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Versions: (draft-huston-sidr-res-certs) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 RFC 6487

SIDR                                                           G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                             G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track                              R. Loomans
Expires: March 10, 2009                                            APNIC
                                                       September 6, 2008


             A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
                      draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-12

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
   the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use"
   of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
   Numbers).  This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
   of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
   use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
   issued certificate.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Resource Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Serial number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Signature Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4.  Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.5.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.6.  Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.7.  Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.8.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields  . . . . .  8
       3.9.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.4.  Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.9.6.  Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.9.7.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.9.8.  Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.9.9.  IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.9.10. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.2.  Issuer Name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.3.  This Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.4.  Next Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.5.  Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.6.  Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.6.1.  Serial Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.6.2.  Revocation Date  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.7.  CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.7.2.  CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.1.  PCKS#10 Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       5.1.1.  PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
               Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.2.  CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       5.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields  . . 17
       5.2.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields  . . . . . 18
     5.3.  Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
           Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   6.  Resource Certificate Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     6.1.  Resource Extension Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21



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     6.2.  Resource Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.3.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates  . . . . . . . . . 24
       6.3.1.  Distribution Format of Nominated Trust Anchor
               Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   10. Draft Review Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 34
   Appendix C.  Cryptographic Message Syntax Profile for RPKI
                Trust Anchor Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     C.1.  Signed-Data ContentType  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
       C.1.1.  encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
       C.1.2.  signerInfos  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
     C.2.  RTA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 42






























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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates
   [X.509] for use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and
   AS Numbers.  Such certificates are termed here "Resource
   Certificates."  Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that
   conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], and also conform to the
   constraints specified in this profile.  Resource Certificates attest
   that the issuer has granted the subject a "right-of-use" for a listed
   set of IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers.

   A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
   that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
   of the issued certificate.  The binding is identified by the
   association of the subject's private key with the subject's public
   key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private
   key of the certificate's issuer.

   In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
   resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
   Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
   public number resource distribution function.  Specifically, when a
   number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
   entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
   Certificate.  This certificate is issued by the number registry, and
   the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer
   corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair
   that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the
   number assignment or allocation.  A critical extension to the
   certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or
   assigned by the issuer to the entity.  In the context of the public
   number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI
   structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one
   'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a
   certification authority operating at the apex of a resource
   distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate.

   Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
   be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate
   chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certification
   authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional
   constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully
   encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject
   certificate chain.

   Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
   secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-of-use of an
   IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,



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   allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of
   routing information.  Related use contexts include validation of
   Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests,
   and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses.

   This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
   Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
   Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
   this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.

1.1.  Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
   Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
   Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
   [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
   policy documents.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.


2.  Describing Resources in Certificates

   The framework for describing an association between the subject of a
   certificate and the resources currently under the subject's control
   is described in [RFC3779].

   There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
   this profile:

   1.  RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
       extension to the X.509 Certificate.  This Resource Certificate
       profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
       extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be
       marked as CRITICAL.

   2.  RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource
       set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix
       masks as appropriate.  All valid certificates in this profile
       MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in
       the resource extension field.





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   3.  A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
       validity includes the condition that the resources described in
       the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the
       certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a
       resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must
       encompass the resource set of the issued certificate.  In this
       context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be
       the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set.

   A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
   sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
   subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
   certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certification
   authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource
   extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's
   issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence
   of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in
   the resource extension.


3.  Resource Certificate Fields

   A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
   consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
   listed in this section.  Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
   all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
   NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate.  Where a field value
   is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
   Certificates.

3.1.  Version

   Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates.  This field
   MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this
   field is 2).

3.2.  Serial number

   The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
   Issuer.

3.3.  Signature Algorithm

   This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
   this certificate.  This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
   RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
   SHA-512.  Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
   OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].



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3.4.  Issuer

   This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
   certificate.  The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.

   If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
   the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
   issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
   immediate superior certificate.

   This field MUST be non-empty.

3.5.  Subject

   This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
   allocated / assigned.  The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.

   In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
   each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
   a subject name that is unique per issuer.

   This field MUST be non-empty.

3.6.  Valid From

   The starting time at which point the certificate is valid.  In this
   profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
   certificate generation.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280],
   Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST
   always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year
   2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
   GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats are defined in [RFC5280].

   In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
   this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
   certificate.  However, it is not valid to infer from this information
   that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
   other than the current time.

3.7.  Valid To

   The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
   certificate's validity ends.  It represents the anticipated lifetime
   of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
   issuer and the subject.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280], CAs
   conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
   "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
   or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats



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   are defined in [RFC5280].

   In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
   this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
   certificate.  However, it is not valid to infer from this information
   that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
   other than the current time.

   CAs are typically advised against issuing a certificate with a
   validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's
   certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate.
   However, in the context of this profile, it is anticipated that a CA
   may have valid grounds to issue a certificate with a validity
   interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's certificate.

3.8.  Subject Public Key Info

   This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
   which the key is used.  The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
   accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
   1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.  The key size MUST be a minimum size of 2048
   bits.

   It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
   both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
   when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

   As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC5280], each extension in a certificate
   is designated as either critical or non-critical.  A certificate-
   using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
   extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension
   MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC5280].

   The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
   Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.

3.9.1.  Basic Constraints

   The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
   certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
   paths that include this certificate.

   The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set.  If this bit
   is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue
   resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
   subject is permitted be a CA).



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   The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
   NOT be present.

   The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
   Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is
   a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.

3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier

   The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
   certificates that contain a particular public key.  To facilitate
   certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
   Resource Certificates.  This extension is non-critical.

   The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
   the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
   immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the
   subject of this certificate).

   The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
   of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
   described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].

3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key,
   by providing a hash value of the issuer's public key.  To facilitate
   path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
   Certificates.  The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all
   Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-
   signed" certificate.  The authorityCertIssuer and
   authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present.  This
   extension is non-critical.

   The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
   of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
   described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].

3.9.4.  Key Usage

   This describes the purpose of the certificate.  This is a critical
   extension, and it MUST be present.

   In certificates issued to Certificate Authorities only the
   keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and MUST be the only
   bits set to TRUE.




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   In end-entity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set and
   MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.

3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points

   This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
   associated with certificates issued by this Issuer.  This profile
   uses the URI form of object identification.  The preferred URI access
   mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
   a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.

   In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
   implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the
   distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present.  The Reasons sub-field
   MUST be omitted.

   The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
   contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer.  The type of the general name MUST
   be of type URI.

   In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
   certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair.

   The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
   DistributionPointName set.  The DistributionPointName set MAY contain
   more than one URI value.  An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
   DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
   this issuer's certificate revocation list.  Other access form URIs
   MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI.

   This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical.  There is one
   exception, namely where a CA distributes its public key in the form
   of a "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted.

3.9.6.  Authority Information Access

   This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
   certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,
   where this certificate's issuer is the subject.  In this profile a
   single reference object to publication location of the immediate
   superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA
   distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
   certificate, in which case the AIA field SHOULD be omitted.

   This profile uses a URI form of object identification.  The preferred
   URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
   with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers.  The URI MUST
   reference the point of publication of the certificate where this



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   issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
   Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
   included in the value sequence of this extension.

   When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
   certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
   field.  In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
   issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all
   subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
   persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates.  This implies
   that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates
   to the same subject in the publication repository, and use the same
   publication name as previously issued certificates.  In this way
   subordinate certificates can maintain a constant AIA field value and
   need not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior
   certificate.  The issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of
   name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's
   Certification Practice Statement.

   This extension is non-critical.

3.9.7.  Subject Information Access

   This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
   relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
   appears.  Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
   and service collection will include all current valid certificates
   that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
   subject's corresponding private key.

   This profile uses a URI form of location identification.  The
   preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
   specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
   subject of the certificate is a CA.  The RSYNC URI must reference an
   object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
   trailing '/' in the URI.

   Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be
   included in the value sequence of this extension.  The ordering of
   URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for
   access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most
   preferred.

   This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
   critical.

   For End Entity (EE) certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this
   field MAY be present, and is non-critical.  If present, it either



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   references the location where objects signed by the key pair
   associated with the EE certificate can be accessed, or, in the case
   of single-use EE certificates it references the location of the
   single object that has been signed by the corresponding key pair.

   When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes objects signed
   with the matching private key in a repository, the directory where
   these signed objects is published is referenced the id-ad-
   signedObjectRepository OID.

          id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }

          id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 }

   When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object
   signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed
   object is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID.

          id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }

   This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests
   [ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS] to list all signed objects that are deposited in
   the repository publication point associated with a CA or an EE.  The
   publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA
   extension of the CA or EE certificate.  This profile uses a URI form
   of manifest identification for the accessLocation.  The preferred URI
   access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified.
   Other accessDescription fields may exist with this id-ad-Manifest
   accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI
   access mechanisms for the same manifest object.

          id-ad-rpkiManifest  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }

   CA certificates MUST include in the SIA an accessMethod OID of id-ad-
   rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
   subject's published manifest object as an object URL.

   When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple
   objects, EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID
   of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to
   the publication point of the objects that are verified using this EE
   certificate.

   When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published object, the
   EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID of id-ad-
   signedObject, where the associated access location refers to the
   publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE
   certificate.  In this case, the SIA MUST NOT include the access



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   method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest.

3.9.8.  Certificate Policies

   This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
   the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2".  This field
   MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
   Certificates.

   PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile.

   This extension MUST be present and it is critical.

3.9.9.  IP Resources

   This field contains the list of IP address resources as per
   [RFC3779].  The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
   particular AFI value.  In the context of resource certificates
   describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
   the SAFI value MUST NOT be used.  All Resource Certificates MUST
   include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
   extensions.

   This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.

3.9.10.  AS Resources

   This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779],
   or may specify the "inherit" element.  RDI values are NOT supported
   in this profile and MUST NOT be used.  All Resource Certificates MUST
   include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
   extensions.

   This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.


4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile

   Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
   consistent with [RFC5280].  The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
   CRLs are supported in this profile.

   An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
   regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
   validity period.

   This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.




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   The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA
   using a given key pair".  The contents of the CRL are a list of all
   non-expired certificates issued by the CA using a given key pair that
   have been revoked by the CA.

   The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
   different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the
   key pair used by the CA.

   No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs
   issued under this profile.  Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
   MUST be present in the CRL.  Where two or more CRLs issued by a
   single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the
   "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.

4.1.  Version

   Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
   integer value of this field is 1).

4.2.  Issuer Name

   The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is
   also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
   the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.

4.3.  This Update

   This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued.  The
   value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the
   year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the
   year 2050 or later.

4.4.  Next Update

   This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued.
   The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
   the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in
   the year 2050 or later.

4.5.  Signature

   This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL.  This
   profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
   (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-
   512.  This field MUST be present.

   It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for



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   both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should
   be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

4.6.  Revoked Certificate List

   When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
   list MUST be absent.

   For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
   be present.  No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
   and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.

4.6.1.  Serial Number

   The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate.

4.6.2.  Revocation Date

   The time the certificate was revoked.  This time MUST NOT be a future
   date.  The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates
   through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for
   dates in the year 2050 or later.

4.7.  CRL Extensions

   The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL.  The
   following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be
   present in a CRL.

4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a CRL.  Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
   method.  The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
   4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].

   This extension is non-critical.

4.7.2.  CRL Number

   The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
   number of positive integers for a given CA and scope.  This extension
   allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes
   another CRL.  The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs
   issued by the CA with the same scope.

   This extension is non-critical.



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5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile

   A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or
   Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF).  A CA Issuer MUST support
   PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer may, with mutual consent of the subject,
   support CRMF.

5.1.  PCKS#10 Profile

   This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
   Resource Certificates.  A Certificate Request Message object,
   formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a CA as the initial step
   in issuing a certificate.

   This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
   (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.

   With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
   permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
   certificate.

5.1.1.  PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:

   Version
      This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.

   Subject
      This field is optional.  If present, the value of this field
      SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject
      name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this
      issuer.  If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY
      consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested
      subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion,
      as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates
      issued by this issuer.

   SubjectPublicKeyInfo
      This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm
      with which the key is used.  The public key algorithm MUST be RSA,
      and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.  This field
      also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public
      key.  For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the
      DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey.





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   Attributes
      [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
      the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.

      The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
      attribute as defined in [RFC2985].  This attribute contains X509v3
      Certificate Extensions.  The profile for extensions in certificate
      requests is specified in Section 5.3.

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:

   signatureAlgorithm
      This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
      (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
      SHA-512.  Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
      OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 }
      [RFC4055].
      It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive
      for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should
      be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

5.2.  CRMF Profile

   This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
   specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
   A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
   CRMF, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate.

   This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
   (RA), acting under the direction of a subject.

   With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
   permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
   certificate.

5.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:

   Version
      This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version
      3 Certificate.  It SHOULD be omitted.







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   SerialNumber
      As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
      omitted in this profile.

   SigningAlgorithm
      As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
      omitted in this profile.

   Issuer
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   Validity
      This field MAY be omitted.  If omitted, the CA will issue a
      Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA.  If
      specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with
      dates as determined by the CA.

   Subject
      This field is optional.  If present, the value of this field
      SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject
      name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this
      issuer.  If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY
      consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested
      subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion,
      as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates
      issued by this issuer.

   PublicKey
      This field MUST be present.

   extensions
      This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions.  The
      profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in
      Section 5.3.

5.2.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields

   The following control fields are supported in this profile:

   Authenticator Control
      It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
      subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
      is that the Authenticator Control field be used.







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5.3.  Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests

   The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate
   Request.  Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate
   Request.  This profile places the following additional constraints on
   these extensions.:

   BasicConstraints
      If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity
      certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the
      issued certificate.

      The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
      Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

      The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on.  If this bit
      is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
      resource certificates within this overall framework.

      The CA MUST honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
      certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity
      certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension.

   SubjectKeyIdentifier
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   AuthorityKeyIdentifier
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   KeyUsage
      The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign if
      present, as long as this is consistent with the BasicConstraints
      SubjectType sub field, when specified.

    SubjectInformationAccess
      This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field
      value SHOULD be honoured by the CA.  If the CA is not able to
      honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the
      Certificate Request.

      This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and
      services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the
      SIA extension appears.





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      Where the subject is a CA in this profile, this information and
      service collection will include all current valid certificates
      that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
      subject's corresponding private key.

      This profile uses a URI form of location identification.  An RSYNC
      URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-
      caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA.  The
      RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection rather than an
      individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI.  Other
      access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be
      included in the value sequence of this extension.  The ordering of
      URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences
      for access methods, with the first method in the sequence being
      the most preferred by the Subject.

      A request for a CA certificate MUST include in the SIA of the
      request the id-ad-caRepository access method, and also MUST
      include in the SIA of the request the accessMethod OID of id-ad-
      rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
      subject's published manifest object as an object URL.

      This field MAY be present when the subject is a EE.  If it is
      present the field value SHOULD be honoured by the CA.  If the CA
      is not able to honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST
      reject the Certificate Request.  If it is not present the CA
      SHOULD honor this request and omit the SIA from the issued
      certificate.  If the CA is not able to honor the request to omit
      the SIA, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate Request.

      When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple
      objects, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST
      include in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-
      signedObjectRepository, and also MUST include in the SIA of the
      request an access method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the
      associated access location refers to the publication point of the
      objects that are verified using this EE certificate.

      When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published object,
      the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST include in the
      SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-signedObject,
      where the associated access location refers to the publication
      point of the single object that is verified using this EE
      certificate, and MUST NOT include an id-ad-rpkiManifest access
      method OID in the SIA of the request.






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      In the case when the EE certificate is to be used exclusively to
      sign one or more unpublished objects, such that the all signed
      objects will not be published in any RPKI repository, then the SIA
      SHOULD be omitted from the request.

   CRLDistributionPoints
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   AuthorityInformationAccess
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.

   CertificatePolicies
      This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
      profile.


   With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
   SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
   requested field.


6.  Resource Certificate Validation

   This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
   This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
   [RFC5280]:

   To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
   things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
   certificates) satisfies the following conditions:

   1.  for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
       issuer of certificate x+1;

   2.  certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;

   3.  certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and

   4.  for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid.

6.1.  Resource Extension Validation

   The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
   extensions for Internet number resources.  These are ASN.1 encoded
   representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
   prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.



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   Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
   number resource extension.  In order to validate a Resource
   Certificate the resource extension must also be validated.  This
   validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource
   sets:

   more specific:  Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges,
      A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP
      addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is
      larger than range A.

   equal:  Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B,
      A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
      collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B.
      The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent to this
      "equality" comparison.
   encompass:  Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
      "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or
      AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more
      specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the
      set X.

   Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
   ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1' is issued by
   a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the
   subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1,
   implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass"
   the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources
   described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources
   described in certificate 1.

6.2.  Resource Certification Path Validation

   Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
   certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
   'Certification Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a
   certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the
   target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions
   hold:

   1.  The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
       the signature algorithm

   2.  The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and
       To values.






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   3.  The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
       contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
       values that MUST be present.

   4.  No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is
       present in the certificate.

   5.  The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
       certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
       Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself
       valid.

   6.  That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource
       extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer
       is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)

   7.  The Certification Path originates with a certificate issued by a
       trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the
       Certification Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the
       Certification Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the
       Certification Path.

   A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
   chosen order.

   Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally
   maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization
   pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource
   distribution hierarchy, via reference to issued certificates and
   their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP.  Alternatively,
   validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line
   certificate access using the certificate's AIA and CRLDP pointers to
   guide the certificate retrieval process for each certificate's
   immediate superior CA certificate.

   There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
   are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
   means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
   Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certification
   path validation process in order to avoid some of the issues
   associated with attempts to validate such structures.  It is
   suggested that implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY
   halt with a validation failure if the certification path length
   exceeds a pre-determined configuration parameter.







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6.3.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates

   The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate
   framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number
   resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-
   down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from
   a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct
   recipients of these resources.  Within this trust model these
   recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform
   further allocations or assignments.  This is a strict hierarchy, in
   that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has
   only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e.
   there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and
   corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct
   or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in
   question (i.e. no loops in the model).

   The more general consideration is that selection of one or more trust
   anchor CAs is a task undertaken by relying parties.  The structure of
   the resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety
   of trust models as the PKIX profile.  There is only one additional
   caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX
   frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust
   anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource
   extension validation property, as described in Section 6.1, and the
   validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only
   involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust
   anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the
   certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource
   set, as described in Section 6.1.

   The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust
   anchor, includes the following:

   1.  the trusted issuer name,

   2.  the trusted public key algorithm,

   3.  the trusted public key,

   4.  optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the
       public key, and

   5.  a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6
       resources and AS number resources.

   The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing
   procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate.



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6.3.1.  Distribution Format of Nominated Trust Anchor Material

   In the RPKI the hierarchical certificate framework corresponds to the
   hierarchies of the resource distribution function.  In consideration
   of this, it is reasonable to nominate to relying parties a default
   set of trust anchors for the RPKI that correspond to the entities who
   operate at the upper levels of the associated resource allocation
   hierarchy.  The corresponding nominated trust anchor CA(s) should
   therefore map, in some fashion, to apex point(s) of the hierarchical
   resource distribution structure.

   The characteristics of a trust anchor framework for the RPKI includes
   the following considerations:

   o  The entity or entities that issue proposed trust anchor material
      for the RPKI should be as close as possible to the apex of the
      associated resource distribution hierarchy.

   o  Such trust anchor material should be long-lived.  As it can be
      reasonably anticipated that default nominated trust anchor
      material would be distributed with relying party validation
      software, the implication is that the distributed default
      nominated trust anchor material should remain constant for
      extended time intervals.

   o  It is a poor trust model when any entity that issues putative
      trust anchor material is forced to be authoritative over
      information or actions of which the entity has no direct
      knowledge, nor is in possession of a current definitive record of
      such actions.  Entities who propose themselves in a role of a
      trust anchor issuer should be able to point to corroborative
      material supporting the assertion that they are legitimate
      authorities for the information where they are representing
      themselves as a potential trust anchor for relying parties.

   An entity offering itself as a putative RPKI trust anchor for a part
   of the RPKI is required to regularly publish a RPKI CA certificate at
   a stable URL, and to publish a packaged form of this URL as
   distributed trust anchor material, as follows:

   o  The entity issues a RPKI self-signed "root" CA certificate that is
      used as the apex of a RPKI certificate issuance hierarchy.  This
      certificate MUST have the keyCertSign sign bit set in the key
      usage extension, and the CA flag set in the basic constraints
      extension, no AIA value and no CRLDP value.  This certificate MUST
      be reissued at regular intervals prior to expiration of the
      current RPKI self-signed certificate, and MUST be reissued upon
      any change in the resource set that has been allocated to the



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      entity who is operating this CA.  The validity interval of this
      certificate should reflect the anticipated period of the regular
      RPKI certificate re-issuance.

   o  The entity maintains a "trust anchor material" key pair.

   o  The entity issues a PKI self-signed CA certificate [RFC5280] using
      the trust anchor material key pair, where the subject public key
      in the certificate is the public key of the trust anchor material
      key pair and the certificate is signed by the corresponding
      private key of trust anchor material key pair.  This certificate
      MUST have the keyCertSign sign bit set in the key usage extension,
      and the CA flag set in the basic constraints extension, no AIA
      value and no CRLDP value.  The validity period of this certificate
      shold be very long-lived, with the period to be defined by the
      entity.  The SIA of this certificate references a publication
      point where the CRL and the subordinate product of this
      certificate are published.

   o  The PKI CA issues a subordinate PKI EE certificate with a validity
      period identical to the validity period of the RPKI self-signed
      "root" CA certificate.  This PKI EE certificate MUST have the
      digitalSignature bit set, and this MUST be the only bit set to
      TRUE.  The CA flag set MUST be cleared in the basic constraints
      extension.  The validity period of this certificate should be
      aligned to the validity period of the RPKI self-signed "root" CA
      certificate.

   o  The PKI CA regularly issues a CRL.  The CRL issuance cycle SHOULD
      be shorter than the validity period for the RPKI self-signed
      "root" certificate.

   o  Each time the RPKI self-signed "root" certificate is re-issued, or
      prior to the expiration of the PKI EE certificate, the PKI CA
      generates a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] signed-
      data object, where the payload is the RPKI self-signed "root"
      certificate.  The object is CMS-signed with the private key of the
      PKI EE certificate.  The PKI EE certificate is included as a CMS
      signed attribute in the CMS object.  The PKI self-signed CA
      certificate and the asociated CRL are not to be included in the
      CMS object.  The format of the CMS object is specified in
      Appendix C.  The CMS object is published at the location
      referenced in the SIA of the PKI self-signed CA certificate.

   o  The entity publically distributes the PKI self-signed CA
      certificate as its proposed trust anchor material.





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   o  The entity publishes the modulus and exponent of the "trust anchor
      material" public key using a trusted form of publication that
      allows the entity's identity to be validated and the retrieval of
      the published information to be secured.

   Relying Parties can assemble the default trust anchor collection by
   using the distributed PKI self-signed CA certificate for each
   nominated trust anchor:

   o  The public key in the self-signed CA PKI certificate can be
      validated using the modulus and exponent values as retrieved from
      the entity's publication point using a secured retrieval
      operation.

   o  The PKI CA's CRL and CMS objects can be retrieved from the
      publication point referenced by the SIA in the PKI CA certificate.

   o  The CRL can be verified against the PKI CA certificate.

   o  The CMS signature can be verified using the included PKI EE
      certificate together with the retrieved CRL and the self-signed
      PKI CA certificate.

   o  The relying party can then load the enclosed RPKI self-signed CA
      certificate as a trust anchor for RPKI validation for those
      resources described in the resource extension of this RPKI
      certificate.

   Relying Parties should perform this retrieval and validation
   operation at intervals no less frequent than the nextUpdate time of
   the published CRL, and should perform the retrieval operation prior
   to the expiration of the PKI EE certificate, or upon revocation of
   the PKI EE certificate that was used to sign the CMS object that held
   the relying party's current RPKI self-signed CA certificate.

   If a trust anchor CA wishes to perform an issuance of the RPKI self-
   signed CA certificate outside the established update cycle time, it
   can notify relying parties of this by revising the nextUpdate time of
   the PKI CA's CRL to a shorter interval, issuing a new PKI CA
   certificate and a new CMS object with the new RPKI self-signed CA
   certificate, and revoking the old PKI EE certificate at the
   nextUpdate time in the next issued CRL.  This revocation will provide
   an indication to relying parties to perform the retrieval operation
   ofthe RPKI self-signed CA certificate at a time earlier than the
   normal update cycle time.






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7.  Security Considerations

   The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779]apply to
   Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use.

   A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
   of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
   the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
   resource.  If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
   status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
   conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the
   allocation and assignment databases.


8.  IANA Considerations

   [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
   considerations stated in this document.]


9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
   Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
   Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
   this document.  The document also reflects review comments received
   from Sean Turner and David Cooper.


10.  Draft Review Notes

   The following review comments are unresolved at present:

   1.  Use of additional non-critical extensions:

       Section 3: "Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the
       fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST NOT
       appear in a conforming Resource Certificate."

          The review comment was that certificate profile should permit
          the use of non-critical extensions.  The scenario nominatedwas
          one in which a CA product added non-critical extensions to a
          certificate that would not affect a relying party's decision
          to accept the certificate, regardless of whether the relying
          party could process the extension.  It was noted that it may
          be possible to configure these CA products so that they do not
          include these extensions in the certificates, but that is a
          question that would need to be answered by someone more



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          familiar with particular CA products that add non-critical
          extensions that identify the CA product used to mint the
          certificate.

          The rationale for not permitting non-critical extensions is
          that it was not seen as being appropriate to be in the
          position of having certificates with extensions which relying
          parties may see as valid, but contain extensions that, were
          the relying party to understand the extension, would
          contradict or qualify in some way this original validity.  The
          profile takes the position of minimialism over extensibility,
          taking the approach of nomination of a specific goal for the
          PKI, namely to construct a PKI that precisely matches the IP
          number resource allocation structure, and then defining a
          certificate profile that was precisely aligned to this
          objective.  If there is some need or requirement to use the
          RFC3779 extensions in contexts other than assertions about
          right of use of resources by virtue of an allocation action,
          that make use of other extensions than are specified here,
          then the authors suggest that it would be more appropriate to
          define a distinct profile to fulfil this function.

          It is proposed to leave the text as is.

   2.  CRL Scope:

       Section 3.9.5: In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
       to be all certificates issued by this CA issue using a given key
       pair.

          The review comment was that the scope of a CRL must be all
          certificates issued by the issuing CA unless the CRL includes
          an issuingDistributionPoint extension.  So, if the scope of
          CRLs is to be limited to certificates signed with a given key
          pair, then the profile must either require inclusion of the
          issuingDistributionPoint extension in CRLs or forbid CAs from
          performing key rollover.  The latter option may be implemented
          by having issuers change names whenever changing the key pair
          used to sign certificates.

          It is proposed to drop the scope restriction, and remove the
          text in Section 3.9.5.

   3.  Name Uniqueness:

       Section 3.5 stipulates that subject names must simply be unique
       per issuer, while X.509 requires that names must be globally
       unique.



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          The review comment was that the Security Considerations
          section in RFC5280 states: " While X.509 mandates that names
          be unambiguous, there is a risk that two unrelated authorities
          will issue certificates and/or CRLs under the same issuer
          name."  X.501 states that a (directory) name shall be
          unambiguous, in that it denotes just one object, but need not
          be unique, in that it not be the only name that unambiguously
          denotes the object, and that for every name form used in the
          GeneralName type, there shall be a name registration system
          that ensures that any name used unambiguously identifies one
          entity to both certificate issuer and certificate users.  The
          review comment is that problem with a less stringent
          requirement is that if two CAs issue certificates and CRLs
          under the same name, there is a risk that a relying party will
          use a CRL issued by one of these CAs to determine the status
          of a certificate issued by the other CA.

          The rationale for using a name this is unique per issuer is
          that the RPKI is strictly hierarchical, the repository
          publication structure is structured on a per-CA basis, the
          CRLDP is mandatory to include in all RPKI certificates (except
          apex self-signed certs) so that each certificate points
          directly to the associated CRL that can revoke it, the
          contextof the use of names is within a per issuer context, a
          single entity may hold resources from multiple sources and the
          RPKI name space is unconstrained such that it is neither
          coordinated nor restricted to be structured in any fashion,
          and the RPKI is not attesting a name or an identity but a
          right to use resources.  Because the context of the use of
          names in the RPKI is one that positions names within a strict
          hierarchy, then the essential name attribute of unambiguity is
          achieved in the RPKI when names are specified to be unique per
          issuer.

          It is proposed not to alter the existing specification of
          uniqueness of names on a per-issuer basis.



11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC2050]  Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
              J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",



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              BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3852, July 2004.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              June 2005.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              September 2005.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [X.509]    ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
              Authentication Framework", 2000.

11.2.  Informative References

   [ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS]
              Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
              Work in progress: Internet
              Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-00.txt,
              January 2008.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              November 2000.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              November 2000.

   [RFC4158]  Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
              Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:



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              Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.

   [rsync]    Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006,
              <http://samba.anu.edu.au/rsync/>.


Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate

   The following is an example Resource Certificate.

   Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer

   Data:
     Version: 3
     Serial: 3
     Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
     Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
       E=ca@apnic.net
     Validity:
       Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT
       Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT
     Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources
     Subject Key Identifier:
       86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d:
       8b:97:49:14
     Subject Key Identifier g(SKI):
       hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
     Subject Public Key Info:
       Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
         RSA Public Key: Modulus:
           c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1:
           59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a:
           0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3:
           f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb:
           b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4:
           5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe:
           e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e:
           4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c:
           56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5:
           c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba:
           dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c:
           f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d:
           92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03:
           d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87:
           24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27:
           03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7
         RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537
     Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE



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     Subject Info Access:
       caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
                             pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
                             q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
                             hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/
     Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
     CRL Distribution Points:
       rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
              pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
              q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
              q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
     Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
       rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
              pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
              q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
       ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02:
       51:c2:a9:1c
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
       q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
     Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
     IPv4: 192.0.2.0/24,
     IPv6: 2001:DB8::/32
     ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370
     Signature:
       c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b:
       4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59:
       0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2:
       a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7:
       11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3:
       92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28:
       f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f:
       e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51:
       26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0:
       4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12:
       5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4:
       81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28:
       33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3:
       bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c:
       1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54:
       52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d










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Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List

   The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.
   CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl

   Data:
     Version: 2
     Signature Algorithm:
       Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
     Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
       E=ca@apnic.net
     This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
     Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
       ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
       07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
       q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
     CRLNumber: 4
     Revoked Certificates: 1
       Serial Number: 1
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
       Serial Number: 2
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
       Serial Number: 4
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
     Signature:
       b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
       0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
       f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
       17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
       f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
       d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
       b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
       66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
       6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
       d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
       cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
       c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
       d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
       09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
       02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
       59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
       34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
       d9






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Appendix C.  Cryptographic Message Syntax Profile for RPKI Trust Anchor
             Material

   Using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852], a RPKI Trust
   Anchor Object (RTA) is a type of signed-data object.  The general
   format of a CMS object is:

         ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           contentType ContentType,
           content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }

         ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   As a RTA is a signed-data object, it uses the corresponding OID,
   1.2.840.113549.1.7.2.  [RFC3852].

C.1.  Signed-Data ContentType

   According to the CMS specification, the signed-data content type
   shall have ASN.1 type SignedData:

         SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
           encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
           certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
           crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
           signerInfos SignerInfos }

         DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier

         SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo

   The elements of the signed-data content type are as follows:

      version
            The version is the syntax version number.  It MUST be 3,
            corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version
            number 3.

      digestAlgorithms
            The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID
            for which is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1.  [RFC4055].  It MUST
            NOT contain any other algorithms.







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      encapContentInfo
            This element is defined in Appendix C.1.1.

      certificates
            The certificates element MUST be included and MUST contain
            only the single PKI EE certificate needed to validate this
            CMS Object.  The CertificateSet type is defined in section
            10 of [RFC3852]

      crls
            The crls element MUST be omitted.

      signerInfos
            This element is defined in Appendix C.1.2.

C.1.1.  encapContentInfo

   encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
   identifier and the content itself.

         EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           eContentType ContentType,
           eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }

         ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The elements of this signed content type are as follows:

      eContentType
            The ContentType for an RTA is defined as id-ct-
            RPKITrustAnchor and has the numerical value of
            1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.33.

               id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
                           us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }

               id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }

               id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 33 }

      eContent
            The content of an RTA is an RPKI self-signed CA certificate.
            It is formally defined as:

               id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor ::= Certificate

            The definition of Certificate is taken from [X.509].




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C.1.2.  signerInfos

   SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:

         SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           sid SignerIdentifier,
           digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
           signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signature SignatureValue,
           unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }

   The content of the SignerInfo element are as follows:

      version
            The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice
            of SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.

      sid
            The sid is defined as:

                SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
                    issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                    subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }

            For a RTA, the sid MUST be a SubjectKeyIdentifier.

      digestAlgorithm
            The digestAlgorithm MUST be SHA-256, the OID for which is
            2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1.  [RFC4055]

      signedAttrs
            The signedAttrs element is defined as:

              SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

              Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
                attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }

              AttributeValue ::= ANY

            The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the
            content-type and message-digest attributes.  The signer MAY
            also include the signing-time signed attribute, the binary-
            signing-time signed attribute, or both signed attributes.
            Other signed attributes that are deemed appropriate MAY also



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            be included.  The intent is to allow additional signed
            attributes to be included if a future need is identified.
            This does not cause an interoperability concern because
            unrecognized signed attributes are ignored by the relying
            party.

            The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any
            particular attribute.  Additionally, even though the syntax
            allows for a SET OF AttributeValue, in a RTA the attrValues
            must consist of only a single AttributeValue.


                  ContentType Attribute
                        The ContentType attribute MUST be present.  The
                        attrType OID for the ContentType attribute is
                        1.2.840.113549.1.9.3.

                        The attrValues for the ContentType attribute in
                        a RTA MUST be 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24
                        (matching the eContentType in the
                        EncapsulatedContentInfo).

                  MessageDigest Attribute
                        The MessageDigest attribute MUST be present.
                        The attrType OID for the MessageDigest Attribute
                        is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4.

                        The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute
                        contains the output of the digest algorithm
                        applied to the content being signed, as
                        specified in Section 11.1 of [RFC3852].

                  SigningTime Attribute
                        The SigningTime attribute MAY be present.  If it
                        is present it MUST be ignored by the relying
                        party.  The presence of absence of the
                        SigningTime attribute in no way affects the
                        validation of the RTA.  The attrType OID for the
                        SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5.

                        The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is
                        defined as:

                           SigningTime ::= Time

                           Time ::= CHOICE {
                              utcTime UTCTime,
                              generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }



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                        The Time element specifies the time, based on
                        the local system clock, at which the digital
                        signature was applied to the content.

                  BinarySigningTime Attribute
                        The The BinarySigningTime attribute MAY be
                        present.  If it is present it MUST be ignored by
                        the relying party.  The presence of absence of
                        the BinarySigningTime attribute in no way
                        affects the validation of the RTA.  The attrType
                        OID for the SigningTime attribute is
                        1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46.

                        The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is
                        defined as:

                         BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime

                         BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

                        The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based
                        on the local system clock, at which the digital
                        signature was applied to the content.

      signatureAlgorithm
            The signatureAlgorithm MUST be RSA (rsaEncryption), the OID
            for which is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.q

      signature
            The signature value is defined as:

               SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

            The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and
            signature algorithms.

      unsignedAttrs
            unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.

C.2.  RTA Validation

   Before a relying party can use an RTA, the relying party must first
   validate the RTA by performing the following steps.

   1.  Verify that the RTA syntax complies with this specification.  In
       particular, verify the following:





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       a.  The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.7.2).

       b.  The version of the SignedData object is 3.

       c.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256 (OID
           2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).

       d.  The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
           and contains an EE certificate whose Subject Key Identifier
           (SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object.

       e.  The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.

       f.  The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is id-ct-
           RPKITrustAnchor (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD])

       g.  The version of the SignerInfo is 3.

       h.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256 (OID
           2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).

       i.  The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.1.1).

       j.  The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
           contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.9.4).

       k.  The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.

   2.  Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature
       on the RTA.

   3.  Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate
       in the Trust Anchor PKI by validating that the PKI CA certificate
       issued this EE certificate, and the PKI CA's CRL has not revoked
       the EE certificate, and that the PKI CA's CRL is valid.












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Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: gih@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   George Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: ggm@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   Robert Loomans
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: robertl@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net






























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