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Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                              Seo, K.
Internet Draft                                                Watro, R.
Expires: May 2009                                              Kong, D.
Intended Status: Informational                                 Kent, S.
                                                       BBN Technologies
                                                          November 2008



                          Certificate Policy (CP)
                        for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                         draft-ietf-sidr-cp-04.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
   any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
   aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
   becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
   BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2009.

Abstract

   This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
   support improved routing security. Each organization that allocates
   IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization
   will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation.
   These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the



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   associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in
   the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these
   resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this
   policy are employed, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed
   data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security
   mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs.

Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................9
      1.1. Overview.................................................10
      1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
      1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
         1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................12
         1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12
         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................13
         1.3.5. Other participants..................................13
      1.4. Certificate usage........................................13
         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................13
         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................14
      1.5. Policy administration....................................14
         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............14
         1.5.2. Contact person......................................15
         1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy....15
         1.5.4. CP approval procedures..............................15
      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................16
   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................17
      2.1. Repositories.............................................17
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................17
      2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................17
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................17
   3. Identification And Authentication.............................19
      3.1. Naming...................................................19
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................19
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................19
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............19
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........19
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................19
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.20
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................20
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........20


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         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............20
         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............20
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................21
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................21
         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................21
      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....21
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key21
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
         revocation.................................................21
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.22
   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............23
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................23
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............23
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............23
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................23
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
         ...........................................................23
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...24
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............24
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................24
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............24
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
         certificate................................................24
         4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................24
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................24
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........24
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............25
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................25
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........25
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......25
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................25
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................25
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................26
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............26
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................26
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
         certificate................................................26
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....26
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................26
      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................26
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................26
         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...27
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........27
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................27


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         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
         certificate................................................27
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...27
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................27
      4.8. Certificate modification.................................27
         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........27
         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............28
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........28
         4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................28
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
         ...........................................................28
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...28
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................28
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................28
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................28
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................29
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................29
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................29
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
         request....................................................29
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.29
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................29
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................29
         4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
         [OMITTED]..................................................30
         4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].30
         4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
         [OMITTED]..................................................30
         4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...30
         4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............30
         4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............30
         4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........30
         4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............30
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................30
         4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............30
         4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................30
         4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................30
      4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................30
      4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................30
         4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................30
         4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
         practices [OMITTED]........................................30
   5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................31
      5.1. Physical controls........................................31


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         5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED]............31
         5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED]...........................31
         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED]................31
         5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED]...........................31
         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED]............31
         5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED].............................31
         5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED]............................31
         5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED]...........................31
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................31
         5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED].............................31
         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED].......31
         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
         [OMITTED]..................................................31
         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED]......31
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................31
         5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
         [OMITTED]..................................................32
         5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED]...............32
         5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED].....................32
         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED].....32
         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED].......32
         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED]........32
         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED].......32
         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED].......32
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................32
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................32
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................32
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32
         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................33
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................33
         5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................33
         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....33
         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................33
      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................33
         5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................33
         5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............33
         5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................33
         5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................33
         5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].33
         5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................33
         5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
         [OMITTED]..................................................33
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................33
      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............34
         5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]34



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         5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
         corrupted [OMITTED]........................................34
         5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..34
         5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
         [OMITTED]..................................................34
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................34
   6. Technical Security Controls...................................35
      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................35
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................35
         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................35
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........35
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........35
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................36
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking36
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)36
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls......................................................36
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........36
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......36
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................37
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................37
         6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED]......................37
         6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
         module [OMITTED]...........................................37
         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED]37
         6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED]..........37
         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED]........37
         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED].........37
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED]..............37
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
         periods....................................................37
      6.4. Activation data [OMITTED]................................38
         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED]38
         6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED]................38
         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED]..........38
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................38
         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements
         [OMITTED]..................................................38
         6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................38
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................38
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38
      6.7. Network security controls................................38
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................39
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................40


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      7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................40
         7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
         7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................40
         7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............40
         7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................40
         7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................40
         7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......40
         7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....40
         7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....40
         7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
         Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................40
      7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................40
         7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
         7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............40
      7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40
         7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
         7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40
   8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................41
      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED].......41
      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED]............41
      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED].....41
      8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED]...................41
      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED]........41
      8.6 Communication of results [OMITTED].......................41
   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42
      9.1. Fees [OMITTED]...........................................42
         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees [OMITTED]......42
         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) [OMITTED]...42
         9.1.3. Refund policy [OMITTED].............................42
         9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED]...................42
         9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED].............................42
      9.2. Financial responsibility [OMITTED].......................42
         9.2.1. Insurance coverage  [OMITTED].......................42
         9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED]..............................42
         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
         [OMITTED]..................................................42
      9.3. Confidentiality of business information [OMITTED]........42
         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information [OMITTED].........42
         9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
         information [OMITTED]......................................42
         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information
         [OMITTED]..................................................42
      9.4. Privacy of personal information [OMITTED]................42
         9.4.1. Privacy plan [OMITTED]..............................43
         9.4.2. Information treated as private [OMITTED]............43
         9.4.3. Information not deemed private [OMITTED]............43
         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................43


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         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................43
         9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
         process [OMITTED]..........................................43
         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances [OMITTED]43
      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) [OMITTED]...43
      9.6. Representations and warranties [OMITTED].................43
         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties [OMITTED].........43
         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties [OMITTED].43
         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................43
         9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
         [OMITTED]..................................................43
      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties [OMITTED]......................43
      9.8. Limitations of liability [OMITTED].......................43
      9.9. Indemnities [OMITTED]....................................43
      9.10. Term and termination [OMITTED]..........................43
         9.10.1. Term [OMITTED].....................................43
         9.10.2. Termination [OMITTED]..............................43
         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival [OMITTED].......43
      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
      [OMITTED].....................................................43
      9.12. Amendments..............................................43
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................43
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44
         The NRO will provide one month's notice of a change to this
         CP.........................................................44
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
         [OMITTED]..................................................44
         If the Secretary judges that the change(s) will not materially
         reduce the  acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes,
         then there will be no change to the CP OID.  If the Secretary
         judges that the change(s) will materially change the
         acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then there
         will be a new CP OID.......................................44
      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions [OMITTED].................44
      9.14. Governing law [OMITTED].................................44
      9.15. Compliance with applicable law [OMITTED]................44
      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions [OMITTED]......................44
         9.16.1. Entire agreement [OMITTED].........................44
         9.16.2. Assignment [OMITTED]...............................44
         9.16.3. Severability [OMITTED].............................44
         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
         [OMITTED]..................................................44
         9.16.5. Force Majeure [OMITTED]............................44
      9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................44
   10. Security Considerations......................................45
   11. IANA Considerations..........................................45


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   12. Acknowledgments..............................................45
   13. References...................................................45
      13.1. Normative References....................................45
      13.2. Informative References..................................46
   Author's Addresses...............................................47
   Intellectual Property Statement..................................48
   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48
   Copyright Statement..............................................48


1. Introduction

   This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
   support improved routing security. An organization that allocates IP
   addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will,
   in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These
   certificates will enable verification that the holder of the
   associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in
   the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these
   resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this
   policy are employed can be used in a number of ways, for example, in
   conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, it can
   be used to provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms,
   e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. This security
   infrastructure is described in more detail in [ARCH].

   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
   this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
   contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
   certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
   to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
   the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
   of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
   to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
   contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
   certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed
   exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to
   address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on support of
   routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs
   managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this
   CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

   Note: This document is based on the template specified in the
   Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647.
   A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from
   this policy because they did not apply to this PKI.  However, we


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   have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted
   sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section
   numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section
   headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents
   the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

   This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
   holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space, and AS numbers, in
   accordance with the (current) records of the registries and ISPs
   that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is
   essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous allocation of these
   resources, and this, in turn, is an essential underpinning of
   routing in the public Internet.

   Internet routing is based on a distributed system of many routers,
   which are grouped into management domains called Autonomous Systems
   (ASes). Routing information is exchanged between ASes using Border
   Gateway Protocol (BGP) [BGP4] UPDATE messages. BGP has proven to be
   highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks [Murphy], due to the lack
   of a scalable means of verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of
   BGP control traffic, e.g., route originations. This PKI, and
   ancillary, signed data, will support detection of bogus route
   originations and facilitate routing security enhancements by network
   operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), e.g., creation
   of accurate route filters. (Bogus route origination occurs whenever
   an AS advertises itself as the origin AS for a prefix, without being
   authorized to do so by the legitimate holder of the prefix or where
   there is no legitimate holder of the prefix.)

   The proposed security infrastructure consists of three components: a
   PKI, repositories, and digitally signed objects (e.g., route
   origination authorizations (ROAs)). The PKI authoritatively
   documents the current allocation of address blocks and AS numbers to
   organizations, as recorded by the organizations that manage such
   allocations. (For brevity, this document uses the term
   "organization" to refer to every resource holder, even if the holder
   is an individual.)  A ROA is a digitally signed object by which an
   address space holder explicitly authorizes one or more ASes to
   originate routes to its address space. Repositories provide the
   means of publishing the PKI data (certificates and CRLs) and signed
   object data in a manner that makes it available to relying parties.
   The intent is for each network operator to upload its new or updated
   PKI and signed objectROA data periodically to its publication
   repository, e.g., daily. On a similar schedule, each network
   operator also is expected to download new or updated data that has
   been published by others. From this locally cached data, operators


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   extract authenticated address block origination data, which can be
   used to validate routing requests or to construct route filters or
   to support similar measures that can make use of validated IP
   address and AS number data in a routing context.

   This PKI parallels the existing IP address and AS number allocation
   hierarchy. These resources are allocated by the Internet Assigned
   Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs -
   - AFRINIC (Africa), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), ARIN (North America),
   LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and RIPE NCC (Europe) and by
   the RIRs to other organizations. Together IANA and the RIRs act as
   default trust anchors for the PKI.  In some regions, National
   Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the
   RIRs for address allocation. ISPs and network subscribers form
   additional tiers below registries. (ISPs who acquire allocations
   from RIRs or NIRs, and who sub-allocate address space are referred
   to as Local Internet Registries (LIRs)).

   This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF
   document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):

  . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
     and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder

  . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
     ROAs and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects

  . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
     support of access control for the repository system

1.2. Document name and identification

   The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
   Resource PKI (RPKI)".

   This policy has been assigned the following OID:

   id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber

       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)

                dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
   cp(14) 2 }

1.3. PKI participants

   Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The


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   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can
   refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and
   LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are
   subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note
   that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as
   organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When
   necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an
   organization that receives network services from an ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

   The organizations that allocate IP addresses (IANA, RIRs, NIRs,
   LIRs/ISPs) and AS numbers (IANA, RIRs and NIRs) act as CAs in this
   PKI.

   Organizations that hold address space and create and sign objects
   such as ROAs and manifests also act as CAs in this PKI. Such
   organizations will include internet number registries, LIRs/ISPs,
   provider-independent subscribers and some dual-homed subscribers.
   For each signed object an organization creates, it will issue a
   corresponding EE certificate that will be used to validate the
   digital signature on the signed object. (Organizations may issue
   other types of EE certificates in the future). See [ARCH] for more
   details.

1.3.2. Registration authorities

   This function will be provided by the CAs listed in Section 1.3.1.
   The RIRs (and NIRs where applicable) already perform this function
   and assume responsibility for allocating and tracking the current
   allocation of address space and AS numbers. LIRs do the same for
   sub-allocation of address space that they hold.  With regard to
   allocation of IP address and AS numbers, RIRs et al. establish a
   formal relationship with an organization and allocate these
   resources to that organization.

1.3.3. Subscribers

   These are the organizations receiving allocations of IP addresses
   and AS numbers - RIRs, NIRs, LIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.
   See [ARCH] for more details.

   Note that any of these organizations may have received allocations
   from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs,



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   which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This
   PKI accommodates such relationships.

1.3.4. Relying parties

   Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
   number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
   entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
   certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
   parties. This includes ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging
   BGP traffic with ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
   allocation of address space from ISP A but want to authorize ISP B
   to originate routes to this space.

   To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
   control -- checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL,
   and ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.

1.3.5. Other participants

   Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
   responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
   with the certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects that it
   issues. The organization can operate its own publication point or
   outsource this function (See sections 2.1 and 2.2.)

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
   space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
   routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
   of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
   fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
   originate a route to these addresses, including the case of ISP
   proxy aggregation.  Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
   basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.

   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
   could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
   access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
   permitted under this policy.






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1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited
   under this policy.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

   This CP is co-administered by IANA and the five Regional Internet
   Registries (RIRs), which act as default trust anchors for the PKI:


   AfriNIC (Africa)
   03B3, 3rd Floor, Ebene Cyber Tower
   Cyber City,
   Ebene,
   Mauritius

   APNIC (Asia-Pacific)
   Level 1,
   33 Park Road,
   Milton,
   Brisbane,
   Australia

   ARIN (North America and Caribbean)
   3635 Concorde Pkwy, Suite 200
   Chantilly, VA 20151-1130
   USA

   IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority)
   4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
   Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6601
   USA

   LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean)
   Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125
   Montevideo, 11400
   Uruguay

   RIPE NCC (Europe)
   Singel 258
   1016 AB Amsterdam
   The Netherlands




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1.5.2. Contact person

   The contact information for this CP is:

   AfriNIC (Africa)
   e-mail: contact@afrinic.net
   phone:  +230 466 6616

   APNIC (Asia-Pacific)
   e-mail: helpdesk@apnic.net
   phone:  +61 7 3858 3188

   ARIN (North America and Caribbean)
   e-mail: hostmaster@arin.net
   phone:  +1 703 227 0660

   IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority)
   e-mail: iana@iana.org
   phone:

   LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean)
   e-mail: comunicaciones@lacnic.net
   phone:  +598 2 6042222

   RIPE NCC (Europe)
   e-mail: ncc@ripe.net
   phone:  +31 20 535 444

1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
   public key in the certificate. These are the same organizations that
   perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to
   the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CP approval procedures

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
   public key in the certificate. The issuing organization is the same
   organization as the one that performs the allocation.






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1.6. Definitions and acronyms

BGP -  Border Gateway Protocol.  This is the protocol used in the
       Internet for propagating the connectivity information used as a
       basis for inter-domain routing. [BGP4]

CPS -  Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
       specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
       in issuing certificates.

IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
       global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems
       and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet
       traffic. IANA allocates IP addresses and AS numbers to Regional
       Internet Registries (RIRs).

ISP -  Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and
       selling Internet services to other organizations.

LIR -  Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
       network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
       IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or
       National) Registry.

NIR -  National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages
       the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a portion of the
       geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.  NIRs form an
       optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP
       address and AS number allocation.

NRO -  Number Resource Organization. This organization was formed by
       the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) for the purpose of
       undertaking joint activities of the five RIRs, including joint
       technical projects, liaison activities, and policy coordination.

RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
       manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
       geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs: AFRINIC
       (Africa), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), ARIN (North America), LACNIC
       (Latin America and Caribbean), and RIPE NCC (Europe).

ROA -  Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed
       object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS
       that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of
       address blocks.





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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

   Certificates, CRLs, and ROAs must be made available for downloading
   by all network operators, to enable them to validate this data for
   use in support of routing security. This motivates use of a robust,
   distributed repository system. Each CA is responsible for publishing
   its signed products (certificates, CRLs, manifests, ROAs and other
   signed objects) at a dedicated publication point. The RPKI
   distributed repository system is the collection of these dedicated
   publication points. An organization may choose to outsource the
   publication of PKI data. (See [REPOS] for further details.)

2.2. Publication of certification information

   All CAs will publish certificates via the repository system.

   Each CA will publish the CRL(s) that it issues by uploading to the
   repository system.

   ROAs and other signed objects will be uploaded to the repository
   system by address space holders, e.g., network subscribers and
   ISPs/LIRs.

   An organization may choose to outsource publication of RPKI data -
   certificates, CRLs, ROAs, and other signed objects. (See [REPOS] for
   further details.).

2.3. Time or frequency of publication

   A certificate will be published within 24 hours after the CA issues
   the certificate.

   Each CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value
   in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. Within 12 hours of
   effecting revocation, a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for the
   revoked certificate.

   A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
   within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
   ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

      Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,
   must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
   (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally


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   signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
   that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
   does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
   the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.














































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3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

   Names for IANA and RIRs will be directory distinguished names, using
   a subset of the following attributes: C, O, OU, and CN. Names for
   NIRs, LIRs/ISPs and subscribers will consist of a single CN
   attribute with a value generated by the issuer.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

   The Subject name in each certificate must be unique relative to all
   Subject names certified by an Issuer, but the name does not need to
   be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee, that
   subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates
   issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of
   routing security, not for identification. The intent is to allow the
   holder of a set of address blocks to be able to announce to the
   Internet, in a secure fashion, the AS number of each entity that is
   authorized to originate a route to these addresses. The PKI binds a
   public key to each address block or AS number.  The name of the
   holder of the address block or AS number need not be "meaningful" or
   even accurate. For purposes of routing security, the issuer and
   subject name in each certificate are not relevant, other than the
   usual PKI requirements for contextual uniqueness in support of
   unambiguous certificate path chaining.

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

   Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
   appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus
   no explicit support for this feature is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

   None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

   Each CA certifies Subject names that must be unique among the
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
   certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
   enforced through technical means.




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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

   Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
   is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
   marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will require each
   Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
   the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
   each CA and will be declared in the CPS of that CA.

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
   reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
   has allocated (or sub-allocated) the address space identified in the
   certificate. The same requirement is imposed on the binding of one
   or more AS numbers in a certificate to the organization represented
   by the Subject. The specific procedures employed for this purpose
   may vary among CAs. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ
   procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
   or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation.

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative
   of each organization that is an address space (AS number) holder.
   This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the
   certificate issued to the organization. The specific means by which
   each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
   organization may vary, and will be specified in the CPS of the CA.
   Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate
   with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
   authenticating individuals as representatives for address space (AS
   number) holders. Moreover, this authentication is solely for use by
   each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it allocates (or
   sub-allocates) address space (or AS numbers), and thus must not be
   relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship.





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3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

   No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
   under this certificate policy.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
   organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to
   represent that organization in this context. Relying parties can
   expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
   already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals
   as representatives for address space (AS number) holders.

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

   This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
   legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space
   and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will require PoP of the private
   key corresponding to the new public key.  The specific procedures
   employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. The means by which
   PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be declared in the CPS of
   that CA.  With respect to authentication of the holder of the
   address space and AS numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to
   employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
   registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number)
   allocation.

   Note: An issuer may choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
   with contractual agreements with the recipient.

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
   revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and
   associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will
   require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key.
   The specific procedures employed for these purposes may vary among


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   CAs. The means by which PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be
   declared in the certification practice statement of that CA.  With
   respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS
   numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
   commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
   the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note that
   there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate
   subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the
   case when it no longer has access to that key.

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting revocation is
   the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address
   space and AS numbers) to be revoked.  The specific procedures
   employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. Relying parties can
   expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
   already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address
   (and AS number) allocation.

   Note:  If new IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to an
   organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not be
   revoked. Instead, a new certificate may issued with both the old and
   the new resources and the old key.  If IP addresses or AS numbers
   are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the
   old certificate must be revoked (and a re-key must be performed in
   the event of key compromise).






















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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

   The Resource PKI issues several types of certificates.  Any entity
   that assigns Internet IP address space or AS numbers should acquire
   a certificate.  This includes registries and ISPs. Additionally,
   entities that hold AS numbers or that have address space assignments
   from a registry, or that are multi-homed, should acquire a
   certificate under this PKI, even if they do not exchange BGP UPDATEs
   with ISPs. The (CA) certificates issued to these entities will
   include one or both of the extensions defined by RFC 3779, X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, as appropriate.

   Most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of registry
   and ISP normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space
   and AS number allocation, and thus a separate specific application
   to request a certificate usually will not be necessary.

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

   The enrollment process and procedures are based on the individual
   polices of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs/ISPs.  An entity that desires one or
   more certificates should contact the authorized registry for its
   geopolitical area, or contact its LIR/ISP if it receives address
   allocations from an LIR/ISP.  During the initial deployment of this
   PKI, registries and ISPs should contact their existing network
   subscribers about obtaining appropriate credentials.

4.2. Certificate application processing

   CAs should make use of existing standards for certificate
   application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
   Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
   and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10.  Each CA will define
   the certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its
   CPS.

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

   Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
   authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance of
   certificates to these subscribers.  It is important to note that the
   Resource PKI is never used to authenticate the identity of an
   organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the address blocks


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   and AS numbers they hold.  Because identity is not being vouched for
   by this PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify
   legal organization names, etc.

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

   Certificate applications will be approved based on the normal
   business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
   records of address space and AS number holders. Each CA will verify
   that the requester holds the corresponding private key for the
   public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to
   the requestor.

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

   No stipulation.  Each CA may declare its expected time frame for
   processing certificate applications as part of its CPS.

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

   If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it will issue the
   corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
   repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
   repository publication point.

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

   The CA will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
   The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in
   its CPS.

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   [OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

   Within 24 hours of issuance, the CA will place the certificate in
   the repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.  Each CA shall state in its CPS
   the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate and
   notification to the subscriber.





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4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

   Certificates will be published in the RPKI distributed repository
   system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
   publication point as per the conduct described in 4.4.1. The
   procedures for publication are defined by each CA in its CPS.

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

   A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

   Each holder of an address space or AS number allocation will be
   issued an X.509 certificate using RFC 3779 extensions.  When the
   subjects of these certificates are LIRs/ISPs or network subscribers,
   they also shall issue EE certificates to themselves for use in
   verifying ROAs.  Subjects also will issue subordinate, end-entity
   certificates to their personnel for repository maintenance.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

   The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
   certificates to verify ROAs and other related signed objects in
   support of generating route filters and validating assertions about
   IP addresses and AS numbers and their intended use.  Repositories
   use certificates to verify the authorization of entities to engage
   in repository maintenance activities, and thus represent a secondary
   type of relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

   A certificate should be processed for renewal based on its
   expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject.
   If the issuing CA initiates the renewal process based on the
   certificate expiration date, then that CA shall notify the holder in
   advance of the renewal process.  The validity interval of the new
   (renewed) certificate should overlap that of the previous
   certificate, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

   Certificate renewal should incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   Section 4.7 will apply.




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4.6.2. Who may request renewal

   The certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the renewal
   process.  For example, a certificate holder may request an early
   renewal if it wishes to change the public key, or if it expects to
   be unavailable to support the renewal process at the normal
   expiration cycle.

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

   Renewal processing must verify that the certificate in question has
   not been revoked.

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   [OMITTED]

4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

   Re-key of a certificate should be performed only when required,
   based on:

   1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or

   2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
      key pair

   The re-key operation can have dramatic consequences, requiring the
   re-issuance of all certificates issued by a re-keyed entity, so it
   should be performed only when necessary.  In particular, if a
   certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
   replacement certificate can and should incorporate the same public
   key rather than a new key.



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   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate must be revoked.

   Section 5.6 below notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the
   signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity
   period of the certificate.  This places additional constraints on
   when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

   The holder of the certificate may request a re-key.  In addition,
   the CA that issued the certificate may initiate a re-key based on a
   verified compromise report.  Note that care must be taken to verify
   the authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when the
   private key has been reported as compromised.

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

   The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
   generation as defined in section 4.3.

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.3.2)

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

   No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
   (see section 4.4.1)

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

   No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2)

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   [OMITTED]

4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

   Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to
   selected attribute values in a certificate.  In the context of this
   PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate
   modification are additions to the address space and/or AS number
   holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension.


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   When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are removed
   from a certificate, then the old certificate is revoked and a new
   certificate is issued.

   When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
   issued.  The new certificate will contain the same public key and
   the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the
   incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS
   allocations expanded.  Revocation of the previous certificate is not
   required.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

   The certificate holder or issuer may initiate the certificate
   modification process.

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

   The CA must determine that the requested modification is appropriate
   and the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
   followed.

4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.3.2)

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

   No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
   (see section 4.4.1).

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

   No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   [OMITTED]

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

   Certificates can be revoked for several reasons.  Either the issuer
   or subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the
   certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate.  A
   certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the


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   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.
   Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data
   signed by that certificate.  For example, if the private key
   associated with an EE certificate has been used to sign a ROA, then
   that EE certificate can be revoked to effect revocation of the ROA.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

   The certificate holder or issuer may request a revocation.

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

   A certificate holder must submit a request to the certificate issuer
   for a revocation.  A certificate issuer must notify the certificate
   holder when revoking a certificate, however this notification
   requirement is satisfied by publication of a CRL by the issuer.

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

   A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified.  There is no specified
   grace period for the subscriber in this process.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

   No stipulation. Each CA is free to specify its expected revocation
   processing time in its CPS.

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

   A relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most
   recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever
   the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

   As indicated in section 2.3, it is expected that CAs will publish
   CRLs approximately every 24 hours, although the specific CRL
   issuance frequency is determine by each CA.  Each CRL carries a
   nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL must be published at or
   before that time.  A CA must set the nextScheduledUpdate value when
   it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be
   issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

   It is expected that a CRL will be posted to the repository system
   with minimal delay after generation.


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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

   This PKI does not make use of OCSP or SCVP, because it is
   anticipated that the primary relying parties (ISPs) will acquire and
   validate certificates for all participating resource holders on a
   daily basis. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale,
   bulk certificate status checking. Instead, retrieval of all changed
   or new certificates and CRLs on a daily basis is the anticipated
   mode of certificate status verification.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
   [OMITTED]










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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

   Each CA will maintain physical security controls for its operation
   that are commensurate with those already employed by the
   organization in the management of address space and AS number
   allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in the
   relevant CPS.

5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED]

5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED]

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED]

5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED]

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED]

5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED]

5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED]

5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED]

5.2. Procedural controls

   Each CA will maintain procedural security controls that are
   commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the
   management of address space and AS number allocation. The details
   for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS.

5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED]

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED]

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role [OMITTED]

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED]

5.3. Personnel controls

   Each CA will maintain personnel security controls that are
   commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the
   management of address space and AS number allocation. The details
   for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS.



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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED]

5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED]

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED]

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED]

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED]

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

   Audit records should be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records should
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include

  . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

  . Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
     requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
     notifications)

  . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

  . Posting of any material to a repository

  . Any attempts to change or delete audit data

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

   Each CA will establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

   Each CA will establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.






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5.4.4. Protection of audit log

   The audit log should be protected based on current industry
   standards.

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

   The audit log should be backed up based on current industry
   standards.

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

   The PKI subsystems of a registry or ISP should participate in any
   vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
   their normal business practice.

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

   When a CA wishes to change keys, it must acquire a new certificate
   containing the public key of the pair, well in advance of the
   scheduled change of the current signature key pair.

   Ideally, the private key that a CA uses to sign a certificate or CRL
   should have a validity period that is at least as long as that of
   any certificate being signed.  However, since a certificate issued
   under this PKI will have a validity period that reflects the
   contractual relationship between the issuer and subject, this may



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   lead to situations where an issued certificate has a validity period
   longer than that of the key used to sign the certificate.

5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
   [OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

   In this PKI, each CA is authoritative for a specified range of IP
   addresses and a specified set of AS numbers.  If an organization
   acting as a CA in this PKI terminates operation without identifying
   a replacement, then the effective control of the IP addresses and AS
   numbers revert back to the issuing organization, and address space
   and AS number allocations that have been previously validated via
   that CA are invalidated as of revocation of the CA's certificate.



























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6. Technical Security Controls

   The organizations that allocate IP addresses and AS numbers to
   subscribers are authoritative for these allocations.  This PKI is
   designed to enable LIRs/ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate
   that they are the holders of the resources that have been allocated
   to them.  Accordingly, the security controls used by CAs and
   subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those that
   apply to the procedures for administering the allocation of IP
   address space and AS number data by the extant organizations.
   Details of each CA's security controls are described in the CPS
   issued by the CA.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

   In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
   subject, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address
   space or AS numbers.  However, some CAs may offer to generate key
   pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the subjects,
   e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the ability to
   perform key generation in a secure fashion. Since the keys used in
   this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key
   pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI.
   Each CA will describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

   If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
   CPS will describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
   subscribers in a secure fashion.

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI defines procedures
   whereby a subscriber requests IP address space (and/or AS numbers),
   authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The CPS of each
   CA will describe how these procedures are extended to support
   certificate issuance. The security of the procedures used by a
   subject to deliver its public key to a CA need only be commensurate
   with the security of the procedures already employed for management
   of the IP address space and AS numbers.

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

   CA public keys for all entities other than IANA and RIRs are
   contained in certificates issued by other CAs.  These certificates


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   plus certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address
   space or AS numbers will be published in the RPKI distributed
   repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates
   from the repositories. Public key values and associated data for the
   default trust anchors will be distributed out of band, e.g.,
   embedded in path validation software that will be made available to
   the Internet community.

6.1.5. Key sizes

   For RIR certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For NIR,
   LIR/ISP, and non-ISP subscriber certificates, the RSA keys will be
   either 2048 or 1024 bits.

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
   (e) F4 (65,537). Each subscriber is responsible for performing
   checks on the quality of its key pair. CAs are not responsible for
   performing such checks for subscribers.

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

   The Key usage extension bit values shall be consistent with RFC
   3280. For CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits shall be
   set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) shall be set
   FALSE, and the extension shall be marked critical. End entity
   certificates in this PKI may include this extension, with
   appropriate bit values, as per RFC 3280, but such inclusion is not
   required.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
   Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

   The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
   will be described in the CPS issued by that CA.

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

   Some CAs, e.g., registry CAs, may employ multi-person controls to
   constrain access to their private keys, but this is not a
   requirement for all CAs in the PKI. The CPS for a CA will describe
   any multi-person controls it employs.





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6.2.3. Private key escrow

   No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

6.2.4. Private key backup

   Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
   loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA should employ a
   secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the
   procedures for backing up a CA's private key will be described in
   the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED]

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
   [OMITTED]

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED]

6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED]

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED]

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED]

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED]

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

   IANA holds all IP address and AS number space, i.e., all the
   resources which form the base of the RPKI hierarchy, Because a self-
   signed IANA certificate represents this base, it should have a very
   long life time.

   Because RIRs and NIRs receive periodic new allocations, it is
   appropriate for their key pairs and certificates to have lifetimes
   that match the periodicity of these allocations.  However, to
   minimize disruption, the key pairs should be maintained across
   certificate changes.




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   LIR/ISP and subscriber certificates typically will have validity
   periods commensurate with the duration of service agreements. The
   validity periods will be chosen by the issuing CA and described in
   its CPS.

6.4. Activation data [OMITTED]

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED]

6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED]

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED]

6.5. Computer security controls

   Each CA will document the technical security requirements it employs
   for CA computer operation in its CPS.

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements [OMITTED]

6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

   The CPS for each CA will document any system development controls
   required by that CA, if applicable.

6.6.2. Security management controls

   The security for the software and equipment used for this PKI shall
   be commensurate with that used for the systems used by the CAs for
   managing and allocating IP address and AS number resources.

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

   Equipment (hardware and software) used for this PKI shall be
   procured, installed, maintained, and updated in a fashion
   commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and
   allocation of IP address space and AS numbers is handled.

6.7. Network security controls

   Each CA shall employ network security controls for CA operation
   commensurate with the protection it employs for the computers used
   for managing allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers.



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6.8. Time-stamping

   The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.















































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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]


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8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments

   The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria
   against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes
   requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already
   authoritative for the management of IP address space and AS numbers,
   and the PKI simply supports verification of the allocation if these
   resources to subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other
   assessments are already used to ensure the security of the
   administration of IP addresses and AS numbers is sufficient for this
   PKI.

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED]

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED]

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED]

8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED]

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED]

8.6  Communication of results [OMITTED]



























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9. Other Business And Legal Matters

   As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
   managing the allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers are
   authoritative in their roles as managers of this data.  They will
   operate this PKI to allow the holders of address space and AS number
   allocations to generate digitally signed data that attests to these
   allocations, and to the authorization of LIRs/ISPs to originate
   routes for address blocks (via ROAs). Therefore, the manner in which
   the organizations in question manage their business and legal
   matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which
   they already manage business and legal matters in their existing
   roles. Since there is no single set of responses to this section
   that would apply to all organizations, the topics listed below
   should be covered in the CPS issued by each CA, although not every
   CA may choose to address all of these topics.

9.1. Fees [OMITTED]

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees [OMITTED]

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) [OMITTED]

9.1.3. Refund policy [OMITTED]

9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED]

9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED]

9.2. Financial responsibility [OMITTED]

9.2.1. Insurance coverage  [OMITTED]

9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED]

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities [OMITTED]

9.3. Confidentiality of business information [OMITTED]

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information [OMITTED]

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information
   [OMITTED]

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information [OMITTED]

9.4. Privacy of personal information [OMITTED]



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9.4.1. Privacy plan [OMITTED]

9.4.2. Information treated as private [OMITTED]

9.4.3. Information not deemed private [OMITTED]

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information [OMITTED]

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information [OMITTED]

9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
   [OMITTED]

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances [OMITTED]

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) [OMITTED]

9.6. Representations and warranties [OMITTED]

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties [OMITTED]

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties [OMITTED]

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED]

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties [OMITTED]

9.8. Limitations of liability [OMITTED]

9.9. Indemnities [OMITTED]

9.10. Term and termination [OMITTED]

9.10.1. Term [OMITTED]

9.10.2. Termination [OMITTED]

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival [OMITTED]

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants [OMITTED]

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment




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   The procedure for amendments to this CP is via written notice from
   the Secretary of the NRO.

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

   The NRO will provide one month's notice of a change to this CP.

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

   If the Secretary judges that the change(s) will not materially
   reduce the  acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then
   there will be no change to the CP OID.  If the Secretary judges that
   the change(s) will materially change the acceptability of
   certificates for RPKI purposes, then there will be a new CP OID.

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions [OMITTED]

9.14. Governing law [OMITTED]

9.15. Compliance with applicable law [OMITTED]

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions [OMITTED]

9.16.1. Entire agreement [OMITTED]

9.16.2. Assignment [OMITTED]

9.16.3. Severability [OMITTED]

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) [OMITTED]

9.16.5. Force Majeure [OMITTED]

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
















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10. Security Considerations

   According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
   rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
   particular community and/or class of applications with common
   security requirements."  A CP may be used by a relying party to help
   in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
   sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
   application. This document describes the CP for the Internet Address
   and AS Number PKI.  There are separate documents (Certification
   Practice Statements (CPS's) that cover the factors that determine
   the degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
   in a certificate. The degree to which such a binding can be trusted
   depends on several factors, e.g., the practices followed by the
   certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's
   operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
   including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
   example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
   responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
   example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
   liability).

11. IANA Considerations

   None.

12. Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush and other
   members of the rescert community for reviewing this document and
   Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
       X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.

[ARCH] Lepinski M., Kent S., Barnes R., "An Infrastructure to Support
       Secure Internet Routing," work in progress.






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13.2. Informative References

[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-
       4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

[Murphy] Murphy, S., BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, draft-ietf-
       idr-bgp-vuln-01.txt, October 2004 (work in progress).

[REPOS] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and Michaelson, G., A Profile for
       Resource Certificate Repository Structure, draft-huston-sidr-
       repos-struct-01.txt, work in progress.

[RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
       X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.

[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
       obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
       Communications ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

[S-BGP] Kent, S., Lynn, C., and Seo, K. Secure Border Gateway Protocol
       (S-BGP). IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, v.18,
       n. 4, Apr. 2000, pages 582-592.

[soBGP] Russ White, Securing BGP Through Secure Origin BGP, The Internet
       Protocl Journal, Volume 6, Number 3, September 2003, pages 15-
       22.

[SPV] Hu, Y.-C., Perrig, A., and Sirbu, M., SPV: Secure Path Vector
       Routing for Securing BGP. In  Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2004,
       pages 179-192.

















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Author's Addresses

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
   Email: skent@bbn.com

   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
   Email: dkong@bbn.com

   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
   Email: kseo@bbn.com

   Ronald Watro
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551
   Email: rwatro@bbn.com













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