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Versions: (draft-gont-opsec-ip-options-filtering) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 7126

Operational Security Capabilities for                            F. Gont
IP Network Infrastructure (opsec)                 UTN-FRH / SI6 Networks
Internet-Draft                                               R. Atkinson
Intended status: BCP                                          Consultant
Expires: June 12, 2014                                      C. Pignataro
                                                                   Cisco
                                                        December 9, 2013


 Recommendations on filtering of IPv4 packets containing IPv4 options.
                draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering-07

Abstract

   This document provides advice on the filtering of IPv4 packets based
   on the IPv4 options they contain.  Additionally, it discusses the
   operational and interoperability implications of dropping packets
   based on the IP options they contain.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 12, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology and Conventions Used in This Document  . . . .  3
     1.2.  Operational Focus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  IP Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  General Security Implications of IP options  . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Processing Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Advice on the Handling of Packets with Specific IP Options . .  7
     4.1.  End of Option List (Type = 0)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  No Operation (Type = 1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.3.  Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR) (Type = 131)  . . . .  8
     4.4.  Strict Source and Record Route (SSRR) (Type = 137) . . . . 10
     4.5.  Record Route (Type = 7)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.6.  Stream Identifier (Type = 136) (obsolete)  . . . . . . . . 12
     4.7.  Internet Timestamp (Type = 68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.8.  Router Alert (Type = 148)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.9.  Probe MTU (Type = 11) (obsolete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.10. Reply MTU (Type = 12) (obsolete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.11. Traceroute (Type = 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.12. DoD Basic Security Option (Type = 130) . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.13. DoD Extended Security Option (Type = 133)  . . . . . . . . 20
     4.14. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) (Type = 134) . . . . 22
     4.15. VISA (Type = 142)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     4.16. Extended Internet Protocol (Type = 145)  . . . . . . . . . 23
     4.17. Address Extension (Type = 147) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     4.18. Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery (Type = 149)  . 25
     4.19. Dynamic Packet State (Type = 151)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.20. Upstream Multicast Pkt. (Type = 152) . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     4.21. Quick-Start (Type = 25)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     4.22. RFC3692-style Experiment (Types = 30, 94, 158, and 222)  . 28
     4.23. Other IP Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35








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1.  Introduction

   This document discusses the filtering of IPv4 packets based on the
   IPv4 options they contain.  Since various protocols may use IPv4
   options to some extent, dropping packets based on the options they
   contain may have implications on the proper functioning of the
   protocol.  Therefore, this document attempts to discuss the
   operational and interoperability implications of such dropping.
   Additionally, it outlines what a network operator might do in a
   typical enterprise or Service Provider environments.  This document
   also draws and is partly derifed from [RFC6274], which also received
   review from the operational community.

   We note that data seems to indicate that there is a current
   widespread practice of blocking IPv4 optioned packets.  There are
   various plausible approaches to minimize the potential negative
   effects of IPv4 optioned packets while allowing some options
   semantics.  One approach is to allow for specific options that are
   expected or needed, and a default deny.  A different approach is to
   deny unneeded options and a default allow.  Yet a third possible
   approach is to allow for end-to-end semantics by ignoring options and
   treating packets as un-optioned while in transit.  Experiments and
   currently-available data tends to support the first or third
   approaches as more realistic.  Some results of regarding the current
   state of affairs with respect to dropping packets containing IP
   options can be found in [MEDINA] [FONSECA].  Additionally,
   [BREMIER-BARR] points out that the deployed Internet already has many
   routers that do not process IP options.

   We also note that while this document provides advice on dropping
   packets on a "per IP option type", not all devices (routers, security
   gateways, and firewalls) may provide this capability with such
   granularity.  Additionally, even in cases in which such functionality
   is provided, the operator might want to specify a dropping policy
   with a coarser granularity (rather than on a "per IP option type"
   granularity), as indicated above.

   Finally, in scenarios in which processing of IP options by
   intermediate systems is not required, a widespread approach is to
   simply ignore IP options, and process the corresponding packets as if
   they do not contain any IP options.

1.1.  Terminology and Conventions Used in This Document

   The terms "fast path", "slow path", and associated relative terms
   ("faster path" and "slower path") are loosely defined as in Section 2
   of [RFC6398].




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   Because of the security-oriented nature of this document, we are
   deliberately including some historical citations.  This is
   intentional, and has the goal of explicitly retaining and showing
   history, as well as removing ambiguity and confusion.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Operational Focus

   All of the recommendations in this document have been made in an
   effort to optimise for operational community consensus, as best the
   editors have been able to determine that.  This has included not only
   accepting feedback from public lists, but also accepting off-list
   feedback from people at various network operators (e.g.  ISPs,
   content providers, educational institutions, commercial firms).


2.  IP Options

   IP options allow for the extension of the Internet Protocol.  As
   specified in [RFC0791], there are two cases for the format of an
   option:

   o  Case 1: A single byte of option-type.

   o  Case 2: An option-type byte, an option-length byte, and the actual
      option-data bytes.

   IP options of Case 1 have the following syntax:

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
   |  option-type  |  option-data
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -


   The length of IP options of Case 1 is implicitly specified by the
   option-type byte.

   IP options of Case 2 have the following syntax:

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
   |  option-type  | option-length |  option-data
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -

   In this case, the option-length byte counts the option-type byte and
   the option-length byte, as well as the actual option-data bytes.



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   All current and future options except "End of Option List" (Type = 0)
   and "No Operation" (Type = 1), are of Class 2.

   The option-type has three fields:

   o  1 bit: copied flag.

   o  2 bits: option class.

   o  5 bits: option number.

   The copied flag indicates whether this option should be copied to all
   fragments in the event the packet carrying it needs to be fragmented:

   o  0 = not copied.

   o  1 = copied.

   The values for the option class are:

   o  0 = control.

   o  1 = reserved for future use.

   o  2 = debugging and measurement.

   o  3 = reserved for future use.

   This format allows for the creation of new options for the extension
   of the Internet Protocol (IP).

   Finally, the option number identifies the syntax of the rest of the
   option.

   The "IP OPTION NUMBERS" registry [IANA-IP] contains the list of the
   currently assigned IP option numbers.


3.  General Security Implications of IP options

3.1.  Processing Requirements

   Historically, most IP routers used a general-purpose CPU to process
   IP packets and forward them towards their destination.  This same CPU
   usually also processed network management traffic (e.g., SNMP),
   configuration commands (e.g., command line interface), and various
   routing protocols (e.g., RIP, OSPF, BGP, IS-IS) or other control
   protocols (e.g., RSVP, ICMP).  In such architectures it has been



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   common for the general-purpose CPU also to perform any packet
   filtering that has been enabled on the router (or router interface).
   An IP router built using this architecture often has a significant
   (Distributed) Denial-of-Service (DDOS) attack risk if the router
   control plane (e.g., CPU) is overwhelmed by a large number of IPv4
   packets that contain IPv4 options.

   From about 1995 onwards, a growing number of IP routers have
   incorporated specialized IP packet processing silicon (i.e., FPGA,
   ASIC), thereby separating the IP packet forwarding function from the
   other functions of the router.  Such router architectures tend to be
   more resilient to DDOS attacks that might be seen in the global
   public Internet.  Depending upon various implementation and
   configuration details, routers with a silicon packet forwarding
   engine can handle high volumes of IP packets containing IP Options
   without any adverse impact on packet forwarding rates or on the
   router's control plane (e.g., general-purpose CPU).  Some
   implementations have a configuration knob simply to forward all IP
   packets containing IP Options at wire-speed in silicon as if the IP
   packet did not contain an IP option ("ignore options & forward").
   Other implementations support wire-speed silicon-based packet
   filtering, thereby enabling packets containing certain IP options to
   be selectively dropped ("drop"), packets containing certain other IP
   options to have those IP options ignored ("ignore options &
   forward"), and other packets containing different IP options to have
   those options processed, either on a general-purpose CPU or using
   custom logic (e.g., FPGA, ASIC), while the packet is being forwarded
   ("process option & forward").

   Broadly speaking, any IP packet that requires processing by an IP
   router's general-purpose CPU can be a DDOS risk to that router's
   general-purpose CPU (and thence to the router itself).  However, at
   present, the particular architectural and engineering details of the
   particular IP router being considered are important to understand
   when evaluating the operational security risks associated with a
   particular IP packet type or IP option type.

   Operators are urged to consider IP option filtering and IP option
   handling capabilities of potential IP routers as they make deployment
   decisions in future.

   Additional considerations for protecting the control plane from
   packets containing IP Options can be found in [RFC6192].

   Finally, in addition to advice to operators, this document also
   provides advice to router, security gateway, and firewall
   implementers in terms of providing the capability to filter packets
   with different granularities: both on a "per IP option type"



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   granularity (to maximize flexibility) as well as more coarse filters
   (to minimize configuration complexity).


4.  Advice on the Handling of Packets with Specific IP Options

   The following subsections contain a description of each of the IP
   options that have so far been specified, a discussion of possible
   interoperability implications if packets containing such options are
   dropped, and specific advice on whether to drop packets containing
   these options in a typical enterprise or Service Provider
   environment.

4.1.  End of Option List (Type = 0)

4.1.1.  Uses

   This option is used to indicate the "end of options" in those cases
   in which the end of options would not coincide with the end of the
   Internet Protocol Header.

4.1.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.1.3.  Threats

   No specific security issues are known for this IPv4 option.

4.1.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Packets containing any IP options are likely to include an End of
   Option List.  Therefore, if packets containing this option are
   dropped, it is very likely that legitimate traffic is blocked.

4.1.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD NOT drop packets
   because they contain this option.

4.2.  No Operation (Type = 1)

4.2.1.  Uses

   The no-operation option is basically meant to allow the sending
   system to align subsequent options in, for example, 32-bit
   boundaries.




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4.2.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.2.3.  Threats

   No specific security issues are known for this IPv4 option.

4.2.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Packets containing any IP options are likely to include a No
   Operation option.  Therefore, if packets containing this option are
   dropped, it is very likely that legitimate traffic is blocked.

4.2.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD NOT drop packets
   because they contain this option.

4.3.  Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR) (Type = 131)

   RFC 791 states that this option should appear at most once in a given
   packet.  Thus, if a packet contains more than one LSRR option, it
   should be dropped, and this event should be logged (e.g., a counter
   could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).  Additionally,
   packets containing a combination of LSRR and SSRR options should be
   dropped, and this event should be logged (e.g., a counter could be
   incremented to reflect the packet drop).

4.3.1.  Uses

   This option lets the originating system specify a number of
   intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the
   destination host.  Additionally, the route followed by the packet is
   recorded in the option.  The receiving host (end-system) must use the
   reverse of the path contained in the received LSRR option.

   The LSSR option can be of help in debugging some network problems.
   Some ISP (Internet Service Provider) peering agreements require
   support for this option in the routers within the peer of the ISP.

4.3.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].







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4.3.3.  Threats

   The LSRR option has well-known security implications [RFC6274].
   Among other things, the option can be used to:

   o  Bypass firewall rules.

   o  Reach otherwise unreachable internet systems.

   o  Establish TCP connections in a stealthy way.

   o  Learn about the topology of a network.

   o  Perform bandwidth-exhaustion attacks.

   Of these attack vectors, the one that has probably received least
   attention is the use of the LSRR option to perform bandwidth
   exhaustion attacks.  The LSRR option can be used as an amplification
   method for performing bandwidth-exhaustion attacks, as an attacker
   could make a packet bounce multiple times between a number of systems
   by carefully crafting an LSRR option.

      This is the IPv4-version of the IPv6 amplification attack that was
      widely publicized in 2007 [Biondi2007].  The only difference is
      that the maximum length of the IPv4 header (and hence the LSRR
      option) limits the amplification factor when compared to the IPv6
      counter-part.

   Additionally, some implementations have been found to fail to include
   proper sanity checks on the LSRR option, thus leading to security
   issues.  These specific issues are believed to be solved in all
   modern implementations.

      [Microsoft1999] is a security advisory about a vulnerability
      arising from improper validation of the Pointer field of the LSRR
      option.

   Finally, we note that some systems were known for providing a system-
   wide toggle to enable support for this option for those scenarios in
   which this option is required.  However, improper implementation of
   such system-wide toggle caused those systems to support the LSRR
   option even when explicitly configured not to do so.

      [OpenBSD1998] is a security advisory about an improper
      implementation of such a system-wide toggle in 4.4BSD kernels.
      This issue was resolved in later versions of the corresponding
      operating system.




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4.3.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the LSRR option
   (such as ping or traceroute with the appropriate arguments) would
   break when using the LSRR option (ping and traceroute without IPv4
   options are not impacted).  Nevertheless, it should be noted that it
   is virtually impossible to use the LSRR option for troubleshooting,
   due to widespread dropping of packets that contain such option.

4.3.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD implement an option-
   specific configuration knob whether packets with this option are
   dropped, packets with this IP option are forwarded as if they did not
   contain this IP option, or packets with this option are processed and
   forwarded as per [RFC0791].  The default setting for this knob SHOULD
   be "drop", and the default setting MUST be documented.

   Please note that treating packets with LSRR as if they did not
   contain this option can result in such packets being sent to a
   different device that the initially intended destination.  With
   appropriate ingress filtering this should not open an attack vector
   into the infrastructure.  Nonetheless, it could result in traffic
   that would never reach the initially intended destination.  Dropping
   these packets prevents unnecessary network traffic, and does not make
   end-to-end communication any worse.

4.4.  Strict Source and Record Route (SSRR) (Type = 137)

4.4.1.  Uses

   This option allows the originating system to specify a number of
   intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the
   destination host.  Additionally, the route followed by the packet is
   recorded in the option, and the destination host (end-system) must
   use the reverse of the path contained in the received SSRR option.

   This option is similar to the Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR)
   option, with the only difference that in the case of SSRR, the route
   specified in the option is the exact route the packet must take
   (i.e., no other intervening routers are allowed to be in the route).

   The SSSR option can be of help in debugging some network problems.
   Some ISP (Internet Service Provider) peering agreements require
   support for this option in the routers within the peer of the ISP.






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4.4.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.4.3.  Threats

   The SSRR option has the same security implications as the LSRR
   option.  Please refer to Section 4.3 for a discussion of such
   security implications.

4.4.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the SSRR option
   (such as ping or traceroute with the appropriate arguments) would
   break when using the SSRR option (ping and traceroute without IPv4
   options are not impacted).  Nevertheless, it should be noted that it
   is virtually impossible to use the SSRR option for trouble-shooting,
   due to widespread dropping of packets that contain such option.

4.4.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD implement an option-
   specific configuration knob whether packets with this option are
   dropped, packets with this IP option are forwarded as if they did not
   contain this IP option, or packets with this option are processed and
   forwarded as per [RFC0791].  The default setting for this knob SHOULD
   be "drop", and the default setting MUST be documented.

   Please note that treating packets with SSRR as if they did not
   contain this option can result in such packets being sent to a
   different device that the initially intended destination.  With
   appropriate ingress filtering this should not open an attack vector
   into the infrastructure.  Nonetheless, it could result in traffic
   that would never reach the initially intended destination.  Dropping
   these packets prevents unnecessary network traffic, and does not make
   end-to-end communication any worse.

4.5.  Record Route (Type = 7)

4.5.1.  Uses

   This option provides a means to record the route that a given packet
   follows.

4.5.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].




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4.5.3.  Threats

   This option can be exploited to map the topology of a network.
   However, the limited space in the IP header limits the usefulness of
   this option for that purpose.

4.5.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the RR option
   (such as ping with the RR option) would break when using the RR
   option (ping without IPv4 options is not impacted).  Nevertheless, it
   should be noted that it is virtually impossible to use such
   techniques due to widespread dropping of packets that contain RR
   options.

4.5.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD implement an option-
   specific configuration knob whether packets with this option are
   dropped, packets with this IP option are forwarded as if they did not
   contain this IP option, or packets with this option are processed and
   forwarded as per [RFC0791].  The default setting for this knob SHOULD
   be "drop", and the default setting MUST be documented.

4.6.  Stream Identifier (Type = 136) (obsolete)

   The Stream Identifier option originally provided a means for the 16-
   bit SATNET stream Identifier to be carried through networks that did
   not support the stream concept.

   However, as stated by Section 3.2.1.8 of RFC 1122 [RFC1122] and
   Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 [RFC1812], this option is obsolete.
   Therefore, it must be ignored by the processing systems.  See also
   [IANA-IP] and [RFC6814].

   RFC 791 states that this option appears at most once in a given
   datagram.  Therefore, if a packet contains more than one instance of
   this option, it should be dropped, and this event should be logged
   (e.g., a counter could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).

4.6.1.  Uses

   This option is obsolete.  There is no current use for this option.

4.6.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791], and deprecated in RFC 1122 [RFC1122]
   and RFC 1812 [RFC1812].  This option has been formally obsoleted by



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   [RFC6814].

4.6.3.  Threats

   No specific security issues are known for this IPv4 option.

4.6.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.6.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets
   containing a Stream Identifier option.

4.7.  Internet Timestamp (Type = 68)

4.7.1.  Uses

   This option provides a means for recording the time at which each
   system (or a specified set of systems) processed this datagram, and
   may optionally record the addresses of the systems providing the
   timestamps.

4.7.2.  Option Specification

   Specified by RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.7.3.  Threats

   The timestamp option has a number of security implications [RFC6274].
   Among them are:

   o  It allows an attacker to obtain the current time of the systems
      that process the packet, which the attacker may find useful in a
      number of scenarios.

   o  It may be used to map the network topology, in a similar way to
      the IP Record Route option.

   o  It may be used to fingerprint the operating system in use by a
      system processing the datagram.

   o  It may be used to fingerprint physical devices, by analyzing the
      clock skew.

   [Kohno2005] describes a technique for fingerprinting devices by
   measuring the clock skew.  It exploits, among other things, the



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   timestamps that can be obtained by means of the ICMP timestamp
   request messages [RFC0791].  However, the same fingerprinting method
   could be implemented with the aid of the Internet Timestamp option.

4.7.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the Internet
   Timestamp option (such as ping with the Timestamp option) would break
   when using the Timestamp option (ping without IPv4 options is not
   impacted).  Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is virtually
   impossible to use such techniques due to widespread dropping of
   packets that contain Internet Timestamp options.

4.7.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets
   containing an Internet Timestamp option.

4.8.  Router Alert (Type = 148)

4.8.1.  Uses

   The Router Alert option has the semantic "routers should examine this
   packet more closely, if they participate in the functionality denoted
   by the Value of the option".

4.8.2.  Option Specification

   The Router Alert option is defined in RFC 2113 [RFC2113] and later
   updates to it have been clarified by RFC 5350 [RFC5350].  It contains
   a 16-bit Value governed by an IANA registry (see [RFC5350]).

4.8.3.  Threats

   The security implications of the Router Alert option have been
   discussed in detail in [RFC6398].  Basically, the Router Alert option
   might be exploited to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by
   exhausting CPU resources at the processing routers.

4.8.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Applications that employ the Router Alert option (such as RSVP
   [RFC2205]) would break.

4.8.5.  Advice

   This option SHOULD be allowed only in controlled environments, where
   the option can be used safely.  [RFC6398] identifies some such



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   environments.  In unsafe environments, packets containing this option
   SHOULD be dropped.

   A given router, security gateway, or firewall system has no way of
   knowing a priori whether this option is valid in its operational
   environment.  Therefore, routers, security gateways, and firewalls
   SHOULD, by default, ignore the Router Alert option.  Additionally,
   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD have a configuration
   setting that governs their reaction in the presence of packets
   containing the Router Alert option.  This configuration setting
   SHOULD allow to honor and process the option, ignore the option, or
   drop packets containing this option.

4.9.  Probe MTU (Type = 11) (obsolete)

4.9.1.  Uses

   This option originally provided a mechanism to discover the Path-MTU.
   It has been declared obsolete.

4.9.2.  Option Specification

   This option was originally defined in RFC 1063 [RFC1063], and was
   obsoleted with RFC 1191 [RFC1191].  This option is now obsolete, as
   RFC 1191 obsoletes RFC 1063 without using IP options.

4.9.3.  Threats

   This option is obsolete.  This option could have been exploited to
   cause a host to set its PMTU estimate to an inordinately low or an
   inordinately high value, thereby causing performance problems.

4.9.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None

      This option is NOT employed with the modern "Path MTU Discovery"
      (PMTUD) mechanism [RFC1191], which employs special ICMP messages
      (Type 3, Code 4) in combination with the IP DF bit.  PLPMTUD
      [RFC4821] can perform PMTUD without the need of any special
      packets.

4.9.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets that
   contain a Probe MTU option.





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4.10.  Reply MTU (Type = 12) (obsolete)

4.10.1.  Uses

   This option and originally provided a mechanism to discover the Path-
   MTU.  It is now obsolete.

4.10.2.  Option Specification

   This option was originally defined in RFC 1063 [RFC1063], and was
   obsoleted with RFC 1191 [RFC1191].  This option is now obsolete, as
   RFC 1191 obsoletes RFC 1063 without using IP options.

4.10.3.  Threats

   This option is obsolete.  This option could have been exploited to
   cause a host to set its PMTU estimate to an inordinately low or an
   inordinately high value, thereby causing performance problems.

4.10.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None

      This option is NOT employed with the modern "Path MTU Discovery"
      (PMTUD) mechanism [RFC1191], which employs special ICMP messages
      (Type 3, Code 4) in combination with the IP DF bit.  PLPMTUD
      [RFC4821] can perform PMTUD without the need of any special
      packets.

4.10.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets that
   contain a Reply MTU option.

4.11.  Traceroute (Type = 82)

4.11.1.  Uses

   This option originally provided a mechanism to trace the path to a
   host.

4.11.2.  Option Specification

   This option was originally specified by RFC 1393 [RFC1393] as
   "experimental", and it was never widely deployed on the public
   Internet.  This option has been formally obsoleted by [RFC6814].





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4.11.3.  Threats

   This option is obsolete.  Because this option required each router in
   the path both to provide special processing and to send an ICMP
   message, it could have been exploited to perform a Denial of Service
   (DoS) attack by exhausting CPU resources at the processing routers.

4.11.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None

4.11.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets that
   contain a Traceroute option.

4.12.  DoD Basic Security Option (Type = 130)

4.12.1.  Uses

   This option is used by Multi-Level-Secure (MLS) end-systems and
   intermediate systems in specific environments to [RFC1108]:

   o  Transmit from source to destination in a network standard
      representation the common security labels required by computer
      security models [Landwehr81],

   o  validate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from the
      source and delivery to the destination, and,

   o  ensure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to the
      level required by all protection authorities indicated on the
      datagram.

   The DoD Basic Security Option (BSO) was implemented in IRIX
   [IRIX2008] and is currently implemented in a number of operating
   systems (e.g., Security-Enhanced Linux [SELinux2008], Solaris
   [Solaris2008], and Cisco IOS [Cisco-IPSO]).  It is also currently
   deployed in a number of high-security networks.  These networks are
   typically either in physically secure locations, protected by
   military/governmental communications security equipment, or both.
   Such networks are typically built using commercial off-the-shelf
   (COTS) IP routers and Ethernet switches, but are not normally
   interconnected with the global public Internet.  Multi-Level Secure
   (MLS) systems are much more widely deployed now than they were at the
   time the then-IESG decided to remove IPSO (IP Security Options) from
   the IETF standards-track.  Since nearly all MLS systems also support
   IPSO BSO and IPSO ESO, this option is believed to have more



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   deployment now than when the IESG removed this option from the IETF
   standards-track.  [RFC5570] describes a similar option recently
   defined for IPv6 and has much more detailed explanations of how
   sensitivity label options are used in real-world deployments.

4.12.2.  Option Specification

   It is specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108]], which obsoleted RFC 1038
   [RFC1038] (which in turn obsoleted the Security Option defined in RFC
   791 [RFC0791]).

      RFC 791 [RFC0791] defined the "Security Option" (Type = 130),
      which used the same option type as the DoD Basic Security option
      discussed in this section.  Later, RFC 1038 [RFC1038] revised the
      IP security options, and in turn was obsoleted by RFC 1108
      [RFC1108].  The "Security Option" specified in RFC 791 is
      considered obsolete by Section 3.2.1.8 of RFC 1122 [RFC1122] and
      Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 [RFC1812], and therefore the
      discussion in this section is focused on the DoD Basic Security
      option specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108].

   Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 states that routers "SHOULD implement
   this option".

      Some private IP networks consider IP router-based per-interface
      selective filtering of packets based on (a) the presence of an
      IPSO option (including BSO and ESO) and (b) based on the contents
      of that IPSO option to be important for operational security
      reasons.  The recent IPv6 CALIPSO option specification discusses
      this in additional detail, albeit in an IPv6 context [RFC5570].

      Such private IP networks commonly are built using both commercial
      and open-source products - for hosts, guards, firewalls, switches,
      routers, etc.  Some commercial IP routers support this option, as
      do some IP routers which are built on top of Multi-Level Secure
      (MLS) operating systems (e.g., on top of Trusted Solaris
      [Solaris2008] or Security-Enhanced Linux [SELinux2008]).

      For example, many Cisco routers that run Cisco IOS include support
      for selectively filtering packets that contain the IP Security
      Options (IPSO) with per-interface granularity.  This capability
      has been present in many Cisco routers since the early 1990s
      [Cisco-IPSO-Cmds].  Some government sector products reportedly
      also support the IP Security Options (IPSO), for example CANEWARE
      [RFC4949].






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      Support for the IPSO Basic Security Option also is included in the
      "IPsec Configuration Policy Information Model" [RFC3585] and in
      the "IPsec Security Policy Database Configuration MIB" [RFC4807].
      Section 4.6.1 of the IP Security Domain of Interpretation
      [RFC2407] includes support for labeled IPsec security associations
      compatible with the IP Security Options.

4.12.3.  Threats

   Presence of this option in a packet does not by itself create any
   specific new threat.  Packets with this option ought not normally be
   seen on the global public Internet.

4.12.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   If packets with this option are blocked or if the option is stripped
   from the packet during transmission from source to destination, then
   the packet itself is likely to be dropped by the receiver because it
   isn't properly labeled.  In some cases, the receiver might receive
   the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the
   received data from the packet whose BSO was stripped by an
   intermediate router or firewall.  Associating an incorrect
   sensitivity label can cause the received information either to be
   handled as more sensitive than it really is ("upgrading") or as less
   sensitive than it really is ("downgrading"), either of which is
   problematic.

4.12.5.  Advice

   A given IP router, security gateway, or firewall has no way to know a
   priori what environment it has been deployed into.  Even closed IP
   deployments generally use exactly the same commercial routers,
   security gateways, and firewalls that are used in the public
   Internet.

   Since operational problems result in environments where this option
   is needed if either the option is dropped or IP packets containing
   this option are dropped, but no harm results if the option is carried
   in environments where it is not needed, the default configuration
   SHOULD NOT (a) modify or remove this IP option or (b) drop an IP
   packet because the IP packet contains this option.

   A given IP router, security gateway, or firewall MAY be configured to
   drop this option or to drop IP packets containing this option in an
   environment known to not use this option.

   For auditing reasons, Routers, security gateways, and firewalls
   SHOULD be capable of logging the numbers of packets containing the



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   BSO on a per-interface basis.  Also, Routers, security gateways, and
   firewalls SHOULD be capable of dropping packets based on the BSO
   presence as well as the BSO values.

4.13.  DoD Extended Security Option (Type = 133)

4.13.1.  Uses

   This option permits additional security labeling information, beyond
   that present in the Basic Security Option (Section 4.12), to be
   supplied in an IP datagram to meet the needs of registered
   authorities.

4.13.2.  Option Specification

   The DoD Extended Security Option (ESO) is specified by RFC 1108
   [RFC1108].

      Some private IP networks consider IP router-based per-interface
      selective filtering of packets based on (a) the presence of an
      IPSO option (including BSO and ESO) and (b) based on the contents
      of that IPSO option to be important for operational security
      reasons.  The recent IPv6 CALIPSO option specification discusses
      this in additional detail, albeit in an IPv6 context [RFC5570].

      Such private IP networks commonly are built using both commercial
      and open-source products - for hosts, guards, firewalls, switches,
      routers, etc.  Some commercial IP routers support this option, as
      do some IP routers which are built on top of Multi-Level Secure
      (MLS) operating systems (e.g., on top of Trusted Solaris
      [Solaris2008] or Security-Enhanced Linux [SELinux2008]).

      For example, many Cisco routers that run Cisco IOS include support
      for selectively filtering packets that contain the IP Security
      Options (IPSO) with per-interface granularity.  This capability
      has been present in many Cisco routers since the early 1990s
      [Cisco-IPSO-Cmds].  Some government sector products reportedly
      also support the IP Security Options (IPSO), for example CANEWARE
      [RFC4949].

      Support for the IPSO Extended Security Option also is included in
      the "IPsec Configuration Policy Information Model" [RFC3585] and
      in the "IPsec Security Policy Database Configuration MIB"
      [RFC4807].  Section 4.6.1 of the IP Security Domain of
      Interpretation [RFC2407] includes support for labeled IPsec
      security associations compatible with the IP Security Options.





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4.13.3.  Threats

   Presence of this option in a packet does not by itself create any
   specific new threat.  Packets with this option ought not normally be
   seen on the global public Internet.

4.13.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   If packets with this option are blocked or if the option is stripped
   from the packet during transmission from source to destination, then
   the packet itself is likely to be dropped by the receiver because it
   isn't properly labeled.  In some cases, the receiver might receive
   the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the
   received data from the packet whose ESO was stripped by an
   intermediate router or firewall.  Associating an incorrect
   sensitivity label can cause the received information either to be
   handled as more sensitive than it really is ("upgrading") or as less
   sensitive than it really is ("downgrading"), either of which is
   problematic.

4.13.5.  Advice

   A given IP router, security gateway, or firewall has no way to know a
   priori what environment it has been deployed into.  Even closed IP
   deployments generally use exactly the same commercial routers,
   security gateways, and firewalls that are used in the public
   Internet.

   Since operational problems result in environments where this option
   is needed if either the option is dropped or IP packets containing
   this option are dropped, but no harm results if the option is carried
   in environments where it is not needed, the default configuration
   SHOULD NOT (a) modify or remove this IP option or (b) drop an IP
   packet because the IP packet contains this option.

   A given IP router, security gateway, or firewall MAY be configured to
   drop this option or to drop IP packets containing this option in an
   environment known to not use this option.

   For auditing reasons, Routers, security gateways, and firewalls
   SHOULD be capable of logging the numbers of packets containing the
   ESO on a per-interface basis.  Also, Routers, security gateways, and
   firewalls SHOULD be capable of dropping packets based on the ESO
   presence as well as the ESO values.







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4.14.  Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) (Type = 134)

4.14.1.  Uses

   This option was proposed by the Trusted Systems Interoperability
   Group (TSIG), with the intent of meeting trusted networking
   requirements for the commercial trusted systems market place.

   It was implemented in IRIX [IRIX2008] and is currently implemented in
   a number of operating systems (e.g., Security-Enhanced Linux
   [SELinux2008], and Solaris [Solaris2008]).  It is also currently
   deployed in a number of high-security networks.

4.14.2.  Option Specification

   This option is specified in [I-D.ietf-cipso-ipsecurity] and
   [FIPS1994].  There are zero known IP router implementations of CIPSO.
   Several MLS operating systems support CIPSO, generally the same MLS
   operating systems that support IPSO.

      The TSIG proposal was taken to the Commercial Internet Security
      Option (CIPSO) Working Group of the IETF [CIPSOWG1994], and an
      Internet-Draft was produced [I-D.ietf-cipso-ipsecurity].  The
      Internet-Draft was never published as an RFC, but the proposal was
      later standardized by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
      Technology (NIST) as "Federal Information Processing Standard
      Publication 188" [FIPS1994].

4.14.3.  Threats

   Presence of this option in a packet does not by itself create any
   specific new threat.  Packets with this option ought not normally be
   seen on the global public Internet.

4.14.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   If packets with this option are blocked or if the option is stripped
   from the packet during transmission from source to destination, then
   the packet itself is likely to be dropped by the receiver because it
   isn't properly labeled.  In some cases, the receiver might receive
   the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the
   received data from the packet whose CIPSO was stripped by an
   intermediate router or firewall.  Associating an incorrect
   sensitivity label can cause the received information either to be
   handled as more sensitive than it really is ("upgrading") or as less
   sensitive than it really is ("downgrading"), either of which is
   problematic.




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4.14.5.  Advice

   Because of the design of this option, with variable syntax and
   variable length, it is not practical to support specialized filtering
   using the CIPSO information.  No routers or firewalls are known to
   support this option.  However, Routers, security gateways, and
   firewalls SHOULD NOT by default modify or remove this option from IP
   packets and SHOULD NOT by default drop packets because they contain
   this option.  For auditing reasons, routers, security gateways, and
   firewalls SHOULD be capable of logging the numbers of packets
   containing the CIPSO on a per-interface basis.  Also, Routers,
   security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD be capable of dropping
   packets based on the CIPSO presence.

4.15.  VISA (Type = 142)

4.15.1.  Uses

   This options was part of an experiment at USC and was never widely
   deployed.

4.15.2.  Option Specification

   The original option specification is not publicly available.  This
   option has been formally obsoleted by [RFC6814].

4.15.3.  Threats

   Not possible to determine (other the general security implications of
   IP options discussed in Section 3), since the corresponding
   specification is not publicly available.

4.15.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.15.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets that
   contain this option.

4.16.  Extended Internet Protocol (Type = 145)

4.16.1.  Uses

   The EIP option was introduced by one of the proposals submitted
   during the IPng efforts to address the problem of IPv4 address
   exhaustion.



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4.16.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in [RFC1385].  This option has been formally obsoleted by
   [RFC6814].

4.16.3.  Threats

   This option is obsolete.  This option was used (or was intended to be
   used) to signal that a packet superficially similar to an IPv4 packet
   actually containted a different protocol, opening up the possibility
   that an IPv4 node that simply ignored this option would process a
   received packet in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the
   sender.  There are no know threats arising from this option, other
   than the general security implications of IP options discussed in
   Section 3.

4.16.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.16.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop packets that
   contain this option.

4.17.  Address Extension (Type = 147)

4.17.1.  Uses

   The Address Extension option was introduced by one of the proposals
   submitted during the IPng efforts to address the problem of IPv4
   address exhaustion.

4.17.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in [RFC1475].  This option has been formally obsoleted by
   [RFC6814].

4.17.3.  Threats

   There are no know threats arising from this option, other than the
   general security implications of IP options discussed in Section 3.

4.17.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.





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4.17.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop packets that
   contain this option.

4.18.  Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery (Type = 149)

4.18.1.  Uses

   This option originally provided unreliable UDP delivery to a set of
   addresses included in the option.

4.18.2.  Option Specification

   This option is specified in RFC 1770 [RFC1770].  It has been formally
   obsoleted by [RFC6814].

4.18.3.  Threats

   This option could have been exploited for bandwidth-amplification in
   Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.

4.18.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.18.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets that
   contain a Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery option.

4.19.  Dynamic Packet State (Type = 151)

4.19.1.  Uses

   The Dynamic Packet State option was used to specify specified Dynamic
   Packet State (DPS) in the context of the differentiated service
   architecture.

4.19.2.  Option Specification

   The Dynamic Packet State option was specified in
   [I-D.stoica-diffserv-dps].  The aforementioned document was meant to
   be published as "Experimental", but never made it into an RFC.  This
   option has been formally obsoleted by [RFC6814].






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4.19.3.  Threats

   Possible threats include theft of service and Denial of Service.
   However, we note that is option has never been widely implemented or
   deployed.

4.19.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.19.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop packets that
   contain this option.

4.20.  Upstream Multicast Pkt. (Type = 152)

4.20.1.  Uses

   This option was meant to solve the problem of doing upstream
   forwarding of multicast packets on a multi-access LAN.

4.20.2.  Option Specification

   This option was originally specified in [I-D.farinacci-bidir-pim].
   It was never formally standardized in the RFC series, and was never
   widely implemented and deployed.  Its use was obsoleted by [RFC5015],
   which employs a control plane mechanism to solve the problem of doing
   upstream forwarding of multicast packets on a multi-access LAN.  This
   option has been formally obsoleted by [RFC6814].

4.20.3.  Threats

   This option is obsolete.  A router that ignored this option instead
   of processing it as specified in [I-D.farinacci-bidir-pim] could have
   forwarded multicast packets to an unintended destination.

4.20.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.20.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop packets that
   contain this option.






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4.21.  Quick-Start (Type = 25)

4.21.1.  Uses

   This IP Option is used in the specification of Quick-Start for TCP
   and IP, which is an experimental mechanism that allows transport
   protocols, in cooperation with routers, to determine an allowed
   sending rate at the start and, at times, in the middle of a data
   transfer (e.g., after an idle period) [RFC4782].

4.21.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 4782 [RFC4782], on the "Experimental" track.

4.21.3.  Threats

   Section 9.6 of [RFC4782] notes that Quick-Start is vulnerable to two
   kinds of attacks:

   o  Attacks to increase the routers' processing and state load, and,

   o  attacks with bogus Quick-Start Requests to temporarily tie up
      available Quick-Start bandwidth, preventing routers from approving
      Quick-Start Requests from other connections.

4.21.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   The Quick-Start functionality would be disabled, and additional
   delays in e.g., TCP's connection establishment could be introduced
   (please see Section 4.7.2 of [RFC4782].  We note, however, that
   Quick-Start has been proposed as mechanism that could be of use in
   controlled environments, and not as a mechanism that would be
   intended or appropriate for ubiquitous deployment in the global
   Internet [RFC4782].

4.21.5.  Advice

   A given router, security gateway, or firewall system has no way of
   knowing a priori whether this option is valid in its operational
   environment.  Therefore, routers, security gateways, and firewalls
   SHOULD, by default, ignore the Quick Start option.  Additionally,
   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD have a configuration
   setting that governs their reaction in the presence of packets
   containing the Quick Start option.  This configuration setting SHOULD
   allow to honor and process the option, ignore the option, or drop
   packets containing this option.  The default configuration is to
   ignore the Quick Start option.




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      We note that if routers in a given environment do not implement
      and enable the Quick-Start mechanism, only the general security
      implications of IP options (discussed in Section 3) would apply.

4.22.  RFC3692-style Experiment (Types = 30, 94, 158, and 222)

   Section 2.5 of RFC 4727 [RFC4727] allocates an option number with all
   defined values of the "copy" and "class" fields for RFC3692-style
   experiments.  This results in four distinct option type codes: 30,
   94, 158, and 222.

4.22.1.  Uses

   It is only appropriate to use these values in explicitly configured
   experiments; they MUST NOT be shipped as defaults in implementations.

4.22.2.  Option Specification

   Specified in RFC 4727 [RFC4727] in the context of RFC3692-style
   experiments.

4.22.3.  Threats

   No specific security issues are known for this IPv4 option.

4.22.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.22.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD have configuration
   knobs for IP packets that contain RFC3692-style Experiment options to
   select between "ignore & forward" and "drop & log").  Otherwise, no
   legitimate experiment using these options will be able to traverse
   any IP router.

   Special care needs to be taken in the case of "drop & log".  Devices
   SHOULD count the number of packets dropped, but the logging of drop
   events SHOULD be limited to not overburden device resources.

   The aforementioned configuration knob SHOULD default to "drop & log".

4.23.  Other IP Options







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4.23.1.  Specification

   Unrecognized IP Options are to be ignored.  Section 3.2.1.8 of RFC
   1122 [RFC1122] and Section 4.2.2.6 of RFC 1812 [RFC1812] specify this
   behavior as follows:

   RFC 1122:  "The IP and transport layer MUST each interpret those IP
            options that they understand and silently ignore the
            others."

   RFC 1812:  "A router MUST ignore IP options which it does not
            recognize."

   This document adds that unrecognized IP Options MAY also be logged.

   Further, routers, security gateways, and firewalls MUST provide the
   ability to log drop events of IP packets containing unrecognized or
   obsolete options.

   A number of additional options are listed in the "IP OPTIONS NUMBERS"
   IANA registry [IANA-IP] as of the time this document was last edited.
   Specifically:

   Copy Class Number Value Name
   ---- ----- ------ ----- -------------------------------------------
      0     0     10    10 ZSU    - Experimental Measurement
      1     2     13   205 FINN   - Experimental Flow Control
      0     0     15    15 ENCODE - ???
      1     0     16   144 IMITD  - IMI Traffic Descriptor
      1     0     22   150        - Unassigned (Released 18 Oct. 2005)

   The ENCODE option (type 15) has been formally obsoleted by [RFC6814].

4.23.2.  Threats

   The lack of open specifications for these options makes it impossible
   to evaluate their security implications.

4.23.3.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   The lack of open specifications for these options makes it impossible
   to evaluate the operational and interoperability impact if packets
   containing these options are blocked.

4.23.4.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD have configuration
   knobs for IP packets containing these options (or other options not



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   recognized) to select between "ignore & forward" and "drop & log").

   Section 4.23.1 points out that [RFC1122] and [RFC1812] specify that
   unrecognized IP options MUST be ignored.  However, the previous
   paragraph states that routers, security gateways, and firewalls
   SHOULD have a configuration option for dropping and logging IP
   packets containing unrecognized options.  While is is acknowledged
   that this advice contradicts the previous RFC requirements, the
   advice in this document reflects current operational reality.

   Special care needs to be taken in the case of "drop & log".  Devices
   SHOULD count the number of packets dropped, but the logging of drop
   events SHOULD be limited to not overburden device resources.


5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.


6.  Security Considerations

   This document provides advice on the filtering of IP packets that
   contain IP options.  Dropping such packets can help to mitigate the
   security issues that arise from use of different IP options.  Many of
   the IPv4 options listed in this document are deprecated and cause no
   operational impact if dropped.  However, dropping packets containing
   IPv4 options that are in use can cause real operational problems in
   deployed networks.  Therefore, the practice of dropping all IPv4
   packets containing one or more IPv4 options without careful
   consideration is not recommended.


7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Ron Bonica,
   C. M. Heard, Merike Kaeo, Panos Kampanakis, Suresh Krishnan, Arturo
   Servin, SM, and Donald Smith for providing thorough reviews and
   valuable comments.  Merike Kaeo also contributed text used in this
   document.

   The authors also wish to thank various network operations folks who
   supplied feedback on earlier versions of this document, but did not
   wish to be named explicitly in this document.

   Part of this document is initially based on the document "Security
   Assessment of the Internet Protocol" [CPNI2008] that is the result of
   a project carried out by Fernando Gont on behalf of UK CPNI (formerly



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   NISCC).  Fernando Gont would like to thank UK CPNI (formerly NISCC)
   for their continued support.


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC1122]  Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989.

   [RFC1191]  Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
              November 1990.

   [RFC1812]  Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
              RFC 1812, June 1995.

   [RFC2113]  Katz, D., "IP Router Alert Option", RFC 2113,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4727]  Fenner, B., "Experimental Values In IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4,
              ICMPv6, UDP, and TCP Headers", RFC 4727, November 2006.

   [RFC4821]  Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
              Discovery", RFC 4821, March 2007.

   [RFC5015]  Handley, M., Kouvelas, I., Speakman, T., and L. Vicisano,
              "Bidirectional Protocol Independent Multicast (BIDIR-
              PIM)", RFC 5015, October 2007.

   [RFC6398]  Le Faucheur, F., "IP Router Alert Considerations and
              Usage", BCP 168, RFC 6398, October 2011.

   [RFC6814]  Pignataro, C. and F. Gont, "Formally Deprecating Some IPv4
              Options", RFC 6814, November 2012.

8.2.  Informative References

   [BREMIER-BARR]
              Bremier-Barr, A. and H. Levy, "Spoofing prevention
              method", Proceedings of IEEE InfoCom 2005 Volume 1, pp.
              536-547, IEEE, March 2005.



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   [Biondi2007]
              Biondi, P. and A. Ebalard, "IPv6 Routing Header Security",
              CanSecWest 2007 Security Conference <http://
              www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf>, 2007.

   [CIPSOWG1994]
              CIPSOWG, "Commercial Internet Protocol Security Option
              (CIPSO) Working Group", 1994, <http://www.ietf.org/
              proceedings/94jul/charters/cipso-charter.html>.

   [CPNI2008]
              Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol",
               <http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Docs/InternetProtocol.pdf>, 2008.

   [Cisco-IPSO]
              Cisco Systems, Inc., "Cisco IOS Security Configuration
              Guide, Release 12.2 - Configuring IP Security Options",
              2006, <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_2/security/
              configuration/guide/scfipso.html>.

   [Cisco-IPSO-Cmds]
              Cisco Systems, Inc., "Cisco IOS Security Command
              Reference, Release 12.2 - IP Security Options Commands",
              <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_2/security/
              command/reference/srfipso.html>.

   [FIPS1994]
              FIPS, "Standard Security Label for Information Transfer",
              Federal Information Processing Standards Publication. FIP
              PUBS 188, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips188/
              fips188.pdf>, 1994.

   [FONSECA]  Fonseca, R., Porter, G., Katz, R., Shenker, S., and I.
              Stoica, "IP Options are not an option", December 2005.

   [I-D.farinacci-bidir-pim]
              Estrin, D. and D. Farinacci, "Bi-Directional Shared Trees
              in PIM-SM", draft-farinacci-bidir-pim (work in progress),
              May 1999.

   [I-D.ietf-cipso-ipsecurity]
              IETF CIPSO Working Group, "COMMERCIAL IP SECURITY OPTION
              (CIPSO 2.2)", draft-ietf-cipso-ipsecurity-01 (work in
              progress), 1992.

   [I-D.stoica-diffserv-dps]
              Stoica, I., Zhang, H., Baker, F., and Y. Bernet, "Per Hop
              Behaviors Based on Dynamic Packet State",



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              draft-stoica-diffserv-dps-02 (work in progress),
              October 2002.

   [IANA-IP]  Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "IP OPTION NUMBERS",
              April 2011,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ip-parameters>.

   [IRIX2008]
              IRIX, "IRIX 6.5 trusted_networking(7) manual page", 2008,
              <http://techpubs.sgi.com/library/tpl/cgi-bin/
              getdoc.cgi?coll=0650&db=man&fname=/usr/share/catman/a_man/
              cat7/trusted_networking.z>.

   [Kohno2005]
              Kohno, T., Broido, A., and kc. Claffy, "Remote Physical
              Device Fingerprinting", IEEE Transactions on Dependable
              and Secure Computing Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005.

   [Landwehr81]
              Landwehr, C., "Formal Models for Computer Security", ACM
              Computing Surveys Vol 13, No 3, September 1981, Assoc for
              Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1981.

   [MEDINA]   Medina, A., Allman, M., and S. Floyd, "Measuring
              Interactions Between Transport Protocols and Middleboxes",
              Proc. 4th ACM SIGCOMM/USENIX Conference on
              Internet Measurement, October 2004.

   [Microsoft1999]
              Microsoft, "Microsoft Security Program: Microsoft Security
              Bulletin (MS99-038). Patch Available for "Spoofed Route
              Pointer" Vulnerability", 1999, <http://www.microsoft.com/
              technet/security/bulletin/ms99-038.mspx>.

   [OpenBSD1998]
              OpenBSD, "OpenBSD Security Advisory: IP Source Routing
              Problem", 1998,
              <http://www.openbsd.org/advisories/sourceroute.txt>.

   [RFC1038]  St. Johns, M., "Draft revised IP security option",
              RFC 1038, January 1988.

   [RFC1063]  Mogul, J., Kent, C., Partridge, C., and K. McCloghrie, "IP
              MTU discovery options", RFC 1063, July 1988.

   [RFC1108]  Kent, S., "U.S", RFC 1108, November 1991.

   [RFC1385]  Wang, Z., "EIP: The Extended Internet Protocol", RFC 1385,



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              November 1992.

   [RFC1393]  Malkin, G., "Traceroute Using an IP Option", RFC 1393,
              January 1993.

   [RFC1475]  Ullmann, R., "TP/IX: The Next Internet", RFC 1475,
              June 1993.

   [RFC1770]  Graff, C., "IPv4 Option for Sender Directed Multi-
              Destination Delivery", RFC 1770, March 1995.

   [RFC2205]  Braden, B., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., and S.
              Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1
              Functional Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.

   [RFC2407]  Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
              Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.

   [RFC3585]  Jason, J., Rafalow, L., and E. Vyncke, "IPsec
              Configuration Policy Information Model", RFC 3585,
              August 2003.

   [RFC4782]  Floyd, S., Allman, M., Jain, A., and P. Sarolahti, "Quick-
              Start for TCP and IP", RFC 4782, January 2007.

   [RFC4807]  Baer, M., Charlet, R., Hardaker, W., Story, R., and C.
              Wang, "IPsec Security Policy Database Configuration MIB",
              RFC 4807, March 2007.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              RFC 4949, August 2007.

   [RFC5350]  Manner, J. and A. McDonald, "IANA Considerations for the
              IPv4 and IPv6 Router Alert Options", RFC 5350,
              September 2008.

   [RFC5570]  StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common
              Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)",
              RFC 5570, July 2009.

   [RFC6192]  Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the
              Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, March 2011.

   [RFC6274]  Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol
              Version 4", RFC 6274, July 2011.

   [SELinux2008]
              National Security Agency, "Security-Enhanced Linux - NSA/



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              CSS", January 2009,
              <http://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux/index.shtml>.

   [Solaris2008]
              "Solaris Trusted Extensions - Labeled Security for
              Absolute Protection", 2008, <http://www.sun.com/software/
              solaris/ds/trusted_extensions.jsp#3>.


Authors' Addresses

   Fernando Gont
   UTN-FRH / SI6 Networks
   Evaristo Carriego 2644
   Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires  1706
   Argentina

   Phone: +54 11 4650 8472
   Email: fgont@si6networks.com
   URI:   http://www.si6networks.com


   RJ Atkinson
   Consultant
   McLean, VA  22103
   USA

   Email: rja.lists@gmail.com


   Carlos Pignataro
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   7200-12 Kit Creek Road
   Research Triangle Park, NC  27709
   US

   Email: cpignata@cisco.com














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