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Versions: (draft-arkko-send-ndopt) 00 01 03 04 05 06 RFC 3971

Secure Neighbor Discovery Working                      J. Arkko (Editor)
Group                                                           Ericsson
Internet-Draft                                                  J. Kempf
Expires: October 12, 2004                 DoCoMo Communications Labs USA
                                                           B. Sommerfeld
                                                        Sun Microsystems
                                                                 B. Zill
                                                               Microsoft
                                                             P. Nikander
                                                                Ericsson
                                                          April 13, 2004



                    SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
                        draft-ietf-send-ndopt-05


Status of this Memo


   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.


   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
   www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.


   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2004.


Copyright Notice


   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.


Abstract


   IPv6 nodes use the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) to discover
   other nodes on the link, to determine the link-layer addresses of
   other nodes on the link, to find routers, and to maintain
   reachability information about the paths to active neighbors. If not
   secured, NDP is vulnerable to various attacks.  This document




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   specifies security mechanisms for NDP. Unlike to the original NDP
   specifications, these mechanisms do not make use of IPsec.


Table of Contents


   1.    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
         1.1   Specification of Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.    Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.    Neighbor and Router Discovery Overview . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.    Secure Neighbor Discovery Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.    Neighbor Discovery Protocol Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
         5.1   CGA Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
               5.1.1 Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . 12
               5.1.2 Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . 13
               5.1.3 Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
         5.2   Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
               5.2.1 Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . 16
               5.2.2 Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . 17
               5.2.3 Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
               5.2.4 Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 19
         5.3   Timestamp and Nonce options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
               5.3.1 Timestamp Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
               5.3.2 Nonce Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
               5.3.3 Processing rules for senders . . . . . . . . . . 21
               5.3.4 Processing rules for receivers . . . . . . . . . 22
   6.    Authorization Delegation Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
         6.1   Certificate Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
               6.1.1 Router Authorization Certificate Profile . . . . 25
         6.2   Certificate Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
               6.2.1 Delegation Chain Solicitation Message Format . . 28
               6.2.2 Delegation Chain Advertisement Message Format  . 30
               6.2.3 Trust Anchor Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
               6.2.4 Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
               6.2.5 Processing Rules for Routers . . . . . . . . . . 35
               6.2.6 Processing Rules for Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . 36
   7.    Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
         7.1   CGAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
         7.2   Redirect Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
         7.3   Advertised Prefixes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
         7.4   Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   8.    Transition Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
   9.    Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
         9.1   Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND  . . . . 42
         9.2   How SEND Counters Threats to NDP . . . . . . . . . . . 42
               9.2.1 Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing . . 43
               9.2.2 Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure  . . . 43
               9.2.3 Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack . . . . . 43
               9.2.4 Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks  . 44




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               9.2.5 Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
               9.2.6 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack  . . . . . . . . . 45
         9.3   Attacks against SEND Itself  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
   10.   Protocol Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
   11.   Protocol Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
   12.   IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
         Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
         Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
         Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
   A.    Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
   B.    Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
   C.    Cache Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
         Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 57







































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1. Introduction


   IPv6 defines the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) in RFCs 2461 [7]
   and 2462 [8].  Nodes on the same link use NDP to discover each
   other's presence, to determine each other's link-layer addresses, to
   find routers, and to maintain reachability information about the
   paths to active neighbors. NDP is used both by hosts and routers.
   Its functions include Neighbor Discovery (ND), Router Discovery (RD),
   Address Autoconfiguration, Address Resolution, Neighbor
   Unreachability Detection (NUD), Duplicate Address Detection (DAD),
   and Redirection.


   The original NDP specifications called for the use of IPsec to
   protect NDP messages. However, the RFCs do not give detailed
   instructions for using IPsec for this.  In this particular
   application, IPsec can only be used with a manual configuration of
   security associations, due to bootstrapping problems in using IKE
   [21, 16].  Furthermore, the number of such manually configured
   security associations needed for protecting NDP can be very large
   [22], making that approach impractical for most purposes.


   This document is organized as follows. Section 2 and Section 3 define
   some terminology and present a brief review of NDP, respectively.
   Section 4 describes the overall approach to securing NDP.  This
   approach involves the use of new NDP options to carry public-key
   based signatures.  A zero-configuration mechanism is used for showing
   address ownership on individual nodes; routers are certified by a
   trust anchor [10].  The formats, procedures, and cryptographic
   mechanisms for the zero-configuration mechanism are described in a
   related specification [13].


   The required new NDP options are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
   describes the mechanism for distributing certificate chains to
   establish an authorization delegation chain to a common trust anchor.


   Finally, Section 8 discusses the co-existence of secure and
   non-secure NDP on the same link and Section 9 discusses security
   considerations for Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND).


1.1 Specification of Requirements


   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
   words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and
   "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2].







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2. Terms


   Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD)


      A process through which SEND nodes can acquire a certificate chain
      from a peer node to a trust anchor.


   Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)


      A technique [13] whereby an IPv6 address of a node is
      cryptographically generated using a one-way hash function from the
      node's public key and some other parameters.


   Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)


      A mechanism which assures that two IPv6 nodes on the same link are
      not using the same address.


   Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP)


      The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol [7, 8].


      Neighbor Discovery Protocol is a part of ICMPv6 [9].


   Neighbor Discovery (ND)


      The Neighbor Discovery function of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
      (NDP).  NDP contains also other functions besides ND.


   Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD)


      A mechanism used for tracking the reachability of neighbors.


   Nonce


      An unpredictable random or pseudorandom number generated by a node
      and used exactly once. In SEND, nonces are used to assure that a
      particular advertisement is linked to the solicitation that
      triggered it.


   Router Authorization Certificate


      An X.509v3 [10] public key certificate using the profile specified
      in Section 6.1.1.


   SEND node


      An IPv6 node that implements this specification.




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   Non-SEND node


      An IPv6 node that does not implement this specification but uses
      only RFC 2461 and RFC 2462 without security.


   Router Discovery (RD)


      Router Discovery allows the hosts to discover what routers exist
      on the link, and what prefixes are available. Router Discovery is
      a part of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol.










































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3. Neighbor and Router Discovery Overview


   The Neighbor Discovery Protocol has several functions. Many of these
   functions are overloaded on a few central message types, such as the
   ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement message.  In this section we review
   some of these tasks and their effects in order to understand better
   how the messages should be treated.  This section is not normative,
   and if this section and the original Neighbor Discovery RFCs are in
   conflict, the original RFCs take precedence.


   The main functions of NDP are the following.


   o  The Router Discovery function allows IPv6 hosts to discover the
      local routers on an attached link.  Router Discovery is described
      in Section 6 of RFC 2461 [7].  The main purpose of Router
      Discovery is to find neighboring routers that are willing to
      forward packets on behalf of hosts.  Prefix discovery involves
      determining which destinations are directly on a link; this
      information is necessary in order to know whether a packet should
      be sent to a router or directly to the destination node.


   o  The Redirect function is used for automatically redirecting a host
      to a better first-hop router, or to inform hosts that a
      destination is in fact a neighbor (i.e., on-link). Redirect is
      specified in Section 8 of RFC 2461 [7].


   o  Address Autoconfiguration is used for automatically assigning
      addresses to a host [8]. This allows hosts to operate without
      explicit configuration related to IP connectivity.  The default
      autoconfiguration mechanism is stateless. To create IP addresses,
      hosts use any prefix information delivered to them during Router
      Discovery, and then test the newly formed addresses for
      uniqueness. A stateful mechanism, DHCPv6 [20], provides additional
      autoconfiguration features.


   o  Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) is used for preventing address
      collisions [8], for instance during Address Autoconfiguration.  A
      node that intends to assign a new address to one of its interfaces
      first runs the DAD procedure to verify that there is no other node
      using the same address.  Since the rules forbid the use of an
      address until it has been found unique, no higher layer traffic is
      possible until this procedure has been completed.  Thus,
      preventing attacks against DAD can help ensure the availability of
      communications for the node in question.


   o  The Address Resolution function allows a node on the link to
      resolve another node's IPv6 address to the corresponding
      link-layer address.  Address Resolution is defined in Section 7.2




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      of RFC 2461 [7], and it is used for hosts and routers alike.
      Again, no higher level traffic can proceed until the sender knows
      the link layer address of the destination node or the next hop
      router. Note the source link layer address on link layer frames is
      not checked against the information learned through Address
      Resolution.  This allows for an easier addition of network
      elements such as bridges and proxies, and eases the stack
      implementation requirements as less information needs to be passed
      from layer to layer.


   o  Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) is used for tracking the
      reachability of neighboring nodes, both hosts and routers. NUD is
      defined in Section 7.3 of RFC 2461 [7].  NUD is
      security-sensitive, because an attacker could falsely claim that
      reachability exists when it in fact does not.


   The NDP messages follow the ICMPv6 message format. All NDP functions
   are realized using the Router Solicitation (RS), Router Advertisement
   (RA), Neighbor Solicitation (NS), Neighbor Advertisement (NA), and
   Redirect messages. An actual NDP message includes an NDP message
   header, consisting of an ICMPv6 header and ND message-specific data,
   and zero or more NDP options. The NDP message options are formatted
   in the Type-Length-Value format.


                         <------------NDP Message---------------->
     *-------------------------------------------------------------*
     | IPv6 Header      | ICMPv6   | ND Message- | ND Message      |
     | Next Header = 58 | Header   | specific    | Options         |
     | (ICMPv6)         |          | data        |                 |
     *-------------------------------------------------------------*
                         <--NDP Message header-->





















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4. Secure Neighbor Discovery Overview


   To secure the various functions in NDP, a set of new Neighbor
   Discovery options is introduced.  They are used to protect NDP
   messages. This specification introduces these options, an
   authorization delegation discovery process, an address ownership
   proof mechanism, and requirements for the use of these components in
   NDP.


   The components of the solution specified in this document are as
   follows:


   o  Certificate chains, anchored on trusted parties, are expected to
      certify the authority of routers.  A host and a router must have
      at least one common trust anchor before the host can adopt the
      router as its default router.  Delegation Chain Solicitation and
      Advertisement messages are used to discover a certificate chain to
      the trust anchor without requiring the actual Router Discovery
      messages to carry lengthy certificate chains. The receipt of a
      protected Router Advertisement message for which no certificate
      chain is available triggers the authorization delegation discovery
      process.


   o  Cryptographically Generated Addresses are used to assure that the
      sender of a Neighbor Discovery message is the "owner" of the
      claimed address.  A public-private key pair is generated by all
      nodes before they can claim an address.  A new NDP option, the CGA
      option, is used to carry the public key and associated parameters.


      This specification also allows a node to use non-CGAs with
      certificates to authorize their use.  However, the details of such
      use are beyond the scope of this specification.


   o  A new NDP option, the Signature option, is used to protect all
      messages relating to Neighbor and Router discovery.


      Public key signatures protect the integrity of the messages and
      authenticate the identity of their sender.  The authority of a
      public key is established either with the authorization delegation
      process, using certificates, or through the address ownership
      proof mechanism, using CGAs, or both, depending on configuration
      and the type of the message protected.


   o  In order to prevent replay attacks, two new Neighbor Discovery
      options, Timestamp and Nonce, are introduced.  Given that Neighbor
      and Router Discovery messages are in some cases sent to multicast
      addresses, the Timestamp option offers replay protection without
      any previously established state or sequence numbers.  When the




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      messages are used in solicitation - advertisement pairs, they are
      protected using the Nonce option.


















































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5. Neighbor Discovery Protocol Options


   The options described in this section MUST be supported by all SEND
   nodes.


5.1 CGA Option


   The CGA option allows the verification of the sender's CGA. The
   format of the CGA option is described as follows.


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |   Pad Length  |   Reserved    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     .                                                               .
     .                        CGA Parameters                         .
     .                                                               .
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     .                                                               .
     .                           Padding                             .
     .                                                               .
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type


      TBD <To be assigned by IANA for CGA>.


   Length


      The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Pad Length,
      Reserved, CGA Parameters, and Padding fields) in units of 8
      octets.


   Pad Length


      The number of padding octets beyond the end of the CGA Parameters
      field but within the length specified by the Length field. Padding
      octets MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers.


   Reserved


      An 8-bit field reserved for future use.  The value MUST be
      initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the




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      receiver.


   CGA Parameters


      A variable length field containing the CGA Parameters data
      structure described in Section 4 of [13].


      This specification requires that if both the CGA option and the
      Signature option are present, then the public key found from the
      CGA Parameters field in the CGA option MUST be the public key
      referred by the Key Hash field in the Signature option.  Packets
      received with two different keys MUST be silently discarded.  Note
      that a future extension may provide a mechanism which allows the
      owner of an address and the signer to be different parties.


   Padding


      A variable length field making the option length a multiple of 8,
      containing as many octets as specified in the Pad Length field.



5.1.1 Processing Rules for Senders


   The CGA option MUST be present in all Neighbor Solicitation and
   Advertisement messages, and MUST be present in Router Solicitation
   messages unless they are sent with the unspecified source address.
   The CGA option MAY be present in other messages.


   A node sending a message using the CGA option MUST construct the
   message as follows.


   The CGA Parameter field in the CGA option is filled in according to
   the rules presented above and in [13]. The public key in the field is
   taken from the node's configuration used to generate the CGA;
   typically from a data structure associated with the source address.
   The address MUST be constructed as specified in Section 4 of [13].
   Depending on the type of the message, this address appears in
   different places:


   Redirect


      The address MUST be the source address of the message.


   Neighbor Solicitation


      The address MUST be the Target Address for solicitations sent for
      Duplicate Address Detection, and the source address of the message
      otherwise.




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   Neighbor Advertisement


      The address MUST be the source address of the message.


   Router Solicitation


      The address MUST be the source address of the message. Note that
      the CGA option is not used when the source address is the
      unspecified address.


   Router Advertisement


      The address MUST be the source address of the message.



5.1.2 Processing Rules for Receivers


   Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement messages without the CGA
   option MUST be treated as insecure, i.e., processed in the same way
   as NDP messages sent by a non-SEND node. The processing of insecure
   messages is specified in Section 8. Note that SEND nodes that do not
   attempt to interoperate with non-SEND nodes MAY simply discard the
   insecure messages.


   Router Solicitation messages without the CGA option MUST be also
   treated as insecure, unless the source address of the message is the
   unspecified address.


   A message containing a CGA option MUST be checked as follows:


      If the interface has been configured to use CGA, the receiving
      node MUST verify the source address of the packet using the
      algorithm described in Section 5 of [13].  The inputs to the
      algorithm are the claimed address, as defined in the previous
      section, and the CGA Parameters field.


      If the CGA verification is successful, the recipient proceeds with
      the cryptographically more time consuming check of the signature.
      However, even if the CGA verification succeeds, no claims about
      the validity of the use can be made, until the signature has been
      checked.


   Note that a receiver that does not support CGA or has not specified
   its use for a given interface can still verify packets using trust
   anchors, even if a CGA is used on a packet.  In such a case, the CGA
   property of the address is simply left unverified.






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5.1.3 Configuration


   All nodes that support the verification of the CGA option MUST record
   the following configuration information:


   minbits


      The minimum acceptable key length for public keys used in the
      generation of CGAs.  The default SHOULD be 1024 bits.
      Implementations MAY also set an upper limit in order to limit the
      amount of computation they need to perform when verifying packets
      that use these security associations. The upper limit SHOULD be at
      least 2048 bits. Any implementation should follow prudent
      cryptographic practice in determining the appropriate key lengths.


   minSec


      The minimum acceptable Sec value, if CGA verification is required.
      This parameter is intended to facilitate future extensions and
      experimental work.  Currently, the minSec value SHOULD always be
      set to zero.


      See Section 2 in [13].


   All nodes that support the sending of the CGA option MUST record the
   following configuration information:


   CGA parameters


      Any information required to construct CGAs, including the used Sec
      and Modifier values, and the CGA address itself.



5.2 Signature Option


   The Signature option allows public-key based signatures to be
   attached to NDP messages. Configured trust anchors, CGAs, or both are
   supported as the trusted root.  The format of the Signature option is
   described in the following diagram:













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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |           Reserved            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     |                          Key Hash                             |
     |                                                               |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     .                                                               .
     .                       Digital Signature                       .
     .                                                               .
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     .                                                               .
     .                           Padding                             .
     .                                                               .
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type


      TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Signature>.


   Length


      The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved,
      Key Hash, Digital Signature, and Padding fields) in units of 8
      octets.


   Reserved


      A 16-bit field reserved for future use.  The value MUST be
      initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the
      receiver.


   Key Hash


      A 128-bit field containing the most significant (leftmost)
      128-bits of a SHA-1 hash of the public key used for constructing
      the signature. The SHA-1 hash is taken over the presentation used
      in the Public Key field of the CGA Parameters data structure that
      is carried in the CGA option. Its purpose is to associate the
      signature to a particular key known by the receiver.  Such a key
      can be either stored in the certificate cache of the receiver, or




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      be received in the CGA option in the same message.


   Digital Signature


      A variable length field containing a PKCS#1 signature, constructed
      using the sender's private key, over the the following sequence of
      octets:


      1.  The 128-bit CGA Message Type tag [13] value for SEND, 0x086F
          CA5E 10B2 00C9 9C8C E001 6427 7C08. (The tag value has been
          generated randomly by the editor of this specification.).


      2.  The 128-bit Source Address field from the IP header.


      3.  The 128-bit Destination Address field from the IP header.


      4.  The 32-bit ICMP header.


      5.  The NDP message header.


      6.  All NDP options preceding the Signature option.


      The signature value is computed with the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
      algorithm and SHA-1 hash as defined in [14].


      This field starts after the Key Hash field.  The length of the
      Digital Signature field is determined by the length of the
      Signature option minus the length of the other fields (including
      the variable length Pad field).


   Padding


      This variable length field contains padding, as many bytes as
      remains after end of the signature.



5.2.1 Processing Rules for Senders


   Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement,
   and Redirect messages MUST contain the Signature option. Router
   Solicitation messages not sent with the unspecified source address
   MUST contain the Signature option.


   A node sending a message using the Signature option MUST construct
   the message as follows:


   o  The message is constructed in its entirety, without the Signature
      option.




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   o  The Signature option is added as the last option in the message.


   o  For the purpose of constructing a signature, the following data
      items are concatenated:


      *  The 128-bit CGA Type Tag.


      *  The source address of the message.


      *  The destination address of the message.


      *  The contents of the message, starting from the ICMPv6 header,
         up to but excluding the Signature option.


   o  The message, in the form defined above, is signed using the
      configured private key, and the resulting PKCS#1 signature is put
      to the Digital Signature field.



5.2.2 Processing Rules for Receivers


   Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement,
   and Redirect messages without the Signature option MUST be treated as
   insecure, i.e., processed in the same way as NDP messages sent by a
   non-SEND node. See Section 8.


   Router Solicitation messages without the Signature option MUST be
   also treated as insecure, unless the source address of the message is
   the unspecified address.


   A message containing a Signature option MUST be checked as follows:


   o  The receiver MUST ignore any options the come after the first
      Signature option.


   o  The Key Hash field MUST indicate the use of a known public key,
      either one learned from a preceding CGA option in the same
      message, or one known by other means.


   o  The Digital Signature field MUST have correct encoding, and not
      exceed the length of the Signature option minus the Padding.


   o  The Digital Signature verification MUST show that the signature
      has been calculated as specified in the previous section.


   o  If the use of a trust anchor has been configured, a valid
      authorization delegation chain MUST be known between the
      receiver's trust anchor and the sender's public key.




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      Note that the receiver may verify just the CGA property of a
      packet, even if, in addition to CGA, the sender has used a trust
      anchor.


   Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be silently
   discarded.  The receiver MAY also otherwise silently discard packets,
   e.g., as a response to an apparent CPU exhausting DoS attack.


5.2.3 Configuration


   All nodes that support the reception of the Signature options MUST be
   configured with the following information for each separate NDP
   message type:


   authorization method


      This parameter determines the method through which the authority
      of the sender is determined. It can have four values:


      trust anchor


         The authority of the sender is verified as described in Section
         6.1.  The sender may claim additional authorization through the
         use of CGAs, but that is neither required nor verified.


      CGA


         The CGA property of the sender's address is verified as
         described in [13]. The sender may claim additional authority
         through a trust anchor, but that is neither required nor
         verified.


      trust anchor and CGA


         Both the trust anchor and the CGA verification is required.


      trust anchor or CGA


         Either the trust anchor or the CGA verification is required.


   anchor


      The public keys and names of the allowed trust anchor(s), if the
      authorization method is not set to CGA.


   All nodes that support the sending of Signature options MUST record
   the following configuration information:







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   keypair


      A public-private key pair. If authorization delegation is in use,
      there must exist a delegation chain from a trust anchor to this
      key pair.


   CGA flag


      A flag that indicates whether CGA is used or not. This flag may be
      per interface or per node. (Note that in future extensions of the
      SEND protocol, this flag may be per subnet-prefix.)



5.2.4 Performance Considerations


   The construction and verification of this option is computationally
   expensive. In the NDP context, however, the hosts typically have the
   need to perform only a few signature operations as they enter a link,
   and a few operations as they find a new on-link peer with which to
   communicate.


   Routers are required to perform a larger number of operations,
   particularly when the frequency of router advertisements is high due
   to mobility requirements.  Still, the number of required signature
   operations is on the order of a few dozen per second, some of which
   can be precomputed as explained below.  A large number of router
   solicitations may cause higher demand for performing asymmetric
   operations, although RFC 2461 limits the rate at which responses to
   solicitations can be sent.


   Signatures can be precomputed for unsolicited (multicast) Neighbor
   and Router Advertisements if the timing of such future advertisements
   is known. Typically, solicited advertisements are sent to the unicast
   address from which the solicitation was sent. Given that the IPv6
   header is covered by the signature, it is not possible to precompute
   solicited advertisements.


5.3 Timestamp and Nonce options


5.3.1 Timestamp Option


   The purpose of the Timestamp option is to assure that unsolicited
   advertisements and redirects have not been replayed.  The format of
   this option is described in the following:








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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |          Reserved             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     +                          Timestamp                            +
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type


      TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Timestamp>.


   Length


      The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved,
      and Timestamp fields) in units of 8 octets, i.e., 2.


   Reserved


      A 48-bit field reserved for future use.  The value MUST be
      initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the
      receiver.


   Timestamp


      A 64-bit unsigned integer field containing a timestamp. The value
      indicates the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00 UTC,
      using a fixed point format. In this format the integer number of
      seconds is contained in the first 48 bits of the field, and the
      remaining 16 bits indicate the number of 1/64K fractions of a
      second.



5.3.2 Nonce Option


   The purpose of the Nonce option is to assure that an advertisement is
   a fresh response to a solicitation sent earlier by the node. The
   format of this option is described in the following:










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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |     Type      |    Length     |  Nonce ...                    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
       |                                                               |
       .                                                               .
       .                                                               .
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type


      TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Nonce>.


   Length


      The length of the option (including the Type, Length, and Nonce
      fields) in units of 8 octets.


   Nonce


      A field containing a random number selected by the sender of the
      solicitation message. The length of the random number MUST be at
      least 6 bytes. The length of the random number MUST be selected so
      that the length of the nonce option is a multiple of 8 octets.



5.3.3 Processing rules for senders


   All solicitation messages MUST include a Nonce.  When sending a
   solicitation, the sender MUST store the nonce internally so that it
   can recognize any replies containing that particular nonce.


   All solicited advertisements MUST include a Nonce, copied from the
   received solicitation.  Note that routers may decide to send a
   multicast advertisement to all nodes instead of a response to a
   specific host. In such case the router MAY still include the nonce
   value for the host that triggered the multicast advertisement.
   Omitting the nonce value may, however, cause the host to ignore the
   router's advertisement, unless the clocks in these nodes are
   sufficiently synchronized so that timestamps can be relied on.


   All solicitation, advertisement, and redirect messages MUST include a
   Timestamp.  Senders SHOULD set the Timestamp field to the current
   time, according to their real time clock.


   If a message has both Nonce and Timestamp options, the Nonce option




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   SHOULD precede the Timestamp option in the message.


5.3.4 Processing rules for receivers


   The processing of the Nonce and Timestamp options depends on whether
   a packet is a solicited advertisement. A system may implement the
   distinction in various ways. Section 5.3.4.1 defines the processing
   rules for solicited advertisements.  Section 5.3.4.2 defines the
   processing rules for all other messages.


   In addition, the following rules apply in all cases:


   o  Messages received with the Signature option but without the
      Timestamp option MUST be silently discarded.


   o  Solicitation messages received with the Signature option but
      without the Nonce option MUST be silently discarded.


   o  Advertisements sent to a unicast destination address with the
      Signature option but without a Nonce option MUST be silently
      discarded.


   o  An implementation MAY utilize some mechanism such as a timestamp
      cache to strengthen resistance to replay attacks. When there is a
      very large number of nodes on the same link, or when a cache
      filling attack is in progress, it is possible that the cache
      holding the most recent timestamp per sender becomes full.  In
      this case the node MUST remove some entries from the cache or
      refuse some new requested entries.  The specific policy as to
      which entries are preferred over the others is left as an
      implementation decision. However, typical policies may prefer
      existing entries over new ones, CGAs with a large Sec value over
      smaller Sec values, and so on.  The issue is briefly discussed in
      Appendix C.


   o  The receiver MUST be prepared to receive the Timestamp and Nonce
      options in any order, as per RFC 2461 [7] Section 9.



5.3.4.1 Processing solicited advertisements


   The receiver MUST verify that it has recently sent a matching
   solicitation, and that the received advertisement contains a copy of
   the Nonce sent in the solicitation.


   If the message contains a Nonce option, but the Nonce value is not
   recognized, the message MUST be silently discarded.





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   Otherwise, if the message does not contain a Nonce option, it MAY be
   considered as an unsolicited advertisement, and processed according
   to Section 5.3.4.2.


   If the message is accepted, the receiver SHOULD store the receive
   time of the message and the time stamp time in the message, as
   specified in Section 5.3.4.2.


5.3.4.2 Processing all other messages


   Receivers SHOULD be configured with an allowed timestamp Delta value,
   a "fuzz factor" for comparisons, and an allowed clock drift
   parameter.  The recommended default value for the allowed Delta is
   TIMESTAMP_DELTA, for fuzz factor TIMESTAMP_FUZZ, and for clock drift
   TIMESTAMP_DRIFT (see Section 11.


   To facilitate timestamp checking, each node SHOULD store the
   following information for each peer:


   o  The receive time of the last received and accepted SEND message.
      This is called RDlast.


   o  The time stamp in the last received and accepted SEND message.
      This is called TSlast.


   An accepted SEND message is any successfully verified Neighbor
   Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Solicitation, Router
   Advertisement, or Redirect message from the given peer. It is
   required that the Signature option has been used in such a message
   before it can update the above variables.


   Receivers SHOULD then check the Timestamp field as follows:


   o  When a message is received from a new peer, i.e., one that is not
      stored in the cache, the received timestamp, TSnew, is checked and
      the packet is accepted if the timestamp is recent enough with
      respect to the reception time of the packet, RDnew:


        -Delta < (RDnew - TSnew) < +Delta


       The RDnew and TSnew values SHOULD be stored into the cache as
      RDlast and TSlast.


   o  If the timestamp is NOT within the boundaries but the message is a
      Neighbor Solicitation message which should be answered by the
      receiver, the receiver MAY respond to the message.  However, if it
      does respond to the message, it MUST NOT create a Neighbor Cache
      entry.  This allows nodes that have large differences in their




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      clocks to still communicate with each other, by exchanging NS/NA
      pairs.


   o  When a message is received from a known peer, i.e., one that
      already has an entry in the cache, the time stamp is checked
      against the previously received SEND message:


        TSnew + fuzz > TSlast + (RDnew - RDlast) x (1 - drift) - fuzz


       If this inequality does not hold, the receiver SHOULD silently
      discard the message. On the other hand, if the inequality holds,
      the receiver SHOULD process the message.


      Moreover, if the above inequality holds and TSnew > TSlast, the
      receiver SHOULD update RDlast and TSlast. Otherwise, the receiver
      MUST NOT update update RDlast or TSlast.




































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6. Authorization Delegation Discovery


   NDP allows a node to automatically configure itself based on
   information learned shortly after connecting to a new link.  It is
   particularly easy to configure "rogue" routers on an unsecured link,
   and it is particularly difficult for a node to distinguish between
   valid and invalid sources of router information, because the node
   needs this information before being able to communicate with nodes
   outside of the link.


   Since the newly-connected node cannot communicate off-link, it cannot
   be responsible for searching information to help validate the
   router(s); however, given a chain of appropriately signed
   certificates, it can check someone else's search results and conclude
   that a particular message comes from an authorized source.  In the
   typical case, a router already connected to beyond the link, can (if
   necessary) communicate with off-link nodes and construct such a
   certificate chain.


   The Secure Neighbor Discovery Protocol mandates a certificate format
   and introduces two new ICMPv6 messages that are used between hosts
   and routers to allow the host to learn a certificate chain with the
   assistance of the router.


6.1 Certificate Format


   The certificate chain of a router terminates in a Router
   Authorization Certificate that authorizes a specific IPv6 node to act
   as a router.  Because authorization chains are not a common practice
   in the Internet at the time this specification was written, the chain
   MUST consist of standard Public Key Certificates (PKC, in the sense
   of [19]).  The certificate chain MUST start from the identity of a
   trust anchor that is shared by the host and the router.  This allows
   the host to anchor trust for the router's public key in the trust
   anchor.  Note that there MAY be multiple certificates issued by a
   single trust anchor.


6.1.1 Router Authorization Certificate Profile


   Router Authorization Certificates are X.509v3 certificates, as
   defined in RFC 3280 [10], and MUST contain at least one instance of
   the X.509 extension for IP addresses, as defined in [12]. The parent
   certificates in the certificate chain MUST contain one or more X.509
   IP address extensions, back up to a trusted party (such as the user's
   ISP) that configured the original IP address space block for the
   router in question, or delegated the right to do so. The certificates
   for the intermediate delegating authorities MUST contain X.509 IP
   address extension(s) for subdelegations. The router's certificate is




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   signed by the delegating authority for the prefixes the router is
   authorized to to advertise.


   The X.509 IP address extension MUST contain at least one
   addressesOrRanges element. This element MUST contain an addressPrefix
   element containing an IPv6 address prefix for a prefix the router or
   the intermediate entity is authorized to route.  If the entity is
   allowed to route any prefix, the used IPv6 address prefix is the null
   prefix, ::/0.  The addressFamily element of the containing
   IPAddrBlocks sequence element MUST contain the IPv6 Address Family
   Identifier (0002), as specified in [12] for IPv6 prefixes.  Instead
   of an addressPrefix element, the addressesOrRange element MAY contain
   an addressRange element for a range of prefixes, if more than one
   prefix is authorized.  The X.509 IP address extension MAY contain
   additional IPv6 prefixes, expressed either as an addressPrefix or an
   addressRange.


   A SEND node receiving a Router Authorization Certificate MUST first
   check whether the certificate's signature was generated by the
   delegating authority.  Then the client MUST check whether all the
   addressPrefix or addressRange entries in the router's certificate are
   contained within the address ranges in the delegating authority's
   certificate, and whether the addressPrefix entries match any
   addressPrefix entries in the delegating authority's certificate.  If
   an addressPrefix or addressRange is not contained within the
   delegating authority's prefixes or ranges, the client MAY attempt to
   take an intersection of the ranges/prefixes, and use that
   intersection.  If the addressPrefix in the certificate is the null
   prefix, ::/0, such an intersection SHOULD be used.  (In that case the
   intersection is the parent prefix or range.)  If the resulting
   intersection is empty, the client MUST NOT accept the certificate.


   The above check SHOULD be done for all certificates in the chain.  If
   any of the checks fail, the client MUST NOT accept the certificate.
   The client also needs to perform validation of advertised prefixes as
   discussed in Section 7.3.


   Care should be taken if the certificates used in SEND are re-used to
   provide authorization in other circumstances, for example with
   routing protocols. It is necessary to ensure that the authorization
   information is appropriate for all applications. SEND certificates
   may authorize a larger set of prefixes than the router is really
   authorized to advertise on a given interface. For instance, SEND
   allows the use of the null prefix. This prefix might cause
   verification or routing problems in other applications. It is
   RECOMMENDED that SEND certificates containing the null prefix are
   only used for SEND.





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   Since it is possible that some public key certificates used with SEND
   do not immediately contain the X.509 IP address extension element, an
   implementation MAY contain facilities that allow the prefix and range
   checks to be relaxed. However, any such configuration options SHOULD
   be off by default.  That is, the system SHOULD have a default
   configuration that requires rigorous prefix and range checks.


   The following is an example of a certificate chain. Suppose that
   isp_group_example.net is the trust anchor. The host has this
   certificate:


             Certificate 1:
               Issuer: isp_group_example.net
               Validity: Jan 1, 2004 through Dec 31, 2004
               Subject: isp_group_example.net
               Extensions:
                 IP address delegation extension:
                    Prefixes: P1, ..., Pk
                 ... possibly other extensions ...
               ... other certificate parameters ...


   When the host attaches to a link served by
   router_x.isp_foo_example.net, it receives the following certificate
   chain:


             Certificate 2:
               Issuer: isp_group_example.net
               Validity: Jan 1, 2004 through Dec 31, 2004
               Subject: isp_foo_example.net
               Extensions:
                 IP address delegation extension:
                   Prefixes: Q1, ..., Qk
                 ... possibly other extensions ...
               ... other certificate parameters ...


             Certificate 3:
               Issuer: isp_foo_example.net
               Validity: Jan 1, 2004 through Dec 31, 2004
               Subject: router_x.isp_foo_example.net
               Extensions:
                 IP address delegation extension:
                   Prefixes R1, ..., Rk
                 ... possibly other extensions ...
               ... other certificate parameters ...


   When processing the three certificates, the usual RFC 3280 [10]
   certificate path validation is performed. Note, however, that at the
   time a node is checking certificates received in a DCA from a router,




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   it typically does not have a connection to the Internet yet, and so
   it is not possible to perform an on-line Certificate Revocation List
   (CRL) check if such a check is necessary. Until such a check is
   performed, acceptance of the certificate MUST be considered
   provisional, and the node MUST perform a check as soon as it has
   established a connection with the Internet through the router. If the
   router has been compromised, it could interfere with the CRL check.
   Should performance of the CRL check be disrupted or should the check
   fail, the node SHOULD immediately stop using the router as a default
   and use another router on the link instead.


   In addition, the IP addresses in the delegation extension must be a
   subset of the IP addresses in the delegation extension of the
   issuer's certificate. So in this example, R1, ..., Rs must be a
   subset of Q1,...,Qr, and Q1,...,Qr must be a subset of P1,...,Pk. If
   the certificate chain is valid, then router_foo.isp_foo_example.com
   is authorized to route the prefixes R1,...,Rs.


6.2 Certificate Transport


   The Delegation Chain Solicitation (DCS) message is sent by a host
   when it wishes to request a certificate chain between a router and
   the one of the host's trust anchors.  The Delegation Chain
   Advertisement (DCA) message is sent in reply to the DCS message.
   These messages are separate from the rest of Neighbor and Router
   Discovery, in order to reduce the effect of the potentially
   voluminous certificate chain information on other messages.


   The Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD) process does not exclude
   other forms of discovering certificate chains. For instance, during
   fast movements mobile nodes may learn information - including the
   certificate chains - of the next router from a previous router, or
   nodes may be preconfigured with certificate chains from roaming
   partners.


   Where hosts themselves are certified by a trust anchor, these
   messages MAY also optionally be used between hosts to acquire the
   peer's certificate chain.  However, the details of such usage are
   beyond the scope of this specification.


6.2.1 Delegation Chain Solicitation Message Format


   Hosts send Delegation Chain Solicitations in order to prompt routers
   to generate Delegation Chain Advertisements.








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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          Identifier           |          Reserved             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Options ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-


   IP Fields:


      Source Address


         A link-local unicast address assigned to the sending interface,
         or the unspecified address if no address is assigned to the
         sending interface.


      Destination Address


         Typically the All-Routers multicast address, the Solicited-Node
         multicast address, or the address of the host's default router.


      Hop Limit


         255


   ICMP Fields:


      Type


         TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Delegation Chain Solicitation>.


      Code


         0


      Checksum


         The ICMP checksum [9].


      Identifier


         A 16-bit unsigned integer field, acting as an identifier to
         help matching advertisements to solicitations.  The Identifier
         field MUST NOT be zero, and its value SHOULD be randomly
         generated. This randomness does not need to be
         cryptographically hard, since its purpose is only to avoid




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         collisions.


      Reserved


         An unused field.  It MUST be initialized to zero by the sender
         and MUST be ignored by the receiver.


   Valid Options:


      Trust Anchor


         One or more trust anchors that the client is willing to accept.
         The first (or only) Trust Anchor option MUST contain a DER
         Encoded X.501 Name; see Section 6.2.3.  If there is more than
         one Trust Anchor option, the options past the first one may
         contain any type of trust anchor.


      Future versions of this protocol may define new option types.
      Receivers MUST silently ignore any options they do not recognize
      and continue processing the message. All included options MUST
      have a length that is greater than zero.


      ICMP length (derived from the IP length) MUST be 8 or more octets.



6.2.2 Delegation Chain Advertisement Message Format


   Routers send out Delegation Chain Advertisement messages in response
   to a Delegation Chain Solicitation.


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |     Code      |           Checksum            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          Identifier           |           Component           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                            Reserved                           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Options ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-


   IP Fields:


      Source Address


         A link-local unicast address assigned to the interface from
         which this message is sent. Note that routers may use multiple




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         addresses, and therefore this address is not sufficient for the
         unique identification of routers.


      Destination Address


         Either the Solicited-Node multicast address of the receiver or
         the link-scoped All-Nodes multicast address.


      Hop Limit


         255


   ICMP Fields:


      Type


         TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Delegation Chain
         Advertisement>.


      Code


         0


      Checksum


         The ICMP checksum [9].


      Identifier


         A 16-bit unsigned integer field, acting as an identifier to
         help matching advertisements to solicitations.  The Identifier
         field MUST be zero for advertisements sent to the All-Nodes
         multicast address and MUST NOT be zero for others.


      Component


         A 16-bit unsigned integer field, used for informing the
         receiver which certificate is being sent, and how many are
         still left to be sent in the whole chain.


         A single advertisement MUST be broken into separately sent
         components if there is more than one Certificate option, in
         order to avoid excessive fragmentation at the IP layer.  Unlike
         the fragmentation at the IP layer, individual components of an
         advertisement may be stored and used before all the components
         have arrived; this makes them slightly more reliable and less
         prone to Denial-of-Service attacks.





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         The first message in a N-component advertisement has the
         Component field set to N-1, the second set to N-2, and so on.
         Zero indicates that there are no more components coming in this
         advertisement.


         The components MUST be ordered so that the certificate after
         the trust anchor is the one sent first. Each certificate sent
         after the first can be verified with the previously sent
         certificates. The certificate of the sender comes last.


      Reserved


         An unused field.  It MUST be initialized to zero by the sender
         and MUST be ignored by the receiver.


   Valid Options:


      Certificate


         One certificate is provided in each Certificate option, to
         establish a (part of a) certificate chain to a trust anchor.


         The certificate of the trust anchor itself SHOULD NOT be
         included.


      Trust Anchor


         Zero or more Trust Anchor options may be included to help
         receivers decide which advertisements are useful for them. If
         present, these options MUST appear in the first component of a
         multi-component advertisement.


      Future versions of this protocol may define new option types.
      Receivers MUST silently ignore any options they do not recognize
      and continue processing the message. All included options MUST
      have a length that is greater than zero.


      ICMP length (derived from the IP length) MUST be 8 or more octets.



6.2.3 Trust Anchor Option


   The format of the Trust Anchor option is described in the following:









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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |  Name Type    |  Pad  Length  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Name ...                                                  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          ... Padding                                          |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type


      TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Trust Anchor>.


   Length


      The length of the option, (including the Type, Length, Name Type,
      Pad Length, and Name fields) in units of 8 octets.


   Name Type


      The type of the name included in the Name field. This
      specification defines two legal values for this field:


               1        DER Encoded X.501 Name
               2        FQDN


   Pad Length


      The number of padding octets beyond the end of the Name field but
      within the length specified by the Length field. Padding octets
      MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers.


   Name


      When the Name Type field is set to 1, the Name field contains a
      DER encoded X.501 certificate Name, represented and encoded
      exactly as in the matching X.509v3 trust anchor certificate.


      When the Name Type field is set to 2, the Name field contains a
      Fully Qualified Domain Name of the trust anchor, for example,
      "trustanchor.example.com". The name is stored as a string, in the
      "preferred name syntax" DNS format, as specified in RFC 1034 [1]
      Section 3.5.  Additionally, the restrictions discussed in RFC 3280
      [10] Section 4.2.1.7 apply.


      In the FQDN case the Name field is an "IDN-unaware domain name
      slot" as defined in [11].  That is, it can contain only ASCII




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      characters.  An implementation MAY support internationalized
      domain names (IDNs) using the ToASCII operation; see [11] for more
      information.


      All systems MUST support the DER Encoded X.501 Name.
      Implementations MAY support the FQDN name type.


   Padding


      A variable length field making the option length a multiple of 8,
      beginning after the ASN.1 encoding of the previous field ends, and
      continuing to the end of the option, as specified by the Length
      field.



6.2.4 Certificate Option


   The format of the certificate option is described in the following:


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |  Cert Type    |    Reserved   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Certificate ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                 ...       Padding                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Type


      TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Certificate>.


   Length


      The length of the option, (including the Type, Length, Cert Type,
      Pad Length, and Certificate fields) in units of 8 octets.


   Cert Type


      The type of the certificate included in the Certificate field.
      This specification defines only one legal value for this field:


               1        X.509v3 Certificate, as specified below








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   Reserved


      An 8-bit field reserved for future use.  The value MUST be
      initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the
      receiver.


   Certificate


      When the Cert Type field is set to 1, the Certificate field
      contains an X.509v3 certificate [10], as described in Section
      6.1.1.


   Padding


      A variable length field making the option length a multiple of 8,
      beginning after the ASN.1 encoding of the previous field ends, and
      continuing to the end of the option, as specified by the Length
      field.



6.2.5 Processing Rules for Routers


   Routers should be configured with a key pair and a certificate from
   at least one certificate authority.


   A router MUST silently discard any received Delegation Chain
   Solicitation messages that do not conform to the message format
   defined in Section 6.2.1. The contents of the Reserved field, and of
   any unrecognized options, MUST be ignored.  Future,
   backward-compatible changes to the protocol may specify the contents
   of the Reserved field or add new options; backward-incompatible
   changes may use different Code values. The contents of any defined
   options that are not specified to be used with Router Solicitation
   messages MUST be ignored and the packet processed in the normal
   manner.  The only defined option that may appear is the Trust Anchor
   option.  A solicitation that passes the validity checks is called a
   "valid solicitation".


   Routers SHOULD send advertisements in response to valid solicitations
   received on an advertising interface. If the source address in the
   solicitation was the unspecified address, the router MUST send the
   response to the link-scoped All-Nodes multicast address. If the
   source address was a unicast address, the router MUST send the
   response to the Solicited-Node multicast address corresponding to the
   source address, except when under load, as specified below. Routers
   SHOULD NOT send Delegation Chain Advertisements more than
   MAX_DCA_RATE times within a second. When there are more
   solicitations, the router SHOULD send the response to the All-Nodes




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   multicast address regardless of the source address that appeared in
   the solicitation.


   In an advertisement, the router SHOULD include suitable Certificate
   options so that a delegation chain to the solicited trust anchor can
   be established.  The anchor is identified by the Trust Anchor option.
   If the Trust Anchor option is represented as a DER Encoded X.501
   Name, then the Name must be equal to the Subject field in the
   anchor's certificate.  If the Trust Anchor option is represented as
   an FQDN, the FQDN must be equal to an FQDN in the subjectAltName
   field of the anchor's certificate.  The router SHOULD include the
   Trust Anchor option(s) in the advertisement for which the delegation
   chain was found.


   If the router is unable to find a chain to the requested anchor, it
   SHOULD send an advertisement without any certificates.  In this case
   the router SHOULD include the Trust Anchor options which were
   solicited.


6.2.6 Processing Rules for Hosts


   Hosts SHOULD possess the public key and trust anchor name of at least
   one certificate authority, they SHOULD possess their own key pair,
   and they MAY possess certificates from certificate authorities.


   A host MUST silently discard any received Delegation Chain
   Advertisement messages that do not conform to the message format
   defined in Section 6.2.2. The contents of the Reserved field, and of
   any unrecognized options, MUST be ignored.  Future,
   backward-compatible changes to the protocol MAY specify the contents
   of the Reserved field or add new options; backward-incompatible
   changes MUST use different Code values. The contents of any defined
   options that are not specified to be used with Delegation Chain
   Advertisement messages MUST be ignored and the packet processed in
   the normal manner.  The only defined options that may appear are the
   Certificate and Trust Anchor options.  An advertisement that passes
   the validity checks is called a "valid advertisement".


   Hosts SHOULD store certificate chains retrieved in Delegation Chain
   Discovery messages if they start from an anchor trusted by the host.
   The certificate chains MUST be verified, as defined in Section 6.1,
   before storing them.  Routers MUST send the certificates one by one,
   starting from the trust anchor end of the chain. Except for temporary
   purposes to allow for message loss and reordering, hosts SHOULD NOT
   store certificates received in a Delegation Chain Advertisement
   unless they contain a certificate which can be immediately verified
   either to the trust anchor or to a certificate that has been verified
   earlier.




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   Note that caching this information and the implied verification
   results between network attachments for use over multiple attachments
   to the network can help improve performance. But periodic certificate
   revocation checks are still needed even with cached results, to make
   sure that the certificates are still valid.


   The host has a need to retrieve a delegation chain when a Router
   Advertisement has been received with a public key that is not stored
   in the hosts' cache of certificates, or there is no authorization
   delegation chain to the host's trust anchor. In these situations, the
   host MAY transmit up to MAX_DCS_MESSAGES Delegation Chain
   Solicitation messages, each separated by at least DCS_INTERVAL
   seconds.


   Delegation Chain Solicitations SHOULD NOT be sent if the host has a
   currently valid certificate chain from a reachable router to a trust
   anchor.


   When soliciting certificates for a router, a host MUST send
   Delegation Chain Solicitations either to the All-Routers multicast
   address, if it has not selected a default router yet, or to the
   default router's IP address, if a default router has already been
   selected.


   If two hosts want to establish trust with the DCS and DCA messages,
   the DCS message SHOULD be sent to the Solicited-Node multicast
   address of the receiver.  The advertisements SHOULD be sent as
   specified above for routers.  However, the exact details are outside
   the scope of this specification.


   When processing possible advertisements sent as responses to a
   solicitation, the host MAY prefer to process first those
   advertisements with the same Identifier field value as in the
   solicitation.  This makes Denial-of-Service attacks against the
   mechanism harder (see Section 9.3).

















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7. Addressing


7.1 CGAs


   Nodes that use stateless address autoconfiguration SHOULD generate a
   new CGA and a CGA Parameters data structure as specified in Section 4
   of [13] each time they run the autoconfiguration procedure.


   By default, a SEND-enabled node SHOULD use only CGAs for its own
   addresses. Other types of addresses MAY be used in testing,
   diagnostics or for other purposes. However, this document does not
   describe how to choose between different types of addresses for
   different communications. A dynamic selection can be provided by an
   API, such as the one defined in [23].


7.2 Redirect Addresses


   If the Target Address and Destination Address fields in the ICMP
   Redirect message are equal, then this message is used to inform hosts
   that a destination is in fact a neighbor.  In this case the receiver
   MUST verify that the given address falls within the range defined by
   the router's certificate.  Redirect messages failing this check MUST
   be silently discarded.


   Note that RFC 2461 rules prevent a host from accepting a Redirect
   message from a router that is not its default router. This prevents
   an attacker from tricking a node into redirecting traffic when the
   attacker is not the default router.


7.3 Advertised Prefixes


   The router's certificate defines the address range(s) that it is
   allowed to advertise securely. A router MAY, however, advertise a
   combination of certified and uncertified prefixes. Uncertified
   prefixes are treated as insecure, i.e., processed in the same way as
   insecure router advertisements sent by non-SEND routers. The
   processing of insecure messages is specified in Section 8. Note that
   SEND nodes that do not attempt to interoperate with non-SEND nodes
   MAY simply discard the insecure information.


   Certified prefixes fall into the following two categories:


   Constrained


      If the network operator wants to constrain which routers are
      allowed to route particular prefixes, routers should be configured
      with certificates having prefixes listed in the prefix extension.
      Routers so configured SHOULD advertise the prefixes which they are




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      certified to route, or a subset thereof.


   Unconstrained


      Network operators that do not want to constrain routers this way
      should configure routers with certificates containing either the
      null prefix or no prefix extension at all.


   Upon processing a Prefix Information option within a Router
   Advertisement, nodes SHOULD verify that the prefix specified in this
   option falls within the range defined by the certificate, if the
   certificate contains a prefix extension. Options failing this check
   are treated as containing uncertified prefixes.


   Nodes SHOULD use one of the certified prefixes for stateless
   autoconfiguration. If none of the advertised prefixes match, the host
   SHOULD use a different advertising router as its default router, if
   available. If the node is performing stateful autoconfiguration, it
   SHOULD check the address provided by the DHCP server against the
   certified prefixes and SHOULD NOT use the address if the prefix is
   not certified.


7.4 Limitations


   This specification does not address the protection of NDP packets for
   nodes that are configured with a static address (e.g., PREFIX::1).
   Future certificate chain-based authorization specifications are
   needed for such nodes.


   It is outside the scope of this specification to describe the use of
   trust anchor authorization between nodes with dynamically changing
   addresses.  Such dynamically changing addresses may be the result of
   stateful or stateless address autoconfiguration, or through the use
   of RFC 3041 [18] addresses.  If the CGA method is not used, nodes
   would be required to exchange certificate chains that terminate in a
   certificate authorizing a node to use an IP address having a
   particular interface identifier.  This specification does not specify
   the format of such certificates, since there are currently a few
   cases where such certificates are required by the link layer and it
   is up to the link layer to provide certification for the interface
   identifier.  This may be the subject of a future specification.  It
   is also outside the scope of this specification to describe how
   stateful address autoconfiguration works with the CGA method.


   The Target Address in Neighbor Advertisement is required to be equal
   to the source address of the packet, except in the case of proxy
   Neighbor Discovery. Proxy Neighbor Discovery is not supported by this
   specification.




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8. Transition Issues


   During the transition to secure links or as a policy consideration,
   network operators may want to run a particular link with a mixture of
   secure and insecure nodes.  Nodes that support SEND SHOULD support
   the use of SEND and plain NDP at the same time.


   In a mixed environment, SEND nodes receive both secure and insecure
   messages but give priority to "secured" ones.  Here, the "secured"
   messages are ones that contain a valid signature option, as specified
   above, and "insecure" messages are ones that contain no signature
   option.


   SEND nodes MUST send only secured messages.  Plain (non-SEND)
   Neighbor Discovery nodes will obviously send only insecure messages.
   Per RFC 2461 [7], such nodes will ignore the unknown options and will
   treat secured messages in the same way as they treat insecure ones.
   Secured and insecure nodes share the same network resources, such as
   prefixes and address spaces.


   In a mixed environment SEND nodes follow the protocols defined in RFC
   2461 and RFC 2462 with the following exceptions:


   o  All solicitations sent by a SEND node MUST be secured.


   o  Unsolicited advertisements sent by a SEND node MUST be secured.


   o  A SEND node MUST send a secured advertisement in response to a
      secured solicitation. Advertisements sent in response to an
      insecure solicitation MUST be secured as well, but MUST NOT
      contain the Nonce option.


   o  A SEND node that uses the CGA authorization method for protecting
      Neighbor Solicitations SHOULD perform Duplicate Address Detection
      as follows.  If Duplicate Address Detection indicates the
      tentative address is already in use, generate a new tentative CGA.
      If after 3 consecutive attempts no non-unique address was
      generated, log a system error and give up attempting to generate
      an address for that interface.


      When performing Duplicate Address Detection for the first
      tentative address, accept both secured and insecure Neighbor
      Advertisements and Solicitations received as response to the
      Neighbor Solicitations.  When performing Duplicate Address
      Detection for the second or third tentative address, ignore
      insecure Neighbor Advertisements and Solicitations.


   o  The node MAY have a configuration option that causes it to ignore




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      insecure advertisements even when performing Duplicate Address
      Detection for the first tentative address. This configuration
      option SHOULD be disabled by default. This is a recovery
      mechanism, in case attacks against the first address become
      common.


   o  The Neighbor Cache, Prefix List and Default Router list entries
      MUST have a secured/insecure flag that indicates whether the
      message that caused the creation or last update of the entry was
      secured or insecure.  Received insecure messages MUST NOT cause
      changes to existing secured entries in the Neighbor Cache, Prefix
      List or Default Router List. The Neighbor Cache SHOULD implement a
      flag on entries indicating whether the entry issecured. Received
      secured messages MUST cause an update of the matching entries and
      flagging of them as secured.


   o  The conceptual sending algorithm is modified so that an insecure
      router is selected only if there is no reachable SEND router for
      the prefix.  That is, the algorithm for selecting a default router
      favors reachable SEND routers over reachable non-SEND ones.


   o  A node MAY adopt an insecure router, including a SEND router for
      which full security checks have not yet been completed, while
      security checking for the SEND router is underway. Security checks
      in this case include delegation chain solicitation, certificate
      verification, CRL checks, and RA signature checks. A node MAY also
      adopt an insecure router if a SEND router becomes unreachable, but
      SHOULD attempt to find a SEND router as soon as possible, since
      the unreachability may be the result of an attack. Note that while
      this can speed up attachment to a new network, accepting an
      insecure router opens the node to possible attacks, and nodes that
      choose to accept insecure routers do so at their own risk. The
      node SHOULD in any case prefer the SEND router as soon as one is
      available with completed security checks.


   o  A SEND node SHOULD have a configuration option that causes it to
      ignore all insecure Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement,
      Router Solicitation and Advertisement, and Redirect messages. This
      can be used to enforce SEND-only networks.













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9. Security Considerations


9.1 Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND


   SEND does not provide confidentiality for NDP communications.


   SEND does not compensate for an insecure link layer. For instance,
   there is no assurance that payload packets actually come from the
   same peer that the NDP was run against.


   There may be no cryptographic binding in SEND between the link layer
   frame address and the IPv6 address.  On an insecure link layer that
   allows nodes to spoof the link layer address of other nodes, an
   attacker could disrupt IP service by sending out a Neighbor
   Advertisement having the source address on the link layer frame of a
   victim, a valid CGA address and a valid signature corresponding to
   itself, and a Target Link-layer Address extension corresponding to
   the victim.  The attacker could then proceed to cause a traffic
   stream to bombard the victim in a DoS attack. This attack cannot be
   prevented just by securing the link layer.


   Even on a secure link layer, SEND does not require that the addresses
   on the link layer and Neighbor Advertisements correspond to each
   other. However, it is RECOMMENDED that such checks be performed where
   this is possible on the given link layer technology.


   Prior to participating in Neighbor Discovery and Duplicate Address
   Detection, nodes must subscribe to the link-scoped All-Nodes
   Multicast Group and the Solicited-Node Multicast Group for the
   address that they are claiming for their addresses; RFC 2461 [7].
   Subscribing to a multicast group requires that the nodes use MLD
   [17].  MLD contains no provision for security.  An attacker could
   send an MLD Done message to unsubscribe a victim from the
   Solicited-Node Multicast address.  However, the victim should be able
   to detect such an attack because the router sends a
   Multicast-Address-Specific Query to determine whether any listeners
   are still on the address, at which point the victim can respond to
   avoid being dropped from the group.  This technique will work if the
   router on the link has not been compromised.  Other attacks using MLD
   are possible, but they primarily lead to extraneous (but not
   overwhelming) traffic.


9.2 How SEND Counters Threats to NDP


   The SEND protocol is designed to counter the threats to NDP, as
   outlined in [24].  The following subsections contain a regression of
   the SEND protocol against the threats, to illustrate what aspects of
   the protocol counter each threat.




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9.2.1 Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing


   This threat is defined in Section 4.1.1 of [24].  The threat is that
   a spoofed message may cause a false entry in a node's Neighbor Cache.
   There are two cases:


   1.  Entries made as a side effect of a Neighbor Solicitation or
       Router Solicitation. A router receiving a Router Solicitation
       with a Target Link-Layer Address extension and the IPv6 source
       address not equal to the unspecified address inserts an entry for
       the IPv6 address into its Neighbor Cache. Also, a node performing
       Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) that receives a Neighbor
       Solicitation for the same address regards the situation as a
       collision and ceases to solicit for the address.


       In either case, SEND counters these treats by requiring the
       Signature and CGA options to be present in such solicitations.


       SEND nodes can send Router Solicitation messages with a CGA
       source address and a CGA option, which the router can verify, so
       the Neighbor Cache binding is correct.  If a SEND node must send
       a Router Solicitation with the unspecified address, the router
       will not update its Neighbor Cache, as per RFC 2461.


   2.  Entries made as a result of a Neighbor Advertisement message.
       SEND counters this threat by requiring the Signature and CGA
       options to be present in these advertisements.


   See also Section 9.2.5, below, for discussion about replay protection
   and timestamps.


9.2.2 Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure


   This attack is described in Section 4.1.2 of [24].  SEND counters
   this attack by requiring a node responding to Neighbor Solicitations
   sent as NUD probes to include a Signature option and proof of
   authorization to use the interface identifier in the address being
   probed.  If these prerequisites are not met, the node performing NUD
   discards the responses.


9.2.3 Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack


   This attack is described in Section 4.1.3 of [24].  SEND counters
   this attack by requiring the Neighbor Advertisements sent as
   responses to DAD to include a Signature option and proof of
   authorization to use the interface identifier in the address being
   tested.  If these prerequisites are not met, the node performing DAD
   discards the responses.




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   When a SEND node is performing DAD, it may listen for address
   collisions from non-SEND nodes for the first address it generates,
   but not for new attempts.  This protects the SEND node from DAD DoS
   attacks by non-SEND nodes or attackers simulating to non-SEND nodes,
   at the cost of a potential address collision between a SEND node and
   non-SEND node.  The probability and effects of such an address
   collision are discussed in [13].


9.2.4 Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks


   These attacks are described in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 4.2.6,
   and 4.2.7 of [24].  SEND counters these attacks by requiring Router
   Advertisements to contain a Signature option, and that the signature
   is calculated using the public key of a node that can prove its
   authorization to route the subnet prefixes contained in any Prefix
   Information Options.  The router proves its authorization by showing
   a certificate containing the specific prefix or the indication that
   the router is allowed to route any prefix. A Router Advertisement
   without these protections is discarded.


   SEND does not protect against brute force attacks on the router, such
   as DoS attacks, or compromise of the router, as described in Sections
   4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of [24].


9.2.5 Replay Attacks


   This attack is described in Section 4.3.1 of [24].  SEND protects
   against attacks in Router Solicitation/Router Advertisement and
   Neighbor Solicitation/Neighbor Advertisement transactions by
   including a Nonce option in the solicitation and requiring the
   advertisement to include a matching option.  Together with the
   signatures this forms a challenge-response protocol.  SEND protects
   against attacks from unsolicited messages such as Neighbor
   Advertisements, Router Advertisements, and Redirects by including a
   Timestamp option.  A window of vulnerability for replay attacks
   exists until the timestamp expires.


   When timestamps are used, SEND nodes are protected against replay
   attacks as long as they cache the state created by the message
   containing the timestamp.  The cached state allows the node to
   protect itself against replayed messages.  However, once the node
   flushes the state for whatever reason, an attacker can re-create the
   state by replaying an old message while the timestamp is still valid.
   Since most SEND nodes are likely to use fairly coarse grained
   timestamps, as explained in Section 5.3.1, this may affect some
   nodes.






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9.2.6 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack


   This attack is described in Section 4.3.2 of [24].  In this attack,
   the attacker bombards the router with packets for fictitious
   addresses on the link, causing the router to busy itself with
   performing Neighbor Solicitations for addresses that do not exist.
   SEND does not address this threat because it can be addressed by
   techniques such as rate limiting Neighbor Solicitations, restricting
   the amount of state reserved for unresolved solicitations, and clever
   cache management. These are all techniques involved in implementing
   Neighbor Discovery on the router.


9.3 Attacks against SEND Itself


   The CGAs have a 59-bit hash value. The security of the CGA mechanism
   has been discussed in [13].


   Some Denial-of-Service attacks against NDP and SEND itself remain.
   For instance, an attacker may try to produce a very high number of
   packets that a victim host or router has to verify using asymmetric
   methods.  While safeguards are required to prevent an excessive use
   of resources, this can still render SEND non-operational.


   When CGA protection is used, SEND deals with the DoS attacks using
   the verification process described in Section 5.2.2. In this process,
   a simple hash verification of the CGA property of the address is
   performed before performing the more expensive signature
   verification. However, even if the CGA verification succeeds, no
   claims about the validity of the message can be made, until the
   signature has been checked.


   When trust anchors and certificates are used for address validation
   in SEND, the defenses are not quite as effective. Implementations
   SHOULD track the resources devoted to the processing of packets
   received with the Signature option, and start selectively discarding
   packets if too many resources are spent. Implementations MAY also
   first discard packets that are not protected with CGA.


   The Authorization Delegation Discovery process may also be vulnerable
   to Denial-of-Service attacks.  An attack may target a router by
   requesting a large number of delegation chains to be discovered for
   different trust anchors.  Routers SHOULD defend against such attacks
   by caching discovered information (including negative responses) and
   by limiting the number of different discovery processes they engage
   in.


   Attackers may also target hosts by sending a large number of
   unnecessary certificate chains, forcing hosts to spend useless memory




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   and verification resources for them.  Hosts can defend against such
   attacks by limiting the amount of resources devoted to the
   certificate chains and their verification.  Hosts SHOULD also
   prioritize advertisements that sent as a response to their
   solicitations above unsolicited advertisements.















































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10. Protocol Constants


   Host constants:


         MAX_DCS_MESSAGES              3 transmissions
         DCS_INTERVAL                  4 seconds


   Router constants:


         MAX_DCA_RATE                  10 times per second










































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11. Protocol Variables


       TIMESTAMP_DELTA                 3,600 seconds (1 hour)
       TIMESTAMP_FUZZ                      1 second
       TIMESTAMP_DRIFT                     1 % (0.01)















































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12. IANA Considerations


   This document defines two new ICMP message types, used in
   Authorization Delegation Discovery.  These messages must be assigned
   ICMPv6 type numbers from the informational message range:


   o  The Delegation Chain Solicitation message, described in Section
      6.2.1.


   o  The Delegation Chain Advertisement message, described in Section
      6.2.2.


   This document defines six new Neighbor Discovery Protocol [7]
   options, which must be assigned Option Type values within the option
   numbering space for Neighbor Discovery Protocol messages:


   o  The CGA option, described in Section 5.1.


   o  The Signature option, described in Section 5.2.


   o  The Timestamp option, described in Section 5.3.1.


   o  The Nonce option, described in Section 5.3.2.


   o  The Trust Anchor option, described in Section 6.2.3.


   o  The Certificate option, described in Section 6.2.4.


   This document defines a new 128-bit value under the CGA Message Type
   [13] namespace, 0x086F CA5E 10B2 00C9 9C8C E001 6427 7C08.


   This document defines a new name space for the Name Type field in the
   Trust Anchor option. Future values of this field can be allocated
   using Standards Action [6]. The current values for this field are:


   1  DER Encoded X.501 Name


   2  FQDN


   Another new name space is allocated for the Cert Type field in the
   Certificate option. Future values of this field can be allocated
   using Standards Action [6]. The current values for this field are:


   1  X.509v3 Certificate








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Normative References


   [1]   Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
         13, RFC 1034, November 1987.


   [2]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


   [3]   Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
         Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.


   [4]   Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402,
         November 1998.


   [5]   Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
         for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.


   [6]   Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
         Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October
         1998.


   [7]   Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
         for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998.


   [8]   Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
         Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.


   [9]   Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
         (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
         Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998.


   [10]  Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
         Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
         Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.


   [11]  Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P. and A. Costello, "Internationalizing
         Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3490, March 2003.


   [12]  Lynn, C., Kent, S. and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
         Addresses and AS Identifiers",
         draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-03 (work in progress),
         September 2003.


   [13]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
         draft-ietf-send-cga-03 (work in progress), December 2003.


   [14]  RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1", PKCS
         1, November 2002.




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   [15]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
         Standard", FIPS PUB 180-1, April 1995, <http://
         www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm>.

















































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Informative References


   [16]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
         RFC 2409, November 1998.


   [17]  Deering, S., Fenner, W. and B. Haberman, "Multicast Listener
         Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October 1999.


   [18]  Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
         Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.


   [19]  Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate
         Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April 2002.


   [20]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C. and M.
         Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
         (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.


   [21]  Arkko, J., "Effects of ICMPv6 on IKE and IPsec Policies",
         draft-arkko-icmpv6-ike-effects-02 (work in progress), March
         2003.


   [22]  Arkko, J., "Manual SA Configuration for IPv6 Link Local
         Messages", draft-arkko-manual-icmpv6-sas-01 (work in progress),
         June 2002.


   [23]  Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S. and J. Laganier, "IPv6 Socket API
         for Address Selection", draft-chakrabarti-ipv6-addrselect-02
         (work in progress), October 2003.


   [24]  Nikander, P., Kempf, J. and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
         Discovery trust models and threats", draft-ietf-send-psreq-04
         (work in progress), October 2003.



Authors' Addresses


   Jari Arkko
   Ericsson


   Jorvas  02420
   Finland


   EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com








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   James Kempf
   DoCoMo Communications Labs USA
   181 Metro Drive
   San Jose, CA  94043
   USA


   EMail: kempf@docomolabs-usa.com



   Bill Sommerfeld
   Sun Microsystems
   1 Network Drive UBUR02-212
   Burlington, MA  01803
   USA


   EMail: sommerfeld@east.sun.com



   Brian Zill
   Microsoft


   USA


   EMail: bzill@microsoft.com



   Pekka Nikander
   Ericsson


   Jorvas  02420
   Finland


   EMail: Pekka.Nikander@nomadiclab.com



















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Appendix A. Contributors


   Tuomas Aura contributed the transition mechanism specification in
   Section 8. Jonathan Trostle contributed the certificate chain example
   in Section 6.1.1.















































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Appendix B. Acknowledgments


   The authors would like to thank Tuomas Aura, Erik Nordmark, Gabriel
   Montenegro, Pasi Eronen, Greg Daley, Jon Wood, Julien Laganier,
   Francis Dupont, and Pekka Savola for interesting discussions in this
   problem space and feedback regarding the SEND protocol.














































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Appendix C. Cache Management


   In this section we outline a cache management algorithm that allows a
   node to remain partially functional even under a cache filling DoS
   attack.  This appendix is informational, and real implementations
   SHOULD use different algorithms in order to avoid he dangers of
   mono-cultural code.


   There are at least two distinct cache related attack scenarios:


   1.  There are a number of nodes on a link, and someone launches a
       cache filling attack.  The goal here is clearly make sure that
       the nodes can continue to communicate even if the attack is going
       on.


   2.  There is already a cache filling attack going on, and a new node
       arrives to the link.  The goal here is to make it possible for
       the new node to become attached to the network, in spite of the
       attack.


   From this point of view, it is clearly better to be very selective in
   how to throw out entries.  Reducing the timestamp Delta value is very
   discriminative against those nodes that have a large clock
   difference, while an attacker can reduce its clock difference into
   arbitrarily small.  Throwing out old entries just because their clock
   difference is large seems like a bad approach.


   A reasonable idea seems to be to have a separate cache space for new
   entries and old entries, and under an attack more eagerly drop new
   cache entries than old ones.  One could track traffic, and only allow
   those new entries that receive genuine traffic to be converted into
   old cache entries.  While such a scheme will make attacks harder, it
   will not fully prevent them. For example, an attacker could send a
   little traffic (i.e. a ping or TCP syn) after each NS to trick the
   victim into promoting its cache entry to the old cache.  Hence, the
   node may be more intelligent in keeping its cache entries, and not
   just have a black/white old/new boundary.


   It also looks like a good idea to consider the sec parameter when
   forcing cache entries out, and let those entries with a larger sec a
   higher chance of staying in.











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