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Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                              Seo, K.
Internet Draft                                                Watro, R.
Expires: January 2010                                          Kong, D.
Intended Status: Informational                                 Kent, S.
                                                       BBN Technologies
                                                          July 12, 2009



                          Certificate Policy (CP)
                        for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                         draft-ietf-sidr-cp-06.txt


Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with
   the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
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   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2010.



Abstract

   This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
   support attestations about Internet resource holdings. Each
   organization that distributes IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS)
   numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a certificate
   reflecting this distribution. These certificates will enable
   verification that the holder of the associated private key has been
   allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the
   current, unique holder of these resources.



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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................7
      1.1. Conventions used in this document.........................8
      1.2. Overview..................................................8
      1.3. Document name and identification..........................8
      1.4. PKI participants..........................................9
         1.4.1. Certification authorities............................9
         1.4.2. Registration authorities.............................9
         1.4.3. Subscribers..........................................9
         1.4.4. Relying parties......................................9
         1.4.5. Other participants..................................10
      1.5. Certificate usage........................................10
         1.5.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10
         1.5.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10
      1.6. Policy administration....................................10
         1.6.1. Organization administering the document.............10
         1.6.2. Contact person......................................11
         1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy....12
         1.6.4. CP approval procedures..............................12
      1.7. Definitions and acronyms.................................12

   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................14
      2.1. Repositories.............................................14
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................14
      2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................14
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................14

   3. Identification and Authentication.............................15
      3.1. Naming...................................................15
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of
                trademarks.........................................15
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16
         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................16
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................16



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         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine
                re-key.............................................17
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key
                after revocation...................................17
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation
           request.................................................17

   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication
                functions..........................................19
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate
                applications.......................................19
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance
                of certificate.....................................20
         4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................20
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
                subscriber.........................................22
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
                certificate........................................22
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................22
      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................23
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................23





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         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public
                key................................................23
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
                subscriber.........................................23
         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
                certificate........................................23
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the
                CA.................................................24
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................24
      4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........24
         4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
                subscriber.........................................24
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified
                certificate........................................25
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the
                CA.................................................25
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................25
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................25
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
                request............................................26
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying
                parties............................................26
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................26

   5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................27
      5.1. Physical controls........................................27
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................27
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................27
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................27
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................27
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................28
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................28
         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................28
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................28



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         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................28
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................28
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................28

   6. Technical Security Controls...................................29
      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................29
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................29
         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................29
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........29
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........29
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................30
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality
                checking...........................................30
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage
                field).............................................30
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
           Engineering Controls....................................30
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........30
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......30
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................31
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................31
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................31
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................31
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair
                usage periods......................................31
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................31
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................31
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................31
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................32
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................32
      6.7. Network security controls................................32
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................32
      The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping........32

   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................33

   8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................34

   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................35
      9.12. Amendments..............................................35
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................35
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................35
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed......35

   10. Security Considerations......................................36




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   11. IANA Considerations..........................................36

   12. Acknowledgments..............................................36

   13. References...................................................36
      13.1. Normative References....................................36
      13.2. Informative References..................................37

   Author's Addresses...............................................38

   Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................39

   Copyright Statement..............................................39






































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1. Introduction

   This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to
   attest to Internet resource holdings. An organization that
   distributes IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an
   organization will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
   distribution. These certificates will enable verification that the
   holder of the associated private key has been allocated the
   resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
   holder of these resources.

   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
   this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
   contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
   certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
   to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
   the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
   of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
   to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
   contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
   certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed
   exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to
   address space and AS number holdings. Use of the certificates and
   CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
   this CP, and relying parties should reject certificates presented
   for such uses.

   Note: This document is based on the template specified in the
   Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647.
   A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from
   this policy because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
   retained the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to
   facilitate comparison with the RFC. The first digit from the RFC
   ("4") has been omitted and in cases where the RFC had bulleted
   items, we added a third level of numbering.  So for example, RFC
   3647's item 4.4.8 ("Certificate Modification") is listed here as
   just 4.8.  The first bullet under this item ("Circumstances under
   which certificate modification can take place...") is listed here as
   4.8.1.








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1.1. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

1.2. Overview

   This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
   holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space, and AS numbers, in
   accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in
   this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring
   the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources.

   This PKI parallels the existing IP address and AS number
   distribution hierarchy. These resources are distributed by the
   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Regional Internet
   Registries. In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs)
   form a tier of the hierarchy below the RIRs for internet number
   resource (INR) distribution. ISPs and network subscribers form
   additional tiers below registries..

   This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF
   document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):

  . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
     and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder

  . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital
     signatures on signed RPKI objects

  . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
     support of access control for the repository system as described
     in 2.4.

1.3. Document name and identification

   The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
   Resource PKI (RPKI)".

   This policy has been assigned the following OID:

   id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber

       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)

                dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
   cp(14) 2 }



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1.4. PKI participants

   Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an ISP. In such cases the term "network subscriber"
   will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
   refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
   some of them are individuals.

1.4.1. Certification authorities

   The organizations that distribute IP addresses (IANA, RIRs, NIRs,
   LIRs/ISPs) and AS numbers (IANA, RIRs and NIRs) act as CAs in this
   PKI.

   Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold  such resources
   also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.

1.4.2. Registration authorities

   This PKI does not require establishment or use of a separate
   registration authority (RA) in conjunction with the CA function. The
   RA function will be provided by the same entity operating as a CA,
   e.g., entities listed in Section 1.4.1. An entity acting as a CA in
   this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization to
   which it distributes INRs. These organizations already perform the
   RA function implicitly since they already assume responsibility for
   distributing INRs.

1.4.3. Subscribers

   These are the organizations receiving distributions of IP addresses
   and AS numbers - RIRs, NIRs, LIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.

   Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions
   from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs,
   which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This
   PKI accommodates such relationships.

1.4.4. Relying parties

   Entities or individuals  that act in reliance of certificates or
   signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying
   parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI.




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1.4.5. Other participants

   Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
   responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
   with the certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects that it
   issues. The organization can operate its own publication point or
   outsource this function (See sections 2.1 and 2.2.)

1.5. Certificate usage

1.5.1. Appropriate certificate uses

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
   space and/or AS numbers.

   Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
   cited above, are also permitted under this policy.

   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
   used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
   control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses
   also are permitted under this policy.

1.5.2. Prohibited certificate uses

   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.5.1 are prohibited
   under this policy.

1.6. Policy administration

1.6.1. Organization administering the document

   This CP is co-administered by IANA and the five Regional Internet
   Registries (RIRs):


   AfriNIC
   03B3, 3rd Floor, Ebene Cyber Tower
   Cyber City,
   Ebene,
   Mauritius

   APNIC
   Level 1,
   33 Park Road,
   Milton,
   Brisbane,



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   Australia

   ARIN
   3635 Concorde Pkwy, Suite 200
   Chantilly, VA 20151-1130
   USA

   IANA
   4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
   Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6601
   USA

   LACNIC
   Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125
   Montevideo, 11400
   Uruguay

   RIPE NCC
   Singel 258
   1016 AB Amsterdam
   The Netherlands


1.6.2. Contact person

   The contact information for this CP is:

   AfriNIC
   e-mail: contact@afrinic.net
   phone:  +230 466 6616

   APNIC
   e-mail: helpdesk@apnic.net
   phone:  +61 7 3858 3188

   ARIN
   e-mail: hostmaster@arin.net
   phone:  +1 703 227 0660

   IANA
   e-mail: iana@iana.org
   phone:

   LACNIC
   e-mail: hostmaster@lacnic.net
   phone:  +598 2 6042222




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   RIPE NCC
   e-mail: ncc@ripe.net
   phone:  +31 20 535 444

1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the
   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.
   These are the same organizations that perform the distribution hence
   they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.6.4. CP approval procedures

   Approval of this CP and subsequent amendments shall be made by the
   organizations administering the CP

1.7. Definitions and acronyms

Internet Number Resources (INRs) - number values for three protocol
       parameter sets, namely:

  .  IP Version 4 addresses,

  .  IP version 6 addresses, and

  .  Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
     Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.

Distribution of INR - A process of distribution and assignment of the
       INR along the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes
       blocks of IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five
       Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs allocate smaller
       address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations
       within their service regions, who in turn assign IP addresses to
       their customers.

CPS -  Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
       specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
       in issuing certificates in this PKI.

IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
       global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems
       and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet
       traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries
       (RIRs).





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ISP -  Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and
       selling Internet services to other organizations.

LIR -  Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
       network service provider, that distributes INRs for a portion of
       the area covered by a Regional (or National) Registry.

NIR -  National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages
       the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area
       covered by a Regional Registry.  NIRs form an optional second
       tier in the tree scheme used to manage INRs.

RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
       manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.

RPKI signed objects - Digitally signed data objects (other than
       certificates and CRLs) that can be validated using certificates
       issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data
       constructs depend on the context in which validation of claims
       of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of these
       objects are repository manifests and CRLs.






























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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

   Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects must be made available
   for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them to validate
   this data. This motivates use of a robust, distributed repository
   system. Each CA is responsible for maintaining a publicly accessible
   online repository and publishing there its RPKI signed objects. This
   collection of repositories forms the RPKI distributed repository
   system. (This function may be outsourced, as noted in Section 2.2
   below.)

2.2. Publication of certification information

   Each CA will publish the certificates it issues via the repository
   system.

   Each CA will publish the CRL(s) that it issues via the repository
   system.

   Each CA will publish its RPKI signed objects via the repository
   system.

   An organization may choose to outsource publication of RPKI data -
   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects.

2.3. Time or frequency of publication

   The CPS for each CA will specify the following information:

   The period of time within which a certificate will be published
   after the CA issues the certificate.

   The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an
   entry for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.
   Note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
   nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
   the CA.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

   Each CA shall implement access controls to prevent unauthorized
   persons from adding, modifying or deleting repository entries. A CA
   shall not intentionally use technical means of limiting read access
   to its CPS, certificates, CRLs or RPKI signed objects.





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3. Identification and Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

   Names for IANA and RIRs will be directory distinguished names, using
   a subset of the following attributes: C, O, OU, and CN. Names for
   all other CAs and all end entities will consist of a single CN
   attribute with a value generated by the issuer.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

   The Subject name in each certificate must be unique relative to all
   Subject names certified by the same Issuer, but the name does not
   need to be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee,
   that subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates
   issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of
   applications that make use of attestations of Internet resource
   holding, not for identification. The PKI binds a public key to sets
   of address blocks, and/or sets of AS numbers. The name of the holder
   of the address block or AS number is not intended to be
   "meaningful".

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

   Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
   appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus
   no explicit support for this feature is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

   None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

   Each CA certifies Subject names that must be unique among the
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
   certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
   enforced through technical means.

3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

   Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
   is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
   marks, etc.




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3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will require each
   Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
   the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
   each CA and will be declared in the CPS of that CA.

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
   reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
   has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate. The specific
   procedures employed for this purpose are described by the CPS for
   each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
   commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
   the management of the INRs. This authentication is solely for use by
   each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes
   INRs, and thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber
   relationship.

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative
   of each organization that is an address space (AS number) holder..
   The specific means by which each CA authenticates individuals as
   representatives for an organization are described by the CPS for
   each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
   commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
   authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders.

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

   No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
   under this certificate policy.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
   organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to
   represent that organization in this context. The procedures are
   described by the CPS for the CA Relying parties can expect each CA
   to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a



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   registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives
   for INR holders.

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

   This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
   legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and associated
   address space and AS numbers and will require PoP of the private key
   corresponding to the new public key. The procedures employed for
   these purposes are described in the CPS for the CA. With respect to
   authentication of the holder of the address space and AS numbers,
   relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate
   with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the
   management of INRs.

   Note: An issuer may choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
   with contractual agreements with the recipient. If so, this will be
   described by the CPS for the CA.

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
   revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was
   issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR. The CA
   will require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public
   key.  The specific procedures employed for these purposes will be
   described by the CPS for the CA.  With respect to authentication of
   the holder of the address space and AS numbers, relying parties can
   expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
   already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.
   Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
   legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
   opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting revocation is
   the legitimate holder of the certificate to be revoked and



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   associated address space and AS numbers. The specific procedures
   employed for these purposes will be described by the CPS for the CA.
   Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate
   with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the
   management of INRs.














































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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

   The Resource PKI issues several types of certificates. Any entity
   that distributes INRs should acquire a certificate. This includes
   Internet Registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that hold INRs
   from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, may acquire a
   certificate under this PKI. The (CA) certificates issued to these
   entities will include one or both of the extensions defined by RFC
   3779, X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, as
   appropriate.

   The application procedure will be described in the CPS for each CA.

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

   The enrollment process and procedures will be described by the CPS
   for each CA.  An entity that desires one or more certificates should
   contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.

4.2. Certificate application processing

   CAs should make use of existing standards for certificate
   application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
   Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
   and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. Each CA will define the
   certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its CPS.

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

   Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
   authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for
   issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to
   note that the Resource PKI is never used to authenticate the
   identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the
   address blocks and AS numbers they hold.  Because identity is not
   being vouched for by this PKI, certificate application procedures
   need not verify legal organization names, etc.

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

   Certificate applications will be approved based on the normal
   business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
   records of address space and AS number holders. Each CA will follow



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   the procedures specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds
   the corresponding private key for the public key that will be bound
   to the certificate the CA issues to the requestor. The details of
   how certificate applications are approved are described in the CPS
   for the CA in question.

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

   No stipulation. Each CA may declare its expected time frame for
   processing certificate applications as part of its CPS.

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

   If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it will issue the
   corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
   repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
   repository publication point.

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

   The CA will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
   The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in
   its CPS.

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

   The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be
   notified when a certificate is issued.

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

   Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA will place the
   certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber.  This will
   be done without subscriber review and acceptance. Each CA shall
   state in its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the
   certificate and notification to the subscriber.

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

   Certificates will be published in the RPKI distributed repository
   system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
   publication point as per the conduct described in 4.4.1. The
   procedures for publication are defined by each CA in its CPS.




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4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

   A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

   Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 CA certificate
   containing appropriate RFC 3779 extensions. When the subjects of
   these certificates are LIRs/ISPs or network subscribers, they also
   may issue EE certificates to themselves to enable verification of
   RPKI signed objects that they generate.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

   Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the
   circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional
   assurances, the relying party must obtain such assurances in order
   for such reliance to be deemed reasonable.

   Before any act of reliance, relying parties shall independently
   1)verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate
   purpose that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP,
   and 2) assess the status of the certificate and all the CAs in the
   chain that issued the certificates relevant to the certificate in
   question. If any of the certificates in the certificate chain have
   been revoked, the relying party is solely responsible to determine
   whether reliance on a digital signature to be verified by the
   certificate in question is acceptable. Any such reliance is made
   solely at the risk of the relying party.

   If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
   appropriate, the relying party shall utilize appropriate software
   and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
   condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover the relying party
   is responsible for validating the certificate in a manner consistent
   with the algorithm specified in RFC 5280 and RFC 3779.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

   A certificate should be processed for renewal based on its
   expiration date or a renewal request from the subscriber. Prior to
   the expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the
   responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to
   maintain continuity of certificate usage. If the issuing CA
   initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
   date, then that CA shall notify the holder in advance of the renewal



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   process. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate
   should overlap that of the previous certificate, to ensure
   continuity of certificate usage.

   Certificate renewal should incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2. Who may request renewal

   Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the
   renewal process. The certificate holder may request an early
   renewal, for example, if it wishes to change the public key, or if
   it expects to be unavailable to support the renewal process during
   the normal expiration period. An issuing CA may initiate the renewal
   process based on the certificate expiration date.

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

   Renewal procedures must ensure that the person or organization
   seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or
   authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate
   holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate. Renewal
   processing must verify that the certificate in question has not been
   revoked.

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

   The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be
   notified when a certificate is issued.








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4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

   Re-key of a certificate should be performed only when required,
   based on:

   1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or

   2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
      key pair

   The re-key operation can have dramatic consequences, requiring the
   re-issuance of all certificates issued by a re-keyed entity, so it
   should be performed only when necessary.  In particular, if a
   certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
   replacement certificate should incorporate the same public key
   rather than a new key.

   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate must be revoked.

   Section 5.6 below notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the
   signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity
   period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on
   when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

   Only the holder of the certificate may request a re-key.  In
   addition, the CA that issued the certificate may initiate a rekey
   based on a verified compromise report.

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

   The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
   generation as defined in section 4.3.

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.3.2)

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

   No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
   (see section 4.4.1)



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4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

   No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2)

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

   The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be
   notified when a certificate is issued.

4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

   Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to
   selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of this
   PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate
   modification are additions to the address space and/or AS number
   holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension.

   When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are removed
   from a certificate, then the old certificate is revoked and a new
   certificate is issued.

   When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
   issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the
   same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the
   incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS
   distributions expanded.  Revocation of the previous certificate is
   not required.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

   The certificate holder or issuer may initiate the certificate
   modification process.

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

   The CA must determine that the requested modification is appropriate
   and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
   followed.

4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.3.2)





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4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

   No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate
   (see section 4.4.1).

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

   No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

   The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be
   notified when a certificate is issued.



4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

   A certificate must be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is
   reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's
   private key. A certificate also may be revoked to invalidate a data
   object signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
   Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate can be
   specified in a CA's CPS.

   Note:  If new IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to an
   organization's existing distribution, the old certificate need not
   be revoked. Instead, a new certificate may issued with both the old
   and the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers
   are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the
   old certificate must be revoked (and a re-key must be performed in
   the event of key compromise).

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

   The subscriber or issuer may request a revocation.

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

   A subscriber must submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
   revocation. A certificate issuer must notify the subscriber when
   revoking a certificate, however this notification requirement is
   satisfied by publication of a CRL by the issuer.





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4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

   A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified grace
   period for the subscriber in this process.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

   No stipulation. Each CA is free to specify its expected revocation
   processing time in its CPS.

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

   A relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most
   recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever
   the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

   The CRL issuance frequency is determined by each CA and stated in
   its CPS. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL
   must be published at or before that time. A CA must set the
   nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
   next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

   The CPS for each CA will specify the maximum latency associated with
   posting its CRL to the repository system.

4.10. Certificate status services

   This PKI does not make use of OCSP or SCVP, because it is
   anticipated that the primary relying parties (ISPs) will acquire and
   validate certificates for all participating resource holders on a
   daily basis. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale,
   bulk certificate status checking. Instead, retrieval of all changed
   or new certificates and CRLs on a daily basis is the anticipated
   mode of certificate status verification.












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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

   Each CA will maintain physical security controls for its operation
   that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of address space and AS number distribution. The details
   for each CA will be specified in its CPS.

5.2. Procedural controls

   Each CA is expected to maintain procedural security controls that
   are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of address space and AS number distribution. The details
   for each CA will be specified in its CPS.

5.3. Personnel controls

   Each CA will maintain personnel security controls that are
   commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of address space and AS number distribution. The details
   for each CA will be specified in its CPS.

5.4. Audit logging procedures

   Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in this
   section (5.4.1 to 5.4.8) will be addressed in its CPS.

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

   Audit records should be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records should
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include

  . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

  . Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
     requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
     notifications)

  . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

  . Posting of any material to a repository

  . Any attempts to change or delete audit data





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5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

   Each CA will establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

   Each CA will establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.

5.4.4. Protection of audit log

   The audit log should be protected based on current industry
   standards.

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

   The audit log should be backed up based on current industry
   standards.

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

   The PKI subsystems of a registry or ISP should participate in any
   vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
   their normal business practice.

5.6. Key changeover

   When a CA wishes to change keys, it must acquire a new certificate
   containing the public key of its new key pair, well in advance of
   the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. The private
   key that a CA uses to sign a certificate or CRL should have a
   validity period that is at least as long as that of any certificate
   being issued under that certificate.



5.8. CA or RA termination

   In this PKI, each subscriber also acts as a CA authoritative for the
   specified INRs that were distributed to that entity. The termination
   of a CA shall therefore be subject to the agreement between the
   issuer and the subscriber and will be described in the CPS for the
   issuer.









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6. Technical Security Controls

   The organizations that allocate IP addresses and AS numbers to
   network subscribers are authoritative for these distributions. This
   PKI is designed to enable LIRs/ISPs and network subscribers to
   demonstrate that they are the holders of the resources that have
   been allocated to them. Accordingly, the security controls used by
   CAs and subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those
   that apply to the procedures for administering the distribution of
   IP address space and AS number data by the extant organizations.
   Details of each CA's security controls are described in the CPS
   issued by the CA.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

   In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
   subject, i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of
   address space or AS numbers.  However, some CAs may offer to
   generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the
   subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the
   ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion. Since the
   keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes,
   generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the
   security of the PKI. Each CA will describe its key pair generation
   procedures in its CPS.

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

   If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
   CPS will describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
   subscribers in a secure fashion.

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

   When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified,
   it shall be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public
   key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber
   possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public
   key.

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

   CA public keys for all entities other than default trust anchors are
   contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates
   will be published in the RPKI distributed repository system. Relying
   parties may download these certificates from the repositories.



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   Public key values and associated data for the default trust anchors
   will be distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation
   software that will be made available to the Internet community.

6.1.5. Key sizes

   This CP specifies use of the RSA algorithm and SHA-256/384/512 for
   signatures applied to certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects.
   It is anticipated that the RPKI will transition to a different suite
   of signature and hash algorithms over time, in order to maintain an
   acceptable level of cryptographic security. Thus both CAs and
   relying parties will need to accommodate two (old and new) algorithm
   suites, simultaneously to enable an orderly transition in the
   future. Later versions of this CP will specify additional
   requirements for algorithm suite support.

   For RIR and IANA certificates, the required RSA key size is 2048
   bits. For all other certificates, the RSA keys is 2048 or 1024 bits.

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
   (e) F4 (65,537). Each subscriber is responsible for performing
   checks on the quality of its key pair. CAs are not responsible for
   performing such checks for subscribers.

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

   The Key usage extension bit values shall be consistent with RFC
   3280. For CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits shall be
   set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) shall be set
   FALSE, and the extension shall be marked critical. End entity
   certificates in this PKI may include this extension, with
   appropriate bit values, as per RFC 3280, but such inclusion is not
   required.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
   Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

   The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
   will be described in the CPS issued by that CA.

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

   CAs may employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their
   private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI.



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   The CPS for each CA will describe which, if any, multi-person
   controls it employs.

6.2.3. Private key escrow

   No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

6.2.4. Private key backup

   Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
   loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA should employ a
   secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the
   procedures for backing up a CA's private key will be described in
   the CPS issued by the CA.

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

   The INRs held by RIRs and the NIRs periodically change because these
   registries receive new distributions. Therefore it is appropriate
   for their certificates to have lifetimes that match the periodicity
   of these changes.  However, to minimize disruption, the key pairs
   should be maintained across certificate changes.

   If LIR/ISP and network subscriber certificates are tied to the
   duration of service agreements, these certificates should have
   validity periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements.
   In any case, the validity period for certificates will be chosen by
   the issuing CA and described in its CPS.

6.5. Computer security controls

   Each CA will document the technical security requirements it employs
   for CA computer operation in its CPS.

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

   The CPS for each CA will document any system development controls
   required by that CA, if applicable.




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6.6.2. Security management controls

   The CPS for each CA will document the security controls applied to
   the software and equipment used for this PKI. These controls shall
   be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for
   managing the INRs.

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

   The CPS for each CA will document how the equipment (hardware and
   software) used for this PKI shall be procured, installed,
   maintained, and updated. This will be done in a fashion commensurate
   with the way in which equipment for the management and distribution
   of INRs is handled.

6.7. Network security controls

   The CPS for each CA will document the network security controls
   employed for CA operation. These should be commensurate with the
   protection it employs for the computers used for managing
   distribution of INRs.

6.8. Time-stamping

The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.


























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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
















































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8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments

   The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria
   against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes
   requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already
   authoritative for the management of INRs, and the PKI simply
   supports verification of the distribution of these resources to
   network subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other
   assessments are already used to ensure the security of the
   management of INRs is sufficient for this PKI. The CPS for each CA
   will describe what audits and other assessments are used.








































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9. Other Business And Legal Matters

   As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
   managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles
   as managers of this data. They will operate this PKI to allow the
   holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to
   these distributions. Therefore, the manner in which the
   organizations in question manage their business and legal matters
   for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which they
   already manage business and legal matters in their existing roles.
   Since there is no single set of responses to this section that would
   apply to all organizations, the topics listed in sections 4.9.1 to
   4.9.11 and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 should be covered in the CPS
   issued by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all
   of these topics.

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

   The procedure for amendments to this CP is via written notice from
   IANA and the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

   The IANA and the RIRs will provide at least one month's advance
   notice of a change to this CP.

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed

   If the IANA and the RIRs judge that the change(s) will not
   materially reduce the acceptability of certificates for RPKI
   purposes, then there will be no change to the CP OID. If they judge
   that the change(s) will materially change the acceptability of
   certificates for RPKI purposes, then there will be a new CP OID.
















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10. Security Considerations

   According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
   rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
   particular community and/or class of applications with common
   security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
   in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
   sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
   application. This document describes the CP for the Internet Address
   and AS Number PKI.  There are separate documents (Certification
   Practice Statements (CPS's) that cover the factors that determine
   the degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
   in a certificate. The degree to which such a binding can be trusted
   depends on several factors, e.g., the practices followed by the
   certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's
   operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
   including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
   example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
   responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
   example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
   liability).

11. IANA Considerations

   None.

12. Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei
   Robachevsky and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing
   this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
       X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.

[ARCH] Lepinski M., Kent S., Barnes R., "An Infrastructure to Support
       Secure Internet Routing," work in progress.







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13.2. Informative References

[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-
       4). IETF RFC 4271, January 2006.

[REPOS] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and Michaelson, G., A Profile for
       Resource Certificate Repository Structure, work in progress.

[RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
       obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
       Communications ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.





































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Authors' Addresses

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
   Email: skent@bbn.com

   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
   Email: dkong@bbn.com

   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
   Email: kseo@bbn.com

   Ronald Watro
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551
   Email: rwatro@bbn.com














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Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
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Copyright Statement

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your
   rights and restrictions with respect to this document.



























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