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Versions: (draft-ymbk-ghostbusters) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 RFC 6493

Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 11, 2011
Expires: September 12, 2011


                      The RPKI Ghostbusters Record
                    draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-02

Abstract

   In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource
   certificates completely obscure names or any other information which
   might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with
   issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs,
   compromises, etc.  This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record
   containing human contact information to be signed (indirectly) by a
   resource-owning certificate.  The data in the record are those of a
   severely profiled vCARD.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example  . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  vCARD Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   6.  Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

























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1.  Introduction

   In the operational use of the RPKI it can become necessary to
   contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-owning
   certificate.  An important example is when the owner of a Route
   Origin Authorization (ROA) sees a problem, or an impending problem,
   with a certificate or CRL in the path between the ROA and a trust
   anchor.  E.g., a certificate along that path has expired, is soon to
   expire, or a CRL associated with a CA along the path is stale, thus
   placing the quality of the routing of the address space described by
   the ROA in jeopardy.

   As the names in RPKI certificates are intentionally hashes which are
   not meaningful to humans, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp], there is no way to
   use a certificate itself to lead to the worrisome certificate's or
   CRL's maintainer.  So, "Who do you call?"

   This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, an object
   signed, indirectly via an End Entity (EE) certificate, by the
   certificate whose maintainer may be contacted using the human usable
   payload information in the Ghostbusters Record.

   The Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax defined in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].

   Note that the Ghostbusters Record is not an identity certificate, but
   rather an attestation to the contact data made by the issuer of the
   certificate signing the Ghostbusters Record.

   This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry
   whois data.  It gives information about an RPKI certificate
   maintainer not a resource holder.

   This specification has three main sections.  The first, Section 4, is
   the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled
   vCARD.  The second, Section 5, profiles the packaging of the payload
   as a profile of the RPKI Signed Object Template specification
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].  The third, Section 6, describes the
   proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters Record.


2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI,
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure,
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], Signed RPKI Objects,
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], and vCARDs [RFC2426].




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3.  RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example

   An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all types
   populated is as follows:

     BEGIN:vCard
     VERSION:3.0
     FN:Human's Name
     N:Name;Human's;Ms.;Dr.;OCD;ADD
     ORG:Organizational Entity
     ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern; WA; 98666;U.S.A.
     TEL;TYPE=VOICE,MSG,WORK:+1-666-555-1212
     TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK:+1-666-555-1213
     EMAIL;TYPE=INTERNET:human@example.com
     END:vCard


4.  vCARD Profile

   The goal in profiling the vCARD is not to include as much information
   as possible, but rather to include as few types as possible while
   providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact the
   maintainer of the RPKI data which threatens the ROA[s] of concern.

   The Ghostbusters vCARD payload is a minimalist subset of the vCARD as
   described in [RFC2426].

   BEGIN -  pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the
      vCARD and MUST have the value "BEGIN:vCARD" as described in
      [RFC2426].

   VERSION -  pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the
      vCARD and MUST have the value "VERSION:3.0" as described in 3.6.9
      of [RFC2426].

   FN -  the name, as described in 3.1.1 of [RFC2426], of a contactable
      person who responsible for the certificate.

   N -  the components of the name of the object the vCard represents,
      as described in 3.1.2 of [RFC2426].

   ORG -  an organization as described in 3.5.5 of [RFC2426].

   ADR -  a postal address as described in 3.2.1 of [RFC2426].







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   TEL -  a voice and/or fax phone as described in 3.3.1 of [RFC2426].

   EMAIL -  an Email address as described in 3.3.2 of [RFC2426]

   END -  pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCARD
      and MUST have the value "END:vCARD" as described in [RFC2426].

   Per [RFC2426], the BEGIN, VERSION, FN, N, and END types MUST be
   included in a record.  To be useful, one or more of ADR, TEL, and
   EMAIL MUST be included.  Other types MAY NOT be included.


5.  CMS Packaging

   The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object conforming to the
   RPKI Signed Data Object Template, [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].

   The ContentType of a Ghostbusters Record is defined as
   rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of [TO BE ASSIGNED].
   This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
   encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute
   in the signerInfo object.  See [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].

   eContent: The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described above in
   Section 4 above.

   Similarly to a ROA, the Ghostbusters Record is verified using an EE
   certificate issued under the CA certificate associated with the
   resource-holding certificate whose maintainer is described in the
   vCARD.

   The EE certificate used to verify the Ghostbusters Record is the one
   that appears in the CMS data structure that contains the payload
   defined above.


6.  Validation

   The validation procedure defined in Section 3 of
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] is applied to a Ghostbusters Record.
   After this procedure has been performed, the Version number type
   within the payload is checked, and the OCTET STRING containing the
   vCARD data is extracted.  These data are checked against the profile
   defined in Section 4 of this document.  Only if all of these checks
   pass is the Ghostbusters payload deemed valid and made available to
   the application that requested the payload.





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7.  Security Considerations

   Though there is no on the wire protocol in this specification, there
   are attacks which could abuse the data described.  As the data, to be
   useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoid this exposure.

   Phone Numbers:  The vCARDs may contain real world telephone numbers
      which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc.

   Email Addresses:  The vCARDs may contain Email addresses which could
      be abused for purposes of spam.

   Relying parties are warned that the data in a Ghostbusters Record are
   self-asserted.  These data have not been verified by the CA that
   issued a (CA) certificate to the entity that issued the EE
   certificate used to validate the Ghostbusters Record.


8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA Considerations.


9.  Acknowledgments

   The author wishes to thank Russ Housley, the authors of
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], Stephen Kent, and Michael Elkins for
   their contributions.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]
              Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
              draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-03 (work in progress),
              February 2011.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2426]  Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
              RFC 2426, September 1998.






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10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-12 (work in
              progress), February 2011.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp]
              Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
              Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI",
              draft-ietf-sidr-cp-16 (work in progress), December 2010.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
              Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
              draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-07 (work in progress),
              February 2011.


Author's Address

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   US

   Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
   Email: randy@psg.com






















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