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Versions: (draft-bagnulo-savi-send) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 RFC 7219

SAVI Working Group                                            M. Bagnulo
Internet-Draft                                        A. Garcia-Martinez
Intended status: Standards Track                                    UC3M
Expires: March 21, 2013                               September 17, 2012


          SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation
                        draft-ietf-savi-send-08

Abstract

   This memo describes SEND SAVI, a mechanism to provide source address
   validation using the SEND protocol.  The proposed mechanism is
   intended to complement ingress filtering techniques to provide a
   finer granularity on the control of the source addresses used.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 21, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Background to SEND SAVI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Address Validation Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Binding Creation for SEND SAVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  SEND SAVI Protection Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.4.  Special cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.  SEND SAVI Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.  SEND SAVI Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2.  SEND SAVI Device Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.3.  Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.3.1.  Transit Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.3.2.  Local Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.4.  SEND SAVI Port Configuration Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . 24
     3.5.  VLAN Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     3.6.  Protocol Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.1.  Protection Against Replay Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.2.  Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . 28
     4.3.  Residual threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     4.4.  Privacy considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   6.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31























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1.  Introduction

   This memo describes SEND SAVI (SEcure Neighbor Discovery Source-
   Address Validation Implementation), a mechanism to provide source
   address validation for IPv6 networks using the SEND protocol
   [RFC3971].  The proposed mechanism is intended to complement ingress
   filtering techniques to provide a finer granularity on the control of
   the source addresses used.

   SEND SAVI uses the DAD_NSOL (Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor
   SOLicitation) and the DAD_NADV (DAD Neighbor ADVertisement) messages
   defined in [RFC4862], and the NUD_NSOL (Neighbor Unreachability
   Detection Neigbor SOLicitation) and NUD_NADV (NUD Neighbor
   ADVertisement) messages defined in [RFC4861], to validate the address
   ownership claim of a node.  In addition, SEND SAVI uses RADV (Router
   ADVertisement) messages, defined in [RFC4861], to identify routers,
   and therefore restrict the nodes which can generate packets
   containing off-link IPv6 source addresses.  Using the information
   contained in these messages, host and router IPv6 addresses are
   associated to switch ports, so that data packets will be validated by
   checking for consistency in this binding, as described in
   [I-D.ietf-savi-framework].

   Scalability of a distributed SAVI system comprised of multiple SEND
   SAVI devices is preserved by means of a deployment scenario in which
   SEND SAVI devices form a "protection perimeter".  In this deployment
   scenario, validation is only performed when the packet ingress to the
   protection perimeter.

   The SEND SAVI specification, as defined in this document, is limited
   to links and prefixes in which every IPv6 host and every IPv6 router
   uses the SEND protocol [RFC3971] to protect the exchange of Neighbor
   Discovery information.

   SEND SAVI is designed to be deployed in existing SEND networks with a
   minimum set of changes.  In particular, SEND SAVI does not require
   any changes in the nodes whose source address is to be verified.
   This is due to the fact that verification solely relies in the usage
   of already available protocols.  Therefore, SEND SAVI does neither
   define a new protocol, nor define any new message on existing
   protocols, nor require that a host or router uses an existent
   protocol message in a different way.

   An overview of the general framework about Source Address Validation
   Implementation is presented in [I-D.ietf-savi-framework].






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2.  Background to SEND SAVI

2.1.  Address Validation Scope

   The application scenario of SEND SAVI is limited to the local link.
   This means that the goal of SEND SAVI is to verify that the source
   addresses of the packets generated by the nodes attached to the local
   link have not been spoofed, and that only legitimate routers generate
   packets with off-link IPv6 source addresses.

   In a link there usually are hosts and routers attached.  Hosts
   generate packets with their own addresses as the source address.
   This is called local traffic.  Routers send packets containing a
   source address other than their own, since they are forwarding
   packets generated by other hosts (usually located in a different
   link).  This is the so-called transit traffic.

   SEND SAVI allows the validation of the source address of the local
   traffic, i.e. it allows to verify that the source addresses of the
   packets generated by the nodes attached to the local link have not
   been spoofed.  In addition, since SEND does provide the means to
   verify that a node claiming to act as a router is indeed authorized
   to do so, SEND SAVI also provides means to prevent hosts from
   generating packets with source addresses derived from off-link
   prefixes.  However, SEND SAVI does not provide the means to verify if
   a given router is actually authorized to forward packets containing a
   particular off-link source address.  Other techniques, like ingress
   filtering [RFC2827], are recommended to validate transit traffic.

2.2.  Binding Creation for SEND SAVI

   Filtering is performed according to the binding existing between a
   layer-2 anchor (the binding anchor) and an IPv6 address.  These
   bindings should allow legitimate nodes to use the bounded IPv6
   address as source address, and prevent illegitimate nodes to do so.

   Any SAVI solution is not stronger than the binding anchor it uses.
   If the binding anchor is easily spoofable (e.g. a MAC address), then
   the resulting solution will be weak.  The treatment of non-compliant
   packets needs to be tuned accordingly.  In particular, if the binding
   anchor is easily spoofable and the SEND SAVI device is configured to
   drop non-compliant packets, then the usage of SEND SAVI may open a
   new vector of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, based on spoofed
   binding anchors.  For that reason, in this specification only switch
   ports MUST be used as binding anchors.  Other forms of binding
   anchors are out of the scope of this specification and proper
   analysis of the implications of using them should be performed before
   their usage.



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   SEND [RFC3971] provides tools to assure that a ND (Neighbor
   Discovery) message containing a CGA option and signed by a RSA option
   has been generated by the legitimate owner of the CGA IPv6 address.
   It also provides tools to verify that a Router Advertisement (RADV)
   message signed by a RSA option with a key bounded to a CGA [RFC3972]
   or a certificate, has been generated by a legitimate router.

   SEND SAVI uses SEND validated messages to create bindings between the
   CGA and the port of the SEND SAVI device from which it is reasonable
   to receive packets with the CGA as source addresses.  The events that
   trigger the binding creation process in a SEND SAVI device are:
   o  The reception of a DAD_NSOL message, indicating the attempt of a
      node to configure an address.  This may occur when a node
      configures an address for the first time or after being idle for
      some time, or when the node has changed the physical attachment
      point to the layer-2 infrastructure.
   o  The reception of any other packet (including data packets) with a
      source address for which no binding exists.  This would occur if:
      a DAD_NSOL message was lost, a node has changed the physical
      attachment point to the layer-2 infrastructure without issuing a
      DAD_NSOL message, a SAVI device loses a binding (for example, due
      to a restart), or the link topology changed

   When the binding creation process is triggered, the SEND SAVI device
   has to assure that the node for which the binding is to be created is
   the legitimate owner of the address.  For a binding creation process
   initiated by a DAD_NSOL exchange, the SEND SAVI device waits for the
   reception of a validated DAD_NADV message indicating that other node
   had configured the address before, or validated DAD_NSOL messages
   arriving from other locations indicating that another node is trying
   to configure the same address at the same time.  For the case in
   which other packets than a DAD_NSOL initiate the creation of the
   binding, the SEND SAVI device explicitly requires the node sending
   those packets to prove address ownership by issuing a secured
   NUD_NSOL which has to be answered by a secured NUD_NADV by the probed
   node.

   Bindings are refreshed periodically by means of secured NUD_NSOL
   message issued by the SEND SAVI device, which had to be answered by a
   valid NUD_NADV message by the node for which the binding exists.

   Validated RADV messages are used to associate router authorization to
   existing bindings (i.e. to an IPv6 address which is also associated
   to a port).  Packets with off-link source addresses are only
   forwarded if they are received from a port associated to the IPv6
   address of a router.

   SEND SAVI needs to be protected against replay attacks, i.e. attacks



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   in which a secured SEND message is replayed by another node.  The
   SEND SAVI specification uses some SEND messages to create a binding
   between the address contained in the message (that must be signed by
   a node possessing the private key associated to the address) and the
   port through which the message is received.  If an attacker manages
   to obtain such a message from another node, for example, because the
   message is multicasted to all the addresses of the link or because
   the attacker has subscribed to the Solicited Node multicast address
   associated to a remote node, it could replay it preserving the
   original signature.  This may create an illegitimate binding in the
   SEND SAVI device, or could be used to abort the address configuration
   procedure at other node.  While SEND provides some means to limit the
   impact of the replay of ND messages, the emphasis for SEND anti-
   replay protection is to limit to a short period of time the validity
   of the ND information transmitted in the message, for example, the
   relationship between an IPv6 address and a layer-2 address.  Note
   that, on the other hand, the period must be long enough to assure
   that the information sent by the legitimate sender is considered
   valid despite the possible differences in clock synchronization
   between sender and receiver(s).  For example, with the values
   recommended by [RFC3971] for TIMESTAMP_FUZZ and TIMESTAMP_DRIFT, a
   node receiving a DAD_NSOL message, would not discard replays of this
   message being received within a period of approximately 2 seconds
   (more precisely, 2/0.99 seconds).  The underlying assumption for SEND
   security is that even if the message is replayed by another node
   during this period of time, the information disseminated by ND will
   not have changed.  However, allowing a node to replay a SEND message
   (used by SEND SAVI to create bindings) do have impact to SEND SAVI
   operation, regardless the time elapsed since it was generated, since
   it can create a new binding in a SEND SAVI device for the port to
   which an illegitimate node attaches.  As can be concluded, the
   protection provided by SEND may be not enough for SEND SAVI.

   The protection against replay attacks provided by SEND SAVI results
   from many design decisions.  First, each node is required to connect
   to the SEND SAVI topology through a different port, so that no
   eavesdropping can occur at this first step.  Then, SEND SAVI bindings
   are updated only according to messages whose dissemination can be
   restricted in the SEND SAVI topology without interfering with normal
   SEND operation.  In particular, SEND SAVI uses for this purpose
   unsolicited DAD_NSOL messages, for which SEND SAVI limits its
   propagation to the ports through which a previous binding for the
   same IPv6 address existed (see (Section 3.3.2), and NUD_NADV messages
   in response to a secured NUD_NSOL sent by the SEND SAVI device to the
   tested port.  Finally, SEND SAVI filtering rules prevent nodes from
   replaying messages generated by the SEND SAVI devices themselves.
   Section 4.1 discusses the resulting protection provided by SEND SAVI
   against replay attacks.



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2.3.  SEND SAVI Protection Perimeter

   In order to reduce computing and state requirements in SEND SAVI
   devices, SEND SAVI devices can form a "protection perimeter"
   [I-D.ietf-savi-framework].  In this model, source address validation
   is performed only when packets enter in a protected realm defined
   through the protection perimeter.  The perimeter is defined by
   appropriate configuration of the roles of each port, which can be
   'Validating ports' and 'Trusted ports':
   o  Validating ports (VPs) are those in which SEND SAVI filtering and
      binding creation is performed.
   o  Trusted ports (TPs) are those in which neither SEND SAVI filtering
      nor binding creation are performed.  So, packets received through
      Trusted ports are not filtered by SEND SAVI.  The only SEND
      messages received through a Trusted port which are processed are
      those related with certificates, prefix information and Neighbor
      Advertisements for Duplicate Address Detection (DAD_NADV).

   The following figure shows a typical topology involving trusted and
   untrusted infrastructure.



         +--+   +--+                          +--+   +--+
         |H1|   |H2|                          |H3|   |R1|
         +--+   +--+                          +--+   +--+
           |     |                              |     |
      +----------SEND SAVI PROTECTION PERIMETER-------------+
      |    |     |                              |     |     |
      |  +-1-----2-+                          +-1-----2-+   |
      |  |  SEND-  |                          |  SEND-  |   |
      |  |  SAVI1  |                          |  SAVI2  |   |
      |  +-3--4----+                          +--3--4---+   |
      |    |  |          +--------------+        |  |       |
      |    |  +----------|              |--------+  |       |
      |    |             |   SWITCH-A   |           |       |
      |    |  +----------|              |           |       |
      |    |  |          +--------------+           |       |
      |  +-1--2----+                          +-----1---+   |
      |  |  SEND-  |                          |  SEND-  |   |
      |  |  SAVI3  |                          |  SAVI4  |   |
      |  +-3-----4-+                          +----4----+   |
      |    |     |                                 |        |
      +------------SEND SAVI PROTECTION PERIMETER-----------+
           |     |                                 |
         +--+   +--+                             +--+
         |R2|   |H4|                             |H5|
         +--+   +--+                             +--+



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   Trusted ports are used for connections with trusted infrastructure,
   including the communication between SEND SAVI devices or other
   trusted nodes.

   Port 3 of SEND-SAVI1 and port 1 of SEND-SAVI3, and port 4 of SEND-
   SAVI2 and port 1 of SEND-SAVI4 are trusted because they connect two
   SAVI devices.  Port 4 of SEND-SAVI1, port 3 of SEND-SAVI2 and port 2
   of SEND-SAVI3 are trusted because they connect to SWITCH-A to which
   only trusted nodes are connected.

   Validating ports are used for connection with non-trusted
   infrastructure and with routers.  Therefore, hosts are normally
   connected to Validating ports.  Routers are also recommended to be
   connected to Validating ports.  So, in the figure above, ports 1 and
   2 of SEND-SAVI1, port 1 of SEND-SAVI2, port 4 of SEND-SAVI3 are
   Validating ports because they connect to hosts.  Port 2 of SEND-SAVI2
   and port 3 of SEND-SAVI3 are Validating ports because they connect to
   routers.  Port 4 of SEND-SAVI4 is also a Validating port because it
   is connected to host H5.

2.4.  Special cases

   Multi-subnet links: In some cases, a given subnet may have several
   prefixes.  This is directly supported by SEND SAVI as any port can
   support multiple prefixes.  Even the case where the forwarding of
   packets between different prefixes involve a router is supported, as
   long as the routers propagate RADV messages through the interfaces
   connected to the link.  In this case, the SEND SAVI device allows the
   router to generate off-link traffic.

   Multihomed hosts: A multihomed host is a host with multiple
   interfaces.  The interaction between SEND SAVI and multihomed hosts
   is as follows.  If the different interfaces of the host are assigned
   different IP addresses and packets sent from each interface always
   carry the address assigned to that interface as source address, then,
   from the SEND SAVI device perspective this is equivalent to two hosts
   with a single interface each with an IP address each.  This is
   supported by SAVI without need for additional considerations.  If the
   different interfaces share the same IP address or if the interfaces
   have different addresses but the host sends packets using the address
   of one of the interfaces through any of the interfaces, then SEND
   SAVI does not directly support it.  It would require either
   connecting at least one interface of the multihomed host to a Trusted
   port, or manually configure the SEND SAVI bindings to allow binding
   the address of the multihomed host to multiple anchors
   simultaneously.

   Untrusted routers: One can envision scenarios where routers are



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   dynamically attached to a SEND SAVI network.  A typical example would
   be a mobile phone connecting to a SEND SAVI switch where the mobile
   phone is acting as a router for other personal devices that are
   accessing the network through it.  In this case, the router does not
   seem to directly fall in the category of Trusted infrastructure (as
   if this was the case, it is likely that all devices would be
   trusted), hence it cannot be connected to a trusted port and if it is
   connected to a Validating port, the SEND SAVI switch would discard
   all the packets containing an off-link source address coming from
   that device.  As a result, the default recommendation specified in
   this specification does not support such scenario.


3.  SEND SAVI Specification

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.1.  SEND SAVI Data Structures

   The following three data structures are defined for SEND SAVI
   operations:

   SEND SAVI Data Base.  The SEND SAVI function relies on state
   information binding the source IPv6 address used in data packets to
   the port through which the legitimate node connects.  Such
   information is stored in the SEND SAVI Data Base.  The SEND SAVI Data
   Base is populated with the contents of validated SEND messages.  Each
   entry contains the following information:
   o  IPv6 source address
   o  Binding anchor: port through which the packet was received
   o  Lifetime
   o  Status: TENTATIVE_DAD, TENTATIVE_NUD, VALID, TESTING_VP,
      TESTING_VP'
   o  Alternative binding anchor: port from which a DAD_NSOL message or
      any data packet has been received while a different port was
      stored in the binding anchor for the address.
   o  Creation time: the value of the local clock when the entry was
      firstly created

   SEND SAVI Prefix list.  SEND SAVI devices need to know which are the
   link prefixes, in order to identify local and off-link traffic.  A
   SEND SAVI device MUST support discovering this information from the
   Prefix Information option [RFC4861] with the L set bit set of
   validated RADV messages, either coming from Validating or Trusted
   ports, as described in Section 3.3.2.  The list of prefixes MAY also
   be configured manually.  This information is not specific to a given



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   port.  The SEND SAVI Prefix list contains one entry per prefix in
   use, as follows:
   o  Prefix: prefix included in a Prefix Information option
   o  Prefix lifetime: time in seconds that the prefix is valid.
      Initially set to the Valid Lifetime value of the Prefix
      Information option of a valid RADV message, or set to a value of
      all one bits (0xffffffff), which represents infinity, if
      configured manually.

   When the SEND SAVI device boots, it MUST send a secured RSOL message.
   The SAVI device SHOULD issue a secured RSOL in case the prefix entry
   is about to expire.

   SEND SAVI Router list.  SEND SAVI keeps a table with one entry for
   each authorized router in use connected to a Validating port of the
   SAVI device.  A SEND SAVI device MUST support discovering this
   information from a validated RADV message addressed to the all-nodes
   multicast address or to the IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device has
   been received from a Validating port.  If the SEND SAVI device uses
   RADV messages to obtain this information, the SAVI device SHOULD
   issue a secured RSOL through the Validating port through which the
   router is reachable (according to the information stored in the SEND
   SAVI Data Base) in case the entry is about to expire, in order to
   ensure that the node is still a router.  Alternatively, the list of
   routers MAY be configured manually.  The information stored in the
   table is the following:
   o  IPv6 address of the Router.  There MUST be an entry in the SEND
      SAVI Data Base for the same IPv6 address.  If the corresponding
      entry in the SEND SAVI Data Base expires, the entry in this table
      MUST be removed.
   o  Router lifetime: Lifetime associated with the default router in
      units of seconds.  Initially set to the Router Lifetime of a valid
      RADV message.  The field can contain values up to 65535.  A
      Lifetime of 0 indicates that the router is not a default router
      and SHOULD NOT appear on the default.

3.2.  SEND SAVI Device Configuration

   In order to perform SEND SAVI operation, some basic parameters of the
   SEND SAVI device have to be configured.  Since a SEND SAVI device
   operates as a SEND node to generate NUD_NSOL, RSOL or CPS messages,
   o  the SEND SAVI device MUST be configured with a valid CGA address.
      This CGA address SHOULD be a Link-Local address, to recover from
      the following situation: the DAD_NSOL message used by a router
      when it configures its link-local address has not been received,
      so that a binding has not been created for this address.  If the
      port to which the router connects is a Validating port, the SEND
      SAVI device cannot accept any packet, so no RADV issued by the



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      router will be accepted.  Then, the SEND SAVI device may not
      receive prefix configuration to configure any other address than a
      link-local.  However, if the SEND SAVI device configures a Link-
      Local CGA, it can issue a NUD_NSOL to the router, and create the
      binding according to the process described in Section 3.3.2.
      Note that when the SEND SAVI device configures this address, it
      MUST behave as regular SEND node, i.e. using secured NSOL messages
      to perform DAD, etc., in addition to fulfill the requirements
      stated for regular IPv6 nodes [RFC6434].
   o  the SEND SAVI device MUST be configured with at least one Trusted
      port to validate the Certification Paths that is used to validate
      router information.
   o  the SEND SAVI device MAY be configured with Certification Paths.
      The alternative is obtaining them by means of issuing
      Certification Path Solicitation messages, as detailed in the SEND
      specification [RFC3971].

   In addition, the port role for each port of the SEND SAVI device
   SHOULD be configured.  The guidelines for this configuration are
   specified in Section 3.4.  Unconfigured ports MUST be labeled as
   Validating ports; in this case performance may be degraded, as
   discussed in [I-D.ietf-savi-framework].

3.3.  Traffic Processing

   In this section we describe how packets are processed by a SEND SAVI
   device.  Behavior varies depending on if the packet belong to local
   or transit traffic.  This is determined by checking if the prefix of
   the source address is included in the SEND SAVI prefix list or the
   unspecified address (local traffic), or not included in the SEND SAVI
   prefix list (transit traffic).

3.3.1.  Transit Traffic Processing

   Transit traffic processing occurs as follows:
   o  If the transit traffic packet is received through a Trusted port,
      the data packet is forwarded and no SAVI processing performed.
   o  If the transit traffic packet is received through a Validating
      port, the packet is only forwarded if the port through which the
      packet has been received is associated to the port of an IPv6
      address for which an entry in the Router list exists.  If transit
      traffic is received from a Validating port which is not associated
      to an entry in the SEND SAVI Router list, the SEND SAVI device
      SHOULD discard the packets, and MAY send a RSOL message to the
      all-routers multicast address to the port through which the packet
      was received.





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3.3.2.  Local Traffic Processing

   If the verification of the source address of a packet shows that it
   belongs to local traffic, this packet is processed using the state
   machine described in this section.  SEND SAVI is designed to perform
   source address validation for both hosts and routers, so in the
   following description we refer in general to nodes.

   For the rest of the section, the following assumptions hold:
   o  When it is stated that a secured NUD_NSOL message is issued by a
      SEND SAVI device through a port P, this means the following: the
      SEND SAVI device generates a NUD_NSOL message according to the
      Neighbor Unreachability Detection procedure described in
      [RFC4861], addressed to the IPv6 target address (source address of
      the packet triggering the procedure).  This message is secured by
      SEND as defined in [RFC3971].  The source address used for issuing
      the NUD_NSOL message is the source address of the SEND SAVI
      device.  The message is sent only through port P.
   o  When it is stated that a validated NUD_NADV message is received by
      a SEND SAVI device, this means that: a SEND secured NUD_NADV
      message has been received by the same port P through which the
      corresponding NUD_NSOL message was issued, and the NUD_NADV
      message has been validated according to [RFC3971] to prove
      ownership for the IPv6 address under consideration and to prove
      that it is a response for the previous NUD_NSOL message issued by
      the SEND SAVI device (containing the same nonce value as the
      NUD_NSOL message to which it answers).

   We use VP to refer to a Validating port, and TP to refer to a Trusted
   port.

   The state machine is defined for a binding of a given source IP
   address in a given SEND SAVI device.  In the transitions considered,
   packets described as inputs refer to the IPaddr IPv6 address
   associated to the state machine.

   The possible states for a given IPaddr are: NO_BIND, TENTATIVE_DAD,
   TENTATIVE_NUD, VALID, TESTING_VP and TESTING_VP'.  The NO_BIND state
   represents that no binding exists for IPaddr; this is the state for
   all addresses unless a binding is explicitly created.

   The states can be classified into 'forwarding' states, i.e. states in
   which packets received from the port associated to the IPv6 address
   are forwarded, and 'non-forwarding' states, i.e. states in which
   packets different to the ones used for signaling are not forwarded.
   VALID, TENTATIVE_DAD, TESTING_VP and TESTING_VP' are forwarding
   states, while NO_BIND and TENTATIVE_NUD are non-forwarding states.




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   The state machine defined for SEND SAVI operation adheres to the
   following design guidelines:
   o  The only events which trigger state changes from forwarding to
      non-forwarding states and vice versa are the reception of
      DAD_NSOL, DAD_NADV and NUD_NADV, or the expiration of a timer.
      The other possible input to consider is 'any other packet', which
      could generate changes to states belonging to the same forwarding
      or non-forwarding class as the original state (i.e. when 'any
      other packet' is received, the state cannot move from being
      forwarding to non-forwarding and vice versa).  A special case of
      'any other packet' is when validated RADV are received, which can
      result in the update of the SEND SAVI Prefix or Router lists.  The
      reduced set of messages being able to trigger a change simplifies
      the processing at SEND SAVI devices.
   o  DAD_NADV and NUD_NADV are only processed when they are a response
      to a DAD_NSOL or a NUD_NSOL message.
   o  ND messages are only used by SEND SAVI devices if they are valid.
      If any of the ND messages used by SEND SAVI is not valid, it is
      discarded.  SEND SAVI devices SHOULD assume that such messages
      received from Trusted ports have been validated by other SEND SAVI
      devices, so they SHOULD NOT validate them in order to reduce
      processing load at the SEND SAVI device.
   o  The only messages the SEND SAVI device is required to generate for
      SEND SAVI operation are NUD_NSOL messages.  This also simplifies
      the state machine.
   o  Well-behaved nodes are expected to initiate communication by
      sending secured DAD_NSOL messages.  The SEND SAVI state machine is
      tailored to efficiently process these events.  The reception of
      other packet types without receiving previously validated DAD_NSOL
      messages is assumed to be consequence of bad-behaving nodes or
      infrequent events (such as packet loss, a change in the topology
      connecting the switches, etc.)  While a binding will ultimately be
      created for nodes affected by such events, simplicity of the state
      machine is prioritized over any possible optimization for these
      cases.
   o  If a node has an address configured, and it can prove the
      ownership of this address, the binding is preserved regardless of
      any indication that a binding for the same source address could be
      configured in other SEND SAVI device.  Bindings for the same
      source address in two or more SEND SAVI devices may occur due to
      several reasons, for example when a host moves (the two bindings
      exist just for a short period of time), or when many nodes
      generate the same address and the DAD procedure has failed.  In
      these infrequent cases, SEND SAVI preserves connectivity for the
      resulting bindings.

   The SEND SAVI device MUST join the Solicited Node Multicast group for
   all the addresses whose state is other than NO_BIND.  This is needed



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   to make sure that the SEND SAVI device receives DAD_NSOL messages
   issued for those addresses.  Note that it may not be enough to relay
   on the IGMP messages being sent by the node attached to a Validating
   port for which a binding for the corresponding address exist, since
   the node may move and after a while, and the packets for that
   particular Solicited Node Multicast group will no longer be forwarded
   to the SEND SAVI device.

   SEND SAVI devices MUST support the processing of validated CPA
   messages, sent in reply to CPS messages, to acquire certificates used
   to validate ND messages.  In order to process a CPA message received
   from a Validating port, an entry for the source address of the
   message MUST exist in the SEND SAVI Data Base.  CPA messages received
   from Trusted ports are always checked and processed.

   SEND SAVI devices MUST use validated RADV messages to update the SEND
   SAVI Prefix list and the SEND SAVI Router list.  SEND SAVI devices
   MAY only consider for this purpose (updating SEND SAVI Prefix and
   Router lists) RADV messages addressed to either its own IPv6 address
   or to the all-nodes multicast address.  Validated RADV messages
   received from Trusted ports MUST be used to update accordingly the
   SEND SAVI Prefix and Router lists in the SEND SAVI device.  Validated
   RADV messages received from Validating ports MUST be processed
   according to the specific rules defined in the state machine for
   local traffic processing.  In short, RADV messages received from
   Validating ports are only processed for updating the SEND SAVI Router
   and Prefix lists if a binding for the source IPv6 address of the RADV
   message is in a forwarding state.

   In order to determine which traffic is on-link and off-link, the SEND
   SAVI device MUST support discovery of this information from the
   Prefix Information option with the L set bit set of validated RADV
   messages.  In this case, at least one router MUST be configured to
   advertise RADV messages containing a Prefix Information option with
   the prefixes that the untrusted nodes can use as source addresses,
   and the bit L set.  An alternative to this is to configure manually
   the SEND SAVI prefix list.

   We next describe how different inputs are processed depending on the
   state of the binding of the IP address 'IPaddr'.

   A simplified version is depicted in the next figure (note that every
   ND message is assumed to be validated according to SEND
   specification):







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                          +-------------+
                          |             |
                          | TESTING_VP' |
                          |             |
                          +-------------+
                             |    ^
            Timeout / VP=VP' |    |
                VP_NUD_NADV  |    |  VP'_DAD_NSOL/
                             |    |    NUD_NSOL
                             |    |
                             v    |
          VP_DAD_NSOL      +--------+
            +------------- |        |
            |              | VALID  |< -------------------+
            |   +-------- >|        |                     |
            |   |          +--------+                     |
            |   |            ^    |                       |
            |   |    VP_NUD_ |    | Timeout,              |
            |   |     NADV/- |    | TP_DAD_NSOL/NUD_NSOL  |
            |   |            |    v                       |
            |   |         +------------+                  |
            |   |         |            |                  |
            |   |         | TESTING_VP |                  |
            |   |         |            |                  |
            |   |         +------------+                  |
            |   |              |                          |
            |   |              | Timeout                  |
            |   | VP*,         |                          |
            |   | Timeout/-    |              VP_NUD_NADV |
            v   |              |                          |
         +---------------+     |           +---------------+
         |               |     |           |               |
         | TENTATIVE_DAD |     |           | TENTATIVE_NUD |
         |               |     |           |               |
         +---------------+     |           +---------------+
            ^  |               |             |         ^
            |  |               |   Timeout/- |         |
            |  | TP_DAD_NSOL,  |             |         |
            |  | TP_DAD_NADV/- |             |         |
            |  |               v             |         |
            |  |           +---------+       |         |
            |  +--------- >|         |< -----+         |
            |              | NO_BIND |                 |
            +--------------|         |-----------------+
            VP_DAD_NSOL/-  +---------+    VP*/VP_NUD_NSOL


                Simplified SEND SAVI state machine



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   NO_BIND

   When the node is in this state, there are no unresolved DAD_NSOL or
   NUD_NSOL messages (generated by SEND SAVI), so the only relevant
   inputs are DAD_NSOL messages coming either from a Validating port
   (VP) or Trusted port (TP), or any packet other than DAD_NSOL coming
   from VP or TP.  There are no timers configured for this state.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL message is received from a Validating port VP, the
      SEND SAVI device checks for its validity.  If the message is not
      valid, it MUST be discarded.  If the message is valid, then the
      SEND SAVI device forwards this message to all appropriate Trusted
      ports (the subset of Trusted ports which belong to the forwarding
      layer-2 topology, with the restrictions imposed by the MLD
      snooping mechanism, if applied).  DAD_NSOL messages are not sent
      through any of the ports configured as Validating Ports.  The SEND
      SAVI device sets the LIFETIME to TENT_LT, stores all the
      information required for future validation of the corresponding
      DAD_NADV message (such as the nonce of the message), creates a new
      entry in the SEND SAVI Data Base for IPaddr, sets BINDING_ANCHOR
      to VP, and changes the state to TENTATIVE_DAD.  Creation time is
      set to the current value of the local clock.
      Note that in this case it is not possible to check address
      ownership by sending a NUD_NSOL because while the node is waiting
      for a possible DAD_NADV its address is in tentative state and the
      node cannot respond to NSOL messages [RFC4862].
   o  If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL is received through a
      Validating port VP, the SEND SAVI device issues a secured NUD_NSOL
      through port VP.  The SEND SAVI device sets the LIFETIME to
      TENT_LT.  The SEND SAVI device creates a new entry in the SEND
      SAVI Data Base for IPaddr, sets BINDING_ANCHOR to VP, and the
      state is changed to TENTATIVE_NUD.  Creation time is set to the
      current value of the local clock.  The SAVI device MAY discard the
      packet while the DAD procedure is being executed, or MAY store it
      in order to send it if the next transitions are (strictly)
      TENTATIVE_NUD and then VALID.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL message containing IPaddr as the target address is
      received through a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI device SHOULD
      assume that the message has been validated.  This message MUST NOT
      be forwarded through any of the Validating ports but they it is
      sent through the proper Trusted ports (as defined by the switch
      behavior that will depend on whether it performs MLD snooping or
      not).  The state is not changed.
   o  Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL received from a Trusted port is
      forwarded to its destination.  This packet is assumed to come from
      a SEND SAVI device that has securely validated the binding
      according to SEND SAVI rules (unless the SEND SAVI perimeter has
      been breached).  The state is not changed.




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   TENTATIVE_DAD

   To arrive to this state, the SEND SAVI device has received a
   validated DAD_NSOL coming from the BINDING_ANCHOR port and it has
   forwarded it to the appropriate TPs.  The relevant events occurring
   in this state are: the reception of a DAD_NADV message from a TP, a
   DAD_NSOL message from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, other Validating port
   or TP, a data packet from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, and the expiration
   of the LIFETIME timer initiated when the DAD_NSOL was received at
   port the BINDING_ANCHOR port.
   o  If a DAD_NADV is received from a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI
      device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated.  The
      reception of a valid DAD_NADV message indicates that the binding
      cannot be configured for the BINDING_ANCHOR port.  The state is
      changed to NO_BIND, and the LIFETIME cleared.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI
      device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated.  The
      reception of a valid DAD_NSOL indicates that a node connected to
      another SEND SAVI device may be trying to configure the same
      address at the same time.  The DAD_NSOL message is forwarded to
      the BINDING_ANCHOR port, so that the node at this port will not
      configure the address, as stated in [RFC4862].  The DAD_NSOL
      message is also forwarded to all appropriate Trusted ports.  Then,
      the LIFETIME is cleared, and the state is changed to NO_BIND.
   o  Any packet other than a validated DAD_NSOL or DAD_NADV received
      from a Trusted port is forwarded to its destination.  This packet
      is assumed to come from a SEND SAVI device that has securely
      validated the binding according to SEND SAVI rules (unless the
      SEND SAVI perimeter has been breached).  The state is not changed.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Validating port VP' different the
      BINDING_ANCHOR port, the SEND SAVI device checks for its validity.
      If the message is not valid, it MUST be discarded.  The reception
      of a valid DAD_NSOL from port VP' indicates that a node connected
      to VP' may be trying to configure the same address at the same
      time.  The DAD_NSOL message is forwarded to the BINDING_ANCHOR
      port, so that the node at this port will not configure the
      address, as stated in [RFC4862].  The DAD_NSOL message is also
      forwarded to all appropriate Trusted ports.  Then, the
      BINDING_ANCHOR is set to VP' (through which the DAD_NSOL message
      was received), the LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT, and the state
      remains in TENTATIVE_DAD.
   o  Any other packet than a validated DAD_NSOL is received from a
      Validating port VP' different from the BINDING_ANCHOR port is
      discarded.  The state is not changed.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, the SEND
      SAVI device checks for its validity.  If the message is not valid,
      it MUST be discarded.  If the DAD_NSOL message is valid, the
      LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT, and the state remains in



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      TENTATIVE_DAD.
   o  If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL is received from the
      BINDING_ANCHOR port, it is assumed that the node has configured
      its address, although it has done it in less time than expected by
      the SEND SAVI device (less than TENT_LT).  Since the node proved
      address ownership by means of the validated DAD_NSOL message, the
      LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID.
      A particular case occur if the packet received is a RADV message.
      The RADV message is checked for validity, and it is discarded if
      it is not valid (and the LIFETIME is not changed, and the state
      remains in TENTATIVE_DAD).  If it is valid, the message is
      forwarded to the appropriate Trusted ports.  In addition, either
      an entry for this IPv6 source address in the SEND SAVI Router List
      is created, or the LIFETIME of an existing entry is updated with
      the information received in this message.  The SEND SAVI Prefix
      list MUST also be updated according to the content of the RADV
      message.  The SEND SAVI device MAY not process (although it MUST
      forward them) RADV messages addressed to destinations other than
      the all-nodes multicast address or to the IPv6 address of the SEND
      SAVI device.
   o  If LIFETIME expires, it is assumed that no other node has
      configured this address.  Therefore, the Validating port VP
      (currently stored in the BINDING_ANCHOR) could be bound to this
      IPv6 address.  The LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT, and the state is
      changed to VALID.

   VALID

   To arrive to this state, successful validation of address ownership
   has been completed and a binding for IPaddr has been created.
   Relevant transitions for this state are triggered by the reception of
   DAD_NSOL from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, other Validating port or a TP,
   and any packet other than DAD_NSOL from other validating port than
   the BINDING_ANCHOR or a TP.  The expiration of LIFETIME is also
   relevant to trigger a check for address ownership for the node at the
   BINDING_ANCHOR port.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address is received through
      the BINDING_ANCHOR port, the message is checked for validity.  If
      the message is not valid, it MUST be discarded.  If the message is
      valid, it is forwarded to the appropriate Trusted ports.  The
      LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT and the state is changed to
      TENTATIVE_DAD.
   o  Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL containing IPaddr as a source
      address arriving from the BINDING_ANCHOR port is forwarded
      appropriately.  The state is not changed.
      A particular case occur if the packet received is a RADV message.
      The RADV message is checked for validity, and it is discarded if
      it is not valid.  If it is valid, the message is forwarded to the



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      appropriate Trusted ports.  In addition, either an entry for this
      IPv6 source address in the SEND SAVI Router List is created, or
      the lifetime of an existing entry is updated with the information
      received in this message.  The SEND SAVI Prefix list MUST also be
      updated according to the content of the RADV message.  The SEND
      SAVI device MAY not process (although it MUST forward) RADV
      messages addressed to destinations other than the all-nodes
      multicast address or to the IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address is received through a
      Trusted port, the SEND SAVI device SHOULD assume that the message
      has been validated.  The message is forwarded to VP.  The LIFETIME
      is set to TENT_LT, a secured NUD_NSOL message is sent to IPaddr
      through VP and the state is changed to TESTING_VP.
   o  If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address
      is received through a Trusted port, the packet is forwarded to VP
      and to other appropriate Trusted ports.  A secured NUD_NSOL is
      sent to the BINDING_ANCHOR port, the LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT,
      and the state is changed to TESTING_VP.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL packet with IPaddr as source address is received
      through a Validating Port VP' (VP' different from the current
      BINDING ANCHOR), the SEND SAVI device checks for its validity.  If
      the message is not valid, it MUST be discarded.  If the message is
      valid, the message is forwarded to the BINDING_ANCHOR port.  In
      addition, a secured NUD_NSOL is sent to BINDING_ANCHOR port, the
      ALTERNATIVE BINDING ANCHOR is set to port VP' (for future use if
      the node at VP' is finally selected), the LIFETIME is set to
      TENT_LT, and the state is changed to TESTING_VP'.
   o  If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address
      is received from a Validating port VP', different from the current
      BINDING_ANCHOR for this binding, VP, the packet is discarded.  The
      SEND SAVI device MAY issue a secured NUD_NSOL through the
      BINDING_ANCHOR port, store VP' in the ALTERNATIVE BINDING ANCHOR
      for possible future use, set the LIFETIME to TENT_LT, and change
      the state to TESTING_VP'.  An alternative to this behavior is that
      the SEND SAVI device MAY not do anything (in this case, the state
      would eventually change after a maximum DEFAULT_LT time, if the
      node at VP does not respond to a NUD_NSOL at TESTING_VP, the state
      is moved to NO_BIND).  Then a packet arriving from VP' would
      trigger a process that may end up with binding for the node
      connecting to VP'.
   o  If LIFETIME expires, a secured NUD_NSOL message is sent through
      the BINDING_ANCHOR port to IPaddr, the LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT,
      and the state is changed to TESTING_VP.  In the TESTING_VP state
      packets are still being forwarded until the timer expires without
      receiving a NUD_NADV.

   TESTING_VP




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   When the SEND SAVI device enters in the TESTING_VP state, the current
   Validating port is under check through a secured NUD_NSOL message
   generated by the SEND SAVI device.  While testing, packets from the
   current Validating port are forwarded.  Packets coming from Trusted
   ports are also forwarded.  The relevant events for this state are the
   reception of a NUD_NADV message from VP, the reception of a DAD_NSOL
   message from VP, VP' or TP, the reception of any packet other than
   the previous cases from VP, VP' or TP, and the expiration of the
   timer associated to the reception of NUD_NADV.
   o  If a NUD_NADV packet is received from VP, the SEND SAVI device
      checks for its validity.  If the message is not valid, it MUST be
      discarded.  If the message is valid, the LIFETIME is changed to
      DEFAULT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID.  The message is not
      forwarded to any other port.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL message is received from VP, the SEND SAVI device
      checks for its validity.  If the message is not valid, it MUST be
      discarded.  If the message is valid, it is forwarded to the
      appropriate Trusted ports, the LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT, and
      the state is changed to TENTATIVE_DAD.
   o  If a RADV packet is received from VP, the message is checked for
      validity, and it is discarded if it is not valid.  If it is valid,
      the message is forwarded appropriately.  Either an entry for this
      IPv6 source address in the SEND SAVI Router List is created, or
      the lifetime of an existing entry is updated with the information
      received in this message.  The SEND SAVI Prefix list MUST also be
      updated according to the content of the RADV message.  The SEND
      SAVI device MAY ignore and discard RADV messages addressed to
      destinations other than the all-nodes multicast address or to the
      IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device.  The state remains in
      TESTING_VP.  Note that if the timeout expires later, while still
      in the TESTING_VP state, the entry of the SEND SAVI Router List
      will also be removed.
   o  Any packet other than DAD_NSOL or NUD_NADV containing IPaddr as a
      source address arriving from the BINDING_ANCHOR port is forwarded.
      Neither the LIFETIME nor the state are changed.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL packet is received from a Trusted port, the SEND
      SAVI device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated.
      The message is forwarded to VP and the appropriate Trusted ports.
      Neither the LIFETIME nor the state are changed.  The node at the
      BINDING_ANCHOR port is under check: if it still is at this port,
      it should answer with a NUD_NADV, and also with a DAD_NADV.  If it
      is not there, neither the NUD_NADV nor the DAD_NADV will be
      received, the timer will expire, the local state will move to
      NO_BIND, and the state at the remote node will change to VALID.
   o  If a packet other than a DAD_NSOL arrives from a Trusted port, the
      packet is forwarded.  Neither the LIFETIME nor the state are
      changed.




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   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Validating port VP' other than
      the current BINDING_ANCHOR port, the SEND SAVI device checks for
      its validity.  If the message is not valid, it MUST be discarded.
      If it is valid, the message is forwarded to the BINDING_ANCHOR
      port and to the appropriate Trusted ports.  In addition, a secured
      NUD_NSOL is sent to the BINDING_ANCHOR port, the ALTERNATIVE
      BINDING ANCHOR is set to VP' (for future use if the node at VP' is
      finally selected), the LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT, and the state
      is changed to TESTING_VP'.
   o  Any other packet received from a Validating port VP' other than
      the BINDING_ANCHOR port is discarded.  This may occur because the
      node has moved but have not issued a DAD_NSOL or the DAD_NSOL
      message has been lost.  The state will eventually move to NO_BIND,
      and then the packets sent from VP' will trigger the creation of
      the binding for VP'.
   o  If the LIFETIME expires, the LIFETIME is cleared and the state is
      changed to NO_BIND.

   TESTING_VP'

   To arrive to this state an indication that a node at VP' different
   from the BINDING_ANCHOR port wants to send data with IPaddr as source
   address occurred while a binding existed for VP.  The port VP' which
   triggered the change of the state to TESTING_VP' was stored at the
   ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ACNHOR, so that it can be retrieved if the node
   at VP' is determined as the legitimate owner of IPaddr.  The SEND
   SAVI device has issued a NUD_NSOL to IPaddr through the
   BINDING_ANCHOR port.  The relevant events that may occur in this case
   are the reception of a NUD_NADV from port VP (the BINDING_ANCHOR
   port), the reception of DAD_NSOL from VP, VP', TP and VP" (VP"
   different from VP and VP'), the reception of any other packet from
   VP, VP', TP or VP", and the expiration of the timer.
   o  If a NUD_NADV is received from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, the SEND
      SAVI device checks for its validity.  If the message is not valid,
      it MUST be discarded.  The reception of a valid NUD_NADV indicates
      that the node at VP is defending its address.  The BINDING_ANCHOR
      in use is kept, the LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT, and the state
      is changed to VALID.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, the SEND
      SAVI device checks for its validity.  If the message is not valid,
      it MUST be discarded.  If the message is valid, it is forwarded to
      VP' (the port stored in the ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR).  The
      BINDING_ANCHOR in use is kept, the LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT and
      the state is changed to TENTATIVE_DAD.  When the DAD_NSOL message
      is received by the node at VP', this node is expected to
      unconfigure its address.





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   o  If a RADV message is received from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, it is
      checked for validity, and it is discarded if it is not valid.  If
      it is valid, the message is forwarded appropriately.  Either an
      entry for this IPv6 source address in the SEND SAVI Router List is
      created, or the lifetime of an existing entry is updated with the
      information received in this message.  The SEND SAVI Prefix list
      MUST also be updated according to the content of the RADV message.
      The SEND SAVI device MAY ignore and discard RADV messages
      addressed to destinations other than the all-nodes multicast
      address or to the IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device.  The state
      remains in TESTING_VP' and the LIFETIME is left unchanged.  Note
      that if the timeout expires later, while still in the TESTING_VP'
      state, the entry of the SEND SAVI Router List will also be
      removed.
   o  Any packet other than a validated DAD_NSOL, a validated NUD_NADV
      or a validated RADV coming from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, is
      forwarded, and the state is not changed.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from the port stored in the
      ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR, the SEND SAVI device checks for its
      validity.  If the message is not valid, it MUST be discarded.  If
      the message is valid, it is forwarded to the BINDING_ANCHOR port.
      The BINDING_ANCHOR and the ALTERNATIVE BINDING ANCHOR are kept,
      the LIFETIME is set to DEFAULT_LT, and the state is not changed.
   o  Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL coming from the
      ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR port is discarded, and the state is not
      changed.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from port VP", different from
      BINDING_ANCHOR and the ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR ports, the SEND
      SAVI device checks for its validity.  If the message is not valid,
      it MUST be discarded.  If the message is valid, it is forwarded to
      the BINDING_ANCHOR and the ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR ports.  The
      node at ALTERNATIVE BINDING ANCHOR port is expected to unconfigure
      its address if the message triggering the transition to this state
      was a DAD_NSOL message received from the
      ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR port (and not any other packet).  The
      state remains in TESTING_VP' although VP" is stored in the
      ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR for future use if the node at VP" is
      finally selected.  The LIFETIME is not changed.
   o  Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL received from port VP" is
      discarded and does not affect to the state.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI
      device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated.  Then,
      the message is forwarded to the BINDING_ANCHOR and the
      ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR ports and other appropriate Trusted
      ports.  The LIFETIME is left unchanged and the state is changed to
      TESTING_VP.  The node at the ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR port is
      expected to unconfigure its address if the packet triggering the
      transition to this state was a DAD_NSOL message received from the



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      ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR port.
   o  Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL coming from a Trusted port is
      forwarded appropriately, but the state is not changed.
   o  If LIFETIME expires, it is assumed that the node for which the
      binding existed is no longer connected through the BINDING_ANCHOR
      port.  Therefore, the BINDING_ANCHOR is set to the
      ALTERNATIVE_BINDING_ANCHOR port value.  The LIFETIME is set to
      DEFAULT_LT and the state is changed to VALID.

   TENTATIVE_NUD

   To arrive to this state, a data packet has been received through the
   BINDING_ANCHOR port without any existing binding in the SEND SAVI
   device.  The SEND SAVI device has sent a NUD_NSOL message to the
   BINDING_ANCHOR port.  The relevant events for this case are the
   reception of a NUD_NADV from port the BINDING_ANCHOR port; the
   reception of DAD_NSOL from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, other VP
   different from the BINDING_ANCHOR port, or a TP; and the reception of
   any packet other than DAD_NSOL and NUD_NADV from the BINDING_ANCHOR
   port, and other than DAD_NSOL for other VP different than the
   BINDING_ANCHOR port, or TP.  In addition, the LIFETIME may expire.
   o  If a NUD_NADV message is received through the BINDING_ANCHOR port,
      the SEND SAVI device checks for its validity.  If the message is
      not valid, it MUST be discarded.  If the message is valid, the
      LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID.
      The message is not forwarded to any port.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL message is received through the BINDING_ANCHOR port,
      the SEND SAVI device checks for its validity.  If the message is
      not valid, it MUST be discarded.  If the message is valid, it is
      forwarded to the appropriate Trusted ports, the LIFETIME is set to
      TENT_LT and the state is changed to TENTATIVE_DAD.
   o  Any packet other than NUD_NADV or DAD_NSOL received through the
      BINDING_ANCHOR port is discarded.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL message is received through port VP' different from
      the BINDING_ANCHOR port, the SEND SAVI device checks for its
      validity.  If the message is not valid, it MUST be discarded.  If
      the message is valid, it is forwarded to the appropriate Trusted
      ports, the LIFETIME is set to TENT_LT, the BINDING_ANCHOR is set
      to VP', and the state is changed to TENTATIVE_DAD.
   o  Any packet other than DAD_NSOL received through port VP' MUST NOT
      be forwarded unless the next state for the binding is VALID.  The
      packets received MAY be discarded or MAY be stored for being sent
      if the state changes later to VALID.  The state is left unchanged.
   o  If a DAD_NSOL message is received through a Trusted port, the SEND
      SAVI device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated.
      The message is forwarded to the BINDING_ANCHOR port, and the state
      is left unchanged.




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   o  Any other packet received from a Trusted port is forwarded
      appropriately.  This packet may come from a SEND SAVI device that
      has securely validated the attachment of the node to its
      Validating port according to SEND SAVI rules.  The state is left
      unchanged.
   o  If LIFETIME expires, the LIFETIME is cleared and the state is
      changed to NO_BIND.

3.4.  SEND SAVI Port Configuration Guidelines

   The detailed guidelines for port configuration in SEND SAVI devices
   are:
   o  Ports that are connected to another SEND SAVI devices SHOULD be
      configured as Trusted ports.  Not doing so will increase
      significantly the CPU time, memory consumption and signaling
      traffic due to SEND SAVI validation, in both the SEND SAVI devices
      and the node whose address is being validated.
   o  Ports connected to hosts SHOULD be configured as Validating ports.
      Not doing so will allow the host connected to that port to send
      packets with spoofed source address.
   o  No more than one host SHOULD be connected to each port.  Not doing
      so will allow hosts to generate packets with the same source
      address as the other hosts connected to the same port, and will
      allow performing replaying attacks as described in Section 4.1.
   o  Ports connected to routers SHOULD be configured as Validating
      ports.  However, the SEND SAVI specification also allows the
      routers to be connected to Trusted ports, as they are assumed to
      be part of the trusted infrastructure.  When connected through a
      Trusted port, a router can generate traffic with any source
      address, even those belonging to the link, while when connected
      through a Validating port it can only send traffic using off-link
      source addresses, or its own source addresses.  When routers are
      connected to Validating, authorization for the routing function is
      bound to the binding anchor of the router itself, instead of being
      bound to a port configured in a switch.
   o  Ports connected to a chain of one or more legacy switches that
      have other SEND SAVI devices but had no routers or hosts attached
      to them SHOULD be configured as Trusted ports.  Not doing so will
      significantly increase the memory consumption in the SEND SAVI
      devices and increase the signaling traffic due to SEND SAVI
      validation.

3.5.  VLAN Support

   In the case the SEND SAVI device is a switch that supports customer
   VLANs [IEEE.802-1Q.2005], the SEND SAVI implementation MUST behave as
   if there was one SEND SAVI process per customer VLAN.  The SEND SAVI
   process of each customer VLAN will store the binding information



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   corresponding the nodes attached to that particular customer VLAN.

3.6.  Protocol Constants

   TENT_LT is 500 milliseconds.

   DEFAULT_LT is 5 minutes.


4.  Security Considerations

   SEND SAVI is defined to operate only with validated SEND messages.
   The interaction in a mixed scenario comprising SEND and non-SEND
   devices should be addressed in other document.  However, nodes MUST
   NOT assume that all SEND messages received from a SEND SAVI device
   are validated, since these devices only validate the messages
   strictly required for SEND SAVI operation.  Among the number of
   messages which are not validated, we can name NUD_NSOL messages
   generated by other nodes and its responses, or RSOL messages.

   SEND SAVI improves protection compared to conventional SAVI, as a
   result of the increased ability of SEND nodes to prove address
   ownership.

   A critical security consideration regarding to SEND SAVI deals with
   the need of proper configuration of the roles of the ports in a SEND
   SAVI deployment scenario.  Regarding to security, the main
   requirement is that ports defining the protected perimeter SHOULD be
   configured as Validating ports.  Not doing so will generate security
   breaches through which an attacker could send packets using any
   source address, regardless of the bindings established in other SEND
   SAVI devices.

4.1.  Protection Against Replay Attacks

   One possible concern about SEND SAVI is its behavior when an attacker
   tries to forge the identity of a legitimate node by replaying SEND
   messages used by the SEND SAVI specification.  An attacker could
   replay any of these messages to interfere with SEND SAVI operation,
   for example, it could replay a DAD_NSOL message to abort the
   configuration of an address for a legitimate node and to gain the
   right to use the address for LIFETIME_LT seconds.  We now discuss the
   risks of such replay attacks and the protection provided by SEND
   SAVI.

   To perform a security analysis of such SEND SAVI reply attacks, we
   have to consider two different cases:




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   o  When the SEND message replayed is used to create or update binding
      information for SEND SAVI, since the port through which this
      message is received is key to SEND SAVI operation.  SEND SAVI
      creates and maintains bindings as a result of the reception of
      DAD_NSOL messages and of the exchange of NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV
      messages.
   o  When the SEND message replayed does not result in the update of
      binding information for SEND SAVI, and thus it is not related to
      the specific port through which it was received.  Such situations
      are the reception of CPA messages containing certificates, and the
      processing of an RADV message coming from a Trusted port, which
      can be used in SEND SAVI to populate the SEND SAVI Prefix list.
      In this tow cases, the security risks are equivalent to those of
      SEND operation, i.e. we can consider that the information will not
      be changed by its legitimate sender for the time during which the
      SEND specification allows replaying (which depends on the values
      of TIMESTAMP_FUZZ and TIMESTAMP_DRIFT, [RFC3971]).
      A special case is the processing of a RADV message coming from a
      Validating port.  Although part of the information obtained (the
      router condition of the node connecting to the port) is
      (indirectly) associated to the binding, the replay of this RADV
      message does not provide an advantage to an attacker.  This is so
      because SEND SAVI requires a binding to exist (between the IPv6
      address and the port of the SEND SAVI device) prior to consider
      the RADV message, so protecting the creation of the binding also
      protects the ability of an attacker to become a router.

   We now discuss the protection provided by SEND SAVI against the
   replay of messages used to create or update bindig information, i.e.
   the replay of DAD_NSOL and NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV messages.  In this case,
   protection results from requiring a one-to-one correspondence between
   SEND SAVI ports and nodes connected to the link Section 3.4, and
   careful filtering when transmitting the messages involved in SEND
   SAVI operation.  Note that if many nodes are attached to the SEND
   SAVI Validating port, any of them can generate packets with the
   legitimate source address of any other node (defeating the source
   address validation ability of SEND SAVI).  Moreover, any of these
   nodes may interfere with the communication capacity of the legitimate
   node in many ways, as it is considered next.  Assume two nodes H1 and
   H2 are connected to switch A, not enabled for SEND SAVI operation,
   which accesses to the SEND SAVI protection perimeter through port 1.
   H1 is switched off.  Node H2 knows IP1, the address H1 will configure
   when it switches on, so H2 subscribes to the Solicited Node of IP1
   address.  Although H2 cannot generate a valid SEND message for H1's
   address, when H1 switches on, H2 receives the DAD_NSOL issued by H1,
   and replays it in a time shorter than the time required to invalidate
   the SEND message.  When H1 receives a valid DAD_NSOL message for its
   own address, it stops its address configuration process for IP1.  The



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   SEND SAVI device receives this second message, but it has no way to
   know that the message has been issued by a different node, so it
   forwards it.  After TENT_LT time, the binding is configured in the
   SEND SAVI device, and H2 can use IP1 for DEFAULT_LT time.
   Alternatively, the SEND SAVI binding could also be configured in a
   different port, provided that there exists a host H3 connected to
   that port which receives from H2 (using a tunnel, to prevent the
   processing from a SEND SAVI device) the DAD_NSOL message legitimately
   issued by H1.



                    +---------+            |
                    |  SEND   |            | +--+
                    |  SAVI   2--------------|H3|
                    +----1----+            | +--+
                         |                 |
      ----SEND SAVI PROTECTION PERIMETER---+
                         |
                    +---------+
                    |SWITCH A |
                    +---------+
                     |      |
                    +--+  +--+
                    |H1|  |H2|
                    +--+  +--+


   If the traffic generated by a node cannot be captured before arriving
   to the SEND SAVI protection perimeter, the protection provided by
   SEND SAVI is the following:
   o  To prevent the replay of DAD_NSOL messages, SEND SAVI devices only
      forward them to ports for which a binding to the address being
      tested by the DAD_NSOL message existed.  Therefore, it is not
      enough for an attacker to subscribe to a Solicited Node address to
      receive DAD_NSOL messages sent to that address, but the attacker
      needs to generate a valid DAD_NSOL message associated to the
      address for which the binding is being tested, which is deemed
      unfeasible [RFC3971].
   o  Protection against the replay of NUD_NSOL and NUD_NADV messages
      results from the protocol specification, as discussed next.  If
      each node is attached directly to a SEND SAVI switch, an attacker
      will never receive NUD_NADV messages issued by other hosts, so
      these message cannot be replayed.  Then, an attacker may try to
      use NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV messages issued by its switch to try to
      create a binding for the IP address of its switch.  If this were
      possible, the attacker could launch a man-in-the-middle attack by
      which it could impersonate other nodes in the link by relaying



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      NUD_NSOL requests from is SAVI device to the legitimate nodes
      (provided that it is allowed to use the IP address of the switch
      as source address), and NUD_NADV messages from the nodes to the
      local switch.  To try to create a binding for the address of the
      SEND SAVI switch, IPs1, by replaying NUD messages, H1 starts using
      IPs1 as source address for a data packet.  S1 issues a NUD_NSOL
      message for IPs1.  H1 replays to S1 the message as received,
      setting its own MAC address as source address, and the switch MAC
      address as destination address.  If S1 assumes that the NUD
      request is legitimate, it could answer with a NUD_NADV that would
      replayed by H1.  This NUD_NADV would be valid, and would match
      with the NUD_NSOL initially issued by S1 to test address IPs1 in
      the considered port, so it may trigger the creation of a binding
      for IPs1.  Fortunately, this is not possible, because H1 cannot
      create the binding for IPs1 in port 1: when H1 replays with the
      same NUD_NSOL issued by IPs1, the switch discards the packet
      before processing it because it does not already exist a binding
      for IPs1.  In general, a switch receiving a replayed NUD message
      that was issued by a switch (either itself, or another switch),
      discards it because there is no previous binding created for it.



                   +---------+
                   |  SEND   |
                   |  SAVI   |
                   | S1,IPs1 |
                   +---------+
                     |      |
      ----SEND SAVI PROTECTION PERIMETER----+
                     |      |
                     |      |
                    +--+  +--+
                    |H1|  |H2|
                    +--+  +--+


4.2.  Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks

   The attacks against the SAVI device basically consist on making the
   SEND SAVI device to consume its resource until it runs out of them,
   or to slow CPU operation.  For instance, a possible attack would be
   to create state for different addresses in order to waste memory.  At
   some point the SEND SAVI device runs out of memory and it needs to
   decide how to react in this situation.  The result is that some form
   of garbage collection is needed to prune the entries.  It is
   RECOMMENDED that when the SEND SAVI device runs out of the memory
   allocated for the SEND SAVI Data Base, it creates new entries by



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   deleting the entries which Creation Time is higher.  This implies
   that older entries are preserved and newer entries overwrite each
   other.  In an attack scenario where the attacker sends a batch of
   data packets with different source address, each new source address
   is likely to rewrite another source address created by the attack
   itself.  It should be noted that entries are also garbage collected
   using the LIFETIME, which is updated by NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV exchange.
   The result is that in order for an attacker to actually fill the SAVI
   DB with false source addresses, it needs to continuously answer to
   NUD_NSOL for all the different source addresses, in order for the
   entries to grow old and compete with the legitimate entries.  The
   result is that the cost of the attack for the attacker is highly
   increased.

   In addition, it is also RECOMMENDED that a SEND SAVI device reserves
   a minimum amount of memory for each available port (in the case where
   the port is used as part of the L2 anchor).  The recommended minimum
   is the memory needed to store 4 bindings associated to the port.  The
   motivation for this recommendation is as follows: an attacker
   attached to a given port of a SEND SAVI device may attempt to launch
   a DoS attack towards the SEND SAVI device by creating many bindings
   for different addresses.  It can do so, by sending DAD_NSOL for
   different addresses.  The result is that the attack will consume all
   the memory available in the SEND SAVI device.  The above
   recommendation aims to reserve a minimum amount of memory per port,
   so that nodes located in different ports can make use of the reserved
   memory for their port even if a DoS attack is occurring in a
   different port.

   As the SEND SAVI device may store data packets while the address is
   being verified, the memory for data packet storage may also be a
   target of DoS attacks.  The effects of such attacks may be limited to
   the lack of capacity to store new data packets.  The effect of such
   attack will be then that data packets will be dropped during the
   verification period.  A SEND SAVI device MUST limit the amount of
   memory used to store data packets, allowing the other functions to
   have available memory even in the case of an attacks as the above
   described.

   It is worth to note that the potential of Denial of Service attacks
   against the SEND SAVI network is increased due to the use of costly
   cryptographic operations in order to validate the address of the
   nodes.  An attacker could generate packets using new source addresses
   in order to make the closest SEND SAVI device spend CPU time to
   validate DAD_NSOL messages or to generate a secure NUD_NSOL.  This
   attack can be used to drain CPU resources of SEND SAVI devices with a
   very low cost for the attacker.  In order to solve this problem,
   rate-limiting the processing of packets which may trigger SEND SAVI



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   events SHOULD be enforced in a per-port basis.

4.3.  Residual threats

   SEND SAVI assumes that a host will be able to defend its address when
   the DAD procedure is executed for its addresses, and that it will
   answer to a NUD_NSOL with a NUD_NADV when required.  This is needed,
   among other things, to support mobility within a link (i.e. to allow
   a host to detach and reconnect to a different Layer_2 anchor of the
   same IP subnetwork, without changing its IP address).  If the SEND
   SAVI device does not see the DAD_NADV or the NUD_NADV, it may grant
   the binding to a different binding anchor.  This means that if an
   attacker manages to prevent a host from defending its source address,
   it will be able to destroy the existing binding and create a new one,
   with a different binding anchor.  An attacker may do so for example
   by launching a DoS attack to the host that will prevent it to issue
   proper replies.

4.4.  Privacy considerations

   Personally identifying information MUST NOT be included in the SEND
   SAVI DB with the MAC address as the canonical example, except when
   there is an attempt of attack involved.  Moreover, compliant
   implementation MUST NOT log binding anchor information except where
   there is an identified reason why that information is likely to be
   involved in detection, prevention or tracing of actual source address
   spoofing.  Information that is not logged MUST be deleted as soon as
   possible (i.e. as soon as the state for a given address is back to
   NO_BIND).  Information about the majority of hosts that never spoof
   SHOULD NOT be logged.


5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.


6.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Jean-Michel Combes and Ana Kukec for their review and
   comments on this document.  The text has also benefited from feedback
   provided by Tony Cheneau.

   Marcelo Bagnulo is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project
   supported by the European Commission under its Seventh Framework
   Program.





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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
              Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [I-D.ietf-savi-framework]
              Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt,
              "Source Address Validation Improvement Framework",
              draft-ietf-savi-framework-06 (work in progress),
              January 2012.

   [RFC6434]  Jankiewicz, E., Loughney, J., and T. Narten, "IPv6 Node
              Requirements", RFC 6434, December 2011.

   [IEEE.802-1Q.2005]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
              Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks /
              Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks", IEEE Standard
              802.1Q, May 2005.











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Authors' Addresses

   Marcelo Bagnulo
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   Av. Universidad 30
   Leganes, Madrid  28911
   SPAIN

   Phone: 34 91 6248814
   Email: marcelo@it.uc3m.es
   URI:   http://www.it.uc3m.es


   Alberto Garcia-Martinez
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   Av. Universidad 30
   Leganes, Madrid  28911
   SPAIN

   Phone: 34 91 6248782
   Email: alberto@it.uc3m.es
   URI:   http://www.it.uc3m.es





























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