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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 RFC 5856

Network Working Group                                         E. Ertekin
Internet-Draft                                                 R. Jasani
Intended status: Informational                               C. Christou
Expires: August 6, 2010                              Booz Allen Hamilton
                                                              C. Bormann
                                                 Universitaet Bremen TZI
                                                        February 2, 2010


      Integration of Robust Header Compression over IPsec Security
                              Associations
                      draft-ietf-rohc-hcoipsec-13

Abstract

   IP Security (IPsec) provides various security services for IP
   traffic.  However, the benefits of IPsec come at the cost of
   increased overhead.  This document outlines a framework for
   integrating Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec).
   By compressing the inner headers of IP packets, ROHCoIPsec proposes
   to reduce the amount of overhead associated with the transmission of
   traffic over IPsec Security Associations (SAs).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 6, 2010.

Copyright Notice




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   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   than English.



























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Table of Contents

   1.      Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.      Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.      Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.      Problem Statement: IPsec Packet Overhead . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.      Overview of the ROHCoIPsec Framework . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.1.    ROHCoIPsec Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.2.    Summary of the ROHCoIPsec Framework  . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   6.      Details of the ROHCoIPsec Framework  . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.1.    ROHC and IPsec Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.1.1.  Header Compression Protocol Considerations . . . . . . . . 10
   6.1.2.  Initialization and Negotiation of the ROHC Channel . . . . 10
   6.1.3.  Encapsulation and Identification of Header Compressed
           Packets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.1.4.  Motivation for the ROHC ICV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   6.1.5.  Path MTU Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   6.2.    ROHCoIPsec Framework Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   7.      Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.      IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   9.      Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   10.     Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
           Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15




























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1.  Introduction

   This document outlines a framework for integrating ROHC [ROHC] over
   IPsec [IPSEC] (ROHCoIPsec).  The goal of ROHCoIPsec is to reduce the
   protocol overhead associated with packets traversing between IPsec SA
   endpoints.  This can be achieved by compressing the transport layer
   header (e.g., UDP, TCP, etc.) and inner IP header of packets at the
   ingress of the IPsec tunnel, and decompressing these headers at the
   egress.

   For ROHCoIPsec, this document assumes that ROHC will be used to
   compress the inner headers of IP packets traversing an IPsec tunnel.
   However, since current specifications for ROHC detail its operation
   on a hop-by-hop basis, it requires extensions to enable its operation
   over IPsec SAs.  This document outlines a framework for extending the
   usage of ROHC to operate at IPsec SA endpoints.

   ROHCoIPsec targets the application of ROHC to tunnel mode SAs.
   Transport mode SAs only encrypt/authenticate the payload of an IP
   packet, leaving the IP header untouched.  Intermediate routers
   subsequently use this IP header to route the packet to a decryption
   device.  Therefore, if ROHC is to operate over IPsec transport-mode
   SAs, (de)compression functionality can only be applied to the
   transport layer headers, and not to the IP header.  Because current
   ROHC specifications do not include support for the compression of
   transport layer headers alone, the ROHCoIPsec framework outlined by
   this document describes the application of ROHC to tunnel mode SAs.


2.  Audience

   The authors target members of both the ROHC and IPsec communities who
   may consider extending the ROHC and IPsec protocols to meet the
   requirements put forth in this document.  In addition, this document
   is directed towards vendors developing IPsec devices that will be
   deployed in bandwidth-constrained IP networks.


3.  Terminology

   ROHC Process

      Generic reference to a ROHC instance (as defined in RFC 3759
      [ROHC-TERM]), or any supporting ROHC components.

   Compressed Traffic





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      Traffic that is processed through the ROHC compressor and
      decompressor instances.  Packet headers are compressed and
      decompressed using a specific header compression profile.

   Uncompressed Traffic

      Traffic that is not processed by the ROHC compressor instance.
      Instead, this type of traffic bypasses the ROHC process.

   IPsec Process

      Generic reference to the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
      process.

   Next Header

      Refers to the Protocol (IPv4) or Next Header (IPv6, Extension)
      field.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [BRA97].


4.  Problem Statement: IPsec Packet Overhead

   IPsec mechanisms provide various security services for IP networks.
   However, the benefits of IPsec come at the cost of increased per-
   packet overhead.  For example, traffic flow confidentiality
   (generally leveraged at security gateways) requires the tunneling of
   IP packets between IPsec implementations.  Although these IPsec
   tunnels will effectively mask the source-destination patterns that an
   intruder can ascertain, tunneling comes at the cost of increased
   packet overhead.  Specifically, an ESP tunnel mode SA applied to an
   IPv6 flow results in at least 50 bytes of additional overhead per
   packet.  This additional overhead may be undesirable for many
   bandwidth-constrained wireless and/or satellite communications
   networks, as these types of infrastructure are not overprovisioned.
   ROHC applied on a per-hop basis over bandwidth-constrained links will
   also suffer from reduced performance when encryption is used on the
   tunneled header, since encrypted headers cannot be compressed.
   Consequently, the additional overhead incurred by an IPsec tunnel may
   result in the inefficient utilization of bandwidth.

   Packet overhead is particularly significant for traffic profiles
   characterized by small packet payloads (e.g. various voice codecs).
   If these small packets are afforded the security services of an IPsec
   tunnel mode SA, the amount of per-packet overhead is increased.



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   Thus, a mechanism is needed to reduce the overhead associated with
   such flows.


5.  Overview of the ROHCoIPsec Framework

5.1.  ROHCoIPsec Assumptions

   The goal of ROHCoIPsec is to provide efficient transport of IP
   packets between IPsec devices without compromising the security
   services offered by IPsec.  The ROHCoIPsec framework has been
   developed based on the following assumptions:
   o  ROHC will be leveraged to reduce the amount of overhead associated
      with unicast IP packets traversing an IPsec SA
   o  ROHC will be instantiated at the IPsec SA endpoints, and will be
      applied on a per-SA basis
   o  Once the decompression operation completes, decompressed packet
      headers will be identical to the original packet headers before
      compression

5.2.  Summary of the ROHCoIPsec Framework

   ROHC reduces packet overhead in a network by exploiting intra- and
   inter-packet redundancies of network and transport-layer header
   fields of a flow.

   Current ROHC protocol specifications compress packet headers on a
   hop-by-hop basis.  However, IPsec SAs are instantiated between two
   IPsec endpoints.  Therefore, various extensions to both ROHC and
   IPsec need to be defined to ensure the successful operation of the
   ROHC protocol at IPsec SA endpoints.

   The specification of ROHC over IPsec SAs is straightforward, since SA
   endpoints provide source/destination pairs where (de)compression
   operations can take place.  Compression of the inner IP and upper
   layer protocol headers in such a manner offers a reduction of packet
   overhead between the two SA endpoints.  Since ROHC will now operate
   between IPsec endpoints (over multiple intermediate nodes which are
   transparent to an IPsec SA), it is imperative to ensure that its
   performance will not be severely impacted due to increased packet
   reordering and/or packet loss between the compressor and
   decompressor.

   In addition, ROHC can no longer rely on the underlying link layer for
   ROHC channel parameter configuration and packet identification.  The
   ROHCoIPsec framework proposes that ROHC channel parameter
   configuration is accomplished by an SA management protocol (e.g.,
   IKEv2 [IKEV2]), while identification of compressed header packets is



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   achieved through the Next Header field of the security protocol
   (e.g., AH [AH], ESP [ESP]) header.

   Using the ROHCoIPsec framework proposed below, outbound and inbound
   IP traffic processing at an IPsec device needs to be modified.  For
   an outbound packet, a ROHCoIPsec implementation will compress
   appropriate packet headers, and subsequently encrypt and/or
   integrity-protect the packet.  For tunnel mode SAs, compression may
   be applied to the transport layer and the inner IP headers.  For
   inbound packets, an IPsec device must first decrypt and/or integrity-
   check the packet.  Then decompression of the inner packet headers is
   performed.  After decompression, the packet is checked against the
   access controls imposed on all inbound traffic associated with the SA
   (as specified in RFC 4301 [IPSEC]).

      Note: Compression of inner headers is independent from compression
      of the security protocol (e.g., ESP) and outer IP headers.  ROHC
      profiles have been defined to allow for the compression of the
      security protocol and the outer IP header on a hop-by-hop basis.
      The applicability of ROHCoIPsec and hop-by-hop ROHC on an IPv4
      ESP-processed packet [ESP] is shown below in Figure 1.



             -----------------------------------------------------------
       IPv4  | new IP hdr  |     | orig IP hdr   |   |    | ESP   | ESP|
             |(any options)| ESP | (any options) |TCP|Data|Trailer| ICV|
             -----------------------------------------------------------
             |<-------(1)------->|<------(2)-------->|

             (1) Compressed hop-by-hop by the ROHC [ROHC] ESP/IP profile
             (2) Compressed end-to-end by the ROHCoIPsec [IPSEC-ROHC]
                 TCP/IP profile

      Figure 1.  Applicability of hop-by-hop ROHC and ROHCoIPsec on an
      IPv4 ESP-processed packet.

   If IPsec NULL encryption is applied to packets, ROHC may still be
   used to compress the inner headers at IPsec SA endpoints.  However,
   compression of these inner headers may pose challenges for
   intermediary devices (e.g., traffic monitors, sampling/management
   tools) that are inspecting the contents of ESP-NULL packets.  For
   example, policies on these devices may need to be updated to ensure
   that packets that contain the ROHC protocol identifier are not
   dropped.  In addition, intermediary devices may require additional
   functionality to determine the content of the header compressed
   packets.




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   In certain scenarios, a ROHCoIPsec implementation may encounter UDP-
   encapsulated ESP or IKE packets (i.e., packets that are traversing
   NATs).  For example, a ROHCoIPsec implementation may receive a UDP-
   encapsulated ESP packet that contains an ESP/UDP/IP header chain.
   Currently, ROHC profiles do not support compression of the entire
   header chain associated with this packet; only the UDP/IP headers can
   be compressed.


6.  Details of the ROHCoIPsec Framework

6.1.  ROHC and IPsec Integration

   Figure 2 illustrates the components required to integrate ROHC with
   the IPsec process, i.e., ROHCoIPsec.


                  +-------------------------------+
                  | ROHC Module                   |
                  |                               |
                  |                               |
        +-----+   |     +-----+     +---------+   |
        |     |   |     |     |     |  ROHC   |   |
      --|  A  |---------|  B  |-----| Process |------> Path 1
        |     |   |     |     |     |         |   |   (ROHC-enabled SA)
        +-----+   |     +-----+     +---------+   |
           |      |        |                      |
           |      |        |-------------------------> Path 2
           |      |                               |   (ROHC-enabled SA,
           |      +-------------------------------+  but no compression)
           |
           |
           |
           |
           +-----------------------------------------> Path 3
                                                      (ROHC-disabled SA)

                Figure 2.  Integration of ROHC with IPsec.

   The process illustrated in Figure 2 augments the IPsec processing
   model for outbound IP traffic (protected-to-unprotected).  Initial
   IPsec processing is consistent with RFC 4301 [IPSEC] (Steps 1-2,
   Section 5.1).

   Block A: The ROHC data item (part of the SA state information)
   retrieved from the "relevant SAD entry" ([IPSEC], Section 5.1,
   Step3a) determines if the traffic traversing the SA is handed to the
   ROHC module.  Packets selected to a ROHC-disabled SA MUST follow



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   normal IPsec processing and MUST NOT be sent to the ROHC module
   (Figure 2, Path 3).  Conversely, packets selected to a ROHC-enabled
   SA MUST be sent to the ROHC module.

   Block B: This step determines if the packet can be compressed.  If
   the packet is compressed, an Integrity Algorithm MAY be used to
   compute an Integrity Check Value (ICV) for the uncompressed packet
   ([IPSEC-ROHC], Section 4.2; [IKE-ROHC], Section 3.1).  The Next
   Header field of the security protocol header (e.g., ESP, AH) MUST be
   populated with a "ROHC" protocol number [PROTOCOL], inner packet
   headers MUST be compressed, and the computed ICV MAY be appended to
   the packet (Figure 2, Path 1).  However, if it is determined that the
   packet will not be compressed (e.g., due to one the reasons described
   in Section 6.1.3), the Next Header field MUST be populated with the
   appropriate value indicating the next level protocol (Figure 2, Path
   2), and ROHC processing MUST NOT be applied to the packet.

   After the ROHC process completes, IPsec processing resumes, as
   described in Section 5.1, Step3a, of RFC 4301 [IPSEC].

   The process illustrated in Figure 2 also augments the IPsec
   processing model for inbound IP traffic (unprotected-to-protected).
   For inbound packets, IPsec processing is performed ([IPSEC], Section
   5.2, Steps 1-3) followed by AH or ESP processing ([IPSEC], Section
   5.2, Step 4).

   Block A: After AH or ESP processing, the ROHC data item retrieved
   from the SAD entry will indicate if traffic traversing the SA is
   processed by the ROHC module ([IPSEC], Section 5.2, Step 3a).
   Packets traversing a ROHC-disabled SA MUST follow normal IPsec
   processing and MUST NOT be sent to the ROHC module.  Conversely,
   packets traversing a ROHC-enabled SA MUST be sent to the ROHC module.

   Block B: The decision at Block B is determined by the value of the
   Next Header field of the security protocol header.  If the Next
   Header field does not indicate a ROHC header, the decompressor MUST
   NOT attempt decompression (Figure 2, Path 2).  If the Next Header
   field indicates a ROHC header, decompression is applied.  After
   decompression, the signaled ROHCoIPsec Integrity Algorithm, MAY be
   used to compute an ICV value for the decompressed packet.  This ICV,
   if present, is compared to the ICV that was calculated at the
   compressor: if the ICVs match, the packet is forwarded by the ROHC
   module (Figure 2, Path 1); otherwise, the packet MUST be dropped.
   Once the ROHC module completes processing, IPsec processing resumes,
   as described in Section 5.2, Step 4 of RFC 4301 [IPSEC].

   When there is a single SA between a compressor and decompressor, ROHC
   MUST operate in unidirectional mode, as described in Section 5 of RFC



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   3759 [ROHC-TERM].  When there is a pair of SAs instantiated between
   ROHCoIPsec implementations, ROHC MAY operate in bidirectional mode,
   where an SA pair represents a bidirectional ROHC channel (as
   described in Section 6.1 and 6.2 of RFC 3759[ROHC-TERM]).

   Note that to further reduce the size of an IPsec-protected packet,
   ROHCoIPsec and IPcomp [IPCOMP] can be implemented in a nested
   fashion.  This process is detailed in [IPSEC-ROHC], Section 4.4.

6.1.1.  Header Compression Protocol Considerations

   ROHCv2 [ROHCV2] profiles include various mechanisms that provide
   increased robustness over reordering channels.  These mechanisms
   SHOULD be adopted for ROHC to operate efficiently over IPsec SAs.

   A ROHC decompressor implemented within IPsec architecture MAY
   leverage additional mechanisms to improve performance over reordering
   channels (either due to random events, or to an attacker
   intentionally reordering packets).  Specifically, IPsec's sequence
   number MAY be used by the decompressor to identify a packet as
   "sequentially late".  This knowledge will increase the likelihood of
   successful decompression of a reordered packet.

   Additionally, ROHCoIPsec implementations SHOULD minimize the amount
   of feedback sent from the decompressor to the compressor.  If a ROHC
   feedback channel is not used sparingly, the overall gains from
   ROHCoIPsec can be significantly reduced.  More specifically, any
   feedback sent from the decompressor to the compressor MUST be
   processed by IPsec, and tunneled back to the compressor (as
   designated by the SA associated with FEEDBACK_FOR).  As such, some
   implementation alternatives can be considered, including the
   following:
   o  Eliminate feedback traffic altogether by operating only in ROHC
      Unidirectional mode (U-mode)
   o  Piggyback ROHC feedback messages within the feedback element
      (i.e., on ROHC traffic that normally traverses the SA designated
      by FEEDBACK_FOR).

6.1.2.  Initialization and Negotiation of the ROHC Channel

   Hop-by-hop ROHC typically uses the underlying link layer (e.g., PPP)
   to negotiate ROHC channel parameters.  In the case of ROHCoIPsec,
   channel parameters can be set manually (i.e., administratively
   configured for manual SAs), or negotiated by IKEv2.  The extensions
   required for IKEv2 to support ROHC channel parameter negotiation are
   detailed in [IKE-ROHC].

   If the ROHC protocol requires bidirectional communications, two SAs



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   MUST be instantiated between the IPsec implementations.  One of the
   two SAs is used for carrying ROHC-traffic from the compressor to the
   decompressor, while the other is used to communicate ROHC-feedback
   from the decompressor to the compressor.  Note that the requirement
   for two SAs aligns with the operation of IKE, which creates SAs in
   pairs by default.  However, IPsec implementations will dictate how
   decompressor feedback received on one SA is associated with a
   compressor on the other SA.  An IPsec implementation MUST relay the
   feedback received by the decompressor on an inbound SA to the
   compressor associated with the corresponding outbound SA.

6.1.3.  Encapsulation and Identification of Header Compressed Packets

   As indicated in Section 6.1, new state information (i.e., a new ROHC
   data item) is defined for each SA.  The ROHC data item MUST be used
   by the IPsec process to determine whether it sends all traffic
   traversing a given SA to the ROHC module (ROHC-enabled) or bypasses
   the ROHC module and sends the traffic through regular IPsec
   processing (ROHC- disabled).

   The Next Header field of the IPsec security protocol (e.g., AH or
   ESP) header MUST be used to demultiplex header-compressed traffic
   from uncompressed traffic traversing an ROHC-enabled SA.  This
   functionality is needed in situations where packets traversing a
   ROHC-enabled SA contain uncompressed headers.  Such situations may
   occur when, for example, a compressor supports strictly n compressed
   flows and cannot compress the n+1 flow that arrives.  Another example
   is when traffic is selected to a ROHC-enabled SA, but cannot be
   compressed by the ROHC process because the appropriate ROHC Profile
   has not been signaled for use.  As a result, the decompressor MUST be
   able to identify packets with uncompressed headers and MUST NOT
   attempt to decompress them.  The Next Header field is used to
   demultiplex these header-compressed and uncompressed packets where
   the ROHC protocol number will indicate that the packet contains
   compressed headers.  To accomplish this, an official IANA allocation
   from the Protocol ID registry [PROTOCOL] is required.

   It is noted that the use of the ROHC protocol identifier for purposes
   other than ROHCoIPsec is currently not defined.  In other words, the
   ROHC protocol identifier is only defined for use in the next header
   field of security protocol headers (e.g., ESP, AH).

   The ROHC Data Item, IANA Protocol ID allocation, and other IPsec
   extensions to support ROHCoIPsec, are specified in [IPSEC-ROHC].







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6.1.4.  Motivation for the ROHC ICV

   Although ROHC was designed to tolerate packet loss and reordering,
   the algorithm does not guarantee that packets reconstructed at the
   decompressor are identical to the original packet.  As stated in
   Section 5.2 of RFC 4224 [REORDR], the consequences of packet
   reordering between ROHC peers may include undetected decompression
   failures, where erroneous packets are constructed and forwarded to
   upper layers.  Significant packet loss can have similar consequences.

   When using IPsec integrity protection, a packet received at the
   egress of an IPsec tunnel is identical to the packet that was
   processed at the ingress (given that the key is not compromised,
   etc.).

   When ROHC is integrated into the IPsec processing framework, the ROHC
   processed packet is protected by the AH/ESP ICV.  However, bits in
   the original IP header are not protected by this ICV, only by ROHC's
   integrity mechanisms (which are designed for random packet loss/
   reordering, not malicious packet loss/reordering introduced by an
   attacker).  Therefore, under certain circumstances, erroneous packets
   may be constructed and forwarded into the protected domain.

   To ensure the integrity of the original IP header within the
   ROHCoIPsec-processing model, an additional integrity check MAY be
   applied before the packet is compressed.  This integrity check will
   ensure that erroneous packets are not forwarded into the protected
   domain.  The specifics of this integrity check are documented in
   Section 4.2 of [IPSEC-ROHC].

6.1.5.  Path MTU Considerations

   By encapsulating IP packets with AH/ESP and tunneling IP headers,
   IPsec increases the size of IP packets.  This increase may result in
   Path MTU issues in the unprotected domain.  Several approaches to
   resolving these path MTU issues are documented in Section 8 of RFC
   4301[IPSEC]; approaches include fragmenting the packet before or
   after IPsec processing (if the packet's DF bit is clear), or possibly
   discarding packets (if the packet's DF bit is set).

   The addition of ROHC within the IPsec processing model may result in
   a similar path MTU challenges.  For example, under certain
   circumstances, ROHC headers are larger than the original uncompressed
   headers.  In addition, if an integrity algorithm is used to validate
   packet headers, the resulting ICV will increase the size of packets.
   Both of these properties of ROHCoIPsec increase the size of packets,
   and therefore may result in additional challenges associated with
   path MTU.



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   Approaches to addressing these path MTU issues are specified in
   Section 4.3 of [IPSEC-ROHC].

6.2.  ROHCoIPsec Framework Summary

   To summarize, the following items are needed to achieve ROHCoIPsec:
   o  IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec
   o  IPsec Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec


7.  Security Considerations

   Several security considerations associated with the use of ROHCoIPsec
   are covered in Section 6.1.4.  These considerations can be mitigated
   by using strong a integrity check algorithm to ensure the valid
   decompression of packet headers.

   A malfunctioning or malicious ROHCoIPsec compressor (i.e., the
   compressor located at the ingress of the IPsec tunnel) has the
   ability to send erroneous packets to the decompressor (i.e., the
   decompressor located at the egress of the IPsec tunnel) that do not
   match the original packets emitted from the end-hosts.  Such a
   scenario may result in decreased efficiency between compressor and
   decompressor, or may cause the decompressor to forward erroneous
   packets into the protected domain.  A malicious compressor could also
   intentionally generate a significant number of compressed packets,
   which may result in denial of service at the decompressor, as the
   decompression of a significant number of invalid packets may drain
   the resources of an IPsec device.

   A malfunctioning or malicious ROHCoIPsec decompressor has the ability
   to disrupt communications as well.  For example, a decompressor may
   simply discard a subset of (or all) the packets that are received,
   even if packet headers were validly decompressed.  Ultimately, this
   could result in denial of service.  A malicious decompressor could
   also intentionally indicate that its context is not synchronized with
   the compressor's context, forcing the compressor to transition to a
   lower compression state.  This will reduce the overall efficiency
   gain offered by ROHCoIPsec.


8.  IANA Considerations

   This draft has no IANA considerations.  All IANA considerations for
   ROHCoIPsec are documented in [IKE-ROHC] and [IPSEC-ROHC].






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9.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Mr. Sean O'Keeffe, Mr. James Kohler,
   and Ms. Linda Noone of the Department of Defense, and well as Mr.
   Rich Espy of OPnet for their contributions and support in the
   development of this document.

   The authors would also like to thank Mr. Yoav Nir, and Mr. Robert A
   Stangarone Jr.: both served as committed document reviewers for this
   specification.

   In addition, the authors would like to thank the following for their
   numerous reviews and comments to this document:

   o  Mr. Magnus Westerlund
   o  Dr. Stephen Kent
   o  Mr. Pasi Eronen
   o  Dr. Joseph Touch
   o  Mr. Tero Kivinen
   o  Dr. Jonah Pezeshki
   o  Mr. Lars-Erik Jonsson
   o  Mr. Jan Vilhuber
   o  Mr. Dan Wing
   o  Mr. Kristopher Sandlund
   o  Mr. Ghyslain Pelletier
   o  Mr. David Black
   o  Mr. Tim Polk
   o  Mr. Brian Carpenter

   Finally, the authors would also like to thank Mr. Tom Conkle, Ms.
   Renee Esposito, Mr. Etzel Brower, and Ms. Michele Casey of Booz Allen
   Hamilton for their assistance in completing this work.


10.  Informative References

   [ROHC]     Jonsson, L-E., Pelletier, G., and K. Sandlund, "The RObust
              Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 4995, July 2007.

   [IPSEC]    Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [ROHC-TERM]
              Jonsson, L-E., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC):
              Terminology and Channel Mapping Examples", RFC 3759,
              April 2004.

   [BRA97]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate



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              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [IKEV2]    Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [ESP]      Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [AH]       Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              December 2005.

   [IPSEC-ROHC]
              Ertekin, E., Christou, C., and C. Bormann, "IPsec
              Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec", work in progress ,
              February 2010.

   [IKE-ROHC]
              Ertekin, E., Christou, C., Jasani, R., Kivinen, T., and C.
              Bormann, "IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec", work in
              progress , February 2010.

   [PROTOCOL]
              IANA, "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers, IANA registry
              at: http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers",
              June 2009.

   [IPCOMP]   Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, and Thomas, "IP Payload
              Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 3173, September 2001.

   [ROHCV2]   Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header Compression
              Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP and UDP
              Lite", RFC 5225, April 2008.

   [REORDR]   Pelletier, G., Jonsson, L-E., and K. Sandlund, "Robust
              Header Compression (ROHC): ROHC over Channels That Can
              Reorder Packets", RFC 4224, January 2006.


Authors' Addresses

   Emre Ertekin
   Booz Allen Hamilton
   5220 Pacific Concourse Drive, Suite 200
   Los Angeles, CA  90045
   US

   Email: ertekin_emre@bah.com




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   Rohan Jasani
   Booz Allen Hamilton
   13200 Woodland Park Dr.
   Herndon, VA  20171
   US

   Email: ro@breakcheck.com


   Chris Christou
   Booz Allen Hamilton
   13200 Woodland Park Dr.
   Herndon, VA  20171
   US

   Email: christou_chris@bah.com


   Carsten Bormann
   Universitaet Bremen TZI
   Postfach 330440
   Bremen  D-28334
   Germany

   Email: cabo@tzi.org


























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