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Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kent, S.
Internet Draft                                                 Kong, D.
Expires: March 2011                                             Seo, K.
Intended Status: Best Current Practice                        Watro, R.
                                                       BBN Technologies
                                                     September 28, 2010

                          Certificate Policy (CP)
                        for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                         draft-ietf-sidr-cp-12.txt
Status of this Memo
   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with
   the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2011.

Abstract
   This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet
   resource holdings. Each organization that distributes IP addresses
   or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in
   parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this distribution. These
   certificates will enable verification that the resources indicated
   in the certificate have been distributed to the holder of the

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   associated private key and that this organization is the current,
   unique holder of these resources.

Table of Contents
   1. Introduction...................................................7
      1.1. Conventions used in this document.........................7
      1.2. Overview..................................................8
      1.3. Document name and identification..........................8
      1.4. PKI participants..........................................9
         1.4.1. Certification authorities............................9
         1.4.2. Registration authorities.............................9
         1.4.3. Subscribers..........................................9
         1.4.4. Relying parties.....................................10
         1.4.5. Other participants..................................10
      1.5. Certificate usage........................................10
         1.5.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10
         1.5.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10
      1.6. Policy administration....................................10
         1.6.1. Organization administering the document.............10
         1.6.2. Contact person......................................11
         1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy....11
         1.6.4. CP approval procedures..............................11
      1.7. Definitions and acronyms.................................11
   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................13
      2.1. Repositories.............................................13
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................13
      2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................13
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................14
   3. Identification and Authentication.............................15
      3.1. Naming...................................................15
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of
                trademarks.........................................16
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16

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         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................17
         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine
                re-key.............................................17
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key
                after revocation...................................17
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation
           request.................................................18
   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication
                functions..........................................19
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate
                applications.......................................19
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance
                of certificate.....................................20
         4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................20
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................22
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
                subscriber.........................................22
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
                certificate........................................22
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................23

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      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................23
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................23
         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public
                key................................................23
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........24
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
                subscriber.........................................24
         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
                certificate........................................24
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the
                CA.................................................24
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................24
      4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
         4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
                subscriber.........................................25
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified
                certificate........................................25
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the
                CA.................................................25
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA
                to other entities..................................25
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................25
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
                request............................................26
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying
                parties............................................26
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................26
   5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
      5.1. Physical controls........................................28
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................29
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................30

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         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30
         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................30
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................30
   6. Technical Security Controls...................................31
      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................31
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................31
         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................31
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........31
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........31
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................32
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality
                checking...........................................32
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage
                field).............................................32
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
           Engineering Controls....................................32
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........32
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......32
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................32
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................32
         6.2.5. Private key archival................................33
         6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a
                cryptographic module...............................33
         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........33
         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................33
         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................33
         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................33
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................33
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair
                usage periods......................................33
      6.4. Activation data..........................................34
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................34
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................34
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................34
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................34
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34
      6.7. Network security controls................................34
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................35
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................36

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   8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................37
   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................38
      9.12. Amendments..............................................38
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................38
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................38
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed......38
   10. Security Considerations......................................39
   11. IANA Considerations..........................................39
   12. Acknowledgments..............................................39
   13. References...................................................40
      13.1. Normative References....................................40
      13.2. Informative References..................................40
   Authors' Addresses:..............................................41
   Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................42
   Copyright Statement..............................................42









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1. Introduction
   This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) used to attest to Internet number resource
   holdings (INRs) (IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers). An
   organization that distributes INRs to another organization MAY, in
   parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this distribution. These
   certificates will enable verification that the resources indicated
   in the certificate have been distributed to the holder of the
   associated private key and that this organization is the current
   holder of these resources.
   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
   this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
   INR holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued
   to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is
   intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion,
   that it is the current holder of an INR based on the current records
   of the entity responsible for the resources in question.
   Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability
   of the entity to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the
   public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
   validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
   is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
   related to INR holdings. Use of the certificates and certificate
   revocation lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for any other purpose
   is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs) SHOULD reject
   certificates presented for such uses.
   Note: This document is based on the template specified in the
   Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647
   [RFC3647].  In the interest of keeping the document as short as
   reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template are
   omitted from this policy because they did not apply to this PKI.
   However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in
   the RFC to facilitate comparison with the outline in Section 6 of
   the RFC. Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No
   stipulation" in CP/CPS parlance.
1.1. Conventions used in this document
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

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1.2. Overview
   This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
   holders of INRs, in accordance with the records of the organizations
   that act as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI. The ability
   to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unambiguous
   distribution of these resources.
   The structure of the RPKI is modeled on the existing organizational
   structure that is already responsible for IP address and AS number
   resource allocation. In this allocation hierarchy, IANA allocates
   resources to five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), each of which
   manages address and AS number allocation within a defined
   geopolitical region. The RIRs in turn allocate resources to Internet
   Service Providers, to subscribers with so-called provider-
   independent ("portable") allocations, and in some regions, to
   National Internet Registries (NIRs). (The term LIR is used in some
   regions to refer to what other regions define as an ISP. Throughout
   the rest of this document we will use the term ISP to simplify
   references to these entities.)
   As noted in the RPKI architecture document [ARCH], although IANA
   and/or the five RIRs are obvious candidates to be default TAs for
   the RPKI, each RP ultimately chooses the set of trust anchors it
   will use for certificate validation. For example, an RP (e.g., an
   LIR/ISP) could create a trust anchor to which all address space
   and/or all AS numbers are assigned, and for which the RP knows the
   corresponding private key. The RP could then issue certificates
   under this trust anchor to whatever entities in the PKI it wishes,
   with the result that the certification paths terminating at this
   locally-installed trust anchor will satisfy the RFC 3779 validation
   requirements.
   This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF
   document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):
  . CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs, and for
     INR holder
  . End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital
     signatures on RPKI-signed objects
1.3. Document name and identification
   The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
   Resource PKI (RPKI)".
   This policy has been assigned the following OID:

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   id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
                         identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }
1.4. PKI participants
   Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an ISP. In such cases the term "network subscriber"
   will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
   refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
   some of them are individuals.
1.4.1. Certification authorities
   The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA,
   RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI.
   Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold such resources
   also act as CAs when they create EE certificates. Subscribers with
   PI space are the principle examples of this class of CAs.
1.4.2. Registration authorities
   This PKI does not require establishment or use of a separate
   registration authority (RA) in conjunction with the CA function. The
   RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as a CA,
   e.g., entities listed in Section 1.4.1. An entity acting as a CA in
   this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization to
   which it distributes INRs. These organizations already perform the
   RA function implicitly since they already assume responsibility for
   distributing INRs.
1.4.3. Subscribers
   These are the organizations receiving distributions of INRs - RIRs,
   NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.
   Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions
   from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs,
   which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This
   PKI accommodates such relationships.

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1.4.4. Relying parties
   Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or
   RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.
   Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See
   section 1.7 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
1.4.5. Other participants
   Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
   responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
   with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects that it issues.
   The organization MAY operate its own publication point or it MAY
   outsource this function (See sections 2.1 and 2.2.)
1.5. Certificate usage
1.5.1. Appropriate certificate uses
   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
   Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
   cited above, are also permitted under this policy.
   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
   used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
   control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses
   also are permitted under this policy.
1.5.2. Prohibited certificate uses
   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.5.1 are prohibited
   under this policy.
1.6. Policy administration
1.6.1. Organization administering the document
   This CP is administered by
   Internet Engineering Steering Group
   c/o Internet Society
   1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
   Reston, VA 20190-5108
   U.S.A.

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1.6.2. Contact person
   The contact information is
     iesg@ietf.org
     +1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)
1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy
   The IESG MUST judge consensus of the IETF community for changes to
   this policy.
1.6.4. CP approval procedures
   The IESG MUST approve a replacement BCP that either updates or
   obsoletes this BCP, following the procedures of the IETF Standards
   Process as defined in RFC 2026 [RFC2026].
1.7. Definitions and acronyms
CPS -  Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
       specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
       in issuing certificates in this PKI.
Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along the
       respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
       addresses and AS Numbers to the five Regional Internet
       Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and AS
       Numbers to organizations within their service regions, who in
       turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.
IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
       global coordination of the IP addressing systems and AS numbers
       used for routing internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to
       Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).
INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
       protocol parameter sets, namely:
       . IP Version 4 addresses,
       . IP version 6 addresses, and
       . Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
          Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.

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ISP -  Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and
       selling Internet services to other organizations.
LIR -  In some regions, the term Local Internet Registry (LIR) is used
       to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.
NIR -  National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages
       the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area
       covered by a Regional Registry.  NIRs form an optional second
       tier in the tree scheme used to manage INRs.
Provider-independent (PI) address space - PI address space is allocated
       directly by an Internet Registry to a subscriber. This space
       cannot be further allocated by the subscriber to other entities.
       The subscriber must contract with an ISP to obtain routing of
       the address block within the Internet. PI space enables the
       subscriber to change service providers without renumbering its
       networks and to use multiple ISPs in a multi-homed
       configuration.
RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
       manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
RPKI-signed object - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
       object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such by
       a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
       certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
       these data constructs depend on the context in which validation
       of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of
       these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.







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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
   Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects (intended for public
   consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying
   parties, to enable them to validate this data. This motivates use of
   a robust, distributed repository system. Each CA MUST maintain a
   publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed
   objects (intended for public consumption) via this repository in a
   manner that conforms with RFCwwww [RFCwwww] (This function MAY be
   outsourced, as noted in Section 2.2 below.) The collection of
   repositories forms the RPKI distributed repository system.
2.2. Publication of certification information
   Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public
   consumption) that it issues via the repository system.
   Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that
   it issues via the repository system.
   Each CA MUST publish its RPKI-signed objects (intended for public
   consumption) via the repository system.
   Each CA MUST publish its CPS.
   An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data -
   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects.
   The CP will be published as an IETF RFC and will be available from
   the IETF RFC repository.
2.3. Time or frequency of publication
   The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information:
   The period of time within which a certificate will be published
   after the CA issues the certificate.
   The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an
   entry for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.
   Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI
   repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively.
   Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
   nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.

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2.4. Access controls on repositories
   Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to
   prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying or deleting
   repository entries. A CA or repository operator MUST NOT
   intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its
   CPS, certificates, CRLs or RPKI-signed objects. This data is
   supposed to be accessible to the public.














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3. Identification and Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names
   The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a
   single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by the
   issuer of the certificate. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute
   MAY be included along with the common name (to form a terminal
   relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive
   instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
   The Subject name in each certificate does not need to be meaningful.
   The certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in
   support of applications that make use of attestations of Internet
   resource holdings, not for identification. The PKI binds a public
   key to sets of INRs. The name of the holder of the INR is not
   intended to be "meaningful".
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
   Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
   appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus
   no explicit support for this feature is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
   None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
   There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this
   PKI. Each CA certifies Subject names that MUST be unique among the
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within
   the RPKI cannot be guaranteed.
   However, Subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a
   way that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
   assigned the same name.


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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
   Since Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no
   provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service marks,
   etc. When generating subject names, CAs should use a mechanism that
   is unlikely to result in Subject names that include trademarks,
   service marks, etc. CAs MUST NOT knowingly issue a certificate with
   a Subject name that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined
   infringes on the trademark of another individual or organization.
3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each
   Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
   the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
   each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA.
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
   reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
   has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate. The specific
   procedures employed for this purpose MUST bedescribed by the CPS for
   each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
   commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in
   the management of the INRs. This authentication is solely for use by
   each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes
   INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this CA-
   subscriber relationship.
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative
   of each organization that is an INR holder. The specific means by
   which each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
   organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. Relying
   parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with
   those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating
   individuals as representatives for INR holders.


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3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
   A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in
   certificates issued under this certificate policy except for SIA
   extensions.
3.2.5. Validation of authority
   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
   organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to
   represent that organization in this context. The procedures MUST be
   described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA
   to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
   registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives
   for INR holders.
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
   This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI.
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
   legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and associated
   INRs and MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the
   new public key. The procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
   described in the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of
   the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
   procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
   or ISP, in the management of INRs.
   Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
   with contractual agreements with the recipient. If so, this MUST be
   described by the CPS for the CA.
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
   revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was
   issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR. The CA
   MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public
   key.  The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be

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   described by the CPS for the CA.  With respect to authentication of
   the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
   procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
   or ISP, in the management of INRs. Note that there MAY be different
   procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses
   the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer
   has access to that key.
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
   Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
   procedures to ensure that:
     .  an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder
        of the certificate to be revoked.
     .  each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records
        with regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed
        the INRs identified in the certificate.
     .  an individual claiming to represent an organization for which
        a certificate is to be revoked, is authorized to represent that
        organization in this context.
   The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
   described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA
   to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
   registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.







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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
   Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate. This
   includes Internet Registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that
   hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY
   acquire a certificate under this PKI. The (CA) certificates issued
   to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined
   by RFC 3779 [RFC3779], X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS
   Identifiers, as appropriate.
   The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
   The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS
   for each CA.  An entity that desires one or more certificates should
   contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.
4.2. Certificate application processing
   CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate
   application processing. Section 6 of the resource certificate
   profile [RFCyyyy] defines the standard certificate request formats
   that MUST be supported
   Each CA MUST define the certificate request/response standards that
   it employs, via its CPS.
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
   Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
   authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for
   issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to
   note that the Resource PKI SHOULD never be used to authenticate the
   identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the
   INRs they hold.  Because identity is not being vouched for by this
   PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal
   organization names, etc.
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
   Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal
   business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
   records of INR holders. Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified

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   in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key
   corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the
   certificate the CA issues to the requestor. The details of how
   certificate applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS
   for the CA in question.
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
   No stipulation. Each CA MUST declare its expected time frame to
   process (approve, issue and publish) a certificate application as
   part of its CPS.
4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
   If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the
   corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
   repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
   repository publication point.
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
   The CA MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
   The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in
   its CPS.
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   The CPS of each CA MUST indicate whether any other entities will be
   notified when a certificate is issued.
4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
   Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA MUST place the
   certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber.  This MAY
   be done without subscriber review and acceptance. Each CA MUST state
   in its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the
   certificate and notification to the subscriber.
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
   Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
   system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
   publication point as per the conduct described in 4.4.1. The
   procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.

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4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
   A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
   Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 CA certificate
   containing appropriate RFC 3779 extensions. Holders of CA resource
   certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves to enable
   verification of RPKI-signed objects that they generate.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
   Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the
   circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional
   assurances, the relying party must obtain such assurances in order
   for such reliance to be deemed reasonable.
   Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1)
   verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose
   that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see
   section 1.5), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all
   the CAs in the chain (terminating at a TA accepted by the RP) that
   issued the certificates relevant to the certificate in question. If
   any of the certificates in the certificate chain have been revoked,
   the relying party is solely responsible to determine whether
   reliance on a digital signature to be verified by the certificate in
   question is acceptable. Any such reliance is made solely at the risk
   of the relying party.
   If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
   appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
   and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
   condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover the relying party
   MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI
   certificate profile [RFCyyyy], which specifies the extended
   validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.
4.6. Certificate renewal
   This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
   Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
   an old one prior to its expiration. Only the validity dates and the
   serial number are changed. The public key and all other information
   remain the same.


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4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
   A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration
   date or a renewal request from the subscriber. Prior to the
   expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the
   responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to
   maintain continuity of certificate usage. If the issuing CA
   initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
   date, then that CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal
   process. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate
   SHOULD overlap that of the previous certificate, to ensure
   continuity of certificate usage. An overlap period of at least 24
   hours is RECOMMENDED.
   Certificate renewal SHOULD incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   Section 4.7 apply.
4.6.2. Who may request renewal
   Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the
   renewal process. The certificate holder MAY request an early
   renewal, for example, if it wishes to change the public key, or if
   it expects to be unavailable to support the renewal process during
   the normal expiration period. An issuing CA MAY initiate the renewal
   process based on the certificate expiration date.
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
   Renewal procedures MUST ensure that the person or organization
   seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or
   authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate
   holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate. Renewal
   processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been
   revoked.
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.

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4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.3.
4.7. Certificate re-key
   This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key.
   Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
   an old one because the key needs to be replaced. Unlike with
   certificate renewal, the public key is changed.
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
   Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when required,
   based on:
   1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or
   2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
      key pair
   A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, requiring the re-
   issuance of all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity. So it
   should be performed only when necessary and in a way that preserves
   the ability of relying parties to validate certificates whose
   validation path includes the re-keyed entity. CA key rollover MUST
   follow the procedures defined in RFCxxxx [RFCxxxx].
   Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779
   extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
   public key rather than a new key.  This applies to when one is
   adding INRs (revocation not required) and to when one is removing
   INRs (revocation required (see Section 4.8.1).
   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate MUST be revoked.
   Section 5.6 below notes that when a CA signs a certificate, its
   certificate SHOULD have a validity interval that is at least as long
   as the validity period of the certificate being signed. This places
   additional constraints on when a CA SHOULD request a re-key.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
   The holder of the certificate may request a re-key.  In addition,
   the CA that issued the certificate MAY chose to initiate a rekey
   based on a verified compromise report.

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4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
   The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
   generation as defined in section 4.3.
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.3.
4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
   Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to
   selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of this
   PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate
   modification are additions to the INR holdings described by the RFC
   3779 extension.
   When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate,
   then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate MUST
   be issued.
   When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
   issued. The new certificate MUST contain the same public key and the
   same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the
   incidental information corrected and/or the INRs expanded.
   Revocation of the previous certificate is not required.
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
   Either the certificate holder or the issuer may initiate the
   certificate modification process.


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4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
   The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate
   and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
   followed (see Section 4.3).
4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
   No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.3.
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
   A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is
   reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's
   private key. A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data
   object signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
   Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate MAY be
   specified in a CA's CPS.
   Note:  If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing
   distribution, the old certificate need not be revoked. Instead, a
   new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new
   resources and the old key. If INRs are being removed or if there has
   been a key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and
   a re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise).
4.9.2. Who can request revocation
   This MUST be defined in the CPS of the relevant organization.
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
   A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
   revocation. This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked

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   and MUST be authenticated. The procedures for making the request
   MUST be described in the CPS for each CA. The RPKI provisioning
   document [PROV] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make
   revocation requests.
   A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a
   certificate. The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL
   publication. The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the
   CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
   A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified grace
   period for the subscriber in this process.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
   No stipulation. Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation
   processing time in its CPS.
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
   A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled
   CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party
   validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
   The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated
   in its CPS. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new
   CRL MUST be published at or before that time. A CA MUST set the
   nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next
   scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
   The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with
   posting its CRL to the repository system.
4.10. Certificate status services
   This PKI does not make provision for use of OCSP or SCVP, because it
   is anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate
   certificates for all participating resource holders. These protocols
   are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status
   checking. RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily. It is
   RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but

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   no more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository
   accesses).
















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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls
   Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation
   that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of INR distribution. The details for each CA MUST be
   specified in its CPS. Possible topics include:
     .  Site location and construction, such as the construction
        requirements for high-security zones and the use of locked
        rooms, cages, safes, and cabinets
     .  Physical access, i.e., mechanisms to control access from one
        area of the facility to another or access into high-security
        zones, such as locating CA operations in a secure computer room
        monitored by guards or security alarms and requiring movement
        from zone to zone to be accomplished using a token, biometric
        readers, and/or access control lists
     .  Power and air conditioning
     .  Water exposures
     .  Fire prevention and protection
     .  Media storage, for example, requiring the storage of backup
        media in a separate location that is physically secure and
        protected from fire and water damage
     .  Waste disposal
     .  Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls
   Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are
   commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of INR distribution. The details for each CA MUST be
   specified in its CPS. Topics covered SHOULD include:
     .  Requirements for recognizing trusted roles
     .  Responsibilities for each role (Examples of trusted roles
        include system administrators, security officers, and system
        auditors.)

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     .  For each task identified, the number of individuals required
        to perform the task (n out of m rule) for each role.
     .  Identification and authentication requirements for each role
     .  When role separation is employed and how it is effected (if
        employed)
5.3. Personnel controls
   Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are
   commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
   management of INR distribution. The details for each CA MUST be
   specified in its CPS.
5.4. Audit logging procedures
   Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in this
   section (5.4.1 to 5.4.8) MUST be addressed in its CPS.
5.4.1. Types of events recorded
   Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records MUST
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:
  . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
  . Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
     requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
     notifications)
  . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
  . Posting of any material to a repository
  . Any attempts to change or delete audit data
  . Key generation
  . Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
  . Clock adjustments
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
   Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.

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5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
   Each CA MUST establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.
5.4.4. Protection of audit log
   The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry
   standards.
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
   The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry
   standards.
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
   The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any
   vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
   their normal business practice.
5.6. Key changeover
   When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate
   containing its new public key, well in advance of the scheduled
   change. This certificate SHOULD have a validity period that is at
   least as long as that of any certificate being issued under that
   certificate.
5.8. CA or RA termination
   In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA authoritative for the
   specified INRs that were distributed to that entity. Procedures
   associated with the termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS
   for that CA. These procedures MUST include a provision to notify
   each entity that issued a certificate to the organization that is
   operating the CA that is terminating.
   Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating
   as the CA (see Section 1.4.2), there are no separate stipulations
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6. Technical Security Controls
   The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are
   authoritative for these distributions. This PKI is designed to
   enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the
   holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them. Accordingly,
   the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need
   only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for
   administering the distribution of INR data by the extant
   organizations. Details of each CA's security controls MUST be
   described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation
   In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
   subject, i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs.
   However, some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their
   subjects at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate
   subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
   a secure fashion. (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only
   if it generates them (see 6.1.6)). Since the keys used in this PKI
   are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs
   does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI. Each CA MUST
   describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
   If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
   CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
   subscribers in a secure fashion.
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
   When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified,
   it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public
   key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber
   possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public
   key.
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
   CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
   contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates
   MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system. Relying
   parties download these certificates from the repositories. Public
   key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are

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   distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis
   of locally-defined criteria.
6.1.5. Key sizes
   The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in RFC
   ZZZZ [RFCzzzz].
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
   The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in RFC ZZZZ
   [RFCzzzz]. Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
   the quality of its key pair. A CA is not responsible for performing
   such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA
   generates the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
   The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in
   RFC YYYY [RFCyyyy].
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
   Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
   The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
   MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA.
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
   CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their
   private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI.
   The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person
   controls it employs.
6.2.3. Private key escrow
   No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.
6.2.4. Private key backup
   Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
   loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a
   secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the
   procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in
   the CPS issued by the CA.

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6.2.5. Private key archival
   The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's
   private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
   The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's
   private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in
   the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
   The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's
   private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from
   unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.8. Method of activating private key
   The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's
   private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
   The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the
   CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
   The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's
   private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
   The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in
   the CPS issued by the CA.
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival
   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
   The INRs held by a CA may periodically change because it receives
   new distributions. Therefore it is appropriate for its certificate

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   to have a lifetime that matches the periodicity of these changes.
   However, to minimize disruption, the key pairs SHOULD be maintained
   across certificate changes (if no INRs are removed as a result of
   the certificate change).
   If ISP and network subscriber certificates are tied to the duration
   of service agreements, these certificates should have validity
   periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements. In any
   case, the validity period for certificates MUST be chosen by the
   issuing CA and described in its CPS.
6.4. Activation data
   Each CA MUST document in its CPS how it will generate, install and
   protect its activation data.
6.5. Computer security controls
   Each CA MUST document the technical security requirements it employs
   for CA computer operation in its CPS.
6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls
   The CPS for each CA MUST document any system development controls
   required by that CA, if applicable.
6.6.2. Security management controls
   The CPS for each CA MUST document the security controls applied to
   the software and equipment used for this PKI. These controls MUST be
   commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for
   managing the INRs.
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
   The CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and
   software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained,
   and updated. This MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the
   way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs
   is handled.
6.7. Network security controls
   The CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls
   employed for CA operation. These MUST be commensurate with the

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   protection it employs for the computers used for managing
   distribution of INRs.
6.8. Time-stamping
   The RPKI does not make use of time stamping.















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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
















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8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments
   The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria
   against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes
   requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already
   authoritative for the management of INRs, and the PKI simply
   supports verification of the distribution of these resources to
   network subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other
   assessments are already used to ensure the security of the
   management of INRs is sufficient for this PKI. The CPS for each CA
   MUST describe what audits and other assessments are used.













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9. Other Business And Legal Matters
   As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
   managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles
   as managers of this data. They MUST operate this PKI to allow the
   holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to
   these distributions. Therefore, the manner in which the
   organizations in question manage their business and legal matters
   for this PKI MUST be commensurate with the way in which they already
   manage business and legal matters in their existing roles. Since
   there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply
   to all organizations, the topics listed in sections 4.9.1 to 4.9.11
   and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued
   by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these
   topics.
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
   The procedure for amending this CP is via written notice from the
   IESG in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this
   document.
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
   Successive versions of the CP will be published with the statement
   "This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY." MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum
   of 6 months from the date of publication.
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
   If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce
   the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there
   will be no change to the CP OID. If the IESG judges that changes to
   the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for
   RPKI purposes, then there will be a new CP OID.




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10. Security Considerations
   According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
   rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
   particular community and/or class of applications with common
   security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
   in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
   sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
   application. This document describes the CP for the Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  There are separate documents
   (Certification Practice Statements (CPS's)) that cover the factors
   that determine the degree to which a relying party can trust the
   binding embodied in a certificate. The degree to which such a
   binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the
   practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
   authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
   and technical security controls, including the scope of the
   subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
   private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
   and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
   warranties, and limitations of liability).
   Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is
   a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and
   CRLs under the same Issuer name. Path validation implementations
   that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm
   [see RFCyyyy] verify that the same key was used to sign both the
   target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL. So a
   name collision will not change the result. Use of the basic X.509
   path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could
   result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid
   certificate being rejected as revoked. Relying parties must ensure
   that the software they use to validate certificates issued under
   this policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the
   certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [RFCyyyy].
11. IANA Considerations
   None.
12. Acknowledgments
   The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei
   Robachevsky and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing
   this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

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13. References
13.1. Normative References
[ARCH] Lepinski M., Kent S., "An Infrastructure to Support Secure
       Internet Routing," work in progress.
[RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels," BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2026]   Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process - Revision 3,"
       BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC3779]   Lynn, C., Kent, S., Seo, K., "X.509 Extensions for IP
       Addresses and AS Identifiers," RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFCwwww] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
       Resource Certificate Repository Structure," work in progress.
[RFCxxxx]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., "CA Key Rollover in
       the RPKI," work in progress.
[RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Loomans, R., "A Profile for
       X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates," work in progress.
[RFCzzzz]   Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use
       in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure," work in progress.

13.2. Informative References
[PROV] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., Austein, R., "A Protocol
       for Provisioning Resource Certificates," work in progress.
[RFC3647]   Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., Wu, S.,
       "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and
       Certification Practices Framework," RFC 3647, November 2003.



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Authors' Addresses:
   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA
   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
   Email: skent@bbn.com
   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA
   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
   Email: dkong@bbn.com
   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA
   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
   Email: kseo@bbn.com
   Ronald Watro
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA
   Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551
   Email: rwatro@bbn.com




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Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer
   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
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   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.
Copyright Statement
   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.
   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
   respect to this document.  Code Components extracted from this
   document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
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   warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.







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