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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 5272

Network Working Group                                          J. Schaad
Internet-Draft                                   Soaring Hawk Consulting
Expires: September 11, 2008                                     M. Myers
                                               TraceRoute Security, Inc.
                                                          March 10, 2008


                Certificate Management Messages over CMS
                    draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-07.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2008.

















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Abstract

   This document defines the base syntax for CMC, a Certificate
   Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
   This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the Internet
   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) community:

   1.  The need for an interface to public key certification products
       and services based on CMS and PKCS #10 (Public Key Cryptography
       Standard), and

   2.  The need for a PKI enrollment protocol for encryption only keys
       due to algorithm or hardware design.

   CMC also requires the use of the transport document and the
   requirements usage document along with this document for a full
   definition.


































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.1.  Protocol Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.2.  Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.3.  Changes since RFC 2797 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.  Protocol Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.2.  Protocol Request/Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  PKI Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.1.  Simple PKI Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.2.  Full PKI Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.2.1.  PKIData content type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
         3.2.1.1.  Control Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
         3.2.1.2.  Certification Request Formats  . . . . . . . . . . 16
           3.2.1.2.1.  PKCS #10 Certification Syntax  . . . . . . . . 17
           3.2.1.2.2.  CRMF Certification Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . 18
           3.2.1.2.3.  Other Certification Request  . . . . . . . . . 19
         3.2.1.3.  Content Info Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
           3.2.1.3.1.  Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
           3.2.1.3.2.  Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
           3.2.1.3.3.  Enveloped Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
           3.2.1.3.4.  Signed Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
         3.2.1.4.  Other Message Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       3.2.2.  Body Part Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       3.2.3.  CMC Unsigned Data Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   4.  PKI Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.1.  Simple PKI Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.2.  Full PKI Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       4.2.1.  PKIResponse Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   5.  Application of Encryption to a PKI Request/Response  . . . . . 28
   6.  Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     6.1.  CMC Status Info Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
       6.1.1.  Extended CMC Status Info Control . . . . . . . . . . . 31
       6.1.2.  CMC Status Info Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
       6.1.3.  CMCStatus values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
       6.1.4.  CMCFailInfo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     6.2.  Identification and Identity Proof Controls . . . . . . . . 36
       6.2.1.  Identity Proof Version 2 Control . . . . . . . . . . . 37
       6.2.2.  Identity Proof Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
       6.2.3.  Identification Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
       6.2.4.  Hardware Shared-Secret Token Generation  . . . . . . . 39
     6.3.  Linking Identity and POP Information . . . . . . . . . . . 40
       6.3.1.  Cryptographic Linkage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
         6.3.1.1.  POP Link Witness Version 2 Controls  . . . . . . . 40
         6.3.1.2.  POP Link Witness Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
         6.3.1.3.  POP Link Random Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
       6.3.2.  Shared-secret/subject DN linking . . . . . . . . . . . 42



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       6.3.3.  Renewal and Re-Key Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
     6.4.  Data Return Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
     6.5.  RA Certificate Modification Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 44
       6.5.1.  Modify Certificate Request Control . . . . . . . . . . 44
       6.5.2.  Add Extensions Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
     6.6.  Transaction Identifier, Sender and Recipient Nonce
           Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
     6.7.  Encrypted and Decrypted POP Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 48
     6.8.  RA POP Witness Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
     6.9.  Get Certificate Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
     6.10. Get CRL Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
     6.11. Revocation Request Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
     6.12. Registration and Response Information Controls . . . . . . 55
     6.13. Query Pending Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
     6.14. Confirm Certificate Acceptance Control . . . . . . . . . . 56
     6.15. Publish Trust Anchors Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
     6.16. Authenticated Data Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
     6.17. Batch Request and Response Controls  . . . . . . . . . . . 59
     6.18. Publication Information Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
     6.19. Control Processed Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
   7.  Registration Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
     7.1.  Encryption Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
     7.2.  Signature Layer Removal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
   10. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
     11.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
   Appendix A.   ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
   Appendix B.   Enrollment Message Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
   Appendix B.1. Request of a Signing Certificate . . . . . . . . . . 79
   Appendix B.2. Single Certification Request, But Modified by RA . . 80
   Appendix B.3. Direct POP for an RSA certificate  . . . . . . . . . 83
   Appendix C.   Production of Diffie-Hellman Public Key
                 Certification Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
   Appendix C.1. No-Signature Signature Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . 88
   Appendix D.   Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 92











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1.  Introduction

   This document defines the base syntax for CMC, a Certificate
   Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
   This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the Internet PKI
   community:

   1.  The need for an interface to public key certification products
       and services based on CMS and PKCS #10, and

   2.  The need for a PKI enrollment protocol for encryption only keys
       due to algorithm or hardware design.

   A small number of additional services are defined to supplement the
   core certification request service.

1.1.  Protocol Requirements

      The protocol must be based as much as possible on the existing
      CMS, PKCS #10 [PKCS10] and CRMF (Certificate Request Message
      Format) [CRMF] specifications.

      The protocol must support the current industry practice of a PKCS
      #10 certification request followed by a PKCS#7 "certs-only"
      response as a subset of the protocol.

      The protocol must easily support the multi-key enrollment
      protocols required by S/MIME and other groups.

      The protocol must supply a way of doing all enrollment operations
      in a single-round trip.  When this is not possible the number of
      round trips is to be minimized.

      The protocol must be designed such that all key generation can
      occur on the client.

      Support must exist for the mandatory algorithms used by S/MIME.
      Support should exist for all other algorithms cited by the S/MIME
      core documents.

      The protocol must contain Proof-of-Possession (POP) methods.
      Optional provisions for multiple-round trip POP will be made if
      necessary.

      The protocol must support deferred and pending responses to
      enrollment requests for cases where external procedures are
      required to issue a certificate.




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      The protocol must support arbitrary chains of Registration
      Authorities (RAs) as intermediaries between certification
      requesters and Certification Authorities (CAs).

1.2.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.3.  Changes since RFC 2797

   We have done a major overhaul on the layout of the document.  This
   included two different steps.  Firstly we removed some sections from
   the document and moved them to two other documents.  Information on
   how to transport our messages are now found in [CMC-TRANS].
   Information on which controls and sections of this document must be
   implemented along with which algorithms are required can now be found
   in [CMC-MUST].

   A number of new controls have been added in this version:

      Extended CMC Status Info Section 6.1.1

      Publish Trust Anchors Section 6.15

      Authenticate Data Section 6.16

      Batch Request and Response Processing Section 6.17

      Publication Information Section 6.18

      Modify Certificate Request Section 6.5.1

      Control Processed Section 6.19

      Identity Proof Section 6.2.2

      Identity POP Link Witness V2 Section 6.3.1.1












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2.  Protocol Overview

   A PKI enrollment transaction in this specification is generally
   composed of a single round trip of messages.  In the simplest case a
   PKI enrollment request, henceforth referred to as a PKI Request, is
   sent from the client to the server and a PKI enrollment response,
   henceforth referred to as a PKI Response, is then returned from the
   server to the client.  In more complicated cases, such as delayed
   certificate issuance, more than one round trip is required.

   This specification defines two PKI Request types and two PKI Response
   types.

   PKI Requests are formed using either the PKCS #10 or CRMF structure.
   The two PKI Requests are:

   Simple PKI Request:  the bare PKCS #10 (in the event that no other
      services are needed), and

   Full PKI Request:  one or more PKCS #10, CRMF or Other Request
      Messages structures wrapped in a CMS encapsulation as part of a
      PKIData.

   PKI Responses are based on SignedData [CMS].  The two PKI Responses
   are

   Simple PKI Response:  a "certs-only" SignedData (in the event no
      other services are needed), or

   Full PKI Response  a PKIResponse content-type wrapped in a
      SignedData.

   No special services are provided for either renewal (i.e., a new
   certificate with the same key) or re-key (i.e., a new certificate
   with a new key) of client certificates.  Instead renewal and re-key
   requests look the same as any certification request, except that the
   identity proof is supplied by existing certificates from a trusted
   CA.  (This is usually the same CA, but could be a different CA in the
   same organization where naming is shared.)

   No special services are provided to distinguish between a re-key
   request and a new certification request (generally for a new
   purpose).  A control to unpublish a certificate would normally be
   included in a re-key request, and be omitted in a new certification
   request.  CAs or other publishing agents are also expected to have
   policies for removing certificates from publication either based on
   new certificates being added or the expiration or revocation of a
   certificate.



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   A provision exists for RAs to participate in the protocol by taking
   PKI Requests, wrapping them in a second layer of PKI Request with
   additional requirements or statements from the RA and then passing
   this new expanded PKI Request on to the CA.

   This specification makes no assumptions about the underlying
   transport mechanism.  The use of CMS does not imply an email-based
   transport.  Several different possible transport methods are defined
   in [CMC-TRANS].

   Optional services available through this specification are
   transaction management, replay detection (through nonces), deferred
   certificate issuance, certificate revocation requests and
   certificate/certificate revocation list (CRL) retrieval.

2.1.  Terminology

   There are several different terms, abbreviations and acronyms used in
   this document.  These are defined here for convenience and
   consistency of usage in no particular order:

   End-Entity  (EE) refers to the entity that owns a key pair and for
      whom a certificate is issued.

   Registration Authority (RA)  or Local RA (LRA) refers to an entity
      that acts as an intermediary between the EE and the CA.  Multiple
      RAs can exist between the End-Entity and the Certification
      Authority.  RAs may perform additional services such as key
      generation or key archival.  This document uses the term RA for
      both RA and LRA.

   Certification Authority  (CA) refers to the entity that issues
      certificates.

   Client  refers to an entity that creates a PKI Request.  In this
      document both RAs and EEs can be clients.

   Server  refers to the entities that process PKI Requests and create
      PKI Responses.  In this document both CAs and RAs can be servers.

   PKCS #10  refers to the Public Key Cryptography Standard #10
      [PKCS10], which defines a certification request syntax.

   CRMF  refers to the Certificate Request Message Format RFC [CRMF].
      CMC uses this certification request syntax defined in this
      document as part of the protocol.





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   CMS  refers to the Cryptographic Message Syntax RFC [CMS].  This
      document provides for basic cryptographic services including
      encryption and signing with and without key management.

   PKI Request/Response  refers to the requests/responses described in
      this document.  PKI Requests include certification requests,
      revocation requests, etc.  PKI Responses include certs-only
      messages, failure messages, etc.

   Proof-Of-Identity  refers to the client proving they are who they say
      that they are to the server.

   Enrollment or certification request  refers to the process of a
      client requesting a certificate.  A certification request is a
      subset of the PKI Requests.

   Proof-Of-Possession (POP)  refers to a value that can be used to
      prove that the private key corresponding to a public key is in the
      possession and can be used by an end-entity.  This document uses
      the following different types of POP:

      Signature  provides the required POP by a signature operation over
         some data.

      Direct  provides the required POP operation by an encrypted
         challange/response mechinism.

      Indirect  provides the required POP opepration by returning the
         issued certificate in an encrypted state.

      Publish  provides the required POP operation by providing the
         private key the the certificate issuer.

      Attested  provides the required POP operation by allowing a
         trusted entity to assert that the POP has been proven by one of
         the above methods.

   Object IDentifier (OID)  is a primitive type in Abstract Syntax
      Notation One (ASN.1).

2.2.  Protocol Request/Responses

   Figure 1 shows the Simple PKI Requests and Responses.  The contents
   of Simple PKI Request and Response are detailed in Section 3.1 and
   Section 4.1.






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   Simple PKI Request                      Simple PKI Response
   -------------------------               --------------------------

    +----------+                            +------------------+
    | PKCS #10 |                            | CMS ContentInfo  |
    +----------+--------------+             +------------------+------+
    | Certification Request   |             | CMS Signed Data,        |
    |                         |             |   no SignerInfo         |
    | Subject Name            |             |
    | Subject Public Key Info |             | SignedData contains one |
    |   (K_PUB)               |             | or more certificates in |
    | Attributes              |             | the certificates field  |
    |                         |             | Relevant CA certs and   |
    +-----------+-------------+             | CRLs can be included    |
                | signed with |             | as well.                |
                | matching    |             |                         |
                | K_PRIV      |             | encapsulatedContentInfo |
                +-------------+             | is absent.              |
                                            +--------------+----------+
                                                           | unsigned |
                                                           +----------+

                Figure 1: Simple PKI Requests and Responses

   Figure 2 shows the Full PKI Requests and Responses.  The contents of
   the Full PKI Request and Responses are detailed in Section 3.2 and
   Section 4.2.
























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    Full PKI Request                        Full PKI Response
    -----------------------                 ------------------------
    +----------------+                      +----------------+
    | CMS ContentInfo|                      | CMS ContentInfo|
    | CMS SignedData |                      | CMS SignedData |
    |   or Auth Data |                      |   or Auth Data |
    |     object     |                      |     object     |
    +----------------+--------+             +----------------+--------+
    |                         |             |                         |
    | PKIData                 |             | PKIResponseBody         |
    |                         |             |                         |
    | Sequence of:            |             | Sequence of:            |
    | <enrollment control>*   |             | <enrollment control>*   |
    | <certification request>*|             | <CMS object>*           |
    | <CMS object>*           |             | <other message>*        |
    | <other message>*        |             |                         |
    |                         |             | where * == zero or more |
    | where * == zero or more |             |                         |
    |                         |             | All certificates issued |
    | Certification requests  |             | as part of the response |
    | are CRMF, PKCS #10, or  |             | are included in the     |
    | Other.                  |             | "certificates" field    |
    |                         |             | of the SignedData.      |
    +-------+-----------------+             | Relevant CA certs and   |
            | signed (keypair |             | CRLs can be included as |
            | used may be pre-|             | well.                   |
            | existing or     |             |                         |
            | identified in   |             +---------+---------------+
            | the request)    |                       | signed by the |
            +-----------------+                       | CA or an LRA  |
                                                      +---------------+


               Figure 2: Full PKI Requests and Responses

















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3.  PKI Requests

   Two types of PKI Requests exist.  This section gives the details for
   both types.

3.1.  Simple PKI Request

   A Simple PKI Request uses the PKCS #10 syntax CertificationRequest
   [PKCS10].

   When a server processes a Simple PKI Request, the PKI Response
   returned is:

   Simple PKI Response  on success.

   Full PKI Response  on failure.  The server MAY choose not to return a
      PKI Response in this case.

   The Simple PKI Request MUST NOT be used if a proof-of-identity needs
   to be included.

   The Simple PKI Request cannot be used if the private key is not
   capable of producing some type of signature (i.e.  DH keys can use
   the signature algorithms in [DH-POP] for production of the
   signature).

   The Simple PKI Request cannot be used for any of the advanced
   services specified in this document.

   The client MAY incorporate one or more X.509v3 extensions in any
   certification request based on PKCS #10 as an ExtensionReq attribute.
   The ExtensionReq attribute is defined as:

     ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension

   where Extension is imported from [PKIXCERT] and ExtensionReq is
   identified by:

     id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
          rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}

   Servers MUST be able to process all extensions defined, but not
   prohibited, in [PKIXCERT].  Servers are not required to be able to
   process other X.509v3 extensions transmitted using this protocol, nor
   are they required to be able to process private extensions.  Servers
   are not required to put all client-requested extensions into a
   certificate.  Servers are permitted to modify client-requested
   extensions.  Servers MUST NOT alter an extension so as to invalidate



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   the original intent of a client-requested extension.  (For example,
   changing key usage from keyAgreement to digitalSignature.)  If a
   certification request is denied due to the inability to handle a
   requested extension and a PKI Response is returned, the server MUST
   return a PKI Response with a CMCFailInfo value with the value
   unsupportedExt.

3.2.  Full PKI Request

   The Full PKI Request provides the most functionality and flexibility.

   The Full PKI Request is encapsulated in either a SignedData or an
   AuthenticatedData with an encapsulated content type of id-cct-PKIData
   (Section 3.2.1).

   When a server process a Full PKI Request, a PKI Response MUST be
   returned.  The PKI Response returned is:

   Simple PKI Response  if the enrollment was successful and only
      certificates are returned.  (A CMCStatusInfoV2 control with
      success is implied.)

   Full PKI Response  if the enrollment was successful and information
      is returned in addition to certificates, if the enrollment is
      pending, or if the enrollment failed.

   If SignedData is used, the signature can be generated using either
   the private key material of an embedded signature certification
   request (i.e., included in the TaggedRequest tcr or crm fields), or a
   previously certified signature key.  If the private key of a
   signature certification request is used, then:

   a.  The certification request containing the corresponding public key
       MUST include a Subject Key Identifier extension.

   b.  The subjectKeyIdentifier form of the signerIdentifier in
       SignerInfo MUST be used.

   c.  The value of the subjectKeyIdentifier form of SignerInfo MUST be
       the Subject Key Identifier specified in the corresponding
       certification request.  (The subjectKeyIdentifier form of
       SignerInfo is used here because no certificates have yet been
       issued for the signing key.)  If the request key is used for
       signing, there MUST be only one SignerInfo in the SignedData.

   If AuthenticatedData is used, then:





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   a.  The Password Recipient Info option of RecipientInfo MUST be used.

   b.  A randomly generated key is used to compute the MAC value on the
       encapsulated content.

   c.  The input for the key derivation algorithm is a concatenation of
       the identifier (encoded as UTF8) and the shared-secret.

   When creating a PKI Request to renew or rekey a certificate:

   a.  The Identification and Identity Proof controls are absent.  The
       same information is provided by the use of an existing
       certificate from a CA when signing the PKI Request.  In this case
       the CA that issued the original certificate and the CA the
       request is made to will usually be the same, but could have a
       common operator.

   b.  CAs and RAs can impose additional restrictions on the signing
       certificate used.  They may require that the most recently issued
       signing certificate for a client be used.

   c.  Some CAs may prevent renewal operations (i.e., reuse of the same
       keys).  In this case the CA MUST return a PKI Response with
       noKeyReuse as the CMCFailInfo failure code.

3.2.1.  PKIData content type

   The PKIData content type is used for the Full PKI Request.  A PKIData
   content type is identified by:

     id-cct-PKIData ::= {id-pkix id-cct(12) 2 }

   The ASN.1 structure corresponding to the PKIData content type is:

     PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
         controlSequence    SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
         reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
         cmsSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
         otherMsgSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
     }

   The fields in PKIData have the following meaning:

   controlSequence  is a sequence of controls.  The controls defined in
      this document are found in Section 6.  Controls can be defined by
      other parties.  Details on the TaggedAttribute structure can be
      found in Section 3.2.1.1.




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   reqSequence  is a sequence of certification requests.  The
      certification requests can be a CertificationRequest (PKCS #10), a
      CertReqMsg (CRMF) or an externally defined PKI request.  Full
      details are found in Section 3.2.1.2.  If an externally defined
      certification request is present, but the server does not
      understand the certification request (or will not process it), a
      CMCStatus of noSupport MUST be returned for the certification
      request item and no other certification requests are processed.

   cmsSequence  is a sequence of [CMS] message objects.  See
      Section 3.2.1.3 for more details.

   otherMsgSequence  is a sequence of arbitrary data objects.  Data
      objects placed here are referred to by one or more controls.  This
      allows for controls to use large amounts of data without the data
      being embedded in the control.  See Section 3.2.1.4 for more
      details.

   All certification requests encoded into a single PKIData SHOULD be
   for the same identity.  RAs that batch process (see Section 6.17) are
   expected to place the PKI Requests received into the cmsSequence of a
   PKIData.

   Processing of the PKIData by a recipient is as follows:

   1.  All controls should be examined and processed in an appropriate
       manner.  The appropriate processing is to complete processing at
       this time, to ignore the control or to place the control on a
       to-do list for later processing.  Controls can be processed in
       any order; the order in the sequence is not significant.

   2.  Items in the reqSequence are not referenced by a control.  These
       items, which are certification requests, also need to be
       processed.  As with controls, the appropriate processing can be
       either immediate processing or addition to a to-do list for later
       processing.

   3.  Finally the to-do list is processed.  In many cases the to-do
       list will be ordered by grouping specific tasks together.

   No processing is required for cmsSequence or otherMsgSequence members
   of PKIData if they are present and are not referenced by a control.
   In this case, the cmsSequence and otherMsgSequence members are
   ignored.







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3.2.1.1.  Control Syntax

   The actions to be performed for a PKI Request/Response are based on
   the included controls.  Each control consists of an object identifier
   and a value based on the object identifier.

   The syntax of a control is:

     TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
         bodyPartID         BodyPartID,
         attrType           OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
         attrValues         SET OF AttributeValue
     }

     AttributeValue ::= ANY

   The fields in TaggedAttribute have the following meaning:

   bodyPartID  is a unique integer that identifies this control.

   attrType  is the OID that identifies the control.

   attrValues  is the data values used in processing the control.  The
      structure of the data is dependent on the specific control.

   The final server MUST fail the processing of an entire PKIData if any
   included control is not recognized, that control is not already
   marked as processed by a Control Processed control (see Section 6.19)
   and no other error is generated.  The PKI Response MUST include a
   CMCFailInfo value with the value badRequest and the bodyList MUST
   contain the bodyPartID of the invalid or unrecognized control(s).  A
   server is the final server if and only if it is not passing the PKI
   Request on to another server.  A server is not considered to be the
   final server if the server would have passed the PKI Request on, but
   instead it returned a processing error.

   The controls defined by this document are found in Section 6.

3.2.1.2.  Certification Request Formats

   Certification Requests are based on PKCS #10, CRMF or Other Request
   formats.  Section 3.2.1.2.1 specifies the requirements for clients
   and servers dealing with PKCS #10.  Section 3.2.1.2.2 specifies the
   requirements for clients and servers dealing with CRMF.
   Section 3.2.1.2.3 specifies the requirements for clients and servers
   dealing with Other Request.





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     TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
        tcr               [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
        crm               [1] CertReqMsg,
        orm               [2] SEQUENCE {
           bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
           requestMessageType    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
           requestMessageValue   ANY DEFINED BY requestMessageType
        }
     }

   The fields in TaggedRequest have the following meaning:

   tcr  is a certification request that uses the PKCS #10 syntax.
      Details on PKCS #10 are found in Section 3.2.1.2.1.

   crm  is a certification request that uses the CRMF syntax.  Details
      on CRMF are found in Section 3.2.1.2.2.

   orm  is an externally defined certification request.  One example is
      an attribute certification request.  The fields of this structure
      are:

      bodyPartID  is the identifier number for this certification
         request.  Details on body part identifiers are found in
         Section 3.2.2.

      requestMessageType  identifies the other request type.  These
         values are defined outside of this document.

      requestMessageValue  is the data associated with the other request
         type.

3.2.1.2.1.  PKCS #10 Certification Syntax

   A certification request based on PKCS #10 uses the following ASN.1
   structure:

    TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
        bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
        certificationRequest  CertificationRequest
    }

   The fields in TaggedCertificationRequest have the following meaning:

   bodyPartID  is the identifier number for this certification request.
      Details on body part identifiers are found in Section 3.2.2.





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   certificationRequest  contains the PKCS #10 based certification
      request.  Its fields are described in [PKCS10].

   When producing a certification request based on PKCS #10, clients
   MUST produce the certification request with a subject name and public
   key.  Some PKI products are operated using a central repository of
   information to assign subject names upon receipt of a certification
   request.  To accommodate this mode of operation, the subject field in
   a CertificationRequest MAY be NULL, but MUST be present.  CAs that
   receive a CertificationRequest with a NULL subject field MAY reject
   such certification requests.  If rejected and a PKI Response is
   returned, the CA MUST return a PKI Response with the CMCFailInfo
   value with the value badRequest.

3.2.1.2.2.  CRMF Certification Syntax

   A CRMF message uses the following ASN.1 structure (defined in [CRMF]
   and included here for convenience):

   CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
     certReq   CertRequest,
     popo      ProofOfPossession  OPTIONAL,
     -- content depends upon key type
     regInfo   SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL }

   CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
     certReqId     INTEGER,        -- ID for matching request and reply
     certTemplate  CertTemplate, --Selected fields of cert to be issued
     controls      Controls OPTIONAL } -- Attributes affecting issuance

   CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
     version      [0] Version               OPTIONAL,
     serialNumber [1] INTEGER               OPTIONAL,
     signingAlg   [2] AlgorithmIdentifier   OPTIONAL,
     issuer       [3] Name                  OPTIONAL,
     validity     [4] OptionalValidity      OPTIONAL,
     subject      [5] Name                  OPTIONAL,
     publicKey    [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo  OPTIONAL,
     issuerUID    [7] UniqueIdentifier      OPTIONAL,
     subjectUID   [8] UniqueIdentifier      OPTIONAL,
     extensions   [9] Extensions            OPTIONAL }

   The fields in CertReqMsg are explained in [CRMF].

   This document imposes the following additional restrictions on the
   construction and processing of CRMF certification requests:





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      When a Full PKI Request includes a CRMF certification request,
      both the subject and publicKey fields in the CertTemplate MUST be
      defined.  The subject field can be encoded as NULL, but MUST be
      present.

      When both CRMF and CMC controls exist with equivalent
      functionality, the CMC control SHOULD be used.  The CMC control
      MUST override the CRMF control.

      The regInfo field MUST NOT be used on a CRMF certification
      request.  Equivalent functionality is provided in the CMC regInfo
      control (Section 6.12).

      The indirect method of proving POP is not supported in this
      protocol.  One of the other methods (including the direct method
      described in this document) MUST be used.  The value of encrCert
      in SubsequentMessage MUST NOT be used.

      Since the subject and publicKeyValues are always present, the
      POPOSigningKeyInput MUST NOT be used when computing the value for
      POPSigningKey.

   A server is not required to use all of the values suggested by the
   client in the CRMF certification request.  Servers MUST be able to
   process all extensions defined, but not prohibited in [PKIXCERT].
   Servers are not required to be able to process other X.509v3
   extensions transmitted using this protocol, nor are they required to
   be able to process private extensions.  Servers are permitted to
   modify client-requested extensions.  Servers MUST NOT alter an
   extension so as to invalidate the original intent of a client-
   requested extension.  (For example change key usage from keyAgreement
   to digitalSignature.)  If a certification request is denied due to
   the inability to handle a requested extension, the server MUST
   respond with a Full PKI Response with a CMCFailInfo value with the
   value of unsupportedExt.

3.2.1.2.3.  Other Certification Request

   This document allows for other certification request formats to be
   defined and used as well.  An example of an other certification
   request format is one for Attribute Certificates.  These other
   certification request formats are defined by specifying an OID for
   identification and the structure to contain the data to be passed.

3.2.1.3.  Content Info Objects

   The cmsSequence field of the PKIData and PKIResponse messages
   contains zero or more tagged content info objects.  The syntax for



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   this structure is:

     TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
         bodyPartID              BodyPartID,
         contentInfo             ContentInfo
     }

   The fields in TaggedContentInfo have the following meaning:

   bodyPartID  is a unique integer that identifies this content info
      object.

   contentInfo  is a ContentInfo object (defined in [CMS]).

   The four content types used in cmsSequence are AuthenticatedData,
   Data, EnvelopedData and SignedData.  All of these content types are
   defined in [CMS].

3.2.1.3.1.  Authenticated Data

   The AuthenticatedData content type provides a method of doing pre-
   shared secret based validation of data being sent between two
   parties.  Unlike SignedData it does not specify which party actually
   generated the information.

   AuthenticatedData provides origination authentication in those
   circumstances where a shared-secret exists, but a PKI based trust has
   not yet been established.  No PKI based trust may have been
   established because a trust anchor has not been installed on the
   client or no certificate exists for a signing key.

   AuthenticatedData content type is used by this document for:

      The id-cmc-authData control (Section 6.16), and

      As the top-level wrapper in environments where an encryption only
      key is being certified.

   This content type can include both PKIData and PKIResponse as the
   encapsulated content types.  These embedded content types can contain
   additional controls that need to be processed.

3.2.1.3.2.  Data

   The Data content type allows for general transport of unstructured
   data.

   The Data content type is used by this document for:



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      Holding the encrypted random value y for POP proof in the
      encrypted POP control (see Section 6.7).

3.2.1.3.3.  Enveloped Data

   The EnvelopedData content type provides for shrouding of data.

   The EnvelopedData content type is the primary confidentiality method
   for sensitive information in this protocol.  EnvelopedData can
   provide encryption of an entire PKI Request (see Section 5).
   EnvelopedData can also be used to wrap private key material for key
   archival.  If the decryption on an EnvelopedData fails, the Full PKI
   Response with a CMCFailInfo value with a value of badMessageCheck and
   a bodyPartId of 0.

3.2.1.3.4.  Signed Data

   The SignedData content type provides for authentication and
   integrity.

   The SignedData content type is used by this document for:

      The outer wrapper for a PKI Request.

      The outer wrapper for a PKI Response.

   As part of processing a PKI Request/Response, the signature(s) MUST
   be verified.  If the signature does not verify and the PKI Request/
   Response contains anything other than a CMC Status Info control, a
   Full PKI Response containing a CMC Status Info control MUST be
   returned using a CMCFailInfo with a value of badMessageCheck and a
   bodyPartId of 0.

   For the PKI Response, SignedData allows the server to sign the
   returning data, if any exists, and to carry the certificates and CRLs
   corresponding to the PKI Request.  If no data is being returned
   beyond the certificates and CRLs, the EncapsulatedInfo and SignerInfo
   fields are not populated.

3.2.1.4.  Other Message Bodies

   The otherMsgSequence field of the PKI Request/Response allows for
   arbitrary data objects to be carried as part of a PKI Request/
   Response.  This is intended to contain a data object that is not
   already wrapped in a cmsSequence field Section 3.2.1.3.  The data
   object is ignored unless a control references the data object by
   bodyPartID.




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     OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
         bodyPartID        BodyPartID,
         otherMsgType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
         otherMsgValue     ANY DEFINED BY otherMsgType }

   The fields in OtherMsg have the following meaning:

   bodyPartID  is the unique id identifying this data object.

   otherMsgType  is the OID that defines the type of message body

   otherMsgValue  is the data.

3.2.2.  Body Part Identification

   Each element of a PKIData or PKIResponse has an associated body part
   identifier.  The body part identifier is a 4-octet integer using the
   ASN.1 of:

      bodyIdMax INTEGER ::= 4294967295

      BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..bodyIdMax)

   Body part identifiers are encoded in the certReqIds field for
   CertReqMsg objects (in a TaggedRequest) or in the bodyPartID field of
   the other objects.  The body part identifier MUST be unique within a
   single PKIData or PKIResponse.  Body part identifiers can be
   duplicated in different layers (for example a PKIData embedded within
   another).

   The bodyPartId value of 0 is reserved for use as the reference to the
   current PKIData object.

   Some controls, such as the Add Extensions control (Section 6.5.2) use
   the body part identifier in the pkiDataReference field to refer to a
   PKI Request in the current PKIData.  Some controls, such as the
   Extended CMC Status Info control (Section 6.1.1), will also use body
   part identifiers to refer to elements in the previous PKI Request/
   Response.  This allows an error to be explicit about the control or
   PKI Request to which the error applies.

   A BodyPartList contains a list of body parts in a PKI Request/
   Response (i.e. the Batch Request control in Section 6.17).  The ASN.1
   type BodyPartList is defined as:

      BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

   A BodyPartPath contains a path of body part identifiers moving



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   through nesting (i.e. the Modify Certificate Request control in
   Section 6.5.1).  The ASN.1 type BodyPartPath is defined as:

      BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

3.2.3.  CMC Unsigned Data Attribute

   There is sometimes a need to include data in a PKI Request designed
   to be removed by an RA during processing.  An example of this is the
   inclusion of an encrypted private key, where a key archive agent
   removes the encrypted private key before sending it on to the CA.
   One side effect of this desire is that every RA which encapsulates
   this information needs to move the data so that it is not covered by
   that RA's signature.  (A client PKI Request, encapsulated by an RA
   cannot have a signed control removed by the key archive agent without
   breaking the RA's signature.)  The CMC Unsigned Data attribute
   addresses this problem.

   The CMC Unsigned Data attribute contains information that is not
   directly signed by a client.  When an RA encounters this attribute in
   the unsigned or unauthenticated attribute field of a request it is
   aggregating, the CMC Unsigned Data attribute is removed from the
   request prior to placing it in a cmsSequence and placed in the
   unsigned or unauthenticated attributes of the RA's signed or
   authenticated data wrapper.

   The CMC Unsigned Data attribute is identified by:

   id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}

   The CMC Unsigned Data attribute has the ASN.1 definition:

      CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
          bodyPartPath        BodyPartPath,
          identifier          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
          content             ANY DEFINED BY identifier
      }

   The fields in CMCUnsignedData have the following meaning:

   bodyPartPath  is the path pointing to the control associated with
      this data.  When an RA moves the control in an unsigned or
      unauthenticated attribute up one level as part of wrapping the
      data in a new SignedData or AuthenticatedData, the body part
      identifier of the embedded item in the PKIData is pre-pended to
      the bodyPartPath sequence.





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   identifier  is the OID that defines the associated data.

   content  is the data.

   There MUST be at most one CMC Unsigned Data attribute in the
   UnsignedAttribute sequence of a SignerInfo or in the
   UnauthenticatedAttribute sequence of an AuthenticatedData.
   UnsignedAttribute consists of a set of values, the attribute can have
   any number of values greater than zero in that set.  If the CMC
   Unsigned Data attribute is in one SignerInfo or AuthenticatedData, it
   MUST appear with the same values(s) in all SignerInfo and
   AuthenticatedData items.







































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4.  PKI Responses

   Two types of PKI Responses exist.  This section gives the details on
   both types.

4.1.  Simple PKI Response

   Clients MUST be able to process the Simple PKI Response.  The Simple
   PKI Response consists of a SignedData with no EncapsulatedContentInfo
   and no SignerInfo.  The certificates requested in the PKI Response
   are returned in the certificate field of the SignedData.

   Clients MUST NOT assume the certificates are in any order.  Servers
   SHOULD include all intermediate certificates needed to form complete
   certification paths to one or more trust anchors, not just the newly
   issued certificate(s).  The server MAY additionally return CRLs in
   the CRL bag.  Servers MAY include the self-signed certificates.
   Clients MUST NOT implicitly trust included self-signed certificate(s)
   merely due to its presence in the certificate bag.  In the event
   clients receive a new self-signed certificate from the server,
   clients SHOULD provide a mechanism to enable the user to use the
   certificate as a trust anchor.  (The Publish Trust Anchors control
   Section 6.15 should be used in the event that the server intends the
   client to accept one or more certificates as trust anchors.  This
   requires the use of the Full PKI Response message.)

4.2.  Full PKI Response

   Clients MUST be able to process a Full PKI Response.

   The Full PKI Response consists of a SignedData encapsulating a
   PKIResponse content type.  The certificates issued in a PKI Response
   are returned in the certificates field of the immediately
   encapsulating SignedData.

   Clients MUST NOT assume the certificates are in any order.  Servers
   SHOULD include all intermediate certificates needed to form complete
   chains one or more trust anchors, not just the newly issued
   certificate(s).  The server MAY additionally return CRLs in the CRL
   bag.  Servers MAY include self-signed certificates.  Clients MUST NOT
   implicitly trust included self-signed certificate(s) merely due to
   its presence in the certificate bag.  In the event clients receive a
   new self-signed certificate from the server, clients MAY provide a
   mechanism to enable the user to explicitly use the certificate as a
   trust anchor.  (The Publish Trust Anchors control Section 6.15 exists
   for the purpose of allowing for distribution of trust anchor
   certificates.  If a trusted anchor publishes a new trusted anchor,
   this is one case where automated trust of the new trust anchor could



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   be allowed.)

4.2.1.  PKIResponse Content Type

   The PKIResponse content type is used for the Full PKI Response.  The
   PKIResponse content type is identified by:

     id-cct-PKIResponse ::= {id-pkix id-cct(12) 3  }

   The ASN.1 structure corresponding to the PKIResponse content type is:

      PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
          controlSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
          cmsSequence       SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
          otherMsgSequence  SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
      }

      ReponseBody ::= PKIResponse

   Note: In [RFC2797], this ASN.1 type was named ResponseBody.  It has
   been renamed to PKIResponse for clarity and the old name kept as a
   synonym.

   The fields in PKIResponse have the following meaning:

   controlSequence  is a sequence of controls.  The controls defined in
      this document are found in Section 6.  Controls can be defined by
      other parties.  Details on the TaggedAttribute structure are found
      in Section 3.2.1.1.

   cmsSequence  is a sequence of [CMS] message objects.  See
      Section 3.2.1.3 for more details.

   otherMsgSequence  is a sequence of arbitrary data objects.  Data
      objects placed here are referred to by one or more controls.  This
      allows for controls to use large amounts of data without the data
      being embedded in the control.  See Section 3.2.1.4 for more
      details.

   Processing of PKIResponse by a recipient is as follows:

   1.  All controls should be examined and processed in an appropriate
       manner.  The appropriate processing is to complete processing at
       this time, to ignore the control or to place the control on a
       to-do list for later processing.

   2.  Additional processing of non-element items includes the saving of
       certificates and CRLs present in wrapping layers.  This type of



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       processing is based on the consumer of the element and should not
       be relied on by generators.

   No processing is required for cmsSequence or otherMsgSequence members
   of the PKIResponse, if items are present and are not referenced by a
   control.  In this case, the cmsSequence and otherMsgSequence members
   are to be ignored.












































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5.  Application of Encryption to a PKI Request/Response

   There are occasions when a PKI Request or Response must be encrypted
   in order to prevent disclosure of information in the PKI Request/
   Response from being accessible to unauthorized entities.  This
   section describes the means to encrypt Full PKI Requests and
   Responses (Simple PKI Requests cannot be encrypted).  Data portions
   of PKI Requests and Responses that are placed in the cmsSequence
   field can be encrypted separately.

   Confidentiality is provided by wrapping the PKI Request/Response (a
   SignedData) in an EnvelopedData.  The nested content type in the
   EnvelopedData is id-SignedData.  Note that this is different from
   S/MIME where there is a MIME layer placed between the encrypted and
   signed data.  It is recommended that if an EnvelopedData layer is
   applied to a PKI Request/Response, a second signature layer be placed
   outside of the EnvelopedData layer.  The following figure shows how
   this nesting would be done:

     Normal              Option 1                  Option 2
     ------              --------                  --------
     SignedData          EnvelopedData             SignedData
      PKIData             SignedData                EnvelopedData
                           PKIData                   SignedData
                                                      PKIData

   Note: PKIResponse can be substituted for PKIData in the above figure.

   Options 1 and 2 prevent leakage of sensitive data by encrypting the
   Full PKI Request/Response.  An RA that receives a PKI Request that it
   cannot decrypt MAY reject the PKI Request unless it can process the
   PKI Request without knowledge of the contents (i.e., all it does is
   amalgamate multiple PKI Requests and forwards them to a server).
   After the RA removes the envelope and completes processing, it may
   then apply a new EnvelopedData layer to protect PKI Requests for
   transmission to the next processing agent.  Section 7 contains more
   information about RA processing.

   Full PKI Requests/Responses can be encrypted or transmitted in the
   clear.  Servers MUST provide support for all three options.

   Alternatively, an authenticated, secure channel could exist between
   the parties that require confidentiality.  Clients and servers MAY
   use such channels instead of the technique described above to provide
   secure, private communication of Simple and Full PKI Requests/
   Responses.





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6.  Controls

   Controls are carried as part of both Full PKI Requests and Responses.
   Each control is encoded as a unique OID followed by the data for the
   control (see syntax in Section 3.2.1.1.  The encoding of the data is
   based on the control.  Processing systems would first detect the OID
   (TaggedAttribute attrType) and process the corresponding control
   value (TaggedAttribute attrValues) prior to processing the message
   body.

   The OIDs are all defined under the following arc:

      id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
           dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }

      id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 7 }

   The following table lists the names, OID and syntactic structure for
             each of the controls described in this document.

   +------------------------+-------+------------------+---------------+
   | Control Identifier     | OID   | Syntax           | Section       |
   +------------------------+-------+------------------+---------------+
   | id-cmc-statusInfo      | id-cm | CMCStatusInfo    | Section 6.1.2 |
   |                        | c1    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-identification  | id-cm | UTF8String       | Section 6.2.3 |
   |                        | c2    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-identityProof   | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.2.2 |
   |                        | c3    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-dataReturn      | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.4   |
   |                        | c4    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-transactionId   | id-cm | INTEGER          | Section 6.6   |
   |                        | c5    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-senderNonce     | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.6   |
   |                        | c6    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-recipientNonce  | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.6   |
   |                        | c7    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-addExtensions   | id-cm | AddExtensions    | Section 6.5.2 |
   |                        | c8    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |




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   | id-cmc-encryptedPOP    | id-cm | EncryptedPOP     | Section 6.7   |
   |                        | c9    |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-decryptedPOP    | id-cm | DecryptedPOP     | Section 6.7   |
   |                        | c10   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-lraPOPWitness   | id-cm | LraPOPWitness    | Section 6.8   |
   |                        | c11   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-getCert         | id-cm | GetCert          | Section 6.9   |
   |                        | c15   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-getCRL          | id-cm | GetCRL           | Section 6.10  |
   |                        | c16   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-revokeRequest   | id-cm | RevokeRequest    | Section 6.11  |
   |                        | c17   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-regInfo         | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.12  |
   |                        | c18   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-responseInfo    | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.12  |
   |                        | c19   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-queryPending    | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.13  |
   |                        | c21   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-popLinkRandom   | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.3.1 |
   |                        | c22   |                  | .3            |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-popLinkWitness  | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.3.1 |
   |                        | c23   |                  | .2            |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV | id-cm | OCTET STRING     | Section 6.3.1 |
   | 2                      | c33   |                  | .1            |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-confirmCertAcce | id-cm | CMCCertId        | Section 6.14  |
   | ptance                 | c24   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-statusInfoV2    | id-cm | CMCStatusInfoV2  | Section 6.1.1 |
   |                        | c25   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-trustedAnchors  | id-cm | PublishTrustAnch | Section 6.15  |
   |                        | c26   | ors              |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-authData        | id-cm | AuthPublish      | Section 6.16  |
   |                        | c27   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |



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   | id-cmc-batchRequests   | id-cm | BodyPartList     | Section 6.17  |
   |                        | c28   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-batchResponses  | id-cm | BodyPartList     | Section 6.17  |
   |                        | c29   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-publishCert     | id-cm | CMCPublicationIn | Section 6.18  |
   |                        | c30   | fo               |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-modCertTemplate | id-cm | ModCertTemplate  | Section 6.5.1 |
   |                        | c31   |                  |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-controlProcesse | id-cm | ControlsProcesse | Section 6.19  |
   | d                      | c32   | d                |               |
   |                        |       |                  |               |
   | id-cmc-identityProofV2 | id-cm | IdentityProofV2  | Section 6.2.1 |
   |                        | c34   |                  |               |
   +------------------------+-------+------------------+---------------+

                      Table 1: CMC Control Attributes

6.1.  CMC Status Info Controls

   The CMC Status Info controls return information about the status of a
   client/server request/response.  Two controls are described in this
   section.  The Extended CMC Status Info control is the preferred
   control; the CMC Status Info control is included for backwards
   compatibility with RFC 2797.

   Servers MAY emit multiple CMC status info controls referring to a
   single body part.  Clients MUST be able to deal with multiple CMC
   status info controls in a PKI Response.  Servers MUST use the
   Extended CMC Status Info control, but MAY additionally use the CMC
   Status Info control.  Clients MUST be able to process the Extended
   CMC Status Info control.

6.1.1.  Extended CMC Status Info Control

   The Extended CMC Status Info control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-statusInfoV2 ::= { id-cmc 25 }

   The Extended CMC Status Info control has the ASN.1 definition:








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   CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
      cMCStatus             CMCStatus,
      bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference,
      statusString          UTF8String OPTIONAL,
      otherInfo             OtherStatusInfo OPTIONAL
   }

   OtherStatusInfo ::= CHOICE {
      failInfo              CMCFailInfo,
      pendInfo              PendInfo,
      extendedFailInfo      ExtendedFailInfo
   }

   PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      pendToken           OCTET STRING,
      pendTime            GeneralizedTime
   }

   ExtendedFailInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      failInfoOID            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
      failInfoValue          ANY DEFINED BY failInfoOID
   }

   BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
      bodyPartID           BodyPartID,
      bodyPartPath         BodyPartPath
   }


   The fields in CMCStatusInfoV2 have the following meaning:

   cMCStatus  contains the returned status value.  Details are in
      Section 6.1.3.

   bodyList  identifies the controls or other elements to which the
      status value applies.  If an error is returned for a Simple PKI
      Request, this field is the bodyPartID choice of BodyPartReference
      with the single integer of value 1.

   statusString  contains additional description information.  This
      string is human readable.

   otherInfo  contains additional information that expands on the CMC
      status code returned in the cMCStatus field.

   The fields in OtherStatusInfo have the following meaning:





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   failInfo  is described in Section 6.1.4.  It provides an error code
      that details what failure occurred.  This choice is present only
      if cMCStatus contains the value failed.

   pendInfo  contains information about when and how the client should
      request for the result of this request.  It is present when the
      cMCStatus is either pending or partial. pendInfo uses the
      structure PendInfo, which has the fields:

      pendToken  is the token used in the Query Pending control
         Section 6.13.

      pendTime  contains the suggested time the server wants to be
         queried about the status of the certification request.

   extendedFailInfo  includes application dependent detail error
      information.  This choice is present only if cMCStatus contains
      the value failed.  Caution should be used when defining new values
      as they may not be correctly recognized by all clients and
      servers.  The CMCFailInfo value of internalCAError may be assumed
      if the extended error is not recognized.  This field uses the type
      ExtendedFailInfo.  ExtendedFailInfo has the fields:

      failInfoOID  contains an OID that is associated with a set of
         extended error values.

      failInfoValue  contains an extended error code from the defined
         set of extended error codes.

   If the cMCStatus field is success, the Extended CMC Status Info
   control MAY be omitted unless it is the only item in the response.

6.1.2.  CMC Status Info Control

   The CMC Status Info control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-statusInfo ::= { id-cmc 1 }

   The CMC Status Info control has the ASN.1 definition:

         CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
              cMCStatus           CMCStatus,
              bodyList            BodyPartList,
              statusString        UTF8String OPTIONAL,
              otherInfo           CHOICE {
                failInfo            CMCFailInfo,
                pendInfo            PendInfo } OPTIONAL
         }



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   The fields in CMCStatusInfo have the following meaning:

   cMCStatus  contains the returned status value.  Details are in
      Section 6.1.3.

   bodyList  contains the list of controls or other element to which the
      status value applies.  If an error is being returned for a Simple
      PKI Request, this field contains a single integer of value 1.

   statusString  contains additional description information.  This
      string is human readable.

   otherInfo  provides additional information that expands on the CMC
      status code returned in the cMCStatus field.

      failInfo  is described in Section 6.1.4.  It provides an error
         code that details what failure occurred.  This choice is
         present only if cMCStatus is failed.

      pendInfo  uses the PendInfo ASN.1 structure in Section 6.1.1.  It
         contains information about when and how the client should
         request for results on this request.  The pendInfo field MUST
         be populated for a cMCStatus value of pending or partial.
         Further details can be found in Section 6.1.1 (Extended CMC
         Status Info Control) and Section 6.13 (Query Pending Control).

   If the cMCStatus field is success, the CMC Status Info control MAY be
   omitted unless it is the only item in the response.  If no status
   exists for a Simple or Full PKI Request, then the value of success is
   assumed.

6.1.3.  CMCStatus values

   CMCStatus is a field in the Extended CMC Status Info and CMC Status
   Info controls.  This field contains a code representing the success
   or failure of a specific operation.  CMCStatus has the ASN.1
   structure:

      CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
           success                (0),
           -- reserved            (1),
           failed                 (2),
           pending                (3),
           noSupport              (4),
           confirmRequired        (5),
           popRequired            (6),
           partial                (7)
      }



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   The values of CMCStatus have the following meaning:

   success  indicates the request was granted or the action was
      completed.

   failed  indicates the request was not granted or the action was not
      completed.  More information is included elsewhere in the
      response.

   pending  indicates the PKI Request has yet to be processed.  The
      requestor is responsible to poll back on this Full PKI request.
      pending may only be returned for certification request operations.

   noSupport  indicates the requested operation is not supported.

   confirmRequired  indicates a Confirm Certificate Acceptance control
      Section 6.14 must be returned before the certificate can be used.

   popRequired  indicates an direct POP operation is required
      Section 6.3.1.3.

   partial  indicates a partial PKI Response is returned.  The requestor
      is responsible to poll back for the unfulfilled portions of the
      Full PKI Request.

6.1.4.   CMCFailInfo

   CMCFailInfo is a field in the Extended CMC Status Info and CMC Status
   Info controls.  CMCFailInfo conveys more detailed information
   relevant to the interpretation of a failure condition.  The
   CMCFailInfo has the following ASN.1 structure:

      CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
           badAlg            (0),
           badMessageCheck   (1),
           badRequest        (2),
           badTime           (3),
           badCertId         (4),
           unsuportedExt     (5),
           mustArchiveKeys   (6),
           badIdentity       (7),
           popRequired       (8),
           popFailed         (9),
           noKeyReuse        (10),
           internalCAError   (11),
           tryLater          (12),
           authDataFail      (13)
      }



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   The values of CMCFailInfo have the following meanings:

   badAlg  indicates unrecognized or unsupported algorithm.

   badMessageCheck  indicates integrity check failed.

   badRequest  indicates transaction not permitted or supported.

   badTime  indicates message time field was not sufficiently close to
      the system time.

   badCertId  indicates no certificate could be identified matching the
      provided criteria.

   unsuportedExt  indicates a requested X.509 extension is not supported
      by the recipient CA.

   mustArchiveKeys  indicates private key material must be supplied.

   badIdentity  indicates identification control failed to verify.

   popRequired  indicates server requires a POP proof before issuing
      certificate.

   popFailed  indicates POP processing failed.

   noKeyReuse  indicates server policy does not allow key reuse.

   internalCAError  indicates that the CA had an unknown internal
      failure.

   tryLater  indicates that the server is not accepting requests at this
      time and the client should try at a later time.

   authDataFail  indicates failure occurred during processing of
      authenticated data

   If additional failure reasons are needed, they SHOULD use the
   ExtendedFailureInfo item in the Extended CMC Status Info control.
   However for closed environments they can be defined using this type.
   Such codes MUST be in the range from 1000 to 1999.

6.2.  Identification and Identity Proof Controls

   Some CAs and RAs require that a proof-of-identity be included in a
   certification request.  Many different ways of doing this exist with
   different degrees of security and reliability.  Most are familiar
   with a bank's request to provide your mother's maiden name as a form



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   of identity proof.  The reasoning behind requiring a proof-of-
   identity can be found in Appendix C of [CRMF].

   CMC provides a method to prove the client's identity based on a
   client/server shared-secret.  If clients support the Full PKI
   Request, clients MUST implement this method of identity proof
   (Section 6.2.2).  Servers MUST provide this method, but MAY
   additionally support bilateral methods of similar strength.

   This document also provides an Identification control
   (Section 6.2.3).  This control is a simple method to allow a client
   to state who they are to the server.  Generally, a shared secret AND
   an identifier of that shared-secret is passed from the server to the
   client.  The identifier is placed in the Identification control and
   the shared-secret is used to compute the Identity Proof control.

6.2.1.  Identity Proof Version 2 Control

   The Identity Proof Version 2 control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-identityProofV2 ::= { id-cmc 34 }

   The Identity Proof Version 2 control has the ASN.1 definition:

      IdentifyProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
          hashAlgID        AlgorithmIdentifier,
          macAlgID         AlgorithmIdentifier,
          witness          OCTET STRING
      }

   The fields of IdentityProofV2 have the following meaning:

   hashAlgID  is the identifier and parameters for the hash algorithm
      used to convert the shared-secret into a key for the MAC
      algorithm.

   macAlgID  is the identifier and the parameters for the message
      authentication code algorithm used to compute the value of the
      witness field.

   witness  is the identity proof.

   The required method starts with an out-of-band transfer of a token
   (the shared-secret).  The shared-secret should be generated in a
   random manner.  The distribution of this token is beyond the scope of
   this document.  The client then uses this token for an identity proof
   as follows:




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   1.  The PKIData reqSequence field (encoded exactly as it appears in
       the Full PKI Request including the sequence type and length) is
       the value to be validated.

   2.  A hash of the shared-secret as a UTF8 string is computed using
       hashAlgID.

   3.  A MAC is then computed using the value produced in Step 1 as the
       message and the value from Step 2 as the key.

   4.  The result from Step 3 is then encoded as the witness value in
       the Identity Proof Version 2 control.

   When the server verifies the Identity Proof Version 2 control, it
   computes the MAC value in the same way and compares it to the witness
   value contained in the PKI Request.

   If a server fails the verification of an Identity Proof Version 2
   control, the CMCFailInfo value MUST be present in the Full PKI
   Response and MUST have a value of badIdentity.

   Reuse of the shared-secret on certification request retries allows
   the client and server to maintain the same view of acceptable
   identity proof values.  However, reuse of the shared-secret can
   potentially open the door for some types of attacks.

   Implementations MUST be able to support tokens at least 16 characters
   long.  Guidance on the amount of entropy actually obtained from a
   given length token based on character sets can be found in Appendix A
   of [PASSWORD].

6.2.2.  Identity Proof Control

   The Identity Proof control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-identityProof ::= { id-cmc 3 }

   The Identity Proof control has the ASN.1 definition:

      IdentifyProof ::= OCTET STRING

   This control is processed in the same way as the Identity Proof
   Version 2 control.  In this case the hash algorithm is fixed to SHA-1
   and the MAC algorithm is fixed to HMAC-SHA1.







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6.2.3.  Identification Control

   Optionally, servers MAY require the inclusion of the unprotected
   Identification control with an Identification Proof control.  The
   Identification control is intended to contain a text string which
   assists the server in locating the shared-secret needed to validate
   the contents of the Identity Proof control.  If the Identification
   control is included in the Full PKI Request, the derivation of the
   key in step 2 (from Section 6.2.1 is altered so that the hash of the
   concatenation of the shared-secret and the UTF8 identity value
   (without the type and length bytes) are hashed rather than just the
   shared-secret.

   The Identification control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-identification ::= { id-cmc 2 }

   The Identification control has the ASN.1 definition:

      Identification ::= UTF8String

6.2.4.  Hardware Shared-Secret Token Generation

   The shared-secret between the EE and the server is sometimes computed
   using a hardware device that generates a series of tokens.  The EE
   can therefore prove their identity by transferring this token in
   plain text along with a name string.  The above protocol can be used
   with a hardware shared-secret token generation device by the
   following modifications:

   1.  The Identification control MUST be included and MUST contain the
       hardware-generated token.

   2.  The shared-secret value used above is the same hardware-generated
       token.

   3.  All certification requests MUST have a subject name and the
       subject name MUST contain the fields required to identify the
       holder of the hardware token device.

   4.  The entire certification request MUST be shrouded in some fashion
       to prevent eavesdropping.  Although the token is time critical,
       an active eavesdropper cannot be permitted to extract the token
       and submit a different certification request with the same token
       value.






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6.3.  Linking Identity and POP Information

   In a Full PKI Request, identity information about the client is
   carried in the signature of the SignedData containing all of the
   certification requests.  Proof-of-possession information for key
   pairs, however, is carried separately for each PKCS #10 or CRMF
   certification request.  (For keys capable of generating a digital
   signature, the POP is provided by the signature on the PKCS #10 or
   CRMF request.  For encryption-only keys the controls described in
   Section 6.7 are used.)  In order to prevent substitution-style
   attacks, the protocol must guarantee that the same entity generated
   both the POP and proof-of-identity information.

   This section describes two mechanisms for linking identity and POP
   information: witness values cryptographically derived from the
   shared-secret (Section 6.3.1.3) and shared-secret/subject DN matching
   (Section 6.3.2).  Clients and servers MUST support the witness value
   technique.  Clients and servers MAY support shared-secret/subject DN
   matching or other bilateral techniques of similar strength.  The idea
   behind both mechanisms is to force the client to sign some data into
   each certification request that can be directly associated with the
   shared-secret; this will defeat attempts to include certification
   requests from different entities in a single Full PKI Request.

6.3.1.  Cryptographic Linkage

   The first technique that links identity and POP information forces
   the client to include a piece of information cryptographically-
   derived from the shared-secret as a signed extension within each
   certification request (PKCS #10 or CRMF).

6.3.1.1.  POP Link Witness Version 2 Controls

   The POP Link Witness Version 2 control is identified by the OIDs:

      id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 ::= { id-cmc 33 }

   The POP Link Witness Version 2 control has the ASN.1 definition:

      PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
          keyGenAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
          macAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
          witness           OCTET STRING
      }

   The fields of PopLinkWitnessV2 have the meaning:





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   keyGenAlgorithm  contains the algorithm used to generate the key for
      the MAC algorithm.  This will generally be a hash algorithm, but
      could be a more complex algorithm.

   macAlgorithm  contains the algorithm used to create the witness
      value.

   witness  contains the computed witness value.

   This technique is useful if null subject DNs are used (because, for
   example, the server can generate the subject DN for the certificate
   based only on the shared-secret).  Processing begins when the client
   receives the shared-secret out-of-band from the server.  The client
   then computes the following values:

   1.  The client generates a random byte-string, R, which SHOULD be at
       least 512 bits in length.

   2.  The key is computed from the shared-secret using the algorithm in
       keyGenAlgorithm.

   3.  A MAC is then computed over the random value produced in Step 1,
       using the key computed in Step 2.

   4.  The random value produced in Step 1 is encoded as the value of a
       POP Link Random control.  This control MUST be included in the
       Full PKI Request.

   5.  The MAC value produced in Step 3 is placed in either the POP Link
       Witness control or the witness field of the POP Link Witness V2
       control.

       *  For CRMF, the POP Link Witness/POP Link Witness V2 control is
          included in the controls field of the CertRequest structure.

       *  For PKCS #10, the POP Link Witness/POP Link Witness V2 control
          is included in the attributes field of the
          CertificationRequestInfo structure.

   Upon receipt, servers MUST verify that each certification request
   contains a copy of the POP Link Witness/POP Link Witness V2 control
   and that its value was derived using the above method from the
   shared-secret and the random string included in the POP Link Random
   control.

   The Identification control (see Section 6.2.3) or the subject DN of a
   certification request can be used to help identify which shared-
   secret was used.



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6.3.1.2.  POP Link Witness Control

   The POP Link Witness control is identified by the OIDs:

      id-cmc-popLinkWitness ::= { id-cmc 23 }

   The POP Link Witness control has the ASN.1 definition:

      PopLinkWitness ::= OCTET STRING

   For this control, SHA-1 is used as the key generation algorithm.
   HMAC-SHA1 is used as the mac algorithm.

6.3.1.3.  POP Link Random Control

   The POP Link Random control is identified by the OID:

   The POP Link Random is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-popLinkRandom  ::= { id-cmc 22 }

   The POP Link Random control has the ASN.1 definition:

      PopLinkRandom ::= OCTET STRING

6.3.2.  Shared-secret/subject DN linking

   The second technique to link identity and POP information is to link
   a particular subject distinguished name (subject DN) to the shared-
   secrets that are distributed out-of-band and to require that clients
   using the shared-secret to prove identity include that exact subject
   DN in every certification request.  It is expected that many client-
   server connections that use shared-secret based proof-of-identity
   will use this mechanism.  (It is common not to omit the subject DN
   information from the certification request.)

   When the shared-secret is generated and transferred out-of-band to
   initiate the registration process (Section 6.2), a particular subject
   DN is also associated with the shared-secret and communicated to the
   client.  (The subject DN generated MUST be unique per entity in
   accordance with the CA policy; a null subject DN cannot be used.  A
   common practice could be to place the identification value as part of
   the subject DN.)  When the client generates the Full PKI Request, it
   MUST use these two pieces of information as follows:

   1.  The client MUST include the specific subject DN that it received
       along with the shared-secret as the subject name in every
       certification request (PKCS #10 and/or CRMF) in the Full PKI



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       Request.  The subject names in the certification requests MUST
       NOT be null.

   2.  The client MUST include an Identity Proof control (Section 6.2.2)
       or Identity Proof Version 2 (Section 6.2.1), derived from the
       shared-secret, in the Full PKI Request.

   The server receiving this message MUST (a) validate the Identity
   Proof control and then, (b) check that the subject DN included in
   each certification request matches that associated with the shared-
   secret.  If either of these checks fails the certification request
   MUST be rejected.

6.3.3.  Renewal and Re-Key Messages

   When doing a renewal or re-key certification request, linking
   identity and POP information is simple.  The client copies the
   subject DN for a current signing certificate into the subject name
   field of each certification request that is made.  The POP for each
   certification request will now cover that information.  The outmost
   signature layer is created using the current signing certificate,
   which allows the original identity to be associated with the
   certification request.  Since the name in the current signing
   certificate and the names in the certification requests match, the
   necessary linking has been achieved.

6.4.  Data Return Control

   The Data Return control allows clients to send arbitrary data
   (usually some type of internal state information) to the server and
   to have the data returned as part of the Full PKI Response.  Data
   placed in a Data Return control is considered to be opaque to the
   server.  The same control is used for both Full PKI Requests and
   Responses.  If the Data Return control appears in a Full PKI Request,
   the server MUST return it as part of the PKI Response.

   In the event that the information in the Data Return control needs to
   be confidential, it is expected that the client would apply some type
   of encryption to the contained data, but the details of this are
   outside the scope of this specification.

   The Data Return control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-dataReturn  ::= { id-cmc 4 }

   The Data Return control has the ASN.1 definition:

      DataReturn ::= OCTET STRING



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   A client could use this control to place an identifier marking the
   exact source of the private key material.  This might be the
   identifier of a hardware device containing the private key.

6.5.  RA Certificate Modification Controls

   These controls exist for RAs to be able to modify the contents of a
   certification request.  Modifications might be necessary for various
   reasons.  These include: addition of certificate extensions or
   modification of subject and/or subject alternative names.

   Two controls exist for this purpose.  The first control, Modify
   Certificate Request (Section 6.5.1), allows the RA to replace or
   remove of any field in the certificate.  The second control, Add
   Extensions (Section 6.5.2), only allows for the addition of
   extensions.

6.5.1.  Modify Certificate Request Control

   The Modify Certificate Request control is used by RAs to change
   fields in a requested certificate.

   The Modify Certificate Request control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-modCertTemplate  ::= { id-cmc 31 }

   The Modify Certificate Request has the ASN.1 definition:

     ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
         pkiDataReference             BodyPartPath,
         certReferences               BodyPartList,
         replace                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
         certTemplate                 CertTemplate
     }

   The fields in ModCertTemplate have the following meaning:

   pkiDataReference  is the path to the PKI Request containing
      certification request(s) to be modified.

   certReferences  refers to one or more certification requests in the
      PKI Request referenced by pkiDataReference to be modified.  Each
      BodyPartID of the certReferences sequence MUST be equal to either
      the bodyPartID of a TaggedCertificationRequest (PKCS #10) or the
      certReqId of the CertRequest within a CertReqMsg (CRMF).  By
      definition, the certificate extensions included in the
      certTemplate field are applied to every certification request
      referenced in the certReferences sequence.  If a request



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      corresponding to bodyPartID cannot be found, the CMCFailInfo with
      a value of badRequest is returned that references this control.

   replace  specifies if the target certification request is to be
      modified by replacing or deleting fields.  If the value is TRUE,
      the data in this control replaces the data in the target
      certification request.  If the value is FALSE, the data in the
      target certification request is deleted.  The action is slightly
      different for the extensions field of certTemplate, each extension
      is treated individually rather than as a single unit.

   certTemplate  is a certificate template object [CRMF].  If a field is
      present and replace is TRUE, it replaces that field in the
      certification request.  If the field is present and replace is
      FALSE, the field in the certification request is removed.  If the
      field is absent, no action is performed.  Each extension is
      treated as a single field.

   Servers MUST be able to process all extensions defined, but not
   prohibited, in [PKIXCERT].  Servers are not required to be able to
   process every X.509v3 extension transmitted using this protocol, nor
   are they required to be able to process other, private extensions.
   Servers are not required to put all RA-requested extensions into a
   certificate.  Servers are permitted to modify RA-requested
   extensions.  Servers MUST NOT alter an extension so as to reverse the
   meaning of a client-requested extension.  If a certification request
   is denied due to the inability to handle a requested extension and a
   Full PKI Response is returned, the server MUST return a CMCFailInfo
   value with the value of unsupportedExt.

   If a certification request is the target of multiple Modify
   Certificate Request controls, the behavior is:

   o  If control A exists in a layer that contains the layer of control
      B, control A MUST override control B. In other words, controls
      should be applied from the innermost layer to the outermost layer.

   o  If control A and control B are in the same PKIData (i.e. the same
      wrapping layer), the order of application is non-determinate.

   The same order of application is used if a certification request is
   the target of both a Modify Certificate Request control and an Add
   Extensions control.

6.5.2.  Add Extensions Control

   The Add Extensions control has been deprecated in favor of the Modify
   Certificate Request control.  It was replaced so that fields in the



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   certification request other than extensions could be modified.

   The Add Extensions control is used by RAs to specify additional
   extensions that are to be included in certificates.

   The Add Extensions control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-addExtensions  ::= { id-cmc 8 }

   The Add Extensions control has the ASN.1 definition:

     AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
         pkiDataReference             BodyPartID,
         certReferences               SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
         extensions                   SEQUENCE OF Extension
     }

   The fields in AddExtensions have the following meaning:

   pkiDataReference  contains the body part identity of the embedded
      certification request.

   certReferences  is a list of references to one or more of the
      certification requests contained within a PKIData.  Each body part
      identifier of the certReferences sequence MUST be equal to either
      the bodyPartID of a TaggedCertificationRequest (PKCS #10) or the
      certReqId of the CertRequest within a CertReqMsg (CRMF).  By
      definition, the listed extensions are to be applied to every
      certification request referenced in the certReferences sequence.
      If a certification request corresponding to bodyPartID cannot be
      found, the CMCFailInfo with a value of badRequest is returned
      referencing this control.

   extensions  is a sequence of extensions to be applied to the
      referenced certification requests.

   Servers MUST be able to process all extensions defined, but not
   prohibited, in [PKIXCERT].  Servers are not required to be able to
   process every X.509v3 extension transmitted using this protocol, nor
   are they required to be able to process other, private extensions.
   Servers are not required to put all RA-requested extensions into a
   certificate.  Servers are permitted to modify RA-requested
   extensions.  Servers MUST NOT alter an extension so as to reverse the
   meaning of a client-requested extension If a certification request is
   denied due to the inability to handle a requested extension and a
   response is returned, the server MUST return a CMCFailInfo with the
   value of unsupportedExt.




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   If multiple Add Extensions controls exist in a Full PKI Request, the
   exact behavior is left up to the CA policy.  However it is
   recommended that the following policy be used.  These rules would be
   applied to individual extensions within an Add Extensions control (as
   opposed to an "all or nothing" approach).

   1.  If the conflict is within a single PKIData, the certification
       request would be rejected with a CMCFailInfo value of badRequest.

   2.  If the conflict is between different PKIData, the outermost
       version of the extension would be used (allowing an RA to
       override the requested extension).

6.6.  Transaction Identifier, Sender and Recipient Nonce Controls

   Transactions are identified and tracked with a transaction
   identifier.  If used, clients generate transaction identifiers and
   retain their value until the server responds with a Full PKI Response
   that completes the transaction.  Servers correspondingly include
   received transaction identifiers in the Full PKI Response.

   The Transaction Identifier control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-transactionId  ::= { id-cmc 5 }

   The Transaction Identifier control has the ASN.1 definition:

      TransactionId ::= INTEGER

   The Transaction Identifier control identifies a given transaction.
   It is used by client and server to manage the state of an operation.
   Clients MAY include a Transaction Identifier control in request.  If
   the original request contains a Transaction Identifier control, all
   subsequent requests and responses MUST include the same Transaction
   Identifier control.

   Replay protection is supported through the use of the Sender and
   Recipient Nonce controls.  If nonces are used, in the first message
   of a transaction, a Recipient Nonce control is not transmitted; a
   Sender Nonce control is included by the transaction originator and
   retained for later reference.  The recipient of a Sender Nonce
   control reflects this value back to the originator as a Recipient
   Nonce control and includes its own Sender Nonce control.  Upon
   receipt by the transaction originator of this response, the
   transaction originator compares the value of Recipient Nonce control
   to its retained value.  If the values match, the message can be
   accepted for further security processing.  The received value for a
   Sender Nonce control is also retained for inclusion in the next



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   message associated with the same transaction.

   The Sender Nonce and Recipient controls are identified by the OIDs:

      id-cmc-senderNonce     ::= { id-cmc 6 }
      id-cmc-recipientNonce  ::= { id-cmc 7 }

   The Sender Nonce control has the ASN.1 definition:

      SenderNonce ::= OCTET STRING

   The Recipient Nonce control has the ASN.1 definition:

      RecepientNonce ::= OCTET STRING

   Clients MAY include a Sender Nonce control in the initial PKI
   Request.  If a message includes a Sender Nonce control, the response
   MUST include the transmitted value of the previously received Sender
   Nonce control as a Recipient Nonce control and include a new value as
   its Sender Nonce control.

6.7.  Encrypted and Decrypted POP Controls

   Servers MAY require that this POP method be used only if another POP
   method is unavailable.  Servers SHOULD reject all certification
   requests contained within a PKIData if any required POP is missing
   for any element within the PKIData.

   Many servers require proof that the entity that generated the
   certification request actually possesses the corresponding private
   component of the key pair.  For keys that can be used as signature
   keys, signing the certification request with the private key serves
   as a POP on that key pair.  With keys that can only be used for
   encryption operations, POP MUST be performed by forcing the client to
   decrypt a value.  See Section 5 of [CRMF] for a detailed discussion
   of POP.

   By necessity, POP for encryption-only keys cannot be done in one
   round-trip, since there are four distinct steps:

   1.  Client tells the server about the public component of a new
       encryption key pair.

   2.  Server sends the client a POP challenge, encrypted with the
       presented public encryption key.

   3.  Client decrypts the POP challenge using the private key that
       corresponds to the presented public key and sends the plaintext



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       back to the server.

   4.  Server validates the decrypted POP challenge and continues
       processing the certification request.

   CMC defines two different controls.  The first deals with the
   encrypted challenge sent from the server to the user in step 2.  The
   second deals with the decrypted challenge sent from the client to the
   server in step 3.

   The Encrypted POP control is used to send the encrypted challenge
   from the server to the client as part of the PKIResponse.  (Note that
   it is assumed that the message sent in Step 1 above is a Full PKI
   Request and that the response in step 2 is a Full PKI Response
   including a CMCFailInfo specifying that a POP is explicitly required,
   and providing the POP challenge in the encryptedPOP control.)

   The Encrypted POP control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-encryptedPOP     ::= { id-cmc 9 }

   The Encrypted POP control has the ASN.1 definition:

      EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
           request        TaggedRequest,
           cms            ContentInfo,
           thePOPAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
           witnessAlgID   AlgorithmIdentifier,
           witness        OCTET STRING
      }

   The Decrypted POP control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-decryptedPOP     ::= { id-cmc 10 }

   The Decrypted POP control has the ASN.1 definition:

      DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
           bodyPartID     BodyPartID,
           thePOPAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
           thePOP         OCTET STRING
      }

   The encrypted POP algorithm works as follows:

   1.  The server randomly generates the POP Proof Value and associates
       it with the request.




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   2.  The server returns the Encrypted POP control with the following
       fields set:

       request  is the original certification request (it is included
          here so the client need not keep a copy of the request),

       cms  is an EnvelopedData, the encapsulated content type being id-
          data and the content being the POP Proof Value, this value
          needs to be long enough that one cannot reverse the value from
          the witness hash.  If the certification request contains a
          Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension, then the recipient
          identifier SHOULD be the SKI.  If the issuerAndSerialNumber
          form is used, the IssuerName MUST be encoded as NULL and the
          SerialNumber as the bodyPartID of the certification request,

       thePOPAlgID  identifies the algorithm to be used in computing the
          return POP value,

       witnessAlgID  identifies the hash algorithm used on POP Proof
          Value to create the field witness,

       witness  is the hashed value of POP Proof Value.

   3.  The client decrypts the cms field to obtain the POP Proof Value.
       The client computes H(POP Proof Value) using the witnessAlgID and
       compares to the value of witness.  If the values do not compare
       or the decryption is not successful, the client MUST abort the
       enrollment process.  The client aborts the process by sending a
       request containing a CMC Status Info control with CMCFailInfo
       value of popFailed.

   4.  The client creates the Decrypted POP control as part of a new
       PKIData.  The fields in the DecryptedPOP are:

       bodyPartID  refers to the certification request in the new PKI
          Request,

       thePOPAlgID  is copied from the encryptedPOP,

       thePOP  contains the possession proof.  This value is computed by
          thePOPAlgID using the POP Proof Value and the request.

   5.  The server then re-computes the value of thePOP from its cached
       value and the request and compares to the value of thePOP.  If
       the values do not match, the server MUST NOT issue the
       certificate.  The server MAY re-issue a new challenge or MAY fail
       the request altogether.




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   When defining the algorithms for thePOPAlgID and witnessAlgID care
   must be taken to ensure that the result of witnessAlgID is not a
   useful value to shortcut the computation with thePOPAlgID.  The POP
   Proof Value is used as the secret value in the HMAC algorithm and the
   request is used as the data.  If the POP Proof Value is greater than
   64 bytes, only the first 64 bytes of the POP Proof Value is used as
   the secret.

   One potential problem with the algorithm above is the amount of state
   that a CA needs to keep in order to verify the returned POP value.
   The following describes one of many possible ways of addressing the
   problem by reducing the amount of state kept on the CA to a single
   (or small set) of values.

   1.  Server generates random seed x, constant across all requests.
       (The value of x would normally be altered on a regular basis and
       kept for a short time afterwards.)

   2.  For certification request R, server computes y = F(x,R).  F can
       be, for example, HMAC-SHA1(x,R).  All that's important for
       statelessness is that y be consistently computable with only
       known state constant x and function F, other inputs coming from
       the certification request structure. y should not be predictable
       based on knowledge of R, thus the use of a One-Way-Function like
       HMAC-SHA1.

6.8.  RA POP Witness Control

   In a certification request scenario that involves an RA, the CA may
   allow (or require) that the RA perform the POP protocol with the
   entity that generated the certification request.  In this case, the
   RA needs a way to inform the CA it has done the POP.  The RA POP
   Witness control addresses this issue.

   The RA POP Witness control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-lraPOPWitness     ::= { id-cmc 11 }

   The RA POP Witness control has the ASN.1 definition:

      LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
          pkiDataBodyid   BodyPartID,
          bodyIds         SEQUENCE of BodyPartID
      }

   The fields in LraPOPWitness have the following meaning:





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   pkiDataBodyid  contains the body part identifier of the nested
      TaggedContentInfo containing the client's Full PKI Request.
      pkiDataBodyid is set to 0 if the request is in the current
      PKIData.

   bodyIds  is a list of certification requests for which the RA has
      performed an out-of-band authentication.  The method of
      authentication could be archival of private key material,
      challenge-response or other means.

   If a certification server does not allow an RA to do the POP
   verification, it returns a CMCFailInfo with the value of popFailed.
   The CA MUST NOT start a challenge-response to re-verify the POP
   itself.

6.9.  Get Certificate Control

   Everything described in this section is optional to implement.

   The Get Certificate control is used to retrieve a previously issued
   certificate from a certificate repository.  A CA, an RA or an
   independent service may provide this repository.  The clients
   expected to use this facility are those where a fully deployed
   directory is either infeasible or undesirable.

   The Get Certificate control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-getCert     ::= { id-cmc 15 }

   The Get Certificate control has the ASN.1 definition:

      GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
          issuerName    GeneralName,
          serialNumber  INTEGER }

   The fields in GetCert have the following meaning:

   issuerName  is the name of the certificate issuer.

   serialNumber  identifies the certificate to be retrieved.

   The server that responds to this request places the requested
   certificate in the certificates field of a SignedData.  If the Get
   Certificate control is the only control in a Full PKI Request, the
   response should be a Simple PKI Response.






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6.10.  Get CRL Control

   Everything described in this section is optional to implement.

   The Get CRL control is used to retrieve CRLs from a repository of
   CRLs.  A CA, an RA or an independent service may provide this
   repository.  The clients expected to use this facility are those
   where a fully deployed directory is either infeasible or undesirable.

   The Get CRL control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-getCRL     ::= { id-cmc 16 }

   The Get CRL control has the ASN.1 definition:

      GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
          issuerName    Name,
          cRLName       GeneralName OPTIONAL,
          time          GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
          reasons       ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }

   The fields in a GetCRL have the following meanings:

   issuerName  is the name of the CRL issuer.

   cRLName  may be the value of CRLDistributionPoints in the subject
      certificate or equivalent value in the event the certificate does
      not contain such a value.

   time  is used by the client to specify from among potentially several
      issues of CRL that one whose thisUpdate value is less than but
      nearest to the specified time.  In the absence of a time
      component, the CA always returns with the most recent CRL.

   reasons  is used to specify from among CRLs partitioned by revocation
      reason.  Implementers should bear in mind that while a specific
      revocation request has a single CRLReason code - and consequently
      entries in the CRL would have a single CRLReason code value - a
      single CRL can aggregate information for one or more reasonFlags.

   A server responding to this request places the requested CRL in the
   crls field of a SignedData.  If the Get CRL control is the only
   control in a Full PKI Request, the response should be a Simple PKI
   Response.







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6.11.  Revocation Request Control

   The Revocation Request control is used to request that a certificate
   be revoked.

   The Revocation Request control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-revokeRequest ::= { id-cmc 17 }

   The Revocation Request control has the ASN.1 definition:

      RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
          issuerName      Name,
          serialNumber    INTEGER,
          reason          CRLReason,
          invalidityDate  GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
          sharedSecret    OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
          comment         UTF8string OPTIONAL }

   The fields of RevokeRequest have the following meaning:

   issuerName  is the issuerName of the certificate to be revoked.

   serialNumber  is the serial number of the certificate to be revoked.

   reason  is the suggested CRLReason code for why the certificate is
      being revoked.  The CA can use this value at its discretion in
      building the CRL.

   invalidityDate  is the suggested value for the Invalidity Date CRL
      Extension.  The CA can use this value at its discretion in
      building the CRL.

   sharedSecret  is a secret value registered by the EE when the
      certificate was obtained to allow for revocation of a certificate
      in the event of key loss.

   comment  is a human readable comment.

   For a revocation request to be reliable in the event of a dispute, a
   strong proof-of-origin is required.  However, in the instance when an
   EE has lost use of its signature private key, it is impossible for
   the EE to produce a digital signature (prior to the certification of
   a new signature key pair).  The Revoke Request control allows the EE
   to send the CA a shared-secret that may be used as an alternative
   authenticator in the instance of loss of use of the EE's signature
   private key.  The acceptability of this practice is a matter of local
   security policy.



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   It is possible to sign the revocation for the lost certificate with a
   different certificate in some circumstances.  A client can sign a
   revocation for an encryption key with a signing certificate if the
   name information matches.  Similarly an administrator or RA can be
   assigned the ability to revoke the certificate of a third party.
   Acceptance of the revocation by the server depends on local policy in
   these cases.

   Clients MUST provide the capability to produce a digitally signed
   Revocation Request control.  Clients SHOULD be capable of producing
   an unsigned Revocation Request control containing the EE shared-
   secret.  (The unsigned message consisting of a SignedData with no
   signatures.)  If a client provides shared-secret based self-
   revocation, the client MUST be capable of producing a Revocation
   Request control containing the shared-secret.  Servers MUST be
   capable of accepting both forms of revocation requests.

   The structure of an unsigned, shared-secret based revocation request
   is a matter of local implementation.  The shared-secret does not need
   to be encrypted when sent in a Revocation Request control.  The
   shared-secret has a one-time use (i.e., it is used to request
   revocation of the certificate), and public knowledge of the shared-
   secret after the certificate has been revoked is not a problem.
   Clients need to inform users that the same shared-secret SHOULD NOT
   be used for multiple certificates.

   A Full PKI Response MUST be returned for a revocation request.

6.12.  Registration and Response Information Controls

   The Registration Information control allows for clients to pass
   additional information as part a Full PKI Request.

   The Registration Information control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-regInfo     ::= { id-cmc 18 }

   The Registration Information control has the ASN.1 definition:

      RegInfo ::= OCTET STRING

   The content of this data is based on bilateral agreement between the
   client and server.

   The Response Information control allows a server to return additional
   information as part of a Full PKI Response.

   The Response Information control is identified by the OID:



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      id-cmc-responseInfo     ::= { id-cmc 19 }

   The Response Information control has the ASN.1 definition:

      ResponseInfo ::= OCTET STRING

   The content of this data is based on bilateral agreement between the
   client and the server.

6.13.  Query Pending Control

   In some environments, process requirements for manual intervention or
   other identity checks can delay the return of the certificate.  The
   Query Pending control allows clients to query a server about the
   state of a pending certification request.  The server returns a
   pendToken as part of the Extended CMC Status Info and the CMC Status
   Info controls (in the otherInfo field).  The client copies the
   pendToken into the Query Pending control to identify the correct
   certification request to the server.  The server returns a suggested
   time for the client to query for the state of a pending certification
   request.

   The Query Pending control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-queryPending     ::= { id-cmc 21 }

   The Query Pending control has the ASN.1 definition:

      QueryPending ::= OCTET STRING

   If a server returns a pending or partial CMCStatusInfo (the
   transaction is still pending), the otherInfo MAY be omitted.  If the
   otherInfo is not omitted, the value of 'pendInfo' MUST be the same as
   the original pendInfo value.

6.14.  Confirm Certificate Acceptance Control

   Some CAs require that clients give a positive confirmation that the
   certificates issued to the EE are acceptable.  The Confirm
   Certificate Acceptance control is used for that purpose.  If the CMC
   Status Info on a PKI Response is confirmRequired, then the client
   MUST return a Confirm Certificate Acceptance control contained in a
   Full PKI Request.

   Clients SHOULD wait for the PKI Response from the server that the
   confirmation has been received before using the certificate for any
   purpose.




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   The Confirm Certificate Acceptance control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance     ::= { id-cmc 24 }

   The Confirm Control Acceptance control has the ASN.1 definition:

      CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber

   CMCCertId contains the issuer and serial number of the certificate
   being accepted.

   Servers MUST return a Full PKI Response for a Confirm Certificate
   Acceptance control.

   Note that if the CA includes this control, there will be two full
   round trips of messages.

   1.  The client sends the certification request to the CA.

   2.  The CA returns a Full PKI Response with the certificate and this
       control.

   3.  The client sends a Full PKI Request to the CA with an Extended
       CMC Status Info control accepting and a Confirm Certificate
       Acceptance control or an Extended CMC Status Info control
       rejecting the certificate.

   4.  The CA sends a Full PKI Response to the client with an Extended
       CMC Status Info of success.

6.15.  Publish Trust Anchors Control

   The Publish Trust Anchors control allows for the distribution of set
   trust anchors from a central authority to an EE.  The same control is
   also used to update the set of trust anchors.  Trust anchors are
   distributed in the form of certificates.  These are expected, but not
   required, to be self-signed certificates.  Information is extracted
   from these certificates to set the inputs to the certificates
   validation algorithm in section 6.1.1 of [PKIXCERT].

   The Publish Trust Anchors control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-trustedAnchors     ::= { id-cmc 26 }

   The Publish Trust Anchors control has the ASN.1 definition:






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       PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
           seqNumber      INTEGER,
           hashAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
           anchorHashes   SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
       }

   The fields in PublishTrustAnchors have the following meaning:

   seqNumber  is an integer indicating the location within a sequence of
      updates.

   hashAlgorithm  is the identifier and parameters for the hash
      algorithm that is used in computing the values of the anchorHashes
      field.  All implementations MUST implement SHA-1 for this field.

   anchorHashes  are the hashes for the certificates that are to be
      treated as trust anchors by the client.  The actual certificates
      are transported in the certificate bag of the containing
      SignedData structure.

   While it is recommended that the sender place the certificates that
   are to be trusted in the PKI Response, it is not required as the
   certificates should be obtainable using normal discovery techniques.

   Prior to accepting the trust anchors changes, a client MUST at least
   do the following: validate the signature on the PKI Response to a
   current trusted anchor, check with policy to ensure that the signer
   is permitted to use the control, validate that the authenticated
   publish time in the signature is near to the current time and
   validate the sequence number is greater than the previously used one.

   In the event that multiple agents publish a set of trust anchors, it
   is up to local policy to determine how the different trust anchors
   should be combined.  Clients SHOULD be able to handle the update of
   multiple trust anchors independently.

   NOTE: Clients that handle this control must use extreme care in
   validating that the operation is permissible.  Incorrect handling of
   this control allows for an attacker to change the set of trust
   anchors on the client.

6.16.  Authenticated Data Control

   The Authenticated Data control allows a server to provide data back
   to the client in an authenticated manner.  This control uses the
   Authenticated Data structure to allow for validation of the data.
   This control is used where the client has a shared-secret and a
   secret identifier with the server, but where a trust anchor has not



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   yet been downloaded onto the client so that a signing certificate for
   the server cannot be validated.  The specific case that this control
   was created for use with the Publish Trust Anchors control
   Section 6.15, but may be used in other cases as well.

   The Authenticated Data control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-authData     ::= { id-cmc 27 }

   The Authenticated Data control has the ASN.1 definition:

      AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID

   AuthPublish is a body part identifier that refers to a member of the
   cmsSequence element for the current PKI Response or PKI Data.  The
   cmsSequence element is AuthenticatedData.  The encapsulated content
   is an id-cct-PKIData, there will then be controls in the
   controlSequence that would need to be processed (one example being
   the Publish Trust Anchors control Section 6.15).

   If the authentication operation fails, the CMCFailInfo authDataFail
   is returned.

6.17.  Batch Request and Response Controls

   These controls allow for an RA to collect multiple requests together
   into a single Full PKI Request and forward it to a CA.  The server
   would then process the requests and return the results in a Full PKI
   Response.

   The Batch Request control is identified by the OID:

       id-cmc-batchRequests  ::= {id-cmc 28}

   The Batch Response control is identified by the OID:

       id-cmc-batchResponses ::= {id-cmc 29}

   Both the Batch Request and Batch Response controls have the ASN.1
   definition:

      BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE of BodyPartID

   The data associated with these controls is a set of body part
   identifiers.  The collection of requests/responses are individually
   placed in the cmsSequence of the PKIData/PKIResponse.  The body part
   identifiers of these elements are then placed in the body part list.




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   When a server processes a Batch Request control, it MAY return the
   responses in one or more PKI Responses.  A CMCStatus value of partial
   is returned on all but the last PKI Response.  The CMCStatus would be
   success if the Batch Requests control was processed, the responses
   are created with their own CMCStatus code.  Errors on individual
   requests are not propagated up to the top level.

   When a PKI Response with a CMCStatus value of partial is returned,
   the Query Pending control (Section 6.13) is used to retrieve
   additional results.  The returned status includes a suggested time
   after which the client should ask for the additional results.

6.18.  Publication Information Control

   The Publication Information control allows for modifying publication
   of already issued certificates, both for publishing and removal from
   publication.  A common usage for this control is to remove an
   existing certificate from publication during a re-key operation.
   This control should always be processed after the issuance of new
   certificates and revocation requests.  This control should not be
   processed if a certificate failed to be issued.

   The Publication Information control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-publishCert     ::= { id-cmc 30 }

   The Publication Information control has the ASN.1 definition:
























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     CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           hashAlg     AlgorithmIdentifier,
           certHashes      SEQUENCE of OCTET STRING,
           pubInfo         PKIPublicationInfo

     PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           action     INTEGER {
                        dontPublish (0),
                        pleasePublish (1) },
           pubInfos  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL }

             -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish"
             -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted,
             -- "dontCare" is assumed)

      SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
            pubMethod    INTEGER {
                dontCare    (0),
                x500        (1),
                web         (2),
                ldap        (3) },
            pubLocation  GeneralName OPTIONAL }
             }

   The fields in CMCPublicationInfo have the following meaning:

   hashAlg  is the algorithm identifier of the hash algorithm used to
      compute the values in certHashes.

   certHashes  are the hashes of the certificates for which publication
      is to change.

   pubInfo  is the information where and how the certificates should be
      published.  The fields in pubInfo (taken from [CRMF]) have the
      following meanings:

      action  indicates the action the service should take.  It has two
         values:

         dontPublish  indicates that the PKI should not publish the
            certificate (this may indicate that the requester intends to
            publish the certificate him/herself). dontPublish has the
            added connotation of removing from publication the
            certificate if it is already published.







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         pleasePublish  indicates that the PKI MAY publish the
            certificate using whatever means it chooses unless pubInfos
            is present.  Omission of the the CMC Publication Info
            control results in the same behavior.

      pubInfos  pubInfos indicates how (e.g., X500, Web, IP Address) the
         PKI SHOULD publish the certificate.

   A single certificate SHOULD NOT appear in more than one Publication
   Information control.  The behavior is undefined in the event that it
   does.

6.19.  Control Processed Control

   The Control Processed control allows an RA to indicate to subsequent
   control processors that a specific control has already been
   processed.  This permits an RA in the middle of a processing stream
   to process a control defined either in a local context or in a
   subsequent document.

   The Control Processed control is identified by the OID:

      id-cmc-controlProcessed     ::= { id-cmc 32 }

   The Control Processed control has the ASN.1 definition:

       ControlList ::= SEQUENCE {
           bodyList        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
       }

   bodyList  is a series of body part identifiers that form a path to
      each of the controls that were processed by the RA.  This control
      is only needed for those controls which are not part of this
      standard and thus would cause an error condition of a server
      attempting to deal with a control which is not defined in this
      document.  No error status is needed since an error causes the RA
      to return the request to the client with the error rather than
      passing the request on to the next server in the processing list.













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7.  Registration Authorities

   This specification permits the use of RAs.  An RA sits between the EE
   and the CA.  From the EE's perspective, the RA appears to be the CA
   and from the server the RA appears to be a client.  RAs receive the
   PKI Requests, perform local processing and then forward them onto
   CAs.  Some of the types of local processing that an RA can perform
   include:

   o  Batching multiple PKI Requests together,

   o  Performing challenge/response POP proofs,

   o  Adding private or standardized certificate extensions to all
      certification requests,

   o  Archiving private key material,

   o  Routing requests to different CAs.

   When an RA receives a PKI Request it has three options: it may
   forward the PKI Request without modification, it may add a new
   wrapping layer to the PKI Request, or it may remove one or more
   existing layers and add a new wrapping layer.

   When an RA adds a new wrapping layer to a PKI Request it creates a
   new PKIData.  The new layer contains any controls required (for
   example if the RA does the POP proof for an encryption key or the Add
   Extension control to modify a PKI Request) and the client PKI
   Request.  The client PKI Request is placed in the cmsSequence if it
   is a Full PKI Request and in the reqSequence if it is a Simple PKI
   Request.  If an RA is batching multiple client PKI Requests together,
   then each client PKI Request is placed into the appropriate location
   in the RA's PKIData object along with all relevant controls.

   If multiple RAs are in the path between the EE and the CA, this will
   lead to multiple wrapping layers on the request.

   In processing a PKI Request, an RA MUST NOT alter any certification
   requests (PKCS #10 or CRMF) as any alteration would invalidate the
   signature on the certification request and thus the POP for the
   private key.

   An example of how this would look is illustrated by the following
   figure:






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      SignedData (by RA)
        PKIData
          controlSequence
               RA added control statements
          reqSequence
               Zero or more Simple PKI Requests from clients
          cmsSequence
               Zero or more Full PKI Requests from clients
                  SignedData (signed by client)
                      PKIData

   Under some circumstances an RA is required to remove wrapping layers.
   The following sections look at the processing required if encryption
   layers and signing layers need to be removed.

7.1.  Encryption Removal

   There are two cases that require an RA to remove or change encryption
   in a PKI Request.  In the first case the encryption was applied for
   the purposes of protecting the entire PKI Request from unauthorized
   entities.  If the CA does not have a Recipient Info entry in the
   encryption layer, the RA MUST remove the encryption layer.  The RA
   MAY add a new encryption layer with or without adding a new signing
   layer.

   The second change of encryption that may be required is to change the
   encryption inside of a signing layer.  In this case the RA MUST
   remove all signing layers containing the encryption.  All control
   statements MUST be merged according to local policy rules as each
   signing layer is removed and the resulting merged controls MUST be
   placed in a new signing layer provided by the RA.  If the signing
   layer provided by the EE needs to also be removed, the RA can also
   remove this layer.

7.2.  Signature Layer Removal

   Only two instances exist where an RA should remove a signature layer
   on a Full PKI Request.  If an encryption layer needs to be modified
   within the request, or if a CA will not accept secondary delegation
   (i.e., multiple RA signatures).  In all other situations, RAs SHOULD
   NOT remove a signing layer from a PKI Request.

   If an RA removes a signing layer from a PKI Request, all control
   statements MUST be merged according to local policy rules.  The
   resulting merged control statements MUST be placed in a new signing
   layer provided by the RA.





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8.  Security Considerations

   Mechanisms for thwarting replay attacks may be required in particular
   implementations of this protocol depending on the operational
   environment.  In cases where the CA maintains significant state
   information, replay attacks may be detectable without the inclusion
   of the optional nonce mechanisms.  Implementers of this protocol need
   to carefully consider environmental conditions before choosing
   whether or not to implement the senderNonce and recipientNonce
   controls described in Section 6.6.  Developers of state-constrained
   PKI clients are strongly encouraged to incorporate the use of these
   controls.

   Extreme care needs to be taken when archiving a signing key.  The
   holder of the archived key may have the ability to use the key to
   generate forged signatures.  There are however reasons why a signing
   key should be archived.  An archived CA signing key can be recovered
   in the event of failure to continue to produced CRLs following a
   disaster.

   Due care must be taken prior to archiving keys.  Once a key is given
   to an archiving entity, the archiving entity could use the keys in a
   way not conducive to the archiving entity.  Users should be made
   especially aware that proper verification is made of the certificate
   used to encrypt the private key material.

   Clients and servers need to do some checks on cryptographic
   parameters prior to issuing certificates to make sure that weak
   parameters are not used.  A description of the small subgroup attack
   is provided in [X942].  Methods of avoiding the small subgroup attack
   can be found in [SMALL-GROUP].  CMC implementations ought to be aware
   of this attack when doing parameter validations.

   When using a shared-secret for authentication purposes, the shared-
   secret should be generated using good random number techniques
   [RANDOM].  User selection of the secret allows for dictionary attacks
   to be mounted.

   Extreme care must be used when processing the Publish Trust Anchors
   control.  Incorrect processing can lead to the practice of slamming
   where an attacker changes the set of trusted anchors in order to
   weaken security.

   One method of controlling the use of the Publish Trust Anchors
   control is as follows.  The client needs to associate with each trust
   anchor accepted by the client the source of the trust anchor.
   Additionally the client should associate with each trust anchor the
   types of messages that the trust anchor is valid for.  (I.e., is the



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   trust anchor used for validating S/MIME messages, TLS or CMC
   enrollment messages.)

   When a new message is received with a Publish Trust Anchor control,
   the client would accept the set of new trust anchors for specific
   applications only if the signature validates, the signer of the
   message has the required policy approval for updating the trust
   anchors and local policy also would allow updating the trust anchors.











































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9.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a number of control objects.  These are
   identified by Object Identifiers (OIDs).  The objects are defined
   from an arc delegated by IANA to the PKIX Working Group.  No further
   action by IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated
   updates.












































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10.  Acknowledgments

   The authors and the PKIX Working Group are grateful for the
   participation of Xiaoui Lui and Jeff Weinstein in helping to author
   the original versions of this document.

   The authors would like to thank Brian LaMacchia for his work in
   developing and writing up many of the concepts presented in this
   document.  The authors would also like to thank Alex Deacon and Barb
   Fox for their contributions.









































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11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [CMS]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3852, July 2004.

   [CRMF]     Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Certification Request Message
              Format", RFC 4211, January 2005.

   [DH-POP]   Prafullchandra, H. and J. Schaad, "Diffie-Hellman Proof-
              of-Possession Algorithms", RFC 2875, June 2000.

   [HMAC]     Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "Diffie-Hellman
              Proof-of-Possession Algorithms", RFC 2104, February 1997.

   [PKCS10]   Kaliski, B., "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
              v1.5", RFC 2314, October 1997.

   [PKIXCERT]
              Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.

11.2.  Informational References

   [CMC-TRANS]
              Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "CMC Transport",
              draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-00.txt , December 2004.

   [CMC-MUST]
              Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "CMC Compliance",
              draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-must-00.txt , December 2004.

   [DH]       Kaliski, B., "PKCS 3: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement v1.4",
              Lost 1900.

   [IPsec]    Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [PASSWORD]
              Burr, W., Dodson, D., and W. Polk, "Electronic
              Authentication Guideline", NIST SP 800-63, April 2006.




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   [PKCS1]    Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption, Version 1.5",
              PKCS #1, March 1998.

   [PKCS7]    Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax v1.5",
              RFC 2315, October 1997.

   [PKCS8]    Laboratories, RSA., "PKCS#8: Private-Key Information
              Syntax Standard, Version 1.2", November 1993.

   [RANDOM]   Eastlake, 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              ""Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106,
              RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [SMALL-GROUP]
              Zuccherato, R., "Methods for Avoiding the "Small-Subgroup"
              Attacks on the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method for
              S/MIME", RFC 2785, March 2000.

   [SMIMEV2]  Dusse, S., Hoffman, P., Ramsdell, B., Lundblade, L., and
              L. Repka, "S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification",
              RFC 2311, March 1998.

   [SMIMEV3]  Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
              RFC 3851, July 2004.

   [TLS]      Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.

   [X942]     Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
              RFC 2631, June 1999.

   [RFC2797]  Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., and J. Weinstein,
              "Certificate Management Messages over CMS", RFC 2797,
              April 2000.

















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Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

EnrollmentMessageSyntax
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(4) internet(1)
security(5) mechansims(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmc2002(23) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All --
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
-- in the other ASN.1 modules.  Other applications may use them for
-- their own purposes.

IMPORTS

  -- PKIX Part 1 - Implicit    From [PKIXCERT]
     GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags
     FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
             internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
             id-pkix1-implicit(19)}

  -- PKIX Part 1 - Explicit    From [PKIXCERT]
     AlgorithmIdentifier, Extension, Name, CertificateSerialNumber
     FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
             internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
             id-pkix1-explicit(18)}

  -- Cryptographic Message Syntax   FROM [CMS]
     ContentInfo, Attribute, IssuerAndSerialNumber
       FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2)
            us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
            modules(0) cms-2004(24)}


-- CRMF                         FROM [CRMF]
   CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate
   FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
          internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
          id-mod-crmf2005(36)};

  -- Global Types
     UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
       -- The content of this type conforms to RFC 2279.


 id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }



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id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7}   -- CMC controls
id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12}  -- CMC content types

-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}
id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}
id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}
id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}
id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}
id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22}
id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23}

-- The following controls have the type UTF8String

id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}

-- The following controls have the type INTEGER

id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}

-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}
id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}


 -- This is the content type used for a request message in the protocol

id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }


PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
    controlSequence    SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
    reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
    cmsSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
    otherMsgSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}

 bodyIdMax INTEGER ::= 4294967295

 BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..bodyIdMax)

TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
    bodyPartID         BodyPartID,
    attrType           OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    attrValues         SET OF AttributeValue
}



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 AttributeValue ::= ANY

 TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
     tcr               [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
     crm               [1] CertReqMsg,
     orm               [2] SEQUENCE {
         bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
         requestMessageType    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
         requestMessageValue   ANY DEFINED BY requestMessageType
     }
 }

 TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
     bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
     certificationRequest  CertificationRequest
 }

 CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   certificationRequestInfo  SEQUENCE {
     version                   INTEGER,
     subject                   Name,
     subjectPublicKeyInfo      SEQUENCE {
       algorithm                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
       subjectPublicKey          BIT STRING },
     attributes                [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
   signatureAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
   signature                 BIT STRING
 }

TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    bodyPartID              BodyPartID,
    contentInfo             ContentInfo
}

OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
    bodyPartID        BodyPartID,
    otherMsgType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    otherMsgValue     ANY DEFINED BY otherMsgType }

--  This defines the response message in the protocol
id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }

ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse

PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    controlSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
    cmsSequence       SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
    otherMsgSequence  SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg



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}

-- Used to return status state in a response

id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}

CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    cMCStatus       CMCStatus,
    bodyList        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
    statusString    UTF8String OPTIONAL,
    otherInfo        CHOICE {
      failInfo         CMCFailInfo,
      pendInfo         PendInfo } OPTIONAL
}

PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    pendToken        OCTET STRING,
    pendTime         GeneralizedTime
}

CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
    success         (0),
    failed          (2),
    pending         (3),
    noSupport       (4),
    confirmRequired (5),
    popRequired     (6),
    partial                (7)
}

CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
    badAlg          (0),
    badMessageCheck (1),
    badRequest      (2),
    badTime         (3),
    badCertId       (4),
    unsuportedExt   (5),
    mustArchiveKeys (6),
    badIdentity     (7),
    popRequired     (8),
    popFailed       (9),
    noKeyReuse      (10),
    internalCAError (11),
    tryLater        (12),
    authDataFail    (13)
}

-- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests



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id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}

AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
    pkiDataReference    BodyPartID,
    certReferences      SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
    extensions          SEQUENCE OF Extension
}


id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}

EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
    request       TaggedRequest,
    cms             ContentInfo,
    thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier,
    witnessAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
    witness         OCTET STRING
}

DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
    bodyPartID      BodyPartID,
    thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier,
    thePOP          OCTET STRING
}

 id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}

 LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
     pkiDataBodyid   BodyPartID,
     bodyIds         SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
 }


--
id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}

GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
    issuerName      GeneralName,
    serialNumber    INTEGER }


id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}

GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
    issuerName    Name,
    cRLName       GeneralName OPTIONAL,
    time          GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,



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    reasons       ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }

id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}

RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    issuerName            Name,
    serialNumber          INTEGER,
    reason                CRLReason,
    invalidityDate         GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    passphrase            OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    comment               UTF8String OPTIONAL }

id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24}

CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber

-- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added to a certificate

id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
     rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}

ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension

-- The following exists to allow Diffie-Hellman Certification Requests Messages to
-- be well-formed

id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}

NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

--  Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data.
--    This will be used in the key archive draft among others.

id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
      rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)}
id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}

CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
    bodyPartPath        BodyPartPath,
    identifier          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    content             ANY DEFINED BY identifier
}

--  Replaces CMC Status Info
--

id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25}




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CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
   cMCStatus             CMCStatus,
   bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                  BodyPartReference,
   statusString          UTF8String OPTIONAL,
   otherInfo             CHOICE {
     failInfo               CMCFailInfo,
     pendInfo               PendInfo,
     extendedFailInfo       SEQUENCE {
        failInfoOID            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        failInfoValue          AttributeValue
     }
   } OPTIONAL
}

BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
   bodyPartID           BodyPartID,
   bodyPartPath         BodyPartPath
}

BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

--  Allow for distribution of trust anchors
--

id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26}

PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
    seqNumber      INTEGER,
    hashAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
    anchorHashes     SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
}

id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27}

AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID

--   These two items use BodyPartList
id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28}
id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29}

BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID


--
id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30}

CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {



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    hashAlg                      AlgorithmIdentifier,
    certHashes                   SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING,
    pubInfo                          PKIPublicationInfo
}

id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31}

ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
    pkiDataReference             BodyPartPath,
    certReferences               BodyPartList,
    replace                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    certTemplate                 CertTemplate
}

-- Inform follow on servers that one or more controls have already been processed

id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32}

ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE {
    bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
}

--  Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility

id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 }

IdentifyProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
    proofAlgID       AlgorithmIdentifier,
    macAlgId         AlgorithmIdentifier,
    witness          OCTET STRING
}

id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 }
PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyGenAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
    macAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
    witness           OCTET STRING
}

END











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Appendix B.  Enrollment Message Flows

   This section is informational.  The purpose of this section is to
   present, in an abstracted version, the messages that would flow
   between the client and server for several different common cases.

Appendix B.1.  Request of a Signing Certificate

   This section looks at the messages that would flow in the event that
   an enrollment is occurring for a signing only key.  If the
   certificate was designed for both signing and encryption, the only
   difference would be the key usage extension in the certification
   request.

   Message from client to server:

   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIData
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {102, id-cmc-identityProof, computed value}
           {103, id-cmc-senderNonce, 10001}
         reqSequence
           certRequest
             certReqId = 201
             certTemplate
               subject = My Proposed DN
               publicKey = My Public Key
               extensions
                 {id-ce-subjectPublicKeyIdentifier, 1000}
                 {id-ce-keyUsage, digitalSignature}
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       SignerInfo
         sid.subjectKeyIdentifier = 1000

   Response from server to client:













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   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIResponse
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {102, id-cmc-statusInfoV2, {success, 201}}
           {103, id-cmc-senderNonce, 10005}
           {104, id-cmc-recipientNonce, 10001}
     certificates
       Newly issued certificate
       Other certificates
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       Signed by CA

Appendix B.2.  Single Certification Request, But Modified by RA

   This section looks at the messages that would flow in the event that
   an enrollment has one RA in the middle of the data flow.  That RA
   will modify the certification request before passing it on to the CA.

   Message from client to RA:

   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIData
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {102, id-cmc-identityProof, computed value}
           {103, id-cmc-senderNonce, 10001}
         reqSequence
           certRequest
             certReqId = 201
             certTemplate
               subject = My Proposed DN
               publicKey = My Public Key
               extensions
                 {id-ce-subjectPublicKeyIdentifier, 1000}
                 {id-ce-keyUsage, digitalSignature}
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       SignerInfo
         sid.subjectKeyIdentifier = 1000

   Message from RA to CA:






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   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIData
       eContent
         controlSequence
           { 102, id-cmc-batchRequests, { 1, 2} }
           { 103, id-cmc-addExtensions,
             { {1, 201, {id-ce-certificatePolicies, anyPolicy}}
               {1, 201, {id-ce-subjectAltName, {extension data}}
               {2, XXX, {id-ce-subjectAltName, {extension data}}}
         cmsSequence
           { 1, <Message from client to RA #1> }
           { 2, <Message from client to RA #2> }
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       SignerInfo
         sid = RA key.

   Response from the CA to the RA:
































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   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIResponse
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {102, id-cmc-BatchResponse, {999, 998}}

           {102, id-cmc-statusInfoV2, {failed, 2, badIdentity}}
         cmsSequence
           { bodyPartID = 999
             contentInfo
               ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
               ContentInfo.content
                 SignedData.encapContentInfo
                   eContentType = id-ct-PKIResponse
                   eContent
                     controlSequence
                      {102, id-cmc-statusInfoV2, {success, 201}}
                 certificates
                   Newly issued certificate
                   Other certificates
                 SignedData.SignerInfos
                   Signed by CA
           }
           { bodyPartID = 998,
             contentInfo
               ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
               ContentInfo.content
                 SignedData.encapContentInfo
                   eContentType = id-ct-PKIResponse
                   eContent
                     controlSequence
                       {102, id-cmc-statusInfoV2, {failure, badAlg}}
                 certificates
                   Newly issued certificate
                   Other certificates
                 SignedData.SignerInfos
                   Signed by CA
           }
         SignedData.SignerInfos
           Signed by CA

   Response from RA to client:







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   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIResponse
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {102, id-cmc-statusInfoV2, {success, 201}}
     certificates
       Newly issued certificate
       Other certificates
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       Signed by CA

Appendix B.3.  Direct POP for an RSA certificate

   This section looks at the messages that would flow in the event that
   an enrollment is done for an encryption only certificate using an
   direct POP method.  For simplicity it is assumed that the
   certification requestor already has a signing only certificate

   The fact that a second round trip is required is implicit rather than
   explicit.  The server determines this based on fact that no other POP
   exists for the certification request.

   Message #1 from client to server:


























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   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIData
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {102, id-cmc-transactionId, 10132985123483401}
           {103, id-cmc-senderNonce, 10001}
           {104, id-cmc-dataReturn, <packet of binary data identifying
                                     where the key in question is.>}
         reqSequence
           certRequest
             certReqId = 201
             certTemplate
               subject = <My DN from my signing cert>
               publicKey = My Public Key
               extensions
                 {id-ce-keyUsage, keyEncipherment}
             popo
               keyEncipherment
                 subsequentMessage
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       SignerInfo
         Signed by requestor's signing cert

   Response #1 from server to client:

























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   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIResponse
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {101, id-cmc-statusInfoV2, {failed, 201, popRequired}}
           {102, id-cmc-transactionId, 10132985123483401}
           {103, id-cmc-senderNonce, 10005}
           {104, id-cmc-recipientNonce, 10001}
           {105, id-cmc-encryptedPOP, {
              request {
                certRequest
                  certReqId = 201
                   certTemplate
                     subject = <My DN from my signing cert>
                     publicKey = My Public Key
                     extensions
                       {id-ce-keyUsage, keyEncipherment}
                   popo
                     keyEncipherment
                     subsequentMessage
              }
              cms
                contentType = id-envelopedData
                content
                  recipipentInfos.riid.issuerSerialNumber = <NULL, 201>
                  encryptedContentInfo
                    eContentType = id-data
                    eContent = <Encrypted value of 'y'>
              thePOPAlgID = HMAC-SHA1
              witnessAlgID = SHA-1
              witness <hashed value of 'y'>}}
           {106, id-cmc-dataReturn, <packet of binary data identifying
                                     where the key in question is.>}
     certificates
       Other certificates (optional)
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       Signed by CA












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   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIData
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {102, id-cmc-transactionId, 10132985123483401}
           {103, id-cmc-senderNonce, 100101}
           {104, id-cmc-dataReturn, <packet of binary data identifying
                                     where the key in question is.>}
           {105, id-cmc-recipientNonce, 10005}
           {107, id-cmc-decryptedPOP, {
             bodyPartID 201,
             thePOPAlgID HMAC-SHA1,
             thePOP <HMAC computed value goes here>}}
         reqSequence
           certRequest
             certReqId = 201
             certTemplate
               subject = <My DN from my signing cert>
               publicKey = My Public Key
               extensions
                 {id-ce-keyUsage, keyEncipherment}
             popo
               keyEncipherment
                 subsequentMessage
     SignedData.SignerInfos
       SignerInfo
         Signed by requestor's signing cert

   Response from server to client:

   ContentInfo.contentType = id-signedData
   ContentInfo.content
     SignedData.encapContentInfo
       eContentType = id-ct-PKIResponse
       eContent
         controlSequence
           {101, id-cmc-transactionId, 10132985123483401}
           {102, id-cmc-statusInfoV2, {success, 201}}
           {103, id-cmc-senderNonce, 10019}
           {104, id-cmc-recipientNonce, 100101}
           {104, id-cmc-dataReturn, <packet of binary data identifying
                                     where the key in question is.>}
     certificates
       Newly issued certificate
       Other certificates
     SignedData.SignerInfos



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       Signed by CA


















































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Appendix C.  Production of Diffie-Hellman Public Key Certification
             Requests

   Part of a certification request is a signature over the request;
   Diffie-Hellman is a key agreement algorithm and cannot be used to
   directly produce the required signature object.  [DH-POP] provides
   two ways to produce the necessary signature value.  This document
   also defines a signature algorithm that does not provide a POP value,
   but can be used to produce the necessary signature value.

Appendix C.1.   No-Signature Signature Mechanism

   Key management (encryption/decryption) private keys cannot always be
   used to produce some type of signature value as they can be in a
   decrypt only device.  Certification requests require that the
   signature field be populated.  This section provides a signature
   algorithm specifically for that purposes.  The following object
   identifier and signature value are used to identify this signature
   type:

      id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}

      NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

   The parameters for id-alg-noSignature MUST be present and MUST be
   encoded as NULL.  NoSignatureValue contains the hash of the
   certification request.  It is important to realize that there is no
   security associated with this signature type.  If this signature type
   is on a certification request and the Certification Authority policy
   requires proof-of-possession of the private key, the POP mechanism
   defined in Section 6.7 MUST be used.




















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Appendix D.  Change History

   RFC Editor - please remove this appendix prior to publishing.

   RFC 27XX to -00

   1.  Addition of Extended CMC Status Info

   From -00 to -01

   1.  Removal of Transport section to a new document.

   2.  Removal of Compliance section to a new document.

   From -01 to -02

   1.  Add processing rules for PKIData and PKIResponse processing.

   2.  Add unsigned attribute for holding data (to be used by key
       archival).

   3.  Add trust root identification control.

   4.  Add Server to Client identity proof method.

   5.  Add controls to identify batch processing, needed by rules added
       in item 1.

   From -02 to -03

   1.  Add unpublish control

   2.  Added use of AuthenticatedData structure from CMS

   3.  Insert Appendix B - Enrollment Message Flows

   4.  Add Modify Certification Request control

   From -03 to -04

   1.  Change author list.

   2.  Add IANA Considerations section

   3.  Correct module names in ASN.1

   4.  Add id-cmc-controlProcessed control with associated changes.




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   From -04 to -05

   1.  Change Trust Root to Trust Anchor.
















































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Authors' Addresses

   Jim Schaad
   Soaring Hawk Consulting
   PO Box 675
   Gold Bar, WA  98251

   Phone: (425) 785-1031
   Email: jimsch@nwlink.com


   Michael Myers
   TraceRoute Security, Inc.

   Email: mmyers@fastq.inc




































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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.











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