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Versions: (draft-rgaglian-sidr-algorithm-agility) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 6916

Network Working Group                                        R. Gagliano
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: BCP                                             S. Kent
Expires: August 12, 2013                                BBN Technologies
                                                               S. Turner
                                                              IECA, Inc.
                                                        February 8, 2013


                 Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI.
                  draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-12

Abstract

   This document specifies the process that Certification Authorities
   (CAs) and Relying Parties (RPs) participating in the Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI) will need to follow to transition to a new
   (and probably cryptographically stronger) algorithm set.  The process
   is expected to be completed in a time scale of several years.
   Consequently, no emergency transition is specified.  The transition
   procedure defined in this document supports only a top-down migration
   (parent migrates before children).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 12, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Key Rollover steps for algorithm migration . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Milestones definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  Process overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.3.  Phase 0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.3.1.  Milestone 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.4.  Phase 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.5.  Phase 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.6.  Phase 3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.7.  Phase 4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.8.  Return to Phase 0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  Multi Algorithm support in the RPKI provisioning protocol  . . 17
   6.  Validation of multiple instance of signed products . . . . . . 18
   7.  Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   8.  Key rollover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   9.  Repository structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   10. Deprecating an Algorithm Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   11. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   12. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   Appendix A.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
















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1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", "NOT RECOMMENDED" and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].













































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2.  Introduction

   The RPKI must accommodate transitions between the public keys used by
   CAs.  Transitions of this sort are usually termed "key rollover".
   Planned key rollover will occur regularly throughout the life of the
   RPKI, as each CA changes its public keys, in a non-coordinated
   fashion.  (By non-coordinated we mean that the time at which each CA
   elects to change its keys is locally determined, not coordinated
   across the RPKI.)  Moreover, because a key change might be
   necessitated by suspected private key compromise, one can never
   assume coordination of these events among all of the CAs in the RPKI.
   In an emergency key rollover, the old certificate is revoked and a
   new certificate with a new key is issued.  The mechanisms to perform
   a key rollover in RPKI (either planned or in an emergency), while
   maintaining the same algorithm suite, are covered in [RFC6489].

   This document describes the mechanism to perform a key rollover in
   the RPKI due to the migration to a new signature algorithm suite.  It
   specifies the process that Certification Authorities (CAs) and
   Relying Parties (RPs) participating in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) will need to follow to transition to a new (and
   probably cryptographically stronger) algorithm set.  The process is
   expected to be completed in a time scale of months or years.
   Consequently, no emergency transition is specified.  The transition
   procedure defined in this document supports only a top-down migration
   (parent migrates before children).

   A signature algorithm suite encompasses both a signature algorithm
   (with a specified key size range) and a one-way hash algorithm.  It
   is anticipated that the RPKI will require the adoption of updated key
   sizes and/or different algorithm suites over time.  This document
   treats the adoption of a new hash algorithm while retaining the
   current signature algorithm as equivalent to an algorithm migration,
   and requires the CA to change its key.  Migration to a new algorithm
   suite will be required in order to maintain an acceptable level of
   cryptographic security and protect the integrity of certificates,
   CRLs and signed objects in the RPKI.  All of the data structures in
   the RPKI explicitly identify the signature and hash algorithms being
   used.  However, experience has demonstrated that the ability to
   represent algorithm IDs is not sufficient to enable migration to new
   algorithm suites (algorithm agility).  One also must ensure that
   protocols, infrastructure elements, and operational procedures also
   accommodate the migration from one algorithm suite to another.
   Algorithm migration is expected to be very infrequent and it will
   require support of a "current" and "next" suite for a prolonged
   interval, probably several years.

   This document defines how entities in the RPKI execute (planned) CA



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   key rollover when the algorithm suite changes.  The description
   covers actions by CAs, repository operators, and RPs.  It describes
   the behavior required of both CAs and RPs to make such key changes
   work in the RPKI context, including how the RPKI repository system is
   used to support key rollover.

   This document does not specify any algorithm suite per se. The RPKI
   Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] mandates the use of the algorithms
   defined in [RFC6485] by CAs and RPs.  When an algorithm transition is
   initiated, [RFC6485] MUST be updated (as defined in Section 4.1 of
   this document) redefining the required algorithm(s) for compliant
   RPKI CAs and RPs under the CP.  The CP will not change as a side
   effect of algorithm transition (and thus the policy OID in RPKI
   certificates will not change.)

   For each algorithm transition, an additional document (the algorithm
   transition timetable) MUST be published (as an IETF BCP) to define
   the dates for each milestone defined in this document.  It will
   define dates for the phase transitions, consistent with the
   descriptions provided in Section 4.  It also will describe how the
   RPKI community will measure the readiness of CAs and RPs to
   transition to each phase.  CAs publish certificates, CRLs, and other
   signed objects under the new algorithm suite as the transition
   progresses.  This provides visibility into the deployment of the new
   algorithm suite, enabling the community to evaluate deployment
   progress.  The transition procedure allows CAs to remove old
   certificates, CRLs, and signed products, after the twilight date.
   This provides an ability to observe and measure the withdrawal of the
   old algorithm suite.  Thus the phases defined in this document enable
   the community to evaluate the progress of the transition.  The
   timetable document will also describe procedures to amend the
   timetable if problems arise in implementing later phases of the
   transition.  It is RECOMMENDED that the timetable document be
   developed by representatives of the RPKI community, e.g., IANA,
   Internet Registries, and network operators.
















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3.  Terminology

   This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the terms and
   concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
   Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280],
   "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], and
   "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure" [RFC6481].
   Additional terms and conventions used in examples are provided below.

   Algorithm migration:  A planned transition from one signature and
               hash algorithm to a new signature and hash algorithm.

   Algorithm Suite A:  The "current" algorithm suite used for hashing
               and signing, in examples in this document

   Algorithm Suite B:  The "next" algorithm suite used for hashing and
               signing, used in examples in this document

   CA X:       The CA that issued CA Y's certificate (i.e., CA Y's
               parent), used in examples in this document.

   CA Y:       The non-leaf CA used in examples this document

   CA Z:       A CA that is a "child" of CA Y, used in examples this
               document

   Non-Leaf CA:  A CA that issues certificates to other CAs is a non-
               leaf CA.

   Leaf CA:    A leaf CA is a CA that issues only EE certs.

   PoP (proof of possession):  Execution of a protocol that demonstrates
               to an issuer that a subject requesting a certificate
               possesses the private key corresponding to the public key
               in the certificate request submitted by the subject.

   Signed Product Set (or Set or Product Set):  A collection of
               certificates, signed objects, a CRL and a manifest that
               are associated by virtue of being verifiable under the
               same parent CA certificate

   Correspond: Two certificates, issued under different Algorithm Suites
               correspond to one another if they are issued to the same
               entity by the same CA and bind identical Internet Number
               Resources (INRs) to that entity.  Two CRLs correspond if
               they are issued by the same CA and enumerate
               corresponding certificates.  Two signed objects (other
               than manifests) correspond if they are verified using



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               corresponding EE certificates and they contain the same
               encapsulated Context Info field.  Two manifests
               correspond if they encompass corresponding certificates,
               ROAs, CRLs, and (other) signed objects (the term
               "equivalent" is used synonymously when referring to such
               RPKI signed products.)

   ROA:        Route Origination Authorisation, as defined in [RFC6482].











































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4.  Key Rollover steps for algorithm migration

   The "current" RPKI algorithm suite (Suite A) is defined in the RPKI
   CP document, by reference to [RFC6485].  When a migration of the RPKI
   algorithm suite is needed, the first step MUST be an update of
   [RFC6485] to define the new algorithm suite.  The algorithm
   transition timeline document MUST also be published (as a BCP), to
   inform the community of the dates selected for milestones in the
   transition process, as described in Section 4.1.

4.1.  Milestones definition

   CA Ready Algorithm B Date:  After this date, all (non-leaf) CAs MUST
               be ready to process a request from a child CA to issue a
               certificate under the Algorithm Suite B. All CAs
               publishing an [RFC6490] Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for
               Algorithm Suite A, MUST also publish the correspondent
               TAL for Algorithm Suite B.

   CA Go Algorithm B Date:  After this date, all CAs MUST have reissued
               all of their signed product sets under the Algorithm
               Suite B.

   RP Ready Algorithm B Date:  After this date, all RPs MUST be prepared
               to process signed material issued under the Algorithm
               Suite B.

   Twilight Date:  After this date, a CA MAY cease issuing signed
               products under the Algorithm Suite A. Also, after this
               date, a RP MAY cease to validate signed materials issued
               under the Algorithm Suite A.

   End Of Life (EOL) Date:  After this date, the Algorithm Suite A MUST
               be deprecated using the process in Section 10 and all
               Algorithm Suite A TALs MUST be removed from their
               publication points.

4.2.  Process overview

   The migration process described in this document involves a series of
   steps that MUST be executed in chronological order by CAs and RPs.
   The only milestone at which both CAs and RPs take action at the same
   time is the EOL Date.  Due to the decentralized nature of the RPKI
   infrastructure, it is expected that an algorithm transition will span
   several years.

   In order to facilitate the transition, CAs will start issuing
   certificates using the Algorithm B in a hierarchical top-down



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   fashion.  In our example, CA Y will issue certificates using the
   Algorithm Suite B only after CA X has started to do so (CA Y Ready
   Algorithm B Date > CA X Ready Algorithm B Date).  This ordered
   transition avoids issuance of "mixed" suite CA certificates, e.g., a
   CA certificate signed using Suite A, containing a key from Suite B.
   In the RPKI, a CA MUST NOT sign a CA certificate carrying a subject
   key that corresponds to an algorithm suite that differs from the one
   used to sign the certificate.  (X.509 accommodates such mixed
   algorithm certificates, but this process avoids using that
   capability.)  A not top-down transition approach would require use of
   such mixed mode certificates, and would lead to exponential growth of
   the RPKI repository.  Also, because the RPKI CP mandates Proof of
   Possession (PoP) for certificate requests, it is not possible for a
   CA to request a certificate for Algorithm Suite B, until its parent
   CA supports that Suite.  (See Section 5 for more details.)

   The algorithm agility model described here does not prohibit a CA
   from issuing an EE certificate with a subject public key from a
   different algorithm suite, if that certificate is not used to verify
   repository objects.  This exception to the mixed algorithm suite
   certificate rule is allowed because an EE certificate that is not
   used to verify repository objects does not interfere with the ability
   of RPs to download and verify repository content.  As noted above,
   every CA in the RPKI is required to perform a PoP check for the
   subject public key when issuing a certificate.  In general a subject
   cannot assume that a CA is capable of supporting a different
   algorithm.  However, if the subject is closely affiliated with the
   CA, it is reasonable to assume that there are ways for the subject to
   know whether the CA can support a request to issue an EE certificate
   containing a specific, different public key algorithm.  This document
   does not specify how a subject can determine whether a CA is capable
   of issuing a mixed suite EE certificate, because it anticipates that
   such certificates will be issued only in contexts where the subject
   and CA are sufficiently closely affiliated (for example, an ISP
   issuing certificates to devices that it manages).

   The following figure gives an overview of the process:














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Process for RPKI CAs:

  Phase 0    Phase 1   Phase 2             Phase 4  Phase 0
-----------x---------x-------------------x--------x-----------
  ^        ^         ^                   ^        ^
  |        |         |                   |        |
 (1)      (2)       (3)                 (5)      (6)

Process for RPKI RPs:

            Phase 0              Phase 3   Phase 4  Phase 0
-------------------------------x---------x--------x-----
  ^                            ^         ^        ^
  |                            |         |        |
 (1)                          (4)       (5)      (6)

(1) RPKI algorithm document is updated and the algorithm transition timeline document is issued
(2) CA Ready Algorithm B Date
(3) CA Go Algorithm B Date
(4) RP Ready Algorithm B Date
(5) Twilight Date
(6) End Of Live (EOL) Date

   Each of these milestones is discussed in the next section when
   describing each phase of the transition process.

   Two situations have been identified that motivate pausing or rolling
   back the transition process.  The first situation arises if the RPKI
   community is not ready to make the transition.  For example, many CAs
   might not be prepared to issue signed products under Suite B, or many
   RPs might not be ready to process Suite B products.  Under these
   circumstances, the timetable MUST be reissued, postponing the date
   for the phase in question, and pushing back the dates for later
   phases.  The other situation arises if, during the transition,
   serious concerns arise about the security of the Suite B algorithms.
   Such concerns would motivate terminating the transition and rolling
   back signed products, i.e., reverting to Suite A. In this case the
   timetable MUST be republished, and the RPKI algorithm document MUST
   be superseded.  The phase descriptions below allude to these two
   situations, as appropriate.

4.3.  Phase 0

   Phase 0 is the steady state phase of the process; throughout this
   phase, Algorithm Suite A is the only supported algorithm suite in
   RPKI.  This is also the steady state for the RPKI.

   During Phase 0, CAs X, Y and Z are required to generate signed



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   product sets using only the Algorithm Suite A. Also, RPs are required
   to validate signed product sets issued using only Algorithm Suite A.

   The following figure shows an example of the structure of signed
   objects in the repository, indicating the algorithm suites in use,
   and showing the relationships between three CAs (X, Y, and Z) that
   form a certification chain.  Vertical alignment in the figure
   indicates objects signed by the same CA using the same private key.
   The differences in horizontal indentation also represent use of
   different publication points for objects signed by different CAs.
   The characters "|->" are used for visualization purposes for both the
   signing relationship and the publication point change.  For example,
   the objects CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A, CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-
   Suite-A and CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A are all signed
   using the private key corresponding to CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-
   Suite-A and published at CA X's corresponding publication point.

   CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-XA)
           |-> CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-YA)
                   |-> CA-Z-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-ZA)
                           |-> CA-Z-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-ZA)
                           |-> CA-Z-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A
                   |-> CA-Y-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-YA)
                   |-> CA-Y-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A
           |-> CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-XA)
           |-> CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A

   Note: Cert-XA represent the certificate for CA X, that is signed
   using the algorithm suite A.

4.3.1.  Milestone 1

   The first milestone initiates the migration process.  It updates
   [RFC6485] with the following definitions for the RPKI:

   o  Algorithm Suite A

   o  Algorithm Suite B

   Additionally, the new algorithm transition timeline document MUST be
   published with the following information:

   o  CA Ready Algorithm B Date

   o  CA Go Algorithm B Date

   o  RP Ready Algorithm B Date




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   o  Twilight Date

   o  EOL Date

   o  Readiness metrics for CAs and RPs in each phase

   Each date specified here is assumed at one minute after midnight,
   UTC.  No finer granularity time specification is required or
   supported.

4.4.  Phase 1

   Phase 1 starts at the CA Ready Algorithm B Date.  During Phase 1, all
   (non-leaf) CAs MUST be ready to process a request from a child CA to
   issue or revoke a certificate using the Algorithm Suite B. If it is
   determined that a substantial number of CAs are not ready, the
   algorithm transition timeline document MUST be reissued, as noted in
   Section 4.2.  However, CAs that are capable of issuing Suite B
   certificates may continue to do so, if requested by their child CAs.
   Since this phase does not require any RPs to process signed objects
   under Suite B, and since Suite B product sets SHOULD be stored at
   independent publication points, there is no adverse impact on RPs.
   If the Suite B algorithm is deemed unsuitable, the algorithm
   transition timeline and the algorithm specification documents MUST be
   replaced, the Algorithm Suite B MUST be deprecated using the process
   described in Section 10.

   As the transition will happen using a (hierarchic) top-down model, a
   child CA will be able to issue certificates using the Algorithm Suite
   B only after its parent CA has issued its own.  The RPKI provisioning
   protocol can identify if a parent CA is capable of issuing
   certificates using the Algorithm Suite B, and can identify the
   corresponding algorithm suite in each Certificate Signing Request
   (see Section 5).  During much of this phase the Suite B product tree
   will be incomplete, i.e., not all CAs will have issued products under
   Suite B. Thus for production purposes, RPs MUST fetch and validate
   only Suite A products.  Suite B products should be fetched and
   processed only for testing purposes.

   The following figure shows the status of repository entries for the
   three example CAs during this Phase.  Two distinct certificate chains
   are maintained and CA Z has not yet requested any material using the
   Algorithm Suite B.








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   CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-XA)
           |-> CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-YA)
                   |-> CA-Z-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-ZA)
                           |-> CA-Z-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-ZA)
                           |-> CA-Z-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A
                   |-> CA-Y-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-YA)
                   |-> CA-Y-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A
           |-> CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-XA)
           |-> CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A

   CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-XB)
           |-> CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-YB)
                   |-> CA-Y-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-B (CRL-YB)
                   |-> CA-Y-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B
           |-> CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-B (CRL-XB)
           |-> CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B

4.5.  Phase 2

   Phase 2 starts at the CA Go Algorithm B Date.  At the start of this
   phase, each signed product set MUST be available using both Algorithm
   Suite A and Algorithm Suite B. Thus, prior to the start of this
   phase, every CA MUST ensure that there is a Suite B product
   corresponding to each Suite A product that the CA has issued.
   Throughout this Phase, each CA MUST maintain this correspondence.
   During this phase, RPs MUST be prepared to validate sets issued using
   Algorithm Suite A and MAY be prepared to validate sets issued using
   the Algorithm Suite B.

   If it is determined that a substantial number of CAs are not ready,
   the algorithm transition timeline document MUST be reissued, as noted
   in Section 4.2.  (Since the processing requirement for RPs here is a
   MAY, if RPs have problems with Suite B products this does not require
   pushing back the Phase 2 milestone, but it does motivate delaying the
   start of Phase 3.)  CAs that are capable of publishing products under
   Suite B MAY continue to do so.  Phase 2, like Phase 1, does not
   require any RPs to process signed objects under Suite B. Also, Suite
   B product SHOULD be stored at independent publication points, so
   there is no adverse impact on RPs that are not prepared to process
   suite B products (See Section 9 for additional details.)  If the
   Suite B algorithm is deemed unsuitable, the algorithm transition
   timeline and the algorithm specification documents MUST be replaced
   and the Algorithm Suite B MUST be deprecated using the process
   described in Section 10.

   It is RECOMMENDED that RPs that can process Algorithm Suite B fetch
   and validate Suite B products.  RPs that are not ready to process
   Suite B products MUST continue to make use of Suite A products.  An



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   RP that elects to validate signed product sets using both Algorithm
   Suite A or Algorithm Suite B should expect the same results.  If
   there are discrepancies when evaluating corresponding signed product
   sets, successful validation of either product set is acceptable.  A
   detailed analysis of the validation of multiple instances of signed
   objects is included in Section 6.

   The following figure shows the status of the repository entries for
   the three example CAs throughout this phase, where all signed objects
   are available using both algorithm suites.

   CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-XA)
           |-> CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-YA)
                   |-> CA-Z-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-ZA)
                           |-> CA-Z-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-ZA)
                           |-> CA-Z-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A
                   |-> CA-Y-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-YA)
                   |-> CA-Y-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A
           |-> CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-XA)
           |-> CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A

   CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-XB)
           |-> CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-YB)
                   |-> CA-Z-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-ZB)
                           |-> CA-Z-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-B (CRL-ZB)
                           |-> CA-Z-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B
                   |-> CA-Y-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-B (CRL-YB)
                   |-> CA-Y-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B
           |-> CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-B (CRL-XB)
           |-> CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B

4.6.  Phase 3

   Phase 3 starts at the RP Ready Algorithm B Date.  During this phase,
   all signed product sets are available using both algorithm suites and
   all RPs MUST be able to validate them.  (The correspondence between
   Suite A and Suite B products was required for Phase 2, and maintained
   throughout that Phase.  The same requirements apply throughout this
   Phase.)  It is RECOMMENDED that, in preparation for Phase 4, RPs
   retrieve and process Suite B product sets first, and treat them as
   the preferred product sets for validation throughout this phase.
   Thus an RP SHOULD try to validate the sets of signed products
   retrieved from the Algorithm Suite B repository first.

   If a substantial number of RPs are unable to process product sets
   signed with Suite B, the algorithm transition timeline document MUST
   be reissued, pushing back the date for this and later milestones, as
   discussed in Section 4.2.  Since the Suite B products SHOULD be



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   published at distinct publication points, RPs that cannot process
   Suite B products can be expected to revert to the Suite A products
   that still exist.  If the Suite B algorithm is deemed unsuitable, the
   algorithm transition timeline and the algorithm specification
   documents MUST be replaced and the Algorithm Suite B MUST be
   deprecated using the process described in Section 10.

   There are no changes to the CA behavior throughout this phase.

4.7.  Phase 4

   Phase 4 starts at the Twilight Date.  At that date, the Algorithm A
   is labeled as "old" and the Algorithm B is labeled as "current".

   During this phase, all signed product sets MUST be issued using
   Algorithm Suite B and MAY be issued using Algorithm Suite A. All
   signed products sets issued using Suite B MUST be published at their
   corresponding publication points.  Signed products sets issued using
   Suite A might not be available at their corresponding publication
   points.  Every RP MUST validate signed product sets using Suite B.
   RPs MAY validate signed product sets using Suite A. However, RPs
   SHOULD NOT assume that the collection of Suite A product sets is
   complete.  Thus RPs SHOULD make use of only Suite B products sets.
   (See Section 6 for further details.)

   If it is determined that many RPs are not capable of processing the
   new algorithm suite, the algorithm transition timeline document MUST
   be reissued pushing back the date for this and the next milestone.
   The document MUST require CA to not remove Suite A product sets if
   this phase is delayed.  If the Algorithm Suite B is deemed
   unsuitable, the algorithm transition timeline, the algorithm
   specification documents MUST be replaced, the Algorithm Suite B MUST
   be deprecated using the process described in Section 10 and CAs MUST
   NOT remove Suite A product sets.  At this stage, RPs are still
   capable of processing Suite A signed products, so the RPKI is still
   viable.

   The following figure describes a possible status for the repositories
   of the example CAs.












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   CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-XA)
           |-> CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-A (Cert-YA)
                   |-> CA-Y-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-YA)
                   |-> CA-Y-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A
           |-> CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-XA)
           |-> CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-A

   CA-X-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-XB)
           |-> CA-Y-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-YB)
                   |-> CA-Z-Certificate-Algorithm-Suite-B (Cert-ZB)
                           |-> CA-Z-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-ZB)
                           |-> CA-Z-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B
                   |-> CA-Y-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-YB)
                   |-> CA-Y-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B
           |-> CA-X-CRL-Algorithm-Suite-A (CRL-XB)
           |-> CA-X-Signed-Objects-Algorithm-Suite-B


4.8.  Return to Phase 0

   The EOL Date triggers the return to Phase 0 (steady state).  At this
   point, the old algorithm suite (Algorithm Suite A) MUST be deprecated
   using the process described in Section 10.

   This phase closes the loop as the new algorithm suite (Algorithm
   Suite B) is the only required algorithm suite in RPKI.  From this
   point forward, this suite is referred to as Algorithm Suite A.

   If it is determined that many RPs are not capable of processing the
   new algorithm suite, the algorithm transition timeline document MUST
   be reissued pushing back the date for this milestone.




















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5.  Multi Algorithm support in the RPKI provisioning protocol

   The migration described in this document is a top-down process, where
   two synchronization issues need to be solved between child and parent
   CAs:

   o  A child CA needs to identify which algorithm suites are supported
      by its parent CA

   o  A child CA needs to signal which algorithm suite should be used by
      its parent CA to sign a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)

   The RPKI provisioning protocol [RFC6492] supports multiple algorithms
   suites by implementing different resource classes for each suite.
   Several different resource classes also may use the same algorithm
   suite for different resource sets.

   A child CA that wants to identify which algorithm suites are
   supported by its parent CA MUST perform the following tasks:

   1.  Establish a provisioning protocol session with its parent CA

   2.  Perform a "list" command as described in Section 3.3.1 of
       [RFC6492]

   3.  From the Payload in the "list response" resource class, extract
       the "issuer's certificate" for each class.  The Algorithm Suite
       for each class will match the Algorithm Suite used to issue the
       corresponding "issuer's certificate" (as specified in the
       SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of that certificate)

   A child CA that wants to specify an Algorithm Suite to its parent CA
   (e.g., in a certificate request) MUST perform the following tasks:

   1.  Perform the tasks described above to identify the algorithm
       suites supported by its parent CA, and the resource class
       corresponding to each suite

   2.  Identify the corresponding resource class in the appropriate
       provisioning protocol command (e.g. "issue" or "revoke")

   Upon receipt of a certificate request from a child CA, a parent CA
   will verify the PoP of the private key.  If a child CA requests
   issuing a certificate using an algorithm suite that does not match a
   resource class, the PoP validation will fail and the request will not
   be performed.





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6.  Validation of multiple instance of signed products

   During Phases 1,2,3 and 4, two algorithm suites will be valid
   simultaneously in RPKI.  In this section, we describe the RP behavior
   when validating corresponding signed products using different
   algorithm suites.

   During Phase 1 two (corresponding) instances MAY be available for
   each signed product, one signed under Algorithm Suite A and one under
   Algorithm Suite B. As noted in Section 4.4, in this phase there is a
   preference for Suite A product sets.  All products are available
   under Suite A, while only some products may be available under Suite
   B. For production purposes an RP MAY fetch and validate only Suite A
   products.  Suite B products SHOULD be fetched and validated only for
   test purposes.  When product sets exist under both Suites, they
   should yield equivalent results, which facilitates testing.  (It is
   not possible to directly compare Suite A and Suite B product sets, as
   certs, CRLs, and manifests will appear syntactically different.
   However, the output of the process, i.e., the ROA payloads
   (Autonomous System Number and address prefix data), SHOULD match,
   modulo timing issues.)

   During Phases 2 and 3 of this process, two (corresponding) instances
   of all signed products MUST be available to RPs.  As noted in Section
   4.5, it is RECOMMENDED that Suite B capable RPs fetch and validate
   Suite B products sets, during Phase 2.  If an RP encounters
   validation problems with the Suite B products, it SHOULD revert to
   using Suite A products.  RPs that are Suite B capable MAY fetch both
   product sets and compare the results (e.g., ROA outputs) for testing.

   In Phase 3 all RPs MUST be Suite B capable, and MUST fetch Suite B
   product sets.  If an RP encounters problems with Suite B product
   sets, it can revert to Suite A products.  RPs encountering such
   problems SHOULD contact the relevant repository maintainers (e.g.,
   using the mechanism defined in [RFC6493] to report problems.)

   During Phase 4 only Suite B product sets are required to be present
   for all RPKI entities, as per Section 4.7.  Thus RPs SHOULD retrieve
   and validate only these product sets.  Retrieval of Suite A products
   sets may yield an incomplete set of signed products and is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.










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7.  Revocation

   The algorithm migration process mandates the maintenance of two
   parallel but equivalent certification hierarchies during Phases 2 and
   3 of the process.  During these phases, a CA MUST revoke and request
   revocation of certificates consistently under both algorithm Suites.
   When not performing a key rollover operation (as described in Section
   8), a CA requesting the revocation of its certificate during these
   two phases MUST perform that request for both algorithm suites (A and
   B).  A non-leaf CA SHOULD NOT verify that its child CAs comply with
   this requirement.  Note that a CA MUST request revocation of its
   certificate relative to a specific algorithm suite using the
   mechanism described in Section 5

   During Phase 1, a CA that revokes a certificate under Suite A SHOULD
   revoke the corresponding certificate under Suite B, if that
   certificate exists.  During Phase 4, a CA that revokes a certificate
   under Suite B SHOULD revoke the corresponding certificate under Suite
   A, if that certificate exists.

   During Phase 1, a CA may revoke certificates under Suite B without
   revoking them under Suite A, since the Suite B products are for test
   purposes.  During Phase 4 a CA may revoke certificates issued under
   Suite A without revoking them under Suite B, since Suite A products
   are being deprecated.


























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8.  Key rollover

   Key rollover (without algorithm changes) is effected independently
   for each algorithm suite and MUST follow the process described in
   [RFC6489].














































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9.  Repository structure

   The two parallel hierarchies that will exist during the transition
   process SHOULD have independent publications points.  The repository
   structures for each algorithm suite are described in [RFC6481].














































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10.  Deprecating an Algorithm Suite

   To deprecate an algorithm suite, the following process MUST be
   executed by every CA in the RPKI:

   1.  Each CA MUST cease issuing certificates under the suite.  This
       means that any request for a (CA) certificate from a child will
       be rejected, e.g., sending an error_response message with error
       code:"request - no such resource class" as defined in [RFC6492].

   2.  Each CA MUST cease generating signed products, except the CRL and
       Manifest, under the deprecated Algorithm Suite.

   3.  Each CA MUST revoke the EE certificates for all signed products
       that it has issued under the deprecated Algorithm Suite.  The CA
       SHOULD delete these products from its publication point, to avoid
       burdening RPs with downloading and processing these products.

   4.  Each CA MUST revoke all CA certificates that it has issued under
       the deprecated Algorithm Suite.

   5.  Each CA SHOULD remove all CA certificates that it has issued
       under the deprecated Algorithm Suite.

   6.  Each CA that publishes a TAL under the deprecated Algorithm Suite
       MUST removed it from the TAL's publication point.

   7.  Each CA SHOULD continue to maintain the publication point for the
       deprecated Algorithm Suite, maintained at least until the CRL
       nextUpdate.  This publication point MUST contain only the CRL and
       a Manifest for that publication point.  This behavior provides a
       window in which RPs may be able to become aware of the revoked
       status of the signed products that have been deleted.

   8.  Each RP MUST remove any TALs that is has published under the
       deprecated Algorithm Suite.

   CAs in the RPKI hierarchy may become aware of the deprecation of the
   algorithm suite at different times, and may execute the procedure
   above in an asynchronous fashion relative to one another.  Thus, for
   example, a CA may request revocation of its CA certificate only to
   learn that the certificate has already been revoked by the issuing
   CA.  The revocation of a CA certificate makes the CRL and manifest
   issued under it incapable of validation.  The asynchronous execution
   of this procedure likely will result in transient "inconsistencies"
   among the publication points associated with the deprecated algorithm
   suite.  However, these inconsistencies should yield "fail safe"
   results, i.e., the objects signed under the deprecated suite should



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   be rejected by RPs.


















































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11.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA requirements
















































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12.  Security Considerations

   An algorithm transition in RPKI should be a very infrequent event and
   it requires wide community consensus.  The events that may lead to an
   algorithm transition may be related to a weakness of the
   cryptographic strength of the algorithm suite in use by RPKI, which
   is normal to happen over time.  The procedure described in this
   document will take years to complete an algorithm transition.  During
   that time, the RPKI system will be vulnerable to any cryptographic
   weakness that may have triggered this procedure (i.e. downgrade
   attack).

   This document does not describe an emergency mechanism for algorithm
   migration.  Due to the distributed nature of RPKI, and the very large
   number of CAs and RPs, the authors do not believe it is feasible to
   effect an emergency algorithm migration procedure.

   If a CA does not complete its migration to the new algorithm suite as
   described in this document (after the EOL of the "old" algorithm
   suite), its signed product set will no longer be valid.
   Consequently, the RPKI may, at the end of Phase 4, have a smaller
   number of valid signed products than before starting the process.
   Conversely, a RP that does not follow this process will lose the
   ability to validate signed products issued under the new algorithm
   suite.  The resulting incomplete view of routing info from the RPKI
   (as a result of a failure by CAs or RPs to complete the transition)
   could degrade routing in the public Internet.
























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13.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the work of the SIDR working
   group co-chairs (Sandra Murphy and Chris Morrow) as well as the
   contributions given by Geoff Huston, Arturo Servin, Brian Weis, Terry
   Manderson, Brian Dickson and Danny McPherson.













































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14.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              February 2012.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.

   [RFC6484]  Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
              Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.

   [RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
              Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
              RFC 6485, February 2012.

   [RFC6489]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification
              Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012.

   [RFC6490]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
              "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
              Locator", RFC 6490, February 2012.

   [RFC6492]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A
              Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates",
              RFC 6492, February 2012.

   [RFC6493]  Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.









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Appendix A.  Change Log

   Note to the RFC Editor: Please remove this section before
   publication.

   From 11 to 12

   Changed to BCP from Standard track.

   From 10 to 11

   Additional GenArt review on section 4 to improve the description of
   the figures showing the CAs chains.

   From 09 to 10

   1.  GenArt Comments: Remove Algorithm C from process and replace a
       couple of "will" with MUST when referring to issuing a new
       document.

   From 08 to 09

   1.  SecDIR comments and nits included

   From 07 to 08

   1.  Typo in Section 10

   2.  Correct reference for RFC6493

   From 06 to 07:

   1.  Added definition for "Correspond"

   2.  Added reference of correspondence between suites in phase 2 and 3

   3.  Small nit on the revocation definition.

   From 05 to 06:

   1.  Added reference to published RFCs

   2.  Removed requirement on dates format

   3.  Changed revocation section to emphasize the differences between
       phase 1,2,3 and 4.





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   4.  Added Section 10: Deprecating an Algorithm Suite

   5.  Typos and editoral changes

   From 04 to 05:

   1.  WGLC nits

   From 03 to 04:

   1.  Added text for "roll-over" capability in each phase

   2.  Added the requirement for splitting the milestone 1 in two
       documents: the update of the alg document and a new document
       specifying the particular timelines

   3.  WGLC nits

   From 02 to 03:

   1.  Explicitely named than "mixed" certificates are not allowed for
       CA certs but may be possible for EE certs that are not used to
       validate repository objects.

   From 01 to 02:

   1.  Add reference to Multi-Objects validation

   2.  EOL Date is the only milestone that RP and CA take actions "at
       the same time".

   3.  Updated references

   4.  Editorial

   From 00 to 01:

   1.  Include text to clarify former Suites

   2.  Include text that documents that an RP that validates an object
       signed with either suites in Phase 2 MUST consider it as valid

   From individual submission to WG item:

   1.  Change form "laisez faire" to "top-down"

   2.  Included Multi Algorithm support in the RPKI provisioning
       protocol



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   3.  Included Validation of multiple instance of signed products

   4.  Included Revocations

   5.  Included Key rollover

   6.  Included Repository structure

   7.  Included Security Considerations

   8.  Included Acknowledgements








































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Authors' Addresses

   Roque Gagliano
   Cisco Systems
   Avenue des Uttins 5
   Rolle,   1180
   Switzerland

   Email: rogaglia@cisco.com


   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA  02138
   USA

   Email: kent@bbn.com


   Sean Turner
   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA  22031
   USA

   Email: turners@ieca.com
























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