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Versions: (draft-vyncke-opsec-v6) 00 01 02 03 04

Operational Security Capabilities for                    K. Chittimaneni
IP Network Infrastructure                                         Google
Internet-Draft                                                   M. Kaeo
Intended status: Informational                      Double Shot Security
Expires: May 12, 2013                                          E. Vyncke
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                        November 8, 2012


         Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
                         draft-ietf-opsec-v6-01

Abstract

   Knowledge and experience on how to operate IPv4 securely is
   available: whether it is the Internet or an enterprise internal
   network.  However, IPv6 presents some new security challenges.  RFC
   4942 describes the security issues in the protocol but network
   managers also need a more practical, operations-minded best common
   practices.

   This document analyzes the operational security issues in all places
   of a network (service providers, enterprises and residential users)
   and proposes technical and procedural mitigations techniques.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal



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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Generic Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Addressing Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  Overall Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  Use of ULAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.3.  Point-to-Point Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.1.4.  Privacy Extension Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.1.5.  DHCP/DNS Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.2.  Link-Layer Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.1.  SeND and CGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.2.  DHCP Snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.2.3.  ND/RA Rate Limiting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       2.2.4.  ND/RA Filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       2.2.5.  3GPP Link-Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.3.  Control Plane Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       2.3.1.  Control Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       2.3.2.  Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       2.3.3.  Packet Exceptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     2.4.  Routing Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       2.4.1.  Authenticating Neighbors/Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       2.4.2.  Securing Routing Updates Between Peers . . . . . . . . 15
       2.4.3.  Route Filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     2.5.  Logging/Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       2.5.1.  Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       2.5.2.  Use of Collected Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       2.5.3.  Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     2.6.  Transition/Coexistence Technologies  . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       2.6.1.  Dual Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       2.6.2.  Transition Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       2.6.3.  Translation Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     2.7.  General Device Hardening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   3.  Enterprises Specific Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . 28
     3.1.  External Security Considerations:  . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     3.2.  Internal Security Considerations:  . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   4.  Service Providers Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . 30



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     4.1.  BGP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
       4.1.1.  Remote Triggered Black Hole Filtering  . . . . . . . . 30
     4.2.  Transition Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     4.3.  Lawful Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   5.  Residential Users Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . 31
   6.  Further Reading  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39






































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1.  Introduction

   Running an IPv6 network is new for most operators not only because
   they are not yet used to large scale IPv6 networks but also because
   there are subtle differences between IPv4 and IPv6 especially with
   respect to security.  For example, all layer-2 interactions are now
   done by Neighbor Discovery Protocol [RFC4861] rather than by Address
   Resolution Protocol [RFC0826].  Also, there are subtle differences
   between NAT44 and NPTv6 [RFC6296] which are explicitly pointed out in
   the latter's security considerations section.

   IPv6 networks are deployed using a variety of techniques, each of
   which have their own specific security concerns.

   This document complements [RFC4942] by listing all security issues
   when operating a network utilizing varying transition technologies
   and updating with ones that have been standardized since 2007.  It
   also provides more recent operational deployment experiences where
   warranted.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they
   appear in ALL CAPS.  These words may also appear in this document in
   lower case as plain English words, absent their normative meanings.


2.  Generic Security Considerations

2.1.  Addressing Architecture

   IPv6 address allocations and overall architecture are an important
   part of securing IPv6.

2.1.1.  Overall Structure

   Once an address allocation has been assigned, there should be some
   thought given to an overall address allocation plan.  A structured
   address allocation plan can lead to more concise and simpler firewall
   filtering rules.  With the abundance of address space available, an
   address allocation may be structured around services along with
   geographic locations, which then can be a basis for more structured
   network filters to permit or deny services between geographic
   regions.

   There still exists a debate whether companies should use PI vs PA



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   space [I-D.ietf-v6ops-enterprise-incremental-ipv6] but from a
   security perspective there is little difference.  However, one aspect
   to keep in mind is who has ownership of the address space and who is
   responsible if/when Law Enforcement may need to enforce restrictions
   on routability of the space due to malicious criminal activity.

   When considering how to assign manually configured addresses it is
   necessary to take into consideration the effectiveness of perimeter
   security in a given environment.  There is a trade-off between ease
   of operational deployment where some portions of the IPv6 address
   could be easily recognizable for operational debugging and
   troubleshooting versus the risk of scanning; [SCANNING] shows that
   there are scientifically based mechanisms that make scanning for IPv6
   reachable nodes more realizable than expected.  The use of common
   multicast groups which are defined for important networked devices
   and the use of commonly repeated addresses could make it easy to
   figure out which devices are name servers, routers or other critical
   devices.  While in some environments the perimeter security is so
   poor that obfuscating addresses is considered a benefit; it is a much
   better practice to ensure that perimeter rules are actively checked
   and enforced and that manually configured addresses follow some
   logical allocation scheme for ease of operation.

2.1.2.  Use of ULAs

   ULAs are intended for scenarios where IP addresses will not have
   global scope.  The implicit expectation from the RFC is that all ULAs
   will be randomly created as /48s.  However, in practice some
   environments have chosen to create ULAs as a /32.  While ULAs can be
   useful for infrastructure hiding (as they force the use of address
   translation to reach the Internet), it may create an issue in the
   future if the decision at some point is to make the machines using
   ULAs globally reachable.  This would require renumbering or perhaps
   even stateful IPv6 Network Address and Port Translation (IPv6 NAPT --
   not an IETF work item).  The latter would be problematic in trying to
   track specific machines that may source malware although this is less
   of an issue if appropriate logging is done which includes utilizing
   accurate timestamps and logging a node's source ports [RFC6302].

   The use of ULA does not isolate 'by magic' the part of the network
   using ULA from other parts of the network (including the Internet).
   Routers will happily forward packets whose source or destination
   address is ULA as long as they have a route to the destination and
   there is no ACL blocking those packets.  This means that using ULA
   does not prevent route and packet filters to be implemented and
   monitored.

   It is important to carefully weigh the benefits of using ULAs versus



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   utilizing a section of the global allocation and creating a more
   effective filtering strategy.  A typical argument is that there are
   too many mistakes made with filters and ULAs make things easier to
   hide machines.

2.1.3.  Point-to-Point Links

   [RFC3627] indicates that the use of a /64 is the best solution for
   point-to-point links while a /112 can be used if that's not
   possible.In current deployments where it is felt that using a /64 is
   wasteful for point-to-point links, many opt to use a /127 or /126
   subnet boundary and create manually defined IPv6 addresses for the
   point-to-point or tunnel endpoints.  However, [RFC6164] describes why
   a /127 should be utilized instead.

   Some environments are also using link-local addressing for point-to-
   point links.  While this practice could further reduce the attack
   surface against infrastructure devices, the operational disadvantages
   need also to be carefully considered [I-D.ietf-opsec-lla-only].

2.1.4.  Privacy Extension Addresses

   Randomly generating an interface ID, as described in [RFC4941], is
   part of stateless autoconfiguration and used to address some security
   concerns.  Stateless autoconfiguration relies on the automatically
   generated EUI-64 node address, which together with the /64 prefix
   make up the global unique IPv6 address.  The EUI-64 address is
   generated from the MAC address.  Since MAC addresses for specific
   vendor equipment can be know, it may be easy for a potential attacker
   to perform a more directed intelligent scan to try and ascertain
   specific vendor device reachability for exploitation.  Privacy
   extensions attempts to mitigate this threat.

   As privacy extensions could also be used to hide illegal and unsavory
   activities, privacy extensions addresses can be assigned, audited,
   and controlled in managed enterprise networks via DHCPv6.

   Some people also feel that stateless addressing means that we may not
   know addresses operating in our networks ahead of time in order to to
   build access control lists (ACLs) of authorized users.  While privacy
   addresses are truly generated randomly to protect against user
   tracking, but assuming that nodes use the EUI-64 format for global
   addressing, a list of expected pre-authorized host addresses can be
   generated.

   The decision to utilize privacy addresses can come down to whether
   the network is managed versus unmanaged.  In some environments full
   visibility into the network is required at all times which requires



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   that all traffic be attributable to where it is sourced or where it
   is destined to within a specific network.  This situation is
   dependent on what level of logging is performed.  If logging
   considerations include utilizing accurate timestamps and logging a
   node's source ports [RFC6302] then there should always exist
   appropriate attribution needed to get to the source of any malware
   originator or source of criminal activity.

2.1.5.  DHCP/DNS Considerations

   Many environments use DHCPv6 in their environments to ensure
   audibility and traceability (but see Section 2.5.1.5).  A main
   security concern is the ability to detect and mitigate against rogue
   DHCP servers (Section 2.2.2).

   DNS is often used for malware activities and while there are no
   fundamental differences with IPv4 and IPv6 security concerns, there
   are specific consideration in DNS64 [RFC6147] environments that need
   to be understood.  Specifically the interactions and potential to
   interference with DNSsec implementation need to be understood - these
   are pointed out in detail in Section 2.6.3.2.

2.2.  Link-Layer Security

   IPv6 relies heavily on the Neighbor Discovery protocol (NDP)
   [RFC4861] to perform a variety of link operations such as discovering
   other nodes on the link, resolving their link-layer addresses, and
   finding routers on the link.  If not secured, NDP is vulnerable to
   various attacks such as router/neighbor message spoofing, redirect
   attacks, Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) DoS attacks, etc. many of
   these security threats to NDP have been documented in IPv6 ND Trust
   Models and Threats [RFC3756] and in [RFC6583].

2.2.1.  SeND and CGA

   The original NDP specification called for using IPsec to protect
   Neighbor Discovery messages.  However, manually configuring security
   associations among multiple hosts on a large network can be very
   challenging.  In many environments the tradeoff between using
   technologies that require an effective key management lifecycle
   process creates more of an operational burden than the protection
   offered by a given technology.  IPsec protection for NDP typically
   falls under this category.

   SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SeND), as described in [RFC3971], is a
   mechanism that was designed to secure ND messages without having to
   rely on manual IPsec configuration.  This approach involves the use
   of new NDP options to carry public key based signatures.



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   Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA), as described in
   [RFC3972], are used to ensure that the sender of a Neighbor Discovery
   message is the actual "owner" of the claimed IPv6 address.  A new NDP
   option, the CGA option, was introduced and is used to carry the
   public key and associated parameters.  Another NDP option, the RSA
   Signature option, is used to protect all messages relating to
   neighbor and Router discovery.

   SeND protects against:

   o  Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing

   o  Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure

   o  Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack

   o  Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks

   o  Replay Attacks

   o  Neighbor Discovery DoS Attacks

   SeND does NOT:

   o  Protect statically configured addresses

   o  Protect addresses configured using fixed identifiers (i.e.
      EUI-64)

   o  Provide confidentiality for NDP communications

   o  Compensate for an unsecured link - SEND does not require that the
      addresses on the link and Neighbor Advertisements correspond

   However, at this time, CGA and SeND do not have wide support from
   generic operating system; hence, their usefulness is limited.

2.2.2.  DHCP Snooping

   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6), as detailed in
   [RFC3315], enables DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters such
   as IPv6 network addresses and other configuration information to IPv6
   nodes.  DHCP plays an important role in any large network by
   providing robust stateful autoconfiguration and autoregistration of
   DNS Host Names.

   The two most common threats to DHCP clients come from malicious or
   misconfigured DHCP servers.  A malicious DHCP server is one that is



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   established with the intent of providing incorrect configuration
   information to the client.  The motivation for doing so may be to
   mount a "man in the middle" attack instead of a valid server for
   services such as DNS or to cause a denial of service attack through
   misconfiguration of the client that causes all network communication
   from the client to fail.  A misconfigured, or sometimes referred to
   as rogue, DHCP server is one that has unintentionally been configured
   to answer DHCP client requests with incorrect configuration
   parameters.  Some additional threats against DHCP are discussed in
   the security considerations section of [RFC3315]

   [I-D.gont-opsec-dhcpv6-shield] specifies a mechanism for protecting
   hosts connected to a broadcast network against rogue DHCPv6 servers.
   This mechanism is based on DHCPv6 packet-filtering at the layer-2
   device on which the packets are received.  Before the DCHPv6-Shield
   device is deployed, the administrator specifies the layer-2 port(s)
   on which DHCPv6 packets meant for DHCPv6 clients are allowed.  Only
   those ports to which a DHCPv6 server is to be connected should be
   specified as such.  Once deployed, the DHCPv6-Shield device inspects
   received packets, and allows DHCPv6 messages meant for DHCPv6 clients
   only if they are received on layer-2 ports that have been explicitly
   configured for such purpose.

   Additionally, the Source Address Validation Improvements (SAVI)
   working group is currently working on other ways to mitigate the
   effects of such attacks.  [I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp] would help in creating
   bindings between a DHCPv4 [RFC2131] /DHCPv6 [RFC3315] assigned source
   IP address and a binding anchor [I-D.ietf-savi-framework] on a SAVI
   device.  Also, [RFC6620] describes how to glean similar bindings when
   DHCP is not used.  The bindings can be used to filter packets
   generated on the local link with forged source IP address.

2.2.3.  ND/RA Rate Limiting

   Neighbor Discovery (ND) can be vulnerable to denial of service (DoS)
   attacks in which a router is forced to perform address resolution for
   a large number of unassigned addresses.  Possible side effects of
   this attack preclude new devices from joining the network or even
   worse rendering the last hop router ineffective due to high CPU
   usage.  Easy mitigative steps include rate limiting Neighbor
   Solicitations, restricting the amount of state reserved for
   unresolved solicitations, and clever cache/timer management.

   [RFC6583] discusses the potential for DOS in detail and suggests
   implementation improvements and operational mitigation techniques
   that may be used to mitigate or alleviate the impact of such attacks.
   Here are some feasible mitigation options that can be employed by
   network operators today:



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   o  Ingress filtering of unused addresses by ACL, route filtering,
      longer than /64 prefix; These require static configuration of the
      addresses.

   o  Tuning of NDP process (where supported)

   Additionally, IPv6 ND uses multicast extensively for signaling
   messages on the local link to avoid broadcast messages for on-the-
   wire efficiency.  However, this has some side effects on wifi
   networks, especially a negative impact on battery life of smartphones
   and other battery operated devices that are connected to such
   networks.  The following drafts are actively discussing methods to
   rate limit RAs and other ND messages on wifi networks in order to
   address this issue:

   o  [I-D.thubert-savi-ra-throttler]

   o  [I-D.chakrabarti-nordmark-energy-aware-nd]

2.2.4.  ND/RA Filtering

   Router Advertisement spoofing is a well-known attack vector and has
   been extensively documented.  The presence of rogue RAs, either
   intentional or malicious, can cause partial or complete failure of
   operation of hosts on an IPv6 link.  For example, a host can select
   an incorrect router address which can be used as a man-in-the-middle
   (MITM) attack or can assume wrong prefixes to be used for stateless
   address configuration (SLAAC).  [RFC6104] summarizes the scenarios in
   which rogue RAs may be observed and presents a list of possible
   solutions to the problem.  [RFC6105] (RA-Guard) describes a solution
   framework for the rogue RA problem where network segments are
   designed around switching devices that are capable of identifying
   invalid RAs and blocking them before the attack packets actually
   reach the target nodes.

   However, several evasion techniques that circumvent the protection
   provided by RA-Guard have surfaced.  A key challenge to this
   mitigation technique is introduced by IPv6 fragmentation.  An
   attacker can conceal the attack by fragmenting his packets into
   multiple fragments such that the switching device that is responsible
   for blocking invalid RAs cannot find all the necessary information to
   perform packet filtering in the same packet.
   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation] describes such evasion
   techniques, and provides advice to RA-Guard implementers such that
   the aforementioned evasion vectors can be eliminated.

   Given that the IPv6 Fragmentation Header can be leveraged to
   circumvent current implmentations of RA-Guard,



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   [I-D.gont-6man-nd-extension-headers] aims to update [RFC4861] such
   that use of the IPv6 Fragmentation Header is forbidden in all
   Neighbor Discovery messages except "Certification Path
   Advertisement", thus allowing for simple and effective measures to
   counter Neighbor Discovery attacks.

   It is still recommended that RA-Guard be be employed as a first line
   of defense against common attack vectors including misconfigured
   hosts.

2.2.5.  3GPP Link-Layer Security

   The 3GPP link is a point-to-point like link that has no link-layer
   address.  This implies there can only be an end host and the first-
   hop router i.e., a GGSN or a PGW on that link.  The GGSN/PGW never
   configures a non link-local address on the link using the prefix
   advertised on it and the advertised prefix must not be used for on-
   link determination.  There is no need for an address resolution on
   the 3GPP link, since there are no link-layer addresses.  Furthermore,
   the GGSN/PGW assigns a prefix that is unique within each 3GPP link
   that uses IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration.  This avoids the
   necessity to perform DAD at the network level for every address built
   by the cellular host.  The GGSN/PGW always provides an IID to the
   cellular host for the purpose of configuring the link-local address
   and ensures the uniqueness of the IID on the link (i.e., no
   collisions between its own link-local address and the cellular
   host's).

   The 3GPP link model itself mitigates most of the known NDP-related
   Denial-of-Service attacks.  In practice, the GGSN/PGW only needs to
   route all traffic to the cellular host that fall under the prefix
   assigned to it.  This implies the GGSN/PGW may implement a minimal
   neighbor discovery protocol subset; since, due the point-to-point
   link model and the absence of link-layer addressing the address
   resolution can be entirely statically configured per each 3GPP link,
   and there is no need to defend any other address than the link-local
   address for very unlikely duplicates.

   See Section 5 of [RFC6459] for a more detailed discussion on the 3GPP
   link model, NDP on it and the address configuration detail.

2.3.  Control Plane Security

   [RFC6192] defines the router control plane and this definition is
   repeated here for the reader's convenience.

   Modern router architecture design maintains a strict separation of
   forwarding and router control plane hardware and software.  The



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   router control plane supports routing and management functions.  It
   is generally described as the router architecture hardware and
   software components for handling packets destined to the device
   itself as well as building and sending packets originated locally on
   the device.  The forwarding plane is typically described as the
   router architecture hardware and software components responsible for
   receiving a packet on an incoming interface, performing a lookup to
   identify the packet's IP next hop and determine the best outgoing
   interface towards the destination, and forwarding the packet out
   through the appropriate outgoing interface.

   While the forwarding plane is usually implemented in high-speed
   hardware, the control plane is implemented by a generic processor
   (named router processor RP) and cannot process packets at a high
   rate.  Hence, this processor can be attacked by flooding its input
   queue with more packets than it can process.  The control plane
   processor is then unable to process valid control packets and the
   router can lose OSPF or BGP adjacencies which can cause a severe
   network disruption.

   The mitigation technique is:

   o  To drop non legit control packet before they are queued to the RP
      (this can be done by a forwarding plane ACL) and

   o  To rate limit the remaining packets to a rate that the RP can
      sustain.  Protocol specific protection should also be done (for
      example, a spoofed OSPFv3 packet could trigger the execution of
      the Dijkstra algorithm, therefore the number of Dijsktra execution
      should be also rate limited).

   This section will consider several classes of control packets:

   o  Control protocols: routing protocols: such as OSPFv3, BGP and by
      extension Neighbor Discovery and ICMP

   o  Management protocols: SSH, SNMP, IPfix, etc

   o  Packet exceptions: which are normal data packets which requires a
      specific processing such as generating a packet-too-big ICMP
      message or having the hop-by-hop extension header.

2.3.1.  Control Protocols

   This class includes OSPFv3, BGP, NDP, ICMP.

   An ingress ACL to be applied on all the router interfaces SHOULD be
   configured such as:



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   o  drop OSPFv3 (identified by Next-Header being 89) and RIPng
      (identified by UDP port 521) packets from a non link-local address

   o  allow BGP (identified by TCP port 179) packets from all BGP
      neighbors and drop the others

   o  allow all ICMP packets (transit and to the router interfaces)

   Note: dropping OSPFv3 packets which are authenticated by IPsec could
   be impossible on some routers whose ACL are unable to parse the IPsec
   ESP or AH extension headers.

   Rate limiting of the valid packets SHOULD be done.  The exact
   configuration obviously depends on the power of the Route Processor.

2.3.2.  Management Protocols

   This class includes: SSH, SNMP, syslog, NTP, etc

   An ingress ACL to be applied on all the router interfaces SHOULD be
   configured such as:

   o  Drop packets destined to the routers except those belonging to
      protocols which are used (for example, permit TCP 22 and drop all
      when only SSH is used);

   o  Drop packets where the source does not match the security policy,
      for example if SSH connections should only be originated from the
      NOC, then the ACL should permit TCP port 22 packets only from the
      NOC prefix.

   Rate limiting of the valid packets SHOULD be done.  The exact
   configuration obviously depends on the power of the Route Processor.

2.3.3.  Packet Exceptions

   This class covers multiple cases where a data plane packet is punted
   to the route processor because it requires specific processing:

   o  generation of an ICMP packet-too-big message when a data plane
      packet cannot be forwarded because it is too large;

   o  generation of an ICMP hop-limit-expired message when a data plane
      packet cannot be forwarded because its hop-limit field has reached
      0;

   o  generation of an ICMP destination-unreachable message when a data
      plane packet cannot be forwarded for any reason;



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   o  processing of the hop-by-hop extension header.  See
      [I-D.krishnan-ipv6-hopbyhop]

   On some routers, not everything can be done by the specialized data
   plane hardware which requires some packets to be 'punted' to the
   generic RP.  This could include for example the processing of a long
   extension header chain in order to apply an ACL based on layer 4
   information.

   An ingress ACL cannot help to mitigate a control plane attack using
   those packet exceptions.  The only protection for the RP is to limit
   the rate of those packet exceptions forwarded to the RP, this means
   that some data plane packets will be dropped without any ICMP
   messages back to the source which will cause Path MTU holes.  But,
   there is no other solution.

   In addition to limiting the rate of data plane packets queued to the
   RP, it is also important to limit the generation rate of ICMP
   messages both the save the RP but also to prevent an amplification
   attack using the router as a reflector.

2.4.  Routing Security

   Routing security in general can be broadly divided into three
   sections:

   1.  Authenticating neighbors/peers

   2.  Securing routing updates between peers

   3.  Route filtering

   [I-D.jdurand-bgp-security] covers these sections specifically for BGP
   in detail.

2.4.1.  Authenticating Neighbors/Peers

   A basic element of routing is the process of forming adjacencies,
   neighbor, or peering relationships with other routers.  From a
   security perspective, it is very important to establish such
   relationships only with routers and/or administrative domains that
   one trusts.  A traditional approach has been to use MD5 HMAC, which
   allows routers to authenticate each other prior to establishing a
   routing relationship.

   OSPFv3 can rely on IPsec to fulfill the authentication function.
   However, it should be noted that IPsec support is not standard on all
   routing platforms.  In some cases, this requires specialized hardware



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   that offloads crypto over to dedicated ASICs or enhanced software
   images (both of which often come with added financial cost) to
   provide such functionality.  An added detail is to determine whether
   OSPFv3 IPsec implementations use AH or ESP-Null for integrity
   protection.  In early implementations all OSPFv3 IPsec configurations
   relied on AH since the details weren't specified in [RFC2740] and the
   updated [RFC5340].  However, the document which specifically
   describes how IPsec should be implemented for OSPFv3 [RFC4552]
   specifically states that ESP-Null MUST and AH MAY be implemented
   since it follows the overall IPsec standards wordings.  OSPFv3 can
   also use normal ESP to encrypt the OSPFv3 payload to hide the routing
   information.

   [RFC6506] changes OSPFv3's reliance on IPsec by appending an
   authentication trailer to the end of the OSPFv3 packets.  This
   document does not specifically provide for a mechanism that will
   authenticate the specific originator of a packet.  Rather, it will
   allow a router to confirm that the packet has indeed been issued by a
   router that had access to the shared authentication key.

   With all authentication mechanisms, operators should confirm that
   implementations can support re-keying mechanisms that do not cause
   outages.  There have been instances where any re-keying cause outages
   and therefore the tradeoff between utilizing this functionality needs
   to be weighed against the protection it provides.

2.4.2.  Securing Routing Updates Between Peers

   IPv6 initially mandated the provisioning of IPsec capability in all
   nodes.  However, in the updated IPv6 Nodes Requirement standard
   [RFC6434] is now a SHOULD and not MUST implement.  Theoretically it
   is possible, and recommended, that communication between two IPv6
   nodes, including routers exchanging routing information be encrypted
   using IPsec.  In practice however, deploying IPsec is not always
   feasible given hardware and software limitations of various platforms
   deployed, as described in the earlier section.  Additionally, in a
   protocol such as OSPFv3 where adjacencies are formed on a one-to-many
   basis, IPsec key management becomes difficult to maintain and is not
   often utilized.

2.4.3.  Route Filtering

   Route filtering policies will be different depending on whether they
   pertain to edge route filtering vs internal route filtering.  At a
   minimum, IPv6 routing policy as it pertains to routing between
   different administrative domains should aim to maintain parity with
   IPv4 from a policy perspective e.g.,




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   o  Filter internal-use, non-globally routable IPv6 addresses at the
      perimeter

   o  Discard packets from and to bogon and reserved space

   o  Configure ingress route filters that validate route origin, prefix
      ownership, etc. through the use of various routing databases,
      e.g., RADB.  There is additional work being done in this area to
      formally validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements in
      [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]

   Some good recommendations for filtering can be found from Team CYMRU
   at [CYMRU].

2.5.  Logging/Monitoring

   In order to perform forensic research in case of any security
   incident or to detect abnormal behaviors, network operator should log
   multiple pieces of information.

   This includes:

   o  logs of all applications when available (for example web servers);

   o  use of IP Flow Information Export [RFC5101] also known as IPfix;

   o  use of SNMP MIB [RFC4293];

   o  use of the Neighbor cache;

   o  use of stateful DHCPv6 [RFC3315] lease cache.

   Please note that there are privacy issues related to how those logs
   are collected, kept and safely discarded.  Operators are urged to
   check their country legislation.

   All those pieces of information will be used for:

   o  forensic (Section 2.5.2.1) research to answer questions such as
      who did what and when?

   o  correlation (Section 2.5.2.3): which IP addresses were used by a
      specific node (assuming the use of privacy extensions addresses
      [RFC4941])

   o  inventory (Section 2.5.2.2): which IPv6 nodes are on my network?





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   o  abnormal behavior detection (Section 2.5.2.4): unusual traffic
      patterns are often the symptoms of a abnormal behavior which is in
      turn a potential attack (denial of services, network scan, a node
      being part of a botnet, ...)

2.5.1.  Data Sources

   This section lists the most important sources of data that are useful
   for operational security.

2.5.1.1.  Logs of Applications

   Those logs are usually text files where the remote IPv6 address is
   stored in all characters (not binary).  This can complicate the
   processing since one IPv6 address, 2001:db8::1 can be written in
   multiple ways such as:

   o  2001:DB8::1 (in uppercase)

   o  2001:0db8::0001 (with leading 0)

   o  and many other ways.

   RFC 5952 [RFC5952] explains this problem in detail and recommends the
   use of a single canonical format (in short use lower case and
   suppress leading 0).  This memo recommends the use of canonical
   format [RFC5952] for IPv6 addresses in all possible cases.  If the
   existing application cannot log under the canonical format, then this
   memo recommends the use an external program (or filter) in order to
   canonicalize all IPv6 addresses.

   For example, this perl script can be used:



















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   #!/usr/bin/perl ?w
   use strict ;
   use Socket ;
   use Socket6 ;

   my (@words, $word, $binary_address) ;

   ## go through the file one line at a time
   while (my $line = <STDIN>) {
     @words = split /[ \n]/, $line ;
     foreach $word (@words) {
       $binary_address = inet_pton AF_INET6, $word ;
       if ($binary_address) {
         print inet_ntop AF_INET6, $binary_address ;
       } else {
         print $word ;
       }
       print " " ;
     }
     print "\n" ;
   }

2.5.1.2.  IP Flow Information Export by IPv6 Routers

   IPfix [RFC5102] defines some data elements that are useful for
   security:

   o  in section 5.4 (IP Header fields): nextHeaderIPv6 and
      sourceIPv6Address;

   o  in section 5.6 (Sub-IP fields) sourceMacAddress.

   Moreover, IPfix is very efficient in terms of data handling and
   transport.  It can also aggregate flows by a key such as
   sourceMacAddress in order to have aggregated data associated with a
   specific sourceMacAddress.  This memo recommends the use of IPfix and
   aggregation on nextHeaderIPv6, sourceIPv6Address and
   sourceMacAddress.

2.5.1.3.  SNMP MIB by IPv6 Routers

   RFC 4293 [RFC4293] defines a Management Information Base (MIB) for
   the two address families of IP.  This memo recommends the use of:

   o  ipIfStatsTable table which collects traffic counters per
      interface;





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   o  ipNetToPhysicalTable table which is the content of the Neighbor
      cache, i.e. the mapping between IPv6 and data-link layer
      addresses.

2.5.1.4.  Neighbor Cache of IPv6 Routers

   The neighbor cache of routers contains all mappings between IPv6
   addresses and data-link layer addresses.  It is usually available by
   two means:

   o  the SNMP MIB (Section 2.5.1.3) as explained above;

   o  also by connecting over a secure management channel (such as SSH
      or HTTPS) and explicitely requesting a neighbor cache dump.

   The neighbor cache is highly dynamic as mappings are added when a new
   IPv6 address appears on the network (could be quite often with
   privacy extension addresses [RFC4941] or when they are removed when
   the state goes from UNREACH to removed (the default time for a
   removal per Neighbor Unreachability Detection [RFC4861] algorithm is
   38 seconds for a typical host such as Windows 7).  This means that
   the content of the neighbor cache must periodically be fetched every
   30 seconds (to be on the safe side) and stored for later use.

   This is an important source of information because it is trivial (on
   a switch not using the SAVI [I-D.ietf-savi-framework] algorithm) to
   defeat the mapping between data-link layer address and IPv6 address.
   Let us rephrase the previous statement: having access to the current
   and past content of the neighbor cache has a paramount value for
   forensic and audit trail.

2.5.1.5.  Stateful DHCPv6 Lease

   In some networks, IPv6 addresses are managed by stateful DHCPv6
   server [RFC3315] that leases IPv6 addresses to clients.  It is indeed
   quite similar to DHCP for IPv4 so it can be tempting to use this DHCP
   lease file to discover the mapping between IPv6 addresses and data-
   link layer addresses as it was usually done in the IPv4 era.

   It is not so easy in the IPv6 era because not all nodes will use
   DHCPv6 (there are nodes which can only do stateless
   autoconfiguration) but also because DHCPv6 clients are identified not
   by their hardware-client address as in IPv4 but by a DHCP Unique ID
   (DUID) which can have several formats: some being the data-link layer
   address, some being data-link layer address prepended with time
   information or even an opaque number which is useless for operation
   security.  Moreover, when the DUID is based on the data-link address,
   this address can be of any interface of the client (such as the



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   wireless interface while the client actually uses its wired interface
   to connect to the network).

   In short, the DHCPv6 lease file is less interesting than in the IPv4
   era.  DHCPv6 servers that keeps the relayed data-link layer address
   in addition to the DUID in the lease file do not suffer from this
   limitation.  On a managed network where all hosts support DHCPv6,
   special care must be taken to prevent stateless autoconfiguration
   anyway (and if applicable) by sending RA with all announced prefixes
   without the A-bit set.

   The mapping between data-link layer address and the IPv6 address can
   be secured by using switches implementing the SAVI
   [I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp] algorithms.

2.5.1.6.  Other Data Sources

   There are other data sources that must be kept exactly as in the IPv4
   network:

   o  historical mapping of MAC address to RADIUS user authentication in
      a IEEE 802.1X network or an IPsec-based remote access VPN;

   o  historical mapping of MAC address to switch interface in a wired
      network.

2.5.2.  Use of Collected Data

   This section leverages the data collected as described before
   (Section 2.5.1) in order to achieve several security benefits.

2.5.2.1.  Forensic

   The forensic use case is when the network operator must locate an
   IPv6 address that was present in the network at a certain time or is
   still currently in the network.

   The source of information can be, in decreasing order, neighbor
   cache, DHCP lease file.  Then, the procedure is:

   1.  based on the IPv6 prefix of the IPv6 address find the router(s)
       which are used to reach this prefix;

   2.  based on this limited set of routers, on the incident time and on
       IPv6 address to retrieve the data-link address from live neighbor
       cache, from the historical data of the neighbor cache, or from
       the DHCP lease file;




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   3.  based on the data-link layer address, look-up on which switch
       interface was this data-link layer address.  In the case of
       wireless LAN, the RADIUS log should have the mapping between user
       identification and the MAC address.

   At the end of the process, the interface where the malicious user was
   connected or the username that was used by the malicious user is
   found.

2.5.2.2.  Inventory

   RFC 5157 [RFC5157] is about the difficulties to scan an IPv6 network
   due to the vast number of IPv6 addresses per link.  This has the side
   effect of making the inventory task difficult in an IPv6 network
   while it was trivial to do in an IPv4 network (a simple enumeration
   of all IPv4 addresses, followed by a ping and a TCP/UDP port scan).
   Getting an inventory of all connected devices is of prime importance
   for a secure operation of a network.

   There are two ways to do an inventory of an IPv6 network.

   The first technique is to use the IPfix information and extract the
   list of all IPv6 source addresses to find all IPv6 nodes that sent
   packets through a router.  This is very efficient but alas will not
   discover silent node that never transmitted such packets...  Also, it
   must be noted that link-local addresses will never be discovered by
   this means.

   The second way is again to use the collected neighbor cache content
   to find all IPv6 addresses in the cache.  This process will also
   discover all link-local addresses.  See Section 2.5.1.4.

2.5.2.3.  Correlation

   In an IPv4 network, it is easy to correlate multiple logs, for
   example to find events related to a specific IPv4 address.  A simple
   Unix grep command was enough to scan through multiple text-based
   files and extract all lines relevant to a specific IPv4 address.

   In an IPv6 network, this is slightly more difficult because different
   character strings can express the same IPv6 address.  Therefore, the
   simple Unix grep command cannot be used.  Moreover, an IPv6 node can
   have multiple IPv6 addresses...

   In order to do correlation in IPv6-related logs, it is advised to
   have all logs with canonical IPv6 addresses.  Then, the neighbor
   cache current (or historical) data set must be searched to find the
   data-link layer address of the IPv6 address.  Then, the current and



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   historical neighbor cache data sets must be searched for all IPv6
   addresses associated to this data-link layer address: this is the
   search set.  The last step is to search in all log files (containing
   only IPv6 address in canonical format) for any IPv6 addresses in the
   search set.

2.5.2.4.  Abnormal Behavior Detection

   Abnormal behaviors (such as network scanning, spamming, denial of
   service) can be detected in the same way as in an IPv4 network

   o  sudden increase of traffic detected by interface counter (SNMP) or
      by aggregated traffic from IPfix records [RFC5102];

   o  change of traffic pattern (number of connection per second, number
      of connection per host...) with the use of IPfix [RFC5102]

2.5.3.  Summary

   While some data sources (IPfix, MIB, switch CAM tables, logs, ...)
   used in IPv4 are also used in the secure operation of an IPv6
   network, the DHCPv6 lease file is less reliable and the neighbor
   cache is of prime importance.

   The fact that there are multiple ways to express in a character
   string the same IPv6 address renders the use of filters mandatory
   when correlation must be done.

2.6.  Transition/Coexistence Technologies

   Some text

2.6.1.  Dual Stack

   Dual stack has established itself as the preferred deployment choice
   for most network operators without a MPLS core where 6PE [RFC4798] is
   quite common.  Dual stacking the network offers many advantages over
   other transition mechanisms.  Firstly, it is easy to turn on without
   impacting normal IPv4 operations.  Secondly, perhaps more
   importantly, it is easier to troubleshoot when things break.  Dual
   stack allows you to gradually turn IPv4 operations down when your
   IPv6 network is ready for prime time.

   From an operational security perspective, this now means that you
   have twice the exposure.  One needs to think about protecting both
   protocols now.  At a minimum, the IPv6 portion of a dual stacked
   network should maintain parity with IPv4 from a security policy point
   of view.  Typically, the following methods are employed to protect



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   IPv4 networks at the edge:

   o  ACLs to permit or deny traffic

   o  Firewalls with stateful packet inspection

   It is recommended that these ACLs and/or firewalls be additionally
   configured to protect IPv6 communications.  Also, given the end-to-
   end connectivity that IPv6 provides, it is also recommended that
   hosts be fortified against threats.  General device hardening
   guidelines are provided in Section 2.7

2.6.2.  Transition Mechanisms

   There are many tunnels used for specific use cases.  Except when
   protected by IPsec [RFC4301], all those tunnels have a couple of
   security issues (most of them being described in RFC 6169 [RFC6169]);

   o  tunnel injection: a malevolent person knowing a few pieces of
      information (for example the tunnel endpoints and the used
      protocol) can forge a packet which looks like a legit and valid
      encapsulated packet that will gladly be accepted by the
      destination tunnel endpoint, this is a specific case of spoofing;

   o  traffic interception: no confidentiality is provided by the tunnel
      protocols (without the use of IPsec), therefore anybody on the
      tunnel path can intercept the traffic and have access to the
      clear-text IPv6 packet;

   o  service theft: as there is no authorization, even a non authorized
      user can use a tunnel relay for free (this is a specific case of
      tunnel injection);

   o  reflection attack: another specific use case of tunnel injection
      where the attacker injects packets with an IPv4 destination
      address not matching the IPv6 address causing the first tunnel
      endpoint to re-encapsulate the packet to the destination...
      Hence, the final IPv4 destination will not see the original IPv4
      address but only one IPv4 address of the relay router.

   o  bypassing security policy: if a firewall or an IPS is on the path
      of the tunnel, then it will probably neither inspect not detect an
      malevolent IPv6 traffic contained in the tunnel.

   To mitigate the bypassing of security policies, it could be helpful
   to block all default configuration tunnels by denying all IPv4
   traffic matching:




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   o  IP protocol 41: this will block ISATAP (Section 2.6.2.2), 6to4
      (Section 2.6.2.4), 6rd (Section 2.6.2.5) as well as 6in4
      (Section 2.6.2.1) tunnels;

   o  IP protocol 47: this will block GRE (Section 2.6.2.1) tunnels;

   o  UDP protocol 3544: this will block the default encapsulation of
      Teredo (Section 2.6.2.3) tunnels.

   Ingress filtering [RFC2827] should also be applied on all tunnel
   endpoints if applicable to prevent IPv6 address spoofing.

   As several of the tunnel techniques share the same encapsulation
   (i.e.  IPv4 protocol 41) and embeb the IPv4 address in the IPv6
   address, there are a set of well-known looping attacks described in
   RFC 6324 [RFC6324], this RFC also proposes mitigation techniques.

2.6.2.1.  Site-to-Site Static Tunnels

   Site-to-site static tunnels are described in RFC 2529 [RFC2529] and
   in GRE [RFC2784].  As the IPv4 endpoints are statically configured
   and are not dynamic they are slightly more secure (bi-directional
   service theft is mostly impossible) but traffic interception ad
   tunnel injection are still possible.  Therefore, the use of IPsec
   [RFC4301] in transport mode and protecting the encapsulated IPv4
   packets is recommended for those tunnels.  Alternatively, IPsec in
   tunnel mode can be used to transport IPv6 traffic over a non-trusted
   IPv4 network.

2.6.2.2.  ISATAP

   ISATAP tunnels [RFC5214] are mainly used within a single
   administrative domain and to connect a single IPv6 host to the IPv6
   network.  This means that endpoints and and the tunnel endpoint are
   usually managed by a single entity; therefore, audit trail and strict
   anti-spoofing are usually possible and this raises the overall
   security.

   Special care must be taken to avoid looping attack by implementing
   the measures of RFC 6324 [RFC6324] and of [I-D.templin-v6ops-isops].

   IPsec [RFC4301] in transport or tunnel mode can be used to secure the
   IPv4 ISATAP traffic to provide IPv6 traffic confidentiality and
   prevent service theft.







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2.6.2.3.  Teredo

   Teredo tunnels [RFC4380] are mainly used in a residential environment
   because that can easily traverse an IPv4 NAT-PT device thanks to its
   UDP encapsulation and they connect a single host to the IPv6
   Internet.  Teredo shares the same issues as other tunnels: no
   authentication, no confidentiality, possible spoofing and reflection
   attacks.

   IPsec [RFC4301] for the transported IPv6 traffic is recommended.

   The biggest threat to Teredo is probably for IPv4-only network as
   Teredo has been designed to easily traverse IPV4 NAT-PT devices which
   are quite often co-located with a stateful firewall.  Therefore, if
   the stateful IPv4 firewall allows unrestricted UDP outbound and
   accept the return UDP traffic, then Teredo actually punches a hole in
   this firewall for all IPv6 traffic to the Internet and from the
   Internet.  While host policies can be deployed to block Teredo in an
   IPv4-only network in order to avoid this firewall bypass, it would be
   more efficient to block all UDP outbound traffic at the IPv4 firewall
   if deemed possible (of course, at least port 53 should be left open
   for DNS traffic).

2.6.2.4.  6to4

   6to4 tunnels [RFC3056] require a public routable IPv4 address in
   order to work correctly.  They can be used to provide either one IPv6
   host connectivity to the IPv6 Internet or multiple IPv6 networks
   connectivity to the IPV6 Internet.  The 6to4 relay is usually the
   anycast address defined in [RFC3068]

   They suffer from several technical issues as well as security issues
   [RFC3964].  Their use is no longer recommended (see
   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-6to4-to-historic]).

2.6.2.5.  6rd

   While 6rd tunnels share the same encapsulation as 6to4 tunnels
   (Section 2.6.2.4), they are designed to be used within a single SP
   domain, in other words they are deployed in a more constrained
   environment than 6to4 tunnels and have little security issues except
   lack of confidentiality.  The security considerations (Section 12) of
   [RFC5969] describes how to secure the 6rd tunnels.

   IPsec [RFC4301] for the transported IPv6 traffic can be used if
   confidentiality is important.





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2.6.2.6.  6PE and 6VPE

   Organizations using MPLS in their core can also use 6PE [RFC4798] and
   6VPE [RFC4659] to enable IPv6 access over MPLS.  As 6PE and 6VPE are
   really similar to BGP/MPLS IP VPN described in [RFC4364], the
   security of these networks is also similar to the one described in
   [RFC4381].  It relies on:

   o  Address space, routing and traffic seperation with the help of VRF
      (only applicable to 6VPE);

   o  Hiding the IPv4 core, hence removing all attacks against
      P-routers;

   o  Securing the routing protocol between CE and PE, in the case of
      6PE and 6VPE, link-local addresses (see [I-D.ietf-opsec-lla-only])
      can be used and as these addresses cannot be reached from outside
      of the link, the security of 6PE and 6VPE is even higher than the
      IPv4 BGP/MPLS IP VPN.

2.6.2.7.  DS-Lite

   DS-lite is more a translation mechanism and is therefore analyzed
   further (Section 2.6.3.3) in this document.

2.6.2.8.  Mapping of Address and Port

   With the tunnel and encapsulation versions of Mapping of Address and
   Port (MAP [I-D.ietf-softwire-map]), the access network is purely an
   IPv6 network and MAP protocols are used to give IPv4 hosts on the
   subscriber network, access to IPv4 hosts on the Internet.  The
   subscriber router does stateful operations in order to map all
   internal IPv4 addresses and layer-4 ports to the IPv4 address and the
   set of layer-4 ports received through MAP configuration process.  The
   SP equipment always does stateless operations (either decapsulation
   or stateless translation).  Therefore, as opposed to Section 2.6.3.3
   there is no state-exhaustion DoS attack against the SP equipment
   because there is no state and there is no operation caused by a new
   layer-4 connection (no logging operation).

   The SP MAP equipment MUST implement all the security considerations
   of [I-D.ietf-softwire-map]; notably, ensuring that the mapping of the
   IPv4 address and port are consistent with the configuration.

2.6.3.  Translation Mechanisms

   Translation mechanisms between IPv4 and IPv6 networks are alternative
   coexistence strategies while networks transition to IPv6.  While a



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   framework is described in [RFC6144] the specific security
   considerations are documented in each individual mechanism.  For the
   most part they specifically mention interference with IPsec or DNSSEC
   deployments, how to mitigate spoofed traffic and what some effective
   filtering strategies may be.

2.6.3.1.  Carrier-Grade Nat (CGN)

   Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN), also called NAT444 CGN or Large Scale NAT
   (LSN) or SP NAT is described in [RFC6264] and is utilized as an
   interim measure to prolong the use of IPv4 in a large service
   provider network until the provider can deploy and effective IPv6
   solution.  [RFC6598] requested a specific IANA allocated /10 IPv4
   address block to be used as address space shared by all access
   networks using CGN.  This has been allocated as 100.64.0.0/10.

   Section 13 of [RFC6269] lists some specific security-related issues
   caused by large scale address sharing.  The Security Considerations
   section of [RFC6598] also lists some specific mitigation techniques
   for potential misuse of shared address space.

   [From Panos K: could mention the log size concern and
   draft-donley-behave-deterministic-cgn that alleviates it]

2.6.3.2.  NAT64/DNS64

   Stateful NAT64 translation [RFC6146] allows IPv6-only clients to
   contact IPv4 servers using unicast UDP, TCP, or ICMP.  It can be used
   in conjunction with DNS64 [RFC6147], a mechanism which synthesizes
   AAAA records from existing A records.

   The Security Consideration sections of [RFC6146] and [RFC6147] list
   the comprehensive issues.  A specific issue with the use of NAT64 is
   that it will interfere with most IPsec deployments unless UDP
   encapsulation is used.  DNS64 has an incidence on DNSSEC see section
   3.1 of [I-D.ietf-behave-nat64-discovery-heuristic].

2.6.3.3.  DS-lite

   Dual-Stack Lite (DS-Lite) [RFC6333] is a transition technique that
   enables a service provider to share IPv4 addresses among customers by
   combining two well-known technologies: IP in IP (IPv4-in-IPv6) and
   Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT)

   Security considerations with respect to DS-Lite mainly revolve around
   logging data, preventing DoS attacks from rogue devices and
   restricting service offered by the AFTR only to registered customers.




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   Section 11 of [RFC6333] describes important security issues
   associated with this technology.

2.7.  General Device Hardening

   There are many environments which rely too much on the network
   infrastructure to disallow malicious traffic to get access to
   critical hosts.  In new IPv6 deployments it has been common to see
   IPv6 traffic enabled but none of the typical access control
   mechanisms enabled for IPv6 device access.  With the possibility of
   network device configuration mistakes and the growth of IPv6 in the
   overall Internet it is important to ensure that all individual
   devices are hardened agains miscreant behavior.

   The following guidelines should be used to ensure appropriate
   hardening of the host, be it an individual computer or router,
   firewall, load-balancer,server, etc device.

   o  Restrict access to the device to authenticated and authorized
      individuals

   o  Monitor and audit access to the device

   o  Turn off any unused services on the end node

   o  Understand which IPv6 addresses are being used to source traffic
      and change defaults if necessary

   o  Use cryptographically protected protocols for device management if
      possible (SCP, SNMPv3, SSH, TLS, etc)

   o  Use host firewall capabilities to control traffic that gets
      processed by upper layer protocols

   o  Use virus scanners to detect malicious programs


3.  Enterprises Specific Security Considerations

   Enterprises generally have robust network security policies in place
   to protect existing IPv4 networks.  These policies have been
   distilled from years of experiential knowledge of securing IPv4
   networks.  At the very least, it is recommended that enterprise
   networks have parity between their security policies for both
   protocol versions.

   Security considerations in the enterprise can be broadly categorized
   into two sections - External and Internal.



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3.1.  External Security Considerations:

   The external aspect deals with providing security at the edge or
   perimeter of the enterprise network where it meets the service
   providers network.  This is commonly achieved by filtering traffic
   either by implementing dedicated firewalls with stateful packet
   inspection or a router with ACLs.  A common default IPv4 policy on
   firewalls that could easily be ported to IPv6 is to allow all traffic
   outbound while only allowing specific traffic, such as established
   sessions, inbound.  Here are a few more things that could enhance the
   default policy:

   o  Filter internal-use IPv6 addresses at the perimeter

   o  Discard packets from and to bogon and reserved space

   o  Accept certain ICMPv6 messages to allow proper operation of ND and
      PMTUD, see also [RFC4890]

   o  Filter specific extension headers, where possible

   o  Filter unneeded services at the perimeter

   o  Implement anti-spoofing filtering or other anti-spoof protections

   o  Implement appropriate rate-limiters and control-plane policers

3.2.  Internal Security Considerations:

   The internal aspect deals with providing security inside the
   perimeter of the network, including the end host.  The most
   significant concerns here are related to Neighbor Discovery.  At the
   network level, it is recommended that all security considerations
   discussed in Section 2.2 be reviewed carefully and the
   recommendations be considered in-depth as well.

   Automated IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels (see Section 2.6.2) should also be
   blocked to avoid bypassing the IPv4 security policy.

   Hosts need to be hardened directly through security policy to protect
   against security threats.  The host firewall default capabilities
   have to be clearly understood, especially 3rd party ones which can
   have different settings for IPv4 or IPv6 default permit/deny
   behavior.  In some cases, 3rd party firewalls have no IPv6 support
   whereas the native firewall installed by default has it.  General
   device hardening guidelines are provided in Section 2.7

   It should also be noted that many hosts still use IPv4 for transport



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   for things like RADIUS, TACACS+, SYSLOG, etc.  This will require some
   extra level of due diligence on the part of the operator.


4.  Service Providers Security Considerations

4.1.  BGP

   The threats and mitigation techniques are identical between IPv4 and
   IPv6.  Broadly speaking they are:

   o  Authenticating the TCP session

   o  TTL security

   o  Prefix Filtering

   These are explained in more detail in section Section 2.4.

4.1.1.  Remote Triggered Black Hole Filtering

   RTBH [RFC5635] works identically in IPv4 and IPv6.  IANA has
   allocated 100::/64 as discard prefix [RFC6666].

4.2.  Transition Mechanism

   SP will typically use transition mechanisms such as 6rd, 6PE, MAP,
   DS-LITE which have been analyzed in the transition Section 2.6.2
   section.

4.3.  Lawful Intercept

   The Lawful Intercept requirements are similar for IPv6 and IPv4
   architectures and will be subject to the laws enforced in varying
   geographic regions.  The local issues with each jurisdiction can make
   this challenging and both corporate legal and privacy personnel
   should be involved in discussions pertaining to what information gets
   logged and what the logging retention policies will be.

   The target of interception will usually be a residential subscriber
   (e.g. his/her PPP session or physical line or CPE MAC address).  With
   the absence of NAT on the CPE, IPv6 has the provision to allow for
   intercepting the traffic from a single host (a /128 target) rather
   than the whole set of hosts of a subscriber (which could be a /48, a
   /60 or /64).

   In contrast, in mobile environments, since the 3GPP specifications
   allocate a /64 per device, it may be sufficient to intercept traffic



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   from the /64 rather than specific /128's (since each time the device
   powers up it gets a new IID).

   A sample architecture which was written for informational purposes is
   found in [RFC3924].


5.  Residential Users Security Considerations

   The IETF Homenet working group is working on how IPv6 residential
   network should be done; this obviously includes operational security
   considerations; but, this is still work in progress.

   Residential users have usually less experience and knowledge about
   security or networking.  As most of the recent hosts, smartphones,
   tablets have all IPv6 enabled by default, IPv6 security is important
   for those users.  Even with an IPv4-only ISP, those users can get
   IPv6 Internet access with the help of Teredo tunnels.  Several peer-
   to-peer programs (notably Bittorrent) support IPv6 and those programs
   can initiate a Teredo tunnel through the IPv4 residential gateway,
   with the consequence of making the internal host reachable from any
   IPv6 host on the Internet.  It is therefore recommended that all host
   security products (personal firewall, ...) are configured with a
   dual-stack security policy.

   If the Residential Gateway has IPv6 connectivity, [RFC6204] defines
   the requirements of an IPv6 CPE and does not take position on the
   debate of default IPv6 security policy:

   o  outbound only: allowing all internally initiated connections and
      block all externally initiated ones, which is a common default
      security policy enforced by IPv4 Residential Gateway doing NAT-PT
      but it also breaks the end-to-end reachability promise of IPv6.
      [RFC6092] lists several recommendations to design such a CPE;

   o  open: allowing all internally and externally initiated
      connections, therefore restoring the end-to-end nature of the
      Internet for the IPv6 traffic but having a different security
      policy for IPv6 than for IPv4.

   [RFC6204] states that a clear choice must be given to the user to
   select one of those two policies.


6.  Further Reading

   There are several documents that describe in more details the
   security of an IPv6 network; these documents are not written by the



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   IETF but are listed here for your convenience:

   1.  Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6 [NIST]

   2.  North American IPv6 Task Force Technology Report - IPv6 Security
       Technology Paper [NAv6TF_Security]

   3.  IPv6 Security [IPv6_Security_Book]


7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their useful
   comments: Mikael Abrahamsson, Tim Chown, Fernando Gont, Panos
   Kampanakis, Jouni Korhonen, Mark Lentczner, Tarko Tikan (by
   alphabetical order).


8.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.


9.  Security Considerations

   This memo attempts to give an overview of security considerations of
   operating an IPv6 network both in an IPv6-only network and in
   utilizing the most widely deployed IPv4/IPv6 coexistence strategies.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC6104]  Chown, T. and S. Venaas, "Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement
              Problem Statement", RFC 6104, February 2011.

   [RFC6105]  Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
              Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
              February 2011.

10.2.  Informative References

   [CYMRU]    "Packet Filter and Route Filter Recommendation for IPv6 at
              xSP routers", <http://www.team-cymru.org/ReadingRoom/



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              Templates/IPv6Routers/xsp-recommendations.html>.

   [I-D.chakrabarti-nordmark-energy-aware-nd]
              Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and M. Wasserman, "Energy
              Aware IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Optimizations",
              draft-chakrabarti-nordmark-energy-aware-nd-02 (work in
              progress), March 2012.

   [I-D.gont-6man-nd-extension-headers]
              Gont, F., "Security Implications of the Use of IPv6
              Extension Headers with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery",
              draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-03 (work in
              progress), June 2012.

   [I-D.gont-opsec-dhcpv6-shield]
              Gont, F. and W. Liu, "DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against
              Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", draft-gont-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-01
              (work in progress), October 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-behave-nat64-discovery-heuristic]
              Savolainen, T., Korhonen, J., and D. Wing, "Discovery of
              the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis",
              draft-ietf-behave-nat64-discovery-heuristic-12 (work in
              progress), November 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-opsec-lla-only]
              Behringer, M. and E. Vyncke, "Using Only Link-Local
              Addressing Inside an IPv6 Network",
              draft-ietf-opsec-lla-only-02 (work in progress),
              October 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp]
              Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "SAVI Solution for
              DHCP", draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-15 (work in progress),
              September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-savi-framework]
              Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt,
              "Source Address Validation Improvement Framework",
              draft-ietf-savi-framework-06 (work in progress),
              January 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
              Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
              draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26 (work in progress),
              February 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-softwire-map]



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              Troan, O., Dec, W., Li, X., Bao, C., Matsushima, S., and
              T. Murakami, "Mapping of Address and Port with
              Encapsulation (MAP)", draft-ietf-softwire-map-02 (work in
              progress), September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-6to4-to-historic]
              Troan, O., "Request to move Connection of IPv6 Domains via
              IPv4 Clouds (6to4) to Historic status",
              draft-ietf-v6ops-6to4-to-historic-05 (work in progress),
              June 2011.

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-enterprise-incremental-ipv6]
              Chittimaneni, K., Chown, T., Howard, L., Kuarsingh, V.,
              Pouffary, Y., and E. Vyncke, "Enterprise IPv6 Deployment
              Guidelines",
              draft-ietf-v6ops-enterprise-incremental-ipv6-01 (work in
              progress), September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation]
              Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
              Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)",
              draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation-05 (work in
              progress), October 2012.

   [I-D.jdurand-bgp-security]
              Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP operations
              and security", draft-jdurand-bgp-security-02 (work in
              progress), September 2012.

   [I-D.krishnan-ipv6-hopbyhop]
              Krishnan, S., "The case against Hop-by-Hop options",
              draft-krishnan-ipv6-hopbyhop-05 (work in progress),
              October 2010.

   [I-D.templin-v6ops-isops]
              Templin, F., "Operational Guidance for IPv6 Deployment in
              IPv4 Sites using ISATAP", draft-templin-v6ops-isops-18
              (work in progress), October 2012.

   [I-D.thubert-savi-ra-throttler]
              Thubert, P., "Throttling RAs on constrained interfaces",
              draft-thubert-savi-ra-throttler-01 (work in progress),
              June 2012.

   [IPv6_Security_Book]
              Hogg and Vyncke, "IPv6 Security", ISBN 1-58705-594-5,
              Publisher CiscoPress, December 2008.




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   [NAv6TF_Security]
              Kaeo, Green, Bound, and Pouffary, "North American IPv6
              Task Force Technology Report - IPv6 Security Technology
              Paper", 2006, <http://www.ipv6forum.com/dl/white/
              NAv6TF_Security_Report.pdf>.

   [NIST]     Frankel, Graveman, Pearce, and Rooks, "Guidelines for the
              Secure Deployment of IPv6", 2010, <http://csrc.nist.gov/
              publications/nistpubs/800-119/sp800-119.pdf>.

   [RFC0826]  Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
              converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
              address for transmission on Ethernet hardware", STD 37,
              RFC 826, November 1982.

   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, March 1997.

   [RFC2529]  Carpenter, B. and C. Jung, "Transmission of IPv6 over IPv4
              Domains without Explicit Tunnels", RFC 2529, March 1999.

   [RFC2740]  Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., and J. Moy, "OSPF for IPv6",
              RFC 2740, December 1999.

   [RFC2784]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
              Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
              March 2000.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [RFC3056]  Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
              via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

   [RFC3068]  Huitema, C., "An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers",
              RFC 3068, June 2001.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
              and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [RFC3627]  Savola, P., "Use of /127 Prefix Length Between Routers
              Considered Harmful", RFC 3627, September 2003.

   [RFC3756]  Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
              Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756,
              May 2004.



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   [RFC3924]  Baker, F., Foster, B., and C. Sharp, "Cisco Architecture
              for Lawful Intercept in IP Networks", RFC 3924,
              October 2004.

   [RFC3964]  Savola, P. and C. Patel, "Security Considerations for
              6to4", RFC 3964, December 2004.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
              Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4293]  Routhier, S., "Management Information Base for the
              Internet Protocol (IP)", RFC 4293, April 2006.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4364]  Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
              Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, February 2006.

   [RFC4380]  Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
              Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
              February 2006.

   [RFC4381]  Behringer, M., "Analysis of the Security of BGP/MPLS IP
              Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4381, February 2006.

   [RFC4552]  Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality
              for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, June 2006.

   [RFC4659]  De Clercq, J., Ooms, D., Carugi, M., and F. Le Faucheur,
              "BGP-MPLS IP Virtual Private Network (VPN) Extension for
              IPv6 VPN", RFC 4659, September 2006.

   [RFC4798]  De Clercq, J., Ooms, D., Prevost, S., and F. Le Faucheur,
              "Connecting IPv6 Islands over IPv4 MPLS Using IPv6
              Provider Edge Routers (6PE)", RFC 4798, February 2007.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC4890]  Davies, E. and J. Mohacsi, "Recommendations for Filtering
              ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls", RFC 4890, May 2007.

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy



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              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007.

   [RFC4942]  Davies, E., Krishnan, S., and P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/
              Co-existence Security Considerations", RFC 4942,
              September 2007.

   [RFC5101]  Claise, B., "Specification of the IP Flow Information
              Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic
              Flow Information", RFC 5101, January 2008.

   [RFC5102]  Quittek, J., Bryant, S., Claise, B., Aitken, P., and J.
              Meyer, "Information Model for IP Flow Information Export",
              RFC 5102, January 2008.

   [RFC5157]  Chown, T., "IPv6 Implications for Network Scanning",
              RFC 5157, March 2008.

   [RFC5214]  Templin, F., Gleeson, T., and D. Thaler, "Intra-Site
              Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", RFC 5214,
              March 2008.

   [RFC5340]  Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPF
              for IPv6", RFC 5340, July 2008.

   [RFC5635]  Kumari, W. and D. McPherson, "Remote Triggered Black Hole
              Filtering with Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)",
              RFC 5635, August 2009.

   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
              Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, August 2010.

   [RFC5969]  Townsley, W. and O. Troan, "IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4
              Infrastructures (6rd) -- Protocol Specification",
              RFC 5969, August 2010.

   [RFC6092]  Woodyatt, J., "Recommended Simple Security Capabilities in
              Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Providing
              Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
              January 2011.

   [RFC6144]  Baker, F., Li, X., Bao, C., and K. Yin, "Framework for
              IPv4/IPv6 Translation", RFC 6144, April 2011.

   [RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, April 2011.




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   [RFC6147]  Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van
              Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
              Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147,
              April 2011.

   [RFC6164]  Kohno, M., Nitzan, B., Bush, R., Matsuzaki, Y., Colitti,
              L., and T. Narten, "Using 127-Bit IPv6 Prefixes on Inter-
              Router Links", RFC 6164, April 2011.

   [RFC6169]  Krishnan, S., Thaler, D., and J. Hoagland, "Security
              Concerns with IP Tunneling", RFC 6169, April 2011.

   [RFC6192]  Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the
              Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, March 2011.

   [RFC6204]  Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., Stark, B., and O.
              Troan, "Basic Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge
              Routers", RFC 6204, April 2011.

   [RFC6264]  Jiang, S., Guo, D., and B. Carpenter, "An Incremental
              Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN) for IPv6 Transition", RFC 6264,
              June 2011.

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and P.
              Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              June 2011.

   [RFC6296]  Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
              Translation", RFC 6296, June 2011.

   [RFC6302]  Durand, A., Gashinsky, I., Lee, D., and S. Sheppard,
              "Logging Recommendations for Internet-Facing Servers",
              BCP 162, RFC 6302, June 2011.

   [RFC6324]  Nakibly, G. and F. Templin, "Routing Loop Attack Using
              IPv6 Automatic Tunnels: Problem Statement and Proposed
              Mitigations", RFC 6324, August 2011.

   [RFC6333]  Durand, A., Droms, R., Woodyatt, J., and Y. Lee, "Dual-
              Stack Lite Broadband Deployments Following IPv4
              Exhaustion", RFC 6333, August 2011.

   [RFC6434]  Jankiewicz, E., Loughney, J., and T. Narten, "IPv6 Node
              Requirements", RFC 6434, December 2011.

   [RFC6459]  Korhonen, J., Soininen, J., Patil, B., Savolainen, T.,
              Bajko, G., and K. Iisakkila, "IPv6 in 3rd Generation
              Partnership Project (3GPP) Evolved Packet System (EPS)",



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Internet-Draft                 OPsec IPV6                  November 2012


              RFC 6459, January 2012.

   [RFC6506]  Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
              Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 6506,
              February 2012.

   [RFC6583]  Gashinsky, I., Jaeggli, J., and W. Kumari, "Operational
              Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583, March 2012.

   [RFC6598]  Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
              M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
              Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, April 2012.

   [RFC6620]  Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS
              SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation
              Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses",
              RFC 6620, May 2012.

   [RFC6666]  Hilliard, N. and D. Freedman, "A Discard Prefix for IPv6",
              RFC 6666, August 2012.

   [SCANNING]
              "Mapping the Great Void - Smarter scanning for IPv6", <htt
              p://www.caida.org/workshops/isma/1202/slides/
              aims1202_rbarnes.pdf>.


Authors' Addresses

   Kiran Kumar Chittimaneni
   Google
   1600 Amphitheater Pkwy
   Mountain View  94043
   USA

   Phone: +16502249772
   Email: kk@google.com


   Merike Kaeo
   Double Shot Security
   3518 Fremont Ave N 363
   Seattle  98103
   USA

   Phone: +12066696394
   Email: merike@doubleshotsecurity.com




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Internet-Draft                 OPsec IPV6                  November 2012


   Eric Vyncke
   Cisco Systems
   De Kleetlaan 6a
   Diegem  1831
   Belgium

   Phone: +32 2 778 4677
   Email: evyncke@cisco.com











































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