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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 6614

RADIUS Extensions Working Group                                S. Winter
Internet-Draft                                                   RESTENA
Intended status: Experimental                                M. McCauley
Expires: January 13, 2011                                            OSC
                                                               S. Venaas
                                                                 UNINETT
                                                             K. Wierenga
                                                                   Cisco
                                                           July 12, 2010


                       TLS encryption for RADIUS
                      draft-ietf-radext-radsec-07

Abstract

   This document specifies security on the transport layer (TLS) for the
   RADIUS protocol when transmitted over TCP.  This enables dynamic
   trust relationships between RADIUS servers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Normative: Transport Layer Security for RADIUS over TCP  . . .  4
     2.1.  TCP port and packet types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  TLS negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Connection Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.4.  Connecting Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.5.  RADIUS Datagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Informative: Design Decisions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  X.509 Certificate Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation Considerations  .  9
     3.3.  RADIUS Datagram Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Compatibility with other RADIUS transports . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Diameter Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Appendix A.  Implementation Overview: Radiator . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix B.  Implementation Overview: radsecproxy  . . . . . . . . 15










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1.  Introduction

   The RADIUS protocol [RFC2865] is a widely deployed authentication and
   authorisation protocol.  The supplementary RADIUS Accounting
   specification [RFC2866] also provides accounting mechanisms, thus
   delivering a full AAA solution.  However, RADIUS is experiencing
   several shortcomings, such as its dependency on the unreliable
   transport protocol UDP and the lack of security for large parts of
   its packet payload.  RADIUS security is based on the MD5 algorithm,
   which has been proven to be insecure.

   The main focus of RADIUS over TLS is to provide a means to secure the
   communication between RADIUS/TCP peers on the transport layer.  The
   most important use of this specification lies in roaming environments
   where RADIUS packets need to be transferred through different
   administrative domains and untrusted, potentially hostile networks.
   An example for a world-wide roaming environment that uses RADIUS over
   TLS to secure communication is "eduroam", see [eduroam].

   There are multiple known attacks on the MD5 algorithm which is used
   in RADIUS to provide integrity protection and a limited
   confidentiality protection (see [MD5-attacks]).  RADIUS over TLS
   wraps the entire RADIUS packet payload into a TLS stream and thus
   mitigates the risk of attacks on MD5.

   Because of the static trust establishment between RADIUS peers (IP
   address and shared secret) the only scalable way of creating a
   massive deployment of RADIUS-servers under control by different
   administrative entities is to introduce some form of a proxy chain to
   route the access requests to their home server.  This creates a lot
   of overhead in terms of possible points of failure, longer
   transmission times as well as middleboxes through which
   authentication traffic flows.  These middleboxes may learn privacy-
   relevant data while forwarding requests.  The new features in RADIUS
   over TLS obsolete the use of IP addresses and shared MD5 secrets to
   identify other peers and thus allow the dynamic establishment of
   connections to peers that are not previously configured, and thus
   makes it possible to avoid aggregation-only RADIUS proxies and reduce
   the number of middleboxes which can eavesdrop on traffic.  One
   mechanism to discover RADIUS over TLS peers with DNS is specified in
   [I-D.winter-dynamic-discovery].

1.1.  Requirements Language

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
   and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in



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   RFC 2119.  [RFC2119]

1.2.  Terminology

   RADIUS/TLS node: a RADIUS over TLS client or server

   RADIUS/TLS Client: a RADIUS over TLS instance which initiates a new
   connection.

   RADIUS/TLS Server: a RADIUS over TLS instance which listens on a
   RADIUS over TLS port and accepts new connections

   RADIUS/UDP: classic RADIUS transport over UDP as defined in [RFC2865]

2.  Normative: Transport Layer Security for RADIUS over TCP

2.1.  TCP port and packet types

   The default destination port number for RADIUS over TLS is TCP/2083.
   There are no separate ports for authentication, accounting and
   dynamic authorisation changes.  The source port is arbitrary.

2.2.  TLS negotiation

   RADIUS has no notion of negotiating TLS in an established connection.
   Servers and clients need to be preconfigured to use RADIUS/TLS for a
   given endpoint.

2.3.  Connection Setup

   RADIUS/TLS nodes

   1.  establish TCP connections as per [I-D.dekok-radext-tcp-transport]

   2.  immediately negotiate TLS sessions.  The following restrictions
       apply: according to [RFC5246] or its predecessor TLS 1.1.  The
       following restrictions apply:

       *  Support for TLS v1.1 [RFC4346] or later (e.g.  TLS 1.2
          [RFC5246]]) is REQUIRED.

       *  Support for certificate-based mutual authentication is
          REQUIRED.

       *  Negotiation of mutual authentication is REQUIRED.

       *  Negotiation of a ciphersuite providing for confidentiality as
          well as integrity protection is REQUIRED.



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       *  Support for and negotiation of compression is OPTIONAL.

       *  Support for TLS-PSK mutual authentication [RFC4279] is
          OPTIONAL.

       *  RADIUS/TLS implementations MUST at a minimum support
          negotiation of the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), and SHOULD
          support TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA and
          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as well (see Section 3.2 (1) ).

       *  In addition, RADIUS/TLS implementations MUST support
          negotiation of the mandatory-to-implement ciphersuites
          required by the versions of TLS that they support.

   3.  If TLS is used in an X.509 certificate based operation mode, the
       following list of certificate validation options applies:

       *  Implementations MUST allow to configure a list of acceptable
          Certification Authorities for incoming connections.

       *  Certificate validation MUST include the verification rules as
          per [RFC5280].

       *  Implementations SHOULD indicate their acceptable Certification
          Authorities as per section 7.4.4 (server side) and x.y.z
          ["Trusted CA Indication"] (client side) of [RFC5246] (see
          Section 3.1)

       *  Implementations SHOULD allow to configure a list of acceptable
          certificates, identified via certificate fingerprint.  When a
          fingerprint configured, the fingerprint is prepended with an
          ASCII label identifying the hash function followed by a colon.
          Implementations MUST support SHA-1 as the hash algorithm and
          use the ASCII label "sha-1" to identify the SHA-1 algorithm.
          The length of a SHA-1 hash is 20 bytes and the length of the
          corresponding fingerprint string is 65 characters.  An example
          certificate fingerprint is: sha-
          1:E1:2D:53:2B:7C:6B:8A:29:A2:76:C8:64:36:0B:08:4B:7A:F1:9E:9D

       *  Peer validation always includes a check on whether the locally
          configured expected DNS name or IP address of the server that
          is contacted matches its presented certificate.  DNS names and
          IP addresses can be contained in the Common Name (CN) or
          subjectAltName entries.  For verification, only one these
          entries is to be considered.  The following precedence
          applies: for DNS name validation, subjectAltName:DNS has
          precedence over CN; for IP address validation, subjectAltName:
          iPAddr has precedence over CN.



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       *  Implementations SHOULD allow to configure a set of acceptable
          values for subjectAltName:URI.

   4.  start exchanging RADIUS datagrams.  Note Section 3.3 (1) ).  The
       shared secret to compute the (obsolete) MD5 integrity checks and
       attribute encryption MUST be "radsec" (see Section 3.3 (2) ).

2.4.  Connecting Client Identity

   In RADIUS/UDP, clients are uniquely identified by their IP address.
   The IP address alone does not permit the server to determine whether
   the connecting entity is a NAS or a different server which proxies a
   request.  When NAT is used on the path to the server, it also does
   not permit to determine whether there is more than one entity
   connecting from the same IP address.

   RADIUS/TLS makes it possible to preserve this traditional RADIUS
   semantics by identifying a connecting client by the IP address which
   initiated the TLS connection.  In addition, it permits a much more
   fine-grained identification.  The parameters of the TLS connection
   can be attributed to the RADIUS packets inside the TLS connection.
   An implementation of RADIUS/TLS should expose as many details of the
   TLS connection which belongs to an incoming RADIUS packet as possible
   to the application layer to allow the administrator to define the
   identification criteria which are applicable to his desired
   operational model.  In X.509 certificate operation, at least the
   following parameters of the TLS connection should be exposed:

   o  Originating IP address

   o  Certificate Fingerprint

   o  Issuer

   o  Subject

   o  all X509v3 Extended Key Usage

   o  all X509v3 Subject Alternative Name

   o  all X509v3 Certificate Policies

   In TLS-PSK operation, at least the following parameters of the TLS
   connection should be exposed:

   o  Originating IP address





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   o  TLS Identifier

2.5.  RADIUS Datagrams

   Authentication, Accounting and Authorization packets are sent
   according to the following rules:

   RADIUS/TLS clients handle the following packet types from [RFC2865],
   [RFC2866], [RFC5176] on the connection they initiated (see
   Section 3.3 (3) and (4) ):

   o  send Access-Request

   o  send Accounting-Request

   o  send Status-Server

   o  send Disconnect-ACK

   o  send Disconnect-NAK

   o  send CoA-ACK

   o  send CoA-NAK

   o  receive Access-Challenge

   o  receive Access-Accept

   o  receive Access-Reject

   o  receive Accounting-Response

   o  receive Disconnect-Request

   o  receive CoA-Request

   RADIUS/TLS servers handle the following packet types from [RFC2865],
   [RFC2866], [RFC5176] on the connections they serve to clients:

   o  receive Access-Request

   o  receive Accounting-Request

   o  receive Status-Server

   o  receive Disconnect-ACK




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   o  receive Disconnect-NAK

   o  receive CoA-ACK

   o  receive CoA-NAK

   o  send Access-Challenge

   o  send Access-Accept

   o  send Access-Reject

   o  send Accounting-Response

   o  send Disconnect-Request

   o  send CoA-Request

3.  Informative: Design Decisions

   This section explains the design decisions that led to the rules
   defined in the previous section.

3.1.  X.509 Certificate Considerations

   (1) If a RADIUS/TLS client is in possession of multiple certificates
   from different CAs (i.e. is part of multiple roaming consortia) and
   dynamic discovery is used, the discovery mechanism possibly does not
   yield sufficient information to identify the consortium uniquely
   (e.g.  DNS discovery).  Subsequently, the client may not know by
   itself which client certificate to use for the TLS handshake.  Then
   it is necessary for the server to signal which consortium it belongs
   to, and which certificates it expects.  If there is no risk of
   confusing multiple roaming consortia, providing this information in
   the handshake is not crucial.

   (2) If a RADIUS/TLS server is in possession of multiple certificates
   from different CAs (i.e. is part of multiple roaming consortia), it
   will need to select one of its certificates to present to the RADIUS/
   TLS client.  If the client sends the Trusted CA Indication, this hint
   can make the server select the appropriate certificate and prevent a
   handshake failure.  Omitting this indication makes it impossible to
   deterministically select the right certificate in this case.  If
   there is no risk of confusing multiple roaming consortia, providing
   this indication in the handshake is not crucial.

   (3) If dynamic peer discovery as per [I-D.winter-dynamic-discovery]
   is used, peer authentication alone is not sufficient; the peer must



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   also be authorised to perform user authentications.  In these cases,
   the trust fabric cannot depend on peer authentication methods like
   DNSSEC to identify RADIUS/TLS nodes.  The nodes also need to be
   properly authorised.  Typically, this can be achieved by adding
   appropriate authorisation fields into a X.509 certificate.  Such
   fields include SRV authority [RFC4985], subjectAltNames, or a defined
   list of certificate fingerprints.  Operators of a RADIUS/TLS
   infrastructure should define their own authorisation trust model and
   apply this model to the certificates.  The checks enumerated in
   Section 2.3 provide sufficient flexibility for the implementation of
   authorisation trust models.

3.2.  Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation Considerations

   Not all TLS ciphersuites in [RFC5246] are supported by available TLS
   tool kits, and licenses may be required in some cases.  The existing
   implementations of RADIUS/TLS use OpenSSL as cryptographic backend,
   which supports all of the ciphersuites listed in the rules in the
   normative section.

   The TLS ciphersuite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA is mandatory-to-
   implement according to [RFC5246] and thus has to be supported by
   RADIUS/TLS nodes.

   The two other ciphersuites in the normative section are widely
   implemented in TLS toolkits and are considered good practice to
   implement.

3.3.  RADIUS Datagram Considerations

   (1) After the TLS session is established, RADIUS packet payloads are
   exchanged over the encrypted TLS tunnel.  In RADIUS/UDP, the packet
   size can be determined by evaluating the size of the datagram that
   arrived.  Due to the stream nature of TCP and TLS, this does not hold
   true for RADIUS/TLS packet exchange.  Instead, packet boundaries of
   RADIUS packets that arrive in the stream are calculated by evaluating
   the packet's Length field.  Special care needs to be taken on the
   packet sender side that the value of the Length field is indeed
   correct before sending it over the TLS tunnel, because incorrect
   packet lengths can no longer be detected by a differing datagram
   boundary.  See section 2.6.4 of [I-D.dekok-radext-tcp-transport] for
   more details.

   (2) Within RADIUS [RFC2865], a shared secret is used for hiding
   of attributes such as User-Password, as well as in computation of
   the Response Authenticator.  In RADIUS accounting [RFC2866], the
   shared secret is used in computation of both the Request
   Authenticator and the Response Authenticator.  Since TLS provides



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   integrity protection and encryption sufficient to substitute for
   RADIUS application-layer security, it is not necessary to configure a
   RADIUS shared secret.  The use of a fixed string for the obsolete
   shared secret eliminates possible node misconfigurations.

   (3) RADIUS [RFC2865] uses different UDP ports for authentication,
   accounting and dynamic authorisation changes.  RADIUS/TLS allocates a
   single port for all RADIUS packet types.  Nevertheless, in RADIUS/TLS
   the notion of a client which sends authentication requests and
   processes replies associated with it's users' sessions and the notion
   of a server which receives requests, processes them and sends the
   appropriate replies is to be preserved.  The normative rules about
   acceptable packet types for clients and servers mirror the packet
   flow behaviour from RADIUS/UDP.

   (4) RADIUS [RFC2865] used negative ICMP responses to a newly
   allocated UDP port to signal that a peer RADIUS server does not
   support reception and processing of the packet types in [RFC5176].
   These packet types are listed as to be received in RADIUS/TLS
   implementations.  Note well: it is not required for an implementation
   to actually process these packet types.  It is sufficient that upon
   receiving such a packet, an unconditional NAK is sent back to
   indicate that the action is not supported.

4.  Compatibility with other RADIUS transports

   Ongoing work in the IETF defines multiple alternative transports to
   the classic UDP transport model as defined in [RFC2865], namely
   RADIUS over TCP [I-D.dekok-radext-tcp-transport], RADIUS over DTLS
   [I-D.dekok-radext-dtls] and this present document on RADIUS over TLS.

   RADIUS/TLS does not specify any inherent backwards compatibility to
   RADIUS/UDP or cross compatibility to the other transports, i.e. an
   implementation which implements RADIUS/TLS only will not be able to
   receive or send RADIUS packet payloads over other transports.  An
   implementation wishing to be backward or cross compatible (i.e.
   wishes to serve clients using other transports than RADIUS/TLS) will
   need to implement these other transports along with the RADIUS/TLS
   transport and be prepared to send and receive on all implemented
   transports, which is called a multi-stack implementation.

   If a given IP device is able to receive RADIUS payloads on multiple
   transports, this may or may not be the same instance of software, and
   it may or may not serve the same purposes.  It is not safe to assume
   that both ports are interchangeable.  In particular, it can not be
   assumed that state is maintained for the packet payloads between the
   transports.  Two such instances MUST be considered separate RADIUS
   server entities.



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   As a consequence, the selection of transports to communicate from a
   client to a server is a manual administrative action.  An automatic
   fallback to RADIUS/UDP is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it may lead to down-
   bidding attacks on the peer communication.

5.  Diameter Compatibility

   Since RADIUS/TLS is only a new transport profile for RADIUS,
   compatibility of RADIUS/TLS - Diameter [RFC3588] vs. RADIUS/UDP
   [RFC2865] - Diameter [RFC3588] is identical.  The considerations
   regarding payload size in [I-D.dekok-radext-tcp-transport] apply.

6.  Security Considerations

   The computational resources to establish a TLS tunnel are
   significantly higher than simply sending mostly unencrypted UDP
   datagrams.  Therefore, clients connecting to a RADIUS/TLS node will
   more easily create high load conditions and a malicious client might
   create a Denial-of-Service attack more easily.

   In the case of dynamic peer discovery as per
   [I-D.winter-dynamic-discovery], a RADIUS/TLS node needs to be able to
   accept connections from a large, not previously known, group of
   hosts, possibly the whole internet.  In this case, the server's
   RADIUS/TLS port can not be protected from unauthorised connection
   attempts with measures on the network layer, i.e. access lists and
   firewalls.  This opens more attack vectors for Distributed Denial of
   Service attacks, just like any other service that is supposed to
   serve arbitrary clients (like for example web servers).

   In the case of dynamic peer discovery as per
   [I-D.winter-dynamic-discovery], X.509 certificates are the only proof
   of authorisation for a connecting RADIUS/TLS nodes.  Special care
   needs to be taken that certificates get verified properly according
   to the chosen trust model (particularly: consulting CRLs, checking
   critical extensions, checking subjectAltNames etc.) to prevent
   unauthorised connections.

   Some TLS ciphersuites only provide integrity validation of their
   payload, and provide no encryption.  This specification forbids the
   use of such ciphersuites.  Since the RADIUS payload's shared secret
   is fixed and well-known, failure to comply with this requirement will
   expose the entire datagram payload in plain text, including User-
   Password, to intermediate IP nodes.

   If peer communication between two devices is configured for both
   RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/UDP, a failover from TLS security to classic
   RADIUS security opens the way for a down-bidding attack if an



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   adversary can maliciously close the TCP connection, or prevent it
   from being established.  In this case, security of the packet payload
   is reduced from the selected TLS cipher suite packet encryption to
   the classic MD5 per-attribute encryption.  Such an attack can be
   mitigated by delisting the RADIUS/UDP client from the server
   configuration after successfully migrating that client to RADIUS/TLS.

   The RADIUS/TLS transport provides authentication and encryption
   between RADIUS peers.  In the presence of proxies, the intermediate
   proxies can still inspect the individual RADIUS packets, i.e. "end-
   to-end" encryption is not provided.  Where intermediate proxies are
   untrusted, it is desirable to use other RADIUS mechanisms to prevent
   RADIUS packet payload from inspection by such proxies.  One common
   method to protect passwords is the use of EAP methods which utilize
   TLS.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.  The TCP port 2083 was already
   previously assigned by IANA for RadSec, an early implementation of
   RADIUS/TLS.  No new RADIUS attributes or packet codes are defined.

8.  Acknowledgements

   RADIUS over TLS was first implemented as "RADSec" by Open Systems
   Consultants, Currumbin Waters, Australia, for their "Radiator" RADIUS
   server product (see [radsec-whitepaper]).

   Funding and input for the development of this Internet Draft was
   provided by the European Commission co-funded project "GEANT2"
   [geant2] and further feedback was provided by the TERENA Task Force
   Mobility [terena].

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]                         Bradner, S., "Key words for use in
                                     RFCs to Indicate Requirement
                                     Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
                                     March 1997.

   [RFC2865]                         Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens,
                                     A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
                                     Authentication Dial In User Service
                                     (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC2866]                         Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting",



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                                     RFC 2866, June 2000.

   [RFC4279]                         Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-
                                     Shared Key Ciphersuites for
                                     Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
                                     RFC 4279, December 2005.

   [RFC4346]                         Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The
                                     Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                                     Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
                                     April 2006.

   [RFC4985]                         Santesson, S., "Internet X.509
                                     Public Key Infrastructure Subject
                                     Alternative Name for Expression of
                                     Service Name", RFC 4985,
                                     August 2007.

   [RFC5280]                         Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell,
                                     S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W.
                                     Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                                     Infrastructure Certificate and
                                     Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
                                     Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5176]                         Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M.,
                                     Mitton, D., and B. Aboba, "Dynamic
                                     Authorization Extensions to Remote
                                     Authentication Dial In User Service
                                     (RADIUS)", RFC 5176, January 2008.

   [RFC5246]                         Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The
                                     Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                                     Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
                                     August 2008.

   [I-D.dekok-radext-tcp-transport]  DeKok, A., "RADIUS Over TCP", draft
                                     -ietf-dekok-radext-tcp-transport-08
                                     (work in progress), July 2010.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.dekok-radext-dtls]           DeKok, A., "DTLS as a Transport
                                     Layer for RADIUS",
                                     draft-dekok-radext-dtls-02 (work in
                                     progress), March 2010.

   [I-D.winter-dynamic-discovery]    Winter, S., "Dynamic Peer Discovery



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                                     for RADIUS over TLD and DTLS",
                                     draft-winter-dynamic-discovery-00
                                     (work in progress), February 2009.

   [RFC3588]                         Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman,
                                     E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko,
                                     "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
                                     September 2003.

   [radsec-whitepaper]               Open System Consultants, "RadSec -
                                     a secure, reliable RADIUS
                                     Protocol", May 2005, <http://
                                     www.open.com.au/radiator/
                                     radsec-whitepaper.pdf>.

   [MD5-attacks]                     Black, J., Cochran, M., and T.
                                     Highland, "A Study of the MD5
                                     Attacks: Insights and
                                     Improvements", October 2006, <http:
                                     //www.springerlink.com/content/
                                     40867l85727r7084/>.

   [radsecproxy-impl]                Venaas, S., "radsecproxy Project
                                     Homepage", 2007, <http://
                                     software.uninett.no/radsecproxy/>.

   [eduroam]                         Trans-European Research and
                                     Education Networking Association,
                                     "eduroam Homepage", 2007,
                                     <http://www.eduroam.org/>.

   [geant2]                          Delivery of Advanced Network
                                     Technology to Europe, "European
                                     Commission Information Society and
                                     Media: GEANT2", 2008,
                                     <http://www.geant2.net/>.

   [terena]                          TERENA, "Trans-European Research
                                     and Education Networking
                                     Association", 2008,
                                     <http://www.terena.org/>.

Appendix A.  Implementation Overview: Radiator

   Radiator implements the RadSec protocol for proxying requests with
   the <Authby RADSEC> and <ServerRADSEC> clauses in the Radiator
   configuration file.




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   The <AuthBy RADSEC> clause defines a RadSec client, and causes
   Radiator to send RADIUS requests to the configured RadSec server
   using the RadSec protocol.

   The <ServerRADSEC> clause defines a RadSec server, and causes
   Radiator to listen on the configured port and address(es) for
   connections from <Authby RADSEC> clients.  When an <Authby RADSEC>
   client connects to a <ServerRADSEC> server, the client sends RADIUS
   requests through the stream to the server.  The server then handles
   the request in the same way as if the request had been received from
   a conventional UDP RADIUS client.

   Radiator is compliant to version 2 of RadSec if the following options
   are used:

      <AuthBy RADSEC>

      *  Protocol tcp

      *  UseTLS

      *  TLS_CertificateFile

      *  Secret radsec

      <ServerRADSEC>

      *  Protocol tcp

      *  UseTLS

      *  TLS_RequireClientCert

      *  Secret radsec

   As of Radiator 3.15, the default shared secret for RadSec connections
   is configurable and defaults to "mysecret" (without quotes).  For
   compliance with this document, this setting needs to be configured
   for the shared secret "radsec".  The implementation uses TCP
   keepalive socket options, but does not send Status-Server packets.
   Once established, TLS connections are kept open throughout the server
   instance lifetime.

Appendix B.  Implementation Overview: radsecproxy

   The RADIUS proxy named radsecproxy was written in order to allow use
   of RadSec in current RADIUS deployments.  This is a generic proxy
   that supports any number and combination of clients and servers,



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   supporting RADIUS over UDP and RadSec.  The main idea is that it can
   be used on the same host as a non-RadSec client or server to ensure
   RadSec is used on the wire, however as a generic proxy it can be used
   in other circumstances as well.

   The configuration file consists of client and server clauses, where
   there is one such clause for each client or server.  In such a clause
   one specifies either "type tls" or "type udp" for RadSec or UDP
   transport.  For RadSec the default shared secret "mysecret" (without
   quotes), the same as Radiator, is used.  For compliance with this
   document, this setting needs to be configured for the shared secret
   "radsec".  A secret may be specified by putting say "secret
   somesharedsecret" inside a client or server clause.

   In order to use TLS for clients and/or servers, one must also specify
   where to locate CA certificates, as well as certificate and key for
   the client or server.  This is done in a TLS clause.  There may be
   one or several TLS clauses.  A client or server clause may reference
   a particular TLS clause, or just use a default one.  One use for
   multiple TLS clauses may be to present one certificate to clients and
   another to servers.

   If any RadSec (TLS) clients are configured, the proxy will at startup
   listen on port 2083, as assigned by IANA for the OSC RadSec
   implementation.  An alternative port may be specified.  When a client
   connects, the client certificate will be verified, including checking
   that the configured FQDN or IP address matches what is in the
   certificate.  Requests coming from a RadSec client are treated
   exactly like requests from UDP clients.

   The proxy will at startup try to establish a TLS connection to each
   (if any) of the configured RadSec (TLS) servers.  If it fails to
   connect to a server, it will retry regularly.  There is some back-off
   where it will retry quickly at first, and with longer intervals
   later.  If a connection to a server goes down it will also start
   retrying regularly.  When setting up the TLS connection, the server
   certificate will be verified, including checking that the configured
   FQDN or IP address matches what is in the certificate.  Requests are
   sent to a RadSec server just like they would to a UDP server.

   The proxy supports Status-Server messages.  They are only sent to a
   server if enabled for that particular server.  Status-Server requests
   are always responded to.

   This RadSec implementation has been successfully tested together with
   Radiator.  It is a freely available open-source implementation.  For
   source code and documentation, see [radsecproxy-impl].




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Authors' Addresses

   Stefan Winter
   Fondation RESTENA
   6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
   Luxembourg  1359
   LUXEMBOURG

   Phone: +352 424409 1
   Fax:   +352 422473
   EMail: stefan.winter@restena.lu
   URI:   http://www.restena.lu.


   Mike McCauley
   Open Systems Consultants
   9 Bulbul Place
   Currumbin Waters  QLD 4223
   AUSTRALIA

   Phone: +61 7 5598 7474
   Fax:   +61 7 5598 7070
   EMail: mikem@open.com.au
   URI:   http://www.open.com.au.


   Stig Venaas
   UNINETT
   Abels gate 5 - Teknobyen
   Trondheim  7465
   NORWAY

   Phone: +47 73 55 79 00
   Fax:   +47 73 55 79 01
   EMail: stig.venaas@uninett.no
   URI:   http://www.uninett.no.















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   Klaas Wierenga
   Cisco Systems International BV
   Haarlerbergweg 13-19
   Amsterdam  1101 CH
   The Netherlands

   Phone: +31 (0)20 3571752
   Fax:
   EMail: kwiereng@cisco.com
   URI:   http://www.cisco.com.









































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