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Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                               K. Seo
Internet Draft                                                 R. Watro
Expires: August 2008                                            D. Kong
Intended Status: Informational                                  S. Kent
                                                        BBN Technologies
                                                       February 25, 2008

                           Certificate Policy (CP)
                         for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                          draft-ietf-sidr-cp-03.txt


Status of this Memo

    By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
    any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
    aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
    becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
    BCP 79.

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    This Internet-Draft will expire on August 31, 2008.

Abstract

    This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
    support improved routing security. Each organization that allocates
    IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization
    will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation.
    These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the
    associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in
    the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these
    resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this



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    policy are employed, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed
    data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security
    mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs.

Conventions used in this document

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents

    1. Introduction...................................................8
       1.1. Overview..................................................9
       1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
       1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
          1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
          1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12
          1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
          1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
          1.3.5. Other participants..................................13
       1.4. Certificate usage........................................13
          1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................13
          1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
       1.5. Policy administration....................................13
          1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............14
          1.5.2. Contact person......................................14
          1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy....14
          1.5.4. CP approval procedures..............................14
       1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................14
    2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................16
       2.1. Repositories.............................................16
       2.2. Publication of certification information.................16
       2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................16
       2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................16
    3. Identification And Authentication.............................17
       3.1. Naming...................................................17
          3.1.1. Types of names......................................17
          3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17
          3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17
          3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17
          3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17
          3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.18
       3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18
          3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18
          3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18
          3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18
          3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19


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          3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19
          3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19
       3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19
          3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key19
          3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
          revocation.................................................19
       3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20
    4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21
       4.1. Certificate Application..................................21
          4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21
          4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21
       4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21
          4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
          ...........................................................21
          4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...22
          4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22
       4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22
          4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22
          4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
          certificate................................................22
          4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................22
       4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22
          4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22
          4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............23
       4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................23
          4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23
          4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23
       4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23
          4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23
          4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23
          4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24
          4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................24
          4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
          certificate................................................24
          4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24
          4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................24
       4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24
          4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24
          4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25
          4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25
          4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................25
          4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
          certificate................................................25
          4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25


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          4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................25
       4.8. Certificate modification.................................25
          4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25
          4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26
          4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26
          4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................26
          4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
          ...........................................................26
          4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...26
          4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................26
       4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................26
          4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................26
          4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27
          4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27
          4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27
          4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
          request....................................................27
          4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.27
          4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................27
          4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................27
          4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
          [OMITTED]..................................................28
          4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].28
          4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
          [OMITTED]..................................................28
          4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...28
          4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............28
          4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............28
          4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........28
          4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............28
       4.10. Certificate status services.............................28
          4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............28
          4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................28
          4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................28
       4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................28
       4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................28
          4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
          ...........................................................28
          4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
          practices [OMITTED]........................................28
    5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................29
       5.1. Physical controls........................................29
          5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED]............29
          5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED]...........................29
          5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED]................29


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          5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED]...........................29
          5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED]............29
          5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED].............................29
          5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED]............................29
          5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED]...........................29
       5.2. Procedural controls......................................29
          5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED].............................29
          5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED].......29
          5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
          [OMITTED]..................................................29
          5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED]......29
       5.3. Personnel controls.......................................29
          5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
          [OMITTED]..................................................30
          5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED]...............30
          5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED].....................30
          5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED].....30
          5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED].......30
          5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED]........30
          5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED].......30
          5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED].......30
       5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................30
          5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................30
          5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................30
          5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................30
          5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................31
          5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................31
          5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................31
          5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....31
          5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................31
       5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................31
          5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................31
          5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............31
          5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................31
          5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................31
          5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].31
          5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................31
          5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
          [OMITTED]..................................................31
       5.6. Key changeover...........................................31
       5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............32
          5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]32
          5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
          corrupted [OMITTED]........................................32
          5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..32



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          5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
          [OMITTED]..................................................32
       5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................32
    6. Technical Security Controls...................................33
       6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................33
          6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................33
          6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................33
          6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........33
          6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........33
          6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................34
          6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking34
          6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)34
       6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
       Controls......................................................34
          6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........34
          6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......34
          6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................35
          6.2.4. Private key backup..................................35
          6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED]......................35
          6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
          module [OMITTED]...........................................35
          6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED]35
          6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED]..........35
          6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED]........35
          6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED].........35
          6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED]..............35
       6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35
          6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35
          6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
          periods....................................................35
       6.4. Activation data [OMITTED]................................36
          6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED]36
          6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED]................36
          6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED]..........36
       6.5. Computer security controls...............................36
          6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements
          [OMITTED]..................................................36
          6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36
       6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36
          6.6.1. System development controls.........................36
          6.6.2. Security management controls........................36
          6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36
       6.7. Network security controls................................36
       6.8. Time-stamping............................................36
    7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37
       7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37
          7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
          7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37


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          7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37
          7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37
          7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37
          7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37
          7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37
          7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37
          7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
          Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37
       7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37
          7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
          7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37
       7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37
          7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
          7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37
    8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................38
       8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED].......38
       8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED]............38
       8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED].....38
       8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED]...................38
       8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED]........38
       8.6   Communication of results [OMITTED]......................38
    9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39
       9.1. Fees.....................................................39
          9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39
          9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39
          9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39
          9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED]...................39
          9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED].............................39
       9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39
          9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39
          9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED]..............................39
          9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
          [OMITTED]..................................................39
       9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39
          9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39
          9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
          information................................................39
          9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39
       9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39
          9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39
          9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39
          9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................40
          9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......40
          9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......40
          9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
          process....................................................40
          9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40
       9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40


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       9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40
          9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40
          9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40
          9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED]
          ...........................................................40
          9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
          [OMITTED]..................................................40
       9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40
       9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40
       9.9. Indemnities..............................................40
       9.10. Term and termination....................................40
          9.10.1. Term...............................................40
          9.10.2. Termination........................................40
          9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40
       9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40
       9.12. Amendments..............................................40
          9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40
          9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40
          9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
          [OMITTED]..................................................40
       9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40
       9.14. Governing law...........................................41
       9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................41
       9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................41
          9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41
          9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41
          9.16.3. Severability.......................................41
          9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41
          9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41
       9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41
    10. Security Considerations......................................42
    11. IANA Considerations..........................................42
    12. Acknowledgments..............................................42
    13. References...................................................42
       13.1. Normative References....................................42
       13.2. Informative References..................................43
    Author's Addresses...............................................44
    Intellectual Property Statement..................................45
    Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
    Copyright Statement..............................................45


1. Introduction

    This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
    support improved routing security. An organization that allocates IP
    addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will,
    in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These


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    certificates will enable verification that the holder of the
    associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in
    the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these
    resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this
    policy are employed can be used in a number of ways, for example, in
    conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, it can
    be used to provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms,
    e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. This security
    infrastructure is described in more detail in [ARCH].

    The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
    this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
    address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
    contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
    certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
    to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
    an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
    the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
    of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
    to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
    contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
    certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed
    exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to
    address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on support of
    routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs
    managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this
    CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

    Note: This document is based on the template specified in RFC 3647.
    A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from
    this policy because they did not apply to this PKI.  However, we
    have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted
    sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section
    numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section
    headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents
    the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

    This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
    holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space, and AS numbers, in
    accordance with the (current) records of the registries and ISPs
    that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is
    essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous allocation of these
    resources, and this, in turn, is an essential underpinning of
    routing in the public Internet.




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    Internet routing is based on a distributed system of many routers,
    which are grouped into management domains called Autonomous Systems
    (ASes). Routing information is exchanged between ASes using Border
    Gateway Protocol (BGP) [BGP4] UPDATE messages. BGP has proven to be
    highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks [Murphy], due to the lack
    of a scalable means of verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of
    BGP control traffic, e.g., route originations. This PKI, and
    ancillary, signed data, will support detection of bogus route
    originations and facilitate routing security enhancements by network
    operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), e.g., creation
    of accurate route filters. (Bogus route origination occurs whenever
    an AS advertises itself as the origin AS for a prefix, without being
    authorized to do so by the legitimate holder of the prefix.)

    The proposed security infrastructure consists of three components: a
    PKI, repositories, and digitally signed objects called route
    origination authorizations (ROAs). The PKI authoritatively documents
    the current allocation of address blocks and AS numbers to
    organizations, as recorded by the organizations that manage such
    allocations. (For brevity, this document uses the term
    "organization" to refer to every resource holder, even if the holder
    is an individual.)  A ROA is a digitally signed object by which an
    address space holder explicitly authorizes one or more ASes to
    originate routes to its address space. Repositories provide the
    means of distributing the PKI data (certificates and CRLs) and ROA
    data to relying parties. The intent is each network operator uploads
    its new or updated PKI and ROA data periodically to repositories,
    e.g., daily. On a similar schedule, each network operator also is
    expected to download new or updated data uploaded by others. From
    this data, operators extract authenticated address block origination
    data, which can be used to validate routing requests or to construct
    route filters in a more secure fashion than is currently offered via
    Internet Routing Registries (IRRs).

    This PKI parallels the existing IP address and AS number allocation
    hierarchy. These resources are allocated by the Regional Internet
    Registries (RIRs -- ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC
    (Asia -Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
    (Africa) which act as default trust anchors for the PKI.  In some
    regions, national (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the RIRs
    for address allocation. ISPs and network subscribers form additional
    tiers below registries. (ISPs who acquire allocations from RIRs or
    NIRs, and who sub-allocate address space are referred to as Local
    Internet Registries (LIRs)).

    The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see draft-ietf-
    sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):



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   . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
      and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder

   . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
      ROAs and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects

   . In the future the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
      support of access control for the repository system

1.2. Document name and identification

    The name of this document is "Certificate Policy for the Resource
    PKI (RPKI)".

    This policy has been assigned the following OID:

    id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber

        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)

                dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
    cp(14) 2 }

1.3. PKI participants

    Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
    organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
    term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
    qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
    the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
    service from an ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can
    refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and
    LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are
    subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note
    that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as
    organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When
    necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an
    organization that receives network services from an ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

    The organizations that allocate IP addresses (RIRs, NIRs, LIRs) and
    AS numbers (RIRs and NIRs) act as CAs in this PKI.

    Non-ISP organizations that hold address space will create and sign
    ROAs and hence will issue EE certificates (and may issue other types
    of EE certificates in the future). Thus they too must act as CAs in
    this PKI.


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1.3.2. Registration authorities

    This function will be provided by the CAs listed in Section 1.3.1.
    The RIRs (and NIRs where applicable) already perform this function
    and assume responsibility for allocating and tracking the current
    allocation of address space and AS numbers. LIRs do the same for
    sub-allocation of address space that they hold.  With regard to
    allocation of IP address and AS numbers, RIRs et al. establish a
    formal relationship with an organization and allocate these
    resources to that organization.

1.3.3. Subscribers

    These are the organizations receiving allocations of IP addresses
    and AS numbers as shown in Figures 1 and 2.

   . For IP address allocations,

        o a non-ISP organization can be a subscriber of an ISP, LIR,
           NIR, or an RIR,

        o an ISP can be a subscriber of an LIR, NIR, or RIR

        o an NIR or LIR is a subscriber of an RIR

   . For AS number allocations,

        o network subscribers and ISPs/LIRs are subscribers of RIRs and
           NIRs.

    Note that any of these organizations may have received allocations
    from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs,
    which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This
    the PKI accommodates such relationships.

1.3.4. Relying parties

    Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
    number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
    entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
    certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
    parties. This includes ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging
    BGP traffic with ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
    allocation of address space from ISP A but want to authorize ISP B
    to originate routes to this space.





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    To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
    control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
    ROA update packages, and they too act as relying parties.

1.3.5. Other participants

    RIRs (and perhaps NIRs) will operate repositories that hold
    certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects, e.g., ROAs.

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

    The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
    in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
    space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
    routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
    of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
    fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
    originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
    proxy aggregation.  Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
    basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.

    Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
    could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
    access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
    permitted under this policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

    Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited
    under this policy.

1.5. Policy administration

    [What organization/contact would the WG like to put here?  This
    section includes the name and mailing address of the organization
    that is responsible for the drafting, registering, maintaining, and
    updating of this CP.  It also includes the name, electronic mail
    address, telephone number, and fax number of a contact person.  As
    an alternative to naming an actual person, the document may name a
    title or role, an e-mail alias, and other generalized contact
    information.  We have left "NRO" for now since it would be simplest
    to have just one organization/contact handle these responsibilities.
    Another possibility would be to have Section 1.5.1 point to:

      . IETF RFC Editor for distribution and making the document
         available.


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      . IETF SIDR Working Group for document drafting, content
         maintenance and updating.

    And have Section 1.5.2 have the corresponding contact info, i.e.,
    the email addresses for the IETF RFC Editor and the Working Group
    Chairs for the SIDR Working Group.]

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

    This CP is administered by the ???.

    [It would be nice to have a single organization responsible for

1.5.2. Contact person

    [insert contact info here]

1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy

    Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
    public key in the certificate. These are the same organizations that
    perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to
    the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CP approval procedures

    Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
    public key in the certificate. The issuing organization is the same
    organization as the one that performs the allocation.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

BGP -  Border Gateway Protocol.  This is the protocol used in the
        Internet for propagating the connectivity information used as a
        basis for inter-domain routing. [BGP4]

CPS -  Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
        specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
        in issuing certificates.

ISP -  Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and
        selling Internet services to other organizations.




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LIR -  Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
        network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
        IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or
        National) Registry.

NIR -  National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages
        the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a portion of the
        geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.  NIRs form an
        optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP
        address and AS number allocation.

RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
        manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
        geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs: ARIN (North
        America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific), LACNIC
        (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).

ROA -  Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed
        object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS
        that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of
        address blocks.





























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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

    Certificates, CRLs, and ROAs must be made available for downloading
    by all network operators, to enable them to validate this data for
    use in support of routing security. This motivates use of a robust
    repository system. Since this data will be accessed by a very large
    number of network operators around the world, multiple repositories
    are required to provide redundancy and for load sharing. As a
    starting point, a repository will be operated by each RIR.

2.2. Publication of certification information

    All CAs will publish certificates via the repository system.

    Each CA will publish the CRL(s) that it issues by uploading to the
    repository system.

    ROAs will be uploaded to the repository system by address space
    holders, e.g., network subscribers and ISPs/LIRs.

    An organization may choose to outsource publication of PKI data.

2.3. Time or frequency of publication

    A certificate will be published within 24 hours after the CA issues
    the certificate.

    Each CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value
    in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. Within 12 hours of
    effecting revocation, a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for the
    revoked certificate.

    A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
    within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
    ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

       Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,
    must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
    (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
    signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
    that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
    does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
    the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.



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3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

    Names for RIRs and NIRs will be directory distinguished names, using
    a subset of the following attributes: C, O, OU, and CN. Names for
    LIRs/ISPs and subscribers will consist of a single CN attribute with
    a value generated by the issuer.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

    The Subject name in each certificate must be unique relative to all
    Subject names certified by an Issuer, but the name does not need to
    be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee, that
    subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates
    issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of
    routing security, not for identification. The intent is to allow the
    holder of a set of address blocks to be able to announce to the
    Internet, in a secure fashion, the AS number of each entity that is
    authorized to originate a route to these addresses. The PKI binds a
    public key to each address block or AS number.  The name of the
    holder of the address block or AS number need not be "meaningful" or
    even accurate. For purposes of routing security, the issuer and
    subject name in each certificate are not relevant, other than the
    usual PKI requirements for contextual uniqueness in support of
    unambiguous certificate path chaining.

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

    Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
    appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus
    no explicit support for this feature is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

    None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

    Each CA certifies Subject names that must be unique among the
    certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
    Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
    certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
    enforced through technical means.




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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

    Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
    is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
    marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will require each
    Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
    corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
    the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
    each CA and will be declared in the CPS of that CA.

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
    procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
    reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
    has allocated (or sub-allocated) the address space identified in the
    certificate. The same requirement is imposed on the binding of one
    or more AS numbers in a certificate to the organization represented
    by the Subject. The specific procedures employed for this purpose
    may vary among CAs. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ
    procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
    or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation.

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
    procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative
    of each organization that is an address space (AS number) holder.
    This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the
    certificate issued to the organization. The specific means by which
    each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
    organization may vary, and will be specified in the CPS of the CA.
    Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate
    with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
    authenticating individuals as representatives for address space (AS
    number) holders. Moreover, this authentication is solely for use by
    each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it allocates (or
    sub-allocates) address space (or AS numbers), and thus must not be
    relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship.





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3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

    No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
    under this certificate policy.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
    procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
    organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to
    represent that organization in this context. Relying parties can
    expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
    already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals
    as representatives for address space (AS number) holders.

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

    This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
    other PKI.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
    procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
    legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space
    and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will require PoP of the private
    key corresponding to the new public key.  The specific procedures
    employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. The means by which
    PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be declared in the CPS of
    that CA.  With respect to authentication of the holder of the
    address space and AS numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to
    employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
    registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number)
    allocation.

    Note: An issuer may choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
    with contractual agreements with the recipient.

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
    procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
    revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and
    associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will
    require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key.
    The specific procedures employed for these purposes may vary among


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    CAs. The means by which PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be
    declared in the certification practice statement of that CA.  With
    respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS
    numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
    commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
    the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note that
    there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate
    subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the
    case when it no longer has access to that key.

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
    procedures to ensure that an organization requesting revocation is
    the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address
    space and AS numbers) to be revoked.  The specific procedures
    employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. Relying parties can
    expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
    already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address
    (and AS number) allocation.

    Note:  If new IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to an
    organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not be
    revoked. Instead, a new certificate may issued with both the old and
    the new resources and the old key.  If IP addresses or AS numbers
    are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the
    old certificate must be revoked (and a re-key must be performed in
    the event of key compromise).






















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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

    The Resource PKI issues several types of certificates.  Any entity
    that assigns Internet IP address space or AS numbers should acquire
    a certificate.  This includes registries and ISPs. Additionally,
    entities that hold AS numbers or that have address space assignments
    from a registry, or that are multi-homed, should acquire a
    certificate under this PKI, even if they do not exchange BGP UPDATEs
    with ISPs. The (CA) certificates issued to these entities will
    include one or both of the extensions defined by RFC 3779, X.509
    Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, as appropriate.

    Most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of registry
    and ISP normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space
    and AS number allocation, and thus a separate specific application
    to request a certificate usually will not be necessary.

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

    The enrollment process and procedures are based on the individual
    polices of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs/ISPs.  An entity that desires one or
    more certificates should contact the authorized registry for its
    geopolitical area, or contact its LIR/ISP if it receives address
    allocations from an LIR/ISP.  During the initial deployment of this
    PKI, registries and ISPs should contact their existing network
    subscribers about obtaining appropriate credentials.

4.2. Certificate application processing

    CAs should make use of existing standards for certificate
    application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
    Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
    and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10.  Each CA will define
    the certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its
    CPS.

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

    Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
    authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance of
    certificates to these subscribers.  It is important to note that the
    Resource PKI is never used to authenticate the identity of an
    organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the address blocks


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    and AS numbers they hold.  Because identity is not being vouched for
    by this PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify
    legal organization names, etc.

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

    Certificate applications will be approved based on the normal
    business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
    records of address space and AS number holders. Each CA will verify
    that the requester holds the corresponding private key for the
    public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to
    the requestor.

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

    No stipulation.  Each CA may declare its expected time frame for
    processing certificate applications as part of its CPS.

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

    If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it will issue the
    corresponding certificate and publish it to the repository.

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

    The CA will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
    The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in
    its CPS.

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
    [OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

    Within 24 hours of issuance, the CA will place the certificate in
    the repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
    subscriber review and acceptance.  Each CA shall state in its CPS
    the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate and
    notification to the subscriber.







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4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

    Certificates will be published in the repository system as per the
    conduct described in 4.4.1. The procedures for publication are
    defined by each CA in its CPS.

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

    A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

    Each holder of an address space or AS number allocation will be
    issued an X.509 certificate using RFC 3779 extensions.  When the
    subjects of these certificates are LIRs/ISPs or network subscribers,
    they also shall issue EE certificates to themselves for use in
    verifying ROAs.  Subjects also will issue subordinate, end-entity
    certificates to their personnel for repository maintenance.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

    The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
    certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route
    filters.  Repositories use certificates to verify the authorization
    of entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus
    represent a secondary type of relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

    A certificate should be processed for renewal based on its
    expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject.
    If the issuing CA initiates the renewal process based on the
    certificate expiration date, then that CA shall notify the holder in
    advance of the renewal process.  The validity interval of the new
    (renewed) certificate should overlap that of the previous
    certificate, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

    Certificate renewal should incorporate the same public key as the
    previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
    compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
    Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2. Who may request renewal

    The certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the renewal
    process.  For example, a certificate holder may request an early


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    renewal if it wishes to change the public key, or if it expects to
    be unavailable to support the renewal process at the normal
    expiration cycle.

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

    Renewal processing must verify that the certificate in question has
    not been revoked.

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

    No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

    No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
    [OMITTED]

4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

    Re-key of a certificate should be performed only when required,
    based on:

    1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
       private key, or

    2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
       key pair

    The re-key operation can have dramatic consequences, requiring the
    re-issuance of all certificates issued by a re-keyed entity, so it
    should be performed only when necessary.  In particular, if a
    certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
    replacement certificate can and should incorporate the same public
    key rather than a new key.

    If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
    certificate must be revoked.




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    Section 5.6 below notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the
    signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity
    period of the certificate.  This places additional constraints on
    when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

    The holder of the certificate may request a re-key.  In addition,
    the CA that issued the certificate may initiate a re-key based on a
    verified compromise report.  Note that care must be taken to verify
    the authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when the
    private key has been reported as compromised.

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

    The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
    generation as defined in section 4.3.

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.3.2)

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

    No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
    (see section 4.4.1)

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

    No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.4.2)

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
    [OMITTED]

4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

    Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to
    selected attribute values in a certificate.  In the context of this
    PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate
    modification are additions to the address space and/or AS number
    holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension.





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    When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are removed
    from a certificate, then the old certificate is revoked and a new
    certificate is issued.

    When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
    issued.  The new certificate will contain the same public key and
    the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the
    incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS
    allocations expanded.  Revocation of the previous certificate is not
    required.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

    The certificate holder or issuer may initiate the certificate
    modification process.

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

    The CA must determine that the requested modification is appropriate
    and the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
    followed.

4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.3.2)

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

    No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
    (see section 4.4.1).

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

    No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.4.2).

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
    [OMITTED]

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

    Certificates can be revoked for several reasons.  Either the issuer
    or subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the
    certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate.  A
    certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the


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    private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.
    Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data
    signed by that certificate.  For example, if the private key
    associated with an EE certificate has been used to sign a ROA, then
    that EE certificate can be revoked to effect revocation of the ROA.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

    The certificate holder or issuer may request a revocation.

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

    A certificate holder must submit a request to the certificate issuer
    for a revocation.  A certificate issuer must notify the certificate
    holder when revoking a certificate, however this notification
    requirement is satisfied by publication of a CRL by the issuer.

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

    A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
    need for revocation has been identified.  There is no specified
    grace period for the subscriber in this process.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

    No stipulation. Each CA is free to specify its expected revocation
    processing time in its CPS.

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

    A relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most
    recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever
    the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

    As indicated in section 2.3, it is expected that CAs will publish
    CRLs approximately every 24 hours, although the specific CRL
    issuance frequency is determine by each CA.  Each CRL carries a
    nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL must be published at or
    before that time.  A CA must set the nextScheduledUpdate value when
    it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be
    issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

    It is expected that a CRL will be posted to the repository system
    with minimal delay after generation.


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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

    This PKI does not make use of OCSP or SCVP, because it is
    anticipated that the primary relying parties (ISPs) will acquire and
    validate certificates for all participating resource holders on a
    daily basis. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale,
    bulk certificate status checking. Instead, retrieval of all changed
    or new certificates and CRLs on a daily basis is the anticipated
    mode of certificate status verification.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
    [OMITTED]










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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

    Each CA will maintain physical security controls for its operation
    that are commensurate with those already employed by the
    organization in the management of address space and AS number
    allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in the
    relevant CPS.

5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED]

5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED]

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED]

5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED]

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED]

5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED]

5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED]

5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED]

5.2. Procedural controls

    Each CA will maintain procedural security controls that are
    commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the
    management of address space and AS number allocation. The details
    for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS.

5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED]

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED]

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role [OMITTED]

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED]

5.3. Personnel controls

    Each CA will maintain personnel security controls that are
    commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the
    management of address space and AS number allocation. The details
    for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS.



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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED]

5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED]

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED]

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED]

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

    Audit records should be generated for the basic operations of the
    certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records should
    include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
    content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include

   . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

   . Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
      requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
      notifications)

   . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

   . Posting of any material to a repository

   . Any attempts to change or delete audit data

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

    Each CA will establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

    Each CA will establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.






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5.4.4. Protection of audit log

    The audit log should be protected based on current industry
    standards.

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

    The audit log should be backed up based on current industry
    standards.

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

    The PKI subsystems of a registry or ISP should participate in any
    vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
    their normal business practice.

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

    The private key that a CA uses to sign a certificate or CRL must
    have a validity period that is at least as long as that of the
    certificate being signed.  This means that a CA must create a new
    signature key pair, and acquire a new certificate containing the
    public key of the pair, well in advance of the scheduled change of
    the current signature key pair.






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5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
    [OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

    In this PKI, each CA is authoritative for a specified range of IP
    addresses and a specified set of AS numbers.  If an organization
    acting as a CA in this PKI terminates operation without identifying
    a replacement, then a portion of the address space and AS numbers
    will need to be managed without support for validating
    authorizations until a new CA is brought on-line.































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6. Technical Security Controls

    The organizations that allocate IP addresses and AS numbers to
    subscribers are authoritative for these allocations.  This PKI is
    designed to enable LIRs/ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate
    that they are the holders of the resources that have been allocated
    to them.  Accordingly, the security controls used by CAs and
    subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those that
    apply to the procedures for administering the allocation of IP
    address space and AS number data by the extant organizations.
    Details of each CA's security controls are described in the CPS
    issued by the CA.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

    In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
    subject, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address
    space or AS numbers.  However, some CAs may offer to generate key
    pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the subjects,
    e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the ability to
    perform key generation in a secure fashion. Since the keys used in
    this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key
    pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI.
    Each CA will describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

    If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
    CPS will describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
    subscribers in a secure fashion.

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

    Each CA operating within the context of this PKI defines procedures
    whereby a subscriber requests IP address space (and/or AS numbers),
    authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The CPS of each
    CA will describe how these procedures are extended to support
    certificate issuance. The security of the procedures used by a
    subject to deliver its public key to a CA need only be commensurate
    with the security of the procedures already employed for management
    of the IP address space and AS numbers.

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

    CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in
    certificates issued by other CAs.  These certificates plus


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    certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
    or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying
    parties will download these certificates from the repositories.
    Public key values and associated data for the default trust anchors
    (RIRs) will be distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path
    validation software that will be made available to the Internet
    community.

6.1.5. Key sizes

    For RIR certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For NIR,
    LIR/ISP, and non-ISP subscriber certificates, the RSA keys will be
    either 2048 or 1024 bits.

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

    The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
    (e) F4 (65,537). Each subscriber is responsible for performing
    checks on the quality of its key pair. CAs are not responsible for
    performing such checks for subscribers.

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

    The Key usage extension bit values shall be consistent with RFC
    3280. For CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits shall be
    set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) shall be set
    FALSE, and the extension shall be marked critical. End entity
    certificates in this PKI may include this extension, with
    appropriate bit values, as per RFC 3280, but such inclusion is not
    required.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
    Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

    The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
    will be described in the CPS issued by that CA.

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

    Some CAs, e.g., registry CAs, may employ multi-person controls to
    constrain access to their private keys, but this is not a
    requirement for all CAs in the PKI. The CPS for a CA will describe
    any multi-person controls it employs.





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6.2.3. Private key escrow

    No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

6.2.4. Private key backup

    Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
    loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA should employ a
    secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the
    procedures for backing up a CA's private key will be described in
    the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED]

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
    [OMITTED]

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED]

6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED]

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED]

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED]

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED]

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

    Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
    to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

    The RIR and accepat key pairs and certificates should have long
    validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the disruption
    caused by key changeover for top tier CAs. LIR/ISP and subscriber
    certificates typically will have validity periods commensurate with
    the duration of service agreements. The validity periods will be
    chosen by the issuing CA and described in its CPS.








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6.4. Activation data [OMITTED]

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED]

6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED]

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED]

6.5. Computer security controls

    Each CA will document the technical security requirements it employs
    for CA computer operation in its CPS.

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements [OMITTED]

6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

    The CPS for each CA will document any system development controls
    required by that CA, if applicable.

6.6.2. Security management controls

    The security for the software and equipment used for this PKI shall
    be commensurate with that used for the systems used by the CAs for
    managing and allocating IP address and AS number resources.

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

    Equipment (hardware and software) used for this PKI shall be
    procured, installed, maintained, and updated in a fashion
    commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and
    allocation of IP address space and AS numbers is handled.

6.7. Network security controls

    Each CA shall employ network security controls for CA operation
    commensurate with the protection it employs for the computers used
    for managing allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers.

6.8. Time-stamping

    The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.




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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

    Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]


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8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments

    The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria
    against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes
    requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already
    authoritative for the management of IP address space and AS numbers,
    and the PKI simply supports verification of the allocation if these
    resources to subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other
    assessments are already used to ensure the security of the
    administration of IP addresses and AS numbers is sufficient for this
    PKI.

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED]

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED]

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED]

8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED]

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED]

8.6  Communication of results [OMITTED]



























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9. Other Business And Legal Matters

    As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
    managing the allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers are
    authoritative in their roles as managers of this data.  They will
    operate this PKI to allow the holders of address space and AS number
    allocations to generate digitally signed data that attests to these
    allocations, and to the authorization of LIRs/ISPs to originate
    routes for address blocks (via ROAs). Therefore, the manner in which
    the organizations in question manage their business and legal
    matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which
    they already manage business and legal matters in their existing
    roles. The topics listed below may be covered in the CPS issued by
    each CA. Not every CA may choose to address all of these topics.

9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED]

9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED]

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED]

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities [OMITTED]

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private


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9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information

9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED]

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions



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9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]

































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10. Security Considerations

    According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
    rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
    particular community and/or class of applications with common
    security requirements."  A CP may be used by a relying party to help
    in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
    sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
    application. This document describes the CP for the Internet Address
    and AS Number PKI.  There are separate documents (Certification
    Practice Statements (CPS's) that cover the factors that determine
    the degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
    in a certificate. The degree to which such a binding can be trusted
    depends on several factors, e.g., the practices followed by the
    certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's
    operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
    including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
    example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
    responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
    example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
    liability).

11. IANA Considerations

    None.

12. Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
    document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
        Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
        X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress, November
        2007.

[ARCH] Lepinski M., Kent S., Barnes R., "An Infrastructure to Support
        Secure Internet Routing," work in progress, February 2007.






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13.2. Informative References

[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-
        4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

[Murphy] Murphy, S., BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, draft-ietf-
        idr-bgp-vuln-01.txt, October 2004 (work in progress).

[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
        obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
        Communications ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

[S-BGP] Kent, S., Lynn, C., and Seo, K. Secure Border Gateway Protocol
        (S-BGP). IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, v.18,
        n. 4, Apr. 2000, pages 582-592.

[soBGP] Russ White, Securing BGP Through Secure Origin BGP, The Internet
        Protocl Journal, Volume 6, Number 3, September 2003, pages 15-
        22.

[SPV] Hu, Y.-C., Perrig, A., and Sirbu, M., SPV: Secure Path Vector
        Routing for Securing BGP. In  Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2004,
        pages 179-192.



























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Author's Addresses

    Stephen Kent
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
    Email: skent@bbn.com

    Derrick Kong
    BBN Technologies
    Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
    Email: dkong@bbn.com

    Karen Seo
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
    Email: kseo@bbn.com

    Ronald Watro
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551
    Email: rwatro@bbn.com













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Intellectual Property Statement

    The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
    Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
    to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
    in this document or the extent to which any license under such
    rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
    it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
    Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
    documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

    Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
    assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
    attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
    of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
    specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
    at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

    The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
    copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
    rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
    this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
    ipr@ietf.org.

Disclaimer of Validity

    This document and the information contained herein are provided on
    an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
    REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
    IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
    WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
    WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
    ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
    FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

    Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

    This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
    contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
    retain all their rights.








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