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Versions: (draft-huston-sidr-res-certs) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 RFC 6487

Individual Submission                                          G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                                R. Loomans
Intended status: Best Current                              G. Michaelson
Practice                                                           APNIC
Expires: December 11, 2006                                  June 9, 2006


             A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
                    draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-00.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document defines a profile for X.509 certificates for the
   purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to- use" of
   an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
   Numbers).  This profile is used to convey the authorization of the
   subject to be regarded as the current unique controlled of the IP
   addresses and AS numbers that are described in a Resource
   Certificate.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Resource Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Serial number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Signature Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4.  Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.5.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.6.  Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.7.  Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.8.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields  . . . . .  7
       3.9.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.9.4.  Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.9.6.  Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.7.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.8.  Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.9.  Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.2.  Issuer Name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.3.  This Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.4.  Next Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.5.  Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.6.  Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.6.1.  Serial Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.6.2.  Revocation Date  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.7.  CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.7.2.  CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.1.  Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . . . . . . 12
     5.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields  . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Resource Certificate Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.1.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates  . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.2.  Resource Extension Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     6.3.  Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   9.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19



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   Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 21
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 23















































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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a profile for X.509 certificates for use in the
   context of Resources Certificates.  Resource Certificates are X.509
   certificates that conform to this profile that convey the authority
   of a subject to be the entity that has the "right-to-use" a listed
   set of IP addresses and Autonomous Numbers.

   A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a
   list of IP address blocks and AS numbers to the Subject of a
   certificate, identified by the unique association of the Subject's
   private key with the public key contained in the Resource
   Certificate.

   In the context of the public Internet it is intended that Resource
   Certificates are used in a manner that is aligned to the public
   number resource distribution function, such that when a number
   resource is allocated or assigned by a Registry to a receiving
   entity, then this allocation is described by a Resource Certificate
   issued by the Registry with a subject corresponding to the entity
   that is the recipient of this assignment or allocation.  Validation
   of a certificate can be undertaken by creating a valid issuer -
   subject chain from the trust anchor allocation authorities to the
   certificate.

   Resource Certificates may be used in the context of secure inter-
   domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an IP number
   resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, to verify
   legitimacy and correctness of routing information.  Related use
   contexts include validation of access to Internet Routing Registries
   for nominated routing objects, validation of routing requests, and
   detection of potential unauthorized used of IP addresses.

   This document defines the fields that are used in a valid Resource
   Certificate that MUST be followed.  Relying Parties SHOULD check that
   a Resource Certificate conforms to this profile as a necessary
   condition of validation of a Resource Certificate.

1.1.  Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
   Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
   Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
   [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
   policy documents.



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   The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.


2.  Describing Resources in Certificates

   This framework for describing an association between the subject of a
   certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current
   control is described in [RFC3779].  It is noted that the RFC's
   description of this extension as a "right to use" is consistent with
   the assertion that the resources are "under the subject's current
   control."

   There are three aspects of this extension that are noted here:

   1.  RFC 3779 notes that this resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
       extension to the X.509 Certificate.  This Resource Certificate
       profile further defines that the use of this certificate
       extension MUST be used and MUST be marked as CRITICAL.

   2.  RFC 3779 defines a canonical form of describing a resource set,
       with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix masks as
       appropriate.  All valid certificates in this certificate resource
       framework MUST use this canonical form of resource description

   3.  A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
       unique value token within the context of certificates issued by
       the validity includes the first condition that the resources
       described in the Issuer's resource extension must encompass those
       of the Subject's resource extension.  In this context "encompass"
       allows for the Issuer's resource set to be the same as, or a
       strict superset of, any subject's resource set.  Certificate
       validity also includes a second condition that no two or more
       certificates issued by a single Issuer to two or more different
       Subjects have a non-null intersection of resources.  In other
       words an Issuer can certify at most one unique Subject as the
       unique current controller of any particular resource.

   This implies that a test of certificate validity implies that there
   exists a set of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain from
   one, and only one, trust anchor to the certificate in question, and
   that the resource extensions from the trust anchor to the certificate
   form a sequence of encompassing relationships.







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3.  Resource Certificate Fields

   A valid X.509 / PKIX Resource Certificate contains the fields listed
   in the following sections.  Unless specifically noted as being
   OPTIONAL, all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other
   field MUST NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate.  Where a
   field value is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming
   Resource Certificates.

3.1.  Version

   Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates.  This field
   MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (value is 2).

3.2.  Serial number

   The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
   Issuer.  This field MUST be present in Resource Certificates.

3.3.  Signature Algorithm

   This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
   this certificate.  This profile uses SHA-256 with RSA.  This field
   MUST be present and MUST use this value.

3.4.  Issuer

   This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
   certificate.  The value of this field is an X.500 name.  For a Root
   Trust Anchor this name is a self-selected name using only the Common
   Name (CN) X.500 name field.  For a subordinate certificate this name
   MUST be the same name as the Subject name field on the 'parent'
   certificate.  This field MUST be present.

3.5.  Subject

   This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
   allocated / assigned.  The value of this field is an X.500 name.

   In this profile the subject name is defined by the Issuer.  All
   immediate subordinate certificates issued by this Subject MUST use an
   Issuer name that is identical to this Subject name.

   This field MUST be present.







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3.6.  Valid From

   The starting time at which point the certificate is valid.  In this
   profile the "Valid From" time is no later than the time of
   certificate generation.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of RFC 3280, CAs
   conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
   "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
   or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats
   are defined in [RFC3280].  This field MUST be present.

3.7.  Valid To

   The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
   certificate's validity ends.  It represents the anticipated lifetime
   of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
   Issuer and the Subject.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of RFC 3280, CAs
   conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
   "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
   or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats
   are defined in [RFC3280].  This field MUST be present.

3.8.  Subject Public Key Info

   This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
   which the key is used.  The public key algorithm MUST be RSA and the
   Modulus must be no less than 1024 bits in length.  This field MUST be
   present.

3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

   As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate
   is designated as either critical or non-critical.  A certificate
   using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
   extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension
   MAY be ignored if it is not recognized [RFC3280].

   The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
   Resource Certificate.

3.9.1.  Basic Constraints

   The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
   certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
   paths that include this certificate.

   The Issuer determines whether the SubjectType CA bit is set.  If this
   bit is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
   resources certificates within this overall framework.



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   The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
   NOT be present.

   The Basic Constraints extension field is a CRITICAL extension in the
   Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present.

3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier

   The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
   certificates that contain a particular public key.  To facilitate
   certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
   Resource Certificates.

   The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
   the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
   certificates issued by the subject of this certificate.

   The Subject Key Identifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of
   the value of the ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key (exponent
   and modulus), excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).

3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier

   This field contains a hash of the Issuer's public key.  The hash
   algorithm is SHA-1 (160) applied to the ASN.1 bit string of the
   Issuer public key (exponent and modulus), excluding the tag, length
   and number of unused bits) ([RFC3280], Section 4.2.1.2).  This field
   MUST be present.

3.9.4.  Key Usage

   This describes the purpose of the certificate.  This is a CRITICAL
   extension, and the field MUST be present.

   The permissions permitted in this profile are Certificate signing and
   CRL signing if the Issuer permits the Subject to issue subordinate
   certificates.

3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points

   This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
   associated with certificates issued by this Issuer.  This profile
   uses a URI form of object identification.  The preferred URI access
   mechanism is a single "rsync" URL that references a single inclusive
   CRL for each issuer.

   This field MUST be present.




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3.9.6.  Authority Information Access

   This field (AIA) identifies the location of all certificates that are
   issued by this Issuer.  This profile uses a URI form of object
   identification.  The preferred URI access mechanisms is "rsync".

   This field MUST be present.

3.9.7.  Subject Information Access

   This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
   relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
   appears.  Where the Subject is a CA for Resource Certificates this
   information and service collection will include all current valid
   certificates that have been issued by this subject.  This profile
   uses a URI form of location identification.  The preferred URI access
   mechanism is "rsync".

   This field MUST be present.

3.9.8.  Certificate Policies

   This field MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using the
   OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2".  This field MUST
   be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
   Certificates.

   The Resource Certificate Policy referenced by this OID MAY be
   referenced by a CPS Pointer qualifier.

   This field MUST be present.

3.9.9.  Subject Alternate Name

   This is an OPTIONAL field, and may contain a Common Name as supplied
   by the subject in the Certificate Request.  The Subject Alternative
   Name Field has no significance in terms of use of the certificate to
   validate assertions made by the Subject on in validation assertions
   made by subordinate entities that rely on a trust chain that includes
   the subject.

3.9.10.  IP Resources

   This field contains the list of IP address resources as per
   [RFC3779].  Either IP Resources or AS Resources fields, or both, MUST
   be present in all Resource Certificates.

   This is a CRITICAL field.



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3.9.11.  AS Resources

   This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779].
   Either IP Resources or AS Resources fields, or both, MUST be present
   in all Resource Certificates.

   This is a CRITICAL field.


4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile

   Resource Certificate Authorities (CA) MUST issue a Certificate
   Revocation List (CRL).  The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
   CRLs are supported in the scope of this profile.  The scope of the
   CRL in this profile MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA".
   The contents of the CRL are a list of all unexpired certificates
   issued by the CA that have been revoked by the CA.

   This profile does not encompass the issuing of Delta CRLs, nor does
   the profile encompass the issuance of multiple CRLs by a single CA.

   The following fields are REQUIRED in a conforming CRL.No other CRL
   fields are supported in this profile.  Where two or more CRLs issued
   by a single CA are present in a certificate repository the CRL with
   the highest value of the "CRL Number" field supercedes all other
   extant CRLs issued by this CA..

4.1.  Version

   Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
   integer value of this field is 1).  This field MUST be present.

4.2.  Issuer Name

   The value of this field is the X.500 name of the issuing CA who is
   also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
   the Resource Certificates.  This field MUST be present.

4.3.  This Update

   This is the date and time that this CRL was issued.  The value of
   this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year
   2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year
   2050 or later.  This field MUST be present.







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4.4.  Next Update

   This is the date and time by which the next CRL will be issued.  The
   value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the
   year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the
   year 2050 or later.  This field MUST be present.

4.5.  Signature

   This fields contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL.  The
   signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA.  This field MUST be
   present.

4.6.  Revoked Certificate List

   When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
   list MUST be absent.

   For each revoked resource certificate the following fields are used
   in this profile.  No CRL extensions are supported in this profile.

4.6.1.  Serial Number

   The Issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate.  This field
   MUST be present.

4.6.2.  Revocation Date

   The time the certificate was revoked.  This time SHOULD NOT be a
   future date.  The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for
   dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime
   for dates in the year 2050 or later.  This field MUST be present.

4.7.  CRL Extensions

   The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL.  The
   following extensions are supported in this profile.

4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a CRL.  The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
   4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].

   Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier method (defined in
   section 5.2.1 of [RFC3280], and MUST include this extension in all
   CRLs issued.



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4.7.2.  CRL Number

   The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a
   monotonically increasing sequence number for a given CRL scope and
   CRL issuer.  This extension allows users to easily determine when a
   particular CRL supersedes another CRL.  The higher CRL Number value
   supercedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within the scope of this
   profile.  CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST include this
   extension in all CRLs.


5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile

   This profile refines the specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to
   Resource Certificates.  A Certificate Request Message object,
   formatted according to the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF),
   is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in issuing a
   certificate.

   This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
   (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.

   [There are no profile-based qualifications are noted regarding Proof-
   of-Possession.  This may be refined in subsequent iterations of this
   draft.]

5.1.  Resource Certificate Request Template Fields


   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:

   Version
      [RFC4211] indicates that this MUST be 2, if supplied.  As Resource
      Certificates are Version 3 certificates, this field MUST be
      omitted in this profile.

   SerialNumber
      As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
      omitted in this profile.

   SigningAlgorithm
      As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
      omitted in this profile.







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   Issuer
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   Validity
      This field MAY be omitted.  If omitted, the CA will assign a
      ValidityFrom date based on the certificate issue date and a
      ValidityTo date based on the CA's business rule.  If this field is
      not omitted then at least one of notBefore and notAfter MUST be
      specified.

      notBefore
         This field will be mapped to the ValidityFrom certificate
         field.  If this field is later than the CA's business rule for
         certificate issuance, then the request MAY NOT be honored.

      notAfter
         This field will be mapped to the ValidityTo certificate field.
         Values of notAfter prior to the current time MUST be considered
         as an invalid Certificate Request.  If this field is later than
         the CA's business rule for certificate issuance then issued
         certificate MAY use a ValidityTo date as determined by the CA's
         business rule for certificate issuance.

   Subject
      As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be
      omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the
      CA.  If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's
      suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion.

   PublicKey
      This field MUST be present.

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to X509 v3
   extension fields that may appear in a Certificate Request:

   BasicConstraints
      If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA.

      The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
      Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

      The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on.  If this bit
      is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
      resources certificates within this overall framework.





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      The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity
      certificate request).

   SubjectKeyIdentifier
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   AuthorityKeyIdentifier
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   KeyUsage
      The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and
      CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the
      BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified.

   CRLDistributionPoints
      This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
      issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
      set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.

      If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
      "rsync" URL that references a single inclusive CRL that will be
      published by the subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be
      honoured by the CA.

      If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning
      then the CA MUST generate a CRLDistributionPoint URL within the
      repository hierarchy administered by the CA.

   AuthorityInformationAccess
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   SubjectInformationAccess
      This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
      issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
      set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.

      If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
      "rsync" URL that references a single publication point that will
      be used by the subject for all certificates that published by the
      subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the
      CA.







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      If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning
      then the CA MUST generate an SIA URL within the repository
      hierarchy administered by the CA.

   Certificate Policies
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   SubjectAlternateName
      This field MAY be present, and the CA SHOULD use this as the
      SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.

   IPResources
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   ASResources
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to
   alter any requested field.

5.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields

   The following control fields are supported in this profile:

   Authenticator Control
      It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
      subject in a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
      is that the Authenticator Control field be used.

      [The method of generation and authentication of this field is to
      be specified.  The desirable properties include the ability to
      validate the subject and the authenticity of the provided public
      key.]

   Resource Class
      The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate
      Requests, namely a Resource Class control.
      The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by
      the CA to which the request refers.  The CA will issue a
      certificate with the IPAddress andASNumber resources that match
      the subject's right-of-use of these resources with the class of
      resources specified by the Resource Class control value.






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6.  Resource Certificate Validation

   This section describes the Resource Certificate validation model.
   This refines the generic procedure described in [RFC3280]:

   To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
   things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
   certificates) satisfies the following conditions:

   1.  for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
       issuer of certificate x+1;

   2.  certificate 1 is issued by the trust anchor;

   3.  certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and

   4.  for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the time
       in question.

6.1.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates

   The trust model used in the resource certificate framework in the
   context of validation of assertions of public number resources in
   public-use contexts is a top-down delegated CA model that mirrors the
   delegation of resources from a registry distribution point to the
   entities that are the direct recipients of these resources.  Within
   the trust model these recipient entities may, in turn, operate a
   registry and perform further allocations or assignments.  This is a
   strict hierarchy, in that any number resource and a corresponding
   recipient entity has only one 'parent' issuing registry for that
   number resource (i.e. there is always a unique parent entity for any
   resource and corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is
   not a direct or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the
   recipient entity in question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy).  The
   only exception to the "no loop" condition are the nominated trust
   anchors, where a self-signed certificate is issued.

   At the time of preparing this draft there are proposed to be multiple
   roots of this public number resource hierarchy, corresponding to
   multiple trust anchors.  These trust anchors are the self-signed
   certificates that are issued by the Regional Internet Registries.
   Each self-signed certificate issued by a RIR contains a resource set
   that describes the resources where the RIR is administratively
   responsible.  There MUST NOT be overlap of resources in the IP
   resource extensions across the collection of RIR self-signed
   certificates.  This implies that a validation path for a valid
   certificate will terminate in a single trust anchor.




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   Cross-certification of these trust anchors, where one trust anchor
   entity issues a certificate with a subject of another trust anchor is
   not seen as providing any further substance to the integrity or ease
   of validation in this trust model, so cross-certification is not used
   in the trust anchor structure for this Resource Certificate
   Framework.

   The adoption of a single trust anchor as a unique distinguished root
   of this certificate hierarchy is a potential future option here, and
   within the proposed framework some care has been taken not to
   preclude the potential for a single distinguished root for this
   certificate framework that could issue a certificate to each RIR with
   a resource extension that matches the resource sets that fall under
   the administrative responsibility of each RIR.

6.2.  Resource Extension Validation

   The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a CRITICAL
   extensions for Internet number resources.  These are ASN.1 encoded
   representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
   prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.

   Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP resource extension.
   In order to validate a Resource Certificate the resource extension
   must also be validated.  This validation process relies on
   definitions of comparison of resource sets:

   more specific  Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A
      and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP
      addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is
      larger than range A.

   equal  Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B,
      A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
      collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B.

   Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
   ordered certification path of {1, ..., n}, each of the contiguous
   resource sets of IP addresses and AS Numbers described in certificate
   x are more specific or equal to the resources described in
   certificate x+1.

6.3.  Resource Certificate Path Validation

   Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
   certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
   'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust
   anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the



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   following conditions hold:

   1.  The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
       the signature algorithm

   2.  The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and
       TO values.

   3.  The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
       contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
       values that MUST be present.

   4.  No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the
       certificate.

   5.  The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
       certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
       Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid.

   6.  That the resource extension data is equal to or more specific
       than the resource extension data contained in a valid certificate
       where this Issuer is the Subject (the previous certificate in the
       ordered sequence)

   7.  The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there
       exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the
       Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the
       Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path.

   Validation of a certificate may perform these tests in any chosen
   order.

   A Resource Certificate may have a number of potential parent
   certificates, where a potential parent certificate is one where the
   subject name matches the issuer name of the resource certificate.  A
   candidate parent certificate is any member of the parent certificate
   set where the resource extension validity constraint is satisfied,
   and a valid candidate parent certificate is any candidate parent
   certificate that also matches validity conditions 1 through 6.  A
   valid parent certificate is a valid candidate parent certificate that
   also matches validity condition 7.

   Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found on a single
   repository, maintained by a regular top-down walk from the Root Trust
   Anchors via Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward
   pointers, plus the CRLDP.  Alternatively, validation may be performed
   using a bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the
   AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process.



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   There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
   are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
   means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
   Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation
   process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts
   to validate such structures.  It is suggested that implementations of
   Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if
   the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration
   parameter.

   In the context of Resource Certificates that are generated in respect
   of public resources and with the framework of the associated resource
   distribution process, it is suggested that this configuration
   parameter of maximum certificate path length be set to a value of
   100.  (There is no particular reason for suggesting this value other
   than the observation that it appears to be comfortably longer than
   any real distribution chain for public number resources, without
   being too long so as to pose potential DOS concerns for relying
   parties performing a validation operation.)


7.  Security Considerations

   [to be completed]


8.  IANA Considerations

   [An OID for a resource class option in a certificate request may need
   to be defined.]


9.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC2050]  Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
              J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
              BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.

   [RFC3280]  Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.



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   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              September 2005.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.


Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate

   The following is an example Resource Certificate.

   Certificate Name: UDkyh1nUjIjk5_WpdkZMh3KuvYo-25f7.crt

   Data:
     Version: 3
     Serial:  9719 (0x25f7)
     Signature Algorithm:
              Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
     Issuer:  CN=APNIC-AP-IANA
     Validity:
              Not Before: Fri May 12 05:37:43 2006 GMT
              Not After:  Thu Aug 10 05:37:43 2006 GMT
     Subject: CN=FC9B85ADDF5B
     Subject Public Key Info:
              Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
              RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
              Modulus (1024 bit):
                   00:f2:e5:63:d6:e3:89:45:47:02:13:90:b7:e5:39:
                   a3:f0:8c:3b:27:0d:d1:90:92:46:9b:45:d0:52:34:
                   f1:7c:c7:34:9f:be:d0:41:18:ab:35:43:62:89:2e:
                   3e:32:ab:01:e2:86:76:2a:44:83:49:4c:83:02:b4:
                   0c:2a:b0:b2:82:c6:35:24:7b:16:7a:35:42:36:15:
                   18:50:fe:8b:7f:c9:04:18:69:6b:ed:59:0d:61:ea:
                   20:ef:cd:19:30:9f:ce:b8:4a:f5:fb:ad:81:42:ab:
                   57:72:0c:47:b0:d8:30:c0:0c:5b:52:dc:aa:94:95:
                   3e:fe:44:ac:d5:b0:f4:d5:cb
              Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
     X509v3 extensions:
       Basic Constraints:
              CA:TRUE
       Subject Key Identifier:
              keyid: 50:39:32:87:59:D4:8C:88:E4:E7:F5:A9:
                     76:46:4C:87:72:AE:BD:8A
       Authority Key Identifier:
              keyid: 19:54:CD:F2:81:C6:4E:31:09:6D:3A:15:
                     E6:88:39:30:21:A6:56:73
       Key Usage: critical



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              Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
       CRL Distribution Points:
              URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/
                         pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
                         GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM/
                         GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM.crl
       Authority Information Access:
               CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/
                                       pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
                                       GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM
       Subject Information Access:
               CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/
                                      pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
                                      GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM/
                                      UDkyh1nUjIjk5_WpdkZMh3KuvYo
       Certificate Policies: critical
               Policy: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
       ipAddrBlock: critical
               192.0.0.0/24
       autonomousSysNum: critical
               64512
       Subject Alternative Name:
               DirName:/CN=<subject_supplied_string>

     Signature:
               72:27:9c:bc:a8:7f:c0:f0:27:62:a1:1f:55:b3:c7:b1:31:c9:fc:
               42:84:71:30:3b:0d:c0:d6:ad:79:b1:f6:1d:14:e8:f3:0f:f3:dd:
               40:3d:ae:28:a6:33:96:b6:d3:7d:d2:f3:ac:d3:8e:d4:2e:ad:ab:
               71:4d:05:74:20:ed:bc:e3:bd:85:7f:af:8b:70:3e:b8:90:b6:2d:
               a5:e3:9d:2a:c8:a9:9b:73:3c:03:43:d2:b8:d2:4e:68:34:eb:db:
               3c:44:eb:eb:1e:3b:03:d9:3b:e0:64:a6:31:90:9b:2c:4a:26:8e:
               0e:36:4c:ee:c8:e9:29:6b:78:61:87:05:e2:f9


Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List

   The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.














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   Certificate Name: GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM.crl

   Data:
     Version: 2
     Issuer:  CN=APNIC-AP-IANA
     Effective Date: Fri May 12 05:37:43 2006 GMT
     Next Update:    Fri May 26 05:37:43 2006 GMT
     Signature algorithn
              Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
     CRL V2 Extensions:
       Authority Key Identifier:
         Keyid: 19:54:cd:f2:81:c6:4e:31:09:6d:3a:15:
                e6:88:39:30:21:a6:56:73
         Certificate Issuer:
                CN=APNIC-AP-IANA
         Certificate Serial Number: 1b
       CRL Number:  1097
     Revocation List:
       Revoked Certificates
         Serial Number: 0b
           Revocation Date: Mon May 8 05:10:19 2006 GMT
         Serial Number: 0c
           Revocation Date: Mon May 8 05:10:19 2006 GMT


Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: gih@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   Robert Loomans
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: robertl@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   George Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: ggm@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net





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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

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Acknowledgment

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