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Versions: (draft-gupta-ospf-ospfv3-auth) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 RFC 4552

   Network Working Group                                       M. Gupta
   Internet Draft                                       Tropos Networks
   Document: draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-auth-08.txt                N. Melam
   Expires: Aug 2006                                   Juniper Networks
                                                          February 2006


                 Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Abstract

   This document describes means/mechanisms to provide
   authentication/confidentiality to OSPFv3 using an IPv6 AH/ESP
   Extension Header.


Copyright Notice
   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).


Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [N7].


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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................2
   2. Transport Mode vs Tunnel Mode..................................3
   3. Authentication.................................................3
   4. Confidentiality................................................3
   5. Distinguishing OSPFv3 from OSPFv2..............................4
   6. IPsec Requirements.............................................4
   7. Key Management.................................................5
   8. SA Granularity and Selectors...................................7
   9. Virtual Links..................................................7
   10. Rekeying......................................................9
      10.1 Rekeying Procedure........................................9
      10.2 KeyRolloverInterval.......................................9
      10.3 Rekeying Interval........................................10
   11. IPsec Protection Barrier and SPD.............................10
   12. Entropy of manual keys.......................................11
   13. Replay Protection............................................12
   Security Considerations..........................................12
   IANA Considerations..............................................13
   Normative References.............................................13
   Informative References...........................................13
   Acknowledgments..................................................14
   Authors' Addresses...............................................14


1. Introduction

   OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) Version 2 [N1] defines the fields
   AuType and Authentication in its protocol header to provide security.
   In OSPF for IPv6 (OSPFv3) [N2], both of the authentication fields
   were removed from OSPF headers.  OSPFv3 relies on the IPv6
   Authentication Header (AH) and IPv6 Encapsulating Security Payload
   (ESP) to provide integrity, authentication and/or confidentiality.

   This document describes how IPv6 AH/ESP extension headers can be used
   to provide authentication/confidentiality to OSPFv3.

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with OSPFv3 [N2], AH [N5],
   ESP [N4], the concept of security associations, tunnel and transport
   mode of IPsec and the key management options available for AH and ESP
   (manual keying [N3] and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)[I1]).







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2. Transport Mode vs Tunnel Mode

   The transport mode Security Association (SA) is generally used
   between two hosts or routers/gateways when they are acting as hosts.
   The SA must be a tunnel mode SA if either end of the security
   association is a router/gateway.  Two hosts MAY establish a tunnel
   mode SA between themselves.  OSPFv3 packets are exchanged between
   routers.  However, since the packets are locally delivered, the
   routers assume the role of hosts in the context of tunnel mode SA.
   All implementations confirming to this specification MUST support
   Transport mode SA to provide required IPsec security to OSPFv3
   packets.  They MAY also support Tunnel mode SA to provide required
   IPsec security to OSPFv3 packets.


3. Authentication

   Implementations conforming to this specification MUST support
   Authentication for OSPFv3.

   In order to provide authentication to OSPFv3, implementations MUST
   support ESP and MAY support AH.

   If ESP in transport mode is used, it will only provide authentication
   to OSPFv3 protocol packet excluding the IPv6 header, extension
   headers and options.

   If AH in transport mode is used, it will provide authentication to
   OSPFv3 protocol packet, selected portions of IPv6 header, selected
   portions of extension headers and selected options.

   When OSPFv3 authentication is enabled,

      O OSPFv3 packets that are not protected with AH or ESP MUST be
        silently discarded.

      O OSPFv3 packets that fail the authentication checks MUST be
        silently discarded.


4. Confidentiality

   Implementations conforming to this specification SHOULD support
   confidentiality for OSPFv3.

   If confidentiality is provided, ESP MUST be used.

   When OSPFv3 confidentiality is enabled,



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      O OSPFv3 packets that are not protected with ESP MUST be silently
        discarded.

      O OSPFv3 packets that fail the confidentiality checks MUST be
        silently discarded.


5. Distinguishing OSPFv3 from OSPFv2

   The IP/IPv6 Protocol Type for OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 is the same (89) and
   OSPF distinguishes them based on the OSPF header version number.
   However, current IPsec standards do not allow using arbitrary
   protocol specific header fields as the selectors.  Therefore, the
   OSPF version field in the OSPF header cannot be used in order to
   distinguish OSPFv3 packets from OSPFv2 packets.  As OSPFv2 is only
   for IPv4 and OSPFv3 is only for IPv6, version field in IP header can
   be used to distinguish OSPFv3 packets from OSPFv2 packets.


6. IPsec Requirements

   In order to implement this specification, the following IPsec
   capabilities are required.

   Transport Mode
      IPsec in transport mode MUST be supported. [N3]

   Multiple SPDs
      The implementation MUST support multiple SPDs with a SPD selection
      function that provides an ability to choose a specific SPD based
      on interface. [N3]

   Selectors
      The implementation MUST be able to use source address, destination
      address, protocol and direction as selectors in the SPD.

   Interface ID tagging
      The implementation MUST be able to tag the inbound packets with
      the ID of the interface (physical or virtual) via which it
      arrived. [N3]

   Manual key support
      Manually configured keys MUST be able to secure the specified
      traffic. [N3]

   Encryption and Authentication Algorithms





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      The implementation MUST NOT allow the user to choose stream
      ciphers as the encryption algorithm for securing OSPFv3 packets
      since the stream ciphers are not suitable for manual keys.

      Except when in conflict with the above statement, the Keywords
      "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD" and "SHOULD NOT" that
      appear in the [N6] document for algorithms to be supported are to
      be interpreted as described in [N7] for OSPFv3 support as well.

   Dynamic IPsec rule configuration
      The routing module SHOULD be able to configure, modify and delete
      IPsec rules on the fly.  This is needed mainly for securing
      virtual links.

   Encapsulation of ESP packet
      IP encapsulation of ESP packets MUST be supported.  For
      simplicity, UDP encapsulation of ESP packets SHOULD NOT be used.

   Different SAs for different DSCPs
      As per [N3], the IPsec implementation MUST support the
      establishment and maintenance of multiple SAs with the same
      selectors between a given sender and receiver.  This allows the
      implementation to associate different classes of traffic with same
      selector values in support of QoS.


7. Key Management

   OSPFv3 exchanges both multicast and unicast packets.  While running
   OSPFv3 over a broadcast interface, the authentication/confidentiality
   required is "one to many".  Since IKE is based on the Diffie-Hellman
   key agreement protocol and works only for two communicating parties,
   it is not possible to use IKE for providing the required "one to
   many" authentication/confidentiality.  This specification mandates
   the usage of Manual Keying to work with the current IPsec
   implementations.  Future specifications can explore the usage of
   protocols like KINK/GSAKMP when they are widely available.  In manual
   keying, SAs are statically installed on the routers and these static
   SAs are used to authenticate/encrypt packets.

   The following discussion explains that it is not scalable and is
   practically infeasible to use different security associations for
   inbound and outbound traffic to provide the required "one to many"
   security.  Therefore, the implementations MUST use manually
   configured keys with the same SA parameters (SPI, keys etc.,) for
   both inbound and outbound SA (as shown in Figure 3).





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       A                  |
     SAa     ------------>|
     SAb     <------------|
                          |
       B                  |
     SAb     ------------>|
     SAa     <------------|                 Figure: 1
                          |
       C                  |
     SAa/SAb ------------>|
     SAa/SAb <------------|
                          |
                      Broadcast
                       Network


   If we consider communication between A and B in Figure 1, everything
   seems to be fine.  A uses security association SAa for outbound
   packets and B uses the same for inbound packets and vice versa.  Now
   if we include C in the group and C sends a packet using SAa then only
   A will be able to understand it.  Similarly, if C sends a packet
   using SAb then only B will be able to understand it.  Since the
   packets are multicast and they are going to be processed by both A
   and B, there is no SA for C to use so that both A and B can
   understand them.

       A                  |
     SAa     ------------>|
     SAb     <------------|
     SAc     <------------|
                          |
       B                  |
     SAb     ------------>|
     SAa     <------------|                 Figure: 2
     SAc     <------------|
                          |
       C                  |
     SAc     ------------>|
     SAa     <------------|
     SAb     <------------|
                          |
                      Broadcast
                       Network





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   The problem can be solved by configuring SAs for all the nodes on
   every other node as shown in Figure 2.  So A, B and C will use SAa,
   SAb and SAc respectively for outbound traffic.  Each node will lookup
   the SA to be used based on the source (A will use SAb and SAc for
   packets received from B and C respectively).  This solution is not
   scalable and practically infeasible because a large number of SAs
   will need to be configured on each node.  Also, the addition of a
   node in the broadcast network will require the addition of another SA
   on every other node.


      A                   |
     SAo     ------------>|
     SAi     <------------|
                          |
      B                   |
     SAo     ------------>|
     SAi     <------------|                 Figure: 3
                          |
      C                   |
     SAo     ------------>|
     SAi     <------------|
                          |
                      Broadcast
                       Network

   The problem can be solved by using the same SA parameters (SPI, Keys
   etc.,) for both inbound (SAi) and outbound (SAo) SAs as shown in
   Figure 3.


8. SA Granularity and Selectors

   The user SHOULD be given the choice of sharing the same SA among
   multiple interfaces or using a unique SA per interface.

   OSPFv3 supports running multiple instances over one interface using
   the "Instance Id" field contained in the OSPFv3 header.  As IPsec
   does not support arbitrary fields in protocol header to be used as
   the selectors, it is not possible to use different SAs for different
   OSPFv3 instances running over the same interface.  Therefore, all
   OSPFv3 instances running over the same interface will have to use the
   same SA.  In OSPFv3 RFC terminology, SAs are per-link and not per-
   interface.


9. Virtual Links




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   A different SA than the SA of the underlying interface MUST be
   provided for virtual links.  Packets sent on virtual links use
   unicast non-link local IPv6 addresses as the IPv6 source address
   while packets sent on other interfaces use multicast and unicast link
   local addresses.  This difference in the IPv6 source address
   differentiates the packets sent on virtual links from other OSPFv3
   interface types.

   As the virtual link end point IPv6 addresses are not known, it is not
   possible to install SPD/SAD entries at the time of configuration.
   The virtual link end point IPv6 addresses are learned during the
   routing table computation process.  The packet exchange over the
   virtual links starts only after the discovery of the end point IPv6
   addresses.  In order to protect these exchanges, the routing module
   must install the corresponding SPD/SAD entries before starting these
   exchanges.  Note that manual SA parameters are preconfigured but not
   installed in the SAD until the end point addresses are learned.

   According to the OSPFv3 RFC [N2], the virtual neighbor's IP address
   is set to the first prefix with the "LA-bit" set from the list of
   prefixes in intra-area-prefix-LSAs originated by the virtual
   neighbor.  But when it comes to choosing the source address for the
   packets that are sent over the virtual link, the RFC simply suggests
   using one of the router's own global IPv6 addresses.  In order to
   install the required security rules for virtual links, the source
   address also needs to be predictable.  Hence, routers that implement
   this specification MUST change the way the source and destination
   addresses are chosen for packets exchanged over virtual links when
   IPsec is enabled.

   The first IPv6 address with the "LA-bit" set in the list of prefixes
   advertised in intra-area-prefix-LSAs in the transit area MUST be used
   as the source address for packets exchanged over the virtual link.
   When multiple intra-area-prefix-LSAs are originated they are
   considered as being concatenated and are ordered by ascending Link
   State ID.

   The first IPv6 address with the "LA-bit" set in the list of prefixes
   received in intra-area-prefix-LSAs from the virtual neighbor in the
   transit area MUST be used as the destination address for packets
   exchanged over the virtual link.  When multiple intra-area-prefix-
   LSAs are received they are considered as being concatenated and are
   ordered by ascending Link State ID.

   This makes both the source and destination addresses of packets
   exchanged over the virtual link predictable when IPsec is enabled.





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10. Rekeying

   To maintain the security of a link, the authentication and encryption
   key values SHOULD be changed from periodically.

10.1 Rekeying Procedure

   The following three-step procedure SHOULD be provided to rekey the
   routers on a link without dropping OSPFv3 protocol packets or
   disrupting the adjacency.

   (1) For every router on the link, create an additional inbound SA for
       the interface being rekeyed using a new SPI and the new key.

   (2) For every router on the link, replace the original outbound SA
       with one using the new SPI and key values.  The SA replacement
       operation should be atomic with respect to sending OSPFv3 packets
       on the link so that no OSPFv3 packets are sent without
       authentication/encryption.

   (3) For every router on the link, remove the original inbound SA.

   Note that all routers on the link must complete step 1 before any
   begin step 2.  Likewise, all the routers on the link must complete
   step 2 before any begin step 3.

   One way to control the progression from one step to the next is for
   each router to have a configurable time constant KeyRolloverInterval.
   After the router begins step 1 on a given link, it waits for this
   interval and then moves to step 2.  Likewise, after moving to step 2,
   it waits for this interval and then moves to step 3.

   In order to achieve smooth key transition, all routers on a link
   should use the same value for KeyRolloverInterval and should initiate
   the key rollover process within this time period.

   At the end of this procedure, all the routers on the link will have a
   single inbound and outbound SA for OSPFv3 with the new SPI and key
   values.

10.2 KeyRolloverInterval

   The configured value of KeyRolloverInterval should be long enough to
   allow the administrator to change keys on all the OSPFv3 routers.  As
   this value can vary significantly depending upon the implementation
   and the deployment, it is left to the administrator to choose the
   appropriate value.




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10.3 Rekeying Interval

   This section analyzes the security provided by manual keying and
   recommends that the encryption and authentication keys SHOULD be
   changed at least every 90 days.

   The weakest security provided by the security mechanisms discussed in
   this specification is when NULL encryption (for ESP) or no encryption
   (for AH) is used with the HMAC-MD5 authentication.  Any other
   algorithm combinations will at least be as hard to break as the ones
   mentioned above.  This is shown by the following reasonable
   assumptions:

   O NULL Encryption and HMAC-SHA-1 Authentication will be more secure
   as HMAC-SHA-1 is considered to be more secure than HMAC-MD5.

   O NON-NULL Encryption and NULL Authentication is not applicable as
   this specification mandates authentication when OSPFv3 security is
   enabled.

   O DES Encryption and HMAC-MD5 Authentication will be more secure
   because of the additional security provided by DES.

   O Other encryption algorithms like 3DES and AES will be more secure
   than DES.

   RFC 3562 [I4] analyzes the rekeying requirements for the TCP MD5
   signature option.  The analysis provided in this RFC is also
   applicable to this specification as the analysis is independent of
   data patterns.

11. IPsec Protection Barrier and SPD

   The IPsec protection barrier MUST BE around the OSPF protocol.
   Therefore, all the inbound and outbound OSPF traffic goes through
   IPsec processing.

   The SPD selection function MUST return a SPD with the following rule
   for all the interfaces that have OSPFv3
   authentication/confidentiality disabled.

   No.  source       destination       protocol        action
   1     any            any              OSPF          bypass

   The SPD selection function MUST return a SPD with the following rules
   for all the interfaces that have OSPFv3
   authentication/confidentiality enabled.

   No.  source       destination       protocol        action


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   2   fe80::/10        any             OSPF           protect
   3   fe80::/10        any       ESP/OSPF or AH/OSPF  protect
   4   src/128        dst/128           OSPF           protect
   5   src/128        dst/128     ESP/OSPF or AH/OSPF  protect

   For rules 2 and 4, action "protect" means encrypting/calculating ICV
   and adding an ESP or AH header.  For rules 3 and 5, action "protect"
   means decrypting/authenticating the packets and stripping the ESP or
   AH header.

   Rule 1 will bypass the OSPFv3 packets without any IPsec processing on
   the interfaces that have OSPFv3 authentication/confidentiality
   disabled.

   Rules 2 and 4 will drop the inbound OSPFv3 packets that have not been
   secured with ESP/AH headers.

   ESP/OSPF or AH/OSPF in rules 3 and 5 mean that it is an OSPF packet
   secured with ESP or AH.

   Rules 2 and 3 are meant to secure the unicast and multicast OSPF
   packets that are not being exchanged over the virtual links.

   Rules 4 and 5 are meant to secure the packets being exchanged over
   virtual links.  These rules are installed after learning the virtual
   link end point IPv6 addresses.  These rules MUST be installed in the
   SPD for the interfaces that are connected to the transit area for the
   virtual link.  These rules MAY alternatively be installed on all the
   interfaces.  If these rules are not installed on all the interfaces,
   clear text or malicious OSPFv3 packets with the same source and
   destination addresses as the virtual link end point IPv6 addresses
   will be delivered to OSPFv3.  Though OSPFv3 drops these packets
   because they were not received on the right interface, OSPFv3
   receives some clear text or malicious packets even when the security
   is enabled.  Installing these rules on all the interfaces insures
   that OSPFv3 does not receive these clear text or malicious packets
   when security is turned enabled.  On the other hand, installing these
   rules on all the interfaces increases the processing overhead on the
   interfaces where there is no other IPsec processing.  The decision of
   installing these rules on all the interfaces or on just the
   interfaces that are connected to the transit area is a private
   decision and doesn't affect the interoperability in any way.  Hence
   it is an implementation choice.


12. Entropy of manual keys
   The implementations MUST allow the administrator to configure the
   cryptographic and authentication keys in hexadecimal format rather
   than restricting it to a subset of ASCII characters (letters, numbers


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   etc).  A restricted character set will reduce key entropy
   significantly as discussed in [I2].

13. Replay Protection

   Since it is not possible using the current standards to provide
   complete replay protection while using manual keying, the proposed
   solution will not provide protection against replay attacks.

   Detailed analysis of various vulnerabilities of the routing protocols
   and OSPF in particular is discussed in [I3] and [I2]. The conclusion
   is that "Replay of OSPF packets can cause adjacencies to be
   disrupted, which can lead to a DoS attack on the network. It can also
   cause database exchange process to occur continuously thus causing
   CPU overload as well as micro loops in the network".

Security Considerations

   This memo discusses the use of IPsec AH and ESP headers in order to
   provide security to OSPFv3 for IPv6.  Hence security permeates
   throughout this document.

   OSPF Security Vulnerabilities Analysis [I2] identifies OSPF
   vulnerabilities in two scenarios - One with no authentication or
   simple password authentication and the other with cryptographic
   authentication.  The solution described in this specification
   provides protection against all the vulnerabilities identified for
   scenarios with cryptographic authentication with the following
   exceptions:

   Limitations of manual key:
   This specification mandates the usage of manual keys.  The following
   are the known limitations of the usage of manual keys.

     O As the sequence numbers can not be negotiated, replay protection
       can not be provided.  This leaves OSPF insecure against all the
       attacks that can be performed by replaying OSPF packets.

     O Manual keys are usually long lived (changing them often is
       a tedious task).  This gives an attacker enough time to discover
       the keys.

     O As the administrator is manually configuring the keys, there is
       a chance that the configured keys are weak (there are known weak
       keys for DES/3DES at least).

   Impersonating Attacks:




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   The usage of the same key on all the OSPF routers connected to a link
   leaves them all insecure against impersonating attacks if any one of
   the OSPF routers is compromised, malfunctioning or misconfigured.

   Detailed analysis of various vulnerabilities of routing protocols is
   discussed in [I3].


IANA Considerations
   This document has no IANA considerations.

   This section should be removed by the RFC Editor to final
   publication.

Normative References

  N1. Moy, J., "OSPF version 2", RFC 2328, April 1998.

  N2. Coltun, R., Ferguson, D. and J. Moy, "OSPF for IPv6", RFC 2740,
     December 1999.

  N3. Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
     Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

  N4. Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303,
     December 2005.

  N5. Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4302, December
     2005.

  N6. Eastlake, D., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements
     For ESP And AH", RFC 4305, December 2005.

  N7. Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
     Level", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  N8. Frankel, S., Glenn, R. and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm
     and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September 2003.

  N9. Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and
     AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

Informative References

  I1. Kaufman, C., "The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC
     4306, December 2005.

  I2. Jones, E. and O. Moigne, "OSPF Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
     draft-ietf-rpsec-ospf-vuln-01.txt, work in progress.


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  I3. Barbir, A., Murphy, S. and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to Routing
     Protocols", draft-ietf-rpsec-routing-threats-07.txt, work in
     progress.

  I4. Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
     Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003.


Acknowledgments

   Authors would like to extend sincere thanks to Marc Solsona, Janne
   Peltonen, John Cruz, Dhaval Shah, Abhay Roy, Paul Wells, Vishwas
   Manral and Sam Hartman for providing useful information and critiques
   in order to write this memo.  Authors would like to extend special
   thanks to Acee Lindem for lots of editorial changes.

   We would also like to thank IPsec and OSPF WG people to provide
   valuable review comments.


Authors' Addresses

   Mukesh Gupta
   Tropos Networks
   555 Del Rey Ave
   Sunnyvale, CA 94085
   Phone: 408-331-6889
   Email: mukesh.gupta@tropos.com

   Nagavenkata Suresh Melam
   Juniper Networks
   1194 N. Mathilda Ave
   Sunnyvale, CA 94089
   Phone: 408-505-4392
   Email: nmelam@juniper.net


Full copyright statement

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   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE


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   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.  The IETF invites any interested party to
   bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent
   applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology
   that may be required to implement this standard.  Please address the
   information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.



























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