over multiple
   packets requires reliability, as the receiver needs to receive all
   packets to verify the signature. A number of schemes that follow this
   approach are [4,5,6,7,8].  See [9] for more details.

   This document presents the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant
   Authentication protocol (TESLA). TESLA uses mainly symmetric
   cryptography, and uses time delayed key disclosure to achieve the
   required asymmetry property. However, TESLA requires loosely
   synchronized clocks between the sender and the receivers.  See more
   details in Section 4.  Other schemes that follow a similar approach
   to TESLA are [10,11,12].

1.1 Notation

   To denote the subscript or an index of a variable, we use the
   underscore between the variable name and the index, e.g. the key K with
   index i is K_i, the key K with index i+d is K_{i+d}. To write a
   superscript we use the caret, e.g. the function F with the argument x
   executed i times is F^i(x), executed j-1 times we write F^{j-1}(x).


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2 Functionality

   TESLA provides delayed per-packet data authentication. The key idea
   to providing both efficiency and security is a delayed disclosure of
   keys. The delayed key disclosure results in an authentication delay.
   In practice, the delay is on the order of one RTT (Round-trip-time).



   TESLA has the following properties:

     ¸ Low computation overhead for generation and verification of
       authentication information

     ¸ Low communication overhead

     ¸ Limited buffering required for the sender and the receiver, hence
       timely authentication for each individual packet

     ¸ Strong robustness to packet loss

     ¸ Scales to a large number of receivers

     ¸ Security is guaranteed as long as the sender and recipients are
       loosely time synchronized, where synchronization can take place
       at session set-up.

   TESLA can be used either in the network layer, or in the transport
   layer, or in the application layer. The delayed authentication,
   however, requires buffering of packets until authentication is completed.

2.1 Threat Model and Security Guarantee

   We design TESLA to be secure against a powerful adversary with the
   following capabilities:

     ¸ Full control over the network. The adversary can eavesdrop,
       capture, drop, resend, delay, and alter packets.

     ¸ Access to a fast network with negligible delay.

     ¸ The adversary's computational resources may be very large, but
       not unbounded. In particular, this means that the adversary can
       perform efficient computations, such as computing a reasonable
       number of pseudo-random function applications and MACs with
       negligible delay. Nonetheless, the adversary cannot find the key
       of a pseudorandom function (or distinguish it from a random
       function) with non-negligible probability.

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   The security property of TESLA guarantees that the receiver never
   accepts M_i as an authentic message unless the sender really sent
   M_i. A scheme that provides this guarantee is called a secure
   broadcast authentication scheme.

   Since TESLA requires the receiver to buffer packets before
   authentication, the receiver needs to protect itself from a
   potential denial-of-service (DOS) attack due to a flood of bogus packets.

2.2 Assumptions

   TESLA makes the following assumptions in order to provide security:

     1.   The sender and the receiver must be be able to loosely
          synchronize. Specifically, each receiver must be able to
          compute an upper bound on the lag of the receiver clock
          relative to the sender clock. We denote this quantity by D_t.
          (That is, D_t = sender time - receiver time).
          We note that an upper bound on D_t can be easily obtained via
          a simple two-message exchange. (Such an exchange can be
          piggybacked on any session initiation protocol. Alternatively,
          standard protocols such as  as NTP [16] can be used.
          (The synchronization assumption of TESLA is considerably weaker
          the synchronization requirements of authentication protocols based
          on timestamps. In those protocols, the participants are
          assumed to have the same global time a-priori.)


     2.   TESLA MUST be bootstrapped at session set-up through a regular
          data authentication system. We recommend to use a digital
          signature algorithm for this purpose, in which case the receiver
          is REQUIRED to have an authentic copy of either the sender's
          public key certificate or a root key certificate in case of a
          PKI (public-key infrastructure).


     3.   TESLA uses cryptographic MAC and PRF (pseudo-random
          functions). These MUST be cryptographically secure. Further
          details on the instantiation of the MAC and PRF are in Section
          4.2.


     4.   We would like to emphasize that the security of TESLA does NOT
          rely on any assumptions on network propagation delay.

3 The Basic TESLA Protocol

   TESLA is described in several academic publications: A book on
   broadcast security [13], a journal paper [14], and two conference papers


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   [8,15]. Please refer to these publications for an in-depth treatment.

3.1 Sketch of protocol

   We first outline the main ideas behind TESLA.

   As we argue in the introduction, broadcast authentication requires a
   source of asymmetry. TESLA uses time for asymmetry. We first make sure
   that the sender and receivers are loosely time synchronized as described
   above. Next, the sender forms a one-way chain of keys, where each key in
   chain is associated with a time interval (say, a second). Here is the
   basic approach:

     ¸ The sender attaches a MAC to each packet. The MAC is computed
       over the contents of the packet. For each packet, the sender uses
       the current key from the one-way chain as a cryptographic key
       to compute the MAC.

     ¸ The sender discloses a key from the one-way chain after some
       pre-defined time delay. (e.g., the key used in time interval i
       is disclosed at time interval i+3.)

     ¸ Each receiver receives the packet. Each receiver knows the
       schedule for disclosing keys and, since it has an upper bound on
       the local time at the sender, it can check that the key used to
       compute the MAC was not yet disclosed by the sender. If so, then
       the receiver buffers the packet. Otherwise the packet is dropped.
       (Note that we do not know for sure whether a "late packet" is a
       bogus one or simply a delayed packet. We drop the packet since we
       are unable to authenticate it.)

     ¸ Each receiver checks that the disclosed key belongs to the hash-chain
       (by checking against previously released keys in the chain) and then
       checks the correctness of the MAC. If the MAC is correct, the
       receiver accepts the packet.

   Note that one-way chains have the property that if intermediate
   values of the one-way chain are lost, they can be recomputed using
   subsequent values in the chain . So, even if some key disclosures
   are lost, a receiver can recover the corresponding keys and check
   the correctness of earlier packets.

   We now describe the stages of the basic TESLA protocol in this order:
   sender setup, receiver bootstrap, sender transmission of
   authenticated broadcast messages, and receiver authentication of
   broadcast messages.



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3.2 Sender Setup

   The sender divides the time into uniform intervals of duration T_int.
   The sender assigns one key from the one-way chain to each time
   interval in sequence.

   The sender determines the length N of the one-way chain K_0, K_1,
   ..., K_N, and this length limits the maximum transmission duration
   before a new one-way chain must be created. The sender picks a random
   value for K_N. Using a pseudo-random function (PRF) f, the sender
   constructs the one-way function F: F(k) = f_k(0).  The rest of the
   chain is computed recursively using K_i = F(K_{i+1}). Note that this
   gives us K_i = F^{N-i}(K_N), so the receiver can compute any value in
   the key chain from K_N even if is does not have intermediate values.
   The key K_i will be used to authenticate packets sent in time
   interval i.


3.3 Bootstrapping Receivers

   Before a receiver can authenticate messages with TESLA, it needs to
   have:
   *  An upper bound D_t on the lag of its own clock with respect to
   the clock of the sender. (That is, if the local time reading is t,
   the current time reading at the sender is at most t+D_t.).
   *  The disclosure schedule of keys. (Note that this information is not
   essential. See details below.)
   *  One authenticated key of the one-way key chain. (Typically, this
   will be the last key in the chain, i.e. K_0, this key will be
   signed by the sender, and all receivers will verify the signature against
   the public key of the signer.

   The sender sends the key disclosure schedule by transmitting the
   following information to the receivers over an authenticated channel
   (either via a digitally signed broadcast message, or over an
   authenticated unicast channel with each receiver):

     ¸ Time interval schedule: interval duration T_int, start time of
       interval i and index of interval i, length of one-way key chain.

     ¸ Key disclosure delay d (number of intervals).

     ¸ A commitment to the key chain K_i (i < j - d + 1, where j is
       the current interval index).

   The receiver can perform the time synchronization and getting the
   authenticated TESLA parameters in a two-round message exchange, which
   we will describe in the technical TESLA document. Time synchronization
   can be performed as part of the registration protocol between member
   and sender.


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3.3.1 Time Synchronization

   Various approaches exist for time synchronization [16,17,18,19].
   TESLA, however, only requires the receiver to know an upper bound on
   the delay of its local clock with respect to the receiver's clock,
   so a simple algorithm is sufficient. TESLA can be used with direct,
   indirect, and delayed synchronization as three default options.
   The specific synchronization method will be part of each instantiation
   of TESLA, and needs to be described in the appropriate standards-track
   RFC.

   For completeness we sketch a simple method for direct synchronization
   between the sender and a receiver:

   * The receiver sends a (sync t_r) message to the sender and records
   its local time t_r.
   * Upon receipt of the (sync t_r) message, the sender records its
   local time t_s and sends (synch, t_r,t_s) to the receiver.
   * Upon receiving (synch,t_r,t_s), the receiver sets D_t = t_s - t_r + S,
   where S is an estimated bound on the clock drift throughout the
   duration of the session.

   Note:

   * Assuming that the messages are authentic (i.e., the message received
   the receiver was actually sent by the sender), and assuming that the
   clock drift is at most S, then at any point throughout the session
   we have that  T_s < T_r + D_t, where T_s is the current time at the
   sender and T_r is the current time at the receiver.

   * The exchange of sync messages needs to be authenticated. This can be
   done in a number of ways, for instance a secure NTP protocol, or in
   conjunction with a session set-up protocol.


3.4 Broadcasting Authenticated Messages

   Each key in the one-way key chain corresponds to a time interval.
   Every time a sender broadcasts a message, it appends a MAC to the
   message, using the key corresponding to the current time interval.
   The key remains secret for the next d-1 intervals, so messages a
   sender broadcasts in interval j effectively disclose key K_j-d. We
   call d the key disclosure delay.

   We do not want to use the same key multiple times in different
   cryptographic operations, that is, to use key K_j to derive the previous
   key of the one-way key chain K_{j-1}, and to use the same key K_j as
   the key to compute the MACs in time interval j may potentially lead
   to a cryptographic weakness.  Using a pseudo-random function (PRF)
   f', we construct the one-way function F': F'(k) = f'_k(1). We use F'
   to derive the key to compute the MAC of messages in each interval.
   The sender derives the MAC key as follows: K'_i = F'(K_i). Figure 1
   depicts the one-way key chain construction and MAC key derivation. To
   broadcast message M_j in interval i the sender constructs packet
   P_j = {M_j || i || MAC(K'_i,M_j) || K_{i-d}}, where || denotes
   concatenation.

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                    F(K_i)     F(K_{i+1})      F(K_{i+2})
          K_{i-1} <------- K_i <--------- Ki+1 <-------   Ki+2

              |             |              |
              | F'(K_{i-1}) | F'(K_i)      | F'(K_{i+1})
              |             |              |
              V             V              V

             K'_{i-1}      K'_i          K'_{i+1}



   Figure 1: At the top of the figure, we  see  the  one-way  key  chain
   (derived  using  the  one-way  function  F), and the derived MAC keys
   (derived using the one-way function F').







3.5 Authentication at Receiver


   Once a sender discloses a key, we must assume that all parties might
   have access to that key. An adversary could create a bogus message
   and forge a MAC using the disclosed key. So whenever a packet
   arrives, the receiver must verify that the MAC is based on a safe
   key; a safe key is one that is still secret (only known by the
   sender). We define a safe packet or safe message to be one with a MAC
   that is computed with a safe key.

   If the packet is not safe, the receiver must discard that packet,
   because the authenticity is not assured any more.

   We now explain the TESLA authentication in more detail. When the
   receiver receives packet P_j sent in interval i, the receiver
   computes an upper bound on the sender's clock: t_j. To test whether the
   packet is safe, the receiver computes the highest interval x the
   sender could possibly be in, namely x = floor((t_j - T_0) / T_int).
   The receiver verifies that x < i + d (where i is the interval index),
   which implies that the sender is not yet in the interval during which
   it discloses the key K_i. If the condition fails then the receiver
   drops the packet.

   The receiver cannot yet verify the authenticity of packets sent in
   interval i without key K_i. Instead, it adds the triplet ( i, M_j,
   MAC( K'_i, M_j) ) to a buffer, and verifies the authenticity after it
   learns K'_i.


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   What does a receiver do when it receives the disclosed key K_i?
   First, it checks whether it already knows K_i or a later key K_j
   (j>i). If K_i is the latest key received to date, the receiver checks
   the legitimacy of K_i by verifying, for some earlier key K_v (v<i)
   that K_v = F^{i-v}(K_i). The receiver then computes K'_i = F'(K_i)
   and verifies the authenticity of packets of interval i.

   Using a disclosed key, we can calculate all previous disclosed keys,
   so even if packets are lost, we will still be able to verify
   buffered, safe packets from earlier time intervals. Thus, if i-v>1,
   the receiver can also verify the authenticity of the stored packets
   of intervals v+1 ... i-1.

   Note that the security of TESLA does not rely on any assumptions on
   network propagation delay.

3.6 Determining the Key Disclosure Delay

   An important TESLA parameter is the key disclosure delay d. Although
   the choice of the disclosure delay does not affect the security of
   the system, it is an important performance factor. A short disclosure
   delay will cause packets to lose their safety property, so receivers
   will discard them; but a long disclosure delay leads to a long



   authentication delay for receivers. We recommend choosing the
   disclo¡ sure delay as follows: in direct time synchronization let
   the RTT be a reasonable upper bound on the round trip time between the
   sender and the receiver; then choose d = ceil( RTT / T_int) + 1. Note
   that rounding up the quotient ensures that d >= 2. Also note that a
   disclosure delay of one time interval (d=1) does not work. Consider
   packets sent close to the boundary of the time interval: after the
   network propagation delay and the receiver time synchronization
   error, a receiver will need to discard the packet, because the sender
   will already be in the next time interval, when it discloses the
   corresponding key.

3.7 An alternative delay description method

   The above description instructs the sender to include the time interval
   i in each packet. The receiver then uses i to determine the time at which
   the key authenticating the packet is disclosed. This method limits the
   the sender to a pre-determined schedule of disclosing keys.

   Alternatively, the sender may directly include in each packet the time t_p
   at which it is going to disclose the key for this packet. This way, the
   receiver does not need to know the duration of intervals or the delay
   factor d. All the receiver needs to know is the bound D_t on the clock
   skew and T_0, the sender's local time at the initiation of the session.
   Then the receiver records the local time T when the packet has arrived,
   and verifies that
                           T <= T_0 + D_t + t_p.

   Else the packet is dropped.


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   Another advantage of this method is that the sender is able to change
   the duration of intervals and the key disclosure delay dynamically
   throughout the session.

3.8 Some extensions

   Let us mention two salient extensions of the basic TESLA scheme.
   A first extension allows having multiple TESLA authentication chains
   for a single stream, where each chain uses a different delay for
   disclosing the keys. This extension is typically used to deal with
   heterogeneous network delays within a single multicast transmission.
   A second extension allows having most of the buffering of packets
   at the sender side (rather than at the receiver side). Both
   extensions are described in [15].

4 Layer placement

   The TESLA authentication can be performed at any layer in the
   networking stack. Three natural places are in the network, transport,
   or the application layer. We list some considerations regarding the
   choice of layer:

     ¸ Performing TESLA in the network layer has the advantage that the
       transport or application layer only receives authenticated data,
       potentially aiding a reliability protocol and preventing denial
       of service attacks. (Indeed, reliable multicast tools based on
       forward error correction are highly susceptible to denial of
       service due to bogus packets.)


     ¸ Performing TESLA in either the transport or the application layer
       has the advantage that the network layer remains unchanged; but it
       has the drawback that packets are obtained by the application layer
       only after being processed by the transport layer. Consequently,
       if TCP is used then this may introduce additional and unpredictable
       delays on top of the unavoidable network delays. (However, if UDP
       is used then this is not a problem.)

5. Security Considerations

   See the academic publications on TESLA [8,14,20] for several security
   analyses.  Regarding the security of implementations, by far the most
   delicate point is the verification of the timing conditions. Care
   should be taken to to make sure that:
   (a) The value bound D_t on the clock skew is calculated according to the
   spec at session set-up.
   (b) The receiver records the arrival time of the packet as soon as possible
   after the packet's arrival, and computes the safety condition correctly.



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6 Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Mike Luby for his feedback and support.

7 Bibliography

   [1] T. Dierks and C. Allen, "The TLS protocol version 1.0." Internet
   Request for Comments RFC 2246, January 1999.  Proposed standard.

   [2] Ipsec, "IP Security Protocol, IETF working group."
   http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html.





   [3] D. Boneh, G. Durfee, and M. Franklin, "Lower bounds for multicast
   message authentication," in Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT '2001
   (B. Pfitzmann, ed.), vol. 2045 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science ,
   (Innsbruck, Austria), pp. 434--450, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany,
   2001.

   [4] R. Gennaro and P. Rohatgi, "How to Sign Digital Streams," tech.
   rep., IBM T.J.Watson Research Center, 1997.

   [5] P. Rohatgi, "A compact and fast hybrid signature scheme for mul¡
   ticast packet authentication," in 6th ACM Conference on Computer and
   Communications Security , November 1999.

   [6] P. Rohatgi, "A hybrid signature scheme for multicast source
   authentication," Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force,
   June 1999.  Work in progress.

   [7] C. K. Wong and S. S. Lam, "Digital signatures for flows and mul¡
   ticasts," in Proc. IEEE ICNP `98 , 1998.

   [8] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, J. Tygar, and D. X. Song, "Efficient
   authentication and signing of multicast streams over lossy channels,"
   in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy , May 2000.

   [9] R. Canetti, J. Garay, G. Itkis, D. Micciancio, M. Naor, and B.
   Pinkas, "Multicast security: A taxonomy and some efficient construc¡
   tions," in Infocom '99 , 1999.

   [10] S. Cheung, "An efficient message authentication scheme for link
   state routing," in 13th Annual Computer Security Applications Confer¡
   ence , 1997.


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   [11] F. Bergadano, D. Cavagnino, and B. Crispo, "Chained stream
   authentication," in Selected Areas in Cryptography 2000 , (Waterloo,
   Canada), August 2000.  A talk describing this scheme was given at IBM
   Watson in August 1998.

   [12] F. Bergadano, D. Cavalino, and B. Crispo, "Individual single
   source authentication on the mbone," in ICME 2000 , Aug 2000.  A talk
   containing this work was given at IBM Watson, August 1998.

   [13] A. Perrig and J. D. Tygar, Secure Broadcast Communication in
   Wired and Wireless Networks Kluwer Academic Publishers, Oct. 2002.
   ISBN 0792376501.

   [14] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, J. D. Tygar, and D. Song, "The tesla
   broadcast authentication protocol," RSA CryptoBytes , vol. 5, no.
   Summer, 2002.

   [15] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, D. Song, and J. D. Tygar, "Efficient and
   secure source authentication for multicast," in Network and Dis¡
   tributed System Security Symposium, NDSS '01 , pp. 35--46, February
   2001.

   [16] D. L. Mills, "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
   Implementation and Analysis." Internet Request for Comments, March
   1992.  RFC 1305.

   [17] B. Simons, J. Lundelius-Welch, and N. Lynch, "An overview of
   clock synchronization," in Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computing (B.
   Simons and A. Spector, eds.), no. 448 in LNCS, pp. 84--96, Springer-
   Verlag, Berlin Germany, 1990.

   [18] D. Mills, "Improved algorithms for synchronizing computer net¡
   work clocks," in Proceedings of the conference on Communications
   architectures, protocols and applications, SIGCOMM 94 , (London,
   England), pp. 317--327, 1994.

   [19] L. Lamport and P. Melliar-Smith, "Synchronizing clocks in the
   presence of faults," J. ACM , vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 52--78, 1985.

   [20] Philippa Broadfoot and Gavin Lowe, "Analysing a Stream
   Authentication Protocol using Model Checking. In Proceedings of the
   7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS),
   2002.



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A Author Contact Information


Adrian Perrig
ECE Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA
US
perrig@ece.cmu.edu

Ran Canetti
IBM Research
30 Saw Mill River Rd
Hawthorne, NY 10532
US
canetti@watson.ibm.com

Dawn Song
CS Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA
US
dawnsong@cmu.edu

Doug Tygar
UC Berkeley


102 South Hall, 4600
Berkeley, CA 94720-4600
US
tygar@cs.berkeley.edu

Bob Briscoe
BT Research
B54/74, BT Labs
Martlesham Heath
Ipswich, IP5 3RE
UK
bob.briscoe@bt.com



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Internet Draft          draft-msec-tesla-intro-02              May 2004



B Full Copyright Statement

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   ument itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the
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   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
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