[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-tschofenig-nsis-threats) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 RFC 4081

   NSIS Working Group
   Internet Draft                                     Hannes Tschofenig
   Document: draft-ietf-nsis-threats-00.txt                  Siemens AG
   Expires: April 2003                                     October 2002
  
  
                               NSIS Threats
                     <draft-ietf-nsis-threats-00.txt>
  
  Status of this Memo
  
  This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance
  with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
  
  
  Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
  Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
  other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
  Drafts.
  
  Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
  and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
  time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
  material or to cite them other than as "work in progress".
  
  The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
       http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
  The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
       http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
                  Informational - Expires April 2003                 1 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  Abstract
  
  This threats document provides a starting point to security
  discussions at the NSIS working group. It therefore tries to help the
  NSIS interested reader to understand various security considerations
  in the NSIS Requirements, Framework and Protocol proposals. This
  document does not describe vulnerabilities of specific NSIS related
  protocols.
  
  1    Introduction
  
  Section 1.1 tries to introduce the reader into the overall process of
  addressing the security of work done in the NSIS working group.
  Section 1.2 gives a big picture about the different network parts
  which are traversed by a signaling protocol. Each part is
  characterized by a different set of requirements and different trust
  relationships. The threats described in Section 2 can be assigned to
  the individual parts.
  
  Note that this document tries to use the terminology introduced and
  used in the NSIS Framework document [5]. Some of the terms which
  demand additional clarifications are briefly explained introduced in
  Section 1.3
  
  1.1  NSIS Security Process
  
  Whenever a new protocol has to be developed or existing protocols
  have to be modified potential security threats should be evaluated.
  The process of securing protocols in separated into individual steps.
  To address security in the NSIS working group a number of documents
  have been produced:
  
            +----------------------------------------------+
            |            NSIS Analysis Activities          |
            |         (e.g. RSVP Security Properties)      |
            +----------------------------------------------+
            +----------------------------------------------+
            |                  NSIS Threats                |
            |                                              |
            +----------------------------------------------+
            +----------------------------------------------+
            |               NSIS Requirements              |
            |                                              |
            +----------------------------------------------+
            +----------------------------------------------+
            |            NSIS Framework Activities         |
            |                                              |
            +----------------------------------------------+
            +----------------------------------------------+
            |                   Published                  |
            |             NSIS Protocol Proposals          |
            +----------------------------------------------+
                Figure 1: NSIS Security related Documents
  
  
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 2 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  In order to reach a satisfactory security protection for a NSIS
  protocol a number of steps are necessary. The relevant information is
  distributed over a number of documents as depicted in Figure 1. The
  purpose of each of these documents is briefly described below to give
  the reader a more insights into the development process.
  
  The primary goal of the NSIS analysis activity is the investigation
  of existing approaches in the area of quality of service signaling
  protocols. Several of the published approaches contain directly
  security relevant descriptions whereas other requirements can be
  derived from different protocol behavior or different scenarios in
  which such a protocol is used. Document [8] points to the reduced
  complexity if RSVP is used without multicast support. This
  modification also comes with some simplifications for security
  handling. In [10] security issues raised by some example
  configurations are given. In [9] the security properties of RSVP are
  described. There are, however, a number of other analysis documents
  available but they do not directly address security issues.
  
  Threats relevant for NSIS are discussed in this document.
  
  To address threats described in this document requirements were
  specified in the NSIS Requirements document [1]. In addition to the
  requirements the document describes some basic scenarios where a QoS
  signaling protocol might be deployed.
  
  Signaling information to a number of devices located in different
  parts in the network with different trust assumptions and possible
  interactions with a large number of other protocols require some
  framework thoughts. A few proposals were submitted and a few authors
  cooperatively produced a NSIS framework document [5], which also
  address security issues.
  
  Finally there are documents describing concrete protocol proposals.
  These proposals either rely on existing security mechanisms or
  develop their own if the existing mechanisms cannot be solve all
  security threats or if they are inappropriate for other reasons. In
  practice a protocol proposal might use existing security mechanisms
  but is likely to require some additional protection mechanisms or to
  combine them in a specific manner.
  
  Note that the process of developing the above-mentioned documents is
  not linear. Instead various iterations are required to reach a
  satisfactory final status.
  
  This document tries to identify the basic threats that need to be
  addressed by the NSIS signaling protocol design. Although the base
  protocol might be secure, some extensions may cause problems when
  used in a particular environment. Furthermore it is necessary to
  investigate the context in which a signaling protocol is used and the
  architecture where it is integrated. As an example of such an
  interaction accounting and charging is often mentioned in
  relationship with QoS signaling protocols. Without an appropriate
  integration of the two there is no good incentive for network
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 3 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  operators to deploy QoS signaling protocols. This interaction is
  subject of a framework and some aspects are discussed in [5].
  
  1.2  Involved Network Parts
  
  Independent of the threat scenarios described in Section 2 end-to-end
  signaling messages traverse different network parts, which demand
  different security mechanisms caused by the difference in trust
  relationships. The sub-parts are: access network part, intra and
  inter-domain part, and finally end-to-end communication. These parts
  are briefly described in this section and the threat scenarios of
  Section 2 can be assigned to the individual parts.
  
  a) Access Network (or First-Peer) Communication
  
  The term access network is fuzzy but in this context we refer to the
  communication between an end host and the first NSIS aware entity in
  the network to which this host is attached. Therefore threats are
  addressed where an NSIS Initiator (NI) transmits and receives
  signaling messages to some entity in the access network. In many
  mobility environments it is difficult to assume the existence of a
  pre-established trust relationship between a user and the access
  network.
  
  Threat scenarios dealing with initial security association setup,
  replay attacks, lack of confidentiality, denial of service, integrity
  violation, identity spoofing and fraud are applicable. From a
  security point of view this part of the network causes the largest
  number of problems.
  
  b) Intra-Domain Communication
  
  After receiving a NSIS signaling message and verifying the request
  somewhere in the access network the signaling message traverses the
  network within the same administrative domain. Since the request has
  already been authenticated and authorized threats are different
  compared to those described in the previous section. To differentiate
  the end-node-to-access network interface with the intra-domain
  communication we assume that no user hosts are logically attached to
  the core-network. (That is: the interface between any host and the
  first router is part of the access network). We furthermore assume
  that nodes within one administrative domain have a stronger trust
  relationship between each other.
  
  c) Inter-Domain Communication
  
  The threat assumptions between the borders of different
  administrative domains largely depends on how accounting is done. If
  one domain transmits forged QoS reservations  to next domain then it
  is likely that the originating network domain has also has to pay for
  the reservation. Hence in this case, there is no real benefit for the
  first network domain to forge a QoS reservation. But if an end-node
  is directly charged by intermediate domains then this kind of attack
  may be reasonable.  Security protection of messages transmitted
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 4 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  between different administrative domains is still necessary to tackle
  attacks like spoofing, integrity violation, denial of service etc.
  The lower number of networks and higher trust relationship (compared
  in the access network case), the fewer problems for key management
  arise.
  
  d) End-to-End Communication
  
  In our opinion end-to-end security for NSIS signaling messages (in
  addition to hop-by-hop security) is rarely required if we assume that
  end-to-end issues like charging and the selection which user has to
  pay for a reservation is already securely negotiated by preceding
  upper layer protocols (for example SIP). Information carried within a
  NSIS signaling protocol for the purpose of charging is therefore
  assumed opaque to the NSIS protocol itself and appropriately
  protected as part of the AAA interaction. Note however that this
  assumption strongly depends on the chosen solution of a protocol
  interaction with AAA, QoS and application layer protocol. It is
  however possible to select a charging solution that requires end-to-
  end protection of information delivered within the QoS signaling
  protocol.
  
  The following example requires some sort of end-to-end protection:
  Alice wants Bob to pay for the QoS reservation (reverse charging).
  Bob wants to be assured that the QoS signaling message he receives
  was transmitted by Alice because he is only willing to pay for
  particular users and not for everyone. Hence Bob requires Alice to
  protect the reservation request.
  
  Regarding end-to-end security one additional issue needs to be
  clarified. Whenever a signaling protocol travels end-to-end and a
  node along the path acts on behalf of the other endpoint then further
  investigation is required how to solve this issues.
  
  1.3  Clarification
  
  Some threat scenarios in this document use the term user instead of
  NSIS Initiator. This is mainly due to the fact that security
  protocols allow a differentiation between entities being hosts and
  users (based on the identities used). Since the NSIS Initiator as
  used in [5] also allows to act on behalf of various entities
  including a network it is reasonable to distinguish between these
  identities.
  
  The term access network is used for networks to which a mobile node
  is attached. Other terms often used in this context are foreign or
  visited network. The missing direct trust relationship between the
  mobile node and the access network complicates authentication and key
  agreement. Usually AAA protocols (like Radius or Diameter) are used
  to provide the initial authentication and key establishment. These
  protocols take advantage of the AAA infrastructure (AAAL, AAAH,
  Broker, etc.) and trust relationships between the access network and
  the users home network. This trust relationship is usually based on
  some sort of business contract. The trust relationship between the
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 5 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  two networks is considered to be symmetric (network A trusts network
  B and vice versa) whereas the dynamically established trust
  relationship between the mobile node and the access network is often
  asymmetric. In today's network a mobile node has to trust the access
  network with regard to collection and processing of accounting data.
  The access network usually does not trust attached end-hosts.
  
  The term security association is used to describe established
  security-relevant data structure between two entities. This data
  structure consists of keys, algorithms including their parameters,
  values used for replay protection etc. Using this information two (or
  more) nodes are able to protect signaling messages.
  
  2    Threat Scenarios
  
  This section provides threat scenarios that are applicable to
  signaling protocols.
  
  2.1  Lack of Authentication and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
  
  This section describes man-in-the-middle attacks of the following
  type: During the process of establishing a security association an
  adversary fools the signaling message initiator with respect to the
  entity to which it has to authenticate. The man-in-the-middle
  adversary is able to modify signaling messages to mount DoS attacks.
  The signaling message initiator wrongly believes that it talks to the
  ôrealö network whereas it is actually attached to an adversary.
  For this attack to be successful, pre-conditions have to hold which
  are described with the following two cases:
  a) Missing Authentication
  
  The first case addresses missing authentication between the
  neighboring peers: Without authentication a NI, NR or NF is unable to
  detect an adversary. However in some cases protection available might
  be difficult to accomplish in a practical environment either because
  the other peer of the communication is unknown or because of
  misbelieved trust relationships in parts of the network. If one of
  the communication endpoints is unknown then for some security
  protocols it is not possible or difficult to select the appropriate
  security association. Sometimes network administrators refuse to
  consider security protection of intra-domain signaling messages. Such
  a configuration would then allow an adversary at a compromised node
  to cause security problems. Even if there was no intention that this
  compromised node actively participates in the signaling message
  exchange its interference cannot be prevented.
  
  b) Unilateral Authentication
  
  In case of only unilateral authentication the NI is not able to
  discover the man-in-the-middle adversary. Although authentication of
  signaling message should take place between each peer participating
  in the protocol operation special focus is given to the communication
  in the end host and the access network.
  
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 6 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  The two threats described above are a general problem of network
  access without appropriate authentication, not only for an NSIS
  signaling protocol. Obviously there is a strong need to correctly
  address them in a future NSIS protocol. The signaling protocols
  addressed by NSIS are different to other protocols where only two
  entities are involved. The impacts of a security breach likely reach
  beyond the directly involved entities (or even beyond a local
  network).
  
  
  Finally it should be noted that the signaling protocol should be
  considered as a peer-to-peer protocol where the roles of initiator
  and responder can be reversed at any time. This leads to the
  conclusion that unilateral authentication is not very useful for such
  a protocol. However there might be a need to have some form of
  asymmetry in the authentication process whereby one entity uses a
  different authentication mechanism than the other one. As an example
  the combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography should be
  mentioned.
  
  2.2  Missing Authorization
  
  Authentication as described in Section 2.1 is a very important step
  for providing the foundation for authorization and accounting. Unlike
  some other protocols where authorization can be verified without huge
  difficulties NSIS protocols might experience some difficulties. First
  there is the question what authorization means in the context of NSIS
  signaling and particularly for quality of service and middlebox
  communication. The possible range is broad and could range from pure
  monetary policies to traditional role-based access control policies.
  Second there is a question where this authorization data can be
  retrieved. Especially in a mobile environment this might be more
  complicated to securely exchange this information between different
  network domains. Finally there is an issue of representing
  authorization information if it has to be shared between a number of
  network domains.
  
  Currently the above-mentioned issues have not been appropriately
  addressed and might cause obstacles for deployment.
  In a discovery phase an additional issue of authorization was raised.
  Whenever a node wants to discover the next NSIS aware node then
  authentication might not be sufficient. In many cases the IP address
  or FQDN of a particular router in an unknown network does not add too
  much trust. An end host for example might want some assurance that
  this node belongs to a network with which some sort of business
  relationship (directly or indirectly) is available.
  
  2.3  Missing Cost Control
  
  This type of threat addresses a deployment problem of QoS signaling
  in a real-world environment. It is not a particular attack. A large
  number of service providers with complex roaming agreements create a
  non-transparent cost-structure. Using AAA protocols in a
  subscription-based scenario. In a traditional subscription-based
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 7 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  scenario users are registered with their home networks and use this
  trust relationship to dynamically establish other security
  associations. In these scenarios users do not learn the identity of
  the access network as part of a regular message exchange. The user is
  therefore only authenticated to the home network (and hopefully vice
  versa). The identity of the access network is possibly not revealed.
  When issuing a reservation request to an entity in the access network
  the end-user does not know the cost of such a reservation.
  Furthermore due to mobility and route changes along the path the
  costs for an end-to-end QoS reservation might not be transparent or
  unacceptable.
  
  Today there is no protocol available which allows users to
  communicate cost limits, to request costs for network resources or to
  learn the currently accumulated costs for a particular reservation.
  
  Especially in mobility environments where many networks might be
  contacted in a short period of time cost control is even more
  complicated.
  
  Some proposals which try to merge mobility protocols with QoS
  signaling probe the access network (towards the cross-over router or
  the MAP) for the possibility making a QoS reservation (without
  actually making the reservation itself). Without a query mechanism a
  user cannot take reservation costs into account when choosing between
  different access networks. Hence the user might not be unable to
  refuse the more expensive service provider. To allow a user to choose
  different providers might be required not only because of the
  availability of different access technologies (either using a WLAN
  card to access the local network or to use UMTS/UTRAN based
  technology) and the different service quality offered but also for
  cost reasons.
  
  Although real-time notifications of quality of service reservation
  costs (cost control) to the user are outside the scope of a quality
  of service signaling protocol itself some interactions might be
  required. Note that payment issues should be discussed independently
  of cost-control since other mechanisms are required to negotiate
  which involved party actually has to pay the costs (and how).
  
  2.4  Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis
  
  This section covers two threats: The first is related to privacy
  concerns whereas the second addresses problems caused by weak
  authentication mechanisms and the increased risk of eavesdropping on
  the wireless link in absence of appropriate confidentiality
  protection.
  
  The first threat case covers adversaries which are able to eavesdrop
  signaling messages but are unable to actively participate in the QoS
  signaling (i.e. passive adversary). The collected signaling packets
  may serve for the purpose of traffic analysis or to later mount
  replay attacks as described in the next section. By eavesdropping an
  adversary might violate a user's privacy preference. Especially QoS
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 8 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  signaling messages provide information that may be interesting for an
  adversary since the messages reveal user and/or application
  identities, policy information, information about the desired QoS
  reservation, etc. The information gathered by an adversary can be
  used to learn communication patterns of users requesting resources
  (QoS, firewall, NAT, etc.).
  
  An adversary might be able to use the signaling protocol to discover
  the topology of a network (e.g. using record route). Additionally it
  might be possible to obtain diagnostic information usually used for
  network monitoring and administration. Other options might allow an
  adversary to route signaling messages specifically along a particular
  route similar to source routing.
  
  The second threat case addresses weak authentication mechanisms
  whereby information transmitted within the QoS signaling protocol may
  leak passwords and may allow offline dictionary attacks. This threat
  is not specific to QoS signaling protocols but may also be applicable
  and countermeasures must be taken.
  
  2.5  Adversary being able to replay signaling messages
  
  This threat scenario covers the case where an adversary eavesdrops
  and collects signaling messages and replays them at a latter point in
  time (or at a different place, or uses parts of them at a different
  place or in a different way û e.g. cut and paste attacks). Without
  proper replay protection an adversary might be able to mount denial
  and/or theft of service attacks.
  
  A more difficult attack that may cause problems even in case of
  replay protection requires the adversary to crash a NSIS aware node
  to loose state information (sequence numbers, security associations,
  etc.) and to be able to replay old signaling messages.
  
  Additionally it should be mentioned that the interaction between
  different protocols based on authorization tokens requires some care.
  Using such an authorization token it is possible to link state
  information between different protocols. Returning an authorization
  token to the end host might allow an adversary to steal resources
  without proper protection of the token delivery or without proper
  verification of the hopefully protected content of the token. The
  functionality and structure of such an authorization token for RSVP
  is described in [3] and in [4].
  
  2.6  Identity Spoofing
  
  The following paragraph gives an example of an adversary using
  identity spoofing:
  
  Eve, acting as an adversary, claims to be the registered user Alice
  by spoofing the identity of Alice. Thereby Eve causes the network to
  charge Alice for the consumed network resources. Using unprotected
  signaling messages Eve may experience no particular problems in
  succeeding. This attack can be classified as theft of service.
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                 9 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  
  If a signaling message is properly protected the adversary is unlike
  to succeed.
  
  A non-traditional identity spoofing attack exploits flow
  classification (required for QoS and Midcom specific signaling
  protocols). Some identifiers such as IP addresses, transport protocol
  identifiers, port numbers, flow labels [6, 7] and others are
  communicated in these protocols and represent an attractive target
  for an adversary. Modification of these flow identifiers cause
  quality of service reservations or policy rules at middleboxes to be
  either ineffective or beneficial for adversaries.
  
  Additional concerns might occur if end hosts perform traffic marking
  (for example by using a DSCP). Whenever an ingress router uses only
  marked incoming data traffic for admission control procedures then
  various attacks are possible. These problems are known in the
  DiffServ community for a long time and documented in various DiffServ
  related documents. The IPSec protection of DiffServ Code Points is
  described in Section 6.2 of [11]. Related security issues (for
  example denial of service attacks) are described in Section 6.1 of
  the same document.
  
  The following paragraph describes a possible threat caused by
  identity spoofing of transmitted data traffic. The spoofed identity
  is thereby the source IP addresses. Assume that accounting records
  are collected based on the source IP address and not on a SPI due to
  IPSec protection. After the network receives a properly protected
  reservation request, transmitted by the legitimate user Alice,
  Traffic Selectors are installed at the corresponding devices (for
  example edge router). These Traffic Selectors are used for flow
  identification and allow to match data traffic originated from a
  given source address to be assigned to a particular QoS reservation.
  The adversary Eve now spoofs the IP address of the Alice.
  Additionally AliceÆs host may be subject of a DoS attack by and by
  the adversary. If both nodes are located at the same link and use the
  same IP address then obviously a duplicate IP address will be
  detected. Assuming that only Eve is present at the link then she is
  able to receive and transmit data (for example RTP data traffic),
  which receives preferential QoS treatment based on the previous
  reservation. Depending on the installed Traffic Selector granularity
  Eve might have more possibilities to exploit the QoS reservation or a
  pin-holed firewall. Assuming the soft state paradigm, where
  periodical refresh messages are required, the absence of Alice will
  not be detected until the next signaling message appears and forces
  Eve to respond with a protected signaling message. Again this issue
  is not only applicable to QoS traffic but the existence of QoS
  reservation causes more difficulties since this type of traffic is
  more expensive. The same procedure is also applicable to a Middlebox
  communication protocol.
  
  2.7  Adversary being able to inject/modify messages
  
  
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                10 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  The next type of threat addresses an integrity violations: An
  adversary modifies signaling messages (e.g. by acting as a man-in-
  the-middle) to cause an unexpected network behavior with a bogus
  signaling message. Possible actions are reordering, delaying,
  dropping, injecting and modifying.
  
  An adversary may inject a signaling message requesting a large amount
  of resources (using a different user identity). If granted it causes
  other user's resource-request not to be successful and a different
  initiator (for example a user) to pay for the QoS reservation. This
  attack is only successful in absence of signaling message protection.
  
  2.8  Missing Non-Repudiation
  
  Repudiation in this context refers to a problem where one party later
  denies to have made a reservation. This issue comes in two flavors:
  
  From a service provider point-of-view the following threat may be
  worth an investigation. A user may deny to have issued reservation
  request for which it was charged. A service provider may then like to
  prove that a particular user issued reservation requests.
  
  The same threat can be interpreted from the users point-of-view. A
  service provider claims to have received a number of reservation
  requests. The user in question thinks that he never issued those
  requests and wants to have a proof for correct service usage for a
  given set of QoS parameters.
  
  In today's telecommunication networks non-repudiation is not
  provided. The user has to trust the network operator to correctly
  meter the traffic, collect and merge accounting data and that no
  unforeseen problems occur. If a signaling protocol is used to
  establish QoS reservations with a higher volume (for example service
  level agreements) then it might impact protocol design.
  
  2.9  Malicious NSIS Entity
  
  Network elements within a domain (intra-domain) experience a
  different trust relationship with regard to the security protection
  of signaling messages compared to edge routers. We assume that edge
  routers have the responsibility to perform cryptographic processing
  (authentication, integrity verification, replay protection,
  authorization, etc.). Depending on the protocol functionality every
  NSIS aware router should be able to issue signaling messages. If
  however an adversary manages to take over an edge router then the
  security of the entire network is affected. An adversary is then able
  to launch a number of attacks including denial of service, integrity
  violation, replay attacks etc. Note that this problem is not only
  restricted to QoS signaling protocols. In case of policy rule
  installation a rogue firewall can cause harm to other firewalls by
  modifying the policy rules accordingly.
  
  The chain-of-trust principle applied in the peer-to-peer security
  protection cannot provide proper protection. An adversary with full
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                11 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  access to the edge router is then also able to retrieve security
  associations to secure signaling messages. Note that even non-peer-
  to-peer security protection might not be able to fully prevent this
  problem.
  
  Thus the edge router is a critical component that requires strong
  security protection. Strong security policy applied at edge routers
  does not imply that intra-domain routers do not need to
  cryptographically verify signaling messages. If the chain-of-trust
  principle is deployed then the security protection of the path (in
  this case within the network of a single administrative domain) is as
  strong as the weakest link. In our case the edge router is the most
  critical component of this network that may also act as a security
  gateway/firewall for incoming/outgoing traffic. For outgoing traffic
  this device has to act according to the security policy of the local
  domain to apply the appropriate security protection.
  
  2.10 Denial of Service in a two phase reservation
  
  This threat tries to address potential denial of service attacks when
  the reservation setup is split into two phases path discovery/path
  pinning and reservation (as for example used in a receiver-initiated
  reservation). For this example we assume that the node transmitting
  the path message is not charged for the path message itself and is
  able to issue a high number of reservation request (possibly in a
  distributed fashion). Charging is activated only after successful
  verification of the reservation request. The reservations are however
  never intended to be successful because of various reasons: the
  destination node cannot be reached; it is not responding or simply
  rejects the reservation. An adversary can benefit from the fact that
  resources are already consumed along the path for various processing
  tasks including path pinning.
  
  2.11 Denial of Service with a bogus signaling request
  
  With a resource reservation request received at a network element
  (for example by the first NSIS aware router) processing is required
  for authentication and authorization. Processing by other nodes
  including policy servers, LDAP servers, etc. is also possible
  depending on the network infrastructure. Verification requires
  cryptographic computations, state maintenance, setting timers,
  transmitting messages and other processing actions. If an adversary
  is able to transmit a large number of reservation request with bogus
  credentials (and assuming that the verification is expensive in terms
  of resource consumption) then the verifying node may not be able to
  process further reservation messages by legitimate users. This
  assumes that verification is expensive (especially cryptographic
  computations).
  
  2.12 DoS Attack at the Discovery Phase
  
  Signaling information to a large number of entities along a data path
  requires some sort of discovery. This discovery process is vulnerable
  to a number of attacks since it is difficult to secure. An adversary
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                12 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  can use the discovery mechanisms to convince an entity to signal
  information to another entity which is not along the data path or to
  cause the discovery process to fail. In the first case the signaling
  protocol could be correctly continued with the problem that policy
  rules are installed at incorrect firewalls or QoS resource
  reservations take place at the wrong entities. For an end host this
  means that the protocol failed for unknown reasons.
  
  2.13 Disclosing the networking structure
  
  In some architectures there is a desire not to reveal the internal
  network structure (or other related information) to the outside
  world. An adversary might be able to use NSIS messages for network
  mapping (e.g. discovering which nodes exist, which use NSIS, what
  version, what resources are allocated, capabilities of nodes along a
  paths etc.). A requirement of not disclosing a network structure
  might conflict with another requirement to provide means for
  automatically discovering NSIS aware nodes and to provide diagnostic
  facilities.
  
  2.14 Modification of Session State Information
  
  An adversary might be able to modify an existing reservation which
  has already been established within the network as a result of a
  previous signaling message exchange.
  Hence it might be necessary to provide assurance for a secure binding
  between an owner of the established session state and the session
  state information distributed at various entities along the data
  path. The state information created at nodes along the path created
  by signaling messages is the uniquely identified Session ID as
  described in [5]. Whenever a signaling message has to refer to
  existing state information (for a refresh, modify or delete
  operation) then the existing session identifier is used. Hence there
  is a requirement that it must not be possible for someone to use an
  existing session identifier to modify state information of someone
  else. An adversary might have learned a session identifier by
  eavesdropping the signaling messages. Especially in a roaming
  scenario where a mobile node retransmits signaling messages from a
  different point of attachment it must be assured that the routers
  along the path are able to verify whether the entity transmitting the
  signaling messages is allowed to modify the established state.
  
  To make processing even more difficult it must be mentioned that not
  only the initial signaling message originator is allowed to signal
  information during the lifetime of an established session. As part of
  the protocol any node along the path (and the path might change over
  time) could be involved in the signaling message exchange and it
  might be necessary to provide mobility support or to trigger a local
  repair procedure. Hence if only the initial signaling message
  originator is allowed to trigger signaling message exchange some
  protocol behavior will not be possible.
  
  In case that this threat is not addressed an adversary can launch
  denial of service, theft of service, and various other attacks.
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                13 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  
  2.15 Faked Error/Response messages
  
  An adversary may be able to use false error/response messages as part
  of a denial of service attack. This could be either at the message
  signaling protocol level, at the level of each client layer protocol
  (QoS, Midcom, etc.) or at the transport level protocol. An adversary
  might cause unexpected protocol behavior or produce denial of service
  attacks. Especially the discovery protocol shows vulnerabilities with
  regard to this threat. In case that no separate discovery protocol is
  used by addressing signaling messages to end hosts only (with a
  Router Alert Option to intercept message as NSIS aware nodes) then an
  error message might be used to indicate a path change. Such a design
  is a combination of a discovery protocol together with a signaling
  message exchange protocol.
  
  3    Security Considerations
  
  This entire memo discusses security issues in the context of NSIS.
  Some additional threats are applicable for a framework where an NSIS
  protocol is used. Some other relevant threats especially for end
  hosts to access network communication described in [2].
  
  4    Open Issues
  
  A future version of this draft will experience a minor restructuring
  to add deployment threats, to separation between attacks during
  security association setup and attacks which aim to attack the
  signaling messages itself, middlebox communication specific threats
  and a discussion of threats applicable to the transport level vs. the
  application level (according to a 2-level-architecture).
  
  5    References
  
  [1]  Brunner, M., "Requirements for QoS Signaling Protocols",
  <draft-ietf-nsis-req-04.txt>, (work in progress), August, 2002.
  
  [2]  Kempf, J., Nordmark, E.: ôThreat Analysis for IPv6 Public
  Multi-Access Linksö, <draft-kempf-ipng-netaccess-threats-02.txt>,
  (work in progress), December, 2002.
  
  [3]  Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., Broda, M., Kosinski, B., Shieh, H.:
  ôSession Authorization for RSVPö, <draft-ietf-rap-rsvp-authsession-
  04.txt>, (work in progress), October, 2002.
  
  [4]  Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., Shieh, H.: ôFramework for session set-up
  with media authorizationö, <draft-ietf-rap-session-auth-04.txt>,
  (work in progress), June, 2002.
  
  [5]  Freytsis, I., Hancock, R., Karagiannis, G., Loughney, J., Van
  den Bosch, S.: ôNext Steps in Signaling: A Framework Proposalö,
  <draft-ietf-nsis-fw-00.txt>, (work in progress), October, 2002.
  
  
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                14 
  
                             NSIS Threats                 October 2002
  
  [6]   Partridge, C.: "Using the Flow Label Field in IPv6", RFC
  1809, June, 1995.
  
  [7]  Rajahalme, J., Conta, A., Carpenter, B., Deering, S.: "IPv6
  Flow Label Specification", <draft-ietf-ipv6-flow-label-02.txt>, (work
  in progress), September, 2002.
  
  [8]  Fu, S., Kappler, C., Tschofenig, H.: "Analysis on RSVP
  Regarding Multicast", <draft-fu-rsvp-multicast-analysis-01.txt>,
  (work in progress), October, 2002.
  
  [9]  Tschofenig, H.: "RSVP Security Properties", <draft-tschofenig-
  rsvp-sec-properties-01.txt>, (work in progress), October, 2002.
  
  [10] de Meer, H., Feher, G., Blefari-Melazzi, N., Tschofenig, H.,
  Karagiannis, G., Partain, D., Rexhepi, V., Westberg, L.: "Analysis of
  Existing QoS Solutions", <draft-demeer-nsis-analysis-03.txt>, (work
  in progress), October, 2002.
  
  [11] Terzis, A., Braden, B., Vincent, S., Zhang, L.: "RSVP
  Diagnostic Messages", RFC 2745, January, 2000.
  
  
  6    Acknowledgments
  
  I would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Marcus Brunner, Jorge
  Cuellar, Mehmet Ersue, Xiaoming Fu and Robert Hancock for their
  comments to this draft. Jorge and Robert gave me an extensive list of
  comments and provided information on additional threats.
  
  7    Author's Addresses
  
  Hannes Tschofenig
  Siemens AG
  Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
  81739 Munich
  Germany
  Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   Tschofenig     Informational - Expires April 2003                15
  

Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.109, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/