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Versions: (draft-huston-sidr-res-certs) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 RFC 6487

SIDR                                                           G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                             G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track                              R. Loomans
Expires: August 24, 2007                                           APNIC
                                                       February 20, 2007


             A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
                    draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-04.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 24, 2007.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
   the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use"
   of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
   Numbers).  This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
   of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
   use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
   associated Resource Certificate.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Resource Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Serial number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Signature Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4.  Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.5.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.6.  Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.7.  Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.8.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields  . . . . .  8
       3.9.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.4.  Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.9.6.  Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.9.7.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.9.8.  Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.9.9.  Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.2.  Issuer Name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.3.  This Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.4.  Next Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.5.  Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.6.  Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       4.6.1.  Serial Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       4.6.2.  Revocation Date  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.7.  CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.7.2.  CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.1.  PCKS#10 Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       5.1.1.  PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
               Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.2.  CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       5.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields  . . 17
       5.2.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields  . . . . . 17
     5.3.  Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
           Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   6.  Resource Certificate Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21



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     6.1.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates  . . . . . . . . . 21
     6.2.  Resource Extension Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.3.  Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   7.  Example Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30







































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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
   use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers.
   These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to
   the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints
   specified in this profile.  Resource Certificates attest that the
   issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of
   IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers.

   A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
   that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
   of the certificate.  The binding is identified by the association of
   the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in
   the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the
   certificate's issuer.

   In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
   resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
   Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
   public number resource distribution function.  Specifically, when a
   number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
   entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
   Certificate.  This Certificate is issued by the number registry, and
   the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer
   corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair
   that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the
   number assignment or allocation.  A critical extension to the
   certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or
   assigned by the issuer to the entity.  In the context of the public
   number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI
   structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one
   'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificated from a
   "Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate.

   Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
   be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate
   chain from a trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate
   [RFC4158], with the additional constraint of ensuring that each
   subject's listed resources are fully encompassed by those of the
   issuer at each step in the issuer-subject chain.

   Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
   secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an
   IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
   to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information.  Related
   use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects,
   validation of routing requests, and detection of potential



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   unauthorised used of IP addresses.

   This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
   Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
   Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
   this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.

1.1.  Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
   Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
   Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
   [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
   policy documents.

   The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.


2.  Describing Resources in Certificates

   The framework for describing an association between the subject of a
   certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current
   control is described in [RFC3779].

   There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
   this profile:

   1.  RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
       extension to the X.509 Certificate.  This Resource Certificate
       profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
       extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be
       marked as CRITICAL.

   2.  RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource
       set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix
       masks as appropriate.  All valid certificates in this profile
       MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in
       the resource extension field.

   3.  A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
       validity includes the condition that the resources described in
       the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the
       certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a



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       resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must
       encompass the resource set of the issued certificate.  In this
       context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be
       the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set.
       The constraints imposed by this profile a certificate furthermore
       require that a the encompassing issuer's resource set be
       described in a single certificate, and not in two or more
       certificates.

   A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
   sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
   subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
   certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to
   the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in
   this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate
   form a sequence of encompassing relationships.


3.  Resource Certificate Fields

   A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
   consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields
   listed in this section.  Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
   all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
   NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate.  Where a field value
   is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
   Certificates.

3.1.  Version

   Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates.  This field
   MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this
   field is 2).

3.2.  Serial number

   The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
   Issuer.

3.3.  Signature Algorithm

   This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
   this certificate.  This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
   RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
   SHA-512.  Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
   OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 11 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].

   It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for



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   both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be
   taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

3.4.  Issuer

   This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
   certificate.  The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.

   If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
   the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
   issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
   immediate superior certificate.

   This field MUST be non-empty.

3.5.  Subject

   This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
   allocated / assigned.  The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.

   In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
   each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
   a subject name that is unique per issuer.

   This field MUST be non-empty.

3.6.  Valid From

   The starting time at which point the certificate is valid.  In this
   profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
   certificate generation.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280],
   Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always
   encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as
   UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
   GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280].

   In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
   this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
   certificate.  However, it is not valid to infer from this information
   that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
   other than the current time.

3.7.  Valid To

   The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
   certificate's validity ends.  It represents the anticipated lifetime
   of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
   issuer and the subject.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs



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   conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
   "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
   or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats
   are defined in [RFC3280].

   In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
   this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
   certificate.  However, it is not valid to infer from this information
   that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
   other than the current time.

   Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a
   certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity
   interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the
   issued certificate.  However, in the context of this profile, it is
   anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate
   with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the
   CA's certificate.

3.8.  Subject Public Key Info

   This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
   which the key is used.  The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
   accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
   1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.  The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024
   bits.  In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that
   certificates that are intended to be used as root certificates, and
   their immediate subordinates SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048
   bits.  Immediate subordinates of these certificates, when used in the
   context of continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key
   size of 2048 bits.

   In the application of this profile to certification of public number
   resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the
   Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that
   their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key
   size of 2048 bits.  All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key
   size of 1024 bits.

   It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
   both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be
   taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

   As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate
   is designated as either critical or non-critical.  A certificate-
   using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical



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   extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension
   MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280].

   The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
   Resource Certificate.

3.9.1.  Basic Constraints

   The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
   certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
   paths that include this certificate.

   The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set.  If this bit
   is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue
   resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
   subject is permitted be a CA).

   The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
   NOT be present.

   The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
   Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present.

3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier

   The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
   certificates that contain a particular public key.  To facilitate
   certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
   Resource Certificates.  This extension is non-critical.

   The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
   the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
   immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the
   subject of this certificate).

   The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
   of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
   described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280].

3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier

   The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
   certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by
   providing a hash value of the issuer's public key.  To facilitate
   path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
   Certificates.  The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present in all
   Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-
   signed" certificate.  The authorityCertIssuer and



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   authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MUST NOT be present.  This
   extension is non-critical.

   The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
   of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
   described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].

3.9.4.  Key Usage

   This describes the purpose of the certificate.  This is a critical
   extension, and it MUST be present.

   In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits
   are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE.

   In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and
   MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.

3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points

   This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
   associated with certificates issued by this Issuer.  This profile
   uses the URI form of object identification.  The preferred URI access
   mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
   a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.

   In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
   implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the
   distributionPoint subfield MUST be present.  The Reasons subfield
   MUST be omitted.

   The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
   contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer.  The type of the general name MUST
   be of type URI.  In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
   to be all certificates issued by this issuer.  The sequence of
   distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
   DistributionPointName set.  The DistributionPointName set MAY contain
   more than one URI value.  An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
   DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
   this issuer's certificate revocation list.  Other access form URIs
   MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI.

   This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical.

3.9.6.  Authority Information Access

   This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
   certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,



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   where this certificate's issuer is the subject.  In this profile a
   single reference object to publication location of the immediate
   superior certificate MUST be used.

   This profile uses a URI form of object identification.  The preferred
   URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
   with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers.  The URI MUST
   reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
   issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
   Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
   included in the value sequence of this extension.

   When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate,the subordinate
   certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
   field.  In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
   issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all
   subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
   persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates.  This implies
   that re-issued certificates overwrite prevously issued certificates
   to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously
   issued certificates.  In this way subordinate certificates can
   maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due
   solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate.  The issuers'
   policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued
   certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice
   Statement.

   Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a
   persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each
   subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the
   most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the
   subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this
   subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate.

   In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a
   "root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension
   field SHOULD be omitted.  In all other cases this field MUST be
   present, and is non-critical.

3.9.7.  Subject Information Access

   This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
   relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
   appears.  Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
   and service collection will include all current valid certificates
   that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
   subject's corresponding private key.




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   This profile uses a URI form of location identification.  The
   preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
   specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
   subject of the certificate is a CA.  The RSYNC URI must reference an
   object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
   trailing '/' in the URI.  Other access method URIs that reference the
   same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this
   extension.

   This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
   critical.

   For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this
   field MAY be present, and is non-critical.  If present, it references
   the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the
   End Entity certificate can be accessed.  The id-ad-
   signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity
   and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a
   repository.

   id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }

   id-ad-signedObjectRepositor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 }

3.9.8.  Certificate Policies

   This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
   the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2".  This field
   MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
   Certificates.

   PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile.

   This extension MUST be present and it is critical.

3.9.9.  Subject Alternate Name

   This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as
   supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by
   the issuer.

3.9.10.  IP Resources

   This field contains the list of IP address resources as per
   [RFC3779].  The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
   particular AFI value.  In the context of resource certificates
   describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
   the SAFI value MUST NOT be used.  All Resource Certificates MUST



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   include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
   extensions.

   This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.

3.9.11.  AS Resources

   This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779],
   or may specify the "inherit" element.  RDI values are NOT supported
   in this profile and MUST NOT be used.  All Resource Certificates MUST
   include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
   extensions.

   This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.


4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile

   Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
   consistent with [RFC3280].  The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
   CRLs are supported in this profile.  The scope of the CRL MUST be
   "all certificates issued by this CA".  The contents of the CRL are a
   list of all non-expired certificates issued by the CA that have been
   revoked by the CA.

   An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
   regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
   validity period.

   This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.

   The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
   different scope by a single CA.

   No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs
   issued under this profile.  Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
   MUST be present in the CRL.  Where two or more CRLs issued by a
   single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the
   highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs
   issued by this CA.

4.1.  Version

   Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
   integer value of this field is 1).






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4.2.  Issuer Name

   The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is
   also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
   the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.

4.3.  This Update

   This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued.  The
   value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the
   year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the
   year 2050 or later.

4.4.  Next Update

   This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued.
   The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
   the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in
   the year 2050 or later.

4.5.  Signature

   This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL.  The
   signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA.  This field MUST be
   present.

4.6.  Revoked Certificate List

   When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
   list MUST be absent.

   For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
   be present.  No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
   and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.

4.6.1.  Serial Number

   The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate.

4.6.2.  Revocation Date

   The time the certificate was revoked.  This time SHOULD NOT be a
   future date.  The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for
   dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime
   for dates in the year 2050 or later.






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4.7.  CRL Extensions

   The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL.  The
   following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be
   present in a CRL.

4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a CRL.  Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
   method.  The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
   4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].

   This extension is non-critical.

4.7.2.  CRL Number

   The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
   number for a given CA.  This extension allows users to easily
   determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL.  The highest
   CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within
   the scope of this profile.

   This extension is non-critical.


5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile

5.1.  PCKS#10 Profile

   This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
   Resource Certificates.  A Certificate Request Message object,
   formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority
   as the initial step in issuing a certificate.

   This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
   (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.

   With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
   permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
   certificate.

5.1.1.  PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:




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   Version
      This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.

   Subject
      The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but
      the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name
      MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer.
      This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a
      subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued
      by this issuer.

   SubjectPublicKeyInfo
      This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm
      with which the key is used.  The public key algorithm MUST be RSA,
      and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.  This field
      also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public
      key.  For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the
      DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey.

   Attributes
      [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
      the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.

      The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
      attribute as defined in [RFC2985].  This attribute contains X509v3
      Certificate Extensions.  The profile for extensions in certificate
      requests is specified in Section 5.3.

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:

   signatureAlgorithm
      Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption).
      Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value
      1.2.840.113549.1.1.11

5.2.  CRMF Profile

   This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
   specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
   A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
   CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in
   issuing a certificate.

   This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
   (RA), acting under the direction of a subject.

   With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is



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   permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
   certificate..

5.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:

   Version
      This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version
      3 Certificate.  It SHOULD be omitted.

   SerialNumber
      As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
      omitted in this profile.

   SigningAlgorithm
      As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
      omitted in this profile.

   Issuer
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   Validity
      This field MAY be omitted.  If omitted, the CA will issue a
      Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA.  If
      specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with
      dates as determined by the CA.

   Subject  As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be
      omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the
      CA.  If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's
      suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion.

   PublicKey
      This field MUST be present.

   extensions
      This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions.  The
      profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in
      Section 5.3.

5.2.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields

   The following control fields are supported in this profile:





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   Authenticator Control
      It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
      subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
      is that the Authenticator Control field be used.

      [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and
      authentication of this field is not specified in this document.
      It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have
      securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the
      Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials.  The
      desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject
      and the authenticity of the provided public key.]

   Resource Class
      The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate
      Requests, namely a Resource Class control.

      The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by
      the CA to which the request refers.  The CA will issue a
      certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match
      the subject's right-of-use of these resources within the class of
      resources specified by the Resource Class control value.

      [Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource
      class is related the various forms of resource allocation which
      imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing
      validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the
      entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single
      'upstream' issuing registry.  Due to this consideration it may not
      be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing
      resource set.  Alternatively it is possible to define a structure
      where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a
      set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject
      (i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")]

5.3.  Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests

   This profile allows the following extensions to appear in a PKCS#10
   and CRMF Certificate Request:

   BasicConstraints
      If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA.

      The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
      Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
      profile.





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      The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on.  If this bit
      is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
      resource certificates within this overall framework.

      The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity
      certificate request).

   SubjectKeyIdentifier
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   AuthorityKeyIdentifier
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   KeyUsage
      The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and
      CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the
      BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified.

    SubjectInformationAccess
      This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
      issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
      set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.

      If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
      RSYNC URI that references a single publication point that will be
      used by the subject for all certificates that published by the
      subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the
      CA.

      If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning
      then the CA MUST generate a URI value for the
      SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information
      that has been passed between the CA and the requester.

      [Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is
      also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a
      certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.]

   SubjectAlternateName
      This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
      SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.








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   CRLDistributionPoints
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   AuthorityInformationAccess
      This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this
      profile.  If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the
      AIA field.

   SubjectInformationAccess
      This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
      issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
      set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.

      If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
      rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be
      used by the subject for all certificates that published by the
      subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the
      CA.

      If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning
      then the CA MUST generate a SIA URL based on out-of-band
      information that has been passed between the CA and the requester.

      [Note not for publication - the same considerations with respect
      to the CRL DistributionPoints apply to this field as well. i.e. if
      this field is missing than it is also an option for the Issuer to
      deny the request and not issue a certificate if the issued
      certificate was to have the CA bit set.]

   CertificatePolicies
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   SubjectAlternateName
      This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
      SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.

   IPResources
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   ASResources
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to
   alter any requested field.



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6.  Resource Certificate Validation

   This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
   This refines the generic procedure described insection 6 of
   [RFC3280]:

   To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
   things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
   certificates) satisfies the following conditions:

   1.  for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
       issuer of certificate x+1;

   2.  certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;

   3.  certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and

   4.  for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid.

6.1.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates

   The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate
   framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number
   resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-
   down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from
   a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct
   recipients of these resources.  Within this trust model these
   recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform
   further allocations or assignments.  This is a strict hierarchy, in
   that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has
   only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e.
   there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and
   corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct
   or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in
   question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy).  The only exception to the
   "no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue
   a self-signed root certificate.

   The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is
   a task undertaken by relying parties.  The structure of the resource
   certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of trust
   models as the PKIX profile.  There is only one additional caveat on
   the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely
   that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of
   certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation
   property, as described in Section 6.2.





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6.2.  Resource Extension Validation

   The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
   extensions for Internet number resources.  These are ASN.1 encoded
   representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
   prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.

   Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
   number resource extension.  In order to validate a Resource
   Certificate the resource extension must also be validated.  This
   validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource
   sets:

   more specific  Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A
      and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP
      addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is
      larger than range A.

   equal  Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B,
      A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
      collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B.
      The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this
      "equality" comparison.
   encompass  Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
      "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or
      AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more
      specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the
      set X.

   Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
   ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust
   anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of
   certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that
   the resources described in certificate 'x', for 'x' is greater than
   1, "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1.

6.3.  Resource Certificate Path Validation

   Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
   certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
   'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust
   anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the
   following conditions hold:

   1.  The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
       the signature algorithm





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   2.  The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and
       To values.

   3.  The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
       contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
       values that MUST be present.

   4.  No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the
       certificate.

   5.  The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
       certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
       Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid.

   6.  That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource
       extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer
       is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)

   7.  The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there
       exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the
       Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the
       Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path.

   A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
   chosen order.

   Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally
   maintained repository, maintained by a regular top-down
   synchronization pass from the Root Trust Anchors via reference to
   Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus
   the CRLDP.  Alternatively, validation may be performed using a
   bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the AIA and
   CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process.

   There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
   are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
   means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
   Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation
   process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts
   to validate such structures.  It is suggested that implementations of
   Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if
   the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration
   parameter.


7.  Example Use Cases

   [1 - signing a Route Registry Object] [2 - signing a Route



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   Origination Authority - note validity time] [3 - performing a
   resource (sub) allocation - An example of this in situations where
   there are contractual period differences between the entity and its
   resource supplier, and the entity and its resource allocation
   subjects.]


8.  Security Considerations

   [To be completed]


9.  IANA Considerations

   [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
   considerations stated in this version of the document.]


10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
   Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
   Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
   this document.


11.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC2050]  Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
              J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
              BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              November 2000.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              November 2000.

   [RFC3280]  Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.




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   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              June 2005.

   [RFC4158]  Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
              Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
              Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              September 2005.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [rsync]    Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006,
              <http://samba.anu.edu.au/rsync/>.


Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate

   The following is an example Resource Certificate.

   Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer

   Data:
     Version: 3
     Serial: 3
     Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
     Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
       E=ca@apnic.net
     Validity:
       Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT
       Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT
     Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources
     Subject Key Identifier:
       86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d:
       8b:97:49:14
     Subject Key Identifier g(SKI):
       hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
     Subject Public Key Info:
       Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
         RSA Public Key: Modulus:



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           c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1:
           59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a:
           0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3:
           f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb:
           b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4:
           5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe:
           e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e:
           4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c:
           56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5:
           c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba:
           dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c:
           f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d:
           92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03:
           d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87:
           24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27:
           03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7
         RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537
     Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE
     Subject Info Access:
       caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
                             pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
                             q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
                             hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
     Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
     CRL Distribution Points:
       rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
              pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
              q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
              q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
     Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
       rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
              pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
              q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
       ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02:
       51:c2:a9:1c
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
       q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
     Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
     IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24,
           203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23
     IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32
     ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370
     Signature:
       c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b:
       4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59:
       0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2:
       a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7:



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       11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3:
       92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28:
       f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f:
       e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51:
       26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0:
       4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12:
       5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4:
       81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28:
       33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3:
       bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c:
       1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54:
       52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d


Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List

   The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.


































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   CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl

   Data:
     Version: 2
     Signature Algorithm:
       Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
     Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
       E=ca@apnic.net
     This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
     Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
       ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
       07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
       q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
     CRLNumber: 4
     Revoked Certificates: 1
       Serial Number: 1
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
       Serial Number: 2
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
       Serial Number: 4
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
     Signature:
       b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
       0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
       f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
       17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
       f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
       d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
       b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
       66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
       6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
       d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
       cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
       c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
       d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
       09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
       02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
       59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
       34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
       d9









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Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: gih@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   George Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: ggm@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   Robert Loomans
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: robertl@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net






























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Full Copyright Statement

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   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
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