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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 RFC 6402

Network Working Group                                          J. Schaad
Internet-Draft                                   Soaring Hawk Consulting
Updates: 5272, 5273, 5274                               January 11, 2011
(if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 15, 2011


             Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates
                     draft-ietf-pkix-rfc5272-bis-02

Abstract

   This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax for CMC, a
   Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message
   Syntax (CMS).  This document updates RFC 5272, RFC 5273 and RFC 5274.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 15, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Updates to RFC 5272 - Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)  .  4
     2.1.  New Section 1.3.  Changes Since RFC 5272 . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Replace Section 6.3. Linking Identity and POP
           Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Replace Section 6.3.3.  Renewal and Rekey Messages . . . .  5
     2.4.  New Section 6.20 RA Identity Proof Witness control . . . .  5
     2.5.  New Section 6.21 Change Subject Name Control . . . . . . .  7
     2.6.  New Section 6.22 Response Body Control . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.7.  New Section 8. Certificate Requirements  . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.8.  New Section 8.1. Extended Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.9.  New Section 8.2. Subject Information Access  . . . . . . . 10
   3.  Updates to RFC 5273 - Certificate Management over CMS
       (CMC): Transport Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.1.  Update to Section 5 TCP-Based Protocol . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.2.  New Section IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.  Updates to RFC 5274 - Certificate Management Message over
       CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.1.  Update to Section 4.2 Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29






















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1.  Introduction

   While dealing with the Suite B profile of CMC
   [I-D.turner-suiteb-cmc], a number of defencies where noted in the
   current base CMC specification.  This document has a set of updates
   to [RFC5272], [RFC5273] and [RFC5274] to deal with those issues.

1.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].







































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2.  Updates to RFC 5272 - Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)

2.1.  New Section 1.3.  Changes Since RFC 5272

   This section is inserted before the current section 1.3.

   The following changes were made in this document.

      Addition of new controls:

      RA Identity Witness  allows for an RA to perform the identity
         checking using the identity and shared-secret and then tell any
         following servers that the identity check was successfully
         performed.

      Change Subject Name  allows for a client to request a change in
         the subject name and subject alternate name fields in a
         certificate.

      Response Body  allows for an RA to identify a nested response for
         an EE to process.

      Add Extended Key Usages for CMC - Define a new Subject Information
      Access to hold locations to contact the CMC server at.

2.2.  Replace Section 6.3. Linking Identity and POP Information

   In a Full PKI Request, identity information about the client is
   carried in the signature of the SignedData containing all of the
   certification requests.  Proof-of-possession information for key
   pairs, however, is carried separately for each PKCS #10 or CRMF
   certification request.  (For keys capable of generating a digital
   signature, the POP is provided by the signature on the PKCS #10 or
   CRMF request.  For encryption-only keys, the controls described in
   Section 6.7 are used.)  In order to prevent substitution-style
   attacks, the protocol must guarantee that the same entity generated
   both the POP and proof-of-identity information.

   This section describes three mechanisms for linking identity and POP
   information: witness values cryptographically derived from the
   shared-secret (Section 6.3.1), shared-secret/subject name matching
   (Section 6.3.2), and linking with an existing certificate (6.3.3).
   Clients and servers MUST support the witness value and certificate
   linking techniques.  Clients and servers MAY support shared-secret/
   name matching or other bilateral techniques of similar strength.  The
   idea behind the first two mechanisms is to force the client to sign
   some data into each certification request that can be directly
   associated with the shared-secret; this will defeat attempts to



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   include certification requests from different entities in a single
   Full PKI Request.

2.3.  Replace Section 6.3.3.  Renewal and Rekey Messages

   New section title is "Existing Certificate Linking"

   Linking between the POP and an identity is easy when an existing
   certificate is used.  The client copies all of the naming information
   from the existing certificate (name and subject alternative name)
   into the new certification request.  The POP on the certificate is
   then performed by using the new key to sign the identity information.
   The identity information is then tied back by signing the POP proof
   as part of the PKIData with a certificate that has matching identity
   information.

   Existing certificate linking can be used in the following
   circumstances:

      When replacing a certificate by doing a renewal or rekey
      certification request.

      Use of an existing certificate to get a new certificate.  An
      example of this would be to get a key establishment certificate
      after having gotten a signature certificate.

      Use of a third party certificate to get a new certificate from a
      CA.  An example of this would be to use a certificate and key pair
      distributed with a device to prove an identity.  This would
      require that the CA have an out-of-band channel to map the device
      identity to the EE identity.

2.4.  New Section 6.20 RA Identity Proof Witness control

   Editors Note: The control is to be added to the table of controls in
   section 6.

   The RA Identity Proof Witness control allows an RA to indicate to
   subsequence control processors that all of the identity proof
   requirements have been met.  This permits the identity proof to be
   performed at a location closer to the end-entity.  For example, the
   identity proof could be done within a department while the CA could
   be companywide.  The RA would perform the identity proof, and
   potentially other tasks that require the secret to be used, while the
   CA would be prevented from knowing the same information.  If the
   identity proof fails, then the RA returns an error to the client
   noting that fact.




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   The relevant ASN.1 for the RA Identity Proof Witness control is as
   follows:

      cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
         { BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }

      id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD}

   The object defined for this control is a CMC-CONTROL and is named
   cmc-raIdentityWitness.  The object is added to the object set Cmc-
   Control-Set.  The control is only permitted to occur in the control
   sequence of a PKIData object.  It is not permitted to occur in the
   control sequence of a PKIRespones.  The control is only permitted to
   be used by an RA.  The control may occur multiple times in a control
   sequence.

   The control is identified using the object identifier id-cmc-
   raIdentityWitness.

   The type structure associated with the control is BodyPartPath.  The
   path contains a sequence of body part identifiers one of the
   following items:

   Identity Proof control  if the RA verified the identity proof in this
      control.

   Identity Proof Version 2  if the RA verified the identity proof in
      this control.

   Full PKI Request  if the RA performed an out-of-band identity proof
      for this request.  The request SHOULD NOT contain either Identity
      Proof control.

   Simple PKI Request  if the RA performed an out-of-band identity proof
      for this request.

   The RA Identity Proof Witness control will frequently be associated
   with a Modify Certification Request control which changes the name
   fields in the associated certification requests as the RA will
   frequently know the actual name to be assigned to the entity
   requesting the certificate and the entity will not know the actual
   details of the name.  (The association would be setup by the operator
   at the time the shared secret was generated by the RA.)

   When this control is placed in a message, it is RECOMMENDED that the
   Control Processed Control be placed in the body sequence as well.
   Using the explicit new control, rather than implicitly relying on the
   Control Processed control is important due to the need to explicity



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   know which identity proofs have been perform.  The new control also
   allows an RA to state that out-of-band idenitity proofs have been
   performed.

   When the identity proof is performed by an RA, the RA also needs to
   perform the linking between the identity proof and the name
   information wrapped inside of the key proof-of-possession.

2.5.  New Section 6.21 Change Subject Name Control

   This item is to be added to the table in section 6.

   The Client Name Change Request Control is designed for a client to
   ask for a change in its name as part of a certificate.  This cannot
   be done in the simple way of just changing the requested subject name
   in the certificate template because of security issues.  The name in
   the certificate request needs to match the name in the certificate
   used to sign the request in order that identity and possession proofs
   are correctly applied.

   The relevant ASN.1 for the Client Name Change Request control is as
   follows:

      at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
         { ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }

      id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD}

      ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
          subject             Name OPTIONAL,
          subjectAlt          SubjectAltName OPTIONAL
      }
      (WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
            COMPONENTS {..., subjectAltPRESENT} )

   The control is designed to be used as an ATTRIBUTE object.  As such
   the control is placed in one of the following two places:

      The attributes field in a CertificationRequest.

      The controls field of a CertRequest for a CRMF certification
      request.

   The control is identified by the Object Identifier id-cmc-
   changedSubjectName.

   The ASN.1 type associated with control is ChangeSubjectName.  The
   fields of the structure are configured as follows:



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   subject  contains the requested subject name for the new certificate.

   subjectAlt  contains the requested subject alternative name for the
      new certificate.

   At least one of the fields in the sequence MUST be present when
   encoding the structure.

   When the CA processes this attribute in a certification request it
   will do the following:

   1.  The subject field is copied to the name field of the template if
       present.  If the subject field is absent, the name field of the
       template will be set to a empty sequence.

   2.  The subjectAlt field is used as the content of a SubjectAltName
       extension in the certificate if present.  The subjectAltName
       extension is removed from the certificate template if the
       subjectAlt field is absent.

2.6.  New Section 6.22 Response Body Control

   This item is to be added to the table in section 6.

   The Response Body Control is designed for an RA to inform an EE that
   there is an embedded response message that needs to be processed as
   part of the processing of this message.  This control is designed to
   be used in a couple of different cases where an RA has done some
   additional processing on the certificate request such as key
   generation and needs to respond with both the original response
   message from the certificate issues as well as the response the RA is
   generating.  Another case this is useful is the shared secret is
   between the RA and the EE and the RA needs to return a Publish Trust
   Anchors control in order to populate the correct trust points.

   The relaveant ASN.1 for the Response Body Control is as follows:

     cmc-responseBody CMC-CONTROL ::= {
        BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseBody
     }

     id-cmc-responseBody OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD}

   This object id defined as a CMC control and is named cmc-
   responseBody.  The control is added to the Cmc-Control-Set.  The
   control is only permitted to occur in the control sequence of a
   PKIResponse object.  It is not permitted to occur in the control
   sequence of a PKIData.  The control is only permitted to be used by



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   an RA (a CA has no need to generate nested responses targetted at the
   EE).  The control may occur multiple times in a single control
   sequence.

   The control is identified using the object identifier id-cmc-
   responseBody.

   The type structure associated with the control is BodyPartID.  This
   field controls the control number for the nested response.

2.7.  New Section 8. Certificate Requirements

   This section is to be inserted before the current section 8.

   Certificates for servers used in the CMC protocol SHOULD conform with
   the profile defined in [RFC5280].  This document defines some
   additional items that can appear in CMC server certificates.  Section
   8.1 defines some additional Extended Key Usage values that can appear
   in certificates.  Section 8.2 defines a new Subject Information
   Access value which allows for a CMC certificate to publish
   information on how to contact the services it provides.

2.8.  New Section 8.1. Extended Key Usage

   The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension is used to restrict the use of
   a certificate to specific applications.  We define three different
   EKUs in this document.  The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is:

      id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
      id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
      id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }

   The usage description for each of the EKUs is as follows:

   CMC Certification Authorities  are identified by the id-kp-cmcCA
      extended key usage.  The certificate may be the same as the CA
      certificate or may be different than the CA certificate.  If a
      different certificate is used, the certificates containing the id-
      kp-cmcCA extended key usage SHOULD have the same name as the
      certificate used for issuing the certificates.  (Using a separate
      public key for CMC protocol operations and for issuing
      Certificates and CRLs decreases the number of operations for which
      the private key would be used.)

   CMC Registration Authorities  are identified by the id-kp-cmcRA
      extended key usage.  This usage is placed into RA certificates.





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   CMC Archive Servers  are identified by the id-kp-cmcArchive extended
      key usage.  CMC Archive Servers and the associated protocol are to
      be defined in a future document.

2.9.  New Section 8.2. Subject Information Access

   The subject information access extension indicates how to access the
   information and services for the subject of the certificate.  We
   define a new value to go into this extension to identify the
   different locations that CMC services will be available.  If this
   value is placed in a certificate, an appropriate extended key usage
   defined in section 8.1 MUST be included in the certificate as well.

   The id-ad-cmc OID is used when the subject offers certification
   services using the CMC Protocol.  Where the CMC services are
   available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation MUST be a
   uniformResourceIdentifier.  Where the CMC services are available via
   electronic mail, accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name.  Where CMC
   services are available using TCP/IP, the dNSName or iPAddress name
   forms MUST be used.  Since the GeneralName data structure does not
   permit the inclusion of a port number, in the absence of other
   external configuration information the value of TBD1 should be used.
   The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation (when
   accessMethod is id-ad-cmc) are not defined by this specification.

   The ASN.1 for this extension is: GeneralName

   id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad TBD }























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3.  Updates to RFC 5273 - Certificate Management over CMS (CMC):
    Transport Protocols

3.1.  Update to Section 5 TCP-Based Protocol

   The following replaces paragraph 3 in section 5.

   CMC requires a registered port number [IANA] to send and recieve CMC
   messages over TCP.  The title of this IP Protocol number is "pkix-
   cmc".  The value of this TCP port is TBD.

3.2.  New Section IANA Considerations

   This is a new section to be inserted before the current section 6.


        Keyword      Decimal   Description                References
        pkix-cmc     TBD1/tcp  PKIX CMC                   [TBA]

































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4.  Updates to RFC 5274 - Certificate Management Message over CMS (CMC):
    Compliance Requirements

4.1.  Update to Section 4.2 Controls

   The following lines should be added to the end of Table 1.

   RaIdentityWitness N/A MUST (2)

   ChangeSubjectName MAY N/A MUST









































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5.  IANA Considerations

   This document contains a new IANA considerations section to be added
   to [RFC5273] as part of this update.















































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6.  Security Considerations

   To be supplied.
















































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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008.

   [RFC5273]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273, June 2008.

   [RFC5274]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management Messages
              over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements", RFC 5274,
              June 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              June 2010.

7.2.  Informational References

   [I-D.turner-suiteb-cmc]
              Zieglar, L., Peck, M., and S. Turner, "Suite B Profile of
              Certificate Management over CMS",
              draft-turner-suiteb-cmc-03 (work in progress), June 2010.



















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Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   An updated 2009 ASN.1 module has been provided as part of this
   update.  The module contains changes that were made as part of the
   re-write to current ASN.1 standards in [RFC5912] as well as the
   changes for this document.

  EnrollmentMessageSyntax-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechansims(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-cmc2002-02(TBD49)}
  DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
  BEGIN
  EXPORTS ALL;
  IMPORTS

  AttributeSet{}, Extension{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
  FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

  AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, KEY-WRAP, KEY-DERIVATION,
      MAC-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
  FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

  CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags,
      CertExtensions, GeneralNames
  FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

  Name, id-pkix, PublicKeyAlgorithms, SignatureAlgorithms, id-ad, id-kp
  FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

  ContentInfo, IssuerAndSerialNumber, CONTENT-TYPE
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
       pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }

  CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate
  FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55)}



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  mda-sha1
  FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)}

  kda-PBKDF2, maca-hMAC-SHA1
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009
      { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) }

  mda-sha256
  FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;

  --  CMS Content types defined in this document

  CMC-ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-PKIData | ct-PKIResponse, ... }

  --  Signature Algorithms defined in this document

  SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-noSignature }

  --  CMS Unsigned Attributes

  CMC-UnsignedAtts ATTRIBUTE ::= { aa-cmc-unsignedData }

  --
  --

  id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7}   -- CMC controls
  id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12}  -- CMC content types

  -- This is the content type for a request message in the protocol

  ct-PKIData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
      { TYPE PKIData IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIData }
  id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }

  PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
      controlSequence    SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
      reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
      cmsSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
      otherMsgSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
  }




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  BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..4294967295)

  TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID         BodyPartID,
      attrType           CMC-CONTROL.&id({Cmc-Control-Set}),
      attrValues         SET OF CMC-CONTROL.
                             &Type({Cmc-Control-Set}{@attrType})
  }

  Cmc-Control-Set CMC-CONTROL ::= {
      cmc-identityProof | cmc-dataReturn | cmc-regInfo |
      cmc-responseInfo | cmc-queryPending | cmc-popLinkRandom |
      cmc-popLinkWitness | cmc-identification | cmc-transactionId |
      cmc-senderNonce | cmc-recipientNonce | cmc-statusInfo |
      cmc-addExtensions | cmc-encryptedPOP | cmc-decryptedPOP |
      cmc-lraPOPWitness | cmc-getCert | cmc-getCRL |
      cmc-revokeRequest | cmc-confirmCertAcceptance |
      cmc-statusInfoV2 | cmc-trustedAnchors | cmc-authData |
      cmc-batchRequests | cmc-batchResponses | cmc-publishCert |
      cmc-modCertTemplate | cmc-controlProcessed |
      cmc-identityProofV2 | cmc-popLinkWitnessV2, ...,
      cmc-raIdentityWitness }

  OTHER-REQUEST ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  --  We do not define any other requests in this document
  --     examples might be attribute certification requests

  OtherRequests OTHER-REQUEST ::= {...}

  TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
      tcr               [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
      crm               [1] CertReqMsg,
      orm               [2] SEQUENCE {
          bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
          requestMessageType    OTHER-REQUEST.&id({OtherRequests}),
          requestMessageValue   OTHER-REQUEST.&Type({OtherRequests}
                                    {@.requestMessageType})
      }
  }

  TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID            BodyPartID,
      certificationRequest  CertificationRequest
  }

  AttributeList ATTRIBUTE ::= {at-extension-req, ...,
      at-cmc-changeSubjectName}



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  CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
     certificationRequestInfo  SEQUENCE {
         version                   INTEGER,
         subject                   Name,
         subjectPublicKeyInfo      SEQUENCE {
             algorithm                 AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY,
                                           {PublicKeyAlgorithms}},
             subjectPublicKey          BIT STRING
         },
         attributes                [0] IMPLICIT SET OF
                                       AttributeSet{{AttributeList}}
      },
      signatureAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier
                                    {SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
                                        {SignatureAlgorithms}},
      signature                 BIT STRING
  }

  TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID              BodyPartID,
      contentInfo             ContentInfo
  }

  OTHER-MSG ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  --  No other messages currently defined

  OtherMsgSet OTHER-MSG ::= {...}

  OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID        BodyPartID,
      otherMsgType      OTHER-MSG.&id({OtherMsgSet}),
      otherMsgValue     OTHER-MSG.&Type({OtherMsgSet}{@otherMsgType}) }

  --  This defines the response message in the protocol

  ct-PKIResponse CONTENT-TYPE ::=
      { TYPE PKIResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIResponse }
  id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }

  ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse

  PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
      controlSequence   SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
      cmsSequence       SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
      otherMsgSequence  SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
  }




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  CMC-CONTROL ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

  cmc-identityProof CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProof }
  id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}

  cmc-dataReturn CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-dataReturn }
  id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}

  cmc-regInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-regInfo }
  id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}

  cmc-responseInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseInfo }
  id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}

  cmc-queryPending CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-queryPending }
  id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}

  cmc-popLinkRandom CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkRandom }
  id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22}

  cmc-popLinkWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitness }
  id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23}

  -- The following controls have the type UTF8String

  cmc-identification CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identification }
  id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}

  -- The following controls have the type INTEGER

  cmc-transactionId CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { INTEGER IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-transactionId }
  id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}

  -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING

  cmc-senderNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-senderNonce }



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  id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}

  cmc-recipientNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-recipientNonce }
  id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}

  -- Used to return status in a response

  cmc-statusInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCStatusInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfo }
  id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}

  CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      cMCStatus       CMCStatus,
      bodyList        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
      statusString    UTF8String OPTIONAL,
      otherInfo       CHOICE {
         failInfo         CMCFailInfo,
         pendInfo         PendInfo
      } OPTIONAL
  }

  PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      pendToken        OCTET STRING,
      pendTime         GeneralizedTime
  }

  CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
      success         (0),
      failed          (2),
      pending         (3),
      noSupport       (4),
      confirmRequired (5),
      popRequired     (6),
      partial         (7)
  }

  CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
      badAlg          (0),
      badMessageCheck (1),
      badRequest      (2),
      badTime         (3),
      badCertId       (4),
      unsuportedExt   (5),
      mustArchiveKeys (6),
      badIdentity     (7),
      popRequired     (8),
      popFailed       (9),



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      noKeyReuse      (10),
      internalCAError (11),
      tryLater        (12),
      authDataFail    (13)
  }

  -- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests

  cmc-addExtensions CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { AddExtensions IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-addExtensions }
  id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}

  AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
      pkiDataReference    BodyPartID,
      certReferences      SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
      extensions          SEQUENCE OF Extension{{CertExtensions}}
  }

  cmc-encryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { EncryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-encryptedPOP }
  cmc-decryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { DecryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-decryptedPOP }
  id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
  id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}

  EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
      request       TaggedRequest,
      cms             ContentInfo,
      thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      witnessAlgID    AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                          {WitnessAlgs}},
      witness         OCTET STRING
  }

  POPAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {maca-hMAC-SHA1, ...}
  WitnessAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {mda-sha1, ...}

  DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartID      BodyPartID,
      thePOPAlgID     AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      thePOP          OCTET STRING
  }

  cmc-lraPOPWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { LraPopWitness IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-lraPOPWitness }

  id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}




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  LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
      pkiDataBodyid   BodyPartID,
      bodyIds         SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
  }

  --

  cmc-getCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { GetCert IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCert }
  id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}

  GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
      issuerName      GeneralName,
      serialNumber    INTEGER }


  cmc-getCRL CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { GetCRL IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCRL }
  id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}

  GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
      issuerName    Name,
      cRLName       GeneralName OPTIONAL,
      time          GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
      reasons       ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }

  cmc-revokeRequest CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { RevokeRequest IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-revokeRequest}
  id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}

  RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
      issuerName            Name,
      serialNumber          INTEGER,
      reason                CRLReason,
      invalidityDate         GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
      passphrase            OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
      comment               UTF8String OPTIONAL }


  cmc-confirmCertAcceptance CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCCertId IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance }
  id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24}

  CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber

  -- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added
  --     to a certificate




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  at-extension-req ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE ExtensionReq IDENTIFIED BY id-ExtensionReq }
  id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
      rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}

  ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
      Extension{{CertExtensions}}

  -- The following allows Diffie-Hellman Certification Request
  --     Messages to be well-formed

  sa-noSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-alg-noSignature
      VALUE NoSignatureValue
      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
      HASHES { mda-sha1 }
  }
  id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}

  NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

  --  Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data.

  id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
      rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)}

  aa-cmc-unsignedData ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE CMCUnsignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-cmc-unsignedData }
  id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}

  CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyPartPath        BodyPartPath,
      identifier          TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id,
      content             TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
  }

  --  Replaces CMC Status Info
  --

  cmc-statusInfoV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCStatusInfoV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfoV2 }
  id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25}


  EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  ExtendedFailures EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= {...}




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  CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
     cMCStatus             CMCStatus,
     bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                    BodyPartReference,
     statusString          UTF8String OPTIONAL,
     otherInfo             CHOICE {
         failInfo               CMCFailInfo,
         pendInfo               PendInfo,
         extendedFailInfo       [1] SEQUENCE {
            failInfoOID            TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id
                                       ({ExtendedFailures}),
            failInfoValue          TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
                                       ({ExtendedFailures}
                                           {@.failInfoOID})
         }
      } OPTIONAL
  }

  BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
     bodyPartID           BodyPartID,
     bodyPartPath         BodyPartPath
  }

  BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

  --  Allow for distribution of trust anchors
  --

  cmc-trustedAnchors CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { PublishTrustAnchors IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-trustedAnchors }
  id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26}

  PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
      seqNumber      INTEGER,
      hashAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                         {HashAlgorithms}},
      anchorHashes   SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
  }

  HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
     mda-sha1 | mda-sha256, ...
  }

  cmc-authData CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { AuthPublish IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-authData }
  id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27}

  AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID



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  --   These two items use BodyPartList

  cmc-batchRequests CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchRequests }
  id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28}

  cmc-batchResponses CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchResponses }
  id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29}

  BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID

  cmc-publishCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { CMCPublicationInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-publishCert }
  id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30}

  CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      hashAlg        AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                           {HashAlgorithms}},
      certHashes     SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING,
      pubInfo        PKIPublicationInfo
  }

  cmc-modCertTemplate CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { ModCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-modCertTemplate }

  id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31}

  ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
      pkiDataReference             BodyPartPath,
      certReferences               BodyPartList,
      replace                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
      certTemplate                 CertTemplate
  }

  -- Inform follow-on servers that one or more controls have
  --     already been processed

  cmc-controlProcessed CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { ControlsProcessed IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-controlProcessed }
  id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32}

  ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE {
      bodyList              SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
  }

  --  Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility




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  cmc-identityProofV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { IdentityProofV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProofV2 }
  id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 }

  IdentityProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
      proofAlgID       AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                           {WitnessAlgs}},
      macAlgId         AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      witness          OCTET STRING
  }

  cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
      { PopLinkWitnessV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 }
  id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 }

  PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
      keyGenAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION,
                            {KeyDevAlgs}},
      macAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
      witness           OCTET STRING
  }

  KeyDevAlgs KEY-DERIVATION ::= {kda-PBKDF2, ...}

  cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
     { BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }

  id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD42}


  --
  --  Allow for an End-Entity to request a change in name
  --  This item is added to RegControlSet in CRMF
  --
  at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
     { TYPE ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }

  id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD43}

  ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
      subject             Name OPTIONAL,
      subjectAlt          GeneralNames OPTIONAL
  }
  (WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
   WITH COMPONENTS {..., subjectAlt PRESENT} )

  --
  --  Key purpose identifiers are in the extended key usage extension



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  --

  id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD44 }
  id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD45 }
  id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD46 }

  --
  --  Subject Information Access identifier
  --

  id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad TBD47 }

  END






































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Author's Address

   Jim Schaad
   Soaring Hawk Consulting

   Email: jimsch@augustcellars.com













































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