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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 4016

   PANA Working Group
   Internet Draft                                    <M. Parthasarathy>
   Document: draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-02.txt       <Tahoe Networks>
   Expires: September 2003                                   March 2003



              PANA Threat Analysis and security requirements



Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [i].

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 except that the right to
   produce derivative works is not granted.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.


Abstract

   The PANA (Protocol for carrying authentication for Network Access)
   working group is developing methods for authenticating clients to the
   access network using IP based protocols. This document discusses the
   threats in general without referring to a specific authentication
   protocol. The security requirements arising out of these threats will
   be used as additional input to the PANA WG for designing the IP based
   network access protocol.



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Table of Contents

   1.0 Introduction..................................................2
   2.0 Keywords......................................................2
   3.0  Terminology and Definitions.................................3
   4.0  Usage Scenarios.............................................4
   5.0  Trust Relationships.........................................4
   6.0  Threat Scenarios............................................5
      6.1 PAA Discovery..............................................5
      6.2 Authentication.............................................6
      6.3 PaC leaving the network....................................9
      6.4 Service theft..............................................9
      6.5 Miscellaneous attacks.....................................11
   7.0  Summary of Requirements....................................11
   8.0  Security Considerations....................................12
   9.0  Normative References.......................................12
   10.0   Informative References....................................12
   12.0 Acknowledgments.............................................13
   13.0 Revision Log................................................13
   14.0 Author's Addresses..........................................14
   15.0 Full Copyright Statement....................................14


1.0 Introduction

   The PANA (Protocol for carrying authentication for Network Access)
   working group is developing methods for authenticating clients to the
   access network using IP based protocols. This document discusses the
   threats in general without referring to a specific authentication
   protocol.

   A client wishing to get access to the network must carry on multiple
   steps. First, it needs to discover the IP address of the PANA
   authentication agent (PAA) and then execute an authentication
   protocol to authenticate itself to the network. Once the client is
   authenticated, there might be other messages exchanged during the
   lifetime of the network access. This document discusses the threats
   in these steps without discussing any solutions. The requirements
   arising out of these threats will be used as input to the PANA
   working group.

2.0 Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].



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3.0  Terminology and Definitions

   Device

      A network element (notebook computer, PDA, etc.) that requires
      access to a provider's network.

   Network Access Server (NAS)

      Network device that provides access to the network.

   Enforcement Point (EP)

      A node that is capable of filtering packets sent by the PaC using
      the DI information authorized by PAA.

   PANA Client (PaC)

      An entity in the edge subnet who is wishing to obtain network
      access from a PANA authentication agent within a network. A PANA
      client is associated with a device and a set of credentials to
      prove its identity within the scope of PANA.

   PANA Authentication Agent (PAA)

      An entity whose responsibility is to authenticate the PANA client
      (PaC) and grant network access service to the device.

   Authentication Server (AS)

      An entity that authenticates the PaC. It may be co-located with
      PAA or part of the back-end infrastructure.

   Device Identifier (DI)

      The identifier used by the network as a handle to control and
      police the network access of a client. Depending on the access
      technology, identifier might contain any of IP address, link-layer
      address, switch port number, etc. of a device. PANA authentication
      agent keeps a table for binding device identifiers to the PANA
      clients. At most one PANA client should be associated with a DI on
      a PANA authentication agent.

   Compound methods






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      Authentication protocol where a sequence of methods is used inside
      an independently established tunnel between the client and server
      [TUN-EAP].



4.0  Usage Scenarios

   PANA is expected to be used in environments where the nodes trust the
   operator of the network to provide the service but do not trust the
   other nodes in the network e.g., Public access networks, Hotel,
   Airport. Note that the usage of word trust above does not mean trust
   relationship. It just denotes the belief about how the nodes involved
   in PANA behave in the future. In these environments, one may observe
   the following.

       o The link between PaC and PAA may be a shared medium e.g.
          Ethernet or may not be a shared medium e.g. DSL network.

       o All the PaCs may be authenticated to the access network at
          layer 2 (3GPP2 CDMA network) and share a security association
          with layer 2 authentication agent (802.11 Access point), but
          still do not trust each other.

   The scenarios mentioned above affect the threat model of PANA. This
   document discusses the various threats in the context of the above
   network access scenarios for a better understanding of the threats.

5.0  Trust Relationships

   PANA authentication involves a client, PANA agent (PAA),
   Authentication server (AS) and an Enforcement point (EP). The
   communication paths involved between the various entities are as
   follows.

     1) The path between PaC and PAA
     2) The path between PaC and EP
     3) The path between PAA and EP
     4) The path between PAA and AS

   This document discusses the threats involved in path (1) and (2).

   If PAA and EP are co-located, the path between PAA and EP (3) can be
   considered secure. Even when they are not co-located, the network
   operators can setup a security association between PAA and EP to
   secure the traffic between them. Hence it is assumed that path (3) is
   secure.




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   The authentication server (AS) could be co-located in the same
   network as PAA or with the back-end system. If it is co-located, then
   the path (4) can be considered secure. If it is not co-located, there
   are various threats possible in this path. [RAD-EAP] discusses the
   possible threats in this path. This implies that if RADIUS is used as
   the protocol between PAA and AS, then all the vulnerabilities that
   are mentioned in [RAD-EAP] are applicable to PANA. As it is beyond
   the scope of PANA to address these threats, this document does not
   discuss this further.

   There is no pre-existing trust between PaC and EP. When PaC is
   successfully authenticated, it will further enable key derivation
   between PaC and EP, which can be used to secure the link. For
   example, EAP keying framework [EAP-KEY], defines a three party EAP
   exchange where the clients derive the transient sessions keys to
   secure the link between PaC and NAS in their final step. Similarly,
   PANA will provide the ability to derive keys between PaC and EP that
   can be used to secure the link further. This is further discussed in
   section 6.4 below.


6.0  Threat Scenarios

   The PANA authentication client (PaC) needs to discover the PAA first.
   This involves either sending solicitations or waiting for
   advertisements. Once it has discovered the PAA, it will lead to
   authentication exchange with PAA. Once the access is granted, PaC
   will most likely exchange data with other nodes in the Internet. All
   of these are vulnerable to denial of service (DoS), man-in-the-middle
   (MITM) and service theft attacks.

   The threats are grouped by the various stages the client goes through
   to gain access to the network. Section 6.1 discusses the threats
   related to PAA discovery. Section 6.2 discusses about the
   authentication itself. Section 6.3 discusses about the threats
   involved while leaving the network. Section 6.4 discusses about
   service theft. Section 6.5 discusses the miscellaneous threats.

6.1 PAA Discovery

   PaC is in the process of discovering the PAA. The agents like PAA are
   discovered by sending solicitations or receiving advertisements.
   Following are the possible threats.

   T6.1.1: A malicious node can pretend to be a PAA by sending a spoofed
   advertisement.

   T6.1.2: A malicious node can send a spoofed advertisement with
   capabilities that indicate less secure authentication methods than


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   what the real PAA supports, thereby fooling the PaC into negotiating
   a less secure authentication method than what would otherwise be
   available. This is a "bidding" down attack.

   T6.1.3: A malicious node can send solicitations to learn more
   information about networks which might help the attacker to launch
   some known attacks e.g., PAA supports weak authentication suite.

   In existing dial-up networks, the clients authenticate to the network
   but generally do not verify the authenticity of the messages coming
   from Network Access Server (NAS). This mostly works because the link
   between the device and the NAS is not shared with other nodes
   (assuming that nobody tampers with the physical link), and clients
   trust the NAS and the phone network to provide the service, without
   which the network operator will not make any profit. Since in this
   environment, nodes in the network cannot directly communicate with
   each other and may assume that the other end of the point-to-point
   link is the PAA, spoofing attacks are not present.

   In environments where the link is shared, any node can pretend to be
   a PAA (including the nodes that are authenticated at layer 2). Hence,
   the threat is still present in such networks. It is difficult to
   protect the discovery process, as there is no a priori trust
   relationship between PAA and PaC. In IEEE 802.11i, the discovery
   [Beacon, Probe Request/Response] process itself is not protected
   because the discovered capabilities are included in a subsequent
   secured exchange allowing spoofing to be discovered later. It is also
   possible that EP might be able to filter out the packets coming from
   PaC that resembles PAA packets.

   Requirement 1

   PANA MUST not assume that the discovery process is protected. Since,
   it is difficult to protect the discovery process, the information
   exchanged during the discovery process SHOULD be limited.

6.2 Authentication

   This section discusses the threats specific to the authentication
   protocol. Section 6.2.1 discusses the possible threat associated with
   success/failure indications that are transmitted to PaC at the end of
   the authentication. Section 6.2.2 discusses the man-in-the-middle
   attack when compound methods are used. Section 6.2.3 discusses the
   replay attack and section 6.2.4 discusses about the device identifier
   attack.

6.2.1 Success or Failure Indications




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   An attacker can send false authentication success or failure to the
   PaC. By sending false failure, the attacker can prevent the client
   from accessing the network. By sending false success, the attacker
   can prematurely end the authentication exchange effectively denying
   service for the PaC.

   If the link is not shared, it may be hard to launch this attack as
   the attacker needs to inject this packet at the right time and the
   PaC can always reject packets coming from any source address other
   than the PAA.

   If the link is shared, it is easy to spoof these packets. If layer 2
   provides per-packet encryption with pair-wise keys, it might make it
   hard for the attacker to guess the success/failure packet that the
   client would accept. Even if the node is already authenticated at
   layer 2, it can still pretend to be a PAA and spoof the success or
   failure.

   This attack is possible because the success or failure indication is
   not protected using a security association between PaC and PAA. In
   order to avoid this attack, PaC and PAA should mutually authenticate
   each other. In the process of mutually authenticating each other,
   they should be able to derive keys to protect the success/failure
   indications.

   Requirement 2

   PaC and PAA MUST mutually authenticate to each other using methods
   that can derive keys, which in turn can protect the success and
   failure indications.

6.2.2 MITM attack

   A malicious node can claim to be PAA to the real PaC and claim to be
   PaC to the real PAA. This is a MITM attack where the PaC is fooled to
   think that it is communicating with real PAA and the real PAA is
   fooled to think that it is communicating with real PaC.

   An instance of MITM attack, when compound authentication methods are
   used is described in [TUN-EAP]. In these attacks, the server first
   authenticates to the client. As the client has not proven its
   identity yet, it acts as the man-in-the-middle, tunneling the
   identity of the legitimate client to gain access to the network. The
   attack is possible because there is no verification that the same
   entities participated among the compound methods. It is not possible
   to do such verification, if compound methods are used without being
   able to create cryptographic binding among them. This implies that
   PANA will be vulnerable to such attacks if compound methods are used
   without being able to cryptographically bind them.


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   Requirement 3

   When compound authentication methods are used in PANA, the methods
   MUST be cryptographically bound.


6.2.3 Replay Attack

   A malicious node can replay the messages that caused authentication
   failure or success at a later time to create false failures or
   success. The attacker can also potentially replay other messages of
   the PANA protocol to deny service to the PaC.

   This threat is absent if the link is not a shared medium. If the link
   is shared, then the attacker can replay old messages to deny service
   to the client.

   If the packets are encrypted at layer 2 using pair-wise keys, it will
   make it hard for the attacker to learn the unencrypted (i.e.,
   original) packet that needs to be replayed. Even if layer 2 provides
   replay protection, the attacker can still replay the PANA messages
   (layer 3) for denying service to the client.

   Requirement 4

   PANA MUST be resistant to replay attacks.

6.2.4 Device Identifier attack

   When the client is successfully authenticated, PAA sends access
   control information to EP for granting access to the network. The
   access control information typically contains the device identifier
   of the PaC, which is obtained from the IP headers and MAC headers of
   the packets exchanged during the authentication process. The attacker
   can gain unauthorized access into the network using the following
   steps.

     . An attacker pretends to be a PAA and sends advertisements. PaC
        gets fooled and starts exchanging packets with the attacker.
     . The attacker modifies the IP source address on the packet,
        adjusts the UDP/TCP checksum and forwards the packet to the real
        PAA. It does the same on return packets also.
     . When the real PaC is successfully authenticated, the attacker
        gains access to the network as the packets contained the IP
        address (and potentially the MAC address also) of the attacker.

   This threat is absent if the link is not a shared medium. If the
   layer 2 provides per-packet protection, then it is not possible to


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   change the MAC address and hence this threat may be absent in such
   cases if EP filters both on IP and MAC address. If the link is
   shared, it is easy to launch this attack.

   Requirement 5

   The device identifier transmitted from the PaC to PAA MUST be
   protected.


6.3 PaC leaving the network

   When the PaC leaves the network, it needs to inform the PAA before
   disconnecting from the network so that the resources used by PaC can
   be accounted properly. PAA may also choose to revoke the access any
   time if it deems necessary. Following are the possible threats.

   T6.3.1: A malicious node can pretend to be a PAA and revoke the
   access to PaC.

   T6.3.2: A malicious node can pretend to be a real PaC and transmit a
   disconnect message.

   This threat is absent if the link between PaC and PAA is not a shared
   medium.

   If the link is shared, any node on the link can spoof the disconnect
   message. Even if the layer 2 has per-packet authentication, the
   attacker can pretend to be a PaC e.g. by spoofing the IP address, and
   disconnect from the network. Similarly, any node can pretend to be a
   PAA and revoke the access to the PaC.

   In some link layers, e.g., 802.11, disassociate and de-authenticate
   messages are not protected (even with 802.11i). In such link layers,
   protecting PANA messages may not be very useful as the attacker can
   attack using the link layer mechanisms rather than PANA.

   Requirement 6

   PANA MUST be able to protect disconnect and revocation messages.


6.4 Service theft

   An attacker can gain unauthorized access into the network by stealing
   the service from another client. Once the PaC is successfully
   authenticated, EP will have filters in place to prevent unauthorized
   access into the network. The filters will be based on something that
   will be carried on every packet. For example, the filter could be


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   based on IP and MAC address where the packets will be dropped unless
   the packets coming with certain IP address match the MAC address
   also. Following are the possible threats.

   T6.4.1: Attacker can spoof both the IP and MAC address to gain
   unauthorized access.

   T6.4.2: Attacker can spoof both the IP and MAC address of any node
   and inject data packets into its data stream.

   These threats are absent in links that are not shared as simple
   ingress filtering can prevent one node from impersonating as another
   node.

   If the link between PaC and PAA is shared, it is easy to launch this
   attack. If layer 2 provides per-packet protection using pair-wise
   keys, it can prevent the attacker from gaining unauthorized access
   using the layer 2 identifier of some other node. But it cannot
   prevent the nodes from using the IP address of some other node.
   Hence, the attacker can still inject false data by spoofing IP
   addresses.

   If the PaC is using a secure VPN service back to the corporate
   network e.g. using IPsec, IPsec already provides per-packet data
   origin authentication and integrity. In this case, it prevents the
   attacker from injecting false data. But this does not prevent the
   attacker from gaining unauthorized access by spoofing the device
   identifier of the authorized client.

   T6.4.2 itself is beyond the scope of PANA. But PANA MUST be able to
   prevent service theft (T6.4.1). In some cases e.g. non-shared links,
   it is sufficient to provide access control information like IP
   address, MAC address, etc., to EP, which in turn can prevent
   unauthorized users from gaining access to the network. In the case of
   shared links, it is not sufficient. PANA MUST be able to provide
   sufficient guidelines for deriving transient keys between PaC and EP.
   For example, EAP keying document [EAP-KEY] defines methods to derive
   such keys between the various entities involved in EAP. This key can
   be further used to setup a security association (e.g., IPsec) between
   PaC and EP to prevent service theft on shared links.

   Requirement 7

   PANA MUST be able to provide sufficient access control information
   like IP address, MAC address etc. to EP for preventing service theft.
   PANA MUST be able to provide sufficient guidelines for deriving keys
   between PaC and EP which can be further used to setup a security
   association for preventing service theft on shared links.



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6.5 Miscellaneous attacks

   T6.5.1: There are various forms of DoS attacks that can be launched
   on the PAA or AS.

     . Attacker can bombard the PAA with lots of authentication
        requests. If PAA and AS are not collocated, PAA may have to
        allocate resources to store some state about PaC locally before
        it receives the response from the backend AS. This can deplete
        memory resources on PAA.
     . The attacker can force the PAA or AS to make a public key
        computation with minimal effort, that can deplete the CPU
        resources of the PAA or AS.

   T6.5.2: PaC acquires IP address before PANA authentication begins
   using methods like e.g., DHCP in IPv4 and auto-configuration in IPv6
   [PANAREQ]. If IP addresses are assigned before authentication, it
   opens up the possibility of DoS attack where malicious nodes can
   deplete the IP addresses by assigning multiple IP addresses. If
   stateless auto-configuration [ADDRCONF] is used, the attacker can
   respond to duplicate address detection probes sent by any node on the
   network effectively not allowing the node to configure a link local
   address. If stateful mechanism is used in IPv6 e.g., DHCPv6, then
   this attack is still possible. Address depletion attack is not
   specific to PANA, but a known attack in DHCP [DHCP-AUTH]. If PANA
   assumes that the client has an IP address already, it opens up the
   network to the DoS attack.

   Requirement 8

   PANA should not assume that the PaC has acquired an IP address before
   PANA begins.


7.0  Summary of Requirements


        1. PANA MUST not assume that the discovery process is protected.
          Since, it is difficult to protect the discovery process, the
          information exchanged during the discovery process SHOULD be
          limited.

        2. PaC and PAA MUST mutually authenticate to each other using
          methods that can derive keys, which in turn can protect the
          success and failure indications.

        3. When compound authentication methods are used in PANA, the
          methods MUST be cryptographically bound.


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        4. PANA MUST be resistant to replay attacks.

        5. The device identifier transmitted from the PaC to PAA MUST be
          protected.

        6. PANA MUST be able to protect disconnect and revocation
          messages.

        7. PANA MUST be able to provide sufficient access control
          information like IP address, MAC address etc. to EP for
          preventing service theft. PANA MUST be able to provide
          sufficient guidelines for deriving keys between PaC and EP
          which can be further used to setup a security association for
          preventing service theft on shared links.

        8. PANA should not assume that the PaC has acquired an IP
          address before PANA begins.


8.0  Security Considerations

   This document discusses various threats with IP based network access
   protocol.


9.0  Normative References


   1. Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
      9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

   2. [PANAUS] Yoshihiro Ohba et. al, "Problem Space and Usage Scenarios
      for PANA", draft-ietf-pana-usage-scenarios-03.txt

   3. [PANAREQ] A. Yegin et al., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
      for Network Access (PANA) Requirements and Terminology", draft-
      ietf-pana-requirements-04.txt

   4. [KEYWORDS] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCS to indicate
      requirement levels", RFC 2119, March 1997


10.0 Informative References


   5. Bernard Aboba, "Pros and Cons of Upper Layer Network  Access",
      BURP BOF.



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   6. Arunesh Mishra, William A. Arbaugh, "An Initial Security Analysis
      of the IEEE 802.1X Standard"

   7. IEEE. Standard for port based network access control. IEEE Draft
      P802.1X

   8. [RADIUS] C. Rigney et.al, "Remote Authentication Dial In User
      Service".

   9. [EAP-KEY] Bernard Aboba et. al, "EAP keying framework", Work in
      Progress.

   10. [ADDRCONF] Susan Thomson et. al "IPv6 Stateless Address
      Autoconfiguration", RFC2462.

   11. [DHCP-AUTH] R. Droms, et. al "Authentication for DHCP messages",
      RFC3118.

   12. [RAD-EAP] Bernard Aboba, et. al "Radius support for Extensible
      authentication protocol", draft-aboba-radius-rfc2869bis-08.txt

   13. [TUN-EAP] J. Puthenkulam et. al "The compound authentication
      binding problem", draft-puthenkulam-eap-binding-01.txt



12.0 Acknowledgments

   The author would like to thank the following people (in no specific
   order) for providing comments: Alper Yegin, Basavaraj Patil, Pekka
   Nikkander, Bernard Aboba, Francis Dupont, Michael Thomas, Yoshihiro
   Ohba, Gabriel Montenegro and Tschofenig Hannes.

13.0 Revision Log

        Changes between revision 01 and 02

        - Renamed the section "Assumptions" to "Trust relationships"
           and added more text to clarify the relationship between PaC
           and EP.
        - Added more text for threats in PAA – AS path
        - Merged the "Type of Attacks" section into "Threat Scenarios"
        - Removed the requirement on DoS attack
        - Reworded most of the requirements

        Changes between revision 00 and 01.



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        - Removed unused terms from section 3.0
        - Removed identity protection as a threat after feedback from
           Atlanta IETF55 meeting.
        - Renamed the section "Attacks on Normal Data communication"
           to "Service theft". Removed confidentiality as a requirement
           from that section.
        - Added a new threat "Device Identifier attack".


14.0 Author's Addresses

   Mohan Parthasarathy
   Tahoe Networks
   3052 Orchard Drive
   San Jose, CA 95134

   Phone: 408-944-8220
   Email: mohanp@tahoenetworks.com

15.0 Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
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   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
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   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.



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   Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.















































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